


# The

# Clarion

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# The Clarion

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## Message From the Editor

We live in truly confusing times. On the one hand, we are living through an era of increasing political and economic centralization -- the European Union, NAFTA, and GATT. On the other hand, however, we are witnessing almost unprecedented xenophobia and appeals to nationalism -- Zhirinovskiy in Russia and Pat Buchanan in the U.S. How have these contradictory phenomena emerged at the same time? We need not look far to find the answer.

As a result of the technological breakthroughs of the past few years, we are truly pioneers in what promises to be a new age. The catch phrase of this newly emerging era is "globalization." With the possibility of instantaneous communication, economic, political, and social boundaries will soon be obsolete. We are supposed to be excited about such prospects. After all, true equality can finally emerge. Yet there is a growing voice inside many of us, that is not that keen on globalization. How can we maintain our national, religious, and ethnic identity if the bonds that separate one group from another are disappearing? It is this feeling of nationalism that grows along with globalization.

Thomas L. Friedman gave this conflict a name. He termed it "NAFTA versus Neighborhood" and refers to it as the conflict of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The North American Free Trade Agreement, an example of new-found globalization is contrasted with a nationalism inherent in all people. In order to deal with such a phenomenon, today's students of political science need a thorough grounding in both international and national issues. For this reason, this volume of the *Clarion* includes articles on world as well as American political concerns. In the pages ahead one can read about NATO expansion and Chinese population control, as well as the powers of the U.S. presidency and welfare.

It is my hope that through this volume of the *Clarion*, the reader's knowledge of the world and American politics will grow. As students of political science and citizens of the U.S. and the world, we will emerge better equipped at dealing with the premiere conflict of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Leebie Mallin  
*Editor-in-Chief*

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# Globalization and the Political Imperative

*Dr. Ruth Bevan*

What is globalization? Immediate thoughts probably turn to transnational economic relations and information exchanges. Firms in northern tier states globalize by pushing their production processes into southern tier states overflowing with cheap labor. Cities globalize through transnational economic linkages (e.g., Cascadia). Information quickens the global competitive edge. This powerful economic-information combination has truly shrunk the world into what Marshall McLuhan called the "global village."

So powerful is this combination, so visible in its effects, that economics is often regarded as the driving force of politics. Economics assumedly sets the direction and pace of the political. Economics is the independent variable; politics is the dependent variable. Ample "proof" can be brought to bear on this proposition. Pragmatic Deng Ziaoping opened up China to market socialism in spite of his "communist" ideology. The lure of capitalist consumerism triggered the falling guillotine on East European state socialism. And so on.

Irony pervades this perspective. If we believe George Bush, we won the Cold War over Marxist "communism." Western democrats during the Cold War scoffed at Marxism as the dehumanizing worship of autonomous technological economic forces. Yet, now, after the Cold War, we talk about the motive force of economics in a globalized world. The "market" has become the metaphor for freedom, for everything good and sublime. Seemingly, the strength of the market more than the strength of political democracy saved the day for us.

The irony continues. No communist revolutionary ever followed Marx's economic theory.

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He could not for a very simple Marxist reason. Every single state, extinct and extant, revolutionized in the name of Marxist communism was a pre-capitalist state. Not one state met the economic conditions for a socialist revolution, as specified by Marx. Indeed, at the end of his life, Marx predicted that imperial China was ripe for revolution. What kind of revolution? The capitalist revolution, wrote Marx. He envisioned the Great Wall bedecked with graffiti proclaiming, *liberte', egalite', fraternite'* in the spirit of the French Revolution. When *narodniki* (populists) wrote Engels, after Marx's death, that they wanted to instigate the socialist revolution in tsarist Russia, they were sorely rebuked. "Impossible," retorted Engels. "The only revolution feasible in Russia is the capitalist revolution."

Lenin and Trotsky, "orthodox Marxists," were acutely aware of the "heresy" of waging a socialist revolution in feudal Russia. Human nature, however, got in the way of their judgment. Why wage a capitalist revolution when capitalism was, according to Marx's scheme, ultimately doomed? Why not strive for the apocalyptic stage of communism? Trotsky suggested "telescoping" the two revolutions, a suggestion briefly followed in the New Economic Policy (NEP period) of the early 1920's. Lenin, Trotsky and all other "communist" leaders were guilty of the very "voluntarism" that Lenin ostensibly forbade; they used political means to accomplish economic ends. Centralized political boards, for example, "substituted" for the market in terms of pricing, production and distribution. Party leaders engineered economic modernization. None of these "communist" states were, in fact, Marxist.

Not being Marxist, the Soviet system did not prove that social property a la Marx does not work. As the Polish-born economist Bartlomiej Kaminiski writes, "the roots of the collapse of state socialism are neither economic nor political—they are institutional and systemic. They stem from the destruction of both politics and economics." (*The Collapse of State Socialism: The Case of Poland*. Princeton UP. 1991.p.4.). "Total planning," based upon a "formula," required a gargantuan, monolithic bureaucracy for its implementation. This bureaucracy substituted its own decisions for the free informational feedback mechanisms which are the lifeline of politics (e.g., elections and lobbying) and of the market (e.g. pricing mechanisms). In blocking and manipulating information, bureaucratic state socialists lacked the means of "rational calculation" and

engineered their own downfall.

With the collapse of state socialism, the market system became the automatic "winner" in this zero-sum game. The "third wave of democratization," beginning with the fall of Salazar's Portugal in 1974 but getting its power form the 1989 East European revolutions, opened up new markets and investment possibilities. Businessmen rushed to take advantage of golden opportunities. Paralleling these events was the economic explosion of the East Asian "tigers," notably South Korea, which followed Japan's lead in "flying goose formation." The post-1989 world appeared to be a market paradise. Market strategies commanded the day. If the market "took off," everything else, like democratization, would follow. Not to be forgotten, the Gulf war, a "turning-of-the-corner" event, showed the world the might of "market America."

All this economic glitz left politics in the background like a second-class citizen. Setting up elections doesn't have the same glamour as setting up stock exchanges. Anyway, getting the economic ball rolling is necessary if the political ball is to roll. Were it that simple! Now that the effervescence of 1989 has lost its zing and the hard work has begun, a more sober assessment emerges. Firstly, the post-revolutionary states of Eastern Europe illustrate the importance of political stability and direction to economic development. Politics is not simply the aftermath. In states like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (and certainly former East Germany) where a political support system exists, economic development has begun. It is anticipated that the state will have to nurture this development for at least another decade. Since "early capitalism" in this transition phase crates significant social dislocations (e.g., unemployment and inequalities of wealth, as described by Kuznets), it places additional stress upon these fragile political institutions. Conversely, in states like Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, where the political structure is weak, even chaotic, economic deterioration is taking place.

