# CHRONOS

MARTIN LUTHER KING:
*A nonviolent attack
on America*
LAUNCH FAILURE:
*NASA's early years*
RETURN OF THE KING:
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*Also:*
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# CHRONOS

## The Journal of the Yeshiva University Historical Society

# 2005-2006

*Editors*
**Paul Adam**
**Michal Bacon**
**Elissa Kempin**
**Eliad Shapiro**

*Faculty Advisor:*
**Dr. Hadassah Kosak**

Dear Reader,

In modern history writing, the notion that knowledge of past events can direct us through the present has mostly fallen out of favor. History is mostly an academic and intellectual pursuit, one that people undertake for its own, modest rewards. What are those rewards? For us, at least, the reward is the pleasure that comes from discovery. Research and investigation is the backbone of all history. When we succeed at it, when we find the prized document, article, reference or notion that completes a historical puzzle, the satisfaction is immense. It can give great insight into ourselves, the countries we live in, the culture we call our own. So much of these identities are rooted in the past that in discovering our history, we are truly discovering ourselves.

This desire for discovery is the reason we publish *Chronos*. It is a showcase of the best historical analysis that Yeshiva University has produced. This year's collection of essays touch on an exciting and broad range of topics, some on Jewish and American history, others on the world history, technology and politics. This year, we also continue to expand the range of *Chronos* with the inclusion of pieces from Stern College and Yeshiva faculty.

Of course, we must thank the numerous people who contributed to this publication. First and foremost, our writers have worked diligently on not only producing, but editing and refining these essays so they would be presented as superbly as you see them here. The Deans and administration of Yeshiva College and Stern College have generously provided us with the funds to not only advertise and publish this journal, but to also award prizes to the most prestigious essays that were submitted over the year. We thank our publishers for their time, advice and expertise in producing *Chronos* so handsomely. And we gratefully thank the Faculty of History at Yeshiva University, particularly our advisor, Dr. Hadassah Kosak for their support, advice and patience throughout the publication of *Chronos*.

We firmly believe that this, the 2006 edition of *Chronos* is the most impressive yet and we are confident that you find it well worth the wait. We hope you enjoy reading and considering these outstanding pieces of history as much as we enjoyed bringing them to you.

Sincerely,

The Editors
*Paul Adam*
*Michal Bacon*
*Elissa Kempin*
*Eliad Shapiro*

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# King's Nonviolence: Attacking America from Within

*Azy Grysman*
*Yeshiva College 1st Prize Winner*

**The civil rights movement** shook the mindset of Americans in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It challenged the accepted practices of interaction between races in the South and caused a great sense of upheaval to be felt throughout the United States. Largely contributing to this sense of upheaval were the tense emotions generated by nonviolent protests across the South. Powerful images of white policemen brutally attacking defenseless blacks as throngs of Negroes sang freedom songs in the streets, dominated the media and the mindset of a country paralyzed in the face of its new challenge.

In 1968, James Farmer, the father of the Freedom Rides of 1961 looked back on an abandoned nonviolent dream and wrote:[1]

> For CORE, nonviolence ... ended on a balmy night, September 1, 1963, in a sleepy town on the Mississippi, when a uniformed mob screamed for my blood... The massive violence of bigotry became the killer of the dream of passive resistance. Replacing that dream was the doctrine of self-defense.[2]

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1 John Lewis, *Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1998), 132.

2 Inge Bell, *CORE and the Strategy of Non-violence* (New York: Random House, 1968), foreword.

What happened in those eight years that started with the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955-56 to lead the nonviolence movement from a path of unprecedented success to abandonment by most of its constituents? An in-depth study of one of nonviolence's biggest proponents, Martin Luther King Jr., and how he implemented his ideology at the Montgomery Bus Boycott will lend some insight to this question.

## The Emergence of Nonviolent Thought in America

The most successful and famous political figure to implement nonviolence, Mohandas Gandhi, writes that nonviolence corresponds to the very nature of man's being. Every man "desire [sic] peace, justice, order, freedom, and personal dignity;" violence "only increases man's progressive degeneration."[3] A person who attempts to fight nonviolence with violence will feel shame betraying these inner desires; nonviolence will then defeat the forces of violence. When Martin Luther King Jr. writes of his "pilgrimage to nonviolence," he discusses the profound impact that witnessing racial and economic injustice as a teenager had on his development, and the amount of concern it instilled within him.[4] When studying theology and philosophy in Crozer Theological Seminary, he read many works of social philosophers as well. After much searching, he arrived at the writings of Gandhi, particularly the Gandhian notion of *Satyagraha*, the love force, about which King writes:

> Gandhi was probably the first person in history to lift the love ethic of Jesus above mere interaction between individuals to a powerful and effective social force on a large scale. It was in the Gandhian emphasis on love and nonviolence that I discovered the method for social reform that I had been seeking for so many months... I came to feel that this was the only morally and practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom.[5]

King adopted many of Gandhi's ideas, and further stressed that this method of nonviolent social reform needed to be applied both in legal instances such as the boycott in Montgomery, as well as through illegal means. He writes:

> We will take direct action against injustice without waiting for other agencies to act. We will not obey unjust laws or submit to unjust practices.... The way of nonviolence means a willingness to suffer and sacrifice. It may mean going to jail.... We will not hate you, but we cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust laws.[6]

A second influential proponent of the nonviolent ideology was Bayard Rustin. Rustin, once involved in the Communist party, and most notably known for his part in the March on Washington of 1963, actively pursued equal rights for blacks throughout the nineteen-forties, fifties, and sixties. He was at the center of the movement, helping it grow through personalities like Martin Luther King.[7] Rustin focused on steering the nonviolent tradition in America from its pacifist non-cooperative roots towards Gandhi's model of direct action. Rustin focused on many of the practical aspects of bringing racial injustice to the forefront of the American political agenda. He delineated three steps: Finding a ground for reconciliation, making the issue public, and guiding participants in the inner preparations needed to succeed in their campaign.[8]

## Montgomery: The Successes of the Protest

The boycott in Montgomery served as inspiration for the entire country. A nation watched with bated breath as thousands of black Americans, under the inspiration of Martin Luther King, refused to ride the buses in response to the arrest of Rosa Parks. Ms. Parks, an elderly and respected member of the black community had refused to move to the back of the bus to make room for a white passenger. The success of the Montgomery community in mobilizing the entire black community, as well as in achieving desegregation on the city's buses inspired the nation's population, both black and white, to mobilize and organize nonviolent protests across the South. Many different organizations fought for desegregation at lunch counters, movie theaters, and department stores, while others fought for voting rights.

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3 Mohandas Gandhi, *Gandhi on Non-Violence*, ed. Thomas Merton ( New York: New Directions, 1965), 23.

4 Martin Luther King, *Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), 90-101.

5 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 97.

6 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 216-217.

7 Daniel Levine, *Bayard Rustin and the Civil Rights Movement* (New Brunswick, N.J.:Rutgers University Press, 2000), 3.

8 Levine, 27-28.

What did the successes of Montgomery mean to blacks throughout the United States? In his depiction of Montgomery in the years leading up to the boycott, King describes a city besieged with problems of infighting, apathy amongst the educated and passivity amongst the uneducated.[9] While much of the community was resigned to accepting the realities of segregation, those who wanted to fight back were met with little support from the community and found that many organizations were more concerned with outdoing their rivals than with progressing towards desegregation. Another important factor was that Montgomery was a city where the practices of segregation were rigid social structures, gone unchallenged for many years. The oppression of the Negro population seemed to be peacefully accepted by all. Although King attributes some of it to fear, as those in the higher economic positions might lose their jobs if they became identified as troublesome, he also claims that those in the lower economic classes began to believe in the system that degraded them:

> Their minds and souls were so conditioned to the system of segregation that they submissively adjusted themselves to things as they were... Segregation... scars the soul and degrades the personality... The system of segregation itself was responsible for much of the passivity of the Negroes of Montgomery.[10]

The boycott of Montgomery showed the nation that the black people could rise above their differences and unite for the cause of the people as a whole. It also showed them that even the most rigid segregation structures could be challenged and even broken. King attributes this turnaround in the Montgomery community to something "suprarational," claiming that it "cannot be explained without a divine dimension."[11] The truth of this statement is not something that can be discussed in this paper, but it emphasizes the ability of the Montgomery community to surmount the staggering pressures against it to fight the system of injustice. This ability served as inspiration for black communities across the South to fight for the civil rights movement, as John Lewis, a teenager at the time, describes:

> I followed it almost every day, either in the newspapers or on the radio. This was riveting. This was real... This wasn't just

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9 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 34-37.
10 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 37.
11 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 69.

talk. This was action...This was a fight, but it was a different way of fighting... There was something about that kind of protest that appealed to me, that felt very, very *right*.[12]

These words are one example of the feelings that were stirred up in many blacks across the South who were not directly involved in the protest. Blacks all around were inspired by the notion that it was possible to break the current structures of segregation.

The protest had ramifications beyond inspiring the average black citizens of the South. The publicity that the boycott generated, so wide-ranging that reports of the event were found in newspapers as far away as Japan, led members of CORE in the North to realize the importance of setting up a protest organization in the South. CORE, the Congress of Racial Equality, was established in 1942 in Chicago by a priest named James Farmer and a number of students and pacifists with the goal of "applying Gandhi's technique of nonviolent resistance to American race relations."[13] In its early successful years it established chapters in many Northern cities. Bayard Rustin later claimed that a discussion between him and King about the need to spread the "Spirit of Montgomery" to other cities across the South led to the establishment of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and, later, of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.[14]

## The Philosophy Behind the Protest

What is even more fascinating about the Montgomery Bus Boycott is the planning, or lack thereof, that went into it. Many in the media claimed that since Rosa Parks had worked for the NAACP, her refusal to stand up was a ploy intended to spark controversy. King, however, writes that the entire event- both Parks's defiant act and the organization of the boycott- was spontaneous. He attributes Parks' timely act of protest to an "intrepid affirmation that she had had enough... she was planted there by her personal sense of dignity and self-respect."[15] The whole protest was organized in a few nights and King was asked to be the spokesman. As King writes:

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12 Lewis, 48.
13 Bell, 9.
14 Levine, 94.
15 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 44.

When I went to Montgomery, I had not the slightest idea that I would later become involved in a crisis in which non-violent resistance would be applicable. I neither started the protest nor suggested it... As the days unfolded, I came to see the power of nonviolence more and more. [16]

King describes a nonviolent movement that instantaneously sprouted from the people. He writes of his awe as members of the community showed support and participated in numbers far beyond what the organizers had anticipated.

At this point, I feel it is appropriate to qualify that the spontaneity that King describes may not be perfectly honest. In Taylor Branch's account of the bus boycott, he explains that refusing to give up a seat on the bus had become a more common act of defiance in the Negro community. Numerous prominent civil rights workers in the South, notably E.D. Nixon and Clifford Durr, had been looking for one such Negro behind whom they could rally to challenge the system of segregation. When Parks refused to give up her seat, she was immediately contacted and asked if she would participate with them to further the civil rights cause through her case.[17]

For the purposes of this essay, what is important is that King had little to prepare him for the boycott, as did the people of Montgomery, despite the advanced preparation from other involved parties. King describes a protest that came from the initiative of the people in which nonviolent ideology was practiced and encouraged. But if King wasn't leading this boycott from an ideological perspective, what force did nonviolence really play in the entire spectacle? After the boycott achieved success, King addressed the people of Montgomery:

A third challenge that stands before us is that of entering the new age with understanding and good will... if we retaliate with hate and bitterness, the new age will be nothing but a duplication of the old age... If we succumb to the temptation of using violence in our struggle for justice, unborn generations will be the recipients of a long and

desolate night of bitterness, and our chief legacy to the future will be an endless reign of meaningless chaos. [18]

These are not words directed at an ideologically driven audience. These are words of restraint by a shepherd trying to teach his flock, attempting to direct the energy he has just witnessed in the proper direction.

## Explaining the Protest

One wonders why 50,000 blacks decided to protest via means of nonviolence if it was not an ideology that they believed in. Bayard Rustin makes a number of suggestions, including that the daily act of community sacrifice created a sense of community spirit as well as group pride. He also posits that the methods of nonviolence turn fear into courage.[19] In this same vein, King, when describing the first day of the protest, writes:

They knew why they walked, and the knowledge was evident in the way they carried themselves. And as I watched them I knew that there is nothing more majestic than the determined courage of individuals willing to suffer and sacrifice for their freedom and dignity. [20]

This opening protest was an act of liberation and defiance driven by the powerful feelings it produced. King often told a story of an old woman who, when asked why she walked when riding would be understood because of her age, answered, "My feets is tired; but my soul is rested."[21] Many blacks finally saw an opportunity to express the feelings they had had for so long, but had no way of fighting back. Now, they faced the opportunity to endure a small sacrifice that had little danger, yet filled them with a sense of dignity.

Martin Luther King saw these steps taken by the community as a positive initiative and attempted to expand on the positive aspects and educate them in the philosophy of nonviolence. He wanted to encourage the community's revolutionary spirit but keep it in line with his nonviolent beliefs. However, what resulted was a form of protest that lacked true

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16 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 101.
17 Taylor Branch, *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954-63*, (New York: Touchstone, 1988), 120-134.

18 Martin Luther King, *I have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World*, ed. James M. Washington (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1992), 21.
19 Levine, 95.
20 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 54.
21 OHIOANA Authors, Nikki Giovani, www.wosu.org/ohioana-authors/giovanni/mlk.php (accessed May 4, 2005)

ideological investment. Now this may not have detracted from the protest per se, but it left the ideological nature of the protest movement in a precarious position. Inge Bell writes:

> In Gandhi's philosophy, nonviolence- not just noninjury, but positive goodwill toward the evildoer- was the indispensable cornerstone of ethical action. Nonviolence was not just a means to other ends, it was itself the highest end, and all other goals were subordinate to it...Gandhi distinguished sharply between *Satyagraha* and passive resistance, *Duragraha*... Passive resistance, he said, is used by those who are interested in a specific goal but are too weak to use violence to attain it... *Satyagraha* is a weapon of the strong...Without the attainment of this conviction and thus this superior strength, a movement will give up its passive resistance the moment it becomes strong enough to use violent means. [22]

These prophetic words taken from Gandhi's philosophy show a fragility in those who protested in Montgomery. The protesters enjoyed the liberating feeling of taking the moral high ground whilst acting against injustice. They enjoyed publicity around the world.[23] They even won a court decision in a federal court declaring the Alabama bus segregation laws unconstitutional, a law that was later upheld by the Supreme Court.[24] But as long as nonviolence was for the people nothing more than a means in their political struggle, and not an "inseparable part of our [sic] very being," it was doomed to its eventual abandonment for more direct tactics.[25]

If we look at King's outlook of nonviolence as a political philosophy and not one that was meant to be a way of life, the history that followed in the movement becomes much clearer. When political leaders in the South showed grim determination to fight bitterly against desegregation by using better jailing techniques to spread out the protesters and crush their group spirit, the tactic of nonviolence began to lose its appeal to the common man. Nonviolent activists were confronted by mobs of white men "screaming for their blood" and ready to use any means necessary to quell the spirit of revolution started by the protesters. The movement gradually became frustrated with the slow process of nonviolence. People refused to stand for the injustice of the murders of their fellow protesters. They didn't believe in nonviolence enough to exercise the restraint that the philosophy called for. Since to them nonviolence was a tactic, it was abandoned when it lost the appeal that it originally offered the oppressed constituents of the South.

I would like to qualify this explanation by pointing out that King, being well-versed in the writings of Gandhi was aware of this reality. In fact, as quoted earlier, King referred the philosophy of nonviolence as "the only morally and practically sound method open to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom."[26] In his address quoted earlier he spoke of the many goals for the black people, the first of which being brotherhood, the second integrity, and only the third nonviolence. Furthermore, he spoke of the boycott as "merely a means to awaken a sense of shame within the oppressor and challenge his false sense of superiority."[27] The more important goal for King was spreading the "Christian virtues of love, mercy, and forgiveness" which stood in danger of being overcome by "hate and bitterness" caused by years of standing "amid the tragic midnight of injustice and indignities" of the years of oppression.[28] For King, nonviolence was a way to revolt against years of injustice without suffering from the negative effects that a violent revolution usually has on the individual. As well, it was a "potent weapon" to be used in the public sphere.[29] Through Gandhi's philosophy King saw a way to bring the already existing Christian value, that of "Love thy Neighbor," to a dimension he had previously thought inconceivable.[30] At the same time, he saw a way for the oppressed people of America to begin to fight back and change the existing order of segregation. Thus, it was a "morally and practically sound method."[31]

But if King was aware of Gandhi's warnings against the use of

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22 Bell, 33-34.

23 Levine, 93.

24 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 152-160.

25 Gandhi, *Gandhi on Nonviolence*, 24. I am worried here that I am writing in a tone overly critical of the protesters. I don't want to present an argument that questions their courage or the significance of what they did. I have the utmost respect for them. I am merely exploring their actions within the nonviolent philosophy.

26 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 97.

27 King, *I have a Dream*, 22.

28 King, *I have a Dream*, 21.

29 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 101.

30 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 96

31 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 97 (taken from footnote 5).

nonviolence as a tactic, why would he fall into that same trap that Gandhi warned would not succeed? I see two possible ways to answer this question. It is possible that King foresaw the eventual end of the use of nonviolence in the civil rights movement. However, he saw in it the potential to gain so much ground, both for the civil rights cause and for the black people, and that it would be worth any setbacks encountered later. He may have thought it was more important to, so to speak, put black protesters on the map, than to develop a cohesive philosophy for the entire movement. Or perhaps he believed that Gandhi's warnings could be overcome. King may have tried to use the philosophy of nonviolence not as a way of life for everyone but as a force for social change, as he described it, despite Gandhi's warnings. King writes:

> Mahatma Gandhi never had more than one hundred persons absolutely committed to his philosophy. But with this small group of devoted followers, he galvanized the whole of India, and through a magnificent feat of nonviolence challenged the might of the British Empire and won freedom for his people.[32]

Thus, if the nonviolent ideology remained a way of life for some, it could rise to be that social force that it was in the time of Gandhi.

Whether it stayed true to Gandhi's philosophy or not, the development of the nonviolent form of protest in the civil rights movement heavily impacted the social realities of the 1950's and 1960's in the United States. The protests challenged the validity of segregation then prevalent in the United States, especially in the South, and brought the reality of a pressing need for change to the consciousness of the entire country. Although nonviolent practices were later abandoned by a large percentage of blacks, its use in the early stages of the protest movement proved crucial for the success of the movement. Despite the lack of clarity as to Martin Luther King's true intentions in implementing the nonviolent philosophy, his effect on the face of American society should serve as an inspiration to all those who study this time period. May his memory live on, and may we learn never to accept systemized injustice in our society.

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32 King, *Stride Toward Freedom*, 218.

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# The Patria
# In the *New York Times:*
## A Historical Analysis of a Primary Source
*Reena Mittelman*

**IT WAS NOVEMBER 25, 1940**. The S.S. Patria, a British-chartered French liner carrying approximately 1,900 illegal Jewish immigrants, lay anchored in the Haifa harbor in Palestine. Several days before, the refugees onboard had been captured by British forces patrolling the Mediterranean coast. The ship now awaited deportation to Mauritius, an island in the Indian Ocean off the east coast of Africa. Suddenly, an explosion rocked the harbor, and the Patria sank almost immediately. The fate of the Patria captivated the attention of the international community, and as the British Administration in Palestine scrambled to investigate the cause of the incident, the Patria tragedy received worldwide media coverage for months afterwards.

Despite the attention it garnered, the situation of the Patria was a familiar matter to many Jewish immigrants and Holocaust survivors attempting to flee the confines and dangers of Nazi Germany. The flow of Jews to Palestine was restricted by the British White Paper of 1939. Nonetheless, clandestine "rescue operations" initiated in the 1930s by the Palestine Jewish underground transported more than 60,000 illegal Jewish immigrants from European ports to Palestine, increasing the Jewish population of Palestine by more than 10%.[1] These operations, known as "Aliya Bet," served as a tactic in the organized Jewish resistance in Palestine de-

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1 Elihu Bergman. "History of the Aliya Bet." Accessed 3 May 2005.
http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/IsraelVets/aliyah_bet.htm.

signed to end British rule, and were seen by many Jews as the ultimate assertion of Jewish rights to settle in Palestine. However, only a handful of ships succeeded in penetrating the British air and sea blockades established to prevent any arrivals in Palestine. Upon reaching the Palestine coast, many of these ships, like those carrying the refugees on the Patria, were routinely seized by the British Royal Navy, and their passengers were transported to faraway islands or prison camps on Cyprus.

The Patria tragedy, from the incident itself to the inquiry that followed, was widely covered in the *New York Times*. The story became symbolic of the tension between the Jews and the British in Palestine. Additionally, the Patria incident highlighted the activities of Jewish terrorist organizations in Palestine. In the decade that followed, the Patria story reappeared numerous times in reference to subsequent illegal immigration operations. This paper will examine the *New York Times* coverage of the Patria incident and its aftermath, focusing specifically on the period from November 1940, when the incident occurred, through March 1947, after which date the Patria virtually disappeared from the newspaper. Throughout its coverage, the *New York Times* consistently maintained an attitude of sympathy towards the illegal immigrants who were victims of the disaster, while at the same time expressing its condemnation of the terrorist activities that had resulted in the tragedy.

