Yeshiva College

Chronos

An Exploration of History and Civilization

BLOOD, FIRE, SMOKE, AND STEEL
The American Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II
Mitchell Rocklin *and* **Avraham Zwanziger**

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Chronos
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Amitai Barth

After a moratorium of two and a half years, we are sincerely delighted to publish the long-awaited third volume of Chronos, the official journal of the Historical Society of Yeshiva University. In the interim, the History Club and the Journal have both made tremendous progress. Particularly memorable was the Spring 2004 symposium on *WAR!*, which featured discussions led by Professors McGrath, Schrecker, and Kaplan on the roles of World War II, the Cold War, and the current war on terror. We hope that the Historical Society continues to flourish at YU.

We would be remiss if we did not thank the **Yeshiva College Dean's Office** for assuring that the Society's events got off the ground and ran smoothly. We are also very grateful to the Dean's Office for the generous grant that made the publication of this journal a reality.

Additionally, we would like to express our gratitude to **Yaniv Kerem** and the entire Yeshiva College Student Association for their financial support which made these stimulating events viable.

Lastly, we would like to thank **Drs. Schrecker, Kosak, McGrath, Kaplan, Stenhouse, Freedman, Feldman**, and **Zimmerman** of the Yeshiva College History Department for their never-ending support for their students, without which the forthcoming articles would not exist. They have been an inspiration for all of us, and it is their constant cajoling and encouragement which has made this journal possible.

Blood, Fire, Smoke, and Steel:

The American Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II

The **Personalities** *Who Led it,*
the **Industry** *That Made it Possible,*
and the **Strategy** *That Guided It*

by **Mitchell Rocklin**
YC '05
and **Avraham Zwanziger**
YC '05

🗨 *Introduction*

And I will show wonders in the heavens and in the earth; blood, fire, and pillars of smoke. **– Joel 2:30**

The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can.
Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving. **– Ulysses S. Grant**

Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed. **– Mao Tse-Tung**

It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it. **– Robert E. Lee**

War is not nice. **– Barbara Bush**

From the standpoint of the soldiers out in the field it doesn't make any difference how you slay an enemy.
Everybody worries about their own losses ... But to worry about the *morality* of what we were doing –
Nuts. A soldier has to fight. We fought. If we accomplished the job in any given battle without
exterminating too many of our own folks, we considered that we'd had a pretty good day. **– Curtis LeMay**

American strategic air power in Europe from 1942-1945 centered around the B-17 Flying Fortress.[1] The bomber was the culmination of the ideas of the strategic air power theorists of the 1920's and 1930's, who believed that heavy bombers, flying alone in formation, could overcome any air defenses with their superior performance and armaments. While the theorists' original precise theories did not hold up in actual combat, the overall idea of strategic bombing would turn out to be a success, despite setbacks that were encountered on the road to its development in the midst of war. The creation of a strategic air force in Europe, epitomized by the great air fleets of the 8th

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[1] Alan J. Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 11.

and 15th air forces, came to symbolize the American desire to win World War II with strategic air power. Both the United States and Great Britain had very commanding personalities at the forefront of their efforts – the Americans in Hap Arnold, and the British in Bomber Harris. The American air power advocates were essential in the creation and conduct of the strategic air campaign against Germany in World War II. At a time when the American Chiefs of Staff were skeptical and even hostile towards strategic air power, these men formulated the doctrine and tactics of the Army Air Forces (AAF), using their views on airpower to create a plan that was both practical and effective, and would at the same time maximize the potential of American industry. Their doctrine and plans were articulated in AWPD-1, one of the most important documents in the history of American military aviation, which will be discussed in this paper. In formulating this plan, the air generals believed that American industry had the potential to produce the greatest and strongest air force in the world, one capable of projecting American power to all reaches of the globe, and especially against their potential enemies, Germany and Japan.

Built for the specific task of long-range high-altitude heavy bombing, the B-17 bomber symbolized the doctrine and ideas of the personalities behind the air campaign. Even the actual physical construction of the aircraft was consistent with both the traditional American way of war and the contemporary doctrine of strategic bombing. Built on the older ideas of Giulio Douhet and William "Billy" Mitchell, and incorporating some of the newer ideas of General H.H. "Hap" Arnold and Carl Spaatz, the B-17's mission was to carry out long-range heavy strategic bombing, while being well-armed, high-flying, and fast enough to deal with any fighters of its time. During the war, baptism by fire changed the American philosophy about bombers and fighter escorts, but the one thing that did not change was the Americans' belief in their ability to out-produce Germany and to eventually win the air war over Europe. America's industrial capacity, with its enormous production of fighters and bombers, allowed the American air generals to draw on resources the likes of which had never been seen before in history. Combined with the B-17 bomber and the ideas of the American air strategists and leaders, this led to the air campaign over Europe during World War II. In this paper, we will discuss the connection between key American personalities, the industrial capacity of America, American strategic thought, and the design of the B-17 heavy bomber, and how these factors influenced and made possible a sustainable strategic air campaign against Germany.

📣 *Personalities*

Wars may be fought by weapons, but they are won by men.
It is the spirit of the men who follow
and of the man who leads that gains the victory. – **George S. Patton**

Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive one;
it is the man and not the materials that counts. – **Mao Zedong**

Two of the most important American air leaders were General H.H. "Hap" Arnold and General Carl Spaatz. These two men helped develop and apply American strategic bombing theory, and then through the war years led the creation of the strategic air forces that would implement these theories. While these theories did not turn out to be entirely correct, they had a very significant influence on the way that the United States thought about military strategy at the beginning of the Cold War and beyond. While the wartime leadership on the strategic level of the AAF (Army Air Forces, a semi-autonomous branch created by the United States Army in June 1941)[1] was primarily provided by Arnold, the actual leadership in the theater of battle was supplied by Spaatz. In this way, both of these men worked together to further a common primary goal - an independent air force. They believed that they could never accomplish this goal if the AAF was to function primarily as a tactical air force rather than a strategic one. (Strategic airpower involves the projection of power against an enemy's vital resources and population centers, while tactical airpower involves the support of ground troops in the field.) Their rationale was both logical and reasonable. They felt that if their air force was to function in primarily a tactical role, the President and other politicians would feel that there would be no reason to create a separate service, as the purpose of the Air Force would really only be to assist the Army in a ground war. They believed that the only way to convince the President and the politicians to create a separate and independent service was to develop a mission for the AAF that did not fall under the purview of the Army. They would choose strategic bombing as that mission, a task that the Army's ground war could not possibly take part in. Arnold and Spaatz also felt that a primarily tactical air force tied to the army would betray the ideas of William "Billy" Mitchell, whom many AAF officers regarded as the greatest airpower leader and theorist in history.

In the years preceding World War II, Arnold and Spaatz, decided that the time had come to attempt to create an air force that, because of the types of aircraft it contained, could only be used effectively for strategic bombing. They hoped that since the Army would have no direct connection to such a task, it would seem prudent to the President and the Congress to create an independent Air Force. Spaatz and Arnold

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[1] Conrad C. Crane, <u>Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II</u> (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 24.

therefore decided to press for the design and production of the B-17 "Flying Fortress" heavy bomber. However, they had to avoid stepping on the toes of the Army brass, who were against strategic bombing because they rightfully believed that the endeavor would siphon off funds traditionally allocated to ground forces. The airpower leaders therefore claimed that the bomber would provide coastal defense hundreds of miles off the American mainland and greater mobility to allow for the shifting of defensive forces to far-off American territories. This might have been true, but it is quite clear that the development of the B-17 was really part of an attempt to create an independent Air Force.[1]

The Army maintained its objections, concerned about the scarcity of funds in the military budget. It wanted more funds allocated for conventional ground forces, and it wanted the money allocated to aircraft to be spent on a larger number of more affordable smaller aircraft, rather than on a lesser number of bigger ones. The smaller aircraft were better suited to support the Army's ground forces, while larger ones were better suited to strategic bombing. This illustrates an important point – once mobilized for war, the United States would be able to meet most of the demands of its forces worldwide, all the while building and maintaining an incredibly expensive heavy bomber force. Germany was simply not able to do this; had they tried, their war effort would have collapsed. Throughout much of the war, they were desperately low on fuel and single-engine fighter planes.[2] A heavy bomber force would have made logistics unbelievably more complicated for the Germans. As for the Americans, Deputy Chief of Staff Embick echoed the thoughts of many pre-war generals when he emphasized the need for economy: "Defense of the sea areas, other than within the coastal zones, is a function of the Navy. The military superiority of a B-17 over two or three smaller airplanes that could be procured by the same funds remains to be established, in view of this vulnerability, air-base limitations and complexity of operation of the former type ... If the equipment to be provided for the Air Corps be the best adapted to carry out the specific functions appropriately assigned to it under Joint Action there would appear to be no need for a plane larger than the B-17." Oscar Westover, chief of the Air Corps until 1938, had "some questions concerning the servicing and fueling of the planes down there as well as the use of funds at the time in view of the stringent demands for economy."[3] Once the war began, these concerns of economy disappeared for the Americans, while they became increasingly important to the Germans.

The airpower enthusiasts were aided in their efforts by many congressional Republicans (traditional supporters of airpower tended to be Republican) and newcomer

[1] Copp, DeWitt S, A Few Good Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1980), 322, 379.

[2] John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking Press, 1990), 199-213.

[3] Copp, 392.

President Roosevelt, an airpower enthusiast who was more open to the airpower ideas of Billy Mitchell. Arnold and Spaatz were quick to use this new ally to create an outline for the future of American airpower.[1] The cooperation between Spaatz and Arnold in this endeavor would have lasting consequences, beginning with entry of the United States into World War II. The strategic bombing effort met with failure in Europe, and Arnold, the commander of the USAAF (United States Army Air Force), decided to try and turn the tide. He sent Spaatz to Europe to take over the campaign because of the close relationship they had developed over the years, beginning with their efforts at setting the agenda for the future of American airpower and for the creation of an independent Air Force.[2] This was probably the best decision Arnold made, in that he made a man in whom he had complete confidence the leader of the most important command for the AAF. Their close relationship would allow the American strategic bombing campaign to operate smoothly and with a clear doctrine. Just as importantly, it meant that the doctrines and tactics developed in the war would be utilized in an independent Air Force that the two leaders sought to create. Arnold realized this, and he wished to make sure that his partner in the attempt to create a separate Air Force would be his partner in developing a doctrine and specific tactics for it.

Like most of the air strategists, Spaatz was a firm believer in the primacy of the Air Force in projecting power through the strategic bombing of the enemy's vital centers. He was sent to England at the beginning of 1942 to project this power while at the same time securing "air supremacy over Western Continental Europe in preparation for and in support of a combined land, sea, and air movement across the Channel into Continental Europe."[3] The first part of this mission was to convince the British of the superiority of daylight precision bombing, a concept radically different from the ideas espoused by the leading British bombing strategist Arthur "Bomber" Harris, who emphasized the idea of night-time area bombing, effectively terror bombing. (It should be noted that area bombing was performed under the cover of darkness. The only advantage daylight conferred on a bomber wing was enabling better precision, a factor weighed nearly as heavily in area bombing.) An outspoken man with a very aggressive personality, Harris often made his beliefs clear on what needed to be done to win the war with area bombing: "It is not possible to dogmatise on the degree of destruction necessary to cause the enemy to capitulate but there can be little doubt that the necessary conditions would be brought about by the destruction of between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the principal German towns ... Allowing for a loss rate of 5 per cent ... the Lancaster

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[1] Richard G. Davis, <u>Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe</u> (Washington: Center of Air Force History, 1993), see chapter 3.

[2] Davis, throughout.

[3] Russell F. Weigley, <u>The American Way of War; A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 335.

force alone should be sufficient, but only just sufficient, to produce in Germany by 1 April 1944 a state of devastation in which surrender is inevitable."[1]

The difference between these philosophies led to a discrepancy in the aircraft employed by the two air forces, along with the targets they pursued. It took the Americans a long time to convince Harris and his boss, Chief Air Marshall Portal, that the American strategy was at all worthwhile. Even then, the British were unable to conduct much daylight bombing themselves, because their bombers, particularly the Lancaster, were unfit for such missions.[2] Previously, the British had applied pressure on the Americans to engage in area bombing, and Churchill had gone so far as to vehemently demand to President Roosevelt's special assistant, Harry Hopkins, that the Americans switch to night bombing and build Lancasters for the task. The Lancasters were better suited because they carried much greater bombloads, but they were only able to do so because they were much lighter armed and armored.[3]

Many British Generals attacked Harris's strategy, and urged him to join in with the Americans, or at least to allow the Americans precision bombing without being badgered by Harris to switch to area bombing. On November 13, 1944, Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley, Chief Air Marshall Portal's deputy, wrote to Harris, telling him that the British could make a difference by working in conjunction with the Americans. He wrote: "the weight and density of attack of which your Command has shown itself capable, given adequate marking, far exceeds that normally achieved by the U.S. Air Forces. It is considered that one successful large scale concentrated attack by Bomber Command should, on the basis of past experience, result in the immobilization of ... [oil production] which is now required."[4] Harris was very popular and powerful politically in Britain, so Portal had to be very careful in criticizing him and his policies. Even so, he pressured Harris for about two months, and on December 6, 1944 told him: "our policy is to make the maximum contribution to the battle [in North-West Europe] and to this end priority has been given to the attack of [sic] German oil production, wherever it may be, and of the communications system behind the critical part of the front." He also said that area bombing by itself "would not produce the impact upon the battle that is required." On December 22 he said that he was "profoundly disappointed that you still appear to feel that the oil plan is just another 'panacea'" and that Bomber Command was choosing not to "play as large a part as possible in what is by far the most immediately profitable policy we have yet undertaken in this war."[5] On January 8, he told Harris: "The energy, resource and determination displayed by the enemy in his efforts to maintain his oil production must be more than matched by our own

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[1] Ellis, 185.

[2] Ellis, 170. Weigley, 337-338.

[3] Levine, 76.

[4] Ellis, 189.

[5] Ellis, 189-190.

determination to destroy it; and your determination matters more than that of all the rest of us put together."[1]

Spaatz's personality was key in helping to convince the British to at least tolerate American precision bombing, if not conduct it themselves. One of the great strengths that Spaatz brought to the table was that he was not hot headed enough to anger anyone, yet still passionate enough about his feelings to get across his ideas to others. His ability to listen, think, and then act on his beliefs while simultaneously shielding his subordinates from Arnold's attacks, made him a very unique man and a great wartime leader.

While fighting Churchill and Harris, Spaatz was setting up the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe, which he led for the better part of the year until the American and British assault against North Africa, when he was seconded to Eisenhower in becoming the commander of the air forces assisting the campaign, leaving Ira Eaker in command of the strategic Eighth Air Force. His association with Eisenhower was extremely important, for when Eisenhower later commanded SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the Allied command for the Normandy invasion), Spaatz was well placed to influence him.

At first, Eaker and his Eighth Air Force had a very difficult time with the strategic bombing of Germany and its occupied territories. German fighter planes were formidable, and the German Luftwaffe's fighter pilots and air defense forces were dedicated, well-trained, and capably led. This made the Eighth Air Force's bombing campaign of 1942-43 a very costly one, involving the loss of a tremendous amount of men and material. It did not help that many resources were diverted to the African theater, that there were not enough bombers and escort fighters for Eaker to work with, especially long-range escort P-38s, and that the Eighth Air Force had to help with the campaign against German U-boats in the Atlantic.[2] Perhaps the greatest problem was the lack of drop tanks and escort fighters, which Eaker had stressed the need for but did not begin receiving in nearly sufficient quantities until June 1943 at the earliest.[3] This almost led to the cessation of the American bomber offensive because of insupportable losses, and it led to the eventual replacement of Eaker.

Eaker's ouster was part of a full-scale shakeup of Allied air commands in Europe in preparation for D-Day. The Americans formed USSTAF (United States Strategic Air Forces) on January 1, 1944, in order to better coordinate their operations while limiting Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory's influence. The British Leigh-Mallory had been

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[1] Ellis, 190-191. [See Table 10 on p.190 for targeting data from the Americans and British. It's source is United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Military Analysis Division), <u>Air Force Rate of Operation</u> (GPO, Washington, January 1947), pp. 26, 58-69; Freeman, loc. cit.] The USSBS is invaluable for examining raw figures relating to bombing effectiveness against Germany, including effects on specific areas of the German economy as well. (Italics were present in the original.)
[2] Levine, 75,82.
[3] Levine, 91.

promoted to commander of AEAF (Allied Expeditionary Air Forces) in preparation for Operation Overlord, the planned invasion of France. The new headquarters were actually the old Eighth Air Force headquarters simply renamed, put under Spaatz, and given authority over the Eighth and Fifteenth air forces. VIII Bomber Command was dissolved, and its headquarters became the new Eighth Air Force headquarters, under Jimmy Doolittle, Spaatz's right-hand man. General Nathan Twining became commander of the Fifteenth Air Force. Eaker became the commander of the new Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Eaker and many others considered this a demotion, though we now know that Eisenhower himself was responsible for the transfer, simply because he wanted to keep working with the commanders who had been successful in serving him in the Mediterranean.[1] It came in the aftermath of terrible coordination of tactical air support and the reorganization of command for Operation Overlord. Eisenhower had even threatened to quit if the these matters were not cleared up, He then made Sir Arthur Tedder, his chief air assistant in the North African campaign, his Deputy Supreme Commander, and made Spaatz the head of all U.S. air forces in England.[2] Nonetheless, Eaker's failure to produce results probably did not have a positive influence on his superiors, considering their constant pressing for results.

This led to one of the most important meetings for the AAF, which took place in Casablanca in early 1943, where Spaatz met with Winston Churchill. This meeting took place when the bombing offensive was at its lowest ebb, coming after the disastrous raids on Messerschmidt's factory in Rendgsburg and a ball-bearing factory in Schweinfurt. Churchill was expected to indicate to Roosevelt his belief that daylight strategic bombing was failing to affect Germany, and that he wanted the Americans to switch to night-time area bombing. His demand was the most dangerous challenge of the war to American airpower theory, and Arnold wanted Spaatz to go to the meeting and convince Churchill that he should consent to the Americans' daylight precision bombing campaign. Spaatz convinced Churchill to assent to the Americans' campaign, even though Churchill and the British bombing establishment felt that it was pointless and a tremendous waste of resources. As a result of this meeting, Churchill did not approach Roosevelt to convince him to suspend the daylight precision bombing campaign.[3]

For his part, the American Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, insisted that Eaker be allowed to decide on the tactics and techniques his bombers would use, even though Portal would be responsible for the "strategic direction" of all the bombers, British and American. He specifically did this in order to prevent any possibility that Eaker would be forced to switch to nighttime area bombing.[4] After this point, the daylight

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[1] Levine, 117.
[2] Thomas Alexander Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 121.
[3] Davis, Chapter 5.
[4] Levine, 78.

precision bombing campaign was never in serious danger of being altered from conducing the kind of campaign that American strategic theory had envisioned, and that American strategic air generals were depending on for the creation of an independent Air Force. From the end of 1943 to the end of the war in Europe, the American strategic bombing campaign in Europe had a tremendous amount of resources at its disposal, sufficient to win the air war over Europe. By D-Day - June 6, 1944, the Allies had overwhelming air superiority. The Germans conducted 200 aerial attacks, against the 15,000 Anglo-American attacks.[1] As Omar Bradley recalled, "For all the air that ventured out against us on the Channel," his command ship's air control room "might better have been converted into a pool hall."[2]

The preparation for the invasion of France would bring about one of the great arguments of the war between Spaatz and Eisenhower. Eisenhower felt that all airpower, tactical and strategic, should be placed his control for the Normandy invasion. This obviously included Spaatz's strategic Eighth Air Force. Spaatz disagreed with Eisenhower, believing that the strategic bombers must be used exclusively to destroy the German war economy by attacking strategic industrial and transportation targets. This disagreement applied directly to how the AAF was viewed by these two generals, in addition to the airpower enthusiasts and the traditional generals. Eisenhower and the rest of the Army (AGF) viewed the Air Force (AAF) as a subsidiary force to the Army, and therefore viewed the idea of a complete victory through strategic bombing as mere fantast. They believed that to win the war, it would be necessary to defeat the enemy's forces decisively, in this case through a cross-channel invasion. In the AAF however, the idea that the enemy could be defeated through the destruction of its vital centers was one of the founding tenets with figures such as Arnold believing in a strategy based on Giulio Douhet.[3] The authors of AWPD/1 also believed in this theory, and they emphasized electric power, transportation, and petroleum as important targets because they believed them to be the true economic "vital centers" of Germany. As Arnold put it: "The Army Air Forces' principle of precision bombing ... aimed at knocking out not an entire industrial area, nor even a whole factory, but the most vital parts of Germany's war factories ... "[4] The authors of AWPD/1 believed that bombers could rely on speed, defensive formations, high flying, guns, and armor to penetrate deep into Germany and knock out these vital centers. At the beginning of the war, they even believed that six months of bombing might win the war, making an invasion unnecessary.[5] The ground commanders, on the other hand, never believed it was possible to win without an invasion. Now, with D-Day approaching, Spaatz, Harris, and Doolittle believed that strategic bombing was the best way for the heavy bombers to aid the invasion. Harris

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[1] Hughes, 4.
[2] Hughes, 4-5, cited from Omar Bradley, <u>A Soldier's Story</u>, 259.
[3] Weigley, 334-336.
[4] Weigley, 337. Cf. General H. H. Arnold, "Air Strategy for Victory," *Flying*, XXXIII, No. 4 (Oct., 1943), 50.
[5] Weigley, 337.

believed that the heavy bombers would not be effective in sir support, but Spaatz later said: "In my mind, I thought we were wasting a lot of effort. We could have probably ended the war quicker by continuing to bomb the targets in Germany."[1]

This issue would come to the forefront of an important argument. Eisenhower wanted the Eighth air force to come under his command, rather than act independently of the ground forces, as Spaatz and Arnold had advocated. In the end, a compromise was reached - Spaatz was to have overall command of the Eighth Air Force except during the last ninety days leading up to the invasion, when he was to fall under Eisenhower's command and coordinate his attacks with Eisenhower's strategy. Nonetheless, this led to further disagreement over timing and strategy.[2] Spaatz wanted to be under Eisenhower's command for the last 60 days before the invasion, and he wanted to attack German oil production and distribution services. This was contrary to the plan put forth by Eisenhower and his air chief, who wanted Spaatz to be under Eisenhower's command for at least six months, and to follow the transportation target plan that was being pushed by Eisenhower. Spaatz and the rest of the American strategic bombing leaders disagreed, believing that the transportation plan could not help to stop Germany from reinforcing the troops at the front because there was too much slack transportation in France. They furthered what they called the "Oil plan". Their reasoning was that after the destruction of the Ploesti oil field in Romania, the Germans were forced to produce most of their oil artificially by synthesizing coal. The refineries in which this was done were rather easy to find, and destroying them would leave the Germans with no oil, forcing them to surrender. This argument went on for months, and had to be settled by Arnold and Marshall after Eisenhower threatened to quit if it was not resolved. The final agreement put the Eighth Air Force under Eisenhower and SHAEF's command for ninety days before the landing as well as anytime Eisenhower thought he needed the extra firepower. It also meant that the transportation plan was the air plan to be implemented.[3]

While this was a major blow to the strategic bomber advocates, Spaatz and the leadership of the Eighth Air Force were conscribed to it and lived with it. With the decision regarding bomber strategy up to D-Day, the impact of strategic bombing decreased after the landing in Normandy as the German ability to resist was completely destroyed.

While Spaatz commanded the American strategic air forces deployed in the major European combat theater, many of his actions would become hallmarks of American air theory. While his impact on the battlefield of Europe is clearly remembered, an equally important and perhaps even more critical battle had been and

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[1] Hughes, 122. [From: Tooey Spaatz interview, K239.0512.754, Air Force Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (AFHRC).]
[2] Davis, Chapter 7.
[3] ibid.

was being fought by the other head of the dragon, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, in Washington D.C. Like Spaatz and most of the World War II American airpower leadership, Arnold was greatly influenced by William "Billy" Mitchell. These leaders remembered how at the end of his career Mitchell was sent to a small fort in Texas so the General Staff could get rid of him, and how he was eventually court marshaled. This had a lasting influence on many of the Air Corps officers, and influenced their way of thinking and their attempts to create an independent air force. Arnold, Chief of Staff of the AAF in World War II, never forgot about Mitchell and his fight to get the Army to realize the potential of air power and the necessity of an independent Air Force. Because of this, when he took command of the Army Air Corps, which controlled Army aviation in the 1930's, he tried to get the corps to reflect the air force that Mitchell had envisioned. This air force was one that was going to be dominated by the strategic bomber. The first important action that Arnold took was to get the President and Congress to reorganize the Army so as to increase the independence of the Air Corps (which had previously become independent from the Army Signal Corps) from the rest of the Army. His fellow officers believed this to be extremely important, as they wanted to be under the command of other airmen and not ground generals.[1]

A reorganization followed, one that greatly increased the independence of the air units in relation to the Army. It created the Army Air Forces (AAF) in June 1941, essentially an independent organization, though technically part of the Army and so subordinate to Army Chief of Staff George Marshall. This was an important moral victory for the airmen and it lifted their spirits, as now they had the independent organization they had long pined for. It was one of the last steps to the airmen's goal of the creation of an independent Air Force, and it helped vindicate Mitchell, something the airmen had hoped to do for many years.[2]

Following these maneuvers, Arnold wanted to get back into the good graces of General George Marshall. At the end of 1937, President Roosevelt realized that the United States needed to rearm because it would eventually need to fight another war. Because of the prevailing sentiment of isolationism, he was having a very difficult time convincing Congress to increase the budgets for the Navy and the Army's ground forces, because Congress saw support of these two branches as requiring a commitment to full scale war. On the other hand, the President did not have the same difficulties with Congress regarding the Air Corps, as most of Congress did not see the same threat posed to isolationism by it as compared to the other two branches.[3] This led Roosevelt to provide Arnold with a generous budget with which to increase the Air Corps in numbers of airplanes. Here was a tremendous opportunity for the airmen - the

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[1] Davis, Chapter 4.

[2] Crane, 24. Weigley, 335.

[3] Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armeggedon, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), Chapter 4.

President had enabled them to produce the airplanes that they wanted. However, Arnold realized that accepting this proposal would increase tension between him and Marshall, so he told the President that the suggested budget was too big for the Air Corps by itself, and that it would be better if the President slightly reduced the budget and spent more money on the AGF. With this excellent decision, Arnold killed two birds with one stone. Firstly, he won Marshall's support him in his pursuit of independence, which was critical, as there had traditionally been a great deal of resentment between the air and ground officers.[1] Secondly, at the time, the Air Corps was not large enough and did not have enough well-trained personnel to make such a large air force worth building. This does not reflect a waning in Arnold's belief in the primacy of airpower, but rather a realization of the importance in maintaining as many friends (or keeping as few enemies) as possible. As a result, Marshall and Arnold did not compete against one another, opting to work together for the betterment of the overall service. This would have profound implications in the coming war.

Related to these events, perhaps the most important decision that Arnold made regarding the overall war effort of American airpower was with regard to the training of pilots. Arnold wanted priority placed not on producing large numbers of airplanes, but on training a large number of very competent pilots.[2] This decision would yield extremely positive results later in the war, as the Americans did not face the problems that the Axis powers had in getting experienced pilots. This decision could not have been an easy one for Arnold to make, as it must have been very tempting to "sacrifice" pilots for airplanes. Indeed, the Germans sacrificed long term flight instruction to make more pilots (flight instructors) available to fly aircraft in the short term.[3] Arnold, however, would not tolerate what he viewed as a backward conception of priorities, and chose to prepare for a long and drawn out conflict. As we will see later, this would prove to be a wise decision.

The third great decision that Arnold had to make would eventually be one of the most controversial decisions of the war. Despite the tremendous pressure placed on him by Roosevelt and Churchill to start getting results, Arnold decided to stick with the precision bombing ideas of Billy Mitchell after 1942. This decision must have been difficult, as he was under tremendous pressure to abandon the ideas of daytime precision bombing, and to switch to nighttime area bombing, in order to get quick results in terms of tonnage of bombs dropped. In the end however, Arnold persevered, helping to create the United States Air Force by formulating a doctrine for the use of American air power for precision strategic bombing, a doctrine that was totally separate from anything that the other services conducted. He even began leaning toward area bombing under tremendous pressure, but when he did, Spaatz, his right-hand man, kept

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[1] Wilbur Morrison, <u>Fortress Without a Roof</u> (New York: St. Martin Press, 1982), Chapter 4.