Furthermore, Robert Putnam has shown, on the basis of ten years of empirical research in Italy, that "social capital," all those values like trust and cooperation that comprise the "civic culture," relates to economic development. Contracts, investment commitments and the like all require social capital. In southern Italy, where social capital lags far behind that of the north, economic development falters. Putnam writes: For political stability, for government effectiveness, and even for economic

progress social capital may be even more important than physical or human capital. Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before the advent of Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, the Hobbesian outcome of the Mezzogiorno (Italy south of Rome)—amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation—seems likelier than successful democratization and economic development. Palermo may represent the future of Moscow. (Making Democracy Work. Princeton UP. 1993. P.183)

“Getting the political act together” is complex but critical. Decades of experience in post-colonial Africa, for example, demonstrated the consequences of failing to do so. Economically, sub-Sahara Africa (with the exception of South Africa), considered the international underclass or “fourth world,” has virtually “dropped off the map.” Jeffrey Goldberg in his article, “Their Africa and Ours” (New York Times Magazine, March 2, 1997) even relates political instability to Africa’s increasing rate and variety of disease. Arguing that Africa-originated disease is “exported” abroad, Goldberg urges the United States to make Africa a top foreign policy concern.

We should have learned an important lesson from the Soviet experiment. The conclusion to be drawn from that experiment was not that socialist economics failed (in fact, it was never tried). The West was never threatened by the Soviet economic base. (Evidence demonstrates that the Western market kept the Soviet afloat.) Threatening, rather, was the Soviet war machine. Political “will” created this machine by distorting the economic system. Since guns and butter were not simultaneously possible, guns took precedence. From a Hobbesian point of view, this Soviet choice might be considered rational within the bellicose international state of nature. Had Gorbachev come along earlier, perhaps when the Chinese started their *perestroika* with Deng in 1978, the Soviet story could have conceivably evolved differently. At any rate, the Soviets demonstrated that political will should not be underestimated. (The failure to date of President Clinton to entreat China into honoring human rights by trade offers exemplifies Chinese political will.)

Furthermore, the “soft authoritarian” states of East Asia should show us that the “market” can function under less than democratic conditions, as

defined by Western standards. Political “preventive intervention” protects and stimulates the national economy. Social capital, to which Confucianism greatly contributes (and which China begins to recultivate after watching the Asian “tigers”), welds together an obedient work force. In East Asia, economic goals are defined by “reason of state.” States like Japan have, presently, no reason of state for military preparedness in view of American protection. We are not sure about China.

The point to be made here is the importance of political will. In *The Third Wave*, Samuel P. Huntington writes, apropos, that “the emergence of social, economic, and cultural conditions favorable to democracy is never enough to produce democracy. Whatever their motives, some political leaders have to want it to happen or be willing to take steps, such as partial liberalization, that may lead to it happening. In the third wave, the conditions for creating democracy had to exist, but only political leaders willing to take the risk of democracy made it happen.” (University of Oklahoma Press. 1991.p.108) Leaders can also will against the democratic alternative which, as Huntington stresses, is not necessarily the more attractive choice for states emerging from authoritarianism.

The lesson, it would seem, is that we should pay much more attention to cultivating the values and leadership skills of political democracy. Preparing the economic conditions is important but not enough. Democracy is about “the citizen” and not simply “the consumer.” If citizenship is not valued as an end in and of itself, it may be thrown overboard in times of economic crisis. Within the post-communist states there is hard democratic work to be done. Policemen have to be taught to be “democratic” officers of the law. Judges must adjudicate, not merely implement orders. Teachers must be retrained to think, not merely to parrot. Citizens must learn the difference between the democratic vote and the communist plebiscite. All of this perhaps appears mundane. Training in civic values is, however, critical to minimizing the possible “reverse wave” of this latest democratization surge. Poignantly, the 1989 East European revolutions marked the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the French Revolution. As Bruce Ackerman writes in *The Future of Liberal Revolution*, “both in the East and in the West, the Europeans’ success or failure to capitalize on the revolutionary potentialities opened up in 1989 will shape the destiny of the entire planet for a very long time to come.” (Yale UP. 1992. P.115)

We are all being swept up in revolution. The "third wave" revolution is being played out within the wider global communications revolution. The revolution in information technologies will effect structural changes in democratic systems as well as in the market system. As yet, we don't know the exact nature or extent of those changes. We can, however, learn another lesson from the collapse of state socialism. There is a bureaucratic optimum beyond which politics ceases to function. Highly centralized structures are information-resistant. Predicated upon the "routine" as opposed to the "changing," they are functionally not equipped to process and respond to new information, functions crucial to effective policy-making. James Madison well understood that the "man on the spot" possesses superior information about "on the spot" problems to the person remote from that spot. This realization formed the basic argument in support of federalism. The need for quick structural decentralization in businesses as well as in government. More localized control appears to be a future necessity.

Two problems flow from the need for localized control. The first problematic concerns the nation-state. Has it fulfilled its historical purpose? Contradictory world trends complicate an answer to this question. Within the arena of globalized economics, the desirability of localized decision-making (as, for example, in transnational urban partnerships) conflicts with national policy planning. Japan's Kenichi Ohmae forecasts a "borderless world" of "natural" business communities. It would be historically presumptuous to assume that the nation-state is the apex of political development. It would be equally presumptuous, however, to assume that trade regions *ipso facto* form viable governing units. If a borderless world does materialize, it may be "stateless," but it will not be without some political framework.

Presently, we can not conceive of such a world, and many do not even want to conceive of it. Politics is, after all, about identity. The state remains the framework in which cultural and political values are cultivated. Ohmae and the GATT notwithstanding, Japanese state protected economics is about protecting Japanese national identity. Within the European Union, originally a "common market," right wing extremism is, in part, a response to feelings of national identity being lost in the larger amalgam. The Union has, for all intents and purposes, recently turned down Turkey for membership. It cites as its reasons Turkey's negative human rights record

and its non-European culture. Some political scientists anticipate cultural politics as the motive force of the coming decades. It seems safe to say that the demands of globalized economics and cultural (i.e., national) politics pose conflict possibilities. Anti-globalization forces are already taking shape; they want localized control to mean national control. American - Mexican relations within NAFTA, especially as they affect the anti-drug war, is a case in point. President Clinton has now elevated economic talks with East Asians to state summit meetings in order to assert the "political principle" globalization. What that principle is remains to be seen. Aside from open door trade, what do we want to accomplish?

The second problematic flowing from localized control concerns the quality of domestic democratic life. If the lesson we learned from the collapse of state socialism is that the market is "sovereign" then we have absolutely learned the wrong lesson. If left to its own devices, the market produces wide discrepancy between the few rich and the many poor; in such a situation, "talk of a free market," says Bruce Ackerman, "degenerates into an ideological apologia for the rich and powerful." (p.10) Such an apologia is not acceptable to the democratic majority, and it becomes, therefore, politically dangerous, as well as being morally reprehensible.