From the beginning, the story of the Patria earned not only a place among the front pages of the *New York Times* but also the status of a humanitarian disaster. On November 26, 1940, the day after the Patria incident, the story made front-page headlines in the *New York Times*. A blurb in the Table of Contents[2] listed the story under Foreign Affairs and the front-page article[3] gave prominence to the incident. While mentioning that Jewish immigration was forbidden in 1939 due to "an organized attempt to thwart the immigration quota law," the article's tone spoke sympathetically of the "wandering, homeless" men, women, and children affected by the blast.[4] At the same time, it emphasized the efficiency and responsiveness of the British troops and police who immediately undertook rescue operations to save the refugees. At this point, the cause of the

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2 *New York Times*, "Today's News Index," 26 November 1940, p.24.
3 Ibid., "Refugee Ship Off Palestine Is Sunk by Blast; Casualties Feared Among 1,771 Homeless," 26 November 1940, p.1.
4 Ibid.

blast was undetermined, but a reference at the end of the article to the 1939 sinking of the "Parita" by an all-Jewish crew hinted to a suspicion that this explosion might also have been the work of Jewish terrorists or underground organizations.

In the days and months following the explosion of the Patria, the *New York Times* continually updated its readers on the developing details of the incident. A page 6 article on November 27, 1940 declared "Disaster Overtook Homeless Jews," and the article displayed a sense of urgency in its report on the rising death toll and the many Patria passengers injured or missing.[5] Once again, the tone of the coverage was sympathetic to the victims, while at the same time the article acknowledged that the refugees "had sought illegally to settle in Palestine."[6] The article reported that most passengers managed to swim ashore following the "unexplained blast," but "planes droned overhead and tugs plied the litter-scattered waters of Haifa Harbor...for bodies of survivors among 1,771 wandering, homeless Jewish refugees hurled overboard."[7] The next day, November 28, 1940, in a page 7 article, it was announced that at least 22 were dead, 21 missing, and 180 injured.[8] Without reference to "illegal immigration," the article briefly described the tragic deaths of Jewish refugees "seeking to reach some British colony" who were caught below the deck by the explosion and killed immediately or drowned.[9] In a December 12, 1940 article on page 6, the death toll was raised to 55, with 190 people missing.[10] While conscious that the victims of the tragedy were illegal immigrants, the *New York Times* nevertheless focused on the humanitarian crisis that had occurred.

In its treatment of the Patria incident, the *New York Times'* underlying attitudes and opinions often glimmered beneath the surface of an otherwise objective and factual article. In a December 8, 1940 article on page 8 of the *New York Times*, for example, it was reported that "in view of the loss of...the Patria, the [British] Government has decided as 'an exceptional act of mercy after taking all circumstances into consideration, particularly the terrible experience undergone by the refugees,' not to proceed with the proposal to send the survivors to another British colony."[11] Although the article reported that the British had restated their unchanging position regarding other illegal immigrants, and had decided that they would deduct the number of returning refugees from the next Jewish immigration quota, the subtle undertones of this article suggest its approval of the British decision that would affect nearly 1,800 suffering Jewish refugees. Language describing the "salvage work" on the Patria's "sunken hull" and the efforts to remove the bodies remaining inside, motivated readers to sympathize with the victims of the tragedy. Without taking a clear side in the incident, the *New York Times* used particular descriptions and selectively chose to mention specific facts in order to express compassion and understanding and to create a moving, emotional, and dramatic narrative of the frustrated hopes of the refugees.

By March 1941, however, this sympathetic tone had assumed a slightly different character. A March 18 article on page 4 boldly declared the Patria loss a "sabotage."[12] The British Special Commission of Inquiry had just concluded its investigations into the Patria incident and issued a report indicating that "some form of sabotage to the ship and other acts of violence had been considered by persons ashore and by others aboard the Patria."[13] The *New York Times* quoted statements from this report, and reported that evidence supported the theory that, with the aid of at least one person aboard, a time bomb had been put in the ship. The commission report expressed its "indignation" and "disgust" at the "deplorable and reckless act" that killed 196 people and caused "the loss of a valuable ship."[14] "We are confident our feelings are shared by responsible persons of all communities," concluded the report.[15] In contrast to previous references to "homeless, wandering refugees," this article called the passengers aboard the Patria "Jewish fugitives from Central Europe," thereby describing a flight from danger as well as subtly implying a flight from justice. It drove home this point by reminding readers that the passengers lacked permits to enter Palestine. Although the underlying tone of the article still remained one of sympathy for the victims of the disaster, it now included elements

5 *New York Times*, "22 Die, 254 Missing in Haifa Ship Blast," 27 November 1940, p.6.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., "22 Dead in Haifa Blast," 28 November 1940, p.7.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., "Refugee Ship Dead Put at 55," 12 December 1940, p.6.

11 Ibid., "Survivors of Patria to Stay in Palestine," 5 December 1940, p.8.
12 *New York Times*, "Patria Loss 'Sabotage'," 18 March 1941, p.4.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.

of rebuke, disappointment, accusation, and condemnation of those who had caused the loss of innocent lives.

Once the Patria incident had been resolved, the *New York Times* temporarily lost interest in the story. In fact, the Patria didn't reappear in the newspaper until the following year, buried in the last line of a September 5, 1942 page 6 article describing shipbuilding activities in France and listing French ships, such as the Patria, that had been destroyed in recent years.[16] Yet the legacy of the Patria continued to live on as a symbol for Zionists, American Jews, Jewish terrorists, and the media in describing the growing tensions and violent conflicts in Palestine.

Essentially, the Patria story encapsulated the conflict between the Jews and British authorities in Palestine. The story of the Patria was an especially poignant symbol because it revolved around a set of ironic and emotional circumstances. To many Jews, without the "sabotage" of the Patria, Jewish Holocaust survivors attempting to escape from persecution would have landed back in Displaced Person's (DP) prison camps similar to the ones they had fled. In a November 19, 1944 article on page 18 of the *New York Times*, the Patria incident was used to attack the British government's unjust and injurious treatment of Jews in Palestine, and to provide a justification for the actions of Palestine terrorists.[17] The article quoted the national chairman of the United Palestine Appeal, who argued that to some extent, the British Government bore the responsibility for the recent assassination of Lord Moyne and other terrorist activities. On the one hand, the chairman claimed that acts of violence by the Irgun and "Stern Gang" were the work of only a "handful" of "traitors" whose actions "had aroused universal condemnation and horror among all sections of Palestinian and world Jewry."[18] At the same time, however, he acknowledged that "all that these men have done, their throwing of bombs, their shooting police officials...must be adjudged by the aberration of men driven crazy by suffering."[19] He attributed violence by Jewish underground groups in part to "the policy of the White Paper, the exclusion and death of refugees fleeing for their lives upon the steamship Patria...rotting in the fever

forests of Mauritius..."[20] The article did not present any directly opposing viewpoints to this rationale. Rather, by viewing the conflict through a balanced lens, the *New York Times* was able to criticize British policies in Palestine while maintaining its attitude of condemnation towards Jewish terrorist activity.

In an August 15, 1946 article, the *New York Times* reprinted the text of a statement issued by Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council.[21] Speaking on behalf of the entire Zionist movement in the United States, Dr. Silver refuted statements made by the British government concerning their positive role in Palestine. He warned that "if Britain continues to deport...refugees, unprecedented catastrophes reminiscent of the tragedies of the Patria...are inevitable."[22] Mocking British claims of "patience, forbearance, and humanity," Dr. Silver countered that "one need only recall the case of the Patria...when it became known that the British Government had refused them permission to land, the desperate people aboard scuttled the boat in the port of Haifa and several hundreds of their number lost their lives."[23] Using the Patria as a symbol of Jewish suffering at the mercy of the British, Dr. Silver justified the explosion of the Patria and portrayed its passengers as martyrs for a holy cause. Whether or not the *New York Times* endorsed these views, the newspaper obviously deemed it important to publish an American Jewish statement, and printed it on page 2 of the newspaper.

Members of the Jewish underground and terrorist organizations also used the Patria incident to justify their activities and create support for their goals. However, although the *New York Times* fairly quoted the views of these members, it took a decidedly oppositional stance toward their activities in Palestine. In a July 28, 1946 article on page 28, the *New York Times* reported on armed bands that had attacked and raided a Jerusalem prison in an attempt to free Jews suspected of dynamiting the King David Hotel, and on the series of skirmishes and arrests that followed the violence.[24] Describing the increasingly evident "ill-feeling between the Jew-

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16 *New York Times*, "Shipbuilding Activity Revealed In France," 5 September 1942, p.6.
17 Ibid., "Palestine Terror Is Laid to Misrule," 19 November 1944, p.18.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
21 *New York Times*, "Text of Statement by U.S. Zionists," 15 August 1946, p.2.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., "Armed Band Raids Jerusalem Prison," 28 July 1946, p.28.

ish community and the British troops," the article presented both British soldiers' "contempt and loathing" for terrorist conduct and Jewish charges of a British "hate campaign" against them.[25] According to the article, the Irgun termed the King David Hotel bombing a "disaster" but said that the incident would not break their spirits "any more than greater disasters, such as that of the Patria."[26] By invoking the Patria as a symbol of British mistreatment and unjust, inhumane conduct towards the Jews, the Irgun attempted to shift blame from itself and place responsibility on the British. The article, however, positioned the Irgun's position within a skeptical and sarcastic context. Essentially adopting the British attitude of ridicule for the New Zionist Organization's expressions of "profound grief" and "deep sympathy," and dismissing the Irgun's claims as the hollow words of an uncooperative, violent, immoral terrorist organization, the New York Times article called on the Jewish public to stop terrorist crimes through active cooperation with the British.

The continued media coverage of the Patria incident stemmed largely from its powerful symbolism, but also functioned through its role as a precedent for similar incidents in subsequent years. In a front-page article on August 19, 1946, the New York Times reported on a group of illegal Jewish refugees who refused to be transferred to a transport bound for Cyprus.[27] Even after the British used tear gas and fire hoses to overcome the resistance and put the refugees aboard a ship, two interior explosions forced the ship to return to Haifa. The article's attitude toward this incident is striking in the similarities to its coverage of the Patria explosion. While sympathizing with the "crying and screaming," "seriously ill," and malnourished refugees, the article simultaneously deplored the violent and disruptive actions that provoked the British to take extreme measures to restore order. Even more striking, however, is the fact that the article drew explicit attention to these similarities, noting that the Cyprus ship explosion "recalled the sinking...in somewhat similar circumstances of the French liner Patria in Haifa's harbor in December, 1940, while she had on board Jewish refugees awaiting deportation to Mauritius."[28]

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25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 New York Times, "Cyprus Ship Forced Back to Haifa by Bomb Blasts," 19 August 1946, p.1.
28 Ibid.

For the refugees aboard the S.S. Patria, even the explosion that had caused such a powerful international storm did not mark the end of their odyssey. It was not until August 1945, nearly five years after the incident, that the British Government permitted the refugees to re-enter Palestine. A New York Times article on August 27, 1945 reported on the emotional return and "joyous reunions between parents and children, sisters and brothers, and other relatives who had all but given up hope of seeing one another again."[29] In dramatic and emotional language, it described how "a large crowd was moved to tears" at the sight of those who "knelt in humility, kissing the paved quays."[30] The article spoke lovingly of the elderly people who "had to be supported down the gangplank because they were so overcome with emotion that they could hardly walk."[31] Additionally, the article asserted its conviction that, with the return of these 1,300 Jewish men, women, and children, "what Zionists regarded as a great wrong was partly remedied."[32] This article is representative of the characteristic sympathy displayed by the New York Times in regard to the victims of the Patria tragedy. Throughout its coverage, the New York Times consistently portrayed the Patria refugees as helpless, struggling people yearning to reach the safety and peace of their homeland. It is no surprise then, that the New York Times would view their eventual return to Palestine in terms of restitution and justice.

The August 27, 1945 article on the return of Jewish refugees to Palestine declared that with the British decision to permit their return, "a journey half way around the world was ended."[33] Yet although the physical trip of the Patria refugees was completed, in many ways, the symbolic journey of the Patria was ongoing. New York Times articles from March 30-31, 1947 reported on a ship of Jewish refugees that was intercepted off the coast of Palestine by the British Royal Navy.[34] One article surmised that the ship, which bore the name Moledeth (Hebrew for "Homeland"), "was probably named for the Patria."[35] Clearly, as a symbol, a precedent, and a

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29 New York Times, "Palestine Admits Former Deportees," 27 August 1945, p.11.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., "Zionist Ship Seized With 1,600 Aboard," 30 March 1947, p.49; Ibid., "Jews' Ship Saved Off Haifa By Navy; Port Oil Blown Up," 31 March 1947, p.1.
35 New York Times, "Jews' Ship Saved Off Haifa By Navy; Port Oil Blown Up," 31 March 1947, p.1.

media narrative, the Patria incident left a complex legacy. Original media coverage of the story serves as a measure of differing global attitudes toward the tensions in Palestine in the 1940s. As I have demonstrated, *New York Times* coverage of the period was no exception. With its clear reporting and underlying convictions, the *New York Times'* lengthy and multifaceted coverage of the Patria incident is powerful evidence of the Patria's historical significance.

# We Shall Overcome: The Story of a Song, a President, and a Movement*

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## Introduction – The Selma-to-Montgomery March and Bloody Sunday

**ON MARCH 15TH, 1965,** President Lyndon B. Johnson delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress. The previous weeks had seen much turmoil and violence in Selma, Alabama, as a large group of people attempted to march from there to Montgomery, Alabama. The march was meant to protest the ongoing oppression of blacks in Alabama, a state governed by an unabashed segregationist named George Wallace. Wallace wanted to prevent the march from happening, and wanted federal support for this position. When the marchers began their trek on Sunday, March 7th, against his will, they were met several miles in by Alabama state troopers who beat them and tear-gassed them until they turned back. The day would later be known as "Bloody Sunday." Wallace eventually met with Johnson

in Washington, D.C., who convinced him to allow the march.[1]

## Johnson's Speech

With the painful images and wounds of "Bloody Sunday" still fresh in the minds and bodies of the American people, Johnson decided to grab the opportunity to push forward groundbreaking civil rights legislation, specifically regarding voting rights.[2] His speech to Congress declaring his intention to introduce such legislation was a major turning point in the Civil Rights Movement.[3]

Johnson's speech was interrupted by clapping close to forty times, including two extended standing ovations.[4] Its long-term effect has been strongly - if not over - emphasized. Indeed, Joseph A. Califano, Johnson's special assistant for domestic affairs, saw the power of Johnson's speech as securing votes for the Democratic Party as late as 1998![5] George Christian, in a review of J. L. Chestnut's *Two Worlds in Selma*, quoted Chestnut lauding the speech as one that changed the world and paved the way for freedom movements worldwide.[6] In a slightly less extreme sense, Jeff Greenfield of the *Chicago Sun-Times* saw this speech as an example of classic presidential rhetoric and leadership. In editorials of December 1992, he invoked its memory twice as a challenge to President Bill Clinton to step up his rhetoric and match the "leaps of faith" made by presidents of the previous three decades.[7] Many others have placed Johnson's speech amongst the greatest by an American president,[8] and John Lewis saw it as "not only the finest speech of his career, but probably the strongest speech any American president has ever made on the subject of civil rights."[9]

Johnson's speech also had immediate effects. John L. Mitchell of the *Los Angeles Times* saw the speech as directly linked to the swift passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,[10] as did the veteran journalist Fred Powledge in his extensive account of the events of the Civil Rights Movement, *Free At Last*.[11]

Garrow, in *Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 1965*, highlighted the fact that many of those usually critical of Johnson's policies were also impressed and swayed by this speech. He claimed that "observers were seemingly unanimous in their praise of the address."[12] However, John Lewis recorded a sharply negative reaction on the part of James Forman.[13] Indeed, several major personalities of the Civil Rights Movement – including James Forman and Cleveland Sellers - did not make any reference whatsoever to Johnson's speech nor to the subsequent Voting Rights Act in their firsthand accounts of the Movement's development. This sharply highlighted the dissonance in the perception of the Movement's nature and goals that existed between the government and many of the leaders of the civil rights movement.

The most memorable moment during Johnson's speech, according to all those who acknowledged the speech's existence, was when he borrowed the words of the anthem of the Civil Rights Movement. He said:

> ...the last time a President sent a civil rights bill to the Congress it contained a provision to protect voting rights in Federal elections. That civil rights bill was passed after eight long months of debate. And when that bill came to my desk from the Congress for signature, the heart of the voting provision had been eliminated.

1 Richard N. Goodwin, *Remembering America* (Boston: Little, Brown And Company, 1988), 319-324

2 Garth E. Pauley, "Rhetoric and Timeliness: An analysis of Lyndon B. Johnson's voting rights address," *Western Journal of Communication* 62. no. 1 (1998) : 26

3 Rep. Chris Van Hollen, "Enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Bill," <(17" *http://www.house.gov/apps/list/speech/md08_vanhollen/votingrightsbillspeech.html*> (17 April 2005)

4 John Lewis, *Walking With the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement* (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1998), 353, Goodwin, *Remembering America*, 336, David Garrow, *Protest At Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 107

5 Joseph A. Califano, Jr., "The Man Behind the Votes," *The Washington Post*, 18 November 1998, sec. A (27), final edition

6 George Christian, review of *Black in Selma: The Uncommon Life of J.L. Chestnut, Jr.*, by J.L. Chestnut, Jr. , *Houston Chronicle*, 23 September 1990, 20

7 Jeff Greenfield, "Rhetoric Is Useful Tool Clinton Needs," *Chicago Sun-Times*, 3 December 1992, 37, final edition, "Can Clinton Make Leap of Faith?," *Chicago Sun-Times*, 22 December 1992, 23, final edition

8 "Top 100 Speeches By Rank," <(17" *http://www.americanrhetoric.com/top100speechesall.html*> (17 April 2000)

9 Lewis, 353

10 John L. Mitchell, "Crossing a Bridge to the Past – and Future; Learning: History – and voting – have new meaning for L.A. youths at scene of bloody civil rights march," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 March 1996, page 1, home edition

11 Fred Powledge, *Free At Last?: The Civil Rights Movement and the People Who Made It* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 626

12 Garrow, 107

13 Lewis, 353

This time, on this issue, there must be no delay, or no hesitation, or no compromise with our purpose. We cannot, we must not, refuse to protect the right of every American to vote in every election that he may desire to participate in. But even if we pass this bill the battle will not be over. What happened in Selma is part of a far larger movement which reaches into every section and state of America. It is the effort of American Negroes to secure for themselves the full blessings of American life. Their cause must be our cause too. [sic] Because it's not just Negroes, but really it's all of us, who must overcome the crippling legacy of bigotry and injustice. And *we shall overcome*.[14]

According to Powledge, using these last words "surprised many Americans,"[15] and even "shocked the nation."[16] As Califano recalled," One southern congressman [upon hearing Johnson use these words] exclaimed in shocked surprise, 'God damn!'"[17] Martin Luther King, Jr. even cried at the sound of an American president so strongly aligning himself with the Civil Rights Movement.[18] Several senators wept, as others initiated a standing ovation that "unified the country as a community whose largeness magnified each of its members."[19] Richard Goodwin, one of Johnson's speechwriters, recalled "the urge toward tears which was not the edge of grief or of some simple pleasure, but some more profoundly human need to be a part of something greater and [sic] more noble than oneself."[20]

## "We Shall Overcome"

These three words, taken from one of the most famous songs of the Civil Rights Movement, have become identified as its single most powerful phrase. Countless articles, books and websites devoted to the history and heritage of the movement are entitled "We Shall Overcome." Predict-

ably, its origin is the subject of no small debate.