[2] Ellis, Chapter 5.

[3] Ellis, 201-205.

the USSTAF focused on precision bombing.[1] Arnold is one of the lesser-known heroes of the Second World War, and one of the few war leaders not to have gotten great accolades for their work during the war. This by no means lessens his achievements, however. He was responsible for making the key decisions in the American bombing campaign, decisions that led to the creation of the United States Air Force. He fought politicians and the Army tooth and nail to establish the American theory of strategic bombing - that of daytime precision bombing focused against the key targets of the enemy's war industry.

Key to the establishment of a purpose for American airpower were the men who defined the AAF's role at the outset of the Second World War. The AAF was given a golden opportunity when President Roosevelt sent a letter to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in July 1941, "requesting the preparation of the Over-All Production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." The services decided to draw up separate plans and sets of requirements. The War Plans Division (WPD) of the General Staff was responsible for the Army's plan. Lieutenant Colonel Clayton Bissell, an Air Corps officer who worked for the WPD, convinced the division to request that Lieutenant General H. H. Arnold, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Corps, assign some Air Corps officers to the division to create an aviation branch. Brigadier General Carl Spaatz and Lieutenant Colonel Harold George were also involved, and the newly established Air War Plans Division (AWPD) of the new Air Staff, part of the Army Air Forces, was given responsibility. Many of the major air theorists had been promoted to staff positions in Washington coinciding with the American military mobilization, so a group of young, relatively inexperienced officers was given the responsibility of defining the role of American air power for the Second World War and beyond. Lt. Col. George, Lt. Col. Kenneth Walker, Maj. Laurence Kuter, and Maj. Haywood Hansell, Jr., all of whom had helped develop the precision-bombing doctrine at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS), were the men responsible for this daunting task. To make matters even more interesting, their boss, Arnold, was away at the Atlantic Conference in Newfoundland, so they were on their own. They were given about one week in August to draw up their plan for the use of air power in future warfare.[2]

As one of the planners wrote: "If the task was staggering, so too was the opportunity." They put together a plan that involved the "straight American air power doctrine" that they had developed at ACTS, while making alterations such as providing for supporting an invasion, in order to satisfy the Army brass. Instead of mapping production requirements alone, they developed a plan that provided for a full-scale strategic bombing campaign, specifically directed against Germany first. Their plan, called AWPD/1, provided for the application of airpower "for the breakdown of the

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[1] **Crane, 109, 116-117.
[2] Crane, 24-26.

industrial and economic structure of Germany" by eliminating "a system of objectives vital to the German war effort" - primarily electrical power, transportation systems, and oil industries.[1] After the plan was reviewed by Spaatz and Arnold, and after discussions with George Marshall and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, AWPD/1 was made part of the reply to President Roosevelt's request for a comprehensive war plan. It did not entirely coincide with War Department policy, so its adoption may have been the result of a race to beat the August 11 deadline. Regardless of the reason for its adoption, AWPD/1 was a tremendous victory for the airmen. "Tacitly, though not legally, the AAF staff had assumed on this occasion a position of equality with those of the older arms."[2]

In his own unique way, Curtis LeMay was just as influential in American strategic bombing strategy as the primary air strategists were, despite the fact that he had little experience in or desire to formulate strategy. LeMay said himself that he did not learn very much at the Air Corps Tactical School. He believed that geniuses were "inclined to forget about the rest of the team," and he preferred to command and work with "a group of average individuals who were highly motivated." He fit the mold of a tough old-school soldier and general; known to his men as "Iron Ass," the innovative navigator would even go on bombing missions in order to share the risks with subordinates. His contributions consisted of operational improvements that he developed for the B-17 in the Eighth Air Force over Europe, and of the strategy that he formulated for the Pacific Theater after he took command of the B-29s assigned there. He pioneered the use of many innovative technologies in Europe, such as the operation of the H2S radar on "Pathfinder" B-17s. This technology improved accuracy by allowing formations to drop their bombs in a coordinated manner, guided by one very accurate radar-quipped "Pathfinder" B-17.[3] His contributions were extremely important, especially in the Pacific, because they created a lasting change in American air strategy, one that would become increasingly important after World War II, and one that was at odds with the prevailing American strategy in the bombing campaign against Germany. If we are to understand the American strategic bombing strategy against Germany within a larger context, we must understand the personality of Curtis LeMay, and the contributions he made to it.[4]

Many bombing runs in Europe were successful due to LeMay's insistence early on that all bombers in a formation should drop their bombs at the same time. He believed that this "pattern bombing" would end the problem of different B-17s fighting with each other for good positions over the target. While many or most bombs were wasted carrying out LeMay's strategy, the Americans simply did not care, as the German targets were far more valuable to the Germans than thousands of bombs were to the Americans. American industry would simply churn out countless more bombs,

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[1] Crane, 26.
[2] Crane, 26.
[3] Roger Freeman, <u>B-17 Flying Fortress</u> (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1983), 40.
[4] Crane, 125.

while the Germans would have to allocate precious resources to repair their damaged targets. LeMay selected and trained the best crews to lead bombing runs and give the signal to drop the bombs, thus improving the accuracy of entire formations. He also developed a staggered and non-evasive bombing formation for B-17s that increased defensive firepower along with accuracy. LeMay helped the bombing campaign accomplish its two goals - establish good defensive formations for bombers to keep them safe, and improve precision in bombing. The significance of this strategy would become clear with the onset of the bombing campaign against Japan, which LeMay formulated.[1]

While his contributions to the European theater were significant, LeMay's formulation of a strategy for the Pacific after Haywood Hansell's failed attempt at using European precision bombing tactics over Japan was far more important. It provides an important contrast between the strategies used in the two theaters, giving us a better perspective with which to examine the ideas and doctrine behind the B-17 and its precision strategic bombing campaign over Europe, especially as far as ultimate goals are concerned.

From the beginning of the bombing campaign against Japan, LeMay was essentially on his own. Arnold had his fourth heart attack in January 1945, and was in no condition to carefully supervise the bombing, and LeMay had no close relationships with any field commanders.[2] Haywood S. Hansell, who had played a key role in the formation of precision bombing doctrine in Europe, had been unsuccessful in his attempts to disrupt the Japanese war economy, mostly because Japan had a dispersed cottage-industry system, and also because of the horrendous weather above Japan. High altitude wind speeds could exceed 230 knots, and tailwinds could create a 550-knot ground speed that bombing tables were simply not designed for. When they would fight strong headwinds, the B-29s would be incredibly vulnerable to antiaircraft fire, and when the wind was not so strong, thicker cloud cover than found in Europe would often prevent visual bombing, necessitating the use of radar-guided bombing. Most crews, however, had not received adequate radar training. All B-29s in the Marianas were then consolidated under Curtis LeMay in January 1945.[3]

LeMay tried to make some changes while using the same basic European Theater tactics, and he was able to improve bombing efficiency, but his results did not show significant improvement. He would go on to lead the AAF effort in Japan away from the precision tactics he had personally implemented in Europe, moving instead towards a strategy much more similar to British area bombing. This effort provides an important insight into the tactics that governed how the industrial might of the United States was used in Europe. The AAF top brass was in favor of precision bombing, but in

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[1] Crane, 125-126. H.P. Wilmott, <u>B-17 Flying Fortress</u> (New York: Gallery Books, 1980), 58.
[2] Crane, 122,124.
[3] Crane, 128-129.

Japan area bombing would rule. The reasons behind this provide significant contrast to the bombing effort against Germany. At the same time, we can gain further insight into the ultimate goal and strategy of the leaders of the American air war.[1]

LeMay took the initiative where Hansell had not, starting a fire-bombing campaign against Japanese cities and urban industries. He cleverly launched the first major fire-bombing raid to time his regular correspondence with Arnold, so that the AAF chief would be out of town when he would received the plans for a radical change in tactics from LeMay.[2] Politics were critical in this relatively simply matter - President Roosevelt and General Marshall demanded results through whatever means necessary, while Arnold wanted them to come from precision bombing. LeMay would show results in tons of bombs dropped, and Arnold would have to allow him to continue in order to satisfy Roosevelt and Marshall.

There were many advantages to bombing at night, since the horrible weather conditions high above Japan could be avoided, thus providing for vastly improved accuracy on bombing tables, as well as much better scope definition on the radar at night. Also, there was less engine strain at lower altitudes which could only be flown at night, as Japan lacked night-fighters and antiaircraft guns. There was also no need to form large formations at high altitude. LeMay was even able to dispense with all defensive guns except for tail guns, thereby allocating additional weight for bombs instead. As a result, less maintenance and fuel were required, allowing aircraft to fly greater distances with more bombs. Also, the paper and wood Japanese houses were extremely flammable, making them especially susceptible to the effects of fire-bombing.

Mission reports from the campaign against Japan stressed that it was "noteworthy that the object of these attacks was not to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations. The object was to destroy the industrial and strategic targets concentrated in the urban areas."[3] After Mitchell, the American air strategists believed that airpower had the ability to completely destroy an enemy's ability to make war. They preferred to do this in a precise manner, in order to minimize civilian casualties. Spaatz remained reluctant to carry out the fire-bombing of Japan, but Arnold and most American air commanders accepted and even embraced the tactic after it became clear that precision bombing could not work. When Spaatz took over the newly formed United States Army Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF), which included the Eighth and Twentieth Air Forces, he was unable to alter the strategy to precision bombing, since the B-29 force was equipped and trained for LeMay's strategy, and any change to precision bombing would have taken a great deal of time to acquire ammunition and train airmen, and this was simply not realistic.[4] Their logic was simple - since Japanese industry was

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[1] Crane, 129-130.
[2] Crane, 131.
[3] Crane, 131.
[4] Crane, 139.

dispersed throughout Japan's cities, the cities must be destroyed with the industry in them, just as William Tecumseh Sherman had destroyed much of the Southern U.S. economy along with much of the South's infrastructure itself in the American Civil War. Even plans to destroy Japanese rice crops and schools of fish with biological warfare were explored, so committed were American leaders to total war on a massive scale.

The goals of the European and Japanese campaigns were exactly the same; only the methods employed to accomplish those goals were different. The conscious strategy of the American air strategists was to employ the industrial might of the United States in building massive numbers of heavy bombers to obliterate enemy industries completely. This can be illustrated by examining the basic assumptions of LeMay, the implementor, and Arnold, the man on top. In April 1945, LeMay wrote that he believed he had the resources to destroy Japan's ability to fight within six months. Arnold visited Guam that June, and LeMay's staff presented him with a briefing, describing how they believed they could destroy all of Japan's industrial facilities and bring the country to the brink of defeat by October 1st. Arnold was skeptical, but he wrote in his journal that "We did it in Germany with much more difficult targets and much more intense antiaircraft. Why not in Japan? We will see."[1] Throughout the war, no other power was able to approach the United States in terms of ability to engage in this type of strategic bombing. The Germans made a decision not to build large numbers of heavy bombers, since their economy could not handle the pressure while producing essential weapons. The U.S. could - it dropped sixty percent of the Allied bomb tonnage on Western Europe, and with greater precision and far more German fighter casualties inflicted than the British. They did this by flying far more missions with tougher B-17s carrying smaller tonnages of bombs. Almost all of the Allied bomb tonnage dropped on Japan was American, where B-29s scorched out 180 square miles of 67 cities, killing over 300,000 people and wounding about another 400,000. The American Twentieth Air Force's losses were quite light, probably due to both sound tactics and poor enemy defenses. Only 437 B-29s were lost in combat operations in the Pacific, and most of them went down because of technical failures. This can be contrasted with the loss of over 3,000 B-17s and 1,000 B-24s by the Eighth Air Force against Germany."[2]

Addressing ethical concerns regarding the killing of civilians, LeMay summed up his view as follows: "We were going after military targets. No point in slaughtering civilians for the mere sake of slaughter. Of course, there is a pretty thin veneer in Japan, but the veneer was there. It was their system of dispersal of industry. All you had to do was visit one of those targets after we'd roasted it, and see the ruins of a multitude of tiny houses, with a drill press sticking up through the wreckage of every home. The entire population got into the act and worked to make those airplanes or munitions of

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[1] Crane, 136-137.
[2] Crane, 140-141. See also, Ellis.

war ... men, women, children. We knew we were going to kill a lot of women and kids when we burned that town. Had to be done."[1]

Arnold had laid out the scope and desired results of the new campaign when he delivered "An Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan" at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. "The absorption of man-hours in repair and relief, the dislocation of labor by casualty, the interruption of public services necessary to production, and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war production"[2] were the prime focal points of the campaign.

There was an element of psychological warfare as well. Leaflets were dropped listing cities that might be targeted and urging residents to flee. The goal was to dislocate the civilian population that the Japanese war industry depended upon by terrifying them into fleeing from industrial cities. This tactic was very successful, creating immense relocation problems for the Japanese government, as refugees clogged the roads leaving the cities. At the height of the exodus, about 6,500,000 Japanese were evacuating the cities. In the end, about one-seventh of the Japanese population fled to the countryside.[3]

The Americans justified this strategy of total annihilation with the belief that it was the only possible way to destroy targets that could not be destroyed by precision bombing. This directly led to the use of the atomic bomb and its justification. The atomic bomb was simply the logical next step to the fire bombings and precision bombing. When unable to destroy targets by pinpoint bombing, they firebombed the entire area; when they were unable to destroy everything with firebombing, they nuked it. The American air commanders, with the notable exception of Spaatz, bought into this logical progression. It was Arnold who had authorized the designation of city centers as secondary targets for firebombing in Japan,[4] and most AAF officers agreed with Prince Konoye's claim after the war that "Fundamentally, the thing that brought about the determination to make peace was the prolonged fire bombing by the B-29s."[5] To illustrate the acceptance of mass destruction, in August, General Lauris Norstad, in charge of planning the atomic bomb missions, sent the following message to Spaatz:

> It is understood that the Secretary of War in his press conference tomorrow will release a map or photostat of Hiroshima showing the aiming point and the general area of greatest damage ... It is believed here that the accuracy with which this bomb was placed may counter a thought that the CENTERBOARD [A-bomb] project involves wanton, indiscriminate bombing.[6]

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[1] Crane, 131.

[2] Crane, 127. From "Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan," ABC 381 Japan (27 August 1943), File ABC 384.5, Boxes 477-478, Army Staff, RG 319, NA, Washington, D.C.

[3] Crane, 134.

[4] Weigley, 364.

[5] Crane, 140.

[6] Crane, 141-142.

🗨 *Production*

You can't say civilization isn't advancing: in every war they kill you in a new way. – **Will Rogers**

Time is the condition to be won to defeat the enemy.
Time ranks first among the three factors necessary for victory,
coming before terrain and support of the people.
Only with time can we defeat the enemy. – **Ho Chi Minh**

American notions of airplane production were very similar to the American ideology regarding the production of any other good – more is better. This idea is fundamentally important in understanding American industrial production in World War II. While in general a "more is better" policy has the downside of sacrificing quality control, this was not the case in the United States for many reasons, most stemming from American ideals of business and the foresight of the American aircraft industry. The ability to mass-produce enough quality goods to support a World War, not only to sustain its own war effort but also to support its allies, was one possessed only by America.[1] If we are to understand the strategic bombing of Germany with massive amounts of heavy bombers (B-17s and B-24s), indeed if we are to understand the American war effort as a whole, we must understand the factors behind America's phenomenal ability to mass produce quality goods in unprecedented numbers.[2]

While American producers had always valued high quality products, the situation after World War I made quality an even more important factor in aircraft production than in other industries. While most American war industries switched from military to civilian production after World War I, the American aircraft industry experienced difficulties doing so. Aircraft manufacturing is very different from other types of manufacturing in many important ways. The airplane is related to locomotives, ships and motor cars in that they are all transportation vehicles, but there is little if any other industrial resemblance between them. Since the other vehicles are meant to travel on relatively stable surfaces, land or sea, while the airplane must travel in the constantly changing conditions of high altitudes, aircraft production is far more complicated and requires far more skilled labor than the other transportation industries. These unique features also make it more difficult to mass-produce airplanes.[3] As Professor Alan S. Milward notes, "The re-equipment of the United States forces with a new rifle required 20,000 hours of preliminary engineering study to plan its mass production and 200,000 hours of engineering and design time to produce the necessary tools. The design and development of a weapon like a heavy bomber took an enormously greater effort in

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[1] Ellis, Chapter 5. Sherry, Chapter 7.
[2] Sherry, Chapter 7.
[3] Courtney Robert Hall, <u>History of American Industrial Science</u> (New York: Library Publishers, 1954), 119-120.

terms of man hours."[1] Just to give an idea of how complicated aircraft production was, Milward goes on to note that "The original Ford V-8 engine had 1,700 separate parts; the early bomber engines of the Second World War had 11,000, the planes themselves about 70,000."[2]

The American aircraft industry found itself in a novel situation in the years following World War I, as it was an industry in which there was a great deal of supply (there were many aircraft companies), but very low demand (government and private sector purchases of aircraft). Thus, if American aircraft companies wished to stay in business in the climate of fierce competition, they were forced to produce reliable and quality airplanes packed with features. When the United States began mobilization for war, and a steady demand for massive numbers of aircraft arose, the American aircraft industry would combine quality with the American knack for mass production to produce an unprecedented number of quality aircraft.[3] Indeed, American equipment in general tended to be of higher quality than that of the other powers. Alan Milward describes the situation:

By 1944 significant differences had appeared in the capacity of combatants whose engineering industries were much more highly developed than Japan's. As United States war production continued to rise American technological capacity came clearly to exceed that of the United Kingdom in spite of the longer period of effort in Britain. The gap could be seen both in design capacity and in productive capacity. American armaments output passed that of Britain in summer 1942 and by 1944 was six times greater. Few British innovations were in fact incorporated into American weapons. Some kinds of tank turrets, several aircraft engines and one or two guns were adapted from British experience or copied directly. Otherwise American equipment weapons. Some kinds of tank turrets, several aircraft engines and one or two guns were adapted from British experience or copied directly. Otherwise American equipment either proved better, or was easier to produce in large quantities while not being inferior in quality. This was particularly true in the design of transport vehicles, copied almost wholesale by the British equivalent of the jeeps and amphibious vehicles used by the American forces.[4]

The transition that the aircraft industry made from limited prewar markets to almost unlimited wartime markets was truly remarkable. The AAF was by far the greatest air force of the war, not only in sheer numbers and quality of airplanes, but in

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[1] Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society 1939-1945 (Great Britain: University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1777), 180.
Also see: R. E. Smith, The Army and Economic Mobilization (United States Army in World War II, Office of the Chief of Military History), G.P.O., Washington, D.C., 1959.
[2] Milward, 185.
[3] Copp, 411.
[4] Milward, 172.

the diversity of models, an advantage that required many thousands of hours of extra research and development.[1] In the end, Wilmot states,

> It may seem incredible in the light of the fact that American industry produced over 98,000 aircraft for the USAAF - of which over 12,000 were Fortresses, over 15,000 were Mustangs and over 19,000 were Liberators - but for most of the war the American air forces operating in Europe were acutely short of aircraft. It was only in the spring and summer of 1944 that the strategic forces, the 8th and 15th Air Forces, grew into their strength, and even after that time much of their activities had to be directed toward tactical objectives. For most of the war American strategic bomber strength was very marginal to requirements. It was only in 1944, after massive reinforcement and a drastic reduction of losses as a result of the Mustang's successful fight for air superiority over Germany, that the Americans possessed the strength to mount a prolonged bombing campaign.[2]

American industrial capacity allowed for this ability to produce massive numbers of quality airplanes of many different models throughout the war, thereby providing the Americans more flexibility in formulating air strategy. Another area in which American industry proved quite capable was the quick upgrade and alteration of aircraft designs and features after feedback from combat experience necessitated modifications. Many such modifications were made, and in ten years of production, the B-17 was improved to such a degree that 11 tons were added to its weight, including improvements in power plants, armaments, and aerodynamics.[3]

To give an idea of the latent potential of the American aircraft industry, we need only examine the results of the American mobilization for war. In 1939, the last year before major mobilization, the American aircraft industry had 125 plants of all sizes, with 49,000 workers and a maximum production capacity of five thousand airplanes. The industry was then given the target figure of 50,000 airplanes per year, which it surpassed.[4] It was no forgone conclusion that this could be done, however. In 1938, 3,675 airplanes were produced, of which 1,800 were military planes, 1,425 light commercial planes, 300 private and business planes, and 150 airline transports. There were many subcategories of aircraft designs as well, and changes were very expensive to make. Many of these designs were varied-purpose, and they could be remodeled only at great cost. For example, it took 500,000 hours of engineering time and 100,000 hours of testing to design the DC-4 transport.[5]

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[1] Hall, 120.

[2] Wilmott, 50.

[3] Frederick A. Johnsen, <u>B-17 Flying Fortress - The Symbol of Second World War Air Power</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 15.

[4] Hall, 120.

[5] Hall, 121.

One of the most important aspects of production is the ability to mass produce the same product consistently, quickly, and efficiently, even after a long production run. This was extremely important over the course of the war, as it made the American air leaders confident in the consistency of the aircraft that were being produced, since they knew that they would not have to make special provisions for non-interchangeable parts, as the Germans and Japanese were forced to.[1] Another advantage the Americans had was that their huge aircraft orders made American suppliers realize that there was eventually going to be an end to the Great Depression. American aircraft manufacturers therefore made plans to vastly upgrade production in the future, thereby acting in a very different manner than the aircraft industries of the competing contemporary powers. This was especially the case with Germany and Japan, in that neither power significantly expanded its powerful prewar industries immediately proceeding or during the war. This lack of industry was a major factor in keeping Axis airplane production low throughout the war.[2] While the United States did expand its industrial capacity during the war, as early as 1940 it had the industrial capacity to speedily and efficiently produce huge amounts of airplanes during 1941 and 1942. This can be confirmed by President Roosevelt's statement in 1938 that he wanted an air force of 10,000 airplanes by 1940 to bomb Japanese cities. In making this statement, Roosevelt obviously understood that it was possible for the American aircraft industry to vastly increase production from depression levels. This ability to produce large numbers aircraft without constructing any new machinery or buildings for that purpose was a great asset to the Americans, as it allowed them to devote more money and resources to construct industrial bases that were in greater demand. Tanks, landing crafts, ships, boots, and other war needs that had not been in demand before mobilization were thus able to be produced at a high rate for the war. Thus, in establishing and maintaining an industrial base that would support their air effort, the Americans were helped mostly by pure ingenuity and cut-throat business sense, rather than by the belief that war was imminent.

Design.

When the American aircraft industry set out to produce an airplane for the Army, it was given instructions based on the writings of Billy Mitchell. In the end, the B-17, considered the best American strategic bomber and the mainstay of the AAF, was the product of Mitchell's theories of strategic airpower, all the way down to its basic design. The B-17 was more than just another bomber – it was the synthesis of the vision of the American air strategists with the skill of American engineers. In keeping with American air strategy, the B-17 was a plane that could penetrate deep into enemy air space with a

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[1] Edward Jablonski, B-17 Flying Fortress: An Illustrated History (New York: Doubleday, 1968), Chapter 3.
[2] Ellis, Chapter 5.

significant bomb payload, while heavily armed and armored so it could fight through enemy air defenses. It would thus be able to project American power deep into an enemy's territories and at its "vital centers," thus disrupting the enemy's war effort from within, as the air strategists predicted. The Flying Fortress was also built with the "American way of war" in mind – it was easy to mass-produce and was built to be a very precise and accurate bomber, equipped with the revolutionary Norden bombsight.[1]

While all of these attributes would seem to be fitting for the perfect bomber, of all the air forces in World War II, only the United States Army Air Forces demanded that they be present in a primary bomber. The other powers that designed and produced long-range strategic bombers in significant numbers (the UK and Japan) all sacrificed different attributes in order to produce bombers that they felt would be better suited for their specific types of bombing, and in order to produce them with reasonable efficiency and cost effectiveness. Japan sacrificed armor and protection for range, bomb capacity, and weight, making their bombers less safe while giving them greater range and tremendous striking power. The British, on the other hand, sacrificed accuracy and armaments, making their bombers more vulnerable while allowing them to carry larger payloads for more striking power. While these philosophies of compromise were backed by valid reasoning, the Americans felt that they could get the best of both worlds in a bomber without sacrificing anything, all the while still maintaining reasonably high production. While compromise is generally essential to war production, the United States was an exception to this rule due to its unprecedented industrial capacity.

This belief led to the creation of the B-17 and the B-24, the great heavy bombers that would be the stalwart warriors of American air power throughout the war years. The Americans believed they had the industrial means with which to realize their ends of a truly strategic air force that would eventually be independent of the other services, with its activities as vital to American warfare as the Army and Navy, if not more so. Indeed, American industry was what allowed them to develop their strategy as they did, since it allowed them to produce unprecedented numbers of airplanes with almost unprecedented performance. The way in which the air strategists used this ability was also incredibly important, as they decided to continue the B-17 heavy bomber program and continue applying the ideas of Billy Mitchell. The American air planners saw the B-17, the first American heavy strategic bomber to be designed and produced, as the penultimate vindication of the beliefs of Mitchell. With the B-17's long range and fairly heavy payload, they would be able to project American airpower deep into the enemy's territory without engaging in slow and costly ground warfare. The B-17's speed and high altitude ceiling would enable it to elude enemy pursuit fighters and anti-aircraft guns, and its armor and defensive guns would enable it to fight them off. These bombers would not be useful in working with ground forces as tactical fighters and medium and

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[1] Weigley, 335. Johnsen, 3.

light bombers were, and the air strategists therefore saw them as a perfect fit for their strategic bombing doctrine, one which they hoped would be key in the future creation of an independent air force. Thus, the B-17 was more than just another combat airplane; it represented the fundamental ideas and doctrine of the contemporary American airpower strategists and theorists.[1]

The air leaders were not strictly motivated by political considerations, however. The air strategists, especially Carl Spaatz, truly believed that air power would be most effective operating independently of the ground forces, targeting vital centers deep in enemy territory, instead of focusing on the futile destruction of enemy forces when the home country could simply send out more. This is why Spaatz, who saw the war as being winnable through the destruction of key enemy industries, found himself in conflict with Eisenhower, who saw the war as being winnable through the destruction of the enemy's forces, and who wanted strategic bombers used against them. Pete Quesada provided an interesting contrast to Spaatz, believing that it was imperative that airpower be utilized to aid ground forces, and he therefore stressed tactical air power.[2]

When considering the actual design of the B-17 early on, the air officers did not really know what they wanted in specific terms, and they did not have a good idea as to what the other powers' air forces were doing to combat strategic air power. This lack of appreciation for enemy air defenses would come back to haunt them during the first year or two of the war, as the strategic bombers were easy prey for German pursuit fighters. Since the B-17 was the one bomber of the prewar/early war era that did not sacrifice anything in creating the ideal daylight strategic bomber, it allowed the air strategists to show off their perfect airplane. Because of this however, the B-17 had the downside of being slow to produce at first, since the strategists had settled for a few of them in the tight military budget, rather than for a greater number of bombers of worse ability. Also, there were problems with the first design that were only addressed after the fighting started, both because of unforeseen circumstances and because of an unwillingness on the part of the air strategists to face certain fundamental realities. There were problems with having sufficient bombloads and defensive armaments for missions, and with formation flying. Also, the air strategists were at first unwilling to admit that the bombers required escort fighters, and tremendous losses were suffered as a result.[3] However, despite its problems, the B-17 fulfilled its role with distinction, and was one of the few designs to serve through the entire war, becoming the legend it is today.

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[1] Johnsen, 6. Copp, 318.
[2] Overlord by Thomas Hughes provides an excellent overview of this position.
[3] Johnsen, preface, xiii, 3.

● Industry.