How do we give substance to "equal citizenship?" "How can we impart greater quality to life?" These will be the burning political issues. Their solutions will incorporate economic as well as political decisions. Since the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, when proactive government replaced laissez-fairism, Americans have been swept up into a "revolution of rising political expectations." We demand more from government. Few, if any, of us want to return to an age when government was not responsible for building roads, providing public hospitals, collecting garbage, providing unemployment insurance, entitlements and the myriad services it does. As demonstrated by the civil rights movement, local control (the American individual states) can perpetuate inequalities. National policy nationally administered is a better guarantee of the standardization of rights. This presents a conundrum: proactive national government is bureaucratic government. Overly centralized structures are remote. Yet national government can set national standards. Postmaterialist "quality of life" issues like environmental control, consumer protection, health insurance and education are serious policy

agenda items that will, perhaps, "reinvent" government in America. They will also cause us to scrutinize the market and its social responsibilities.

The political question looms before us in this globalized age. Its solution will come, if not by intent, then by default. It will not be decided by market forces alone. If the twentieth century has taught us anything, it should be the power of political will reinforced by modern technology. If the post-communist world presents a window of democratic opportunity, that window must be opened through democratic initiative. The present generation could leave its mark on history by seizing that initiative.

## Market Socialism: The Answer to America's Decline

*Leebie Mallin*

Currently Americans are disenchanted with government. They feel that they have little say in how they are governed and they do not trust government. Americans object to the existence of career politicians and to the fact that campaign contributors have a disproportionate amount of political power ( Philips, 71). These however, are only symptoms of a larger problem; the fear that the American people are losing control over their lives and that America's moral fabric is eroding. This fear stems from problems with America's status as a procedural democracy and as a civic republic. Though seemingly radical, Robert Dahl's vision of market socialism is an antidote to both aspects of America's problems. It will lead to redistribution of both economic and political power, thus aiding procedural democracy. At the same time, market socialism will create self-governing citizens to perpetuate civic republicanism. This can be done despite the various criticisms of market socialism.

The word socialism has a very negative connotation in the United States. It evokes thoughts of government impeding upon the liberty of the individual and of despotism comparable to Soviet Communism. Americans feel this way since capitalism is socialized in the minds of Americans as being the "effective and egotistic ideal" ( Davis, 579 ). The spirit of American individualism and self help also runs contrary to any form of socialism, no matter how moderate. For these reasons there will definitely be a great deal of skepticism toward attempts to introduce socialism into the United States. Americans will however, surely overcome their aversions once it is realized that Dahl's vision of market socialism is a viable alternative to corporate capitalism.

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It offers a solution to both the procedural and civic problems that American democracy is facing.

Market socialism is an economic system in which the means of production are publicly owned, but privately controlled. Under Dahl's version of such a system, "self-governing enterprises" will replace corporations. If the workers own and control the corporation, they can curb the economic inequalities that lead to a lack of participation in government. At the same time, by owning and running the corporation, workers will gain the skills needed for self-government.

A procedural democracy is an aspect of the 18th and 19th century political philosophy of liberalism. It emphasizes procedure instead of values and maintains that government should be neutral in regard to the moral and religious views of its citizens (Sandel, 4). This system works best when citizens convey their concerns and preferences to government officials. This is clearly not the political reality of the United States. Since 1960 there has been a steady decline in voter turnout. Between 1960 and 1988 voter turnout fell by almost 13 percentage points. Only one half of the American electorate voted in the 1988 presidential election and only one third voted in the 1990 midterm election. Fewer citizens contributed time or money to a political campaign, attended a political meeting, or tried to influence the votes of others (Hansen and Rosenstone, 1). Additionally, public trust in government has eroded over the years. In 1958, 76 percent of the American public said they "trusted the government in Washington to do what is right," while in 1980 only 20 percent of Americans felt this way (Hansen and Rosenstone, 148). The evident lack of participation in government is but one indication of America's failure to achieve a true procedural democracy.

It is maintained that in order for citizens to be truly free and for a procedural democracy to be successful, a basic amount of equality among citizens must exist. The financial realities of the 1990s do not meet this requirement. Ninety-eight percent of American companies in the United States compose only about 25 percent of the business in the United States, while the remaining two percent of business accounts for nearly 75 percent. The top 500 industrial corporations represent only one-tenth of one percent of the elite two percent. Never the less, these corporations control over two-thirds of the business resources, employ two-thirds of the industrial workers, account for 60 percent of the sales and gross 70 percent of the

profits (Schwartz, 3). The top ten percent of American households own 98 percent of the tax exempt state and local bonds, 94 percent of business assets, and 95 percent of the value of all trusts. The richest one percent own 60 percent of all corporate stock and fill 60 percent of all business assets; while 90 percent of American families have few or no net assets (Parenti, 7).

There is a connection between income and political participation. According to a survey conducted by Sydney Verba, voter turnout is a great deal higher among the wealthy than among the poor. Those with the lowest family incomes are the least represented among those that play an active role in political campaigns. The poor are only one fourth as likely as the wealthy to participate in campaign work and only one tenth as likely to contribute money to a campaign. Participation by means of communicating with government officials, joining in community activities, and serving in local governing boards is also greatly dependent upon income (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 74). As a result of such figures, Dahl maintains that the best way to bring about economic equality is through the introduction of political equality. He therefore concludes that the democratic process should be instituted into the economy.

According to Dahl the democratic process requires the following elements: The people in an association must make at least some collective decisions. These decisions must consist of agenda setting and final decision making. Only members of the association (those subject to the decisions) should make the decisions. The "good" of each member is entitled to equal consideration. Each member of the association is the ultimate judge of what is in his or her best interest. Every member is qualified to determine which decisions should be made by the members and which should be delegated to authority figures. Finally, resources should be fairly allocated (Dahl, 57). Market socialism meets these conditions and is therefore Dahl's prescription for economic equality.

Many of America's inequalities are caused by a highly concentrated ownership of property and very large payments to top corporate executives. Under market socialism, the workers, or their elected representatives, will set wages and decide how the company's profit should be used. They will also determine how much is to be set aside for reinvestment and how much should be distributed to the workers. It is quite likely that self-governing enterprises will set salaries of managers and workers in their firms lower



than the ten to one or 20 to one ratios that are currently present in American firms. The workers will also most probably limit the perquisites of top executives, like bonuses, stock options, retirement benefits, salary guarantees, and golden parachutes. Above all else though, inequalities in income and wealth will be reduced because the surplus of a self-governing firm will be shared among all of its members. By dispersing income from ownership to employees, a system of self-governing enterprises will go a long way in helping America attain distributive justice (Dahl, 105).

Market socialism can also further equality by increasing the profits of firms, thus increasing everyone's share. Sales at Mondragon, a complex of more than 80 worker cooperatives in Spain, grew at a much higher rate than comparable private firms in Spain. Mondragon's sales averaged up to 8.5 percent from 1970-1979. Its market share increased from less than 1 percent in 1960 to over 10 percent in 1976. The percentage of gross value added through investment from 1971 through 1979 averaged 36 percent, nearly four times the average rate of industry in the heavily industrialized Basque province where Mondragon is located (Dahl, 124).