On one extreme lay the position of Cleveland Sellers, a young, fiery member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Sellers identified the song with "militancy, direct action, and tenacious belief."[21] The origin and lyrics of the song contain no such indication. Nonetheless, it is not impossible to imagine the song acquiring such meaning in the context of continued protests and demonstrations. Indeed, Sellers's position was definitely imprinted into the minds of journalists and later writers who darkly described the song as a "battle hymn,"[22] a "protest hymn,"[23] the "rallying cry of the American Negro"[24], and the "anthem of black protest."[25]

Others correctly saw the song in a religious context. Leonard Gadzekpo claimed that " 'We Shall Overcome'...captured the black religious ethos inherent in the movement."[26] Francis Shor placed a quote from Charles Sherrod about the satisfaction he felt as he observed "We Shall Overcome" being sung in southwest Georgia within a specific "grounded utopian" religious framework. Shor viewed utopian religious belief as the basis for all SNCC activities during the early part of the Civil Rights Movement.[27] Goodwin and Lewis referred to the song as an "old Baptist hymn."[28]

In 1963, Guy and Candie Carawan compiled a book of "Songs of the Southern Freedom Movement" specifically for SNCC, complete with lyrics and musical notation. It was aptly titled "We Shall Overcome," and it outlined the true story of the song that had already become the anthem of the Civil Rights Movement, and was destined to be a part of so much more history. The song "originally came out of the black church in the southern United States, was adapted and used in the labor movement, and rose to international prominence as the theme song of the civil rights movement."[29] The original church version was called, "I'll Overcome Someday." The

14 Lyndon B. Johnson, *Speech to Congress*, March 15, 1965, < *http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/johnson.htm* > (March 20, 2005) – emphasis mine
15 Fred Powledge, *We Shall Overcome: Heroes of the Civil Rights Movement* (New York: Macmillan Publishers, 1993), 72-73, Pauley, 26
16 Powledge, *Free At Last*, 626
17 Califano, 27
18 Goodwin, 334, Lewis, 354, Peter Ling, "We Shall Overcome," *History Review* 45 (March 2003): 29-34
19 Goodwin, 334
20 Goodwin, 334

21 Cleveland Sellers, *River of No Return*, (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1973), 44
22 Greenfield, "Rhetoric", 39
23 Goodwin, 334
24 Editorial, "Two Challenges," *New York Times*, 21 March 1965, E1
25 Goodwin, 334
26 Leonard Gadzekpo, "The Black Church, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Future," *Journal of Religious Thought* 53/54, no. 2/1 (1997): 102-104
27 Francis Shor, "Utopian Aspirations in the Black Freedom Struggle: SNCC and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 1960-1965," *Utopian Studies* 15:2 (2004):171-187
28 Goodwin, 318, Lewis, 82
29 Guy and Candie Carawan, *Sing For Freedom: The Story Of The Civil Rights Movement Through Its Songs* (Bethlehem, Pennsylvania: Sing Out Corporation, 1992), 3

first known instance of its adaptation to a non-church setting was its usage by Negro Food and Tobacco Union workers on picket lines during their 1945 strike in Charleston, South Carolina. Zilphia Horton spread this adaptation to union gatherings throughout the South. Pete Seeger learned it from Zilphia Horton, and began to spread it throughout the North. As time went on, lyrics were tweaked and verses were added to make the song appropriate to the given setting, be it a union gathering, a peace rally, or a protest against segregation.[30]

Many characteristics of the song contributed to its popularity and eventual identity as the anthem of the Civil Rights Movement. Wyatt Tee Walker, as quoted in the Carawans' compilation specifically highlighted its contextual versatility:

> One cannot describe the vitality and emotion this one song
> evokes across the Southland. I have heard it sung in great
> mass meetings with a thousand voices singing as one; I've
> heard a half-dozen sing it softly behind the bars of the Hinds
> County prison in Mississippi; I've heard old women sing-
> ing it on the way to work in Albany, Georgia; I've heard the
> students singing it as they were being dragged away to jail.
> It generates power that is indescribable.[31]

The fact that the song was by nature an adaptation allowed everyone who sang it to lend it relevance to their own specific situation. Indeed, in addition to its well-known use before, during, and after demonstrations throughout the South, it was also sung at concerts by liberals in the North who strove to identify with the freedom movement occurring in the South. It was recorded by professional musicians, and it was sung at the 1963 March on Washington attended by over 200,000 people.[32]

In addition to this contextual versatility, it was also musically versatile. Yale University's Nicholas Wolterstorff commented that from an aesthetical perspective, "We Shall Overcome" was not the most brilliant musical composition of its time. It is "not bad," but not much better than that. But even those who could not carry a tune found that they were able and inspired to sing "We Shall Overcome."[33]

30 Ibid., 15
31 Ibid.
32 Lewis, 225
33 Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Dwelling With Music," *Arts Education Policy Review 99*, no.
   1 (Sep/Oct 1997): 2-9, Lewis, 82

In George W. Bush's August 15th, 2000 speech to the Republican National Convention, he portrayed the song as a paradigm of "American courage," and innovatively highlighted the determination of the song's lyrics:

> ...Brave men and women [of the civil rights movement]
> did not say..."We shall cope," or "We shall see." They
> said..."We Shall Overcome..."[34]

The power and success of "We Shall Overcome" was truly based on its communal nature. Geiger correctly emphasized the fact that the song's lyrics, at least in the version written specifically for the Civil Rights Movement, were "not 'I shall overcome,' [but rather] 'We shall overcome.'"[35] The song united the movement geographically, as it was sung in the North as well as the South, at concerts, in churches, and on marches. As such, when Johnson quoted the song during his March 15th speech, he lent clear presidential support to the popular nature of the civil rights movement. He gave control of government actions – at least regarding civil rights - to the people, the people whom the government was always meant to serve.[36]

## The Struggle to Actually Overcome

The years following Johnson's speech and the Voting Rights Act saw much confusion. Some leaders of the Movement felt that even the Voting Rights Act was only mere legislation, and continued their efforts to make actual changes on the ground. Others felt that although the legislation was important, there was no more that could be done on the political front. The movement's collective focus shifted towards economic issues, with affirmative action becoming one of many challenging issues that it would present to the nation. It was difficult to point to tangible events as indicative of success on the economic front, which together with the ever-present, day-to-day struggles of integration caused much frustration. In addition, several influential members of SNCC attributed the perceived stunt in the movement's growth to its continued insistence on nonviolence. The Civil Rights Movement quickly gave way to the Black Power movement, which

34 George W. Bush, "Address to the Republican National Convention: Compassionate
   Conservatism," *Vital Speeches of the Day 66*, no. 21 (2000): 643
35 Keith Geiger, "Allies For Education," *Vital Speeches of the Day 61*, no. 23 (1995):
   733, Powledge, *We Shall Overcome*, 127, 180
36 Jordan Hirsch, personal interview by author, 24 April 2005

was characterized by its dark, violent nature, its tendency towards rioting, and its utter disregard for the government.

Several commentators actually attributed this unfortunate chain of events to Johnson's speech. Even immediately after the speech, James Forman commented that "Johnson spoiled a good song that day."[37] Jerome Rodnitzky claimed that the song lost much of its meaning once it was used by Johnson in his speech.[38] J. L. Chestnut said that the events in Selma, Johnson's speech, and the immediate aftermath finally convinced him that blacks would never attain true integration and equality.[39] In an article about the road from Selma to Montgomery and its designation as a national historic trail, Chuck Stone pointed out that decades later, the marches and speeches surrounding the events of 1965 in Selma had still not managed to fully eliminate its segregation.[40] Garth Pauley questioned the strategic timing of Johnson's speech, and connected it to the downward spiral of the Civil Rights Movement in the following years.

Johnson recognized the disappointing steps that the movement was taking. He remembered the strong support he had lent the movement in 1965, and the wonderful response his March 15th speech had brought. He twice tried, through his powerful tool of rhetoric, to reenact the extraordinary feelings of that day. On April 5th, 1968, the day after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., Johnson addressed the nation and said:

> ...We must move with urgency, with resolve, and with new
> energy in the Congress, in the Courts, in the White House,
> the statehouses and the city halls of the nation, wherever
> there is leadership...until *we do overcome*...[41]

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37 Lewis, 354

38 Jerome L. Rodnitzky, "The Sixties between the Microgrooves: Using Folk and Protest Music to Understand American History, 1963-1973" *Popular Music and Society,* (1999): 108

39 Christian, 20

40 Chuck Stone, "Selma to Montgomery," *National Geographic 197* no. 2 (2000): 98-105

41 Lyndon B. Johnson, "Speech Following Assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.," quoted in Steven R. Goldzwig, "LBJ, the Rhetoric of Transcendence, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968," *Rhetoric and Public Affairs 6* no. 1 (2003): 36 – emphasis mine. William Chafe, in *The Unfinished Journey*, quotes Harry McPherson as saying that there had been another speech prepared for Johnson, one recommending an even further intensification of the fighting in Vietnam. McPherson astonishingly referred to this never-revealed speech as the "we shall overcome" speech, indicating the possibility of a disparity between Johnson and some of his staff as to the significance and respect that should be accorded to this phrase.

The following week saw intense rioting in many major cities across the country.

At a civil rights symposium Johnson convened in December of 1972 at the LBJ Library in Texas, he said the following about the civil rights movement:

> ...The progress has been much too small; we haven't done
> nearly enough. I'm kind of ashamed of myself that I had
> six years and couldn't do more... We know there's injus-
> tice. We know there's intolerance. We know [sic] there's
> discrimination and hate and suspicion... But there is a larger
> truth. We have proved that great progress is possible. We
> know how much still remains to be done. And if our efforts
> [sic] continue, if our will is strong and our hearts are right
> ... I am confident *we shall overcome*...[42]

This speech was the last of Johnson's life; he died of a heart attack several weeks later. In this last speech, as well as in his speech following King's assassination, Johnson attempted to fan the flickering flames of cooperation between the Civil Rights Movement and the federal government. He attempted to do so by once again invoking "We Shall Overcome," the anthem of the Civil Rights Movement. These speeches received much less attention and acclaim than the speech of March 15th, 1965. At this point, Johnson's name and policy was already identified with the violent and terrible frustrations of the war in Vietnam. His domestic policies had not seen much success, as the Civil Rights Movement had deteriorated into Black Power, and the Great Society had yet to be revealed. Even before his speech on April 5th, 1968, Johnson had announced that he was not going to campaign for reelection. Unfortunately, the president who in 1965 quoted "We Shall Overcome" before Congress and the entire American nation and thus identified himself with the Civil Rights Movement and its ideology more strongly than any other president, was largely ignored in later speeches attempted to revive the Movement, mostly due to circumstances beyond his control.

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42 Lyndon B. Johnson, "Speech at December 1972 Civil Rights Symposium," as quoted in < *http://www.nps.gov/lyjo/Ourheartshome/lbj10.htm* > (28 April 2005) – emphasis mine

## Conclusion

The rich history of the song, "We Shall Overcome," made it a major part of the history of the Civil Rights Movement. In its original form, it was religious. In later years, it acquired economic relevance when sung by union laborers on picket lines. When its lyrics were adapted for the Civil Rights Movement, it became a symbol of community, individual and communal determination, courage, nonviolence, and confidence (except according to Cleveland Sellers). It was sung by blacks and whites alike. It was sung privately and publicly. It became the anthem of the Civil Rights Movement. When Lyndon B. Johnson quoted it in his March 15th, 1965 speech, he aligned himself and his administration with all of its themes. The quotation of the song was the highlight of a speech that was to have incredible effects on the Civil Rights Movement, the country, and even the whole world for years to come. Most saw the speech and the quote as a groundbreaking success for the Civil Rights Movement, while others saw it as the beginning of its end. In later years, Johnson twice quoted the song in speeches meant to stir the passions of the country and its lawmakers towards greater advancement of civil rights. While the success of Johnson's efforts is debatable, the strength of his attempts is not, and that can be visibly seen in his continued quoting of the song that contained so much of the feelings, beliefs, and complexity of the Civil Rights Movement.

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# Democratization and the Third Wave

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**AMARTYA SEN,** winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economics, was once asked to name the greatest event of the twentieth century. In a keynote address delivered in 1999, he declared that "among the great variety of developments that have occurred in the twentieth century, I did not, ultimately have any difficulty in choosing one as the preeminent development of the period: the rise of democracy".[1] Indeed, the last century has seen remarkable progress in world democratization. Today, democracy[2]

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1 Amartya Sen. "Democracy as a Universal Value." *Journal of Democracy* 10.3 (1999): 3
2 The analyses in this essay are based on the following definition of democracy: "A democracy is a state in which all fully qualified citizens vote at regular intervals to choose, from among alternative candidates, the people who will be in charge of setting the state's policies. Democracy is 'government of the people'; therefore, there is also a sense that the full population of citizens will be actively engaged between elections in debate over alternative policies and in the work of setting the policies; how fully engaged they are varies across democracies, and whether they are sufficiently engaged has long been a matter of debate". See Phillips Shivley, *Power and Choice: An Introduction to Political Science,* 8th ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2003), 169.
However, other definitions are more inclusive, such as that of Amartya Sen, who says, "We must not identify democracy with majority rule." More than being just a mechanical system, which certainly includes voting and respect for election results, democracy also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair comment Sen 8-9.
It is important to note that different definitions of democracy can yield significantly different conclusions. For example, distinctions between "liberal democracy" and "minimal democracy" have led some scholars to the conclusion that only a small percentage of "democracies" are truly democratic. See Larry Diamond, "Is the Third

has a worldwide reach that probably has not been equaled at any other moment in the history of mankind.[3] The average level of freedom in the world is also the highest level ever recorded in the Freedom House annual survey of political rights and civil liberties. The 2001-2002 Freedom House Survey of Freedom concluded that "as 2001 drew to a close, the world reached a new watermark in the number and proportion of democratically elected governments",[4] According to the 2001 Freedom in the World Survey, 121 of the world's 192 governments (63 percent) are now electoral democracies, up from 91 in 1991. In its 1999 *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, the U.S. State Department went so far as to identify democracy and human rights as a third "universal language".[5] Though some electoral democracies have poor human rights records, all of them allow for political opposition movements, provide opposition parties and viewpoints access to the media, and meet the minimum standard of a relatively fair vote count in conditions of ballot secrecy. Two decades ago, less than 30 percent of the countries in the world were democratic; now more than 60 percent have governments produced by some form of open, fair, and competitive elections. The authoritarian governments, communist Politburos, military juntas, and personal dictatorships of a quarter century ago are no longer the norm.

In this essay, I attempt to explain this recent surge of democratization, focusing specifically on the period which political scientist Samuel Huntington has dubbed the "third wave." I will argue that the third wave began as a reaction to desires for human rights and economic security, and was facilitated by the fatigue of authoritarianism, by economic development, and by international pressure, and found eventual success through its inherent self-sustaining abilities. Through the lens of political, economic,

and cultural perspectives, I will show that the transparency of democracy, its impact on the relationship between state and society, its representation in the presence of non-governmental organizations, and its universal values were all factors that kept the third wave triumphant and alive.

In his book *The Third Wave*, Huntington asserts that although recent shifts of democracy have occurred in regional waves, they were all part of three larger, distinct waves of democratization. The first, long wave, which started in the early nineteenth century with the American Revolution and ran through World War I, led to the democratization of approximately 30 countries by 1920, including Germany (1918) and many states in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The second, short wave of democratization came in the wake of World War II, when democracy was reestablished in countries such as Germany and Italy, and large numbers of former European colonies in the South achieved independence. Yet both of these waves of democratic expansion were followed by "reverse waves" that undermined the triumphs and achievements of previous democratization[6].

The third wave, though, was different. The title of Huntington's book refers to the two decades of vast global democratic expansion that, following the Portuguese revolution in 1974, enveloped Southern Europe and then moved on to Latin America and Asia. During this period of the "third wave," the number of democracies in the world increased exponentially, from 41 to anywhere from 71 to 117, depending on how one counts.[7] In the late 1970's, Southern Europe saw three shifts from right-wing dictatorships to democracy: in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. By 1989 the third wave was in full flood, reaching its crest at the end of the year with the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, which was soon followed by the disintegration of the USSR. In 1989 and 1990, the wave of

Wave Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 7.3 (1996): 20-37. Some even utilize this distinction to restructure Huntington's waves model of democratization. Looking at the same data with a different set of definitions, they produce a model of democratization with "waves" that are much less distinct, that cover different historical periods, and that are not always accompanied by reverse waves. See Renske Doorenspleet, "Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratization" *World Politics* 52.3 (2000): 384-406.

3 Fernando Henrique Cardoso. "Democracy as a Starting Point." *Journal of Democracy* 12.1 (2001): 8

4 Adrian Karatnycky. "The 2001-2002 Freedom House Survey of Freedom: The Democracy Gap." *Freedom in the World 2001-2002.* 14 Dec. 2004, 7 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2002/akessay.pdf

5 Lary Diamond. "A Report Card on Democracy." *The Hoover Digest* No. 3 (Summer 2000). 14 Dec. 2004 http://www.hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/003/diamond

6 Many of the newly formed first-wave democracies failed under the economic pressure of the Great Depression or succumbed to the violence of WWII, and renewed authoritarianism and the rise of fascism and communism in the 1920s and 1930s reduced the number of democracies in the world to about a dozen by 1942. Although the second wave was able to once again increase the number of democracies in the world to somewhat over 30, this wave too was followed by the collapse of democracy in many of these countries, and although many survived, many fragile new democracies in Africa and Latin America succumbed to party coups and military dictatorships during the 1960s and early 1970s.

7 Carl Gershman. "Building a Worldwide Movement for Democracy: The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations." *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* 8.1 (Aug. 2003). 14 Dec. 2004 http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0803/ijpe/pj81gershman.htm

democratization reached the formerly communist states of Eastern Europe, including East Germany (which has since merged with former West Germany), Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In Latin America, several states reestablished democracies after periods of military dictatorship: Ecuador and Peru in 1978, Bolivia in 1982, Argentina in 1983, Uruguay in 1984, Brazil in 1985, and Chile in 1989. This surge of democratization was not limited to specific regions, however, as many states scattered around the world rapidly became democratized: Algeria over the period 1989-1991, Haiti in 1990, South Korea in 1987, Nepal in 1990, Nicaragua in 1990, Pakistan in 1988, the Philippines in 1986, and South Africa in 1994. At the same time, Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia moved closer to being democracies.

The third wave encompasses a remarkable period in the history of democracy. Huntington goes so far as to label the democratic expansion since 1974 a "military campaign," one in which country after country was liberated by surging democratic forces.[8] According to Huntington, the third wave created the "age of democracy," in which, for the first time in history, more than half the countries of the world have some form of democratic government.[9] "This dramatic growth of democracy in such a short time is, without doubt, one of the most spectacular and important political changes in human history".[10] Not only did the democratization of the third wave occur much faster and on a much wider scale than that of the previous two waves, but in contrast to the preceding waves, the absence of a reverse wave of authoritarian resurgence after the third wave is notable. Obviously, the third wave has had profound effects on global democracy. But how did this surge of democratization come about? Why did the third wave succeed where the previous two waves had failed? What factors account for the long and successful period of the third wave?

Evident in all of the cases of recent democratization is the people's desire for human rights and security against arbitrary abuse.[11] A desire for security and dignity ranked high on the reasons for democratization in

South America, where many of the military regimes had been brutally oppressive. In Argentina and Chile, thousands of people disappeared during the dictatorships and are presumed to have been tortured and killed. In the Philippines, the murder of Corazon Aquino's husband sparked the move for democracy. In East Germany, after the overthrow of the communist regime, it was discovered that the secret police had maintained files on 6 million people (out of a total population of 16 million), and had employed hundreds of thousands of informants. A basic human yearning for dignity and security has always played a large part in the formation of most democracies, from the establishment of the first democracies until today.[12] In the face of abuse and oppression, people often find the strength and motivation to push for democratic reforms.

The success of these reforms depends on the power and control of the incumbent authoritarian regime. One explanation for the dramatic success of democratization during the third wave is that many authoritarian systems during this period were in a stage of fatigue,[13] which consequently cost the regime crucial popular support, thereby paving the way for a transition to democracy. In Spain and Portugal, the deaths of long-term dictators spurred democratization. In Argentina, democratization followed the military government's defeat in a war with Britain. Most dramatically, the exhaustion of the Soviet Union at maintaining its control of Eastern Europe was a critical element in the wave of democratization in that region in 1989, and the corruption and senility of its Communist Party led to the victory of democracy in the Soviet Union. "This was evident in the communists' botched counter-coup in 1991 – the old party could not muster enough imagination and organization to take advantage of a good opportunity to establish its rule".[14]

Another critical factor of third-wave democratization was the ability of recent democracies to combat and overcome obstacles to their democratization which previously had posed insurmountable threats. These problems include communal conflict, foreign war, and social decay, as well as problems inherited from previous authoritarian regimes. A recent study by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder shows that in the "transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not

8 Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy For The Long Haul." *Journal of Democracy* 7.2 (1996): 5
9 Samuel P. Huntington, "After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave." *Journal of Democracy* 8.4 (1997): 3
10 Huntington, "After Twenty Years" , 4
11 Shivley, 171
12 Shively, 171
13 Shively, 171
14 Shively, 171

less".[15] In fact, the study's shocking evidence reveals that countries that make the transition from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies. In addition, the weakening of state authority during democratization often translates into "the removal of state constraints on individual behavior, a loosening of social inhibitions, and uncertainty and confusion about standards of morality",[16] thereby bringing about an increase in crime and drug use, and resulting in the disintegration of the family. Clearly, democratization poses several critical problems, yet the success of third-wave democracies in dealing with these problems contrasts sharply with the failures of first- and second-wave democracies. During the 1960s and 1970s, second-wave democracies were threatened by forces from outside the political system, such as the Marxist-Lenin insurgencies, that challenged both democratic and nondemocratic incumbent regimes. In Bosnia, the initiation of elections forced political leaders to compete for votes, resulting in appeals to tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies, and promoting ethnic conflict between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Military interventions overthrew democratic regimes in Greece, Turkey, South Korea, Pakistan, and in many Latin American countries.

Third-wave democracies, however, were able to overcome these obstacles. In contrast to the violence experienced during earlier democratic transitions, during the third wave, countries successfully passed the initial transition stage of democratization. Now that their democratic systems had been stabilized, the historical axiom that democracies do not fight with other democracies could be applied, and there was a major expansion of the zone of peace in the world and a reduction in the likelihood of interstate conflict. According to Huntington, the success of these third-wave democracies lies in their greater economic development.[17] The problems experienced by democracies in the previous waves of democratization reflected the still relatively underdeveloped nature of their economies. Their substantial peasant populations acted as a rural base for revolutionary movements, and the small and weak middle class and bourgeoi-

sie often felt threatened by populist and lower-class movements. In contrast, the urban, literate, middle-class, and industrial societies formed during the third wave eliminated these threats. In his analysis, Huntington identifies a "coup-attempt ceiling" of $3,000 per-capita GNP and a "coup-success ceiling" of $1,000: In countries with per-capita incomes above $3,000, coups are rarely attempted and almost never succeed.