The most critical question in industry is how many items can be produced, and the aircraft industry is no exception. This is a two-pronged question, and must be dealt with from two separate angles. The first is how many hours does it take to manufacture the airplane (more complex = longer), and the second is how much is each factory capable of producing. The reason that both of these questions must be asked is that if we just count the aggregate number of aircraft produced, we would see only the number produced as an end result of production, without understanding the complexity of the aircraft produced. This is extremely important if we want to fully understand the extent of production going on at a given time. This can be illustrated with an analogy. It is much easier to produce a compact car than a luxury car, but if we only looked at the numbers produced, we would say that the compact car can be produced more easily and is therefore qualitatively superior. This is obviously not so simple, because far more man hours are required to produce the superior luxury car. It is therefore important to take into account the quality of the products in question when considering the numbers produced. When examining the efficiency of an industry, it behooves one to take into account both the quantities it is producing as well as the quality of its products, in order to get a better idea of how much was produced. 1,000 well armored, well armed, fast, and high-flying B-17s took far more effort to produce and functioned far better than, one thousand rickety and unsafe Japanese bombers.[1]

The American aircraft industry was quite successful in meeting the needs of the United States and its allies. In 1938, President Roosevelt stated that he wanted 10,000 airplanes produced by 1940. At the time of his announcement, everyone involved believed that this figure could definitely be reached. The wild card was AWPD-1. Written in 1940, AWPD-1 assumed that the US economy could easily produce around 40,000 planes a year. Comparing these projections with the actual numbers of planes produced over the war years, we see that the original prewar projections were met by wartime production, especially when it is considered that the American aircraft industry had to produce airplanes for Britain, Russia, and other allies as well. This proved to be incredibly important, not only because the war effort mobilized huge numbers of new workers, but because these workers in general went straight into the factories, with no need to build factories first. This was possible because of the powerful American economy's plethora of aircraft companies with their many factories that were built before the war. As a result, the American aircraft industry was in a very unique position. It was able to quickly expand existing operations in order to apply effective American manufacturing methods to the creation of the largest and most powerful air force the world had ever seen.

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[1] Copp, 411. Milward, 172.

◀ *Strategy*

A good plan executed now is better than a perfect plan next week. – **George S. Patton**

Before a war, military science seems a real science, like astronomy;
but after a war it seems more like astrology. – **Rebecca West**

When studying Allied strategic bombing strategy in World War II, it is important to understand the fundamental differences between British and American methods. While both air forces were influenced by Douhet's theories on air power, they differed with regard to how exactly strategic air power was to be used. The Americans looked at Douhet through the lens of Billy Mitchell's theories, where the most important mission for strategic air power was the destruction of enemy industries directly related to the war effort. This view emphasized the value of precision bombing, which the Americans adopted as their doctrine. Despite its drawbacks that necessitated limiting operations to daylight raids in heavily armed and armored bombers, precision bombing had the advantage of allowing for the placement of a large amount of bombs in a small area most vital to the enemy war effort. This doctrine was the basis for American strategic bomber designs, and would dictate how the B-17 would be used.

While the United States pursued precision bombing, the British went in the opposite direction by resorting to area bombing, or terror bombing, after their attempts at precision bombing had failed miserably.[1] This followed directly from Douhetian theories of air power and its ability to create terror, and it led to the belief that bombers could decide the outcome of war with their ability to terrorize civilians into forcing the surrender of their leadership.[2] Douhet had claimed that if a strategic air force was developed that could terrorize the civilian population to this extent, a long ground war could be avoided.[3] The post-World War I Generals, and especially the senior air leadership in Britain, all remembered or fought in World War I, and they were quite familiar with the horrors of prolonged trench warfare. This led to a situation where the war leaders were attempting to fight a war in which the fighting men would take the fewest casualties possible, by trying to end the war soon after it began. This strategy was at odds with the American strategy of precision strategic bombing heavily influenced by Billy Mitchell. With the exception of some rash statements made at a time when he was furious with the military, there is no evidence to suggest that Mitchell believed in Douhet's idea of the crumbling of civilian morale.[4] This conflict would last throughout World War II, and it would have a profound impact on many aspects of the war, from the top leaders who formulated strategy, to those who formulated tactics, to

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[1] Ellis, 170.
[2] Ellis, 182.
[3] Crane, 16-17.
[4] Weigley, 223. See William Mitchell, *Skyways: A Book on Modern Aeronautics* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1930).

the type of airplanes produced, to the types of bombs that were used. We must therefore analyze the fundamental issues at hand with regard to strategic bombing strategy, and the way in which key personalities influenced American bombing strategy not only for the war, but also in setting precedents for modern strategy.

🔊 Numbers.

World War II was above all a war of numbers, in that the side that produced a greater number of war supplies was going to win the war. While the Allies vastly out-produced the Axis Powers, it is essential to understand the critical role this played in the war and its outcome. Because of their quantitatively superior production, the Allies were willing and able to sacrifice vast amounts of men and equipment to achieve their goals. The reasoning was that since war is above all an endeavor in which lives are lost, a conscious decision to sacrifice large numbers of men and/or material early on is a decision that in the long term can save many lives. The Allies decided that this was proper doctrine after World War I – a conflict in which millions of men were killed and maimed because the political leaders of the time did not have the decisiveness to end the conflict with overwhelming attacks. This haunted the military leaders of the Second World War generation, men who had either served in or just graduated after the war, and therefore saw the sacrifice of large numbers of men early on as a necessary cost if it would save a much greater number of men by preventing a long and protracted stalemate. While bloody and destructive, this strategy was seen as a cleaner way of waging war when compared to the bloodbath on the Western Front in the First World War. Air leaders therefore endorsed massive strategic bombing campaigns against cities, with the British bombing campaign led by Arthur Harris, who conducted the vast majority of such raids in the European theater. The hope was that such attacks would prevent a protracted war, with the result being the killing of a small number of people quickly, with military casualties remaining relatively light when compared to a ground campaign.

While the Great War affected the European officers to a greater degree than the Americans, strategic bombing advocates virtually monopolized the American air strategy arena. The Air Corps Tactical School, the primary strategy school for American military aviation, taught strategic bombing techniques, much to the dismay of pursuit fighter enthusiasts such as Claire Chennault.[1] Indeed, tactical bombing techniques were almost completely neglected until later in the war, and even then they required the direction of officers in the field such as Pete Quesada. Although the Americans focused on precision rather than on terror bombing, it is important to realize that both the American and European conceptions of strategic bombing (Mitchellism and Douhetism

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[1] Copp, 318.

respectively) worked only with large numbers of large bombers, and both therefore advocated the production of a plethora of heavy bombers.[1] While this aspect of grand strategy is important, one must keep in mind that without a strategy behind the use of heavy bombers, their production was useless. We must therefore examine the ideas behind the strategy employed, and their relationship to the design and upgrades of the B-17 Flying Fortress.

● *Mitchellism and the American Strategy:* Precision Bombing in World War II

With the American ability to produce large amounts of war materials, it was important for the strategic leadership to determine how they could be used with the greatest effect. The Americans refused to adopt the British strategy of terror bombing in Europe, and consequently adhered almost without exception to a strategy of precision bombing. The British no longer believed that heavy bombers were capable of conducting accurate attacks against vital targets, but the Americans would not budge. Since America was setting out on its own, it could design the implements necessary to conduct its own form of air warfare, as well as pioneer the tactics and select the targets that would be used by its heavy bombers.[2] This gave American aircraft designers the freedom to pick and choose what they wanted in their designs and upgrades, and they chose not to follow the conventional wisdom employed by Britain, the power with more experience in the war.[3] The B-17's original design and upgrades were thus products of the unwavering American commitment to precision bombing.

The B-17 was designed for a strategic system based on two separate ideas. Firstly, it was believed that accurate bombing could destroy a country's industrial capacity and thereby force it into surrender. Secondly, it was taken for granted that American bombers could fight their way through any air defenses with their heavy armor and armaments. These theories seemed reasonable to the air leaders when they were formulated, but the reality of the circumstances would later disprove them. Firstly, it was unrealistic for the air strategists to predict exactly what would work in war. War is often described as "controlled chaos", and often times careful planning must be tossed out the window. The air war over Europe was no exception. The Norden bombsight is an excellent example of this problem. Tested in perfect weather and under ideal conditions in the United States, the bombsight was devastatingly accurate, but when combat and poor weather conditions were present, accuracy was almost nonexistent until much later in the war. Secondly, the air leaders were blinded by their ideologies.[4] They truly

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[1] Sherry, Chapter 5.
[2] Sherry, Chapter 1. Davis, Chapter 4.
[3] Jablonski, Chapter 3.
[4] Davis, Chapter 3, 5-11.

believed that if they modified their theories at all, they would be giving up on Billy Mitchell's ideas, something nearly sacrilegious to them.[1] Because of their reluctance, even though the air leaders had direct empirical evidence of what would happen if heavy bombers were sent over Europe without fighter escort, no change in doctrine was implemented.[2] This would lead to tragic results, including the inability of bomber formations to attack in an organized manner, in addition to heavy casualties on missions.[3] The situation would not be remedied until the end of 1943.

While the Americans made some incorrect assumptions about how and what to bomb, in general their strategy was ultimately much more successful than the British strategy, as can be gauged by the marked drop in German industrial production after the American bombing campaign got under way in full force.[4] This was not immediately apparent for many reasons. Firstly, American losses on precision bombing runs were so high as to be unsupportable. Unlike the British, who bombed cities during the relative safety of nighttime, the Americans were losing more than five percent of their airplanes on some bombing runs. This led to the appearance that daylight bombing was inefficient and to the belief that it should therefore be stopped. This was indeed the suggestion of the British military leadership, and indeed of Churchill himself, both of whom pressed the Americans to adopt area bombing.[5] A possible reason behind the pressure is that the British did not want the Americans to be successful where they had failed, since the American adoption of their strategy would vindicate their area bombing campaign against civilians. The appearance of correctness was important to both the British and the Americans, as both wanted their plans adopted, yet were limited by the political considerations of conducting a campaign that would produce results they could show to their publics. Also, the generals of the two Allied powers wanted their systems adopted exclusively, with no compromise.

This impasse was exacerbated by the hostile and arrogant personalities on each side that attempted to dominate their counterparts. As mentioned previously, from the very beginning it was extremely important to the Americans that precision bombing be adopted. Their greatest air strategist, Billy Mitchell, was court marshaled for voicing his views about the importance of precision strategic bombing. This effectively made him a martyr for the cause – an independent air force for strategic bombing. This made any attempt to disprove Mitchell's theories almost heretical to the American air leaders, and because of this the Americans had problems changing their strategy to modify Mitchell's theories to coincide with the reality of air warfare in the 1940's.[6] By then, the British had more than two years of fighting experience under their belts, during which they had

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[1] Davis, Chapters 3-11. Wilbur, Chapters 1-5.

[2] Davis, Chapters 5-7. Wilbur, Chapters 3-4.

[3] Davis, Chapters 5-6.

[4] Davis, Chapters 10-11. See also USSBS.

[5] Davis, Chapter 5. Wilbur, Chapter 4.

[6] Davis, Chapters 5-7.

proven that Douhet's theories did not always hold true, but it still took the Americans two years of lost blood and steel to internalize this notion. However, by the beginning of 1944 the Americans had altered their strategy in such a way that they were operating successfully while utilizing Mitchell's basic theoretical ideas. They did so by adjusting their theories to conform to the realities of the war. This was in contrast to the British, who abandoned daylight precision bombing to conduct a safer campaign of nighttime area bombing, thus rejecting not only Douhet's idea of quick and effective terror bombing, but their original plans of precision bombing as well. Instead, they opted for what they hoped would be an easier way out.

📣 Douhetism and the British Bombing Command: *Area Bombing in World War II*

The British learned early on that Douhet's theories could not work without major changes in strategy to meet the demands of modern warfare.[1] After they were expelled from the continent in the middle of 1940, the British were only able to carry on an offensive campaign against Germany through strategic bombing. The British campaign really began with General Arthur "Bomber" Harris, who instead of using small raids to avoid German fighters, used very large raids against relatively large targets, mostly cities. The intent was to maximize the effect of each raid and the destructiveness of each bomber. This worked well in some circumstances, but it failed when the British tried to raid Berlin, deep in German territory. While the British bombers were very heavily loaded down with bombs, they carried very little in the way of defensive armaments. The Germans then started to use night fighters with radar (Radio Direction and Ranging), making it somewhat easy for them to find and attack the relatively defenseless bombers. Harris then insisted that large bomber formations, with hundreds of bombers flying together, be sent to swamp the German defenders so that the percentage of bombers shot down would be relatively small, but this was only slightly successful. Harris also decided to use a tremendous amount of incendiary devices to do most of his work, because he wanted to lay huge swaths of German cities and countryside to waste, thinking that if his bombers were completely inaccurate he might as well raze huge areas to the ground. He also formulated the idea of targeting cities to get rid of the "housing of the working men".[2]

This strategy clearly arose from Douhet's ideas. In Douhetian thinking, the primary goal of a war effort is to break the will of the enemy nation, and it was therefore important to force the enemy nation into suing for peace not by achieving victory on the battlefield, but by terrorizing and/or destroying its civilian population.[3] In this respect,

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[1] Wilbur, Chapter 1.
[2] Ellis, Chapter 5. Specifically 182-189.
[3] Crane, 16-17.

Harris's doctrine was by far the greatest example of Douhetian thinking in modern times. Harris believed that bombers were not accurate enough to destroy specific targets, and he also believed that it was worthwhile to destroy cities for reasons of morale alone. While this thinking denied most known facts about cities and their populations, which indicated that they would be able to resist massive terror bombing, it also ignored the ineffectiveness of fire bombing in general. Although it was a well known fact that incendiaries did not work well, Harris nonetheless continued to use them because he made himself believe that they would work. As a Douhetian, he felt that while it would take time, eventually the enemy's society would crack and the war would end, as long as they kept up the bombing. This approach was very different from that of the American strategists influenced by Mitchell, who believed that the most important goal of the air campaign was the destruction of key industries to destroy the enemy war effort, not the random destruction of human lives and resources.

Indeed, understanding the British position allows us to better understand the American doctrine. The B-17 was built and equipped not for the purpose of laying waste to the enemy's country, but for the precise targeting of factories, marshaling yards, oil refineries, and other key targets. It was well-suited to the American doctrine of precision strategic bombing, in contrast to the British strategy of area bombing. While the Americans believed in defeating the enemy through disabling her, the British believed in defeating them by terrorizing and annihilating them.

This conflict in doctrine and strategy led to a conflict in operational procedures, the first being when a formation was justified in dropping its bombs. The AAF policy up till mid-1944 was not to drop bombs on any targets unless they were identified as either a primary target or another worthy military target. The RAF, on the other hand, viewed the bombing of a wrong target as acceptable so long a target was destroyed. Since the two allies disagreed on issues of doctrine and strategy, disagreements arose regarding operational policy, as Harris wanted the AAF to drop its bombs even if they were not dropped on the correct target. (This would be necessary if the bombers went off course and strayed from their primary targets.) One of the biggest arguments between the two sides was between Ira Eaker commander of the U.S. 8th Air Force until the end of 1943, and Harris. It clearly shows how the British and American philosophies were fundamentally opposed, and it led to serious problems between Eaker and Harris. It also may have played a role in the replacement of Eaker with Spaatz, who was much easier to work with. The main reason for this was that Eaker simply could not morally equate the use of his bombers as area bombers to kill large numbers of civilians with the destruction of factories as primary targets.[1] Eaker was also unwilling to risk sending on sorties with a high likelihood of civilian casualties and a low probability of a

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[1] Davis, Chapters 6-7.

successful hit against the primary target.[1] Eaker opposed causing civilian casualties, while Harris saw them as beneficial to the Allies.

Nuclear Weapons — Weapons of the Apocalypse

With the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the greatest war in the history of mankind came to a close. Following the war, revolutionary weapons such as these would bring about an important change in air strategy. While many would say that the atomic bomb vindicated Douhet's ideas, in reality it completely revolutionized the way war is fought, in the process rendering both the theories of Douhet and Mitchell irrelevant. Both Douhet and Mitchell would say that because the nuclear bomb has the ability to devastate tremendous areas and kill massive numbers of people, it has changed warfare to the extent that weapons need not be used at all for a nation to exert its power or make demands. As a result, Douhet would be incorrect, as the deterrent to war would not be a threat to civilian morale through the potential deaths of some civilians, but the threatened annihilation of unprecedented and truly incomprehensible numbers of people. As for Mitchell, a similar point holds true. There would be no need to destroy a nation's industries individually and through accurate bombing if a massive portion of the nation's population and industries could be destroyed in one fell swoop. While in World War II casualties from bombing were measured in the thousands, the nuclear age could see casualties measured in the millions. In the end, nuclear weapons fundamentally changed air strategy, shifting the paradigm for war in such a way that previous forms of warfare would have to be re-examined, and possibly ruled obsolete for the conduct of total war.

Conclusion

At the conclusion of the war, the United States put together strategic bombing surveys to categorize and display in statistical form the effects of strategic bombing in World War II on Germany and Japan. What these statisticians learned was that preconceived prewar notions of war and the power of strategic bombing would need to be changed as a result of the experiences of WWII. This came about with the advent of two separate types of airplanes for two separate roles. With the creation of fission and then the fusion weapons, the pure Douhetism idea of lightning victory became very appealing, yet at the same time the realization that not all conflicts could be solved with atomic weapons (it took the United States Air Force Korea and Vietnam to figure this out) brought about a second class of bomber. The first type of bomber, the B-52, was a direct descendent of the great heavy bombers of the Second World War, and it

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[1] Crane, 45.

functioned mainly as a heavy nuclear bomber, carrying strategic deterrence to another level.

Today, the B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit, a stealth bomber, function as America's strategic bomber deterrence force, functioning as a deterrent together with land and submarine based missiles. These airplanes have an important role in national security, functioning as nuclear weapons platforms. The second type of bomber is the innovative modern fighter-bomber, the F-16 Fighting Falcon being the best example. The fighter-bomber is capable of carrying a small load of nuclear weapons, but its primary role is the support of ground troops using powerful and accurate weaponry. While it might be said that the modern fighter-bomber is descended from the World War II fighter, it can better be seen as a cross between the accurate fighter and powerful conventional bomber of World War II. Whatever the case may be, the irony is that the heyday of the bomber also brought about it extinction. With the advent of the A-Bomb and then the H-Bomb, huge bomber fleets numbering several thousand were simply no longer needed for strategic deterrence, as a much smaller fleet of nuclear bombers would suffice. Large bombers were also not needed for tactical purposes, as smaller fighter-bombers are much more accurate, especially with modern weapons, and can be manufactured for much cheaper while still carrying a formidable weapons package on a strong frame powered by powerful jet engines.

In a way, the Second World War was an arena of experimentation for air power that began to be rendered moot with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Nuclear weapons assured that strategic bombing could be a decisive weapon, and an independent Air Force was thus created without much debate. When the United States Air Force was established, an agreement was made whereby the service would be split into two commands – the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Tactical Air Command (TAC). Part of the agreement was that TAC would be adequately funded so it would be able to provide close air support to the Army, as it had done under the command of men such as Pete Quesada during the war. Unfortunately, the Air Force reneged on its promise and virtually gutted TAC, believing strategic nuclear bombing to be the only important tool in modern warfare. A lesson in the need for tactical close air support would be learned only with the spilling of blood in Korea and Vietnam. With regards to the issue of American industry and its enabling the strategic bombing of World War II, this issue is particularly relevant. During the war, the industrial might of America was devoted to war production, and sufficient aircraft for both tactical and strategic purposes were produced. After the war, military budget cuts would hinder the ability of American war industries to produce, and disaster would befall the newly formed Air Force in Korea and the first half of Vietnam, with the organization displaying no ability whatsoever to support ground campaigns, to the point where the U.S. Army established its own air wing.

Still, in the end, Arnold and Spaatz achieved their goal – the creation of an independent air organization on par with the other military services. While it is debatable as to whether or not this was a proper development, one thing is clear. The road was very rough, but the development of the AAF, the American industries that built it, the personalities that guided it, and the strategies and doctrines that preserved and transformed it into an independent organization, all played a major role in putting an end to the German war plan and thereby ending the war.

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Jabotinsky Revisited:
The Vision of an Israeli Leader

by **Israel Steckler**
YC '05

▄▟ *The Making of a Zionist*

Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky can be called one of the greatest proponents of the Zionist cause. Jabotinsky succeeded in influencing thousands of young Jews to fight for the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz Israel. Jabotinsky stressed the importance of gaining foreign support for a Jewish homeland yet he believed that a Jewish army was needed to protect the state from enemy attacks.

Jabotinsky was a lifelong Zionist. He made his first speech at the age of seventeen and continued to campaign for Zionism until his death thirty seven years later. Everything in which Jabotinsky involved himself was devoted to the cause. Dr. Oscar K. Rabinowicz recalled Jabotinsky saying, "When I look at a lamp and talk of it, I do so 'Zionistically'; when I look at a house, a ship, a street, or talk of them, I do so 'Zionistically.'"[1]

Jabotinsky joined the World Zionist executive in 1921, and was one of the founders of *"Keren Hayesod,"* which was the main institution for financing the Zionist Organization's activities in Eretz Israel. After a series of policy disagreements on the direction of the Zionist Movement, he seceded from the executive and, in 1925, established the Union of Revisionist Zionists (*Hatzohar*) which called for the immediate establishment of a Jewish State.[2]

Colin Shindler, a professor at the University of London, writes that Jabotinsky attacked Chaim Weizmann's, the leader of the World Zionist Organization, assertion that the call for a Jewish state was 'extremism.'[3] Weizmann's vision seemingly repudiated the very idea of a Jewish state, or even a Jewish majority in Palestine, in favor of an autonomous community.[4] Jacob Abadi, a professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy, writes that in the fall of 1922, the gap between Weizmann and Jabotinsky widened because Jabotinsky promoted a militant policy and rejected

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[1] Schechtman, Jacob B. Fighter and Prophet (New York: Eshel Books, 1986), 549.

[2] "Biography." Tel Aviv, Israel: The Jabotinsky Institute in Israel. http://www.jabotinsky.org/jabhom_e.htm.

[3] Shindler, Colin. (Israel, Likud, and the Zionist Dream (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1995), 8.

[4] Shindler, 7.

Weizmann's conciliatory approach to Great Britain. "Jabotinsky rejected Weizmann's 'synthetic' approach; his tactic was to demand the maximum. As Jabotinsky saw it, one cannot compromise on such an issue. He said: there is a need to present these demands and to insist upon them as unpleasant as they may be ... and if they stem from your clear right, the British side would eventually recognize them.' "[1] Weizmann's view thus contrasted sharply with the ideology of Jabotinsky's newly formed group, the Revisionist Zionists, which believed that the immediate goal of Zionism was the establishment of an independent Jewish state.[2]

◀ A Visionary Leader

Jabotinsky's vision of a state was one with a Jewish majority on both sides of the Jordan River. Jabotinsky strongly opposed any plan that would split the Land of Israel into an Arab and a Jewish state. The Revisionist leader opposed several British resolutions, including the 1922 White Paper which curtailed Jewish immigration to Palestine and the plan offered by the Peel Commission in 1937, which proposed the partition of Palestine. The Revisionists required their members to formally support the belief in *Shlemut Hamoledet*, the right of the Jews to Eretz Israel in its entirety.[3]

Jabotinsky believed that Jews had to adopt a philosophy of power, of *barzel* (iron), in order to strengthen themselves for the battles to come. Only an iron wall of Jewish strength would protect Israel from Arab attacks.[4] Jabotinsky regarded Arab opposition to Zionism as inevitable and he believed that efforts aimed at reconciliation were hopeless and doomed to failure. In 1937, Jabotinsky oversaw the creation of the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization). The I.Z.L. (Irgun) became the military arm of the Revisionist movement and fought against the enemies of the Zionist enterprise.[5]

Early in 1939, Count Michael Lubiensky, a minister in the Polish government, arranged a meeting between Jabotinsky and the renowned pacifist Professor Orzensky. During the course of the meeting, Orzensky objected to the Irgun's actions against British military installations. The professor argued for a more evenhanded approach insisting that, "reason and not the sword must rule human destiny."[6] To support his belief in military force, Jabotinsky quoted Ferdinand Lasalle's drama *Franz von Sickingen*. In the play, Father Oekolampadius, a Lutheran chaplain, describes the importance of force to the great humanist, Ulrich Von Hutten. Oekolampadius said:

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[1] Abadi, Jacob. <u>Israel's Leadership, From Utopia to Crisis</u> (Westport: Greenwood Press, 993), 66.
[2] Shindler, 7.
[3] Peleg, Ilan. "Jabotinsky's Legacy and Begin's Foreign Policy." <u>Reconstructionist</u> XLIX (1983): 9-14.
[4] Shindler, 12.
[5] "Biography."
[6] Schechtman, 476.

My worthy Sir! You ill acquainted are
With history. You're right – 'tis Reason that
Its contents constitutes, its *form* is even *Force*
... My worthy Sir! Think better of the sword!
A sword, for freedom swung on high, that, Sire,
The Word *Incarnate* is of which you preach.[1]

Although Jabotinsky's philosophy of iron called for a strong Jewish military, he also disagreed with reprisals that cost the lives of Arabs who were not directly connected with Arab terror.[2] Jabotinsky sometimes questioned the tactics of the Irgun and once asked its commanding officer in Europe about the group's activities. "How can your Irgun people throw bombs in Arab quarters at random, indiscriminately killing women and children? You must at least warn the Arabs in time to evacuate the sections where you are going to retaliate."[3]

Jabotinsky also understood that political action was significant as well in his quest to establish a Jewish state. An intrinsic element of Jabotinsky's philosophy was that the Jewish problem could be solved by a world-wide Zionist movement which pressured foreign governments on the Palestine issue. A sustained and concerted political offensive along these lines was an important part of the Zionist struggle.[4]

Jabotinsky opposed radical, Fascist movements including Abba Achimeir's "Club of Revisionist Maximalists" which completely rejected the political approach. Abba Achimeir, a Revisionist activist, demanded that the Revisionist party abandon its democratic structure and organize itself into a military unit, similar to an exclusive order, which would focus all of its energies into the physical struggle for Israel.[5] Jabotinsky was equally unimpressed with the Brit Ha'Biryonim group which looked to the Fascist and Nationalist Socialist movements for ideological support.[6]

One of the essential features of Fascist ideology is the glorification of an authoritarian government fully dominating the acts and thoughts of its citizens. In 1937, Jabotinsky's "Revolt of the Fathers" preached, on the contrary, a minimalist state, which leaves the citizen free to fend for himself as long as he does not hurt his neighbor and a state which behaves "like a decent policeman intervening only when you call for him."[7]

Schechtman explains that throughout his life, Jabotinsky was an unhyphenated Zionist: not a Socialist or religious Zionist, but simply a Zionist. To him, two ideals, which simultaneously control one's mind and one's soul, were "an absurdity like two gods, like two altars in one temple. For "a healthy soul can be only singular minded ... the word

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[1] Schechtman, 477.
[2] Schechtman, 453.
[3] Schechtman, 413.
[4] Schechtman 454.
[5] Schechtman, 438.
[6] Shindler, 18.
[7] Schechtman, 563.

'ideal' has in its essence no plurals ... If Zionism is an ideal, there remains no room for any other independent objective of equal right ; and there can exist no partnership, no cartel, and no combination." He opposed the Socialist and religious models of Zionism not because he was inherently opposed to Socialism or religion, but because they had no place within the temple of Zionism.[1] The primary goals of Zionism were the establishment of the Jewish state and the redemption of the Jewish people. These goals were so great, so lofty, and at the same time so difficult and complicated an undertaking, that they required the undivided attention of the Jewish youth. Zionism needed to be pure from any other ideal; it could not tolerate a rivalry with another ideological movement.

Jabotinsky recalled the biblical injunction against *shaatnez* (wearing garments made of a mixture of wool and cotton) by calling on the youth to ban *shaatnez* from their ideological garments. A stanza in one of Chaim Nachman Bialik's poems illustrates Jabotinsky's beliefs. "One sun in the sky, and one faith in the heart – and no other." Jabotinsky succeeded in spreading the anti-*shaatnez* spirit into the hearts and minds of young Jewish revolutionaries. When Shlomo Ben Yosef, an Irgun activist, went to the gallows in Acre in 1938, he did so with "one faith" in his heart. Dov Gruner and the other heroes of the underground also followed in the footsteps of Ben Yosef and gave their lives for the cause.[2]

◀ *A Legacy of Pride*

Menachem Ussishkin, a Zionist activist who was not part of Jabotinsky's camp, expressed appreciation to Jabotinsky for "having given the youth new hope in our political future."[3] The Revisionist leader told the youth that they were the heirs to King David, to the spiritual values of the prophets and to the proud, heroic tradition of the Maccabees and of Bar Kochba. He emphasized that historical circumstances had assigned them the unparalleled honor and unprecedented responsibility of resurrecting the Jewish state and that they may not divest themselves of their destiny and responsibility. The Revisionist party's youth wing, *Betar*, wholeheartedly followed Jabotinsky's teachings and exhortations. They absorbed Jabotinsky's message into their hearts and carried it stubbornly, persistently, and successfully to the rest of the Jewish world.[4]

Jabotinsky expected the members of *Betar* to be upstanding citizens of their respective countries. He emphasized this idea in a letter to the students of the new

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[1] Schechtman, 550-551.
[2] Schechtman, 412.
[3] Schechtman, 411.
[4] Schechtman, 411-412.