Cooperatives will also lead to other forms of equality. Under the corporate system, managers assume that the interests of the employees are of secondary importance to the interests of the owners. With self-management though, managers are chosen by the workers, so their priority is the interests of the workers. Such a policy will also reduce political conflicts about redistribution of wealth and the regulation of money in politics. Currently, privileged business people fear that too much democracy will destroy property, or will at least threaten it, so they have a distrust of political equality, majority rule, Congress, and other institutions of democratic government. Business uses its resources (money, organization, status, and access) to further its interests and maintain the status-quo. This is the reason that political reform is so unsuccessful in the United States. Self-governing enterprises will reduce the intensity of this problem. Under such a system, all citizens will have the same interests in maintaining political equality and democratic institutions (Dahl, 109).

Even if cooperatives are only equally as efficient as current corporations, they will still increase equality. Equality extends beyond economics. By integrating the democratic process into the work place, Americans will be more likely to participate in the American democratic process. As a result, political and economic equality will be promoted.

According to political scientist Michael J. Sandel, the problem facing the United States is not a lack of procedural democracy, but rather the disintegration of civic republicanism from American government. Civic republicanism is the basis of republican political theory. Such a system requires that citizens share in self-government in order to bring about the "common good." This can only take place if the government provides citizens with the qualities necessary to self-govern. Sandel claims that it is the lack of such a system, and not inequality, that has led to the decline of American politics. If government focuses on the conditions necessary to cultivate citizens capable of self-government instead of staying neutral, it can return America to its former glory (Sandel, 5-6). This can most obviously be accomplished in regard to the economy. Sandel's discussion of the 19<sup>th</sup> century debate between free labor and wage labor illustrates his point. He says that wage labor is not consistent with freedom because it does not perpetuate the characteristics necessary for self-government. It can be thus be inferred that modern corporate capitalism is unable to cultivate self-governing citizens.

In sharp contrast to capitalism, self-governing enterprises will contribute to civic republicanism by enabling Americans to have more control over their lives. Members of cooperatives will have a strong incentive to invest and save. By doing so, they will increase the surplus available for distribution to themselves. In many cases workers have made significant short-term sacrifices in wages and benefits in order to maintain the efficiency of their firms. This has taken place at Chrysler Corporation and the Roth Packing Company (Dahl, 123). Workers will have an even stronger incentive to make similar sacrifices if they have an ownership stake in the company. As a worker in a plywood co-op put it, "If things get bad we'll all take a pay cut. You don't want to milk the cow, because if you milk the cow there's nothing left. And we lose the company" (Dahl, 123). The creation of civic responsibility is also evident from the Mondragon cooperatives. When a recession hit Spain and Mondragon was in financial trouble, the workers made sacrifices in order to keep it in business. The members of one of the co-ops went so far as to vote to increase their individual capital contributions by amounts that ranged from 570 to 1700 dollars, depending on wage level (Dahl, 124).

Workplace democracy will also promote human development, increase the sense of political effectiveness, reduce alienation, and create a concern

for the community good, thus creating a more virtuous citizen. That is, not only will Americans be capable of self-government, they will be better and happier citizens. Experiments with self-governing enterprises indicate that this is the case. J. Maxwell Elden studied a West Coast plant producing a "paper based product" that implemented market socialism. He found increased personal growth and satisfaction with opportunities for self-management. These changes led to increased political effectiveness and social participation (Dahl, 97). Another advantage of self-governing enterprises for civic republicanism is their contribution to the moral character of Americans. The complexity and size of modern corporations have led to a lack of realization that there are consequences for one's actions. This is evident in the 1983 civil suit that the federal government brought against General Motors. The company allegedly was aware that its 1980 X-model cars had defective brakes (Dahl, 99). Self-governing enterprises would not completely alleviate America's moral decay. These companies will operate within a market and be subject to the pressures to make a profit. Worker owned corporations, however, will eliminate the antagonistic relations between employers and employees, which lead to irresponsible behavior by each. Workers are also a much larger and more representative part of the public than executives and will be more inclined to understand that their decisions have consequences for the public (Dahl, 100).

There are many criticisms of market socialism, yet most can be easily refuted. There are studies that indicate no direct correlation between worker owned firms and improved citizenship. It must be recalled that such studies only measure short term effects. It however, takes time to change characteristics perpetuated since the adoption of corporate capitalism in the late 19th century, which have become such an inherent part of the American worker (Dahl, 98).

Many argue that socialism is a violation of the constitutional right to property. The fifth amendment of the United States constitution states that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." It therefore follows that socialism is not an option, no matter what benefits it may reap. A right to property, however is not necessarily a right to ownership of economic enterprises. There is no indication that the framers intended to include corporations under the right

to property. At the time that the constitution was written, the United States was an agriculture based economy, with few if any versions of the modern day corporation. It is much more likely that when the framers wrote of a right to property, they were referring to the right to own land.

Another point in regard to corporate ownership is that no matter what the constitution says, there is an inherent right to property. Advocates of this approach assert that this natural right justifies corporate ownership by stockholders. Despite this claim, even adamant defenders of property rights fail to defend corporate property rights. This is clear from Robert Nozick's entitlement theory. His theory says that private property is only a right if two conditions are met. The property must be obtained in a just way and it must have been transferred from someone originally entitled to it. Corporate holdings do not meet these requirements (Dahl, 75). Locke's theory of property also does not justify ownership of a corporation by stockholders. Locke holds that only those that work to produce the goods and services, the workers and employees, are permitted to own the company (Dahl 76).

Stockholder ownership is also justified for practical reasons. There is a need for capital to invest in business, but why do those who supply the capital have to own and control the company? Some answer that stockholder ownership is a reward for the investment of capital in the corporation. Such investment, though, only requires a return and not control of the company (Dahl, 79).

Inequalities will not be eliminated under a cooperative system. Differences in markets, demands, and ratio of capital to labor are a few of the many factors that will lead to differences in revenues among firms (Dahl, 107). These differences among firms have the potential to promote political inequality. For this reason even under self-governing enterprises, the government might have to help redistribute wealth through taxes or to regulate the firms by setting limits for use of funds in politics (Dahl, 108). Under market socialism however, the redistribution and regulation will be more successful than presently, since inequalities will be less polarized. Equality in economic enterprises will also lessen the antagonism in firms. That is, business people will be less inclined to feel threatened by redistribution and regulation on grounds that it threatens their property. Instead workers will jointly own the property and consensus will be reached for the good of the firm, which is in everyone's best interest

(Dahl, 109 -110).

Capitalism has been an integral part of the United States economy since America's founding. For this reason many are inclined to believe that capitalism and democracy go hand in hand. In the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries it was true that capitalism which involves free enterprise, promoted pluralism and democracy. With the introduction of the corporation in the 20<sup>th</sup> century however, this is no longer the case. Instead of promoting equality as earlier capitalism did, corporate capitalism leads to a breakdown in procedural democracy and civic republicanism. It is America's status as a procedural democracy and a civic republic that have made it the world's leading democracy. In order to retain this position, it is imperative that the United States make a break with capitalism. Dahl's system of corporate socialism is the route that America should take in its quest to achieve this goal.