Huntington's analysis rests on the extremely high correlation that exists between levels of democracy and levels of economic development. Setting aside the oil-rich states as a special case, all the wealthiest countries in the world, except Singapore, are democratic, and almost all the poorest countries in the world, with the exception of India and several others, are not democratic. The countries at intermediate levels of economic development are in some cases democratic and in other cases not. This evidence establishes economic development as a two-part factor in democratization. From one direction, democratization during the third wave can be viewed as the product of people's desire for economic development.[18] The economic stagnation of many authoritarian states during the period of the third wave presented a sharp contrast to the dynamic prosperity of democracies such as Japan and (then West) Germany, thus prompting a wave of democratization in many authoritarian regimes. Although the connection between free markets, democracy, and prosperity is not all that clear, the theory contends that in many democratizing states, part of the thrust for democracy came from "a sense that the state had stagnated economically, that it was not 'modern,' and that democracy was part of being modern".[19] It applies especially to the communist states of Eastern Europe, where establishing democracy was intermingled with the dismantling of inefficient socialist economies and the establishment of market economies.

However, a more convincing explanation approaches the issue from the other side, arguing that economic growth produces an environment conducive to democratic development. According to Seymour Martin Lipset,[20] the correlation between economic growth and democratization translates into a clear-cut causal mechanism, with overwhelming evidence

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15 Mansfield and Snyder qtd in Huntington, "Long Haul", 6
16 Huntington, "Long Haul", 7
17 Huntington, "Long Haul", 7

18 Shively, 171-172
19 Shively, 172
20 Lipset qtd in Huntington, "After Twenty Years", 5

that economic development has a strong positive effect on democratization. He cites five reasons for this effect. First, economic development involves higher levels of urbanization, literacy, and education. It also involves a shift in occupational structure, with a decline in the size and importance of the peasantry and the development of a middle class and an urban working class who increasingly wants a voice in and influence over policies that affect them. With higher levels of education, these people are able to organize trade unions, political parties, and civic associations to promote their interests. Second, economic development produces more public and private resources for distribution among groups in society, thereby encouraging compromise and toleration. Third, economic growth produces a more complex economy that becomes increasingly difficult for the state to control; state control can only be maintained at the price of economic stagnation. Fourth, the easing of state control of the economy leads to the creation and growth of independent centers of power, based on private control of capital, technology, and communications. The bourgeoisie who hold these assets want a political system in which they can exercise influence, and so they will not tolerate a government dominated by a military power or a dictator. Finally, while in the short term, rapid economic growth often exacerbates income inequalities, in the long term it produces greater equality in income distribution, thus facilitating the emergence of democracy. Therefore, according to this theory, third-wave democratization was the result of economic development taking place in many authoritarian regimes at this time.

Lipset's explanation provides a compelling explanation for third-wave democratization, especially when combined with Huntington's concept of a "transition zone." Huntington argues that as countries grow economically, they enter into this zone of intermediate levels of economic development, and pressures develop within them to democratize their political system. In fact, most of the 40 or more transitions to democracy that have occurred in recent decades have been in countries that were in this transition zone. Yet despite this corroboration, the relationship between economic development and democratization is often invalidated on the basis of conflicting and interrelated factors in comparative studies.[21] The case of Brazil, however, demonstrates that when taken together, both theories concerning the relationship between economic development and democratization provide a satisfactory explanation for third-wave democratization.

In a speech at the Second Assembly of the World Movement for Democracy in 2000, Brazilian president Fernando Henrique Cardoso discussed not only the positive effect of economic development on democratization in Brazil, but also spoke of the importance of democracy in restructuring the economy of Brazil.[22] Brazil, which became a democracy in 1985, utilized democratic means to confront its hyperinflation crisis. Their method of inflation control was one "that needed to be embraced by society," and debates were held "so that the population would accept and understand" it. Although the new plan seemed to present the impression of a short-term loss, Cardoso attributes the eventual stabilization of Brazil's currency to "the people's awareness of... [the plan's] objectives and their willingness to accept difficult measures" with long-term benefits for the economy.[23] Thus economic development can be regarded as both a cause and an effect of democratization: economic growth creates an environment conducive to democratic development, and democratic development is an incentive for countries seeking economic growth.

Cardoso's remarks corroborate Lipset's argument, and at the same time demonstrate two crucial inferences that may be drawn relating to democratization: 1) popular support plays an important role in the success of democratization, and 2) the relationship between economic development and culture impacts on democratic growth. In regard to the first concept, it is clear that the success of third-wave democratization was due in large part to the willingness of the countries and people involved. For example, South American leaders met and adopted a "democracy clause," through which members can alert fellow countries of violations.[24] This pact demonstrates their readiness to act together in solidarity in order to preserve and consolidate democracy. Without this unity of purpose or motivation of individuals, the third wave would not have had such dramatic and far-reaching effects. Huntington provides support for the second inference, highlighting the relationship between economic development and culture, and claiming that "economic development can alter a

21 Sen, 7

22 Cardoso, 5
23 Cardoso, 6
24 Cardoso, 8

country's culture and make it more supportive of democracy".[25] He accounts for recent democratization by citing the receptivity of cultures to democracy as a major factor in its acceptance, and specifically the receptivity to democracy of non-Western cultures that will determine the future of the third wave.[26] The data shows that the prevalence of Western culture and values, including Western Christianity and economic development, is an important factor in recent democratization. Third-wave transitions to democracy have extended democracy throughout almost all the wealthier countries in the world and almost all countries that have largely Western cultures. Exceptions, such as Western, non-democratic Cuba and non-Christian, non-wealthy India, demonstrate that these conditions are not required for democratization. However, almost all the remaining non-democracies in the world are either poor, non-Western, or both. The democratization of these countries is not impossible, but it is far more difficult, especially since many non-Western societies are searching for identity and meaning in their own cultural traditions, and are therefore more likely to resist Western attempts to export Western values and institutions.

These explanations are representative of an ongoing debate among scholars of democratization on the issue of crafting versus preconditions.[27] Some scholars argue that movement toward democracy depends on the existence within society of particular social, economic, or cultural preconditions, while others see democratization as primarily the product of political leaders who have the will and the skill to bring it about. In this case, it can be argued that the countries democratized during the third wave are those in which the conditions favoring democratization, such as economic development, religion, and culture, are strong. But the argument that political leaders were the primary "crafters" of third-wave democratization is equally valid. Therefore, in light of these explanations, it seems safe to say that both preconditions and crafting played major roles during the third wave, and that certain preconditions facilitated democratic crafting.

One of the most remarkable features of third-wave democratization is that it has lasted so long. Even according to those who maintain that the third wave is over,[28] its success over the span of three decades is no small

matter. In an effort to understand the reason for the recent surge of democratization, I suggest that, in addition to the social, economic, and political explanations offered thus far, the sustaining power of the third wave was by itself a substantial factor in its accomplishments.

This theory is echoed in the words of many political scientists, who believe that democracy, rather than being the ultimate "finish line",[29] is a starting point in itself. The establishment of democracy is clearly a starting point for the long-term solution of problems in society and the economy. But more importantly, it is an inherent foundation stone for future democratic development. A crucial difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes lies in the way each form of government perceives and deals with problems. In repressive, authoritarian regimes, injustice is hidden and information is unclear, making it difficult to recognize and confront problems. In open and democratic regimes, however, "the insistence on revealing what is wrong, revealing injustices, revealing inequalities, and urging that all this be corrected paves the way for finding solutions to these problems, even if they cannot be solved immediately".[30] The mere visibility and transparency of problems can increase societal motivation to combat injustice. Thus, it can be argued that the recent wave of democratization essentially sustained itself. Once begun, it revealed to individual countries and to the world the injustices plaguing society, thereby spurring subsequent democratic reforms.

A good example of democracy's self-sustaining power is in the interconnected roles of society and the state in democratization. Cardoso points out that Brazil and many other Latin American countries still suffer from social differences and poverty, despite the strides that their governments have made to ensure equality and human rights. He differentiates between policies that the government considers to be its responsibilities and policies that affect society's "everyday life." The government on its own, he says, is not always able to put a stop to the disrespect of social rights in society, because this will depend on society increasingly reorganizing itself toward that end. In essence, the functions and interactions of the state and society go hand-in-hand: Democracy is both the product of a society that has become more assertive, better organized, and more watchful, and

25 Huntington, "Long Haul", 5
26 Huntington, "After Twenty Years", 4
27 Huntington, "Long Haul", 3
28 Diamond, 31

29 Cardoso, 10
30 Cardoso, 10

a state that has become more open, thus enabling society to penetrate the state.[31] During the past few decades, democratization's changes in civil society blurred the boundary between state and society, thereby encouraging future democratization from both levels.

Evidence of this transformation can be found in the recent proliferation of non-governmental and other organizations, which played (and continue to play) active roles in global decision-making processes. Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, cites the role of non-governmental organizations as an important factor in recent democratization, calling them "a new agent of change in the world." The surge of democratization of the past few decades can in large part be attributed, he says, to "the presence in every culture and region of the world where democracy is weak or nonexistent of grassroots democratic movements composed of ordinary people who are struggling and sacrificing, often at great risk to their own safety, to build societies that respect the right of all people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness".[32]

A quarter of a century ago, these democracy organizations and movements hardly existed at all, except for small groups of dissidents in communist countries and isolated activists. Then, in the 1980s, they began to emerge in post-communist and developing countries. The Solidarity movement was established in Poland, and throughout Central Europe and even in the Soviet Union, independent cultural and media groups started springing up, along with groups pressing for human and minority rights. As the third wave gained momentum, the number of NGOs grew by the thousands. A wide variety of civic and democratic reform groups also became active in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, among them the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in the Philippines, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative (IDASA) in South Africa, the Human Rights Activists in Uganda, the women's organization Conciencia in Argentina, Radio Nanduti in Paraguay, the National Civic Crusade in Panama, and the Movement for Free Elections in Chile. These groups still exist today throughout East and South Asia, Latin America, Africa, Central Europe, the Eurasian region of the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East.

NGOs have made enormous advances for the democratic cause in the areas of national government, human rights, education, and the media. NGOs strengthen local government and aid in political party development and election monitoring. Representatives provide legal aid and advocate for legislative and institutional reforms, and think tanks and business groups aid in the development of a legislative and political environment that will encourage economic investment and growth. NGOs also train civilians in issues of national defense to enable them to monitor security policy and discourage the involvement of the military in politics. In war-torn and post-conflict societies, NGOs focus on curbing violence, fostering reconciliation, and building a culture of tolerance and respect for pluralism and minority rights. NGO investigators monitor and investigate human rights violations and alert the international community to abuses. Trade unions defend the rights of workers and give them a voice in shaping the government. Educators promote public education, providing youth and minorities with the tools to create a democratic society. For example, NGOs educate and involve young people in the political process; motivate and empower women by training them in new communications technologies, informing them of their rights, and protecting them against domestic violence and socioeconomic discrimination; provide civic education in the formal school system and in the community; and teach conflict resolution and peace education, especially in deeply divided societies. In addition, NGOs promote an independent media by training investigative reporters and developing support systems to protect them from intimidation and violence. Although Gershman acknowledges that it is still too early to judge the long-term impact of these organizations on cooperation and democratization, he contends that they have increased the democratic pressure from below on governments in both authoritarian and post authoritarian societies, thereby forcing reforms that might not have otherwise been implemented and also restraining governments from taking regressive measures.

An important characteristic of NGOs lies in the fact that they transcend national borders. Gershman calls the NGO factor "one that animates the principle of democratic universalism in the everyday life of people around the world and, by so doing, also validates its authenticity." This phenomenon highlights the perception of democracy as a "global citizen-

31 Cardoso, 12
32 Gershman 2003

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31 Cardoso, 12
32 Gershman 2003

ship",[33] an attitude that, when commonly accepted, plays an important role in the spread and acceptance of democracy. The extraordinary reach of democracy, embodied in the worldwide presence or NGOs, reflects the universality of the values on which the democratic system is based. During the third wave, the rapid surge of democratization impacted the global perception of democracy, establishing it as the norm and accepted moral standard of government. As Amartya Sen points out, the idea of democracy as a universal commitment is a recent development, and it was only in the twentieth century that democracy became established as the "normal" form of government to which any nation is entitled.[34] This "coverage of universality"[35] played an important role in the advent of equal and universal suffrage. In addition, as countries consolidated their newly established democracies, they were essentially de-privatizing the state, reforming and strengthening the public sector and guaranteeing the global public realm of democracy. Rather than leading to exclusion, this globalization represented solidarity across borders.[36] As in the case of the South American democracy pact, third-wave democratization represented the acceptance of a new set of beliefs and values. Cardoso sums up this idea of strength in globalized democracy, saying, "We must consider that we are living on the threshold of a new era, in which democracy is even stronger because it is imbued not only with classic values, but with new values that go beyond the limits of the nation-state".[37] This presents another support for the self-sustaining argument of democratization. The globalization of democratic values strengthened and encouraged a continued spread of democracy, and served as a powerful pressure against the return of dictatorships. As more countries embraced democratization, democracy became increasingly universalized, thereby providing further authentication and encouraging future democratization.

Pressure for democratization did not come only from NGOs. In fact, international pressure on nondemocratic regimes was a big factor in the recent surge of democratization.[38] For example, Spain, Portugal, and Greece came under pressure from their neighbors to become democratic, and they were implicitly offered the incentive of membership in the European Union if they established democratic systems. It is no coincidence that the three countries became democracies shortly thereafter, Greece in 1975, Portugal in 1976, and Spain in 1978. South Africans were placed under international trade and investment sanctions for several years to force them to give democratic rights to their black majority, and those sanctions led to the establishment of a democratic government in 1994. Nicaragua's government held free elections under quasi-military pressure from the United States, which promoted a civil war in the country to force a change in regime. Even in China, where democracy is not the established form of government, the administration's concern for international reactions has tempered its suppression of democratic movements.

The achievements of the third wave have promoted a sense of euphoria and optimism in the ultimate triumph of universal democracy. However, new dangers threaten democracy from within the democratic process itself, as political leaders and groups increasingly use the mechanisms of democracy to destroy it. "With third-wave democracies, the problem is not overthrow but erosion".[39] For this reason, many scholars stress that the world should now focus not on the creation of additional democracies, but on the consolidation of recently established democracies and the completion of transitions to democracy already underway, such as those in Russia, Ukraine, South Africa, and Mexico.[40] This essay has shown how a variety of factors, including economic development, security and human rights motivations, and the spread of Western ideals and institutions, have prompted such a striking surge of democratization in recent years. Underlying all of these factors is the fundamental nature of democracy itself, which has allowed the third wave to sustain itself for almost 30 years. If political leaders and ordinary individuals in non-governmental organizations are willing to embrace and promote the globalization of democratic values, the third wave will last even longer.

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33 Cardoso, 12
34 Sen, 4
35 Sen, 4
36 Cardoso, 12
37 Cardoso, 12
38 Shively, 171

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39 Huntington, "Long Haul" 8.
40 Lary Diamond, "Assessing Global Democratization a Decade after the Communist Collapse." Address to the Workshop on Democratization. New Europe College and Romanian Academic Society, Bucharest. 6 May 2002. http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers.html

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# The People's
# Popular Conqueror

*Michael Pottash*

**"A BAND OF FIVE OR SIX THOUSAND FUGITIVES** flatter themselves that they can conquer France and impose their laws on a nation of twenty-five million people." – Journal des Debats, March 18, 1815

Napoleon Bonaparte was anything but content to play Emperor for 110,000 people on a tiny island off the cost of Italy. The Emperor made his arrangements and secretly escaped the island to begin his unlikely return to head of state. He and a few hundred men began a trip from the coast to Paris and finally to the Tuileries, Napoleon's palace and home where the current king, Louis XVIII, had made his residence. Upon hearing of the Emperor's march, the King thought nothing of it, unable to see how it would be possible for Napoleon to pose much of a problem. "Surely such a desperate undertaking – with just a few hundred men and no organized support within the country – could not advance very far inland before being stopped by royal army units. Indeed what could a small landing party do against a standing army of over 200,000 men?"[1] The king and many in his government gave Napoleon and his army very little credit. The wife of Marshal Michel Ney, —an imperial army officer whom the king felt he could trust to put down Napoleon—, had very damning words to say of the Emperor's march. "What utter madness could have seized the Emperor? But he will soon be its first victim. Who will support him? Not a soul."[2] Napoleon seemed to be attempting the impossible. After leaving

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1 Alan Schom, *One Hundred Days: Napoleon's Road to Waterloo* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), 35
2 Schom, 34

his empire in a bruised and beaten state, who would be willing to support him? He had bankrupted the state, thus bleeding the French economy dry. To meet the increasing expenses of maintaining France's artificially expanding boundaries, the Emperor reintroduced taxes, which had not existed since before the French Revolution. An additional drain on France's economy was a boycott on all British shipping and import. Napoleon had also been generously rewarding those aristocrats who would pledge their allegiance to him. They received fortunes from the nation's reserves and he endowed them with all kinds of titles. The constant state of war stripped male labor from the fields, causing production of crops to drop drastically. Despite the massive lands he had conquered and the nationalism he had instilled, Napoleon had failed his subjects by pursuing his own prestige. Most of all, the people longed for peace as Napoleon's reign ended. Even loyal Bonapartists wished to know peace.[3]

Why then would the people of France welcome back Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte? Is it possible that any other ruler would have been a relief from Napoleon's predecessor, the unpopular and inadequate Louis XVIII? His blunders included hurting the economy even further and alienating the Protestants and Jews. Napoleon said about the Bourbons, the line of kings from which Louis had descended, "'Forget the past,' say the royalists. So, the French must be made to forget their women violated, their properties laid waste, and France her glory destroyed, her name dishonored by the Bourbons? The people must be made to forget that the wolves are in the place of the shepherd and his dogs?"[4] The Emperor held Louis and his ancestors responsible for the tyranny and failures of the past and challenged the French to reconsider their choice in granting him the throne. Napoleon's plea to the people may have had an effect, but the true and only reason why the Emperor was able to retake his Empire without a shot being fired is because the people simply loved him as their leader. The people of France effectively elected Napoleon back into power by allowing him to retake the country. They could have easily opposed him and his small force but instead chose him to replace the current ruling body. He had won their hearts in battle and their minds with his extensive code

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3 Schom, 37
4 Claude Manceron, *Napoleon Recaptures Paris*, Trans. George Unwin (New York: Norton and Company, 1968), 19

of laws. They longed for their beloved Emperor with whom they had known glory and victory.

## The Peasants

As Napoleon marched from city to city he was acclaimed by all. Peasants lined the streets to catch a glimpse of their emperor and his growing army. The Emperor's flower, the violet, had returned to decorate France along with his colors, red, white and blue. Cries of "Vive l'Empairreur" and songs composed by the rural poets were deafening as Napoleon's parade made its way from town to town.[5] He returned as a tribune of the people, a revolutionist, once more fighting the tyranny of the king. The people could still remember the promise of the French revolution and of a republic.[6] The French Revolution had occurred less than thirty years earlier and the people could still recall the sentiment of the time. The Federes of Dijon, a sect of revolutionists, had joined the Emperor's cause once they saw his revolutionary ideas in him. "The workers called him on that day 'the great entrepreneur.'"[7] He would reconstruct his empire and bring back the glory that it had brought France in his previous reign. The peasants remembered his previous reign and they exploded with love and admiration for him. Napoleon himself said, "The people everywhere are welcoming me as a liberator. I have sung my way here from Grenoble. More than three thousand songs have been made in my honor. They are not wonderful in execution, but they are excellent in sentiment: this is the language of the heart."[8] He now felt as if he gave the people a sense of belonging as citizens in his empire. The French greeted him as a hero and as their representative. They believed he had their best interests at heart. Even Napoleon was surprised by the emotion and love he encountered in such a warm reception from his people.

The peasants played a major role in turning the army's support to Napoleon. They would cheer on Napoleon's army, and wherever it encountered resistance they would cheer even louder so as to extinguish the indecision in the minds of the opposition in favor of the Emperor. In one such case, the 7th regiment of the king headed by Colonel Labedoyere

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5 Manceron, 120
6 Robert Alexander, "The Federes of Dijon in 1815." *The Historical Journal* 30 (1987): 3
7 Manceron, 19
8 Manceron, 132

joined Napoleon's lines marching on Paris, but some troops were hesitant. "The Peasantry of Dauphiny, the cradle of the revolution, lined the roadside: they were transported and mad with joy. The first battalion, which had just been alluded to, had shown some signs of hesitation, but thousands of the country people crowded round it, and by their shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" endeavored to urge the troops to decision, while others who followed in Napoleon's rear encouraged his little troop to advance by assuring them that they would meet with success. Napoleon said he could have taken 2,000,000 of these peasants with him to Paris, but that then he would have been called "'the King of the Jacquerie,'" (Jacques being a common name for a peasant)."[9] When the Royal armies saw who their fellow Frenchmen had chosen as their ruler, they turned right around and headed back towards Paris with their new leader. The crowds were confident in their choice, and this confidence was crucial in turning the tides of loyalty.