Betar Naval Academy in Civitavecchia, Italy. The Revisionist leader insisted on the strictest observance of the minutest rules of behavior and good manners:

> "Be tactful, be noble ... do not grab the first bench, even if it is given to you. Learn the Italian language well ... learn to speak quietly in school, in the street, at your meetings. ... Personal cleanliness of your clothing should be a commandment to you every moment of your life. You must shave every morning. ... Every morning you must check whether your nails are clean. When you work, your face, hands, ears and your whole body must be clean.[1]

Jabotinsky will be remembered as someone who changed the face of Zionism forever. At a time when the youth of Europe were in despair, Jabotinsky gave them hope for the future. Through persistence, courage and bravery, Jabotinsky assured his young followers that they would be able to build a secure life in the Land of Israel. Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky can be considered as one of the foremost Zionist personalities because he succeeded in promulgating Zionism successively on a massive scale throughout Europe and the world.

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[1] Schechtman, 416.

The Birth of Modern Turkey

A Study in the History of Turkish Nationalism

by **Brahm Weinberg**
YC '04, RIETS '08

◀ *Introduction*

Modern Turkey is unique in so many ways: It is one of the few non-Arab countries of the Middle East and is also the most democratic besides Israel. In many ways, the politics of the relatively young state are still in flux, and the course that the Turkish nation will take in the future has not yet been determined. Much of the reason Turkey is so unique today and why it is still trying to determine its identity lies in the circumstances out of which the modern Turkish Republic was born over eighty years ago. The case of Turkish nationalism is unique amongst other nationalist movements of the late nineteenth century and deserves special attention. We must trace the history of Turkish nationalism that was born in the Muslim Ottoman Empire and carefully examine its leaders, its organization, and its goals. Furthermore, we must qualify exactly what type of state was created in 1923, as well as the method by which Turkish identity was fostered amongst the once Ottoman population, in order to better define the characteristics of the national movement.

◀ *The Young Ottomans and Young Turks*

In response to the slow progression of the Tanzimat period of reforms in the Ottoman Empire from 1839-1876, a group of educated Ottomans banned together in the 1860's to push the government to modernize the ailing empire. Many of them had studied in European universities, and had been exposed to modern liberal thinking of the times. They then brought those ideas back to the Ottoman Empire. While they mainly pushed for reform and modernization, they did begin to have a sense of patriotism for the Ottoman Empire, and saw themselves invoking change in order to preserve their country from demise in the face of advancing Europeans. These reformers, who came to be named Young Ottomans, were eventually exiled. They lost

touch with each other, but their initial ideas about the state laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Young Turks soon after.

The Young Turks, a group of army officers and intellectuals who banned together in the 1890's, began to form opposition groups to the Sultan's government in the 1890's, and were closely tied to the many intellectuals and rebels that were in exile in Egypt and Europe. The Young Turks were mainly made up of Muslim Turks whose goal was to modernize the Empire and free it from its oppressive sultan. The Young Turks were important because they took the ideas of the Young Ottomans a step further. They were primarily patriots, but also believed in the nation tied to the Fatherland and were concerned with the survival of the Empire. Their nationalism, sometimes called Ottomanism, consisted of uniting people under the political banner of the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks raised the issues of state, government, revolution, nation, and the mix of Muslim, Turkish, and Ottoman identities that became important in the national movement. They also formed secret societies that inculcated army officers and students with a revolutionary fervor, and formed the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP).[1]

The Young Turk revolt of 1908 took the Turkish national movement to its next level. In July of 1908, army generals associated with the CUP revolted against the regime of Abdulhemid and demanded restoration of their constitution. Sultan Abdulhemid feared a Young Turk march on Istanbul, so he conceded to reinstate the constitution and voted to include many CUP members in the government. Once a majority in the government, and once overcoming a counter-revolution in 1913, the CUP worked to improve the lot of the Ottoman masses. In doing so, they aimed to foster a national consciousness of being Ottomans.[2] This period of rule under the CUP introduced a period where people could be opened to thinking about issues of nationalism. But ironically, it was their failure that was essential to the Turkish National movement. They soon realized that perhaps there really was no complete body of united people called Ottomans to try and unite. The Young Turk movement and its revolution may have failed, but it was a giant step in the awakening of a Turkish national consciousness that was dormant for many years.[3]

◀ *Turkish Awakening*

It was because of the failure of the CUP and the Young Turks that intellectuals realized that there could be no real Ottomanism because of the diversity of the empire. Historically, there was an ancient ethnic group called the Turks that descended from the

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[1] Ramsaur, Ernest Edmondson. The Young Turks (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1957), 94

[2] Fisher, Sydney Nettleton and William Ochsenwald. The Middle East Volume II (USA: McGraw-Hill Companies. 1997), 321-9

[3] Lewis, Bernard. The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press. 1961), 213

area around Anatolia. However, they were not really conscious of the fact that they constituted any sort of special group per se; they saw themselves primarily as Ottomans and as Muslims. In the early twentieth century people began to notice that amongst the ethnicities of the Empire, the ethnic Turks seemed to be numerous and dominant over the rest. "What existed [in the Ottoman Empire] was not a nation but a domination, the hegemony of the conquerors of an empire [Turks] over the people's they had conquered."[1] However, the question then became: what was the nature of that group called the Turks? Were they Muslims or were they Turks? The two concepts had been heavily intertwined because the growth of the Empire as well as Islam had always gone hand in hand. Intellectuals such as Namik Kemal hardly distinguished between "what was Ottoman and what was Islamic."[2] As this question was pondered, a Turkish national consciousness distinct from Ottomanism was born. This time of discovery in Turkish history would be what Miroslav Hroch would call "phase A" of the national movement in which there is a national awakening.

This national awakening was only able to occur because of certain outside influences on the Turks. Because of the whole process of reform within the Empire, Young Turk military leaders were trained under French, and later, German officers. The German officers taught skill as well as ideology, and profoundly affected the officers by teaching them the values of the German romantic nationalism of the 1880's: The ethnic nationalism of Central and Eastern Europe as opposed to the political nationalism of the old continuous states of the West. This nationalist ideology was strongly influenced by Johann Gottlieb Fichte who wrote about the racial basis of a nation that remained in the "original dwelling place of the ancestral stock". The focus of some Young Turks after they abandoned Ottomanism became a romantic nationalism stressing their ethnic roots, their ties to the land and their "volk," their people.

Aside from the influence of European officers on the Empire, many Turks themselves traveled to Europe to attend university and were exposed to ideas of liberal nationalism. Moreover, Orientalists of the eighteenth century began to study the history and language of the Islamic Turks as an ethnic group, and developed a field called Turcology. They showed how the Turkish people had a vital role in the history of the area even before they adopted Islam. European ideas also influenced the Turks via Eastern Europeans from Russia and the territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire who came to settle in Turkey after the failed national uprisings of 1848. One such person, a Russian Tatar named Yusuf Akcura, recognized that there was no hope in trying to create an Ottoman political nation; the Turks had to create a unified Turkish nation based on the Turkish race and composed of ethnic Turks from all over Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, this exact form of nationalism was rejected by Kemal and did not form the basis of the Turkish nation, but it was a crucial realization nonetheless.

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[1] Ibid., 233
[2] Ibid., 233

After intellectuals and more educated people were "awakened" to their national Turkish identity, either in the mid 1800's or more solidly after the failure of Ottomanism and the CUP, the ideas of a Turkish nation were spread and popularized amongst mainly the elite through a host of clubs and literary publications dedicated to Turkish cultural activity. These societies were studying Turkish language, history, and lexicography, and were led by important figures such as Necib Asim who was a pioneer in the field of Turcology. Groups such as *Turk Demegi*, Turk Society, helped to bring the idea of the Turk from obscurity into the foreground. Its purpose was " 'to study and make known the ancient remains, history, languages, literatures, ethnography and ethnology, social conditions and present civilizations of the Turks, and the ancient and modern geography of the Turkish lands.' "[12] In educating themselves about the "new Turk," and in focusing on the historic ethnicity of the Turk, they connected together all the Turks of the empire to each other and to the land. Journals such as *Turk Yurdu* were founded, and they became the organ of the nationalist movement. Ziya Gokalp, a towering figure of the Turkish national movement was "the outstanding theoretician"[3] and wrote about Turkish nationalism in these publications. Gokalp held the nation in the highest regard and "like Mazzini [the famed Italian nationalist], he rationalized as morally good all that the nation did."[4] He believed that the individual could only be fully realized within the context of his collective community. For Gokalp, the Turkish nation was one that had to be based primarily on ethnicity or race, but also on a common culture, geography, language, and religion. Gokalp, unlike Ataturk who did built off of this theory, believed that Islam was an intrinsic part of the Turkish nation but that many of its outdated and ancient practices should be done away with. Gokalp's plan for national consciousness was for the elite to help the masses realize their "true native" values by developing their folk culture.[5] Gokalp said in 1923 that the nation was not ethnic or racial, but actually "composed of men and women who have gone through the same education, who have received the same acquisitions in language, religion, morality, and aesthetics."[6] Other poets and literary figures of the time that played a part in the national awakening include Mehmed Emin who began to publish poetry in Turkish reminiscent of the type of Turkish used in folk poetry. Emin reminded people of the notion of "The Turk" as an ethnic group tied together by blood that is still alive. This word, "Turk," as well as the idea of a Turkish Fatherland, would be the basis of the self-awareness of those people that had always existed with an identity overshadowed by being Ottoman and Islamic.[7]

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[1] Get orig. source

[2] Ibid., 349

[3] Ibid., 350

[4] Peretz, Don. The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1978), 158

[5] Ibid., 157-9

[6] B Lewis, 323

[7] Ibid., 343

Much of the progress of the national awakeners was halted as the CUP led the Empire into World War I and these Turkish nationalists, ironically, fought for the Empire. However, after the war, the movement really came to a head under Mustafa Kemal (later to be known as Ataturk, or father of Turkey), and the nationalists achieved independence soon after. It is interesting to note that historian Miroslav Hroch describes three distinct phases of the national movement. His theory reveals that the natural progression would have been for the national awakeners that have been discussed so far in this paper to have convinced the rest of the population of their national identity prior to independence. The Turkish case is somewhat unique: Primarily, a small group of military officers, artists, and elites realized their national consciousness, wrote about it, and rebelled alone against the empire to gain independence. At the time of independence, most of the population considered themselves Muslims (Britannica 964), not Turks, and some even rebelled against the nationalists. "Support for Kemal, the Grand National Assembly, and the Ankara government came chiefly from the military, civilian bureaucrats, large landowners, the *ulama*, and professionals, but there was popular enthusiasm among many peasants and townspeople as well."[1] Many non-Turkish nationalists also joined forces with Kemal because they still wished to overthrow the foreign invading powers that were destroying the Empire that they held dear.

The Nationalists Under Kemal

How did the nationalists gain independence without the support of the nation? It was their skill, determination, and their incredible leader that paved the way to victory. Mustafa Kemal was born in Salonika in 1881, and grew up to be the leading force in the Turkish national movement and the primary national agitator in the pre-Republic and post-Republic eras. He trained as a young Turkish army officer in military college during the reign of Abdulhemid. The College in which he studied was a base for many secret nationalist societies, as were many of the army schools. He read the works of the Young Turks, learned about nationalism and about taking charge of the ills of one's country, and he recalled that he "felt the urge to communicate this discovery to the thousands of other students."[2] He wrote for many newspapers and spread his initial ideas of the nation of Turks. After the War was over, Kemal joined one of the many resistance groups that opposed the Sultan's government and all the treaties that were slitting apart their state. By this time, many of the military officers had been trained in nationalist ideology: They knew about what it meant to fight for your nation and be self defined even if they disagreed on what their definition should be. These Turks believed that the Ottoman Empire really belonged in the hands of the Turks and not just any

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[1] Fischer, 400
[2] B Lewis, 244

Muslim, Arab, or especially any foreign power. Mustafa Kemal became the spokesman for the entire nationalist and resistance movement, and more clearly defined Turkish nationalism. In one of many letters, Mustafa Kemal wrote to military officers to warn them that "the territorial integrity of the Fatherland and our national independence are in danger."[1] This statement is incredible. It shows that at this stage there was already a consciousness of a distinct Turkish nation, there was a connection made from the nation to its land, and there was a desire amongst one segment of the population to fight and ensure independence.

Under Kemal, the Nationalists assembled a congress of representatives in Erzurum, and established some of the basic tenets of their nationalist mission in what they called the National Pact of 1919. This pact was bold, influential, and assertive of nationalist demands. The pact says that the post-World War I Treaty of Lausanne would be a "Turkish peace treaty" showing that they were affirming their national status to the world. They affirmed that their nation would grow and prosper and that they "accept no restriction that will hamper" their political, financial, and judicial development.[2] The next step in realizing their independence was the formation of the Grand National Assembly (GNA), the seat of nationalist political power and the forerunner of the future Republic's government. It is in this forum that Kemal stated the decisive nationalistic words so reminiscent of Rousseau and Sieyes: "Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation. The Grand National Assembly is the true and sole representative of the nation."[3] It was from this position that the nationalists presented an ultimatum to the Grand Vizir of the post-war Ottoman Government in Istanbul to either resign or make way for them "to take any action it thinks fit."[4] Kemal spoke as a representative not of the nationalists in Ankara, but on behalf of the nation. The Grand Vizir's resignation allowed for the government to recognize the nationalists, agree to Turkish territorial integrity, and serve as delegates at the Lausanne Peace Conference. All preparatory steps were made and the nationalist camp was sufficiently prepared to bring about independence.

As outlined in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, all foreign troops left Istanbul and only a few days later Kemal and his nationalist troops entered into the capital and took over the government. The GNA then voted that the permanent capital of the new Turkish state should be in Ankara. This was already the first sign that showed a complete break with the Ottoman past and a newly established Turkey in the area of Anatolia. Now that the nationalists had control of the government, they began the final stage of the nationalist movement, albeit out of order – the remainder of Hroch's Phase B. The nationalists aimed to convince the population at large of their Turkish identity through a six point plan called Kemalism that consisted of: Republicanism, Secularism,

[1] Lewis, Geoffrey. Turkey (Great Britain: Frederick A. Praeger. 1965), 58
[2] Ibid., 62
[3] Ibid., 64
[4] Ibid., 60

Populism, Nationalism, Statism, and Reformism. We must outline some of the ideas of these six points of the national program because they illustrate the values and ideas of the nationalists, and help to define the nature of the national movement.

After much talk of what type of what system of government would be used to rule the new country, Kemal declared that "The form of government of the Turkish State is a Republic" (GL Lewis 79). Along with this came the realization that people would be able to vote whomever they wanted into government following the principle that that sovereignty lies with the nation. Kemal continued to be the President and acted as a benevolent dictator, a post necessary in order to keep his program of Turkification on track. He abolished the Sultanate, and declared a constitution in 1924. Republicanism was important because it was the most modern and Western way to suitably govern the state: Being modern and Western was crucial for the Turks to get rid of old Islamic stigmas, integrate into Europe, keep up, and thrive. Another way the Turks became European and also got rid of ancient Islamic and Ottoman habits was through Secularism, the second point of Kemalism. A secular state allowed Turks to focus on Turkish heritage and culture rather than on being Muslim. They adopted the Gregorian calendar, outlawed the Fez, adopted civil, penal, and commercial law based on different western models, and ended polygamy along with many other innovations.

◖ *Kemalism and Turkification*

It was not only important to get rid of old stigmas, but also to create a new Turkish identity to replace the old Ottoman one. The Kemal administration engaged in Turkification of the nation in many ways. One of the major achievements of the Kemal administration that is worth mentioning is the abolition of the old Arabic alphabet and creation of a whole new Turkish alphabet with Latin characters. This forced not only the ninety percent of illiterates to read in Turkish, but also the literate ones to learn how to read and write all over again in a uniquely Turkish way. In the process of bringing this plan to fruition, they used the principle of Populism to enforce mandatory public education using newly printed textbooks and literature in the Turkish alphabet. This was an incredibly daunting task that succeeded not only in tripling the literacy rate, but also in giving an added Turkish character to the Turkish language freeing it from all Arabic and Muslim ties.

In another linguistic attempt to Turkify the nation, the nationalists got rid of many Arabic and Persian words that were used in Turkish in order to purify and restore the Turkish language to its greatness and "resurrect obsolete Turkish words."[1] They went so far as to publish government-generated lists of new Turkish words. They did so, once again, in order to foster a sense of pride in the ancient Turkish culture and separate it

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[1] Fischer, 406.

from Islam, Arabs, and Persians. This was a somewhat justified attempt, because there was an Old Anatolian Turkish in pure unadulterated Turkish that existed in the eleventh century that they could have been aspiring to recreate. However, even back then, Turkish absorbed many Arabic and Persian words and grammar, as well as the Arabic script.[1]

One of the other points that the program of Kemalism focused on was Nationalism itself. The way in which Kemalism portrays Turkish nationalism will reveal some of the essential qualities of the movement as a whole. Kemal attempted to show the citizens of Modern Turkey that they weren't only part of the Republic, but that they belonged to an ancient civilization that played a critical role in human history. The opportunities to re-write history from this perspective happened to be ideal because they were already re-writing all textbooks in the new Turkish alphabet. History in Turkey ended up teaching that some of the most important ancient nations of the Middle East, like the Sumerians and Hittites, were Turks. Yet, according to the new Turkish government, the Turks dated back even further: Adam in the story of creation was a Turk. In fact, the name Adam means "man" in Turkish. Teaching this myth of origin in time made the Turks think that they gave birth to all of mankind, and thus had the most important role of any nation in history.[2] This particular point is clearly a myth because "Adam" also means "man" in Hebrew and other languages. The nationalist agitators theorized that this ancient Turkish race was born in the "cradle of civilization:" Central Asia close to modern Turkey. In continuing to trace the development of the Turks in ancient times, they explain that the Turks migrated in all different directions when the area was desiccated, and moved to Africa and Asia. These migrant Turks ended up establishing the populations of India, China, and the Middle East: all the historically important civilizations that shaped world history.

This whole notion of a long Turkish history was so important in building a glorious Turkish identity that Ataturk formed the "Turkish Historical Society" in 1930 as the medium to impose these historical theories that contributed so greatly to the population's sense of nationalism.[3] Tracing the Turkish past to these early dates made the Turks the rightful rulers of the Fatherland of Turkey and made people proud to be part of the most ancient and influential civilization on earth. However, the excessiveness of this theory indicates that many of these things that were attributed to the Turks were simply myths. It seems that little is known about the Turkish people before the tenth century except for obscure references to some Turkish people here and there. This might indicate that they were not as important as the nationalists made them out to be. Nevertheless, it is not a complete myth: There was some basis to the claims they made, though they were exaggerated. It seems that Turks were actually located in the western

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[1] Encyclopedia Britannica. s.v. "Turkish Language."
[2] Ibid.
[3] Lewis, 359

and northern parts of Asia, and did migrate to places like China and Iran. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that they actually gave birth to those civilizations. The Turks really came to dominate the area of central Asia with great success under the Seljuk dynasty starting in the eleventh century.[1] Some of the Turkish claims are true, some are complete myth, and some are in between. They definitely tried to embellish their historical claims in order to establish a place and time when the Turkish nation came into being. By doing so, they hoped Turks would aspire to lead their nation to the greatness it once possessed in the golden age when the Turks gave birth to society, civilization, art, and culture worldwide.

The real facts actually point to the Turks having risen to greatness not at creation, but in the days of the Seljuks when the Oghuz Turkish tribe under the leadership of Osman came to the area of Turkey and began what was later known as the Ottoman Empire which grew to great height up until the end of the seventeenth century. Then again, promoting this completely truthful account of Turkish history and influence would have made too much of a connection between the significance of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire.

Some of the defining characteristics of the Turkish Republic were: Its granting all people equality before the law, placing sovereignty with the nation, and defining a Turk as anyone who was a citizen of the Republic.[2] In this respect, Turkish nationalism was inclusive in that it did not limit itself to ethnic Turks, but rather was willing to include anybody and make them equal before the law. However, Turkish nationalism itself started off as ethnic in that it was founded on the basis of a commonality between people of the same Turkish race, focusing on a common history and language. In fact, there were early Turkish nationalist theorists who wanted to stick to ethnicity and include all ethnic Turks in their movement, even ones living in Russia and elsewhere. In the end, Kemal won out and the original focus of ethnicity was shifted to a more politically based Turkish nation defined by the borders of the Fatherland even if there were ethnic Turks that lived outside those boundaries. Kemal rejected the non-Ottoman Pan-Turkists who wished to create an imperial dynasty of Turkish and Tatar peoples. Kemal simply wanted to focus not on imperialism, but on patriotism, loyalty to the Fatherland that he felt was an intrinsic part of the Nation, and thus defined the Nation's borders in a more political and exclusive way. Because of this shift in the nature of the movement, in the time of the Republic someone of Turkish decent outside the State was not considered a Turk, whereas a non-ethnic Turk who obtained citizenship in the Republic was considered a Turk. We see that the Turkish nationalism of the Republic was both inclusive and exclusive. It came to include anyone regardless of race or religion, but yet excluded many actual ethnic Turks who were not citizens of the Republic. Kemal himself was not even born in the territory that he came to name

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[1] Encyclopedia Britannica. s.v. "Turkic Peoples."
[2] Fischer, 401.

Turkey, but in Salonika, Greece. He regarded himself as part of the Turkish "nation" even if he was born outside of the territory that eventually came to define people as Turks. His birthplace did not matter because he moved to the area of Turkey and considered himself to be a Turk and a citizen. He told the GNA that "Unfortunately my birthplace lies outside our present frontiers. That is not my fault...I think I have won the affection and regard of my nation."[1]

Historian Peter Alter includes Turkish nationalism within his model of Risorgimentio nationalism, but places it within a subcategory called Reform nationalism. The Turks longed for a resurgence of an ancient glorious past, but were also unique – the Turkish nation grew out of the already existent state that "proved inferior...when confronted with Western Powers."[2] We have seen that the very first steps towards Turkish nationalism that were initiated by the Young Turks occurred because of this dissatisfaction with the declining Ottoman Empire and the desire to reform and become like Europe. However, unlike other cases of reform nationalism like Japan, Turkey tried to rid itself, as we have seen, of all symbols and traditions from the previous state, the Ottoman Empire.

◀ *Conclusion*

Turkish Nationalism was a movement that achieved a complete overhaul of a very ancient and well-established empire. The movement was ambitious and was successful because of the efforts of strong leaders and the help of certain historical circumstances. It was a top-down movement that aimed at "Turkifying" the masses of people in the empire by implementing devices to foster a sense of Turkish nationalism and also to get rid of the heavily Muslim and Ottoman identities that existed. The nationalists created a Republic whose borders and definition of citizenship and nationality were secular and political. The Turkish nationalists took an empire that was multiethnic, multi-religious, and multi-linguistic, and embarked on a mission to homogenize the many disparate groups on an enormous landmass into one Turkish nation. Their efforts are still being realized and the nature of the young Republic is still being determined up until today.

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[1] G Lewis, 70.
[2] Alter, Peter. Nationalism. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1994), 23.

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Imperialism in Practice:
The Influence of the Missionary Motive

by **Amitai Barth**
YC '04

◀ Introduction

There have been many Empires established or attempted throughout the ages, with varying degrees of success. In the age of nation-states and globalization following the anti-climatic culmination of the Cold War, our world has experienced a dissociation from the notion of Empire as a method for asserting influence upon other peoples. It is particularly imperative in today's post-colonial society, where the idea of imperialism is being repudiated as elitist, that we look back as historians and attempt to fathom the motivations for Empire-building and why they may or may not be justified today.

Empires have been established and expanded for financial, strategic, and colonial purposes. Yet the most overwhelmingly prevalent motive, which often led civilians to take up the battle cry and be willing to sacrifice their lives for their respective empires, was the missionary motive. The missionary motive is described by Richard Faber as the "ambition to proselytize; to convert other peoples to a religion, a culture or way of life."[1] While the primary interest of empires might have been the acquisition of money or territory, they have always had a latent interest in enforcing their values, which they have deemed superior, upon the colonies under their control. This interest stems from the belief that the imperialist, her civilization, and her culture are more advanced than those of the colonized.

◀ The Roman Empire

The Roman Empire was arguably history's most successful. No other empire has had such a lasting and immense impact on modern civilization. During her heyday, a span of two hundred years of peace and prosperity known as the Pax Romana, Rome encompassed virtually the entire known civilized world. The primary motivation for Rome's expansion in all directions was to acquire wealth. In 168 BCE Rome defeated Perseus in northern Greece; the subsequent celebration, known as a triumph, was three days long, as the 250 wagons displaying the captured art, weapons, silver, and gold

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[1] Faber, Richard. "The Vision and the Need: Late Imperialist Aims." (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), 16

were marched through Rome. The booty acquired in this and later battles gave Rome a budget surplus so great that she was able to suspend the war levy for 125 years, until the assassination of Julius Caesar threw the country into unrest. Another major motive behind Rome's expansion was the desire to show off her power, which was rooted in having the most advanced and disciplined army of its time. Thirdly, Faber explains, the strategic motive was predominant in causing the Roman legion to advance.[1] Rome had buffer zones in every direction, preventing any foreign invasion. This strategic safeguarding of the mother country and its environs allowed her to maintain tranquility within her borders for the two hundred years of Pax Romana, the longest period of internal prosperity an Empire of such magnitude has ever experienced.[2]

While Faber has ignored the missionary motive as a chief reason for Roman expansion, it is impossible to dismiss it. Virgil attributes the missionary motive as the raison d'etre, the sole purpose of existence, of the united Roman Empire. It was founded according to the will of the gods, as is described in Virgil's The Aeneid, for, although Aeneas was reluctant to leave Carthage to sail to Latium, Venus and her colleagues forced him to do so in order to start Rome as a beacon of civilization. Numa, the king who built early Rome, did so on a foundation of laws in order to spread the value of justice to the masses.[3] Rome's empire, Anchises tells his son Aeneas in Virgil's masterpiece, will rule the Earth's peoples in order to "pacify, impose the rule of law, to spare the conquered, [and] battle down the proud."[4] These efforts by the Romans were done in order to show the greatness of her regime, which would lead to mass conversions to the Roman mores and culture. Included in the missionary motive is the "ambition to convert other peoples to... a culture or a way of life,"[5] which is not accomplished by the sword but rather by the projection of superiority using imagery, propaganda, and displays of power. When the Roman provinces saw Rome's overwhelming dominance and felt the benefits of her imposition of law and order upon them, they succumbed to her might and assimilated. "When you can't beat 'em, join 'em" and "when in Rome, dress like the Romans" are clichés that illustrate the attitudes of the conquered peoples who later became citizens.

The power of assimilation exercised by the Romans was incomparable to that of modern imperial nations, Faber argues. He posits that the lack of resistance to Rome's assimilatory powers was due to a general lack of nationalism, racial prejudice, religious fanaticism, language barriers, and a clear rival. Rome's missionary work in terms of her assimilation left the most indelible impact; even fourteen centuries later the "traces of

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[1] Faber, 23

[2] The US by comparison is currently in the midst of a hundred and forty year period of tranquility; this fragile peace is being threatened by the rise of radical Islam.

[3] Virgil. The Aeneid, translated by Robert Fitzgerald. (Knopf, New York, 1992), Book VI, lines 190-193

[4] Virgil, Book VI, lines 1152-1154

[5] Faber, 16

civilization are still distinguishable."[1] Other empires were not as successful in their missionizing attempts to exert their superiority upon captured territories. Never again do we see an Empire able to convert peoples to its belief system largely without the use of force, relying almost solely upon assimilation.