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## Overpopulation in China

*Aviva Feit*

China, the most heavily populated country in the world, has a population of about 1.2 billion people. This figure numbers about one fifth of the world's populace, and it is growing by approximately 14 million per year. At this growth rate, it is expected to increase to more than 1.5 billion by the year 2020. This count is hardly surprising given the fact that in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, when the entire population of Europe totaled a mere 75 million, China sustained 100 million people.

Before the country began its modern development, it had around 555 million people. During the 1950's, China's government viewed the populace in "supply-side" terms. It maintained that each person born had the potential to advance modernization. Thus, a larger population would ensure greater production and development. However, as the numbers grew, it became evident that such an enormous population could not survive given China's limited resources. Therefore, a "demand-side" perspective was adopted, which has influenced the country's population planning since the 1970's.<sup>1</sup>

At this time, Chinese government officials and population experts realized that steps had to be taken to effectively deal with China's overpopulation dilemma. If the population continued to grow at such a rapid pace, the "population-resource balance" would weigh down on the side of the growing population. Furthermore, China relies on foreign exchange for food and other goods. The fact that the nature of its relations with other countries sometimes makes trade difficult poses a problem for providing sustenance for China's 1.2 billion people.<sup>2</sup> China's overpopulation has also resulted in environmental problems and energy shortages. Thus, a question that the Chinese government has given a great deal of attention to is: what is the most effective way of controlling China's overpopulation?

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Much has changed in the attitudes of the Chinese government and the people toward population policy since 1949, when Mao declared that "Of all things in the world people are the most precious"<sup>3</sup> and that "Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production".<sup>4</sup> In the 1950's, demographic study was prohibited. Nevertheless, the huge increase in population resulted in much thought about options for population control during the remaining part of the century. Ironically, it was Mao's "One Hundred Flowers" approach that contributed to this discussion and policy development.

The Chinese government instructed the establishment of "family planning clinics" during the 1950's. In order to promote birth control, conventional methods were employed. However, such devices were too scarce to ensure effective country-wide birth control. Furthermore, abortion and sterilization were expensive and although not objected to on religious grounds, many found these procedures morally reprehensible. The need for birth control was so pressing that "folk methods (such as swallowing tadpoles) and acupuncture were recommended."<sup>5</sup>

The program was halted during the late 1950's and then reinstated in 1962. After being stopped again at the end of the decade, population policy found renewed interest among the Chinese in 1970. The state declared in 1971 that "late marriage and birth planning [must] become voluntary behavior." When the "Gang of Four" was denounced for being against population planning late in the 1970's, it became apparent that family planning was an important concern of Chinese officials. Many provinces developed quotas and goals for population growth. The objective of controlling family sizes became so significant that it was regulated by an "autonomous system of service delivery".<sup>6</sup>

The policy established "wan-xi-shao," which means "later-longer-fewer," took into account differences between urban and rural areas by fixing separate population objectives. For example, while urban dwellers were allowed to have two children, those who lived in the countryside were entitled to three children. When this plan did not sufficiently reduce the population growth rate, the government instituted two child rule all over China in 1977.

In 1979, China established a program to promote the one-child family. It utilizes incentives and disincentives in order to encourage couples to have only one child. Some of these incentives include a salary

increase for those who promise to have one child and priority for housing, as well as school and job placement. The government even decided to give extra food allotment and retirement assistance for those with one child. China also provides for healthcare preferences and "generous allocations of private land" for one-child families.<sup>7</sup> Disincentives include a "multichild tax" for couples who have more than one child.<sup>8</sup> This population policy is implemented by each individual province, since every province in China has its own committee to take care of family planning, and the national government does not instruct what types of incentives should be employed.

The Marriage Law of 1980 as well as the 1982 National Constitution declared that every Chinese couple must "practice family planning".<sup>9</sup> Modernization and development have facilitated compliance with this decree. This is because the modern Chinese citizens who lives in the city is more educated, earns more money and marries later in life. Thus, he or she is less traditional and does not value the conventional Chinese extended family that favors a multiple child family. Furthermore, the growth of cities in China, although still primarily a "nation of farmers," prevents couples from having many children because of the lack of adequate urban living space.<sup>1</sup>

Even though Chinese officials hoped to achieve zero population growth by the year 2000, this is no longer the goal. Rather, by 1986, a numerical target (1.2 billion at the end of the century) was adopted. However, the population is currently at the 1.2 billion mark, and it is bound to grow in the next three years. This has necessitated the proposal of other population and family planning measures.

Proof that the one-child policy may no longer be an adequate solution for China's overpopulation problem can be found in the way it subordinates women. In one Chinese village, Jiekuang, the doctor must promote government family planning objectives by giving out birth control devices to the 30 women living there that are married but not sterilized.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Same as #7, p.26.

<sup>2</sup> Susan V. Lawrence, "Family planning at a price," U.S. News and World Report 117 (September 19, 1994): 56.

This diverts the doctor's attention from other women residents who have health concerns unrelated to child birth.

Most Chinese are agriculturally employed. For these inhabitants of rural areas a large family, especially one with more than one son, is important because more individuals means more help in the fields. This benefit is prevented by the one-child family plan. Since those who live in the country have a greater need for more than one child, more urbanites receive governmental incentives, furthering economic inequality between city and countryside inhabitants. It is also very difficult for people to accept stringent policies regarding personal decisions when no direct positive effect is immediately witnessed and when individual rights are secondary to the needs of the general society.

Another problem with the one-child policy is that, at times, coercive measures are used to implement it. The terms of the program are so strict that they inevitably result in government officials performing compelled abortions and insertion of intrauterine devices in order to meet the desired goals.<sup>7</sup> Although the one-child policy is technically voluntary, many Americans believe that for the Chinese, this includes some sort of coercion which violates human rights.<sup>8</sup>

Traditionally, Chinese people see more benefits in having sons than daughters. This is because sons are able to inherit and work on farms and in fields. Thus, in areas where this ideal is especially adhered to (for example, rural areas), Chinese citizens will be likely to keep having children until they have at least one son. While most Chinese do adhere to long standing traditions, recent events demonstrate that the Communist regime might be undermined by more progressive and liberal idealists. Such adherents will not accept the program, and this also threatens the one-child policy.

The reduction of the amount of children born results in an overly

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<sup>7</sup> Jodi L. Jacobson, "Baby Budget," *World Watch* 2 (September-October 1989): 26.

<sup>8</sup> J. Mayone Stycos, "The Second Great Wall of China: Evolution of a Successful Policy of Population Control," *Population and Environment* 12 (summer 1991): 397.

large elderly population. This segment of the populace must be supported by the younger generations. This effort, however, becomes more difficult when a small portion of the people have to provide for the large number of Chinese elderly. Others argue against the prevailing policy by asserting that a lower birth rate will slow down the country's economic and military growth. Expansion in both of these areas is essential for a developing China which must try to establish a stronghold for itself in the Pacific Rim.