Napoleon continued to feel an unexpected upsurge in his popularity. His sentimental words reflected his surprise. As he entered Paris he took special caution. He dared not enter as a conqueror and wished to enter peacefully as a symbol of freedom. Napoleon was concerned not to alienate those whose support he had won, by crashing down on Paris as a brute. He hoped to repay the trust he had been shown with some care of his own. "But with Paris practically in sight, the situation was never more delicate, with thousands of troops, often drunk, in and around Auxerre. And thus on 19 March Napoleon again reminded the generals of the necessity of maintaining strict discipline. 'I am told that your troops...are bent on reprisals against the royalist forces they encounter,' he informed General Girard. 'But, General, the only people you are going to meet are Frenchmen. Therefore call your soldiers. Tell them I have no intention of entering my capital with troops covered with French blood.'"[10] The Emperor always maintained the strictest level of discipline but took extra precautions now that he would be entering his capital hoping to win the favor of the lords, governors and especially the peasants. For all their encouragement, Napoleon felt the people deserved to be treated fairly, and he hoped to avoid bloodshed. The peasantry composed the backbone of

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9 Louis Antoine Fauvelet De Bourrienne, *Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte.* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), 69
10 Schom, 54

Napoleon's support and strength in arms. This had been the first time that the people voted in the leader of their choice by allowing him to regain power. The Emperor had not retaken his nation by force nor strength, but by inspiration and trust.

## The Soldiers

If it had not been for the support of the army and its soldiers, Napoleon would have been finished before he ever began. The army was the only thing standing between the Emperor and his Empire, and as he approached his throne the defenses split as if by the hand of G-d. Napoleon recognized this turn of fate in his favor. "My calculation was this: if the people and the army were not for me, at the first encounter thirty or forty of my men would be killed, the rest would lay down their arms, I should no longer exist, and France would be at peace. If the people and the army were for me, as I hoped, the first battalion I met would give the signal by throwing itself into my arms. All the rest would follow, and the revolution would be over as from that moment."[11] Simply put, the army's opinion was the key to the state. They had the power to either exalt him or bury him, to elect him or reject him. If he could find favor in the eyes of the soldiers he had once commanded then France was his for the taking.

When Napoleon finally reached the Hamlet of Laffray in Grenoble it appeared inevitable that there would be a skirmish between the King's army and Napoleon's Liberators. A battalion of the 5th Regiment of the Line met the Emperor's force and blocked their forward progress. The King's troops looked indecisive and stared across into the determined faces of their counterparts opposite them. "Stepping forward of his little army, Napoleon advanced within a pistol shot of the hostile troops who had formed up and been given orders to open fire on the Emperor. They hesitated, at the sight of Napoleon so brazenly standing before him. It is recorded that he threw open his coat and shouted to them: 'Let him that has the heart, kill his Emperor!' It is also recorded that these soldiers threw down their arms and cried 'Vive l'Empereur!' Napoleon then ordered them to form up and they all marched on together."[12] True or not, the story describes the

11 Manceron, 132
12 Harvest Pack, "Napoleon Escapes From Elba, But is Defeated at Waterloo." *North Park University: History Department.* 9 April 1997. 10 March. 2004 [http://campus.northpark.edu/history/WebChron/WestEurope/Waterloo.html]

feeling of loyalty all over France. Napoleon was rallying battalion after battalion to his cause as if on a campaign trail. No soldier could bring himself to kill his Emperor and consequently, no force could move against him.

When Napoleon brought his ever growing army up against the remaining defenses, he felt a confidence that he had lacked when he began his trip. He could feel that the momentum had almost completely changed in his favor. However, the King's last and best hope still stood before him. The bulk of the Royal army, commanded by Marshal Macdonald, received Napoleon's troops between Fountainebleau and Paris, at Melun. The officers most devoted to the King sang royalist songs to keep the soldiers loyal to his majesty while the regimental bands of music played along. Beside the music there existed a silence that was broken by the galloping of horses, some of which drew a carriage. Napoleon's private secretary continued to describe the scene, "It came on at full speed and Napoleon, jumping from the vehicle, was in the midst of the ranks which had been formed to oppose him. His escorts threw themselves from their horses, mingled with their ancient comrades, and the effect of their exhortations was instantaneous on men whose minds were already half made up to the purpose which they now accomplished. There was a general shout of 'Vive Napoleon!' The last army of the Bourbons (the King's house) passed from their side, and no further obstruction existed betwixt Napoleon and the capital, which he was once more- but for a brief space- to inhabit as a sovereign."[13] And so the opposition had failed; no Frenchman would come to the King's aide. Napoleon's theatrics had seized the Royal army to his cause. The ranks of the Royal army remained in indecision and Napoleon's escorts reminded their fellows of the days of the previous Empire. They had been an integral part in winning over the King's troops.

Everywhere, the King's army was hearing the footsteps of the Emperor and it was hard to fight off the excitement. The King himself could not believe that his armed forces would fold to Napoleon so easily, and he had expected them to fight for him. He had called on Marshall Ney to lead a force against the Emperor, and he expected his orders to be obeyed. "I am expecting a great deal from Marshal Ney. He promised to seize him and bring him to me in an iron cage." To which the King's advisor, Vitrolles,

13 De Bourrienne, 78

responded, "Sire, I believe he will make every effort to fulfill his promise. He is a man of honor. But his troops could escape him; the example is catching and unfortunately the contagion is spreading."[14] The example and contagion that Vitrolles referred to was the choice the soldiers had made to return their Emperor to his throne. The collective decision was everywhere as if it were something tangible. The King's advisor understood that loyalties were shifting and that soon, no one would be able to stop this revolution. He feared for his King.

Vitrolles had every reason to fear, for Napoleon's forces were marching ever closer to the capital, and the King's army had not put up a bit of resistance. The troops were being turned to the Emperor's cause at every turn. Now the stage was set for Napoleon's glorious return to Paris. He would not return as a conqueror, but he had won the popular vote and returned as a liberator escorted by the King's own army. Once at the steps of the Tuileries, the Emperor was snatched up away from his advisors, away from the comfort of his carriage and away from his exile in Elba. He was hoisted up onto the shoulders of several young officers who carried him up the steps of the palace to the chants and cheers of the people of Paris.[15]

## The Marshal

The story of Marshal Ney's betrayal of King Louis XVIII ran deeper than the popular vote of the people. Ney was known to be the bravest of the brave and a close general to Napoleon during his earlier reign as Emperor.[16] With the exile of Napoleon, Ney had settled down to the peace of the Bourbon court until the day that his old commander returned. Upon news of Napoleon's appearance, the King summoned Ney to take charge of 4,000 soldiers and capture the intruder. When Ney departed from his audience before the king he was quite unsure where his loyalties rested. If the Marshal was to side with the Emperor there was no question that many would follow his example.

Ney's decision would come at the hands of his troops who decided for him. Napoleon said of the marshal, "Ney was firmly committed to attack me, but when he saw that his troops would not allow it, he was forced to go along with popular feeling, at the same time seeking a way to profit from

a situation he could not prevent."[17] The Emperor did not believe that his former general would have joined the little army on his own accord. Napoleon thought that the Marshal was simply looking out for his own interests and wanted to be on the winning team.

However, the Emperor gave himself little credit. He attributed Ney's betrayal to the soldiers, but in reality the Marshal was split on the matter of which ruler to follow. He longed for the peace of his life in the Bourbon court and at the same time felt loyalty towards his Emperor. What tipped the scale so dramatically that Ney would blatantly and fearlessly defy the king's orders?

One perilous night on the road to meet his nemesis, Ney was brought a letter from Napoleon in which the Emperor pleaded with the Marshal. He reminded Ney of the glory and the honor that they had captured together while conquering Europe.[18] All the French blood that had been spilled in combat was now in vain as the Bourbons looked to erase it from the memory of France. Napoleon begged Ney to join him in reclaiming past glories. It instilled in Ney vigor with which to defy the King and announce a proclamation to his soldiers in which he acknowledged his allegiance and support of Napoleon. He spoke to them of the military grandeur they once enjoyed and of the liberty and rights that Napoleon looked to re-establish. Ney acted as a spark for Napoleon's campaign, and upon hearing Nay's speech, his soldiers erupted in a deafening wave of support.

Thinking of the well-being and prosperity of his men, Ney told Bourmont, his lieutenant, "It's only from a man of the army, like Bonaparte, that the army will be able to get any consideration."[19] The Marshal had been transformed into the soldier of his youth, having thrown off the reigns of the King to join his glorious commander, Napoleon. His verdict decisively swayed the soldier's opinions in favor of the Emperor. As goes the army, so goes the nation! Since Napoleon was a man of the army, he was also a man of France. To make his intentions clear he finally denounced the King and positioned himself with his true ally, Napoleon. "Here's what I intend to read to the troops: The Bourbon cause is lost forever."[20] Ney had followed his heart into the second coming of the Emperor.

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14 Manceron, 86
15 Schom, 56
16 Schom, 43

17 Schom, 50
18 Manceron, 61
19 Manceron, 64
20 Manceron, 64

## The King

The King made his fair share of mistakes. It is possible that Louis XVIII, through inaction and alienation, separated himself from his subjects. This separation could have driven the people right into the arms of any ruler who contended for the throne. The leader in this case was Napoleon, and so they followed him with all their hearts. This separation was primarily caused by the unfamiliarity of Louis with his people. The king had been granted complete executive powers by the allies who had defeated Napoleon.[21] Not a single Frenchman had any input in this decision. The people did not remember Louis and his ancestors, the Bourbons, because they had not held the throne since before the Revolution, some twenty-five years earlier. "Louis XVIII was not familiar with the people he now ruled and the changes wrought over the past decades; nor did he wish to be so, all of which was aggravated by his natural secretiveness and his tendency to listen to only one advisor, the Comte de Blacas d'Aulps."[22] The people did not know who their king was because they had never been properly introduced. To make things worse, the one man whom the king relied on to lead the nation had no political title and held only an honorary position. How could the French trust a monarch who would not trust them? The people felt indignant. To deepen the void between him and his subjects, the King put all religious decisions in the hands of the Roman Catholic Church, creating a very uncomfortable environment for the Protestants and Jews. Under Napoleon, all religions had been tolerated.[23]

The King's worst choice came when he reduced the standing army from half a million to about 200,000. 300,000 troops then suddenly returned to a work place that was already full of unemployment.[24] The glory of Napoleon's conquests was slowly being dismantled. The King's popularity continued to plummet. A popular song captured the feelings of alienation and mistrust that were prevalent between the monarch and his subjects. "Was he fit to reign over France, this King, who had the nerve to say, as bold as brass among the French: 'I owe my crown to Englishmen'? From that time on says all of France, smashing his scepter to pieces, 'If you do have it from England, this won't matter! This won't matter!'"[25] Louis had

21 Schom, 40
22 Schom, 40
23 Schom, 40
24 Schom, 41
25 Manceron, 219

taken the wrong approach to dealing with the French especially after they had been under the rule of an elegant and confident ruler, like Napoleon. The French saw Louis' existence as an insult since his regime had been established by the hated English. The people longed for a loving King who could instill pride in the nation. Louis was obese by this time and his image instilled pride in no one. He resembled a crippled man who was barely maintaining control.

The King was not for France. When the Emperor had begun his march to Paris, the King sent Ney to meet him in battle but not without possible reinforcements. When Ney expressed his worries about his encounter with Napoleon to his fellow Marshals, Cappelle and Bourmont, they tried to ease his mind with a reminder of the Swiss forces in reserve. "'But Marshal, don't forget that we can still count on the Swiss. They are ready to move off to join the defenders of the royal cause.' At this Ney was on his feet in fury: 'Monsieur, if foreigners set foot on French soil, all France will be for Napoleon! There's nothing left for the King, for his part, but to place himself at the head of his troops, to have himself borne on his litter, so as to fire the soldiers and resolve them to fight!'"[26] The King did not understand France's need to be separate and strong in her own right. For the French to rely on others to protect their own domain would be a great dishonor. Ney understood that Louis's last hope for peace and control was to show the people that he could be a strong leader. The King's only chance of success was to personally lead the Royal army to victory. Louis XVIII had lost the battle even before the first soldiers had thrown down their arms at the sight of Napoleon and before the first chants of 'Vive l'Empereur'.

These shortcomings of the King hurt his relationship with the French people, but they were not the reason the people ran to Napoleon's outstretched arms the moment he showed his familiar face. The cause of their collective betrayal was that they could not stand Louis in comparison to the Emperor. In every endeavor that the King was compared to Napoleon, the King failed. The successes of the Emperor were the failures of Louis.

26 Manceron, 35

## The Conclusion

The goal of every nation is to have a say in the way in which she is governed. When Napoleon defied his exile and returned to the land he loved, the people were confronted with an option. Would they love him back? The French turned their back on the secretive and deceptive peace that Louis offered and chose the glory and confidence that Bonaparte offered. An election is simply the choosing of a person to fill an office. Napoleon was chosen by the people who allowed him to march on Paris. The army and its top general lead the decision making with confident vows of loyalty to the Emperor. The people followed their lead by showing affection for Napoleon with their songs and their encouragement.

Every other country at the time was under the control of a monarch. Despite Napoleon's fanatical attempts to conquer all of Europe, it appears as though his was the only legitimately popular government of the day. The rulers abroad took their power by force or inherited it from their royal parents, while the Emperor was given his throne by the people. Napoleon was nothing without them.

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# Flying Low: America's Unambitious Early Space Program

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**THE EARLY HISTORY** of the American space program can best be described as a straight road that forks, and then at some point later on, rejoins and continues in its original direction. In this analogy, the first part of the road symbolizes the military objectives in the program. When the road splits, it signifies an additional awareness that there are numerous scientific achievements that can be made by exploring outer space. As the roads merge, an understanding is reached that while there are certainly military benefits to be had by entering space, the main importance and value of it is the scientific one.

Of course, navigating such a route can be difficult, and the path America took to space was certainly a bumpy one. During this time, the United States was not only attempting to enter space for its own benefit, but it always had to keep in mind its competitor on the other side of the world, namely Russia. America had won World War II and was now a major force in world diplomacy. As a result, the United States always had to consider the political implications that entering space would cause. At the helm of this mammoth responsibility was President Eisenhower with his committed staff.

The job became significantly more complex for Eisenhower after October 4, 1957, when the Russians launched the Sputnik satellite into Earth's orbit. While on the surface Sputnik might look like a high-flying piece of metal, in reality it symbolized so much more. Sputnik uncovered staggering scientific achievements on the part of the Russians, putting America to shame. But perhaps more foreboding and terrifying, the launch signaled that Russia was just a few steps away from creating a missile that could reach the United States. With both scientific and military significance, the historic milestone can therefore be compared to the turn in the forked roads that begins to bring them together again.

The American journey to space began immediately after World War II, as the military realized that in the future, there may be a necessity for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), warheads that could be launched from American soil directly into Russian territory. What prevented the United States from doing this in 1945, was that rockets powerful enough to carry the required payload had not yet been engineered. As research into rocketry progressed, it became increasingly clear that once the necessary propulsion technology developed to launch an ICBM, reaching Earth's outer atmosphere would be an easy task. In 1946, the military contracted the RAND corporation to conduct a study to find out exactly what it would take to reach outer space, and what the military could do when it got there.[1]

The RAND report came back in May of that year and concluded that it was indeed possible to reach Earth's upper limits with continued engineering research and development. The report also took a few pages to comment on the possible applications space could have. While it concluded that entering space would "undoubtedly prove to be of great military value,"[2] the report mainly focused on the scientific utilizations to be found in space. These included, among others, advances in meteorology and communications.[3]

President Truman's post-war administration cutback in military spending had caused any early dreams of entering space to be quickly forgotten. The Navy began a small project, called the Earth Satellite Vehicle Project, but as reduced funding worked its way through the divisions of the military, the project quickly ran out of money. The Earth Satellite Vehicle Project was officially cancelled in mid-1948.[4]

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[1] Walter McDougall, , ...*the Heavens and the Earth* (New York: Basic Books Inc., Publishers, 1985), 102.
[2] McDougall, *102.*
[3] McDougall, *102.*
[4] McDougall, 103.

This first attempt at entering space was eerily characteristic of much of the rest of the space program's development. As the military contemplated new uses for space, they conducted studies in order to find out the full benefits of expanding into this area. When the reports came back, they confirmed the military's latest plans as feasible, but also stressed the scientific advancements that would arise if the plans were fully pursued. Even though the military was eager to enter space, it moved slowly to get there. When the budget was tight the space initiatives were the first to go, causing projects to fail. In addition, one must know that any space program always had its foundation in the military and not in a non-governmental or private endeavor. However, it is important to note that the two sides of the space issue, the science and the military, were realized early on.

The next big step for America in space came during President Eisenhower's second term. Even though ICBM development had been reinstated and increased since the beginning of his first term, progress in space research was almost non-existent, and entering space was not a goal of the program.[5] Even still, the technology needed to enter space was once again available. What finally made launching a satellite a major goal was an April 1957 report given to Eisenhower depicting how Russia was soon going to equal and surpass America in terms of military capabilities. The Gaither Report, as it came to be known, made clear the need for gathering intelligence concerning Russia's status in terms of ICBM progress.[6] The easiest solution for this, the military reasoned, was to create a surveillance satellite, which would be able to relay pictures from Russian missile sites without risking American lives.[7]

Eisenhower, while quickly realizing the need to address the intelligence issue, was at the same time very wary of launching a satellite into space with markedly military intentions. Eisenhower was afraid of opening space as a theatre of future warfare, one where wars would be fought and won in space. Many of these issues were addressed much earlier than Eisenhower in a second report issued in October 1950 by the RAND corporation which highlighted the political implications a space launch would

have, and how publicity, not secrecy, was the key to launching a peaceful space mission. The RAND report suggested that all progress on the creation of a satellite be made public, something which certainly was not going to happen if plans went forward on the surveillance satellite.[8]

To Eisenhower's rescue came the announcement from the International Geophysical Year (IGY) that it was challenging every country to launch a satellite in the name of science by mid-1958. The IGY was the brainchild of a gathering of scientists who wanted to conduct high-altitude research. Previously, in 1882 and 1932, International Polar Years had been held and the gathering decided to propose another one. When they took the proposal to the International Council of Scientific Unions, the union expanded the idea to include the whole earth. From there it was just a few more steps before launching a satellite was made the central goal. The IGY was therefore the perfect excuse for Eisenhower to test out international space policy. He immediately moved to create the Vanguard project, which was in charge of fulfilling the IGY's goals. All Vanguard progress would be made public, while keeping America's military reconnaissance mission a secret.[9]

Since the two programs were completely separate, many holdups occurred while bringing Vanguard to fruition. The first of these problems was that the public Vanguard project was unable to make full use of military advances in rocketry without sacrificing the secrecy which the military programs needed.[10] Second, budgeting for the IGY was always difficult; a direct result of the program's scientific nature. Scientific projects were often last on the totem pole for federal funding since military projects obviously took precedence. When funding was denied for the project, the date of completion was pushed back.

It was perhaps at this point in the American space timeline that the scientific and military roads were farthest apart. The military was acting on its own in order to develop ICBMs and satellites which would keep an eye on Russia, while the Vanguard project was in charge of fulfilling the nation's IGY obligations and testing the political response to launching a satellite. Granted, the Vanguard project was minimally reliant on ICBM in order to become functional, yet it still had to make its own use of any

5 Dwight D.Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, The White House Years: 1956-1961* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1965), 208.
6 Eisenhower, 220.
7 McDougal, 117.

8 McDougal, 109.
9 McDougal, 118-119.
10 Eisenhower, 209.

advances which were given to them. ICBM, the better funded of the two projects, was making much more headway in reaching its goal as Vanguard lagged behind in creating a viable satellite. The contrast between these two programs was made crystal clear when the Russians launched a satellite named Sputnik, and forever changed the American spatial outlook.

Sputnik itself had all kinds of implications for both Russia and United States. First and foremost, the successful launch of Sputnik was seen as a failure for the American people. Despite the warnings and knowledge of Russia's progress in the field, the United States continued to stall, always assuming that she, being the superior power, would be first in space. One of the crucial factors in this failure was the time period between the end of World War II and NSC-68 (which promoted the buildup of American military forces) when ICBM and rocket development was almost non-existent in the United States. It was at this time that Russia began to look into these fields and surge ahead of their American rivals.[11] The second cause of failure was the IGY Vanguard program. The Eisenhower administration, in its desire not to cause a political blunder, chose the slower, less aggressive Vanguard project, when the military could have beaten Russia to space by at least a year.[12]

After the launch of Sputnik, there were new assumptions that could be made about Russians and their abilities. It was now clear to the people of the United States that Russia either already had, or would soon have, the means to launch an ICBM at their country. Also, there was fear of a lack of brain power within the American society and that somehow Russian scientists had become smarter than the best of American scientists.[13]

The greatest contribution that Sputnik made to the American space program, and what began to bring the "roads" back together again, was opening of a free space. "The Russians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space,"[14] said Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles during a meeting with the president to discuss the Russian satellite. The rest of the administration shared Quarles' outlook on the situation, and remained focused on formulating a response to Sputnik.

The opening of a free space was a relief to the Eisenhower administration. As is known, Eisenhower was very cautious about opening space as a military front, and Sputnik had set the political standard in space as a free and peaceful one. From here on, Eisenhower and his staff would use Sputnik as their reasoning and proof for keeping space a scientific field of study.