Charlemagne

The Empire of Charlemagne was established in 800 CE by Charles the Great who persevered through a lifetime of military campaigns in order to expand the lands which he had inherited, Neustria and Austrasia, into a sizeable empire. His realm was so large, spanning eastward until modern Turkey, that the term Europe was adopted to refer to the area under his dominion. In addition to being a voracious conqueror, Charlemagne was an energetic builder and patron of the literary arts. The reason for Charles the Great's ambitious military campaigns was primarily his Christian missionary motive, his goal being to "spread the Gospel by fire and sword."[2]

Charlemagne's ulterior motives can be understood from his intervention in the papacy's affairs in the year 800. Leo III, appointed pope in 1795, was attacked by relatives of Pope Adrian I, who attempted to excise his eyes and cut off his tongue, which would render him unfit for the papacy. Before the pope recovered from the attack his survival was far from certain. His death at that juncture would have brought about an existential crisis for Christianity – a tremendous blow could have been delivered to the credence of the religion as having Divine intervention. Pope Leo III fled to the protection of Charlemagne in 799, ensuring the perpetuation of the papacy. The next year, on Christmas Day, the pope crowned Charlemagne Emperor, an event marking the beginning of the Holy Roman Empire, a Christian entity. Although he was illiterate and may not have been knowledgeable in Christian doctrines, Charles the Great's contributions to Christianity were indisputable and were rewarded with his canonization.[3]

The Spanish in the New World

Following Columbus's discovery of the New World, the Spanish rose to imperial heights, setting up a highly profitable Empire in South America, Central America, the Caribbean, and the Philippines. In the sixteenth century, their conquistadors were successful in delivering gold and silver to Spain in great quantities. At this point Spain reached her apex; she was a world power with a navy which ensured that the sun never

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[1] Faber, 24
[2] Davies, Norman. Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 304
[3] ibid.

set on her empire. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Spain's colonies gained their independence, embracing the trend of revolution that was sweeping the world. After close to two centuries of independence, why is it that most of South and Central America are still composed of Roman Catholic, Spanish-speaking countries? Because of Spain's missionary motive, which was an integral part of their policy toward their colonies and was extremely successful in its replacement of the local lifestyles with Iberian culture. What at first glance seems like a solely mercantile empire in fact devoted a large amount of resources to religious and cultural efforts abroad.

The beginning of the Spanish Empire's deterioration, and likewise the rise of British ascendancy, can be pinpointed to the year 1588, which witnessed a clash between the Spanish Armada and the British navy. King Philip II of Spain had sent his navy with 30,000 men to invade England and gain the throne for himself. Largely due to bad luck and bad weather, the British Navy was able to rout the Spanish Armada. The "Invincible Armada" returned home in defeat with only half of her original fleet. This English victory led to a period of British dominance, although Britain's empire would not reach its climax until the 19th century.[1]

The British in India

It was in the 19th century that "the sun did not set on the British Empire." The British Empire was one of the greatest; it had dominion over more souls and was spread out more than any other. Hazewell in fact argued that Britain's influence was greater than Rome's, for the Roman Empire was "favorably situated for the maintenance of her supremacy" and could only boast of a population of 120,000,000, compared to Britain's, which from afar ruled over several hundred million in India alone.[2]

What was the British motive for acquiring India as a colony? The economic motive was clearly at the forefront; India provided the British with valuable spices and textiles. England was keen on maintaining her monopoly over Indian trade, which was threatened from within by interlopers attempting to divert trade and from the outside by the Russians and French.

The missionary motive, though not usually the primary cause for British imperial pursuits, usually contributed to her actions. From the outset the missionary objective had a vital role, as Edward Hay explains, for "'the discoverie [sic] and planting' of remote countries could only succeed if their chief intent was the sowing of Christian religion."[3] British missionary efforts were for the most part geared at imposing Anglican

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[1] Encyclopedia.com; s.v. "Spanish Armada"

[2] Hazewell, Charles Creighton. "British India." The Atlantic Monthly 1:1 (1857): 85-93

[3] Faber, 37

Protestantism on its subjects; Britain's efforts have been somewhat successful in India, which today has a Christian population of approximately 25 million.

Britain's missionary goals were not solely religious; there was an attempt to indoctrinate British culture and mores as well. In 1787, England's Abolition of Slavery Society founded the colony of Sierra Leone in Africa to spread the fledgling English belief calling for the abolition of slavery. England also installed parliamentary democracies in her colonies and allowed them to govern themselves, which was done in order to elevate the colonies to the British ideal of democratic self-rule.

◀ *Hitler's Doctrines*

Perhaps the bleakest example of Empire, the German state under Hitler, was similarly built upon the missionary motive. In the late 1930's Adolf Hitler expanded Germany beyond the borders of the Weimar Republic largely without the use of force. His justification for annexing large portions of neighboring Slavic countries into Germany was that more *lebensraum*, living space, was needed to accommodate their large population. In reality, the primary purpose of annexing the Sudetenland, Saarland, Bohemia and Moravia, and Austria was to spread Aryan ideals. Karl Haushofer, a German theorist, believed that it was necessary for the Nazis to seize *lebensraum* from the Slavs and to spread their "master race."[1] Aryan doctrines extolled strength and discipline, for these virtues were found in the Nazi ideal, the *ubermensch*, or super-man. The Germans also sought to spread their form of totalitarian government, which was organized as a pyramid with the Fuhrer at the top, and their system of socialism. Democracy had to be abolished everywhere, according to Nazi doctrines, for it was a distorted form of government acting to protect the "deformed cripples and cretins, women who look merely loathsome, men who resemble beasts rather than humans, children that if encountered in real life would be viewed as a curse of God."[2]

◀ *America's Spread of Capitalism and Democracy*

Finally we come to the most enigmatic 'Empire,' the United States of America. No country has been "as dominant culturally, economically, technologically and militarily in the history of the world since the Roman Empire" as the United States has, columnist Charles Krauthammer posits.[3]

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[1] Encyclopedia.com, s.v. "National Socialism"
[2] Hitler, Adolf. "Peroration of Speech at the German Art Exhibition." (1937)
From D. Ades (ed.), <u>Art and Power: Europe under the Dictators 1930-45</u> (London: Hayward Gallery, 1995)
[3] Eakin, Emily; "All Roads Lead to D.C." NY Times (March 31, 2002)

Following WWII the United States reached her prime as a world power while Germany, France, England, and Japan were all greatly weakened by the destruction which the world's worst war wrought. It was during the period of the Cold War (1945-1989) that the United States exerted tremendous financial and political influence in Latin America, Southern Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, all in an attempt to prevent the spread of communism. This intervention can't be considered economically motivated, for to be so the United States would have had to have been driven by a "lust for loot or tribute... a search for markets or materials,"[1] while the United States intervened not by taking, but rather by proffering money to the countries under its influence. Nor can this intervention be deemed as self-motivated colonizing (i.e., economically motivated), for it was dictated by the missionary and strategic[2] motives. It sought to protect the mother country from the threat posed by communism via the use of buffer countries to prevent its spread. It simultaneously attempted to indoctrinate these buffer countries in the American values of capitalism, freedom of speech, the right to property, and democracy.

Following the decline of communism and the end of the Cold War in 1989, the United States has emerged as the only superpower in the world. Based on the previous examples of Empire, one would have expected the United States to attempt to increase the size of her already broad Empire. Yet during the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, there was a decrease in foreign intervention. The pro-isolationist position espoused can be attributed to the fear of America's downfall due to imperial overreach[3] and the association of empire building with despotism and totalitarian rule[4]. The United States condemned the motivations behind the building of empires as being unjust and therefore attempted to dissociate herself from notions of imperialism; it is for this reason that Pat Buchanan dubbed his book America: A Republic, not an Empire.

Since the September 11, 2001 attack, the United States has been in the process of re-evaluating her role and duties as the world's only superpower. Many have come to the conclusion that the attack was due to "*insufficient* American involvement and ambition" [author's italics] and have claimed that in order to rectify the situation it is necessary for her to be "more expansive in [her] goals and more assertive in [her] implementation."[5] What we are witnessing in the United States is a push to reassert itself as an empire, not a republic. This endeavor will manifest itself primarily in the missionary motive, as the United States will attempt to replace dictatorial, repressive rule with liberal democratic rule.

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[1] Faber, 15

[2] The strategic motive is defined as the maintenance of territory in order to protect the mother country.

[3] Yale University professor Paul Kennedy's fear. (Eakin)

[4] A connection expressed by Tony Sloman. [Ebner, Sarah. "Rome, sweet Rome." The Guardian (September 5, 2002)]

[5] Quote of Max Boot, editorial features editor for the Wall Street Journal. (Eakin)

The current target of these missionary efforts is Iraq, a country the United States fought just eleven years ago. When, in 1991, the allied troops ousted Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait, the United States was in a position to effect a "regime change" by removing the tyrannical despot controlling the country and implement a democracy based on American values. But due to her post-Cold War, anti-imperialist stance, the United States refrained from doing so. In 2003, the United States again invaded Iraq, mainly for the stated purpose of converting Iraq to the American way of life, to democracy and free enterprise.

◀ *Conclusion*

While not usually the primary cause of imperialism, the missionary motive was constantly an issue which determined the colonizer's policies. In certain instances it came to the fore and had overreaching influences, as we have seen with Charlemagne's restoration of the pope, which perpetuated Catholicism, with the Nazi expansion to spread Aryan ideals, and with United States attempts to reshape the Middle East in her image. Although classical empire building with the forced colonization of territories has declined, a new form of imperialism stressing the missionary motive appears to be emerging, one which may have a tremendous impact on post-9/11 society.

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Geiger's Historiography:
A Jewish-Centered Jewish History

by **Brian Kinzbrunner**
YC '02, Revel '04, RIETS '06

◀ *Introduction*

As the birth pangs of modernity gave way to the nineteenth century, the Jewish people of Western Europe began reexamining Judaism. Many Jewish scholars of the early nineteenth century, second generation members of the German *Haskalah*, decided to use modern methods of critical analysis in their study of Judaism. This method, known as *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, attempted to evaluate Judaism through its culture and history, creating the field of "Academic Jewish studies."[1] The reasons for the development of Jewish studies include the response to the anti-Jewish propaganda being spread by German student movements and the improvement Jewish intellectual standards of this period, for the feeling was that Jewish thought, both law and philosophy, was not taking into account current (nineteenth century) methods. For others, such as Leopold Zunz, the reason had to do with the increased integration of Jews within German society. Many Jews were estranged from Jewish heritage because they found Judaism irrelevant to the modern world. Thus, the goal was to show how Judaism could still be relevant through the use of modern methods of analysis. A third factor causing the rise of a scientific study of Judaism was self-propaganda, the need to strengthen the desire to be Jewish internally. Among the various scholars involved in developing this science was Abraham Geiger, one of the primary spokesmen for religious reform. As this paper will show, Geiger believed that Jewish history continuously evolves throughout every generation going back to the Bible.[2] Furthermore, we will see that Geiger's historiography is Jewish-centered, through the study of texts, showing the importance and strength of Judaism. One could argue that Geiger's historiography is a form of self-propaganda.

◀ *Abraham Geiger: Life and General Philosophy*

Abraham Geiger (1810-74) was one of the leaders of early Reform Judaism in nineteenth century Germany. As a child, he received a traditional education, something

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[1] The creation of "Academic Jewish Studies" implies the incorporation of Jewish studies into university curriculum. It also implies a departure from Jewish studies being strictly rabbinic property. However, many members of the *Wissenschaft* were themselves students of the *Beit Midrash*.

[2] Dinur, Benzion. "Wissenschaft des Judentums." *Encyclopedia Judaica*. CD-Rom edition c. Judaica Multmedia (Israel) Ltd.

common among many of the early Reform Rabbis. In 1829, he went to the University of Heidelberg to study oriental languages. Three years later he transferred to Bonn, were he met his eventual opponent, R' Samson Raphael Hirsch.[1] At Bonn, Geiger spent time studying under the philosopher Bobrich. Bobrich was important to Geiger's philosophical development because he did not espouse any specific philosophic system. Geiger believed that philosophical study should not be limited.[2] The other major influence on Geiger came from the philosopher Herder, a pre-romantic thinker whose interest in history was not political, "but (was) in order to discover the *evolution* (emphasis is mine) of the human spirit."[3]

In 1832, Geiger received a challenge from his professor, the German Arabist Georg Wilhelm Freytag, to write for a contest sponsored by the Philosophic Faculty of the University of Bonn. The contest called for a paper discussing the various aspects of Jewish thought found in the Quran. For this contest, Geiger wrote *Was Hat Mohammed aus dem Judenthum aufgenommen?*[4] This title implies that Mohammed's prophecies were developed as a result of his knowledge of Jewish thought, as opposed to a divine revelation.[5] Eventually, Geiger submitted this work as his doctoral dissertation.[6]

As Geiger was working on this essay, he was also appointed rabbi in Wiesbaden. As rabbi, he began to introduce reforms into the synagogue service, and also began publishing the journal *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift fuer juedische Theologie (Scientific Journal for Jewish Theology).*[7] This journal was Geiger's attempt to combine historical research with the issues of Jewish reform. There were six volumes of this journal published, and it included articles by Isaac Marcus Jost and Leopold Zunz.[8] Geiger believed that it was the Jewish theologian's role to advance Jewish scholarship because of his familiarity with the history of Judaism and their ability to judge ideas at a "'level appropriate to the ages' (a Herderian expression)."[9]

In 1857, while rabbi in Breslau, his main work, *Urshrift und Uebersetzungen der Bibel in ihrer Abhaengigkeit von der inneren Entwicklung des Judentums (The Original Text and Translations of the Bible in their Relation to the Inner Development of*

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[1].Levinger, Jacob. "Abraham Geiger." *Encyclopedia Judaica.* CD-Rom edition c. Judaica Multmedia (Israel) Ltd. As an aside, there are many who claim Hirsch's *Nineteen Letters* was written with Geiger in mind.

[2] Meyer, Michael. 1971 "Jewish Religious Reform and Wissenschaft des Judentums: The positions of Zunz, Geiger, and Frankel," *LBYIB* 16: 26-27.

[3] Ibid. 27.

[4] Translated as *What did Mohammed borrow from Judaism.*

[5] Lassner, Jacob. 1999 "Abraham Geiger: A Nineteenth-Century Jewish Reformer on the Origins of Islam." In *The Jewish Discovery of Islam: studies in honor of Bernard Lewis* ed. Martin Kramer. Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African studies, 103. This is clearly a polemical idea as well, for his work will come to show that Mohammed is not a prophet, but a very intellectually endowed person who is able to develop a religious system.

[6] Ibid. 104.

[7] "Geiger" EJ cd-rom.

[8] Wiener, Max. *Abraham Geiger and Liberal Judaism: The challenge of the Nineteenth Century.* 1962 Trans. Ernst J. Shlochauer. Philadelphia: JPS, 12.

[9] Meyer, "Jewish Religious Reform," 28.

Judaism) was published.[1] Geiger's motivation with this work, and various other books he wrote, was to show the evolution of Judaism. He attempted to prove that Judaism changed throughout the generations through the study of the text.[2] This work began this process by looking at the Bible and Talmud, determining that the Sadducees were the original heirs of Biblical Judaism, as they descended from the Zadokites, the priestly tribe in power of the Temple since the days of King David. Eventually, with the destruction of the Second Temple, the Pharisees asserted their control and "developed" a new Judaism whose chief works were the Mishnah and Gemara.[3]

Finally, as Rabbi in Frankfurt and Berlin, from 1863-1871, he wrote *Das Judenthum und seine Geschichte* (Judaism and Its History), a three volume work based on a series of lectures he gave as Rabbi of Frankfurt.[4] In these lectures, he distinguished between two historical views of Jewish tradition. The first view sees "Jewish history as a 'great world-historical phenomenon'" and the second view is that Jewish history is "merely a historical consideration."[5] These lectures were Geiger's attempt at presenting Judaism as something meaningful and current. He avoided objectifying Jewish history, something that many others involved in *Wissenschaft* were guilty of doing.[6] It must be remembered that part of Geiger's purpose was self-propaganda[7], causing him to present Judaism with a spirit (*Geist*).

◀ "A General Introduction to the Science of Judaism:" Judaism and Its History

◀ General ideas.

In a series of lectures Geiger gave at the Academy for the Science of Judaism in Berlin from 1872-1874, he discussed what *Wissenschaft* meant to him. Geiger was cofounder of the academy and was the first director, lasting from 1872-1874, when he passed away.[8] Through these lectures, Geiger wanted to present a "full understanding

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[1] Weiner 49.

[2] Ibid. 50.

[3] Ibid. 50-1. One should note that this analysis of the Bible and Talmud distinguishes Geiger from Zechariah Frankel, for Frankel did not study Bible as part of *Wissenschaft*. Geiger believed that Bible needed to be treated with the same philological and historical criticism that was being used for all other Jewish texts (Meyer, "Jewish Religious Reform" 36). It should be noted that the finding of the Dead Sea Scrolls has added considerable discussion to the development of Jewish law in the Second Temple period, further proving Geiger's notion of Jewish evolution.

[4] "Geiger" EJ cd-rom.

[5] Koltun-Fromm, Ken, 2000 "Historical Memory in Abraham Geiger's account of Modern Jewish Identity," *Jewish Social Studies* 7:1: 111.

[6] Ibid. 111.

[7] We must distinguish between propaganda and self-propaganda. Propaganda is an attempt at influencing those outside a certain group or religion about the group or religion, while self-propaganda is a method of influencing those within the fold.

[8] "Geiger" EJ cd-rom.

of the religious thought and ideal content which pervades Judaism and which dwells within it as its unique life giving force."[1] This life giving force, also known as *Geist*, is the spirit that allows an individual power to transcend time and space. This was an imagination that led to the feeling that knowledge was a presence. Knowledge is not simply something defined as past or present but is continuous. This *Geist* is also seen as a historical memory that is limited, allowing for Geiger's division of Jewish history between a "great world-historical phenomenon" and "historical consideration."[2] Geiger believed that *Geist* was part of the process allowing for continuous revelation throughout every generation.[3]

The Science of Judaism according to Geiger includes three aspects, philological study, historical study, primarily through the use of Jewish literature and culture, and philosophical and religious study. Regarding philology, since Judaism has its own language, which developed throughout the generations, it attests to Judaism's greatness. Hebrew, unlike Latin, which **became** the language of the church, was a purely Jewish language. The fact that Jews developed a language of their own is a strength of the religion. Those things which are powerful tend to exert the most influence upon the world. For example, Greek art, while it has become obsolete, is an example of the influence of great nations, for people are still following the patterns established. Judaism, because it has its own history and language, influenced other nations, thus allowing Geiger to argue that Judaism is universal. At the same time, Judaism began by developing as a nation and developing its own language. The people survived throughout the generations because, internally, Judaism was a closed system, one not designed to be universal.[4] Christianity, on the other hand, as a universal faith from the start, has been declining out of the weakness of no unique language and no specific nationhood.[5]

Geiger sees language and history as correlated, for "language is the articulation of the national idea" while history is the actualization of this idea.[6] In other words, history is the realization of the spoken idea. In Jewish history, we see that through the study of past events, one can develop a life of spirituality and intellectualism. Geiger therefore claims that Jewish history is the study of spiritual achievements (spiritual growth), for knowledge of these achievements will increase one's own spirituality. Other, non-intellectual historical events serve as a basis for understanding how these achievements occurred. However, Jewish history needs to be studied like any other

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[1] Weiner 149.

[2] Koltun-Fromm 111and 113-4.

[3] Meyer, Michael. 1975 "Abraham Geiger's Historical Judaism," In *New Perspectives on Abraham Geiger*. Ed. Jakob J. Petuchowski. New York: HUC-JIR, 6.

[4] At first glance, one might think this sentence and its predecessor contradict each other. However, Geiger is arguing that the people remain closed off from the world, but the idea known as Judaism is something that has taken on universal significance. Hence, the strength of Judaism is its duality.

[5] Weiner 149-52.

[6] Ibid. 154.

history, using methods of criticism and scientific study, following the path of the academy. Judaism should not allow its dogmas to interfere with a careful and true study of what happened in the past.[1]

Jewish history begins in antiquity and continues until the present day, another unique aspect of Judaism. The scholar must therefore start his study from the beginning in order to see how later developments already exist in a primitive form from the earliest of times. Geiger feels without the critical study of ancient Judaism, it would be near impossible to understand latter parts of Jewish history.[2]

Geiger divides Jewish history into four periods. The first he calls *Revelation*, which he believes is a time of internal creativity. This period ends with the close of the biblical era and not with the exile. Geiger names the second period *Tradition*, which is the period spanning from the completion of the Bible until the completion of the Babylonian Talmud. During this time, Judaism began to develop a sense of past, seeing itself as a continuation from the biblical Judaism, but still believed in the freedom to evolve from the past. Period three is the period of *Legalism*. Jewish leaders of this period did not believe they had to ability to deviate from the heritage they received from the past. Instead, this period is marked by the summation of the laws and ideas from the time of *Tradition*. This period lasted from the closing of the Babylonian Talmud to the middle of the 18th century. The fourth period is the era of *Critical Study*. Geiger felt the present generations had the ability and desire to again view Judaism as an evolving religion. He felt the goal of modernity was "to cause the stream of history to flow forth once again."[3]

◀ Period of Revelation.

Geiger begins by discussing the concept of the Deity within Biblical Israel. He says that similar to the other nations, the Jews believed the Tetragrammaton represented their own personal G-d, similar to any other prime deity of the time, and the Jewish people even believed the alien gods also had power.[4] The Israelites believed that their G-d would ultimately emerge victorious over these other gods. The notion of a supreme G-d, a single Deity who was unfathomable did not exist yet. Nevertheless, Geiger shows the idea of one G-d controlling the rest was an idea that was embedded within ancient Judaism.[5] There is no evidence for when Judaism actually began to

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[1] Ibid. 154-5

[2] Ibid. 156.

[3] Ibid. 156-7.

[4] As early as Exodus 20:4, in the Ten Commandments, G-d tells the people He is a jealous G-d. A standard question is why G-d would be jealous of other gods. Some claim that it is because the other gods are artificial, made up by humans. Using Geiger's reading, perhaps jealous G-d is more literal. However, as will be seen soon, the entire story of the Exodus might be a later development for Geiger.

[5] Ibid. 157. Karen Armstrong discusses these ideas in her work, *A History of G-d: the 4000-year quest of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.*, 1993 New York: Random House. This book begins with a discussion on how the god of

revolve around this single G-d, but with each subsequent generation, many forms of worship began to fade away. Geiger claims that Beer Sheba is one of the first major centers for the worship of G-d. In that time, common modes of worship included human sacrifice and the worship of trees and other objects.[1] For Geiger, this was simply the result of Israel developing in the midst of various other nations who worshipped their gods through these methods.[2] Eventually, the worship of G-d began to prevail and certain alien worships were replaced with other rituals, such as circumcision, which Geiger sees as a lesser form of human sacrifice. The prophets of the time, Elijah, Elisha, Amos, Hosea, and others, as well as the priestly class, began to "Israelize" various practices, such as sacrifices. There goal was to incorporate various ancient rituals, but at the same time cause a feeling of revulsion for those modes of worship removed from the Israelite society.[3]

Another issue Geiger discusses within this time is the development of the historical narrative, which he saw as having developed during the reign of Davidic dynasty. The exodus from Egypt, the migration in the desert, and various other events were placed within the context of the entire nation. This was done in order to claim that the Northern Kingdom strayed from the proper path, as opposed to the other theory which is they followed much of the first four books of the Torah. This narrative developed the idea of a lawgiver, who with the help of the priestly class was able to create the nation. The Judean tribe also began to develop during this time as a formidable group. The Davidic dynasty was part of this tribe. However, Judah didn't begin to develop its own literature and narrative until the fall of the Northern Kingdom, for there was a need to claim they were the chosen people who would continue with G-d's work. During this period the development of the doctrine of one true G-d also occurred, solidifying the priestly and Judean doctrines for the future.[4]

◖ Period of Tradition.

The period of Tradition saw the end of the development of completely novel doctrines, but at the same time was not a period lacking in creativity. The concern of the time was to preserve the ideas developed during the period of Revelation. Preservation of ideas was not to be seen as the end of developing ideas nor a barrier against

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the Jews, the Tetragrammaton, was a warrior god, and eventually Judaism developed into a full monotheistic religion, where the Tetragrammaton became G-d. Geiger's idea appears to be influenced by the ideas of natural religion and Mendelssohn's claim of the G-d of the exodus being the Jews personal god.

[1] Ibid. Geiger's examples are the worship of Molech and Asheirah, both acts prohibited by the Torah. Molech worship consisted of passing a child through the fire, either killing him or simply as a gesture of offering the child as a sacrifice (Leviticus 18:21). Asheirah worship revolved around the worship of a tree (Deuteronomy 16:21).

[2] Geiger, Abraham. 1911 *Judaism and Its History*. Trans. Charles Newburgh. New York: Bloch, 32.

[3] Weiner 158.

[4] Ibid. 159-60.

change. Nevertheless, the spirit (knowledge) often lacks the ability to adapt and allow for various changes, as can be seen during the Jews exile in Persia. The people were merely able to live. Geiger uses the book of Esther as an example. He claims this work, while not accurate as a history book, does shed light on the situation for the Jews at the time. The Jews of Persia were dependent on the ruling class and because of this dependence and a lack of stability, "the spirit atrophied."[1]

However, the downfall of Persia and the rise of Greece changed the situation for the Jews. Instead of the spirit feeling weak, the Jews began to create again. The main influence for this came from Egypt, which was perhaps the most strongly Hellenized of all the nations of the time. The Jews of Alexandria assimilated, but at the same time felt connected to the rebuilt Judea both on a national and a religious level. Alexandrian Jewry is Geiger's first example of a Jewish community developing along religious boundaries extra-territorially. This is particularly important to Geiger for it shows that Judaism had transcended the notion of a land a few hundred years before Christianity.[2]

During the period of Tradition, Christianity developed. Jews longed for the Messiah who would return the glory of Israel back to the house of David and lead to a new era, "the Kingdom of G-d." Jesus the Nazarene considered himself to be the Messiah. Geiger begins to analyze the various opinions about Jesus using the New Testament. He eventually concludes that Jesus meant only to be a Messiah for the Jews, because he claimed to be saving the twelve tribes of Israel. Therefore, the notion of him being a universal savior is foreign to the New Testament. Jesus was the spokesman for the average Jew, the *am-ha'aretz*. Since he involved himself with the common-folk, the Pharisees did not care for him.[3] Furthermore, the Sadducees were against him because he believed in the resurrection.[4]

Out of Jesus' life two strong sects of Judaism developed. The Post-Temple Pharisees (Tannaim) became the bearers of Jewish law and worked towards adapting this law to post-Second Temple Judaism. They also believed in a time when the nation of Israel would again rule over the land and be independent. The other group revolved around the idea of a Messianic ruler, Jesus, who died and then came back into existence. This group was known as the Judeo-Christians. Part of this group continued to follow Jewish law. Other Judeo-Christians, however, were influenced by the Sadducees and could not foresee Judaism without the Temple or the sacrifices. Therefore, they developed a doctrine that stated the old law needed to be abrogated for the new kingdom to come into existence. Eventually, the Jews removed themselves

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[1] Ibid. 160-1.
[2] Ibid. 161-2.
[3] As is known from general classical Jewish history, the Pharisees would often legislate against the *am-haaretz* in order to keep separate. A well known example is the law of *Demai* (food which one is in doubt if it was tithed). Since a few farmers didn't separate *maaser*, the rabbis established laws regarding the need to tithe again and even whether one can eat at the same table of someone who is suspected of not tithing.
[4] Ibid. 162-4.

from this group.[1] Geiger's main point is that Christian doctrine developed from Jewish doctrine, an idea somewhat radical for his time. Geiger proves this by reading the New Testament as a historical document, which was a revolutionary idea because Christians did not look at this text as a history book.[2] It is important to remember that Geiger did not conceive of any work being outside of his historical canon. All books were treated with the same historical analysis. If Geiger can scrutinize the primary work of his own religion, then surely he is able to critically evaluate the primary work of another religion.

Geiger believes the Talmud is proof of the evolutionary nature of Judaism. He claims the Jerusalem Talmud indicates the intellectualism of Palestinian Jewry at the time. Their intellectualism is dull and bare, yet it is full of the usual superstitious ideas of the time. Nevertheless, Geiger does see this work as important for historical study because it is reliable in its reports on antiquity. The Babylonian Talmud, on the other hand, is vigorous. It is full of new ideas and innovations developed by the Jewish scholars. This work became sacred in the eyes of the people. This bothers Geiger because he wants to move away from Talmudic Judaism. He claims that in order to abrogate the Talmud's worth, Jews need to move beyond the medieval rigidity and recognize modern methods of analysis.[3] Geiger explains that through reading the Talmud one can see the various changes in language and content over time.[4] Therefore, he warns that this work is not as worthwhile for historical study, for the accounts tend to be less reliable and its emphasis is on the law.[5]

Period of Legalism.

Geiger claims that this era, which spans from the sixth to the middle of the eighteenth centuries, was a time of "inner legalistic rigidity," yet was also a period of creativity.[6] Jews participated and were heavily involved in the general culture of the time.[7] The intellectualism of the period was not dictated by internal concerns, nor was it developed out of a desire to generate new and original ideas. Instead, the Rabbis of the

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[1] Ibid. 164-5.

[2] Heschel, Susannah. 1998 *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus*. Chicago: U. of Chicago, 78.