A study was conducted in which 1,741 Chinese children were observed. Those who belonged to single-child families were more "willful, selfish and lacking in sense of responsibility and collective sentiment".<sup>9</sup> If the majority of the Chinese populace were single children (and this would be a direct consequence of the one-child policy), these attitudes would be prevalent in the society. This would be detrimental to China, a country that desperately needs cooperation among its citizens to advance modernization and development.

The one-child program has significantly reduced the growth rate of China's populace. Many Chinese citizens feels that it is their patriotic duty to do everything they can to ensure a better future for china, including having less children. However, the plan is problematic because of the reasons mentioned above, and the urgent need to reduce the population increase even more than has already been done. Therefore, alternative policies have been proposed.

Another option for controlling China's population crisis was suggested by John Bongaarts and Susan Greenhalgh, two sinologists from an American population research organization. They suggest the implementation of a plan that would decrease population growth more than the one-child policy did, or a least meet the same goals without some of the policy's negative aspects. This program would allow Chinese families to have two children, but require a woman to be at least twenty-five before having her first child. She must then wait four years before having her second child. Requiring this four year waiting period results in a delay in population growth, which is the desired effect.

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<sup>9</sup> Wong Sui-Iun, "Consequences of China's New Population Policy," *The China Quarterly* (June 1984): 236.

Couples would be able to choose between having two children, but doing so under restrictions, or having one child at anytime. Thus, if a woman becomes pregnant before the age of twenty-five, she does not have to abort. Since this proposal would include incentives similar to those offered by the one-child policy, many Chinese would still opt to have only one child, further securing the attainment of the population targets. Since 1984, the number of instances in which couples are permitted to have two children has grown. This illustrates the government's acknowledgment of the disadvantages of the current policy.

A two-child policy would provide the Chinese traditional extended family with a better chance of survival. Under the one-child policy, most citizens would have no siblings. Thus, their children would have no aunts, uncles or cousins. This would result in the destruction of the familial structure. Another advantage of the two-child policy is that those who desire a larger family can have one without sacrificing as much for the future of China. Furthermore, such a policy is more lenient and therefore easier to impose on the public. The one-child plan leads to "cases of female infanticide [and] abuse of wives" because of Chinese preference for sons.<sup>12</sup> A two-child policy also supports the natural tendency of people to desire many offspring to carry on their family name.

If the Chinese government would promote gender equality, the fertility rate would drop. If more women were career-oriented, like men, they would choose to have fewer children. Such a result can only be achieved by a change in the attitudes of members of the Chinese society towards women. This type of shift will only occur gradually if the right steps are taken to secure its accomplishment.

Instead of continuing to implement the one-child policy in its strictest form, the Chinese government might opt to provide security for future generations by changing politically. If China would develop a more democratic system of governing, emphasizing individual, civil, political, and human rights, then powerful western countries, such as the United

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<sup>12</sup> John Bongaarts and Susan Greenhalgh "An Alternative to the One-Child Policy in China" Population and Development Review 11 (December 1985): 607.

States, might be more inclined to trade or give aid to China in the form of much needed resources. These extra natural resources would diminish the need for reduction in population growth. Although this approach might not be sufficient enough to solve China's overpopulation problem, it does provide relief from the harsh terms of the one-child policy.

Zhu Mei, a research student at the University of Bradford in England, proposed that the Chinese use education and "existing scientific and technical resources to enhance productivity."<sup>13</sup> He believes that China should develop ways to convert waste into resources and recycle as much as possible. If the Chinese people can devise a strategy whereby they make effective use of technology to preserve and even create raw materials, the one-child policy will not be the government's only option for ensuring a strong and healthy China in the future.

During the past half century, China has begun to deal with the dilemma of its growing population. After much debate, research, and trial and error, the government instituted the one-child policy. Although basically successful in its goals, the program has many inherent flaws, as illustrated above. Therefore, it is now time for China to think about adopting a new strategy that would either limit population growth or provide for more resources to feed its growing population. The establishment of only one of these options might prove insufficient in attaining China's goals. However, a combination of the alternatives to the one-child policy listed above, should yield a successful solution.

The Chinese now find themselves in an interesting predicament. Their population control policy is potentially harmful to Chinese society since it advances many different types of inequalities and fosters destructive and non-productive attitudes on the part of the people. However, the absence of regulations and population policies will undoubtedly prove to be just as damaging. Given all of this, it is the Chinese government's responsibility to find a suitable balance among the needs of the present population and those of future generations.

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<sup>13</sup> Zhu Mei, "Options for Sustainable Development in China: Overpopulation and Shortages of Natural Resources," Asian Economies 23 (March 1994): 35

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## The Power Elite: Money Isn't Everything

*Ziona Hochbaum*

According to the ideals of democracy, elected leaders should faithfully represent the interests of the electorate. This arrangement would seem to be the closest feasible alternative to direct democracy. But does a high level of responsiveness to the people actually exist in this country? Or is policy making in the hands of a power elite who pursue their own interests at the expense of everyone else? Despite a political climate in which politics often seems like nothing more than a vote auction, I believe that power still lies in the hands of the people.

As human beings and as Americans, each of us is a member of many groups. We are defined by our race or country of origin, our gender, religion, occupation, where we live--even our hobbies. That we are different in those areas makes the existence of interest groups both natural and inevitable. According to pluralist theory, in at least some of those capacities we have a chance to influence policy.

Now, not everyone is a card-carrying member of an organized interest group, like NOW, the NRA, or AARP. According to power elite theorist William Hudson, "interest groups represent only a small proportion of Americans. In the everyday policy-making process, the play of group pressures leaves out many citizens."<sup>1</sup> But what that really means is that organized interest groups effectively represent many more people than their membership rosters suggest, whether their lobbyists realize it or not. I think they do. In theory and in mission, the NAACP seeks to better conditions for all African Americans. Consumer groups look out for the interests of consumers everywhere.

Pluralists do not deny the existence of a power elite; they deny the pervasiveness and perfection of their power.

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Who are the power elite? In a word, the rich. In two words, big business. What chief executives have to offer politicians is money--no small bargaining chip.

But is money enough? As a starting point, let's recall the 1994 Senatorial campaign in California. Billionaire Michael Huffington set new records for election spending, and yet lost to the incumbent by a wide margin. What was unique here was that most of the money was his own, rather than the gift of corporations. But his example is helpful because it allows us to dismiss out of hand the claim that the candidate with the most money always wins. This principle applies when, as is usually the case, the two candidates--while often well-to-do--are non-billionaires and fund their campaigns through outside contributions.

On the other hand, money and votes go hand in hand in getting candidates elected, since bought publicity is the way they make themselves known to the electorate. To minimize corporate privilege in this respect, campaign finance reform should be a legislative priority. While politicians from House Speaker Newt Gingrich to Governor George Pataki, have touted the need for such reform during election season, they have failed to follow through on their pledges once in office. The reason for that is no mystery, and it is unclear whether more vocal public demands for change would be enough, given politicians' incentive to resist reform in this area. What is clear is that if corporate backing of candidates were limited, the playing field would be more level. Elections are a separate process from policy-making, yet the two arenas are related because of the circular relationship between voting blocs and elected officials. First, groups who get their candidate elected--whether competing minorities in pluralist theory or big business in power elite theory--expect in return that he or she will carry out policies favorable to their attentive public. Second, all that might compel the official to meet those expectations--short of an overwhelming sense of gratitude--is the knowledge that the next election is a few short years away.