Even though the military/science dispute had been solved as far as outer space was concerned, it did not in any means translate into a settlement between the two sides on the ground. It was clear to the United States that it must not lose the strategic territory of outer space to the Russians, and that it must do all that it could in order to catch up and surpass them. In order to do this, Eisenhower appointed James Killian, then President of MIT, to be the Science Advisor to the President. Eisenhower also began to increase the nation's interest in science so that America would never again lag behind the Russians in terms of scientific knowledge. Lastly, Eisenhower delivered speeches to the entire nation which intertwined both science and defense, mostly to calm the nation which was in constant fear of what the public thought was an imminent Russian attack.[15]

If one were to have taken a poll of the American people as to whether or not they thought Sputnik was a positive or negative event, the overwhelming response would have been that it was a negative, perhaps even catastrophic, event. But if one were to have conducted the same poll within the White House, the response would have been much different. The Eisenhower administration chose to look at Sputnik as a challenge, an event that highlighted several failures that existed within the United States, but none that could not be fixed. Illusions that America was way behind Russia in terms of missile capabilities were exactly that, and Eisenhower seized the opportunity to move America forward in several sectors, furthering research into satellites and rockets and promoting education reform. Eisenhower decided to look deeply into the meaning behind Sputnik and saw that Russia did not have at its roots a military threat which was based in space, but rather a gesture towards the US that this arena

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11 Eisenhower, 206.
12 Eisenhower, 209.
13 Harold M., Schmeck, "Nation is Warned to Stress Science," *New York Times*, 8 October 1957, p. 14.
14 Eisenhower, 210.

15 Eisenhower, 223-224.

should be used for the greater good, and this idea was incorporated into all of his further space planning.

The opening of space as a scientific frontier meant that it didn't matter which program Eisenhower used to mount a response to Russia's Sputnik, as long as the response was taken as being peaceful in nature. At first, Vanguard was given a chance, but instead of being successful, a trial run blew up almost immediately after liftoff. This left the United States being ridiculed by nations across the world, who called America's attempt names like "Puffnik," and "Kaputnik"[16]. After this, Eisenhower's Defense Secretary, Neil McElroy, moved the IGY mission into the hands of the Army and its Jupiter-C project, which was ultimately successful, even though the total weight of the American satellite was a mere 3.5 pounds, compared to Russia's 184 pound mega-craft.[17]

With the playing field between Russia and America for the most part level (Russia had by now launched Sputnik II and a dog into space), it was now necessary for Eisenhower and his staff to take a step back and define exactly what the goals of the United States' space program would be. In order to do this, Eisenhower instructed Killian to write a report suggesting what America's space responsibilities were. Even before this was completed, it was already quite clear that there would need to be some sort of organization which would balance the defensive and scientific agendas which were to be carried out in space.

When Killian and his staff returned with the report in March 1958, it was overwhelmingly apparent from the text that scientific research would be priority number one in outer space. When the military uses of space were mentioned, it was only as a source of information gathering, and it was stated that combat proposals "do not hold up well on close examination".[18] The suggestion of the Presidential Science Advisory Committee, which Killian headed, that space be treated as a scientific frontier was reiterated several times by a plethora of other studies into the future uses of space from other organizations.[19] Eisenhower, who was obviously in agreement with the studies' findings, nodded his head

16 James R. Jr. Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977), 119.
17 Killian, 122. Refers to the program move, not the crafts' weights.
18 Killian, 124.
19 Killian, 124-125.

throughout the entire report.[20]

The new organization which would soon be proposed did not only have to manage all the scientific research, development and missions, but it would also have to be proficient at handling the political aspects of having a national space program. Not only would it be responsible for procuring its own funding from the government, but outer space at this point in time was still an uncharted and undefined political zone. It was unclear how any move that would be made in space would be interpreted by the world. The new organization would have to be in charge of explaining all accomplishments to the general public, and it would also have to describe America's intentions if something controversial were ever to come about.

It was for these reasons that the first two departmental candidates for control of the new US space program were rejected. Both the Army and the United States Air Force originally contended for rights to the space program, but their proposals were denied since it was determined that they would be unable to meet the scientific and political goals of the mission. It was the government's intention all along to keep the program within a preexisting unit of the government, since Congress was wary of creating yet another organization in the name of science (the Atomic Energy Commission and the NSF already existed, among others), which is why the Army and Air Force thought they had a chance at running mission.

The main reason for both the Army and the Air Force's rejection was the fact that they were both part of the military, which was completely contrary to the message which Eisenhower was trying to send about his space program. Eisenhower and his staff thought it wouldn't make sense for peaceful, scientific missions to be handled by the military. This was the case even though the Army was the organization which put the first US satellite into orbit. The Air Force made its case by arguing that "the atmosphere and outer space were a continuum," and therefore had the rights to the new agency. The Air Force had also recently launched a successful military satellite.[21]

It was therefore evident that the new space program would have to be part of an already existing civilian organization. The suggestion made on this front was the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which had been set up after World War I to research advances in aeronau-

20 Killian, 124.
21 Killian, 128.

tics which could then be applied to combat. The committee had been working successfully for almost fifty years and was governed by a committee, not a single person, which could have clear benefits for such a complex mission as exploring space. In addition, it handled both civilian and military contracts and was run entirely by civilians, giving it a more peaceful appearance. The only problem with NACA was that it was not connected to a pre-existing government agency, and a sensitive issue such as a space mission could not be under the auspices of an agency that had no government control. The solution to this problem was that the president would be made chairman of the board, therefore making sure that all decisions and missions would be in the best interest of the country.[22]

After a few more negotiations between Eisenhower, Congress, and the military, the papers were drawn up to reorganize the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). On October 1, 1958, less than a year after the Russian's launch of Sputnik, NASA began its first day of operations. NASA, in Eisenhower's eyes, represented the perfect balance between the science and the military. Now there was a central place where all procedures relating to space would take place. No longer would there have to be double projects to achieve the same goal, and funding for all space related activity would go through one organization. NASA, Eisenhower felt, did not hold too much power as if it were dictating to the military proper uses of space, yet would be able to make sure that all military uses for space would be in the best interest of the country. America could once again focus on surpassing Russia in space technology and begin to answer the many questions that outer space asked.

The thirteen years since the end of World War II, saw scientific achievements that people had been dreaming about for thousands of years. However, as with everything that occurred during the Cold War, it was unclear whether these advancements would be ones that would become tainted with combatant undertones of war, or if it would translate into incomprehensible developments for mankind. Fortunately, the answer to this question was answered by both countries, first by Russia with its peaceful launch of Sputnik and then reinforced by America when it decided to take a solely scientific approach towards outer space.

It would be hard to imagine what the world would be like today if outer space had been put to military uses. Thanks to just the smallest amount of restraint from the Russians, and clearly-stated, non-provoking plans from the Americans, we are delighting in the many discoveries that have come from our further research. Today, outer space and its related research has contributed to our society's many new inventions, such as Velcro and Silly Putty, and has allowed us to conduct experiments that could not take place within the gravitational pull of planet Earth. To the delight of all, the science that goes into space is placed in the public domain, allowing all to gain from it, and space research serves as an example of the possibility for world peace in the future.

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# The Non Italian Italians: The Anti-Kabbalah Movement In Italy

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**KABBALAH** was meant to be an esoteric lore, finding a home in the hearts and souls of select individuals. Its great wisdom and power would guide those who studied it to great levels of spirituality and holiness. While the study of Kabbalah flourished in Spain in the beginning of the 12th century, it found a home as well on the open-minded shores of Italy. With the arrival of Kabbalah to Italy, changes and new meanings were assigned to fundamental concepts contained within this perplexing text. Tenets like the immortality of the soul and the "world to come" took new meanings in the Italian Kabbalah revolution. However, along with the new fervor of the study of Kabbalah, a school of opposition emerged, limiting its importance. The opposition to the study of Kabbalah in Italy developed as a response to the ever-changing social construct of the community, and out of a need to suppress Kabbalah's effect. The opponents of Italian Kabbalah reacted in opposition to it for various reasons that must be understood and discussed in order to gain a full perspective of the Italian Kabbalah revolution.

Elijah Delmedigo (1460-1497), an early opponent of the study of Kabbalah, raises a number of fundamental questions in his critique of Kabbalah. In his work *Behinat Hadat*, Delmedigo questions the authorship of the *Zohar*, traditionally attributed to the Tana Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai[1]. While Delmedigo does not offer a plausibale alternative, the question itself is important in order to understand the way in which the anti-Kabbalists were framing their questions. Being that Delmedigo is an early example of an anti-Kabbalist, his question is the important element, not necessarily the answer.

A second critique that Delmedigo offers questions the history of a basic Kabbalistic concept. Delmedigo claims that some Kabbalists equate the *Ten Sefirot,* the ten emanations, with the Divine and thus destroy the monotheistic faith of Judaism. Through this polemical diatribe, Delmedigo demands to know how any Jew could accept Kabbalstic teachings when they seemingly appose the fundamental teachings of the Jewish faith. Delmedigo further points out that the views of the Kabbalists are close to those of certain ancient philosophers, including Plato, who Delmedigo claims was "proven false by those who were knowledgeable".[2]

Delmedigo does not raise an abundance of questions against Kabbalah, rather he sticks to a few main points and tries to reveal the thrust of their arguments. However the question remains, what was the impetus behind the attacks against Kabbalah? Heinrich Graetz explains Delmedigo's opposition to Kabbalah as an early expression of rationalism in Jewish thought, breaking through the shackles of mysticism and irrationality that held the Jews captive throughout the Middle Ages.[3] Alternatively, David Ruderman suggests that Delmedigo was sensitive to the Christian polemics against Judaism.[4] Delmedigo rejected the efforts of men to bring spirituality down to the earth through the usage of images and talismans and held that this practice was against the Torah and considered idolatry. Ruderman proposes that Delmedigo was openly reacting to his encounter with the Christian Kabbalist Pico Della Mirandola and his intellectual environment.

Alternatively, Delmedigo felt a need to make sure that the masses did not learn the secrets of the Torah. He emphasized the vital need to keep the "deep" knowledge of the Torah hidden from the general population-

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1 This is a popular question among the critiques of Kabbalah, and it is a theme that will be repeated again by modern day scholars.
2 See David Ruderman. *The World Of A Renaissance Jew : The Life And Thought Of Abraham Ben Mordecai Farissol.* (Cincinatti: Hebrew Union College Press, 1981), 54
3 See Ruderman, 59.
4 Ruderman, 61.

tion, and to reveal its teachings only to those who were worthy of them. Delmedigo was grappling with the problem of Kabbalah becoming more accessible to the common man, and he was afraid this might cause harm to the public. However, in conjunction with Ruderman's understanding of Delmedigo, one could argue that it was not Jewish Kabbalah that Delmedigo was afraid of. Rather, he was worried that Christian missionaries would preach their own interpretations of the secrets of Kabbalah. It therefore stands to reason that Delmedigo was afraid of both preaching Kabbalah to the masses and the possible Christian interpretation of the secrets of the Kabbalah.

Arguably, the most important document testifying to Jewish rationalists' uneasiness concerning Kabbalah is Judah Arieh Modena's (1571-1648) *Ari Nohem*. Although *Ari Nohem* is not the first clear critique of Kabbalah, it is the most comprehensive and systematic attack upon the most vital teachings of the Kabbalists. However, even before *Ari Nohem* was published, we get a sense of Modena's opposition to Kabbala in a letter sent to Rabbi Isaac Uziel of Amsterdam[5]. In this letter, Modena responds to Uziel's inquiry about three subjects, which "seemed strange in Uziel's eyes"[6]. The first and second issues deal with Modena's understanding of *"Masseh Breishit"*, or the world's creation, and his attitude towered the rabbinic tradition. The third issue, which is the most relevant to our discussion, addresses two points in relation to Kabbalah. Modena stresses that the Kabbalists are creating explanations that utilize combination of letters, innovations which contradict traditional claims[7]. He further asks if the current form of Kabbalah is authentic and hints at the possibility that the secrets that are now considered part of the Kabbalah could be different from the true ancient text.

A second source of Modena's understanding of Kabbalah can be found in a responsum written in 1625, some twenty-five years after the first letter. When asked whether it is permitted to teach Kabbalah in public, Modena answered that the real problem was whether it was worthwhile to study

5 Joanna Weinberg. "Preaching in The Venetian Ghetto," in *Preachers Of The Italian Ghetto*. D. Ruderman, ed (California: University of California Press, 1992), 105.
6 Moshe Idel. "Differing Conceptions of Kabbalah In The Early 17th Century" in *Jewish Thought In The Seventeenth Century* I. Twersky and B. Septimus ed.(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1987), 149
7 Idel,151

Kabbalah in private. It is clear from the response that Modena disapproves of public discussions of esoteric issues since they may be innovations, pretending to be the real secrets of the Torah. Additionally, Modena hints to another important facet of his unwillingness to permit open discussion on Kabbalah. Modena reasons that if certain Kabbalistic teachings contain anti-Christian elements, then it is dangerous to propagate them to the general public. Moreover, the Christians may misuse Kabbalistic opinions, such as the Kabbalistic explanation of Adam's sin causing a defeat in the *Sefirah of Yesod,* in order to strengthen their doctrines.[8] This argument which Modena explicitly uses is later elaborated in his *Ari Nohem.*

Modena's expressed skepticism of Kabbalah's antiquity and authenticity found in the letters above was only articulated in a fragmentary and veiled way. It resulted from the necessity to act in accordance with his position as a Rabbi, a public official who could not question the validity of a document held in high esteem by many of his followers. However, twenty years after these letters were first written, Modena published his seminal critique of Kabblah the *Ari Nohem.* As a student of history we must ask what happened in the meantime. What could convince Modena to commit to writing his views on Kabbalah, which he had refrained from expanding upon many years before? One possible answer seems to be implied by the author himself in the introduction to his autobiography. He writes that he compiled *Ari Nohem* out of anger against Kabbalists who had denigrated the luminaries of Israel, especially Maimonides. Indeed in his book, Modena does criticize two Kabbalists, Rabbi Shem Tov Ibn Shem Tov and Rabbi Meir Ibn Gabbai, who vehemently argued with Maimonides's rational approach. However, Modena's refutation of these two Kabbalists cannot be considered the core of *Ari Nohem.* Rather, a proper view at the content of *Ari Nohem* must be considered to gain an understanding of Modena's view of Kabbalah.

The clearest understanding of Modena's view on Kabbalah can be found in his discussion on the historical relation between philosophy and Kabbalah. Modena asks the simple question whether a relationship exists between these two fields of study. Modena answers by describing three Kabbalistic solutions to this question: The first that there is no similarity between Kabbalah and philosophy, rather their views are completely con-

8 Idel, 137

tradictory. The second is that there does exists a relationship between the two, and both Kabbalah and philosophy share many common ideas. The third solution is that the similarities between Kabbalah and philosophy are not a phenomenological affinity, but a result of the historical influence of the Jews on ancient philosophy; for instance Plato spoke with Jeremiah and Aristotle with Simeon the Righteous.[9] Disregarding these solutions, Modena presents his own solution as the exact reverse of the last view. Modena argues that there is indeed a clear similarity between Kabbalistic views and those of the philosophers. However, he argues, this similarity is the result of the influence of Greek philosophy on Jewish scholars. This knowledge only came into fruition from the post Maimonidean Spanish scholars, who were heavily affected by Platonic ideas. Notwithstanding, the true interest of Modena was not to disprove the third option; rather, his goal was to disprove the second opinion, namely the idea that philosophy and Kabbalah share many of the same ideas.

When examined, the list of persons supporting Modena's view reveals that all of them were Modena's contemporaries and almost all were his acquaintances.[10] The view that was systematically laid out by Modena is concerned with a historical affinity between ancient philosophy and Kabbalah, both of them belonging to a lasting philosophy. The Kabbalists of Modena's era subscribed to the Renaissance view concerning the antiquity of Kabbalah in concordance with philosophy. When Modena pointed out the similarity between Platonism and Kabbalah it was only in order to rebuke them together. Modena aimed to draw a distinct line between Judaism and other religious phenomena by excluding Kabbalah from the mainstream corpus of Jewish literature. The description of the Platonic philosophy as a source of Kabbalah was intended to present Kabbalah as a late innovation springing from alien fountains. As such, the claim of the Kabbalists that the Kabbalah was a corpus of secrets alluded to by the Talmud, by definition cannot be true if one posits that this lore is an entirely new innovation. To further this point Modena uses the term *"hamzaah"* (invention) to describe the emergence of the Kabbalah.

Modena's rejection of the fact that Kabbalah is part of the corpus of lasting philosophy, or *philosophia perennis*, supported his goal in another

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9 Idel, 155.
10 Idel, 157.

field. By presenting Jewish Kabbalah as a late forgery he also dealt a blow to the foundations of Christian Kabbalah. The new vain of Christian Theology was based upon the idea that the Jewish Kabbalah was ancient lore, even more ancient then the Talmud, and that it adumbrated some of the tenets of the future Christian faith. A historical reevaluation of Jewish Kabbalah presenting it as medieval lore, denied Christian Kabbalah its major claims that Christian tenets were part of a secret Jewish doctrine stemming from Moses himself. Further, Modena felt that a scrutiny of Christian Kabbalah was also necessary in order to persuade his students not to take seriously the Christian books they may have read.

There exists a common thread when comparing the anti-Kabalistic polemics of Modena and Delmedigo in regards to the Kabbalistic view of prayer. The theurgist view of prayer is one of the most important elements in Kabbalistic interpretation of the commandments. The Kabbalist's awareness that he could influence the divine world, the *sefirot,* by fulfilling the commandments transformed one of the most common commandments, prayer, into a powerful instrument.[11] This view was strongly criticized in Delmedigo's *Behinat Daat* and his criticism was echoed in Modena's *Ari Nohem.* Delmedigo attacked a general conception without analyzing in detail the actual implications of the Kabbalistic view of commandments. Modena did the same and added to Delmedigo's criticism another classical attack on the Kabbalists, focusing on the Kabbalistic theory of prayer. Delmedigo argues that lower beings cannot cause change in higher ones, whereas Modena goes further and clearly labels the Kabbalists' prayer to the *sefirot* as idolatry. Modena takes this position when attacking Cordovero's view, who believes that it is a theological error to pray to the ultimate simple "First Cause" without the help of the *sefirot.* While both Delmedigo and Modena argue against the Kabbalistic view of prayer, Modena clearly formulates his response trying to actively attack this Kabbalistic practice, whereas Delmedigo's polemics were formulated in more general terms.

One would suspect that by the time the nineteenth century hit the debates regarding the validity of Kabbalah would have been forgotten. One could even question the possibility of the survival of Kabbalah in Italy, where Jews in the nineteenth century were about to gain civil rights com-

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11 Idel, 175.

parable to the Catholic majority. The general understanding of the Kabbalah was that it was considered an exclusive discourse, emphasizing the essential specificity of Israel. The Jews in Italy were living in a society where integration was becoming the norm and exclusivity was part of the past. However, even with the move of Jewish scholarship into a historical science, the debate over the validity of Kabbalah was still raging. This debate only involved a small number of individuals, Isaac Samuel Reggio (1784-1855) and Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-1865). The development of Reggio's and Luzzatto's position on Kabbalah requires a bit of considerable thought. In 1827, Reggio dedicated a chapter of his book *Torah and Philosophy* to the relationship between Kabbalah and free, rational research. In Reggio's work there is an interplay between an admiration for the loftiness of the esoteric meaning of Kabbalah, and the doubts as to the reality of their sources. As a great believer in the literal interpretation of texts, Reggio remained respectful and faithful to his central idea that uncertainties and mysteries need not be resolved. This is why he condemned the diffusion of Kabbalistic ideas among the uneducated populace who may feel the need to resolve certain mysteries contained within the text. Disregarding his own premise, Reggio concludes by saying that when the Israelite nation had its own country, it could dedicate itself to secret doctrines, but now in exile it has to keep a distance from this study. Hence, while in exile, one should distance oneself from Kabbalah since one may come to err when studying it, and alter the true meaning of the text. Thus, according to Reggio, now is not yet the time to concern oneself with Kabbalah.

In 1854, only one year before his death, Reggio underwent a drastic change of opinion, one that created another controversy over this important issue. Reggio, in a reversal of opinion stated that Kabbalists do not reason, but are content to walk in others footsteps. Many Kabbalists make amulets and practice witchcraft while, according to Reggio, they also capriciously insert strange dogmas into the faith. Even the doctrine of anthropomorphism, which had been considered by Reggio as a linguistic necessity, was now denounced as a harmful invention that could turn even the most balanced people into fanatics.[12] Further, Reggio in his play *The Dialogues*, denounces the importance of Kabbalah in the Jewish can-

non, having characters fall asleep when Kabbalistic texts are discussed and blatantly showing a lack of interest in the esoteric text. Reggio's attack on Kabbalah transformed from one of hesitant optimism, to critiquing the way in which the Kabbalists practice the secret tradition. Reggio hints at the fact that it does not take knowledge and understanding to practice Kabbalah, rather one only has to imitate the actions of previous scholars to gain the understanding of the Kabbalistic teachings.