[3] Around the same time, the Brisker method was also being formulated in Eastern Europe under R. Hayyim Soloveitchik's leadership as a means of showing how Talmud study can remain traditional while being more "scientific." However, neither was completely innovative, as both did work off of prior models of learning. The main innovation of both is the language used to discuss the text. For more on the development of the Brisker method of study, see Solomon, Norman. 1993 *The Analytic Movement: Hayyim Soloveitchik and his Circle*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

[4] Just to clarify, Geiger's method is not distinctly his but part of the whole methodology of the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*.

[5] Weiner 166-7.

[6] Ibid. 168.

[7] Ibid. The notion of Jewish involvement with the outside cultures surrounding them is one of interest to many historians. For example, Reuven Bonfil, in *Jewish Life in Renaissance Italy*, discusses the Jewish involvement in the Italian culture and its affect on their own development.

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time decided that it would be best to develop ideas that responded to these evolutionary notions. However, as time elapsed, the lack of desire to create and the various persecutions of the period led to the idea that the Babylonian Talmud was the authoritative work and nothing could come to supercede it. Instead all the laws and customs delineated in this work became binding upon the Jews. The job of the Rabbis, after the canonization of the Talmud, became to explain the laws and offer various proofs within tradition for these laws and customs.[1] This period did not preclude creative thought, but merely placed it within certain confines.

An example of this legal rigidity can be seen in Geiger's analysis of Maimonides. Geiger says that Maimonides' two legal writings, his Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah, are both examples of the solidification of Talmudic law into systematic works. In the introduction to the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides says that the work's purpose is to have an alternative to the Talmud, for he incorporates all the various Talmudic discussions throughout this work. Maimonides' purpose was to create a work that was "user-friendly," for unlike the Talmud, it was divided according to various topics without mixing in outside discussions. Geiger faults Maimonides and others for making it seem as if one could simply summarize the whole Talmudic enterprise into guidebooks. These works gloss over the law's evolution, causing one to believe the law is not ever-changing. Nevertheless, Geiger's major complaint is that the modern Jew should not fall into the same trap as the medieval Jew.[2] The medieval Jew did not have a concept of idea development but believed in the permanence of the notions they had. Geiger warns the modern Jew here and in various other places that because of modern historical consciousness, they should not fall into this same system of thought. Modern Jews must recognize history and idea development throughout the generations.

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[1] Ibid. 168-9. One should recognize that Geiger's theories regarding this period include much fallacy. For example, various laws and customs developed in sixteenth century Safed, such as Kabbalat Shabbat, which did not have precedent, yet eventually made their way into the mainstream of Judaism. Geiger's lack of sight regarding the innovations in the law could be the result of his lumping various (Geonic, Early Middle Ages, Late Middle Ages, and Early Modern) eras into one period. He doesn't distinguish between Rashi, who merely explains and interprets the Talmud, and R' Yosef Karo, who developed the *Shulchan Aruch* which included various innovative laws and was not merely a commentary on the Talmud.

[2] *Judaism and its History* 340-2. It should be noted that Geiger does not discuss Kabbalah or its development, which would seemingly place his whole theory of medieval rigidity into question. For example, Hayyim Vital and R' Isaac Luria both held Kabbalah superceded halacha when the two conflicted. This would also include various "new ideas" that various Rabbis received through divine inspiration. In fact, if Geiger had given merit to the ideas of Kabbalah, he would have been able to justify (although for altogether different reasons) his theory of historical evolution. However, it should also be established that Vital and Luria's theory was not based on historical consciousness but was based on the belief that there are two systems of law, a this-worldly and an other-worldly law.

● *Conclusion*

Geiger's historiography is based on his reading of various Jewish texts. He believes in a Jewish-centered Jewish history, though he views the Sadducees and Karaites as part of his corpus. Geiger believes that Jewish history is an evolution from one generation to the next, starting with ancient, Biblical Israel, and continuing until his day. Textual criticism is one aspect of the Jewish Wissenschaft, though Geiger takes it to the logical extreme and believes that this textual study must also encompass the Bible. It is this innovation that makes Geiger unique and significant to the development of Jewish history in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Geiger's conclusions, which led to various reforms in Judaism, appear to be quite subjective, for his primary goal was to justify a Jewish Reformation and also to combat the assimilation of German Jewry which was rampant at the time. Therefore, he approaches the text with certain biases which later prove to be false.

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Sejanus and Tiberius:
Their roles in Rome's Anti-Jewish Policies

by **Benzion N. Chinn**
YC '04

◀ *Introduction*

The rapid rise to power of Aelius Sejanus and his even faster fall has long been a source of fascination to Historians of the Roman Empire. Sejanus was appointed co-head of the Praetorian Guard, alongside his father, Lucius Seius Strabo, soon after Augustus' death. In 14 C.E. Strabo retired a year later leaving Sejanus as the sole commander of the Praetorian Guard. In 23 C.E Sejanus convinced the emperor, Tiberius, to station all nine cohorts of the Praetorian Guard within Rome, instead of the usual three. This action radically increased Sejanus' power, giving him control over the balance of power in Rome. In addition to this, Tiberius' son, Drusus the younger, died soon afterward and Sejanus came to be Tiberius' sole close confident. Tiberius in fact referred to Sejanus as "My Sejanus"[1] and as the "Partner of his Labours."[2] According to Tacitus, Sejanus at this point also tried, unsuccessfully though, to marry Tiberius' niece Julia Livilla, who was also the widow of the late Drusus. In 26 C.E, Tiberius retired to the island of Capri, never to set foot within the city of Rome again. This left Sejanus in effective control over the Roman Empire. He controlled all access to the emperor's person, and he was Tiberius' eyes and ears, controlling how Tiberius viewed the situation back in Rome. Sejanus, if the chroniclers are to be believed, used his new found power to denounce Tiberius' niece, Agrippina, for seditious designs along with two of her children, Nero Caesar and Drusus Caesar. What happened to them is not exactly clear; what we do know is that all three of them were either imprisoned or banished and within the next four years all of them were dead. In 31 C.E Sejanus was made co-Consul with Tiberius; since Tiberius was in Capri, Sejanus was, de-facto, the sole Consul. Tiberius, at this point, even consented to allow Julia Livilla to be engaged to Sejanus. Then all of a sudden Tiberius seems to have begun to see Sejanus as a threat and secretly sent a letter to the Senate denouncing him. After the letter was read, Sejanus, who supposedly was in the Senate expecting to hear news of more honors to be heaped on his person, was arrested on the spot and that same evening was handed

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[1] See Tacitus [Tacitus. The Complete Works of Tacitus. Trans. Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb. The Modern Library, (Random House: New York, 1942)]
[2] Ibid.

over to an executioner and strangled. Not only that but, in the following days, Sejanus' entire family were, on the emperors orders, also taken out and killed as well.

🗨 *Was Sejanus the Scapegoat?*

In the post-31 C.E Roman world Sejanus was a very convenient scapegoat, particularly for someone like Philo. All Roman accounts of Sejanus portray him as a power-hungry, murderous thug. They accuse him of having poisoned Drusus the Younger and of plotting to take over the empire. In this same vain, Sejanus is fingered by Philo as being the main figure behind all major anti-Jewish actions during this period. In Philo's *Legatio Ad Gaium* (Embassy to Gaius) Sejanus comes out looking like a first-century Haman,[1] out "to destroy that race [the Jews] completely."[2] Philo, in *Flaccus,* also credits Sejanus with initiating Rome's policy of "attacking the Jews."[3] Accepting, at least up to a point, Philo's view of Sejanus, many historians[4] assume that it was due to Sejanus that Jews did not even try to send an emissary to Tiberius to protest over Pontius Pilate's bringing the legionary standards into Jerusalem. Sejanus, in this view, therefore becomes a key figure in understanding Pilate; Sejanus' downfall in 31 C.E is supposed to have changed the dynamic of Pilate's rule. The mass Jewish protest over Pilate marching his soldiers into Jerusalem carrying statues of Tiberius,[5] mentioned by Josephus, is tagged as being pre-31 C.E. A similar incident, mentioned by Philo, where Pilate sent a Roman legion into Jerusalem carrying gilded shields[6] is seen as being post-31 C.E; because in that case the Jews were able to get Tiberius to overrule Pilate. In addition to the incidents mentioned, the divide between the Pilate of the Sejanus era and of the post-Sejanus era has also been used as an explanation of Pilate's actions during the Crucifixion. The Gospels, unlike Josephus and Philo, portray Pilate as being a weak and passive ruler, who only consented to have Jesus killed in order to satisfy the Jewish mob. The theory goes that Pilate really was scared of the possibility that the

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[1] While Philo does not explicitly draw the comparison between Sejanus and Haman, it is not unlikely that Philo had that kind of figure in mind. You have, in Philo's version of events, a wicked advisor, ruling from behind the scenes, who is out to destroy the Jews. He is stopped and killed by the ruler, who then makes all sorts of favorable decrees for the Jews.

[2] Philo. Legatio Ad Gaium. Trans. E. Mary Smallwood. (Leiden; Netherlands, 1961) 160

[3] Ibid. Flaccus. Trans. F.H. Colson. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,. 1941)

[4] Maier, P.L. "The Episode of the Golden Roman Shields at Jerusalem," Harvard Theological Review 62 (1969) 109-121; Smallwood, E. Mary. "Philo and Josephus as Historians of the Same Events," Josephus, Judaism and Christianity edited by Louis Feldman and Gohei Hata; Gideon Fuks. "Again on the Episode of the Gilded Roman Shields at Jerusalem." Harvard Theological Review. Volume 75 (1982) 503-507; Kraeling, Carl. "The Episode of the Roman Standards at Jerusalem," Harvard Theological Review 35 (1942), 263-289; Doyle, A.D. "Pilate's Career and the Date of the Crucifixion, Journal of Theological Studies 42 (1941) 190-193

[5] Josephus, Flavius. Antiquities. Trans. William Whiston, Book 18.60-62

[6] Philo: Legatio Ad Gaium, 299-305

Jews would take their complaints to the emperor. As an appointee of the now dead and disgraced Sejanus, Pilate could not afford to bring any attention to himself.

The flaw with this theory is that it is completely reliant on the assumption that Philo's description of Sejanus has some basis within reality. The connection between Pilate's action and Sejanus' control over the Roman Empire rests on the claim that Sejanus was the mover of Rome's anti-Jewish policies. The problem is that the only writer we have who says that Sejanus had malicious intent toward the Jews is Philo. Even if we were to take Philo at his word, the Sejanus/Pilate connection would be speculative. Without Philo, the theory of a Sejanus/Pilate connection is a matter of pure conjecture.

🗨 *Philo's Portrayal of Tiberius*

The reason why Philo's view of Sejanus cannot be taken at face value is because Philo has a highly vested interest in portraying Tiberius as a friend of the Jews. Philo's main discussion of Sejanus occurs in the Embassy to Gaius, which is Philo's account of a trip he took, with a group of other Alexandrian Jews, to Rome to appeal to Caligula on behalf of Alexandrian Jewry, who were under attack by the local Greek populace. Philo's enterprise faired badly, to say the least. Philo, having to explain why he failed, spends a significant amount of space demonstrating that Caligula was an arbitrary maniac who acted contrary to his predecessor Tiberius, who of course was a model of enlightened leadership. In support of this view Philo records numerous outrages committed by Caligula, particularly his attempt to put a statue of himself within the Holy of Holies of the Temple in Jerusalem. In regards to that incident, Philo brings down a letter from Agrippa I[1] to Caligula asking him to reconsider his decree. In order to demonstrate that Caligula was going against the precedent set by Tiberius, Agrippa[2] points to how Tiberius had handled Pilate and tells Caligula how:

> Pilate ... with the intention of annoying the Jews rather than of honouring Tiberius, ... set up gilded shields in Herod's palace in the Holy City. They bore no figure and nothing else that was forbidden. But only the briefest possible inscription ... when the Jews at large learnt of his action,... They wrote a letter to Tiberius pleading their case as forcibly as they could. What word, what threats Tiberius uttered against Pilate when he read it! It would be superfluous to describe his anger, although he was not easily moved to anger, since his

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[1] Agrippa was a close friend of Caligula. Caligula had earlier freed Agrippa from prison, which he had been sentenced to by Tiberius for commenting to loudly how he could not wait until Caligula ascended the throne, and placed Agrippa as one of the Tetrarchs over Judea.
[2] The genuineness of this letter is certainly questionable. Agrippa was a relative of Philo, so it is not unrealistic that Philo would have a copy or would have been made aware of the contents of a letter from Agrippa to Caligula.

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reaction speaks for itself. For immediately, without even waiting until the next day, he wrote to Pilate, reproaching and rebuking him a thousand times for his new-fangled audacity and telling him to remove the shields at once and have them taken from the capital to the coastal city of Caesarea ... This was duly done. In this way both honour of the Emperor and the traditional policy regarding Jerusalem were alike preserved.[1]

The point that Philo is trying to make is that Tiberius was so careful not to upset Jewish sensibilities that he rebuked Pilate for just bringing in gilded shields, which did not even contain any images.[2] This is in contrast to Caligula, who was planning to put up a statue of himself in the guise of Jupiter, within the Temple. Philo's purpose in citing this is to demonstrate that unlike the previous emperors, who "ruled reasonably and legally,"[3] Gaius [Caligula], "had made a cult of illegality; for he regarded himself as the law, and broke the laws of the lawgivers of every country as if they were empty words."[4]

Tiberius, according to Philo, in contrast to Caligula, was responsible for holding "sway for twenty-three years without allowing any spark of war to smoulder in Greek or barbarian lands, and [for giving] peace and the blessings of peace to the end of his life with ungrudging bounty of hand and heart."[5] Now even Philo cannot just ignore certain "upheaval[s] in Italy."[6] His solution is to say that these upheavals occurred "when Sejanus was contriving his attack."[7] This allows Philo to claim that "Tiberius realized immediately after [Sejanus'] death that the charges brought against the Jews living in Rome were unfounded slanders, fabricated by Sejanus, who wanted to destroy that race completely."[8] As to what was Sejanus' motive for trying to wipe out the Jews, Philo suggests that Sejanus knew that "should the Emperor be in danger of being betrayed, [the Jews] would offer in his defense the only, or the keenest, resistance to treacherous schemes and actions."[9]

◀ *Tiberius and Sejanus Reexamined*

In truth, Philo's portrayal of Tiberius is contradicted by Josephus, Tacitus and Suetonius and Cassius Dio, who all report that Tiberius ordered that all Jews be

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[1] Philo, Ibid., 299-305
[2] What about the shields was offensive to Jews is a good question. See Doyle, Fuks or Smallwood for possible solutions.
[3] Philo, Ibid., 119
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 141
[6] Ibid., 159
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid., 160
[9] Ibid.

expelled from the city of Rome sometime around the year 19 C.E.[1] Since we have grounds to reject Philo's portrayal of Tiberius we can also call into question Philo's portrayal of Sejanus, which had the sole purpose of propping up Philo's portrayal of Tiberius, and cast doubt on the possibility that there was any connection between Sejanus' position of power in Rome and Pilate's style of governing in Judea. Suetonius,[2] Tacitus,[3] Cassius Dio[4] and Josephus,[5] all make mention of the fact that there was a major crackdown on Jewish worship, particularly within Rome itself, during the reign of Tiberius and that Tiberius drafted Jews to go fight in unhealthy climates with the intention of killing them off. According to Suetonius, Tiberius banned

all foreign religions, including the Egyptian and Jewish rites ... compelling those who practiced that kind of superstition to burn their vestments and all their sacred utensils. He distributed the Jewish youths, under colour of a military oath, to a sundry island noted, above other things, for an unwholesome and pestilential climate; the rest of that nation or such as were addicted to its practices,[6] he banished out of Rome, under pain of perpetual bondage if they obeyed not.[7]

Tacitus and Josephus are a bit more specific in regards to the details. Tacitus reports that the Senate passed a resolution drafting

four thousand of the freedmen class who were infected with [Jewish and Egyptian] superstitions and were of military age ... to quell the brigandage [on the island of Sardinia,] a cheap sacrifice should they die from the pestilential climate. The rest were to quit Italy, unless before a certain day they repudiated their impious rites.[8]

Josephus[9] adds that the reason for Tiberius' action was that four Jews had swindled a woman named Fulvia into sending "purple and gold to the temple at Jerusalem," which they then appropriated for their own uses. Cassius Dio devotes only a sentence to the incident commenting in passing that: "As the Jews flocked to Rome in great numbers and were converting many of the natives to their ways, [Tiberius] banished most of

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[1] It should be noted that Josephus praised Tiberius for only sending two proctors to Judea over the course of his reign.
[2] Suetonius. Lives of the Twelve Caesars. (Wordsworth Classics of World Literature, 1997), 36
[3] Annuals ii.85
[4] Dio, Cassius. Dio's Roman History. Trans. Herbert Baldwin Foster, Leob (Cambridge Mass: Classical Library. Harvard University Press, 1954) 57.18.5a
[5] Josephus, Flavius. Antiquities. Trans. William Whiston 18.81-84
[6] Probably referring to the so called "G-d fearers," gentiles who were sympathetic to Jewish causes and who adopted Jewish practices.
[7] Seutonius, 36
[8] Annuals. ii.85
[9] Josephus, Antiquities, XVIII, iii, 5

them."[1] Dio is helpful because, he lists this event as having taken place during the Consulship of Tiberius and Germanicus. Because of Dio we can pinpoint the year of the year of the expulsion to somewhere between 17 and 20 C.E. It seems from Tacitus also that the explosion took place around 19 C.E. If the expulsion happened around the year 19 C.E then it was still several years before Sejanus became that powerful, so Sejanus could not have been the one pulling the strings to get this to happen and Tiberius must have done this on his own.

The claim that Philo's charges against Sejanus are problematic is nothing new. E. Mary Smallwood points out, in her translation of Philo, that:

> Philo ignores [the] expulsion completely in this treatise, mentioning it neither in 159-61 nor in his eulogy of Tiberius in 141-2 nor again in 291-322, where he deals further with Augustus' and Tiberius' treatment of the Jews. He implies here that in the years of Tiberius' principate before Sejanus' attack the Jews had enjoyed the same religious liberty and protection as they had under Augustus.[2]

Smallwood though is not willing to doubt the veracity of Philo's claim about Sejanus, even though she also acknowledges that Josephus does not say a word about any anti-Jewish polices coming from Sejanus and that therefore Philo has to be exaggerating.[3] She says, though, that if Tacitus did not make any mention of Sejanus' anti-Jewish polices then there would be grounds for doubting Philo's claim. Unfortunately, we do not have Tacitus' account of the years 30-31 C.E. as they have been lost. Since there is nothing to contradict directly Philo's claim, Smallwood is willing to give Philo the benefit of the doubt. The problem with this attitude is that while we have no direct reason to question what Philo says about Sejanus, Philo's measure of Sejanus is tied to a set of facts that Philo gives us about Tiberius which are false. Since we cannot rely on the general rubric of Philo's estimation of Tiberius we must also call into question the veracity of the individual facts given by Philo, such as Sejanus' role in formulating an Anti-Jewish policy.

🗨 *Conclusion*

Was Sejanus an anti-Semite? Not unlikely. Did he initiate a round of anti-Jewish policies and did he allow Pilate a free hand in Judea? Possibly, but we have no proof. The claim that Sejanus was responsible for all anti-Jewish policies during the reign of Tiberius is based on Philo's interpretation of the inner workings of the Roman Empire,

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[1] Dio,57.18

[2] Philo, Legatio Ad Gaium, 244

[3] Feldman, Louis and Gohei Hata. "Philo and Josephus as Historians of the Same Events," Josephus, Judaism and Christianity (Detroit, Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1987) 127 Is this citation correct?

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which seems to be highly flawed. Philo was a contemporary of Sejanus, so it is perfectly reasonable to assume that Philo was aware that Sejanus had a reputation of not being friendly to Jewish interests, but to credit Sejanus with initiating all Roman anti-Jewish practices is to ignore the fact that Rome,[1] and even Tiberius, had engaged in anti-Jewish actions before Sejanus' rise to power. As to any connection between Sejanus and Pilate, that is a matter of pure speculation. It seems absurd to ascribe to the Jewish mob the degree of introspection necessary to consider if it would be more prudent or not to attempt to negotiate before taking to the streets. Does this mean that Philo's incident did not take place before 31 and Josephus' incident was not something separate, coming after 31 C.E? It is impossible to say. Either of these two incidents could have happened any time during Pilate's ten year prefectship[2] of Judea. The fall of Sejanus in 31 C.E does not help us in any way.

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[1] The Jews were in fact also kicked out of Rome in 130 B.C.E.

[2] While Josephus and Tacitus referred to Pilate as the procurator of Judea, we know now from an inscription found in Caesarea that Pilate's official title was "Praefectus Iudaeae," not procurator. The inscription is actually not complete, saying only ECTUS Iudeae. The only word that ECTUS can conclude is praefectus, or prefect. See Louis Feldman. Josephus and Modern Scholarship (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984) 317-320 and Antonio Frova: "L'Iscrizione di Ponzio Pilato a Caesarea." In: Rendcconti Istituto Lombardo 95 (Accadmemia di Scienze e Lettere 1961) 419-434

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The Gods of Greek History:
Herodotus and Thucydides

by **Nachum Rybak**

In the pantheon of great historians, Herodotus and Thucydides are held in the highest regard. The "Father of History" and his younger contemporary encountered a world in which the notion of history – "inquiry" in classical vernacular – was hardly appreciated and was largely undeveloped. Inarguably, their greatest legacy was the development of history as a literary genre. In history, unlike in myth, mortals occupy the center stage – man and not god is responsible for man's own fate. History records those actions that confer honor and privilege upon man, as well as those misdeeds that result in his calumny and disgrace.

Despite these general characteristics of history, there is much room for difference among historical accounts: differing worldviews, differing perceptions of mankind, and most of all, differing outlooks on the role of history. It is in the context of these variances that the distinctions between Herodotus and Thucydides gain texture and meaning. This paper will explore the historians' divergent outlook on the role of the divine in history, how this relates to their overall perception of human nature, and how this relates to their general goals as historians.

◀ The Role of Gods in Herodotus

The presence of gods in Herodotus' account is most pronounced. The ubiquitous refrain in almost all of Herodotus' stories echo the message: "the deity, having shown a glimpse of happiness to many, has afterward utterly overthrown them" (I.32) The gods do not fill passive roles; they are often the cause behind failure. When the Persian ships are decimated by a tempest off the Artemisium, Herodotus claims (8.13) that the gods were endeavoring to equalize the Greek and Persian armies. Solon, an Athenian sage, relates to Croesus the story of Cloebis' and Biton's noble deaths. Herodotus quotes Solon as saying that through their deaths, "the Diety clearly showed that it is better for a man to die than to live." (I. 31) Although Herodotus does not actually say this himself, he does portray Solon as a wise man whose wise words come true – fortune is fickle and that the powerful – Croesus – becomes powerless – and therefore Herodotus seems to agree with his sentiment.

But often, the contribution of the divine is more focused; it is aimed at redressing perceived misdeeds. In Book VIII chapter 129, when discussing the ignoble death of the

Persians killed during the siege on Pallene, Herodotus sides with the Potidaeans who allege that the Persians were experiencing retribution for their attack on the temple of Neptune.[1] Croesus suffers because "the indignation of the gods fell heavy upon Croesus, probably because he thought himself the most happy of all men." (I. 34) In another instance, Candaules is slain because of his extreme arrogance – his insistence that his wife is "the fairest woman in the whole world." (I. 8) He forces his loyal servant, Gyges, to glimpse at his naked wife and the insulted queen compels Gyges to avenge her indignity and kill her prude husband.

These two offenses – sacrilege and overconfidence – are recurring themes in The Histories. Although different in nature, sacrilege, like overconfidence, is a form of hubris in that it is man's irreverence that causes him to arrogantly desecrate those realms that are higher than him. The jealous gods zealously pursue man for his insolence and punish him even after many generations – such as in the case of Croesus who paid for Gyges' crime. (I. 8)

Interestingly, in Herodotus' account, the only sin for which man is punished is hubris. Man's reliance on deception, for example, does not warrant divine censure. Artemisia, one of Xerxes' most brilliant advisors, saves her ship at Salamis by sinking an allied ship. The Greeks, fooled into thinking that her ship was one of their own, spare it – at the expense of another Persian ship. (VIII. 87) Not only does she suffer no punishment but, "she raised herself to a greater height than ever in his esteem." (VIII. 88) Militiades, son of Cimon, deceitfully imprisons the consolers who come to mourn his brother's passing and makes himself ruler of the Chersonese. His trickery goes uncensured and despite the fact that he was "not long in the country when a calamity befell him," (VI. 40) he eventually manages to escape safely to Athens. (VI. 41) And although Herodotus claims that Pythoness insisted that "'twas decreed that Miltiades should come to an unhappy ending," (VI. 135) Herodotus neither passes judgment on him nor claims that this was retribution for his sin.[2]

However, in The Histories, the gods do not govern in a vacuum. They may conspire to punish mortals for their misdeeds, but it is the unsuspecting man who ultimately ensnares himself. Despite being doomed for a variety of reasons (as scapegoat for Gyges' crime and because of his own hubris), Croesus is practically defeated only because he was outmaneuvered and outsmarted by Cyrus. After the initial bloody conflict, Cyrus retreats and Croesus believes that his enemy is disbanding his army – so he does too. However, this action proves to be woefully misguided as Cyrus elects not to rest for the winter but to fight again. Caught unprepared, Croesus faces an insurmountable challenge. (I. 77) Further exacerbating Croesus' situation is

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[1] Marincola, John. Greek Historians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 (pg 55)

[2] Dewald, Carolyn. The Greek Historians – Literature and History. Ed. Michael H. Jameson. Saratoga: Anma Libri, 1985 (pg 53)

Cyrus' stratagem to place camels at the head of his onslaught. The camels unnerve Croesus' horses and Cyrus outsmarts his foe.[1]

Another example of human error that results in defeat can be culled from Herodotus' account of Xerxes. (VIII. 68-69) After Artemisia delivers a brilliant speech that tactfully outlines the strategic course that will confer victory on Xerxes, he is pleased with her advice. However, he insists that since "he would be an eyewitness of the combat," (VIII. 69) his mere presence would suffice to inspire an unguided attack. Needless to say, Xerxes was wrong and the Persians were routed.[2]

◄ *Thucydides' Omission of Divine Intervention*

In Thucydides, the tone from the start is quite different. Thucydides painstakingly sketches a portrait of human history and evolution noticeably devoid of any supernatural influence. Most of the first twenty-three chapters of his account are dedicated to a rationalist explanation for the rise of great superpowers – the slow accumulation of resources. This drive is part of a general attempt to "bring *all human action* into the realm of natural causes,"[3] which is also evident in Thucydides' account of the Athenian soldiers' illness which he attributes "to its being the sickly season of the year." (VII. 47)[4]

Even those scholars who insist that there is much difference between Herodotus and Thucydides' general attitudes towards religion do admit that even in The Peloponnesian War the characters acknowledge the presence of gods. Often, such as in Book I chapter 25, the Greeks consult oracles to determine what is best. In other instances, the gods "are called upon as witnesses to oaths," indicating that Thucydides did recognize that the common Greek was afraid of divine wrath.[5]

Overall though, Thucydides voices much skepticism about the potency of divine intervention. "In the pathetic, unanswered appeals to [the gods]...he seems to go out of his way to deny their intervention in human affairs."[6] A prime example of this trend can be found in Thucydides treatment of Nicias' unanswered appeal for divine assistance. (VII. 77) The sarcastically dismissive, "this or the like was the cause of the death of a man who...least deserved such a fate" – reveals Thucydides' "pathetic credulity."[7] Along similar lines, Thucydides often denigrates all attention paid to superstition. He asserts that Nicias, "who was somewhat over-addicted to divination and practices of that kind, refused from that moment even to take the question of departure into consideration,"

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[1] Dewald 49

[2] Dewald 50

[3] Cochrane, Charles Norris. Thucydides and the Science of History. London: Oxford University Press, 1929 (pg 29)

[4] Finley, John H.. Thucydides. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942 (pg 311)

[5] Grundy, G. B.. Thucydides and the History of His Age. Oxford: Alden Press, 1948 (pg 40)

[6] Finley 310

[7] Grundy 40

(VII. 50) once he witnessed an eclipse on the eve of the Athenian offensive. In another instance, Thucydides ridicules the soldiers who were senselessly unnerved by the thunderclaps and lighting that were so common in autumn weather. (VI. 70) And there is a palpable sense of scorn in Thucydides' remark that at the beginning of the war, "everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the contending cities." (II. 8)[1]

🔊 *Approaches to Human Nature*

Resulting from the historians' differing approaches to the portrayal of divine causation in historical accounts, are their differing approaches to human nature and capacity. Herodotus, who views man's failings as a product of his overconfidence and other shortcomings, is swift to limit man's ability to help himself succeed. Thucydides, on the other hand, who nimbly embraces a rationalistic approach to causation, portrays human nature in an equally rational light, with an emphasis on man's ability to help himself.