That votes can be bought and sold, and that politicians concern themselves with such transactions, in fact illustrates that the ultimate seat of power is with the voters. They are free to give their votes away--to elitists, or pluralists, or witches, or gang members. Their means are their votes.

It is true that the largest campaign contributions generally come from

corporations. And although there is no guarantee, elected officials often do most of their posturing toward that particular interest group, in the form of favorable tax policies and other pro-business measures. Hudson argues that to a large extent, business need not even lobby for favorable policy outcomes because "intelligent public officials know without being told what they must do: Keep business happy."<sup>3</sup>

As an example, Hudson cites the 1992 General Motors plant closing. When GM executives leaked their plans to close plants in Ypsilanti, Michigan and Arlington, Texas, both municipalities responded with generous inducements in what became a bidding war to keep their plants open. Such pandering to business is, as power elite theorists contend, a result of its privileged position among other interest groups in the United States.

However, let us for a moment adopt James Lamare's benefit-analysis approach, which as a power elite theorist, he uses to demonstrate corporate advantage.<sup>4</sup> Who stood to benefit from keeping the plants open? Workers, local residents, and local small business owners. Rank and file Americans. Voters. So, in fact, by crafting tax-free packages to lure the corporations into their corners, local officials were pandering at their own blue-collar constituents. The unemployed are not known to come out in droves for incumbents on election day.

Besides directly effecting policies through lobbying and flooding the media, power elite theorists argue that corporations maintain the upper hand by setting the policy agenda. They control, the argument goes, which issues become public (and thus subject to public debate) by exercising power in its second dimension as formulated by Steven Lukes.<sup>5</sup> The most oft-referred to example of agenda-setting power is Matthew Crenson's study of U.S. Steel in Gary, Indiana. Local leaders, under pressure from the corporation, ignored the issue of air pollution, effectively keeping the problem from coming to the public's attention. Crenson admits, however, that while industrial leverage seems to have prevented action on the issue, "it is difficult to say how."<sup>6</sup>

I would add that it is also difficult to say what would have happened had a determined group of environmentally conscious citizens vocally challenged government or company officials with their concern. When air pollution becomes a real problem for a community, it would be difficult to conceal. In this decade, certainly, environmental awareness has put



citizens everywhere on alert. We are increasingly on guard for violations of any kind against our health, safety, and well-being. It is a consequence of what has been called our "victim mentality"-- the rise in lawsuits against schools, hospitals, and yes, corporations. This psycho-social phenomenon is a counterpoint of Lamare's argument of economic socialization, the way he says that cultural messages teach us from childhood to "revere the intrinsic merit of capitalism."<sup>12</sup>

Many Americans have become cynical about politics and distrustful of politicians precisely because they feel that the latter are not responsive to them but to the moneyed interests. Has this cynicism fostered a feeling of powerlessness? If so, John Gaventa, author of the famed study of the Appalachian Valley coal miners, would say that these conditions are favorable to domination by a power elite.

However, we must draw a distinction between powerlessness, either real or imagined, and latent power. A key ingredient in Gaventa's formula for elite rule is the absence of anger, outrage, even understanding of their position on the part of the subjugated group that keeps them from mobilizing. But once a group realizes that they are powerless, in a sense they are no longer powerless. That is what we saw happen with African Americans during the civil rights movement. Their great achievement was not the accumulation of power but the discovery of it. Martin Luther King Jr. drew upon the latent power of African Americans and brought about an upheaval of the system. What was their latent power? Pride, common needs and interests, outrage at the system, and sheer numbers.

Whereas the Gary, Indiana study was released in 1971, an example from just a few months ago illustrates the weakness of the agenda-setting argument. Tobacco companies have recently been dealt one heavy blow after another as the Clinton Administration has sharply curtailed cigarette advertising and vending in an effort to curb teenage smoking. Lamare might argue that while this was a public relations defeat for the industry, the regulations that actually trickle down to the implementation and, more importantly, the enforcement stage will turn out to be a lot of hot air.

Yes, businesses often prefer to pollute and pay rather than overhaul operations. However, in a market ruled by the consumer, public relations is everything. Image matters in industry. And when the President indicted tobacco companies as the culprits, smoking became a campaign issue--at least for those not yet addicted to tobacco. (Witness Vice President Gore's

speech at the Democratic National Convention, in which he devoted considerable time to the story of his sister's smoking-induced death.)

Let us remember where the anti-smoking movement started. The President was only seizing upon an issue that already had tremendous support in this country, among blacks and whites and women and men worried about their children. This public support is what convinced him that it was okay to alienate the tobacco industry and perhaps lose a few campaign dollars.

Along the same lines of the agenda-setting argument, power elite theorists contend that issues that become subject to public debate have been largely winnowed down to their basically non-revolutionary, widely acceptable two sides. Thus, the game is rigged: politicians have raised for consideration only policy options they know will satisfy at least so many segments of the community. Before I counter that argument, let me point out its implication. If business rules, and if policy debates tend to spawn two camps, then the business community isn't always united. It is not always a monolith arguing for collective interests. This is obvious; it is the sign of the healthy competition that is the mainstay of our economy.

Now, let me return to the claim of emasculated public debate. Lamare says, "Elections, for instance, do not ordinarily vibrate with dishonest economic discourse."<sup>13</sup> I can speak best about the most recent history, and that we quit the case in the 1996 Presidential election. Dole's late day conversion to Reaganomics make economic philosophy a key issue in the campaign. The question was raised: Can government cut taxes and balance the budget at the same time? Other bitterly controversial issues that made their way to the public last year were welfare reform (read cutbacks), the denial of education to the children of illegal immigrants, the rollback of affirmative action, and the ban on late term abortion vetoed by President Clinton.

Hudson is correct when he argues that in a contest with government, big business would win on the question of who affects our lives in the most meaningful and far-reaching ways. After all, most Americans spend more time speaking with their bosses than with their Senators. But Hudson, based on Charles Lindblom's analysis, scribes undue decision-making powers to business. Are corporations really free to answer questions like "Will automobiles have airbags?," "Will guns be sold?"<sup>14</sup> Not as long as there are laws banning the use of CFCs and the sale of alcohol to minors,

and the interest groups to lobby for such legislation. The power elite certainly did not favor the Brady Bill. But it passed.

One of the first and most ballyhooed measures taken by President Clinton when he first entered office was the signing of the Family and Medical Leave Act. This bill too was, not surprisingly, unpopular with the business community. But, sensing public support, or feeling morally bound, or seeking to show his mettle, the President signed the bill into law. Either way, there were forces stronger than corporate power at play.