What occurred between 1827 and 1854 to cause such a marked change in direction on the part of Reggio? The answer is very apparant. Samuel David Luzzatto's work against the Kabbalistic literature that laid unpublished for over twenty years finally appeared in 1852, and had a tremendous influence on Reggio. In fact, in Reggio's play, he molds his characters to represent psychological dimensions of Luzzatto's personality. The cause behind this sudden change in the philosophy of Reggio can be attributed to dialectical nature of Luzzatto's arguments, and the influence it had on Reggio.

Samuel David Luzzatto was himself decidedly and unreservedly an anti-Kabbalist. His view did not stem from his cultural or family background; his father, a carpenter was inclined to Kabbalistic study and even practiced it as a youth.[13] Luzzatto's critical observations of Kabbalah may be summed up into three main categories. The first, he claims that the Kabbalah is based in medieval thought and is inspired by Judah Halevi's *Kuzari*. The second is a philological criticism based on the dating of the vowel system in the Masoretic text, from which the *Zohar* draws some of its arguments. The *Zohar*, according to Luzzatto, must have appeared later than the introduction of the vowel system, hence it came much later then the Mishniac period. The third is a linguistic analysis of the *Zohar*, where Luzzatto argues that the text shows many linguistic anachronisms, and many corrupt forms of language.[14] Seemingly, the form in which Luzzatto critiques the Kabbalah is not from a polemical way, rather he raises questions about the text itself.

One of the weightier accusations made by Luzzatto is a comparison of the philosophy of Spinoza to Kabbalah. Spinoza, whom Luzzatto consid-

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12 Alessandro Guetta. "The Last Great Debate on Kabbalah in Italian Judaism" in
  *The Jews of Italy: Memory and Identity*. B. Cooperman, ed. (Maryland: University
  Press of Maryland, 2000), 260

13 Interestingly, one cause that did factor in his critique of Kabbalah was the rise of
  Hasidism in Eastern Europe. Luzzatto called Hasidism the enemy of all culture,
  trying to limit its spread to the rest of Europe.
14 Guetta, 266

ered a betrayer of his people, made the claim that the idea of a Final Cause does not exist and he thus rejected the tenet that God was the original creator of all things. Included in his rejection of the Final Cause, Spinoza rejects the teleological proof of the existence of God, which according to Luzzatto the Kabbalah rejects as well. With the great importance placed on the role of *sefirot* in the Kabbalistic realm, God loses his status as the Final Cause, leaving everything to be done by the *sefirot*. This claim by Luzzatto differs from his original claim, in that he undertakes an effort to underscore the way Kabbalah view's God's role in this world. The rejection of the Final Cause is a new polemic created by Luzzatto to fight against the use of Kabbalah as a holy text. Delmedigo, Modena and Reggio do not even come close in their arguments saying that the Kabbalah rejects a simple tenet like Final Causality. It is true that Modena and Delmedigo argue against *sefirot*, but that is only an argument in regards to prayer and they do not claim Kabbalah rejects the idea of God being the Final Cause.

This shift in argument, showing that Kabbalah disputes a fundamental tenet of Judaism, suggests that all other critiques used by the anti-Kabbalah movement had failed, thus a new mode of attack was necessary. Luzzatto's final argument did not focus on the social ramifications that the Kabbalah may contain, rather, this was an attack from within the Jewish community, taking aim at a belief that all Jews understood and took seriously. Luzzatto, as well as Delmedigo, Modena and Reggio all wanted to undermine the force of which Kabbalah had on the Jewish community. However, one could argue that Luzzatto used his last argument for a different purpose. With the passing of the literary baton to Eastern Europe, Luzzatto felt that the literary innovations of Kabbalah were of no use in Italy. Thus, the Kabbalah that uses literary motifs and imagery does not belong in a culture that cannot support it. This shifts the focus of Luzzatto's argument to a socio-intellectual one, leaving out the philosophical polemic that appeared in his previous arguments. Nevertheless, the weight of Luzzatto's anti-Kabbalah polemic through this argument shows his ability to draw it out in a number of ways.

When comparing the various polemics seen above, an interesting progression of arguments becomes clear. When Elijah Delmedigo and Judah Modena argued against the study of Kabbalah as a polemic against Christian scholars, they did so out of a need to respond to the cultural and intellectual events of the time. Consequently, when they argued that Kabbalah should not be accessible to the public, they did so as a response to the cultural norms of the community. It is clear that the impetus behind the arguments of Delmedigo and Modena was a response to the social problems that they viewed as dangerous. For example, the rejection of the Kabbalah as an ancient text allowed Modena to argue against the rise of Christian Kabbalah that threatened the Jewish community. This theme runs through the polemics of Isaac Reggio and Samuel David Luzzatto as well. The arguments that both Reggio and Luzzatto present against Kabbalah serves as a polemic against the religious practices they encountered within the Jewish community. The claim that Kabbalah was an invention from the time of Judah Halevi allowed Luzzatto to argue that it should not be regarded as an ancient lore with deep secrets buried inside of it. Further, the rejection of Kabbalah as witchcraft by Reggio allowed him to argue that the Jewish community must embrace modernity and give up the mystical customs of old. The arguments used above were not said in a vacuum, rather they must be understood as a response to the social order of the time.

The anti-Kabbalah revolution in Italy produced arguments that questioned the core beliefs of many people in the Italian Jewish community. Whether or not it convinced any one of the validity of Kabbalah is secondary to the primary goal this revolution achieved. This movement showed that Jewish thought was not bound to popular belief, and seemingly obvious ideas could, and should be questioned. This is the lesson that must be taken from this great intellectual revolution, one that should be applied in other areas as well.

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# Returning Refugees between East and West: Alfred Kantorowicz and Hans Mayer

*Mario Kessler*

**"WHO WOULD HAVE WANTED US HERE** [in West Germany], then?" asked Alfred Kantorowicz.[1] This writer and former professor of modern literature, who had lived for some time in West Germany, addressed a Western critic who had reproached him for having, in 1946, chosen the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany as the place to which he hoped to return after the end of World War II. He had returned from the United States to the Soviet Zone, but, like his colleague Hans Mayer, Kantorowicz left East Germany for the West. Mayer and Kantorowicz were examples of people who were estranged in both parts of divided Germany.

In the Soviet Occupation Zone, the dispossession of large-scale real estate and the nationalization of industry, banking, and wholesale trade were enforced under the ambitious claim of constructing a democratic socialist society: a project which was fully in keeping with the programmatic vision of German communists at this time. Those who had been expelled from Germany by the Nazi regime were encouraged to return to

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1 Hans Albert Walter, "Das Risiko des Moralisten: Begegnungen mit Alfred Kantorowicz," [Preface to:] Alfred Kantorowicz, *Etwas ist ausgeblieben: Zur geistigen Einheit der deutschen Literatur nach 1945* (Hamburg: Christians, 1985), p. 12.

East Germany: "To all of you who were driven out of Germany; all German scientists, scholars, artists, and writers beyond the borders of your homeland, we send our greetings," so proclaimed the official statement of the *Kulturbund* (Cultural Association) for the Democratic Renewal of Germany in November 1945. "The time of emigration has ended within Germany and outside its borders. Let it be known that Germany needs you."[2] For the first time in their lives many of these refugees had the feeling of being indispensable. No such call to return came from any institution from the Western part of Germany.

Marxist returnees faced dubious welcome in the East, and later in the West. In East Germany they were indebted, as some gradually came to realize, to a regime whose practices had little to do with the overly optimistic expectations that those in exile had envisioned for a socialist society. Whoever turned their back on the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would be welcomed in the West. However, once in the Federal Republic of Germany, those who stood by their critical assessment of the society's development would then be effectively marginalized, although not actively persecuted. The following remarks try to illustrate this dual experience. They deal with two outstanding figures in the scholarly and literary landscapes of both East and West Germany: Alfred Kantorowicz (1899-1979) and Hans Mayer (1907-2001).[3]

These two writers, although not close friends, had much in common. They belonged to a generation, which experienced its formative years in the Weimar Republic, the first and unsuccessful democratic experiment on German soil. Kantorowicz and Mayer were both of Jewish origin. They grew up in assimilated, urban middle class families. Both studied law, but turned soon to literary criticism and political activity on the left. Both were driven out of Germany after the Nazis came to power. Both returned to East Germany, but neither Kantorowicz nor Mayer could stay there forever, although they seemed at first to be well integrated into the local intellectual elite.

Both went to West Germany to remain critical commentators on po-

litical developments. Thus, both became outsiders beyond the West German political consensus, although Mayer, but not Kantorowicz, could succeed professionally. Who were these intellectuals? What makes them of interest for today?

## Alfred Kantorowicz:
## A Critical Embracement of German Communism

Alfred Kantorowicz was born in Berlin as a son of a merchant. During World War I he volunteered for the German army. Like many of his generation, he became disillusioned with the old social order after Germany's defeat in 1918. Four years of mutual killing on the European battlefields and in the trenches turned many young Germans from nationalism to pacifism. Others sought revenge, which would reverse the results of the Treaty of Versailles and would Germany regain a dominant role in European politics. A distinct group of German nationalists blamed the Jews for the "aborted" revolution of 1918. Most of German Jews tended to support the democratic Weimar Republic, what most of Gentile Germans did not. A minority among the Jews sympathized with communism, while a much smaller minority embraced political Zionism.

In a certain way, Kantorowicz was part of all these contradictory currents. He studied law, mainly in Erlangen, where he submitted in 1924 his doctoral thesis on the legal claim for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, an unorthodox subject for a university thesis at this time. Afterward he worked as a journalist and Paris correspondent for a number of quality newspapers, including the *Vossische Zeitung*. However, he also wrote for *Die Tat*, in the late 1920s the mouthpiece of the so-called "Conservative Revolution". This was a political tendency, which wanted to substitute for the democratic constitution an authoritarian state with a strong executive in order to avoid what was then called "party quarrels" (*Parteiengezänk*). It was the growth of anti-Semitism within this non-Nazi, but outspokenly nationalist current, which impelled Kantorowicz to the extreme left: in 1931, he joined the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). This was, at this time, the strongest communist party outside the Soviet Union and Germany's third largest political force (after the Social Democratic Party – the SPD – and the Nazi Party).

Within the KPD, Kantorowicz worked as a functionary in a local branch of Berlin's South West District, where a number of communist writers and

2 Statement, quoted from: Karola Fings and Cordula Lissner (eds.), *Unter Vorbehalt: Rückkehr aus der Emigration nach 1945* (Cologne: Emos, 1945), p. 164.

3 For biographical sketches of Mayer and Kantorowicz see Mario Kessler, "Sozialisten jüdischer Herkunft zwischen Ost und West," *Argonautenschiff: Jahrbuch der Anna-Seghers-Gesellschaft*, Vol. 6 (1997), pp. 159-78, and the literature cited there.

artists lived in a large housing project. He continued to write for the liberal press, which remarkably tolerated his conversion to communism, but he also wrote for KPD publications, not at least to bring the communist's attention to the dimension of the danger in which German Jews would be should Hitler's bid for power be successful.[4]

As a well-known communist writer, Kantorowicz was among the first who was forced to leave Germany when the Nazi dictatorship was erected. On March 12, 1933 he went to Paris. There he was among those who became most active in anti-Nazi propaganda. He became involved in cultural party activities surrounding Willy Münzenberg, mainly acting as General Secretary of the Association for the Protection of German Writers in Exile (*Schutzverband deutscher Schriftsteller im Exil*). He was founder and director of *Deutsche Freiheitsbibliothek*, a public library of books, which were forbidden in Germany. Kantorowicz also contributed to the famous Brown Book, the *Braunbuch gegen Reichstagsbrand und Hitlerterror*. He wrote the chapter about Nazi anti-Semitism at work, one of the first testimonies about the murderous practice, which preceded the Holocaust.[5]

Besides that, Kantorowicz was co-organizer of the International Writer's Congress held in Paris in 1935. Like other activities, this congress was organized under the auspices of the Communist International. Its aim was to help to form an alliance of communist and non-communist writers and artists in order to combat Nazism and fascist tendencies outside Germany.[6] In many of his articles and essays of this period, Kantorowicz made a clear distinction between the Nazis and the German people. He pointed out that only a minority had voted for Hitler (although this minority was strong). The overwhelming majority of the Germans was, in Kantorowicz's eyes, disillusioned about the Nazis and would, successively, turn its back on Hitler. In the end, the German masses would stand up against the bloody regime.[7]

Like many artists and writers throughout the Western world, Alfred Kantorowicz volunteered for the International Brigades to defend the Spanish Republic against the coup d'état of Franco and his followers. At the end of 1936, he went to Spain. According to his diary, which he later published in East Berlin, he worked at first in the Commissariat of the Eleventh Brigade in Madrid. From January to April 1937 he worked as editor of the newspaper *Volunteer for Liberty* in Valencia. Then he joined the staff of the Thirteenth Brigade, where he was appointed Information Officer of the Brigade's Chapaiev Battalion whose official record he wrote.[8] He wrote that the first time he fired a gun was in June 1937 to put his pet dog, which had been bitten by a snake, out of his misery.[9] However, Kantorowicz stayed with this military unit during the battle of Brunete, where he was severely wounded and hospitalized.

As a witness of the defeat of anti-Fascist forces in Spain, Kantorowicz nevertheless remained unshaken in his belief of the "indestructible consciousness of eventual victory [over fascism]."[10] Like other KPD members during the Spanish Civil War, he did not want to know much about the persecution of anarchists, Trotskyites, and critical communists behind the front lines. He mentioned in his diary that the commissar of the battalion had complained to him "that certain highly ambivalent figures, which claim to be anarchists, are trying to deliberately bring confusion into our ranks in an attempt to undermine morale."[11] In writings, which were published years after his death, Kantorowicz expressed serious doubts about the capacity of leading KPD functionaries to participate in a struggle for a society, which, simultaneously, sought social justice and political freedom. Thus, he saw KPD Politburo member Franz Dahlem (wrongly) as a "primitive Prussian sergeant-major".[12] On another occasion he characterized in his private diary his colleague and comrade, the writer Willy Bredel, as a person whose anticipated prominent role in a post-fascist Germany "will be the bitterest hour of our lives and at the same time the last."[13]

4 See Alfred Kantorowicz, „Liquidierung der Judenfrage," *Klärung: 12 Autoren, Politiker über die Judenfrage* (Berlin: W. Kolk, 1932), pp. 154-68.

5 [Anon.,] „Die Judenverfolgungen in Hitlerdeutschland," *Braunbuch über Reichstagsbrand und Hitlerterror* (Basel: Universum, 1933), pp. 222-69.

6 See Alfred Kantorowicz, *Politik und Literatur im Exil: Deutschsprachige Schriftsteller im Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus* (Hamburg: Christians, 1978), pp. 205-24.

7 See Alfred Kantorowicz, "Stichtag der Barbarei in Nazideutschland" [1943], Idem, *Im zweiten Drittel unseres Jahrhunderts: Illusionen, Irrtümer, Widersprüche, Einsichten, Voraussichten* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1967), p. 38.

8 *Tschapaiew: Das Bataillon der 21 Nationen*, ed. by Alfred Kantorowicz (Madrid: Imprenta Colectiva Torrent, 1938; reprint Rudolstadt: Greifenverlag, 1948).

9 Alfred Kantorowicz, *Spanisches Tagebuch* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1948), p. 348.

10 Ibid., p. 63.

11 Ibid., p. 44.

12 Alfred Kantorowicz, *Nachtbücher: Aufzeichnungen im französischen Exil*, ed. by Ursula Büttner and Angelika Voss (Hamburg: Christians, 1995), p. 238.

13 Ibid., p. 226.

Kantorowicz mentioned only briefly the show trial against Zinoviev and Kamenev, which took place in 1936 in Moscow, referring to it as "the trial here against the terrorists."[14] That might have been an act of protecting himself, since Kantorowicz was on a brief stay in Moscow at this time, where his notes could have been inspected. Two years later, he wrote with great emotion about his close friend Hermann Duncker, whose son had disappeared in the Soviet Union.[15]

Kantorowicz was, as the British historian Josie McLellan rightly mentions, "far from a slavish devotee from the party. But despite his private doubts and complaints, there were many areas where he did accept the party line. It would scarcely have been possible to do his job as a party employee had this not been the case." Like many other communists, Kantorowicz "had more important things on his mind [than to make his doubts about Stalin publicly known], and membership of the party seemed to offer a chance to effective resistance to Nazism."[16]

In April 1938, Kantorowicz was sent back to France from Spain. He worked again at *Deutsche Freiheitsbibliothek*, but in July 1939 he went to southern France. He wanted to publish his diaries from Spain. The political events, however, did not allow him to retreat from active engagement. During the Munich Agreement of September 1938, when Britain and France allowed Hitler to occupy the German-speaking parts of Czechoslovakia, Kantorowicz suppressed all his political doubts. As he told to a West German researcher much later, he saw at this time only little differences between the camp of Fascists and bourgeois-parliamentary democracies. He did not change his mind fundamentally after the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939. This political step, would, as he and so many communists wanted to believe, help the Soviet Union to avoid a military confrontation with Nazi Germany.[17] After a turbulent time, Kantorowicz managed to leave France in March 1941. He was interned in a camp on Martinique, but on June 18 he arrived in New York City. The time of Soviet-American cooperation was yet to come, and Kantorowicz was lucky to find a permanent position as radio commentator at CBS, where his wife Friedel worked as secretary and also as translator. He attained a nation-wide audience when he organized in May 1943 an exhibition about forbidden and burned German books, whose authors had either left Germany or had disappeared in concentration camps and prisons. This exhibition at the New York Public Library made him almost a household name in the United States "at that time.[18] Unlike in France, Kantorowicz lived under good conditions in New York. Among his close personal friends were Ernest Hemingway, Carson McCullers, and Howard Fast. But he decided to go back to Germany as soon as the country was liberated from Nazism.

Facing his return, Kantorowicz had ambivalent feelings. "I am afraid of the future," as he wrote in his diary.[19] But he never questioned his decision to return. He arrived in Bremen in June 1946. "My place is in Germany" was the title of an essay, which he published more than one year after his return to Berlin.[20] Soon after his arrival he said in a German radio program: "Whoever mourns for the lost [former East German] provinces and dreams of revenge is judged. Germany can never find its greatness again in renewed attempts to subjugate other peoples through war, by running amok, but only by struggling through to an inner peace that manifests itself as spiritual strength and a humane order. German rehabilitation in the eyes of the world requires inner rehabilitation and German freedom will be won or lost to the extent that we win back our own freedom."[21]

In the eastern part of the city, Kantorowicz found a position as editor and writer. Supported by the Soviet administration, he founded the journal *Ost und West* and the publishing house with the same name. The main

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14 Ibid., p. 173.

15 Alfred Kantorowicz, *Exil in Frankreich: Merkwürdigkeiten und Denkwürdigkeiten* (Bremen: Schünemann Universitätsverlag, 1971), pp. 178-81.

16 Josie McLellan, "The Politics of Communist Biography: Alfred Kantorowicz and the Spanish Civil War," *German History*, Vol. 22 (2004), No. 4, p. 554. For remarkable differences in the texts of Kantorowicz's *Spanisches Tagebuch*, originally published 1948 in the Soviet sector of Berlin, and the West German edition *Spanisches Kriegstagebuch* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1966) see ibid., pp. 549-50, and Michael Rohrwasser, *Der Stalinismus und die Renegaten: Die Literatur der Exkommunisten* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1991), pp. 113-19.

17 Ursula Büttner, "Alfred Kantorowicz: Sein Beitrag zum geistigen Widerstand,"

Ulrich Walberer (ed.), *10. Mai 1933: Bücherverbrennung in Deutschland und die Folgen* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1983), p. 210, cited herafter as: Büttner, „Kantorowicz".

18 See Kantorowicz, *Politik und Literatur im Exil*, pp. 293-301.

19 Alfred Kantorowicz, Unpublished Diary, July 30, 1954, quoted in Büttner, "Kantorowicz," p. 214.

20 Kantorowicz, "Mein Platz ist in Deutschland," [February 14, 1947], Idem, *Im zweiten Drittel*, pp. 98-101.

21 Kantorowicz, „Vom moralischen Gewinn der Niederlage,"[January 1947], *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

task of the bimonthly journal was, as its editor told to an American journalist, "bridging the gap between East and West."[22] Regarded with suspicion from both sides of the Cold war, *Ost und West* lost its financial support by Soviet or East German authorities, when the currency reform and the Berlin Crisis made cooperation between intellectuals from both sides almost impossible. A year later, in December 1949, the journal ceased to exist.[23]

Kantorowicz was bitterly disappointed about the unexpected end of his journal. East Germany's ruling communists – the German Democratic Republic had just been founded – gave him some comfort. In November 1949, an associate professorship at Humboldt University for modern German literature was offered to him. Five years later, he became full professor. To remain what he was and "to survive in the ivory tower of scholarship" – that was the way what Kantorowicz wanted to live now.[24] Among East Germany's recognized experts of modern German literature he was second only to Hans Mayer, but a strong second. He wrote a great number of books and essays, among which a double biography of Heinrich and Thomas Mann deserves to be mentioned. He also edited Heinrich Mann's collected works.