Herodotus takes a pessimistic view of the ability of political leaders to govern wisely. Often, as in Apries' case, their rash acts only undermine their cause. Apries loses his temper and mutilates his servant when he fails to return with Amasis. Not only does the defaced servant not tell his master of Amasis' malevolent intent, but those who witnessed Apries' cruel act join the rebellion. (II. 162) The relevance of informed political action is also impugned – as with the account of Polycrates and Oroetes. (III. 122-125) Despite Polycrates having endeavored to verify Oroetes true intent (he sent his trusted secretary, Maeandius to confirm Oroetes' offer), Polycrates is tricked and killed.

In fact, as mentioned above, only swindlers are generally successful in The Histories. Artemisia and Militiades both triumph through their deception. Themistocles cajoles, deceives, and manipulates his way to Greek victory (VIII. 5, 22, 75). Man's reliance on deception is a confirmation of his own limitations – he is inherently unable to overcome the obstacle and thus must depend on hoax and pretense. Since this is the opposite of hubris in which man believes that his own abilities will allow him to prevail, he does not provoke the enmity of the gods. This skepticism is most profoundly echoed in Herodotus' core belief of the unpredictability of human life: "the Deity, having shown a glimpse of happiness to many, has afterward utterly overthrown them" (I. 32). Mankind, in Herodotus' eyes, is doomed for disappointment. Man's successes are short-lived and his attempts to enhance his situation often backfire.

Thucydides' attitude towards human potential is very different. In confluence with his rational narrative, there is little attempt to moralize or find higher meaning. According to Pericles, a character much lauded by Thucydides (as in II. 65), Athens grasps its

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[1] Finley 311

empire as a tyranny "which may have been wrong to acquire, but is dangerous to surrender" (II. 63). Once Thucydides uncovers the fact that Sparta's fear of Athens propels them towards war, "it is clear that the war is in accordance with nature"[1] – no one is in the right or wrong.

Thucydides' rationalism finds its way into his political outlook. His greatest praise of Pericles was that he was able to "lead [the Athenians] instead of being led by them…he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them…With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude" (II. 65). Thucydides demonstrates that there are certain concrete guidelines for the governance of a state; Pericles was attuned to them and was therefore successful while his successors were not attuned and were therefore not successful.

Humans are meant to invent and innovate – this was the ultimate praise for an Athenian (I. 70). Human development is the result of man's own initiative – the growth of Athens was primarily the work of Theseus, a man of wisdom and power. Thucydides' worldview maintained that man is responsible for his own situation and thus, like Pericles, must endeavor to improve his lot.

Comments like, "Usually daring results from ignorance, caution from reflection" (II. 40), "peace stays longest with those who are careful to use their power justly" (I. 71), and "decay is a law of nature" (II. 64) which are stated by characters in the account, contribute a psychological component to Thucydides' work.[2] Although Thucydides may not necessarily endorse these views, his characters' awareness of them adds a deeper layer not found in Herodotus. They believe that human nature is perceived as static – it can be dissected, understood, and used for one's advantage.

◀ *Conclusion*

In conclusion, the distinctions between Herodotus' The Histories and Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War are great in depth and scope. The cause of these differences seems to be rooted in their profoundly dissimilar goals as historians. The message behind Herodotus' themes of the unpredictability of human life and the power of divine retribution is that man must be wary of the decisions he makes. Herodotus' primary thesis is that man must assiduously curb certain behavior. The underlying message is a reverberating, "Thou shalt not …" in which Herodotus alerts his reader to the dangers inherent in many aspects of life.

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[1] Murray, Oswyn. Herodotus – The Histories.Ed. Walter Blancon, Jennifer Tolbert Roberts. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992 (pg 316)
[2] Grundy 53

In Thucydides, on the other hand, the message is a proactive, "Thou shall..." Known as the historian of human nature, Thucydides delicately outlines exactly which rational behavior will guarantee success. Certain actions are to be emulated, and for this explicit reason he composes his history – "an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble" (1.22) the past.

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The Reform-Orthodox Debate
A Case-Study in Polemics, 1818-1820

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◀ *Introduction*

Reform Judaism can trace its roots to changes in the Jewish community that began almost two centuries ago; Orthodox opponents can trace their opposition just as far. For as long as there has been a movement to reform Judaism, there has been a counter-movement to reject these changes. Yet, in the past two hundred years, there has been only one period of time that allowed for genuine *halachic* dialogue. However, the years between 1818 and 1820, inclusive, were filled with polemics instead of *halachic* debate. The polemical Orthodox response to Reform *halachic* arguments was meant to assure total victory and erase any chances of validity in Reform opponents. Orthodoxy failed in stopping Reform but succeeded in stifling all future halachic debate.[1]

The first reforms began in Berlin in 1815 with the formation of a reformed worship by Israel Jacobson.[2] These first services included some German prayers, made modifications to the Eighteen Benedictions, changed the traditional liturgy of the *kedushah* in the Shabbat morning service, provided organ accompaniment, and adopted a Sephardic pronunciation, among other changes.[3] An anonymous pamphlet circulated sometime between 1815 and 1818 attacked the reformers and these changes. The distribution of this pamphlet marked the first traditionalist effort to deal with the changes in a *halachic* context. The model of Orthodox response set forth would later be repeated in official publications. Despite its apparent *halachic* context, the work

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[1] This paper analyses the type of argument used by the Reform and Orthodox in their early *halachic* debates. It presents the idea that while the Reform presented *halachic* arguments to support their position, the Orthodox chose to respond with polemics to invalidate the Reform position. The Orthodox were not forced into such an approach; they chose polemics over *halachic* debate. While this paper analyses the motivation and consequences of such a decision, it does not seek to pass judgment on the Orthodox choice. The choice of polemics carried consequences which are outlined below. However, it is not the goal of the author to determine if these consequences were sufficient justification for the Orthodox choice or if the Orthodox decision was later validated by history. This paper limits itself to an analysis of the arguments and a presentation of the consequences without considering the sagacity of the approaches. A judgment as to the validity of each approach, if it can even be determined, is left for the reader to conclude.

[2] Jakob Josef Petuchowski, <u>Prayerbook Reform in Europe: the Liturgy of European Liberal and Reform Judaism</u> (New York: World Union for Progressive Judaism, 1968), 84

[3] Petuchowski, 84-85.

did not engage in any serious *halachic* discussion. The bulk of the arguments against the reformers were based on the general prohibition of changing established practice and not on specific textual or rabbinic sources. The final point of the pamphlet especially expressed this style of argument.

> They transgress the law, "Forsake not the teaching of thy mother," by changing what had been the custom of our fathers to this day. This is not the correct and upright way in the sight of the Lord. If it were, why did not our sainted fathers conduct themselves like this, seeing that they were more intelligent than we are?[1]

Notwithstanding this attack, Israel (Eduard) Kley, Meyer Israel Bresselau, Seckel Isaak Fränkel, and 66 members of the community founded the "New Israelitish Temple Association" in Hamburg based on the Berlin service. They proposed German prayers, a German sermon, choral singing, and organ music.[2] The constitution of the association from December 11, 1817 stated:

> Since public worship has for some time been neglected by so many... the undersigned, convinced of the necessity to restore public worship to its deserving dignity and importance... [plan to arrange] a dignified and well-ordered ritual according to which the worship service shall be conducted on Sabbath and holy days.[3]

Specifically, the association introduced "a German sermon, and choral singing to the accompaniment of an organ." Also, they sought to introduce a religious ceremony "in which the children of both sexes, after having received adequate schooling in the teachings of the faith, shall be accepted as confirmants of the Mosaic religion." This ceremony would become the confirmation service popular in Reform Temples. On October 18th, 1818, the New Israelitish Temple Association founded the Hamburg Reform Temple.[4]

The following year, Bresselau and Fränkel edited and printed the first Reform prayerbook. Published in Hamburg, the book read from left to right, translated the word גאל (redeemer) as redemption, added על ישראל to the *kaddish*, contained Sephardic

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[1] Translation in Petuchowski, 85, quoted by Eliezer Liebermann in Eliezer ben Ze'eb Wolf Liebermann. אור נוגה: כולל דברי חכמה ומוסר בעניני עבודת השם. (Dessau: Gedruckt bei C. Schlieder, 1818), 1ff, and by Aaron Choriner in Eliezer ben Ze'eb Wolf Liebermann. נוגה הצדק. (Dessau: Gedruckt bei C. Schlieder, 1818), 14ff, and by David Caro in David Caro. ברית אמת. (Dessau: 1820), 21.

[2] W. Gunther Plaut, The Rise of Reform Judaism: A Sourcebook of its European Origins. (New York: World Union for Progressive Judaism, 1963), 31.

[3] Ibid. Excerpts from the constitution of the "New Israelitish Temple Association," December 11, 1817.

[4] David Ellenson, "A Disputed Precedent: The Prague Organ in Nineteenth-Century Central-European Legal Literature and Polemics," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 40 (1995): 251.

transliterations, and printed German translations at the bottom of the page.[1] Each change was a significant deviation from existing practice. In particular, the use of the word redemption was indicative of later Reform ideologies that called for the rejection of the human messiah and general "messianic age." The introduction of the vernacular and the change of the direction of the book were radical secularizations for the time.

Accompanying this flurry of activity, Eliezer Liebermann, a teacher and itinerant preacher,[2] published in Dessau two works set in the traditional Hebrew and Talmudic style in defense of the reforms. אור נוגה (*The Shining Light*) was written by Liebermann himself and dealt with a range of innovations. In נוגה הצדק (*The Splendor of Righteousness*), Liebermann edited a collection of responsa from several rabbinic authorities, including Moses Kunitz, Rabbi of Ofen, Hungary; Shem-Tob Samun, Rabbi of Leghorn, Italy; Jacob Vita Recanati of Verona; and Aaron Choriner, Chief Rabbi of Arad, Hungary.[3] While most of the responsa in נוגה הצדק dealt with the organ, Choriner addressed liturgical changes as well.

The Orthodox response was prompt and fierce. אלה דברי הברית (*These are the Words of the Covenant*) was published by the Hamburg Orthodox Rabbinic Court in Altona in 1819.[4] It contained a collection of 22 rabbinical opinions and the signatures of 40 rabbis from Germany, Poland, France, Italy, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. The unequivocal book declared that the "work of the innovators stood outside the pale of Judaism."[5] The Hamburg court announced three declarations:

1) It is forbidden to change anything in the order of the prayer ritual, as it has been handed down to us from days of yore.

2) It is forbidden, in the synagogue, to pray in any other language except the holy tongue, as it has been the usage in all Israel.

3) It is forbidden to play on any instrument in the synagogue, either on Shabbat or holidays, even if the playing is done by a non-Jew.[6]

This response to the *halachic* arguments of Liebermann and the Reform, the first official Orthodox publication on the issue, effectively ended all opportunity for debate. Its positions were not open for, and destroyed, any prospect of dialogue.

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[1] Plaut, 32.

[2] Ellenson, 251. On the somewhat doubtful reputation of Liebermann, see references in Petuchowski, 367, note 8. Among the rumors surrounding Liebermann is the report by historian Heinrich Graetz that he eventually converted to Catholicism.

[3] Petuchowski, 86.

[4] Ellenson, 251.

[5] Ibid quoting Bet Din Tsedek Hamburg, אלה דברי הברית (Altona: Bet Din Tsedek de-k. k. Hamburg, 1819).

[6] אלה דברי הברית, title page.

🗨 *The Reform Position*

The two Reform tracts, נוגה הצדק and אור נוגה, justified the Reform changes based on traditional Jewish texts. Jacob Hayim Recanati published his opinion concerning the organ under the title יאיר נתיב and identified three issues concerning the organ: Is the practice of playing an organ considered *avodah zarah* (idol worship)? Is the playing of music permitted after the destruction of the Temple? Will the organ interfere with proper concentration during prayers?

Concerning the nature of the organ and its relationship to non-Jewish worship, he ruled that the organ would only be prohibited if the instrument itself was used for idol worship. He compared the organ to a candle, an object used in Christian services but not prohibited in Jewish tradition because of this practice. He explained further that other references to the prohibition of non-Jewish music refer to the music itself and not the instrument. Dealing with the prohibition of playing music, he cited the שלחן ערוך which allowed for the playing of music in certain situations as evidence for the lack of a prohibition. Finally, he dismissed the last concern of disturbed concentration based on an existing custom of the entire congregation's singing the *Shema* together so that everyone would learn to recite it.[1]

In similar style, Shem-Tob Samun, writing under the title דרך הקודש, addressed the same objections. In his responsum, he explained that the prohibition against emulating non-Jewish customs (חוקת הגוים) applies to customs that are not motivated by a specific reason or rationale, a חוק. However, logical actions taken to beautify a service, such as the accompaniment of music, are not included in this prohibition. He also explained the prohibition against music to include only the exact type of music and instruments played in the Temple, which did not include the organ. Beyond the validation of the use of an organ, Samun encouraged and lauded the use of the instrument for the benefit it will bring to the service. He even described its use in improving worship as a potential mitzvah.[2]

These arguments and the others made in נוגה הצדק are all based on the understanding and interpretation of rabbinic and biblical texts. The positions are written in the traditional style. It appears that Liebermann and the other rabbis included in this work felt that they had a good understanding of the appropriate texts and were proposing a valid position in their justification of the innovations. In respect to content, these works appear to represent a genuine attempt to deal with the *halachic* issues involved in the proposed changes.

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[1] נוגה הצדק, 9.
[2] Samun's response begins on נוגה הצדק, 3.

◀ *Timing and Response*

While it is clear that the Orthodox response was forceful in nature, it is less clear why the rabbis of the Hamburg Orthodox Rabbinic Court chose to respond in this way. There are two popular understandings of the harshness of the Orthodox response.

Many feel that Liebermann's works were a defense of the Hamburg Temple and, more directly, of the 1819 Hamburg Reform prayerbook. Israel Jacobson, to whom the prayerbook was dedicated, worked to secure the positions of the rabbis included in נוגה הצדק. Therefore, it appears that when the Orthodox response was published the following year, it was addressed to the changes of the Hamburg Reform Temple as well as the arguments in Liebermann's works. This concurs with the issues raised in אלה דברי הברית.[1]

However, some have argued that the Reform publications were meant to respond to the previous attacks on the Berlin service and were not formulated in reference to the Hamburg Temple at all. Chronologically, this position is more plausible since the Reform works were published in 1818, the year before the Hamburg Reform prayerbook. While it is true that the same *halachic* arguments could be applied to the Hamburg service, the Hamburg Temple was fundamentally more radical than the Berlin innovations.[2]

Textual proof for this position can be found in אלה דברי הברית. After Choriner, the most prominent reformer in נוגה הצדק, had published his opinion, he wrote a retraction that was the central piece of the Orthodox response. In his retraction, he specifically mentioned facts that had come to light only after he had given his previous opinion and uses these to justify his retraction.[3] Choriner wrote, that the reformers "no longer petition for the restoration of Israel."[4] This comment was probably in reference to the change in the Hamburg prayerbook that translated גואל (redeemer) as redemption. It would seem that he was unaware of the Hamburg reforms when he wrote his earlier position and that he was only prepared to defend the Berlin services. While he later retracted this retraction, it seems as if he was initially unprepared to defend the Hamburg service.

Looking again at the chronology: Liebermann's publications were in 1818, the Reform temple was founded on October 18, 1818, and אלה דברי הברית was published in mid-1819.[5] It seems most logical that the Orthodox had the same reaction as Choriner; they saw Reform publications and interpreted them as a justification for the Hamburg reforms that followed. They did not care so much what reforms the publications defended; rather they interpreted both services as part of the same dangerous

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[1] Plaut, 32.

[2] Petuchowski, 86.

[3] אלה דברי הברית, 98.

[4] Ibid

[5] This is evidenced by a letter in אלה דברי הברית dated March 17, 1819 (p. 83).

movement. Regardless of the intentions of Liebermann and the other authors, both Reform groups were joined together in the Orthodox condemnation.

🗨 *The Orthodox Position*

The arguments included in the 22 opinions from 40 rabbis included in אלה דברי הברית share many commonalities. The most striking feature is their general unwillingness to cite the sources presented by the reformers, although some letters do deal with certain textual sources. While these few Reform interpretations were disputed, the bulk of the reformers' textual sources were ignored. One such letter attempted to disprove at length the Reform interpretation of the sources and offered different explanations. However, even this opinion concluded with a telling comment:

> While there may not be an actual prohibition, it is forbidden to publicly permit something that was in every place accustomed to be forbidden, and certainly [it is forbidden] to make it common practice... We shouldn't rely on the most lenient interpretations to establish a permanent practice.[1]

While this *halachic* confession was the most the Orthodox are willing to concede, the argument is indicative of the general Orthodox approach. While there may be a strict legal basis for the innovations, they are prohibited because they were not allowed before, or because they were "in every place accustomed to be forbidden." This argument asserted the tradition of what has been accepted over what may be done strictly according to rabbinical sources. The Orthodox also relied heavily on the kabbalistic doctrines on which the prayers were based.[2] These arguments appear predominantly in the writings of Rabbi Moses Sofer of Pressburg, one of the leading Orthodox figures and one of the staunchest opponents of the reformers. Sofer wrote that since the rabbis who enacted the prayers did not include music, it is forbidden to introduce it in the present day.[3] Indeed, most of the Orthodox rabbis based their rulings on the inherited custom. Beyond these general commonalities, Orthodox opinions differ slightly. Some of the Reform sources are introduced, although the positions primarily draw on stories and Biblical verses that allude to a possible prohibition as their primary sources.[4] Ignoring the Reform textual proofs and asserting their invalidity revealed a conflict within the Orthodox position. The Orthodox both discredit the Reform

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[1] אלה דברי הברית, 2, second letter.

[2] Petuchowski, 91.

[3] אלה דברי הברית, 6.

[4] Sofer quotes the verse "eich nashir at shir hashem al admat nechar" and not "lfinei bnei nechar" to show that Jews should not pray with music. He also quotes the Talmud, Pesachim 51a, אלה דברי הברית, 6.

interpretation, indicating that it is invalid, but at the same time struggle to understand the plain meaning of the textual sources, showing that the Reform opinions have merit.

Another dichotomy in the Orthodox position is the attitude towards the reformers. The title page of the tract declared:

> Let it be known: that these letters are printed to the gory of the Holy One, praised be He, and of His Torah; and not, God forbid, to reproach or to provoke a single man of Israel. And also to the glory of our community, the Congregation of Jacob – to make known that they are but a few, who have stumbled in the error and the mistakes of the new sect. They represent less than one out of a hundred. But the whole congregation consists of holy ones. Most of them are God-fearing and faithful, holding fast to the Law of the Lord, both Written and Oral, and they carefully observe the minutiae of the Scribes, even as they have been doing, the Lord be praised, from the day of the community's establishment. Only the minority of a minority have been made to stumble by some enticers and seducers, strangers who have come to destroy the inheritance of the Lord.[1]

The Orthodox sought to minimize the Reform movement and its impact by dismissing the changes as affecting the tiny minority of the communities. However, their attitude towards the reformers shows that they were well aware of the dangers. Despite the fact that only a "minority of a minority" have turned to Reform practice, the Orthodox undertook a high profile polemical attack against Reform.

The principal example of the Orthodox opinion was delivered by Sofer. In both rhetoric and Talmudic argument, Sofer set the standard for the official Orthodox response. He refuted each innovation in turn. The organ was inadmissible because it went back to the Biblical Jubal and was a pagan instrument. This argument circumvents the entire Reform position since it classifies the organ as an instrument of the idol worship itself. All joy had been banished after the destruction of the Second Temple; therefore music in services was forbidden. Finally, Hebrew was the only acceptable language for prayer since it was the language of the King and one should address the King only in His language. Describing the reformers, Sofer wrote: "These people really have no faith. Their main intention is to persuade Christians that they are wiser than their brothers. In reality, they are neither Jews nor Christians."[2]

This language matches almost exactly the responsum of the Beth Din of Prague, headed by Eleazer Fleckeles, included in אלה דברי הברית. It is apparent that Sofer functioned as the model for the Orthodox attitude against Reform: "However, these people really have no religion at all. It is their entire desire to parade before the

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[1] אלה דברי הברית, title Page.
[2] Plaut, 36.

Christians as being more learned than their brothers. Basically, they are neither Christians nor Jews."[1]

It is interesting to note the inherent difference in Sofer's argument versus the Reform *halachic* positions. While the Reform dealt with textual sources for the validation of vernacular prayer, Sofer's argument was based on extra-textual logical reasoning. While the Reform analyzed the שלחן ערוך for the nature of the ban on music, Sofer asserted that all forms of joy are prohibited without an explanation of the cases presented in the שלחן ערוך. Finally, while the reformers explain the nature of the rules governing *chukat hagoyim*, Sofer declared the organ itself a pagan instrument and subverted all further discussion. Sofer failed to deal with the textual claims of the reformers and his responses left no room for dialogue.

Another example of this type of reasoning can be seen in Sofer's explanation of the *mishnah* that explicitly allows for vernacular prayers.

> As far as their using a language other than the Holy Tongue for congregational worship is concerned, this is impossible under any circumstances. Even though there is a specific *mishnah*, permitting, among other things, the recitation in the vernacular of the obligatory Eighteen Benedictions, this specifically refers to a chance occurrence, to the case of an individual... For, if it were not, then the Men of the Great Assembly would not have composed the Eighteen Benedictions in a pure and elegant Hebrew.[2]

This argument is a prime example of the Orthodox response. Despite the obvious textual proof, the Orthodox largely ignored the reformers' interpretations, instead relying on the prevailing custom. Effectively, the Orthodox constructed a position of status quo, a stance that allowed them to forbid any change in existing practice since it deviated with the established custom. This type of argument universally destroyed any validity of the Reform explanations, regardless of the case-by-case presentation of the reforms. Orthodoxy ignored the *halachic* explanations of the Reform and instead responded with polemics declaring that there is no validity to the other side's claim.

In order to successfully pursue a polemical argument, the Orthodox had to go beyond the normal *halachic* model. The polemical approach required the Orthodox to make several difficult claims. Consider Sofer's claim that the organ is a pagan instrument since it originates from Jubal. Jubal is credited with the invention of the "mouth-organ" or Pan's pipe, a distant predecessor to the organ. Thus, Sofer's argument is that because the organ is historically descended from the "mouth-organ" is it a forbidden instrument. However, Jubal is also credited with the invention of the harp, an instrument used by King David and to which seemingly no Biblical prohibition

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[1] Ibid, 35.

[2] אלה דברי הברית, 10.

applies.[1] Sofer's desire for a polemical approach forced him to make claims that are factually problematic but present devastating problems for the Reform position.

This approach is evident in other Orthodox views in אלה דברי הברית, which claimed that "most of the prayers were recited in German." They clearly exaggerated in order to vilify the innovations.[2] Moreover, many of the Orthodox launched personal attacks against the reformers. Despite the benevolent attitude expressed in the introduction of אלה דברי הברית, the book is filled with vengeful assaults against the Reform:

> As concerns the blasphemous book, נוגה הצדק, printed in Dessau, it is not permitted to follow its dicta. We know of those people who, with much pomp, are being paraded in this book. The whole thing is deceit and deception and aims to mislead us through empty words.[3]

Other vengeful assaults were directed at specific Reform rabbis. Despite invalidating the contents of the arguments and attacking their authors, the Orthodox still had to struggle with the prominence of Rabbi Aaron Choriner. Choriner's reputation as Chief Rabbi of Arad could not easy be ignored, and the Orthodox singled him out especially for attack:

> Now, as regards the book נוגה הצדק, its unreliability, speaks from its own pages. Those who want to lie usually call on strange witnesses. Why should the author rely on the pronouncements of some Italian scholar and look around for a man like Aaron Chroin? Aren't there enough legitimate rabbis in Germany, Moravia, Bohemia, and Poland who have posts in rabbinical academies and congregations? Even in Hungary, aren't there highly learned men whose pupils have greater knowledge in Talmud and commentary than this Rabbi of Arad?[4]

Nevertheless, even these sharp personal attacks were not sufficient to discredit the Chief Rabbi of Arad. To deal with his character and standing the Orthodox relied on his own retraction, contained in אלה דברי הברית.

> Since I have learned that the foundations of the new ritual have also abbreviated the blessings and prayers and no longer petition for the restoration of Israel (the

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[1] Jubal - Lamech's second son by Adah, of the line of Cain. He was the inventor of "the harp" (Heb. kinnor, properly "lyre") and "the organ" (Heb. 'ugab, properly "mouth-organ" or Pan's pipe), Gen. 4:21.
Easton, M.G. M.A., D.D., *Illustrated Bible Dictionary.* (pub. Thomas Nelson, 1897). Available online at: http://www.ccel.org/e/easton/ebd/ebd.html
[2] Petuchowski, 88.
[3] The responsum of the Beth Din of Prague, headed by Eleazer Fleckeles, quoted in Plaut, 35.
[4] Responsum of Rabi Eliezer of Triesch in Moravia, cited in Plaut, 35.

realization of which we expect in accordance with the principles of our holy religion), and since they change other prayer formulae as well, I apply to myself the scriptural verse, "Let this ruin be under thy hand" (Isaiah 3:6)! Therefore, I declare publicly: All my words in the letter *Kin'at Ha-emet* are annulled and invalid. Besides, I am not worthy to judge and decide this subject matter. Only the sages of Israel and their leaders of the time are justified in doing so. In comparison with their opinions, mine is null and void.[1]

Despite declarations of the invalidity of the Reform arguments, the polemical nature of the response required the Orthodox to go a step further and attack the status of the authors as accepted *halachic* authorities. It appears that Choriner was pressured by the Orthodox to write this retraction, as evidenced by his quick retraction, his eventual religious developments,[2] and his subsequent retraction of this retraction.[3] Finally, Choriner himself wrote that "the unpleasant treatment I had received when, with the best of intentions, I published my *Rosh Amanah*[4] made me hesitant. I knew well the yen which some zealots have for persecuting others, which does not rest until it has done harm, which is deaf to all reason, insensitive to all progress, and resistant to all ennoblement."[5] Choriner's retraction was part of an Orthodox campaign to discredit the Reform rabbinical supporters.

In addition to אלה דברי הברית, Rabbi Abraham Levy Löwenstamm, the rabbi of Emden, published a separate work in Amsterdam.[6] ספר צרור החיים (*The Bundle of Life*) reached similar conclusions as אלה דברי הברית. However, Löwenstamm allowed some liturgical changes in certain circumstances. Most importantly, unlike the other Orthodox, Löwenstamm made an effort to deal with the sources cited by the reformers. He did not deny the meaning of the sources; rather he developed alternative philosophical explanations that allowed him to reach the same conclusions as the opinions in אלה דברי הברית.[7]

The response of the Orthodox rabbis reveals the problem presented by the Reform arguments. While they completely opposed the innovations, they could not engage in a *halachic* argument with the reformers. Doing so would validate the Reform position as a plausible, albeit incorrect, interpretation. Discussion would give the

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[1] אלה דברי הברית, 98.

[2] Petuchowski, 94.

[3] This was not the first time that Choriner had been pressured to retract an opinion. Also, it seems likely that he was pressured to write his retraction by Rabbi Moses Münz, one of his chief supporters in the past. For more on Choriner, see The Jewish Encyclopedia, s.v. "Chorin (Choriner), Aaron"

[4] "Principles of Faith," an essay published in 1803, in Prague, as the opening chapter of the work *Emek Ha-shaveh*. A German translation appeared in 1837 under the title "Hillel." See The Jewish Encyclopedia, s.v. "Chorin (Choriner), Aaron"

[5] Plaut, 33.

[6] Published in 1819/1820.

[7] Petuchowski, 94.

innovations the status of rabbinical opinion, providing a theoretical basis for further reforms. To avoid granting the Reform this status, the Orthodox largely ignored the texts, instead arguing against the validity of the Reform position and destroying the reputation and status of the authors.