The Slánsk_ Trial in Prague was a decisive step in Kantorowicz's process of dissociation from East German communism. In November 1952, the world witnessed one of the most startling trials of the 20th century, with Rudolf Slánsk_, former General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Stalin's erstwhile lieutenant, appearing as the principal defendant. The trial showed how much the Soviet secret apparatus had infiltrated, as the historian Francois Fejtö pointed out, "the East European Communist parties and governments, robbing them of their sovereignty, paralyzing their nerve centres, and producing a kind of collective pathological condition, compounded of fear, mistrust, apathy and self-destructiveness from which it was to take the leaders and their people much time and trouble to recover."[25]

22 Alfred Kantorowicz, *Deutsches Tagebuch*, Vol. I (Munich: Kindler, 1959), p. 279.
23 See Barbara Baerns, *Ost und West - eine Zeitschrift zwischen den Fronten: Zur politischen Funktion einer literarischen Zeitschrift in der Besatzungszeit 1945-1949* (Münster: Fahle, 1968).
24 Kantorowicz, *Deutsches Tagebuch*, Vol. I, p. 668.
25 Francois Fejtö, *A History of People's Democracies: Eastern Europe since Stalin* (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1974), p. 14.

The defendants were subjected to all kinds of moral pressure and physical torture in order to convince them that there was no escape from their fate. Eleven of the fourteen defendants were of Jewish origin. The organizers tried to show that there was no coincidence and that these Jewish prisoners were predisposed to become instruments of American espionage and of 'Zionist conspiracy'. The testimonies at the trial provided the material for a new sort of *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, according to which the Jews, an international people with the State of Israel as its main base, were playing a key role in the American conspiracy against the Soviet Union and her allies. All communist newspapers, including East Berlin's *Neues Deutschland*, had to publish the proceedings of the trial.

In his published writings or diaries, Kantorowicz seldom referred to his Jewish origins. Within the communist movement Judaism was mistrusted both as an alternative identity and as a remnant from pre-capitalist ages. From Marx to Lenin, all principal Marxist theorists had regarded Judaism as obsolete. Anti-Semitism, however, had been condemned fiercely, particularly during the Nazi era. It was during Stalin's last years that anti-Semitism became official part of Soviet ideology, although Stalin's successors tried to suppress it again, though often half-heartedly.

One of the German-Jewish communists, who had lost their jobs in the campaign against 'Cosmopolitism' was Kantorowicz's close friend Lex Ende, who died a few months later. Kantorowicz did not want to believe that anti-Semitism could ever become a part of official communist policy. But following the Slánsk_ Trial he wrote in his diary: "That – that is monstrous. That is the language of Streicher, the mentality of Himmler, the atmosphere of Gestapo interrogations and people's Court Trails under Freisler's presidency, the 'morality' of mass murder of Dachau and Buchenwald, the gas executioners of Auschwitz and Majdanek. It is inhuman. Hitler, you were imitated – not only in the West, where your followers in Spain, in Portugal, everywhere in the world where fascist dictatorships exist follow your example, but also in the East."[26]

Half a year later East German workers started their uprising against the regime. This pushed the problem of anti-Semitism in the background. It is indeed ironic that the same Jewish (and non-Jewish) communists, who just six months earlier had feared Soviet repression now came to

26 Alfred Kantorowicz, *Deutsches Tagebuch*, Vol. II (Munich: Kindler, 1961), p. 335.

regard the presence of Soviet troops as a warranty for their – relative – safety. Not everyone was able to push aside so quickly what had happened earlier. Alfred Kantorowicz, who was in the hospital on June 17, recorded in his diary: "Why did we, intellectuals and old socialists, not lead this movement? What did we do, besides resist passively, complain or relocate?"[27] Whether the demonstrating workers would have listened to state-supporting intellectuals is a different matter. Kantorowicz's optimism for socialism with a humane face in East Germany had disappeared.

The suppression of the Hungarian revolt of 1956 prompted his break with Soviet-style communism. In December 1956 his old friend Walter Janka was arrested in East Berlin. "In the last week the rumor went around that I too had been arrested," Kantorowicz recorded in his private writings. "Everyone believed it. Foreign visitors were surprised to find me still at home. The rumor kept up so stubbornly that even my students and assistants became alarmed and rang me up several times a day to make sure I was still here."[28] Kantorowicz wrote that Walter Ulbricht, the head of East German communist party, "loathes all those who had risked their lives under the Nazis or in Spain while he was making his career in Moscow."[29] In August 1957 Kantorowicz refused to sign a resolution of East Germany's writer's association, which condemned Hungarian and East German intellectuals who had sympathized with the Imre Nagy government in Budapest. He expected to be arrested within the next few days. In order to avoid this he fled to West Berlin.

## Hans Mayer: Marxism without Communism

Hans Mayer was Germany's most productive literary critic of the 20th century. He wrote books on the history of German literature from the times of Goethe to the present, on music (biographies of Wagner and Brahms) and on modern German thinkers, such as on Marx and Heine. He was the biographer of Georg Büchner, Thomas Mann, and Gerhart Hauptmann. In his later years he reflected much on the Jewish heritage to German culture and about the failed German-Jewish symbiosis.

Like Kantorowicz, Mayer at first studied law. In 1930 he graduated with a doctorate from the University of Cologne, his native town. The young Mayer was deeply influenced by the writings of Ernst Bloch, Kurt Tucholsky, and Georg Lukács. For a brief period he worked with a group of communist students at Cologne University.[30] A committed socialist and Marxist since his student years, Mayer nevertheless decided not to join any of the major organizations of the German left, neither the Communist nor the Social Democratic Party. Instead, he was active in small left-wing groups, which, according to Mayer, developed a more clear-sighted analysis of emerging fascism than Communist and Social Democrats did in their internecine warfare. Thus, in 1929 he edited a biweekly, *Der Rote Kämpfer*, which was originally founded by radical Marxists within the SPD. Soon, the paper started to criticize the SPD leadership consistently. Like other members around the *Rote Kämpfer* circle, Mayer became, in 1931, a founding member of the small Socialist Worker's Party (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei* or SAP). A year later, he joined the KPD-Opposition (KPDO), the anti-Stalinist alternative to the official communist party.

In 1933 Mayer was forced to go into exile. At first, he published in Strasbourg the newspaper *Neue Welt*, the KPDO daily, than he went to Geneva, where he had obtained a fellowship at the prestigious University Institute of the League of Nations. Simultaneously he worked as research associate for Max Horkheimer's exiled Institute of Social Research.

The beginning of World War II enforced Mayer to a labor camp designated by Swiss government to "concentrate" German anti-Nazi refugees. There he remained until the end of 1944. At the end of the war he came in close contact with KPD members, such as the writer Stephan Hermlin and the politician Michael Tschesno-Hell. They convinced him to cooperate with the KPD. Mayer never became a card-carrying party member. Nevertheless, he articulated the communist standpoint when he was active in public life in West Germany after 1945. He worked as radio commentator for the new democratic broadcast system, taught as the Worker's Academy in Frankfurt-on-Main (the trade union school) and was simultaneously the regional chairman of *Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Nazi-Regimes*, a procommunist organization for the protection of those who had been persecuted under Nazism. But his main goal was to become a university teacher in the sociology of literature.

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27 Ibid., p. 376.
28 Ibid., p. 694.

29 Ibid., p. 693.
30 See Mayer's autobiography *Ein Deutscher auf Widerruf*, 2 Vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982 and 1984), Vol. I, p. 98.

In the West, Mayer saw no prospects for the university career he sought, because, he wrote, "the joint decision of the Americans and their German confidants for a restored, conservative German reconstruction [...] would also have led to difficult conflicts for me in academia."[31] He was fortunate to get support from his new East German friends, such as the specialist in Roman languages and literatures, Werner Krauss, who helped him to get a chair in the history of literature at the University of Leipzig. The professorship in Leipzig that Mayer accepted for the winter semester 1948-49 allowed him, as he later emphasized in the West, "to dedicate myself to what I really wanted to do: teach and write. At that time I acquired all the material I later needed for scientific and literary work: material from experience and from research. In Leipzig I finally awakened to myself. [...] I wasn't chased out of Leipzig and the university. I left when I could no longer continue."[32]

In the late 1940s and during the 1950s the University of Leipzig was a place of first-rate research and teaching. It attracted a great number of refugee scholars and of those whose promising careers had been brutally interrupted by the Nazis. All of them considered themselves as Marxists, but no one was able to teach and to write within the narrow confinements of Soviet-style understanding of science and scholarship. They could not directly challenge the power-holders, but they taught in a style, which avoided mentioning those doctrinaire ideologues, such as Andrej Zhdanov, who were considered as pillars of Stalinism. For their direct contacts with party officials, but not for their teaching and writing, these scholars had to learn to use a kind of 'slave language' (Sklavensprache). "I had to learn it'" Mayer wrote, "and to practice it for fifteen years. When I met Bertolt Brecht in Berlin at the end of 1948, it became clear to me thanks to the example of my great colleague, who had to testify before the House Committee for un-American Activities, that a slave language, which had to be ambiguous and can also include the opposite of the testimony, remains applicable in the most different forms of society – not only in a slave society."[33]

The SED, the ruling communist party of Germany, looked with suspicion to what went on in the university's lecture halls. Some of Mayer's closest friends, all internationally well-known scholars, were punished and disciplined by the party apparatus and faced problems in teaching and writing. Among them were the philosopher Ernst Bloch, who eventually left East Germany for the West, the historian Walter Markov and the economist Fritz Behrens. Mayer himself was attacked by local party authorities for his open-mindedness to modern Western literature, which he placed far ahead of contemporary writings of most of East German authors despite (or because of) their orientation towards official doctrine of "Socialist Realism".[34]

Under the influence of Ernst Bloch, who became a father figure for him, Mayer sought the anticipatory illumination (Vor-Schein) of the past to guide his work in the future. He endeavored, as Jack Zipes writes, "to establish categories in his literary criticism that would expose the traditions of bourgeois art and at the same time make this art relevant to the present."[35] This utopian commitment to German culture stood obviously in the tradition of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Franz Mehring, whose selected writings Mayer had edited right after the end of World War II.[36] It was, however, constantly criticized by the defenders of the status quo in East Germany, what included all conservative party functionaries who had been deeply confused after Nikita Khrushtshev's revelations of Stalin's crimes on the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956. One of Mayer's harshest critics was Paul Fröhlich, who led the party district organization of Leipzig.[37] Mayer was under constant surveillance of the Staatssicherheitsdienst or Stasi, East Germany's secret police. One of the Stasi reports mentioned that "a Jew" had to be found in order to deliver information about Hans Mayer and Ernst Bloch. However, the Stasi officers were unable to find an eligible person.[38]

31 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 386.
32 Ibid., Vol. II, p. 9.
33 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 415-16.

34 See Hans Mayer, "Zur Gegenwartslage unserer Literatur," Sonntag, December 2, 1956, reprinted in: Inge Jens (ed.), Über Hans Mayer (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 65-74.
35 Jack Zipes, "The Critical Embracement of Germany: Hans Mayer and Marcel Reich-Ranicki," Leslie Morris and Jack Zipes (eds.), Unlikely History: The Changing German-Jewish Symbiosis, 1945-2000 (New York and Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 188.
36 Franz Mehring, Die Lessing-Legende, ed. by Hans Mayer (Basel: Mundus, 1946).
37 See Alfred Klein, Unästhetische Feldzuege: Der siebenjährige Krieg gegen Hans Mayer, 1956-1963 (Leipzig: Faber & Faber, 1997), and Manfred Neuhaus et. al. (eds.), Hans Mayers Leipziger Jahre (Leipzig: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Sachsen, 1997).
38 See the detailed analysis by Guntolf Herzberg, "Ernst Bloch in Leipzig: Der operative Vorgang 'Wild'," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, Vol. 42 (1994), No. 8, especially p. 692.

During the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 Mayer, like his (and Kantorowicz's) friend Ernst Bloch, was in the West. Unlike Bloch, he decided to return to East Germany. Although he demonstrated his commitment with his colleagues, he nevertheless remained an uncertain figure. He again articulated his disengagement with party activities to depict modern Western writers, such as Kafka and Joyce, considered decadent and not publishable in the GDR. In spring 1963, after the publication of a collection of essays, Mayer came under attack again.[39] A student, who was supported by the local party leadership, wrote in Leipzig's university newspaper an article entitled "*Eine Lehrmeinung zuviel*" (A Superfluous Doctrine). Mayer was not allowed to respond. This led him to break with the GDR. He had come to realize that his literary commitment to a critical Marxism was incompatible with the official doctrine of "Socialist Realism".

In August 1963, Mayer, while in West Germany, decided not to return. "I was not persecuted and endangered; I have never claimed that," he emphasized in his memoirs. "But from then on, because the pact had been broken, I could no longer protect my students."[40] Twenty years later, he emphasized that he would not have gone to the West if the university have had the courage to defend him against neo-Stalinist accusation from the party apparatus. But his academic colleagues, with very few exceptions, refused to speak to him. There was almost no courage of conviction. "This disappointed me bitterly," he wrote in his memoirs. "A bitter feeling returns to my tongue, even today still as I write. Ever since I had gone to the 'Russians' in October 1948 to work as a professor and to help with the founding of a changed social science and literary criticism, I had understood my work as a pact. I wanted to remain the person who and what I was and only agree with arguments that convinced me and wanted to have nothing to do with public applause that I secretly disapproved of."[41]

## Kantorowicz, Mayer, and the Legacy of the German Democratic Republic

In 1957, Alfred Kantorowicz had just left East Germany to remain the person who he was. In West Germany, he formulated the principles of his work in the following words: "This is not to speak in favor of the whole range of sterile, unconditional anti-communism that in its customary extreme form is another variant of totalitarianism that is not the antithesis, but rather a parallel version of the Stalinist variant of communism."[42]

Kantorowicz underscored elsewhere: "*The struggle against tyranny is indivisible.* Whoever protested the massacres in Hungary must also protest the massacres in Angola; whoever is indignant about intellectual suppression in the East Bloc states, must not remain silent or gloss over the fact that in Franco Spain ownership of a Luther Bible is a punishable offense; whoever is correctly dismayed by brainwashing, cannot be an advocate of the McCartyite inquisition methods that were only an episode in America but found fertile ground among those in the Federal Republic [of Germany] who do not wish to master the past but rather would all too gladly revive it."[43]

Kantorowicz hoped that a Western university would offer him a new professorship. West Germany's *Germanistik*, however, rejected the unconventional outsider right from the beginning. The formal argument was Kantorowicz's age and the lack of a *Habilitation* Thesis (a required admission to teach at West German universities). He even did not get the so-called *Wiedergutmachungszahlung* (restitution money), since he had, according to a legal decision, supported a dictatorial regime through his active work in the communist party. Only very late in his life Kantorowicz got a small financial compensation from the government which allowed him to retire from freelance writing.[44]

Mayer's West German career was more successful. Two years after his arrival he was appointed to professorship at Hanover Technical College. The school had no full university status at this time, but this position secured Mayer's professional and financial future. He continued to read literature as inseparable from history and social dynamics. Mayer's

39 Hans Mayer's book *Ansichten: Zur Literatur der Zeit* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1962) was legally published in the West.

40 Mayer, *Ein Deutscher auf Widerruf*, Vol. II, p. 256.

41 Ibid.

42 Alfred Kantorowicz, *Der geistige Widerstand in der DDR* (Troisdorf: Kammwegverlag, 1968), p. 3.

43 Kantorowicz, *Deutsches Tagebuch*, Vol. II, p. 712 (emphasis in the original).

44 See Alfred Kantorowicz, *Etwas ist ausgeblieben*, p. 206; Ralph Giordano, "Gibt es keinen Gewinn?," Heinz Joachim Heydorn (ed.), *Wache im Niemandsland: Zum 70. Geburtstag von Alfred Kantorowicz* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1969), p. 41; Hermann Kuhn, *Bruch mit dem Kommunismus: Über autobiographische Schriften von Ex-Kommunisten im geteilten Deutschland* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1990), p. 73.

academic activities were part of the school's rising reputation in West Germany's academic life. In the end, the Technical College was given university status and Mayer retired in 1973 as a University Professor Emeritus.

After his retirement, Mayer continued to work on his central subject on twofold outsiders. As a Jewish refugee, a homosexual (as he commented on later in his life), and an anti-Stalinist Marxist Mayer represented both the type of "existential" and "intentional" outsider, i.e. a person who was marginalized both by origin and by conviction.[45] In a number of writings he pointed out that the period of bourgeois enlightenment in Germany failed to bring about authentic equal rights for outsiders, be they women, Jews or homosexuals. The German labor movement, whose heritage Mayer insisted to preserve, also often neglected the needs of outsiders who sought for intellectual independence within the left.

Both thinkers, Kantorowicz as well as Mayer, addressed their writings to readers in both parts of Germany. After their escape from East Germany, they became non-persons there, although some of their former students tried to keep in touch with them. It was not before the late 1970s that Mayer and Kantorowicz were mentioned in East German scholarly works, such as the multi-volume history of German refugee culture after 1933.[46] In 1986, Hans Mayer was invited to East Germany and lectured at the Academy of Arts in Berlin. While Kantorowicz did not live not long enough to witness the events of 1989-90, Mayer commented on the dramatic events at length.

Kantorowicz, while still living in East Berlin, saw how attractive the so-called West German economic miracle could be for Easterners. It was in 1955 that he anticipated a final collapse of the German Democratic Republic and a quick unification with the Federal Republic of West Germany. "If the unexpected happened," he wrote in his diary, "what would we [in the East] hope for, fear, win, loose? As far as intellectual life is con-

cerned, one inhuman bureaucracy here would be replaced through another, more courteous in form but in content hardly less threatening; instead of a party sergeant we would have to deal with another species of sergeant contemptuous of literature and the arts. Political careerists from over there would overlap with those from here or make a pact with them (exactly this is to be feared)."[47]

He repeated in 1963, while already living on the other side of the Wall: "Whoever wants to make political capital out of the struggles and sorrows of our [East German] compatriots is despicable.[...] The danger of intellectual alienation is thereby accentuated [...], because of the innumerable Sunday sermons [in West Germany] about Germany's unity and because of narrow, established, propaganda clichés, the average citizen of the Federal Republic has become somewhat lethargic, rather than addressing the more delicate, intangible but ultimately more important moral decisions and imponderable undercurrents. [In the West] it is not considered productive to find what real values have been preserved [in the East] and what continues in the humanistic tradition [there] – certainly even its socialist component – what has survived and holds future promise." Under the condition of dictatorship, the GDR would experience "flight into inwardness, intensification of thought, an imaginative wealth of self-assertion, the art of expressing oneself in Aesopian language, the development of self-censorship of conscience and self-expression," in the face of the West's demand for "humility and trust. [...] Above all, there should be no prejudices and no blanket judgments."[48]

In his book *Der Turm von Babel* (The Babel Tower), published in 1991, Hans Mayer insisted that the GDR would remain a "German wound" for a long time.[49] He saw the rush to German unity as the worst possible form of unification, a more cautious and less rapid way would have been a much better alternative. In a 1993 interview with *Der Spiegel*, Mayer noticed with sorrow the dismantling of industrial and intellectual infrastructure of the former GDR and the large-scale dismissal of intellectuals from East German universities. He pointed out: "There is here [in the East] a huge deposit of hate and disappointment. After all these are millions of

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45 See Hans Mayer, *Außenseiter* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975). American edition: *Outsiders: A Study in Life and Letters*, transl. by Denis M. Sweet (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1982).

46 Werner Mittenzwei et. al., *Kunst und Literatur im antifaschistischen Exil 1933-1945*, 7 Vols. (Leipzig: Reclam, 1979-81), especially Vol. 3: Eike Middell, *Exil in den USA* (1979), pp. 91, 114, 14, 155, and *passim*, Vol. 6: Silvia Schlenstedt et al., *Exil in den Niederlanden und in Spanien* (1981), pp. 121, 263, 270, 283 and *passim*, and Vol. 7: Dieter Schiller et al., *Exil in Frankreich* (1983), pp. 76, 138, 156, 194, and *passim*.

47 Kantorowicz, *Deutsches Tagebuch*, Vol. II, p. 560.

48 Kantorowicz, *Etwas ist ausgeblieben*, p. 115-16.

49 See Hans Mayer, *Der Turm von Babel: Erinnerung an eine Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991).

decent, industrious people, to whom the profiteers of the Trusteeship (*Treuhand*) now say; you have to be written off; everything must first get the right spit and polish. And if the workers get the feeling that they are being cheated because of deplorable party politics, a lot can still happen." Mayer feared, "if the impoverishment of the petit bourgeoisie continues, then we will soon have no reason to be glad about the disappearance of the GDR."[50]

It is important, as Mayer repeatedly stressed, to treat people in the East, who had toppled a dictatorship, not as losers but as equals. Above all, their life achievements should be acknowledged, which were often won under difficult circumstances. Mayer also wanted "all people of the GDR, who honestly believed in a new social order of human dignity and equal opportunity and who now think they misled their lives to be told: It is not so, and: That's what we also want."[51] With this rebellious stance, Mayer remained, like Kantorowicz, true to himself and his convictions.

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50 "Ich bin unbelehrbar: Der Literaturhistoriker Hans Mayer über die verpaßten Chancen der DDR und die Zukunft des Marxismus," *Der Spiegel*, Vol. 47 (1993), No. 28. p. 169.
51 "Wer hier verliert, das ist noch gar nicht ausgemacht: Im Gespräch mit dem Literaturwissenschaftler Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Hans Mayer," *Neues Deutschland*, June 24-25, 1995.