It is difficult to understand, given the historical sequence of events, exactly why the Orthodox felt the need for polemics. While the changes discussed in Liebermann's tracts were clearly a break from the status quo, their response seems disproportionate. It is likely that the Orthodox were responding to what they saw as a general trend of innovation and not the published opinions. They understood the publications to be part of the new changes in the Hamburg Reform Temple. They may have read the new Reform prayerbook and took these changes as the beginning of a dangerous movement, perhaps sensing in the mistranslation of גואל an indication for theological change. אלה דברי הברית was not just addressing the Reform responsa. Instead it dealt with the totally of what they saw as a dangerous movement that threatened Judaism.

🗨 *Reform Responds*

Based on Reform writings and the Orthodox reaction, it is not surprising that Reform felt a need to respond. Their *halachic* sources had been ignored. The German Jewish historian Heinrich Grätz, a strict traditionalist but not Orthodox, considered the responses of the Orthodox to be vapid, superficial, and unequal to the challenge.[1] The reformers correctly understood that the Orthodox had changed the nature of the debate.

Two Reform publications followed these attacks. They reasserted the type of *halachic* argument that was omitted from אלה דברי הברית.[2] Published in 1819 by Bresselau, one of the founders of the Hamburg Reform Temple and editor of the prayerbook, חרב נוקמת נקם ברית (*The Sword which Avenges the Covenant*) restated the arguments mostly ignored by the Orthodox. Additionally, the work adopted some of the tone of the Orthodox by attacking אלה דברי הברית:

> Despite all this the Rabbi of Lissa has the nerve to say with Isaiah (6:9): "Hear ye indeed, but understand not," by which he means that in "Hear O Israel" the act of hearing is sufficient, even without understanding! Therefore, he says, even when it comes to hearing about God's unity, it does not say "Understand Israel," but "Hear O Israel," which speaks only of the transmission of words. Thus his argument. Let the heavens behold this! No wonder the rabbi's name is Jacob, for he holds on to his brother's heel twice, yea thrice, with such exegesis! ... If our

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[1] Plaut, 34.
[2] Petuchowski, 97.

ancient sages were like angels, then is it not clear that the latter-day sages, the authors of אלה דברי הברית, are but a generation pure only in their own eyes?[1]

The following year, David Caro, a Hebrew polemicist, published his work ברית אמת (*The Covenant of Truth*) in Dessau. Like Bresselau, he attacked the Orthodox positions and criticized Sofer for his explanation that one is to speak to a King only in His language.

Woe unto the ears which have to hear this! Before a human king, it would not be fitting to do so, even though he does not know the feelings of our heart. How much the less before He Who knows the secrets and understands the thoughts! Our mouth is supposed to be full of prayers, while our heart is to think strange thoughts! ... Thus according to his (Sofer's) own words, he himself is going against the decision of the Talmud and the Codes; and, as he writes himself, he knows what the punishment for that transgression is.[2]

The Reform response not only indicates the frustration that they felt with the Orthodox's failure to address their arguments, but displays a concern with the *halachic* explanation of their actions. When new changes would be introduced twenty years later, they would no longer care about *halachic* justification.

◖ *A Problem with Precedent*

By relying on established tradition over textual sources the Orthodox were able to ignore the textual proof. However, there was a problem with the tactic of claiming that such customs had never existed; there was indeed a precedent for using the organ in prayers. The first recorded use of an organ in Jewish worship is in the Maisel Synagogue in Prague, evidenced by the 1679 Prague prayerbook.[3] Additionally, Dr. Alexander Putik of the Jewish Musem in Prague, in a personal letter dated May 6th, 1994, asserted that "in the baroque period" there is reference to the organ in both "the Old-New (Altneu) and Maisel synagogues" and does not preclude the possibility that the organ was used in the liturgical rites of other contemporaneous Prague synagogues.[4] The Prague prayerbook shows that the organ was used to accompany *lecha dodi* before Shabbat and was played by a Jew, presumably until the beginning of Shabbat. Liebermann and other Reformers cited this precedent as support for their interpretation of the laws of *chukat hagoyim*. In אור נוגה, Liebermann wrote:

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[1] Plaut, 37.
[2] Caro, 52ff.
[3] Ellenson, 252.
[4] Ellenson, 252, note 9. The baroque period extended from 1600-1750.

I have also not forgotten that which several elders related to me at the time I was in Prague. They remember the organ that was in the Altneushul. There on every Sabbath, Rosh Chodesh, and Holiday eve they would play it, and even today they receive the Sabbath in the Altschul with musical instruments. The music continues for a half hour into the night, and those who perform it are Jews.[1]

The Prague organ did not pose a problem for the *halachic* argument of some of the Rabbis in אלה דברי הברית; Rabbi Hirtz Scheur of Mainz conceded that there is legal justification for permitting the organ. He acknowledged the legality of the organ which concurs with the evidence from Prague. However, he was able to exclude a renewal of the organ for another reason. "In our generation, where the lawless among our people have publicly increased... and where many publicly profane the Sabbath, we have no right at all to permit such a thing."[2] Additionally, Scheur argued against Liebermann's claim that the organ was played "for a half hour into the night" and insists that they stopped at *boi b'shalom*, the end of *lecha dodi,* when the Shabbat began. This correction seems likely based on evidence from the Prague prayerbook. Finally, Scheur argued against the use of a single case as being a valid precedent.[3]

Scheur's doubt of Liebermann's "half hour into the night" claim was supported by the Rabbinical Council of Prague, which asserted that the music stopped half an hour before ברכו.[4] This led them to state that נוגה הצדק was an "evil darkness and should not be relied on at all... Everything in it is a devilish lie [designed] to blind the eyes of the Jews and lead them astray."[5] Apparently, misstating the Prague organ precedent was designed to misinform and confuse the public.

In contrast to the textual argument, any precedent poses a significant problem for the tradition-based position. Sofer and others who declared that the organ was prohibited by a Biblical prohibition of *chukat hagoyim* cannot ignore the use of an organ in a previous generation. Sofer defended his explanation of the organ by claiming that the Prague custom had been mistaken, evidenced by the fact that when the organ did break, they did not fix it. The custom had been erroneous and the congregation corrected their mistake.[6]

Löwenstamm, who agreed with Sofer's reasons for prohibiting the organ, developed a different hypothesis. His explanation is remarkable.

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[1] Ibid, 254.
[2] Ibid
[3] אלה דברי הברית, 2, second letter.
[4] Ibid, 17, fifth letter.
[5] Ibid
[6] Ellenson, 256.

... Perhaps the synagogue was constructed with this organ at a time when this custom [of playing the organ] was not part of their [Christian or pagan] worship. In truth, according to what we have heard, this synagogue has been standing since the time of the Second Temple. Consequently, [the organ] was installed legally. The prohibition against imitating the way of the Gentiles did not apply in this instance, and [the organ] was therefore not moved from its place. However, when it broke, they did not repair it or erect another, because at the time of its destruction, the Gentiles already employed this musical instrument, in their houses of worship for the specific purpose of idol worship. [Hence,] it is forbidden.[1]

Löwenstamm faced the same challenge from the Prague organ as did Sofer. However, he was uncomfortable with declaring an established custom to be invalid. Since his position imbued tradition with a venerated status, discrediting that tradition could undermine his position.

Löwenstamm's approach forced him to develop a fantastic historical explanation. There are varying beliefs as to the age of the Altneushul, although it is improbable that Löwenstamm's account is correct. Some claim that it is the oldest synagogue in Europe, dating from the 11th century, the present building from somewhere in the 14th century. Other explanations place its building in the 12th century or the middle of the 13th. It is hard to determine the exact age since the builders followed no certain architectural style. The name Altneushul means "old new synagogue," probably a reference to its outgrowth of another synagogue or a name given after a renovation.[2]

Instead of accepting these dates, Löwenstamm chose to rely on a legend about the creation of the synagogue which stated that the synagogue was built by emigrants from Jerusalem who came after the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE.[3] They brought stones from the Temple and used them for the foundation of the synagogue. The builders accepted these stones on the condition that when the Messiah came, the building would be torn down and the foundation stones returned for use in the new Temple. Altneushul may be a product of the Hebrew Al-Tenai Schul, meaning "on the condition that synagogue." Löwenstamm's reliance on a legend over the more probable dating of the synagogue's building demonstrates the strain of his historical explanation.

Even more problematic is the fact that the synagogue in question was not the Altneushul, but the Maisel. Despite modern scholarship's assertion that the organ was used in both congregations, the precedent was based on evidence from the Prague prayerbook description of the Maisel. Liebermann was inaccurate in naming the Altneushul and therefore Löwenstamm's response was mistaken. The Maisel

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[1] Abraham Levy Löwenstamm, ספר צרור החיים (Amsterdam, 1820), 6b.

[2] "The Old New Synagogue." http://user.intop.net/~jhollis/oldnewsynagogue.htm

[3] Ibid

synagogue was built in 1590-1592 and was financed by Mordechai Maisel, the mayor of the Jewish town who funded extensive reconstruction of the Jewish area. The original builders were Josef Wahl and Juda Goldsmied de Herz. Fire seriously damaged the building leading to its renovation in the Baroque style in 1689. It was again rebuilt in the pseudo-Gothic style by Professor Grott in 1893-1905.[1]

Since historical evidence places both synagogues after the eleventh century, Löwenstamm's position requires that the Church's adoption of the organ take place after this point as well. However, Christian use of the organ significantly predates this period. The organ was first employed in public Church worship by Pope Vitalian I in 666 A.D. In Spain, it may have been used as early as 450 A.D. Other accounts place the Church's use of the organ even earlier. Either way, the organ was in use by the Church nearly 1000 years before the Maisel synagogue was built.[2]

Additionally, Sofer's claim attributing the organ to Biblical Jubal is problematic given the historical evidence. Organ historians Hopkins and Rimbault discount any significant similarity between the organ mentioned in Genesis (4:21) and the modern organ.[3] They caution against any thought that the biblical organ was anything like the modern instrument.[4]

Sofer and Löwenstamm used reasoning which forced extremely inaccurate historical claims. Sofer made other such assertions by claiming elsewhere that the Talmud demonstrated a preference for a Yiddish-enhanced German over a pure German language.[5] Sofer's excessive claims express his concern for permitting any validity to the Reform *halachic* arguments. The polemical attack and discrediting of Reform leadership was meant to not only destroy the Reform movement but to place it outside the bounds of justified Orthodox observance. The devaluation of the Prague organ precedent is the prime example of Orthodoxy's unwillingness to let any Reform argument persist. The organ became the most obvious and significant division between Reform and Orthodox groups.[6] As changes spread throughout the Jewish religious world, the organ was constantly used as a litmus test for synagogual affiliation. The organ became such a strong symbol that Orthodox Berlin ordination was granted with the understanding that the rabbi would not preside over a synagogue using an organ and that such an appointment would constitute the invalidation of the ordination.[7] The assault on the organ in Europe parallels the defense of the synagogue *mechitzah* and gender seating separation of Orthodox synagogues of 1950's America.

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[1] "Prague Maisel Synagogue," http://www.hotels-prague.biz/sights/maiselsynagogue.htm

[2] E.J. Hopkins and E.F. Rimbault, The Organ: Its History and Construction (Amsterdam: Frits A.M.Knuf, 1972), 17.

[3] Hopkins and Rimbault, 2.

[4] Ibid, see note in Hopkins and Rimbault.

[5] Jacob Katz, A House Divided: Orthodoxy and Schism in Nineteenth-Century Central European Jewry (Hanover, NH: University Press, 1998), 52.

[6] Ellenson, 252, note 4.

[7] Ellenson, 252.

◖ *The End of Debate*

To say that *halachic* debate between the Orthodox and Reform ended in 1820 with the end of literary warfare is inaccurate since it is difficult to say that it ever began. What were in fact polemical debates were inconclusive. The Reform arguments were never addressed and the Orthodox response made discussion impossible. Grätz, no friend of the Berlin and Hamburg Reforms, characterized the *halachic* aspect of the debate:

> The reasons which the (Orthodox) rabbis had adduced against the worship services of the (Hamburg) Temple were mostly not valid, and some of them were downright childish. The letter (of the Law) was against them (the Orthodox.) The multiplicity of Rabbinic authorities, belonging to such different times and countries, always enabled one to bring apparent proofs for and against a specific case. The rabbis should have said that, even though the letter could be adduced in favor of the innovations, the spirit of Talmudic Judaism must nevertheless condemn them. But they did not stand on that level; and, in their desire to utilize the letter also for their position, they revealed many a weak spot.[1]

The historical inaccuracies and the omission of the Reform textual sources loom as weaknesses in the Orthodox position. Nevertheless, despite the unwillingness of the Orthodox to engage in debate or ascribe any merit to their opposition, they were able to discredit the Reform innovations.

While scattered *halachic* arguments appear later in the Reform movement, the brief period between 1818 and 1820 comprises nearly all of the rabbinical disputes on the validity of Reform practices.[2] Looking back, one wonders if the Orthodox polemical response was justified or appropriate. Many of the Orthodox predictions came true; Reform stopped relying on *halacha* and innovations became more radical. The mistranslations of the Hamburg prayerbook provided a tiny but accurate prediction of eventual dogmatic changes. While these early innovations were solidly based in rabbinic writings, later decisions lacked any such validity and blatantly broke with Jewish tradition.

Additionally, the Orthodox were correct in their assertion that some claims in the Reform publications were false. Liebermann's contention that the Prague organ was played past sundown was false. Even more significant, נוגה הצדק contained a letter from

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[1] Quoted in Petuchowski, 98, note 38.
[2] Textual proof for Reform's innovations was rendered for the Frankfort Assembly in 1845 by Leopold Stein. However, this work was based largely on the previous Reform *halachic* writings and came long after the textual debate had ended; Plaut, 166.

"Rabbis from Jerusalem" that supported the Reform position. This letter was later proven to be a forgery. The Orthodox may have correctly anticipated these events and directed אלה דברי הברית appropriately. They could, however, rightly claim that they have never given even minor Reform innovations any validity whatsoever.

On the other hand, perhaps the Orthodox prophesy was self-fulfilling. By refusing to engage in serious debate, the Reform abandoned *halachic* arguments out of frustration. The next time accusations were made against the validity of the reformers' innovations, the movement decided to reject the authority of *halacha* rather than attempt another debate. While it may be difficult to suggest that the Orthodox position caused the Reform movement to abandon *halacha*, it is naïve to pretend that the strong reaction of the Orthodox had no influence in their decision not to engage in further textual debates.

It is impossible to determine to what extent outcomes of the debate and decisions of later Reform leadership would have changed given a different Orthodox response. However, it is clear that the Orthodox rejoinder set the tone for the relationship between the two movements, discrediting the Reformers as invalid and setting them outside the pale of traditional Judaism.[1]

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[1] This paper makes a distinction between the strict legal authority of textual sources in *halacha* and the reliance on tradition as precedent. There is no question that traditional understanding and interpretation of Jewish law requires an understanding of the precedents and existing practices. The customs of the Jewish people are an intricate part of the *halachic* process.

If this is the case, why does this paper continuously assume a distinction between the strict interpretation of rabbinic texts and prevailing practice? While the two may not be separated for normal *halachic* rulings, they are separable and distinguishable. What the *Shulchan Aruch* allows and what common Jewish practice permits are not always the same. It was this distinction that the Reform made and the Orthodox refused to accept. However, the Orthodox rejection of this distinction is not a rejection of the idea that such a distinction can be drawn. On the contrary, Orthodox Jewish law uses such a distinction for many *halachic* issues. Consider the use of English sermons and prayers in today's American synagogue. There is no question that according to the Shulchan Aruch adding certain prayers or sermons in the vernacular pose no *halachic* problem. However, the Orthodox of the early 19th century fought against just such changes. History has proven that these innovations are in fact consistent with Jewish law. Nevertheless, the Orthodox chose to reject them based on a lack of precedent. Modern Jewish practice is replete with such examples of new practices that break with tradition and find no problem in Jewish legal texts. The Orthodox could have allowed such changes but chose not to. They chose to use the argument of tradition because it automatically invalidated any argument for change.

Further discussion of this issue is beyond the capacity of this simple note. This topic itself is worthy of a detailed analysis in a separate work. What is important for the topic presented in this paper is that the Orthodox had the ability to separate tradition from rabbinic sources; they chose to assert tradition over the texts. They did not have to make such an argument but they did in order to push their position and ignore the supporting texts.

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A Struggle of Biblical Proportions

The Fourth Session of the Council of Trent and its Aftermath

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The Council of Trent (1545-63) played a key role in crystallizing Catholic doctrine on a number of fronts ranging from Church corruption to the nature of the Eucharist and the writing of the catechism. What is not very well known is the role the Council played in defining the Church's view in regards to the Bible. It was at the Council of Trent that Jerome's Latin translation of the Bible, the Vulgate, was declared to be of Divine inspiration and the only legitimate translation of the Bible. This issue was dealt with at the Fourth Session of the Council (February-April, 1546), but the controversy surrounding this issue continued until the end of the century. This paper is an attempt to explain the nature of the controversy and to put it within the context of the late 16th century.

◀ The Controversy Surrounding Vulgate

Even at the Council itself the Vulgate issue proved problematic. At first a committee was formed to draft a statement in regard to the Vulgate. Unable to agree to a single drafted statement, the committee issued two different drafts. The legates did not care for either of the two drafts so they, in the end, put out a third one, which contained two decrees, "The Decree Concerning the Canonical Scriptures" and "The Decree Concerning the Edition, and the Use, of the Sacred Books." In the first Decree the Council set forth the status of Scripture, both the Old and New Testaments; its relationship to tradition, and which books were to be counted as being part of Scripture. The second decree made the Vulgate the only acceptable translation of the Bible.

The Canonical Scriptures Decree set forth that the Synod:

> following the examples of the orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with an equal affection of piety, and reverence, all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament – seeing that one God is the author of both – also the said

traditions,[1] as well those appertaining to faith as to morals, as having been dictated, ... and preserved in the Catholic Church by a continuous succession.[2]

Furthermore, to be specific, the Council set forth a list of works to be counted amongst the New and Old Testaments.

The issue of which books were properly a part of Scripture had a long history within the Church. While the Septuagint and most of the early Church fathers had considered the books of Maccabees, Judith, Tobias, Wisdom of Solomon, and Ecclesiasticus to be legitimate parts of Scripture, Jerome had dubbed these books "the Apocrypha," the hidden books, those not canonical but "suitable for the edification of the faithful."[3] Similarly in regard to the New Testament there had long been issues surrounding the authenticity of Paul's epistle to the Hebrews, the epistles of James and Jude and the Apocalypse of Saint John.[4] The controversy surrounding many of these books had become a very keen issue for the Church since the rise of the Protestant Reformation. Martin Luther had all together removed "the Apocrypha" from his translation of the Bible and questioned the legitimacy of the epistles of James and Jude, referring to them as "epistles of straw."[5] To counter Luther, the Council affirmed the legitimacy of these books and even went so far as to place all the books of "the Apocrypha" alongside the other books of the Old Testament, in essence raising them to the status of Scripture, something Jerome had strongly opposed.

The Canonical Scriptures Decree is important because it set up the rationale behind the Vulgate Decree. The fundamental underpinning of the Council's view of the relationship between scripture and tradition, as set forth in the Canonical Scriptures Decree, was that of "*pari pietatis affectu ac reverential,*" equal affection of piety, and reverence. Once one views the Vulgate as part of Church tradition, equal to Scripture, then the Latin text of the Vulgate becomes a sort of scripture in of itself. Hence the Vulgate decree which stated that

> the old and Vulgate edition, which, by the lengthened usage of so many years, has been approved of in the Church, be, in public lectures, disputations, sermons and expositions, held as authentic; and that no one is to dare, or presume to reject it under any pretext whatever.[6]

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[1] In this and in all future quotations the Italics are mine.

[2] Hanover Historical Text Project: http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct04.html

[3] Jedin, Hubert. A History of the Council of Trent Vol. II Trans. Dom Ernest Graf. (B. Herder Book Co. St. Louis MO, 1961.) 56.

[4] Revelations

[5] Jedin, Hubert. A History of the Council of Trent Vol. II Trans. Dom Ernest Graf. (B. Herder Book Co. St. Louis MO, 1961.) 56.

[6] Hanover Historical Text Project: http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct04.html

Furthermore, to add some teeth to this decree, the Council declared that

> wishing, as is just, to impose a restraint, … also on printers, who now without restraint – thinking, that is, that whatsoever they please is allowed them – print, without the license of ecclesiastical superiors, the said books of sacred Scripture, … [this synod] ordains and decrees, that, henceforth, the sacred Scripture, and especially the said old and vulgate edition, be printed in *the most correct manner possible*; and that it shall not be lawful for anyone to print, or cause to be printed, any books whatever, on sacred matters… unless they shall have been first examined, and approved of, by the Ordinary; under pain of the anathema and fine.[1]

This in effect banned the use of all vernacular Bibles. Furthermore the Council was, in essence, banning all interpretations of Scripture that were inconsistent with the Vulgate. While the Church, in the earlier decree, had, in a sense, gone against Jerome, here they were making him a *de facto* second Moses.[2]

◖ *The Aftermath of the Vulgate Decree*

The Council's actions were extremely controversial. The legitimacy of the Vulgate had for some time been under attack not just in the decades before by the Protestant Reformers, but even earlier by Humanists such as Giannozzo Manetti, Lorenzo Valla and Erasmus. The fact was that there were many different versions of the Vulgate, all of which differed extensively from both the Septuagint and the original Hebrew. By the count of the early 16th century Christian Hebraist, Johann Reuchlin, there were over two hundred differences between the Vulgate and the Mesoratic text. To make matters worse, the Vulgate was not even consistent with Jerome; there were many instances where the Vulgate translated verses differently from the way Jerome himself did in his commentaries on the Bible. The Council's solution to this problem was essentially to admit that there was a problem with the Vulgate being corrupted over the centuries and that the Church would take action so that the Vulgate would "be printed in the most correct manner possible."[3]

It took the Church over forty years and numerous commissions in order to follow through with the mandate of the Council of Trent and put together a standardized text of the Vulgate. A commission to work on the project, in addition to working on a critical

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[1] Ibid.

[2] In the coming decades there where in fact quite a number of portraits made of Jerome taking dictation directly from an angel, while writing the Vulgate.

[3] Hanover Historical Text Project: http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct04.html

edition of the Septuagint, was not officially put together until 1560, under Pope Pius IV.[1] In regards to the Vulgate, this commission accomplished nothing. Pope Pius V[2] similarly tried to put a commission together, at the end of the decade, to put out a critical edition of the Vulgate and Septuagint but again it folded after only six months, accomplishing nothing. Several years later a third commission was put together under Pope Gregory XIII[3] and headed by Cardinal Antonio Carafa; this commission did an extensive amount of work on the Septuagint. When Gregory XIII died in 1585 he was succeeded by Pope Sixtus V.[4] Under Sixtus a critical edition of the Septuagint was finally published in 1588. Already in 1586 Sixtus, seeing how well things were going with the Septuagint translation, finally put together a commission to specifically deal with the Vulgate. In the beginning Sixtus left things in the hands of Carafa, but by 1588, after two years of work on the project, Sixtus decided to take matters into his own hands. Confident that he was capable of handling the task, based on his experience in dealing with the works of Ambrose of Milan, Sixtus decided that he would make the decisions for the translation himself.

◀ *The Sistine Vulgate*

Sixtus, after only six months on the project, overrode his own commission and forced through a text, against the wishes of just about everybody who was involved in the project, thus creating the Sistine Vulgate. The Sistine Vulgate was published on March 1, 1590; along with the Vulgate text, Sixtus also put out a papal bull titled *Aeternus ille caelestium*, in which he declared that

> in this our perpetually valid constitution ... we resolve and declare from our certain knowledge and from the plenitude of apostolical authority that that Vulgate Latin edition of the sacred page of the Old and New Testament, which was received as authentic by the Council of Trent is without any doubt or controversy to be reckoned that very one which we now publish, corrected as best may be, and printed in the printing office of the Vatican, to be read in the universal republic of Christendom and in all the Churches of the Christian world, decreeing that it, approved as it is, first by the universal consent of the holy Church and of the holy fathers, then by the decree of the general Council of Trent, and now also by the apostolical authority delivered to us by the Lord, is to

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[1] Giovanni Angelo Medici
[2] Michele Ghisleri
[3] Ugo Buoncompagni (best known for his work on the calendar).
[4] Felice Peretti

be received and held as true, legitimate, authentic, and undoubted in all public and private controversies, readings, preachings, and expositions.[1]

Sixtus saw himself as fulfilling the wishes of the Council of Trent. Yet while the Council of Trent had merely declared that the Vulgate should be the bible used by the Church and that it needed to be corrected as much as possible, Sixtus was declaring that the only legitimate text of the Vulgate was the one that was now coming off of the Vatican press. In essence, Sixtus was banning every single copy of the Vulgate that existed presently.[2]

There was an immediate outcry within both Catholic and Protestant circles over the Sistine Vulgate. Many of Sixtus' translations were not supported by the manuscripts. Instead of relying on the more ancient copies of the Vulgate, such as the Codex Amiatinus, Sixtus chose to rely on the more recent printed editions of the Vulgate, such as the editions of Henten and Stephanus.[3] One particularly grievous error in the Sistine edition was that it omitted Numbers Chapter XXX verses 11-13, which deal with a husband's power to annul his wife's vows.[4] Another problem was that Sixtus had decided to reformulate the chapter placements in the bible.

Sixtus died suddenly on August 27, 1590, less then six months after he had released his edition of the Vulgate. It took only a week for Sistine edition to be rescinded and banned by the Church. Plans to put out a rectified version of the Sistine edition were delayed as over the next eighteen months the Church went through three Popes. The first of these Popes, Urban VII,[5] died twelve days after his election. The second, Pope Gregory XIV,[6] lasted less than a year and the third Pope, Innocent XI,[7] lasted less than two months. The task of revising Sixtus' work ultimately fell to Pope Clementine VIII.[8] The result of this was the Sixto-Clementine Vulgate, which was published in 1592. While Clementine claimed to only be editing Sixtus' work, the new Sixto-Clementine Vulgate made more than 4,900 changes to the Sistine Vulgate.

In the introduction to the Sixto-Clementine Vulgate, Clementine printed the papal bull *Cum sacrorum* in which he declared:

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[1] http://www.the-highway.com/transmission2_Skilton.html#57
[2] The evidence would suggest that Sixtus did not intend for his decree to be carried out in its fullest and most literal sense.
[3] Greenslade, S.L. The Cambridge History of the Bible: the West from the Reformation to Today. (Cambridge University Press, Great Britain. 1963) 210
[4] Sixtus's reasons for doing this are not at all clear. It is possible that the omission of these verses was simply a printing error. It is also possible that Sixtus was specifically trying to avoid tangling himself in the issue of a husband's power to annul his wife's vows of chastity, which had long been a controversial issue for theologians.
[5] Battista Castagna
[6] Niccolo Sfondrato
[7] Gian Antonio Facchinetti
[8] Ippolito Aldobrandini

No one may presume to entrust this edition of the sacred scriptures to print unless a copy of it has been previously deposited in the Vatican Press, lest even the smallest portion of the text has been changed, added to, or subtracted from it ... The printed books of this edition, whether they disagree in some respect or from another text other than the Vatican Press, printed within a ten year period, equally whether he has presumed to sell it or propose to sell it or to publish it, aside from the loss of all the books and other temporal penalties to be inflicted by our authority, let him incur thereby even the sentence of greater excommunication, from which let him not be absolved save by the Roman Pontiff...[1]

Unlike Sixtus, who had put a blanket ban on all other editions of the Bible, Clementine had simply banned anyone from printing a Bible not approved by the Vatican and gave the Vatican press the sole printing rights for the next decade.

◀ *Conclusion*

In looking back at these events it would seem that the purpose of the decrees from the Fourth Session of the Council of Trent was so that the Church could clearly define its attitude toward Scripture. The reason for this issue taking on the kind of predominance that it did was because of the Protestant Reformation, with its battle cry of *sola scriptura*, (only scripture) and Martin Luther's vernacular translation of the Bible. To counter the Protestants it had become necessary for the Church to have a clearly stated set of opposition points which would define the boundaries between Catholicism and Protestantism and allow the Church to take action against Protestants. The Protestant cry of *sola scriptura* was to be met with the declaration of *pari pietatis affectu ac reverential* (equal affection of piety and reverence) that tradition and scripture were equal decisors of Christian doctrine. Even more than that, tradition was being put above scripture, in a sense, in that the only way that scripture could be interpreted was through the eyes of Church tradition, the Vulgate. While all of these elements had existed in Christendom before the Reformation, it was the coming of the Reformation that made it necessary to make official Church doctrine out of what had merely been accepted convention.

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