Other times, politicians have not stood up to industry pressures. Clinton, in fact, has made a reputation for such weakness. One example is Clinton's caving into business interests by retreating from his campaign pledge to take a tough stand on China because of human rights abuses. But we have seen that public support can outweigh the corporate lobbies, and it damages power elite theory when such examples are dismissed as exceptions. Power elite theorists can demonstrate a high batting average for corporations, but they cannot produce a perfect record. Pluralism is still in the game, and the "minorities" of Dahl's "minorities rule" are still at play.

Business is one of the many interest groups competing for political attention in our pluralist system. Pluralism is what keeps them all on their toes. Corporations have the advantage of wealth in the political market place. But even Lamare concedes that corporations "must compete with non business forces to gain the attention, the respect and most important, the vote of a political decision maker."<sup>18</sup> What is that if not a description of pluralism at work?

<sup>1</sup> William E. Hudson, *American Democracy in Peril* (Chatham House) 188.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid 198.

<sup>3</sup> Jams W. Lamare, *Who Rules America?* (West) 78.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas W. Simon, *Democracy and Social Injustice* (Rowman & Littlefield) 51.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in *Power and Powerlessness* by John Gaventa, 10.

<sup>6</sup> Lamare, 88.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Hudson, 196. See 1 above.

<sup>18</sup> Lamare, 74.

## Germany's Changing Face

*Tikvah Shachter*

This paper will analyze today's post-unification Germany. In view of its Nazi past, Germany continues to live in a glass house. Careful of its every move, trying to be democratically correct, Germany seeks, above all else, to legitimate itself as a stable, reliable regional and world citizen. Since unification in 1990 (the first all German elections), right wing extremist activities, xenophobic and often violent, have increased in Germany, attracting world attention. Do these activities indicate a resurgence of the past? In answering this question, this paper seeks to evaluate the wider problem of Germany's coming to grips with its Nazi past.

However much Germany wishes to gain its legitimization, to be seen like any other European country, it will never be clear of its "Holocaust shadow." Its neighbors won't let it, keeping a close eye on Germany. In 1991, for example, Germany recognized Croatia as an independent state before anyone else. Ever since, Bonn has heard remarks that the decision accelerated the disaster in former Yugoslavia, and that it was old time Nazi loyalties that led to the decision (Powell 49). Jurgen Trunpf, Germany's ambassador to the European Community remarked in 1992, "our neighbors are now experiencing an allergic reaction to us" ("Responding" 17). This interrogation, this fear of Germany, that has increased since unification, is not unfounded. A united Germany has arisen, being called the "economic hub" of the European Union. Since unification, Neo-Nazism has increased. In 1994 there were 42,000 right-wing radicals in Germany, 6,200 of them considered dangerously militant (Marks 43). Yet, in spite of this, Germany seeks and needs legitimization. To gain a fraction of the world's legitimacy, Germany needs to allay current fears.

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The questions arise, has Germany changed socially? Is Germany of today the Germany of yesterday? Germany is going through a historical revision, both in terms of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, of coming to terms with its past, and in terms of political Neo-Fascism. These two aspects of Germany, trying to cope with the past while being confronted with reminders of the past, is a source of immense tension. An examination is needed to understand the source of tension, this Neo-Nazism of the 1990's.

The Neo-Nazi parties of the nineties have their own character - they are less exclusive and ideological, while being more anarchistic, violent, xenophobic, and more widely supported. In 1991 it was estimated that 'militant right-wing extremists' numbered at least 4,500 in all of Germany, equal to the number of active skinheads. In addition, the potential for extreme right sympathy, specifically amongst the young, numbered 50,000. A recent study reported that a third of job trainees and a quarter of school pupils aged fourteen to twenty-five years held the opinion that 'we should keep pure what is German and prevent interbreeding of different peoples'. Fifty-four per cent of those polled had a negative attitude towards foreigners. Twenty-four per cent of male trainees agreed that 'the Jews are our misfortune.' (Husbands 330-31). In fact, there has been an increase in anti-Semitic crimes, as opposed to xenophobic ones. Common crimes were desecration of Jewish graves and attacks on Jewish people (Husbands 335).

The rise of Neo-Nazi violence has led many to believe that this is the same Germany reincarnated. Since 1991, the Federal Republic of Germany has been experiencing an escalation in the rise of violence against foreigners and asylum seekers, in the forms of insults, physical attacks, murder, and arson (Bohleber 329). In 1992 eight hundred people were injured and 17 killed in right wing violence. In the city of Molln where one in ten people voted for a far right party, a 51 year old Turkish grandmother, her niece and her granddaughter were murdered by a firebomb. There are more than 40,000 right-wing extremists in Germany (Juhnke 12). Despite these attacks and figures, Josef Joffe, in his article entitled, "Why 1992 is different from 1932," points out that this wave of Neo-Nazism is quite different from the Nazi regime. First, notes Joffe, "these murderous punks do not a movement make" (33). They have no leader, nor do they have an ideology. They are a clean shaven lot with studded motorcycle boots. Their music more closely resembles Ice-T than the Nazis' "Horst Wessel Lied." If an election were held today, they would barely make it into

parliament. Secondly, writes Joffe, these Neo-Nazis do not reflect the character of today's Germans. Many Germans expressed outrage at the recent Neo-Nazi violence. Papers were filled with editorials and ads condemning anti-Semitism and this new wave of xenophobia. Rallies and protests were being led by church and civic leaders (Joffe 33). In fact, according to an opinion poll by *Die Woche*, a majority of Germans felt the war was Germany's fault and it was good the country lost. Two thirds found Nazism to be false or wicked and would not have wanted to live in Germany had Hitler won. Sixty nine percent of Germans felt Germany's loss was also a liberation ("Arts, Books" 76). Thirdly, observes Joffe, the government itself has taken an active stance. Within one week, the two arsonists in the Molln attack were caught (Joffe 33). Furthermore, in May 1993, the government strengthened laws aimed at Neo-Nazi groups, limiting their right to demonstrate and exhibit Nazi material. Consequently, the number of Neo-Nazi incidents was reduced by 45 percent, in comparison to 1993. Even the far right Republican Party failed to win a seat in the legislature (Powell 49). According to Christopher T. Husbands, the fact that the German state has been able to handle and suppress recent militant incidents shows how much Germany has changed. In 1992 to 1993, perhaps this could not have been said because the police did not crack down on militant activities, so the perpetrators essentially succeeded. Yet today there has been a concerted state response to Neo-Nazism, especially in terms of prosecution and sentencing (Husbands 342-43). This is the critical difference in the Neo-Nazism of the 90's. Today's "punks" are disorganized, mostly private, and lack the support of the German government (Joffe 33).

Today's "punks" are in fact young men dealing with psychological problems, not a political group rallying for political purposes. Many skinheads grew up in an environment without a father, the only male figure being old grandfathers who relish the glorious days of the militaristic past. These images develop into a mythical vision of manhood in the minds of these boys lacking a father figure (Shrivastava 12). Notes psychoanalyst Werner Bohleber, due to disturbed adolescent narcissism, shame in one's delinquent father leaves open the fantasy of a whole world filled with total care and subjection under an orderly authority, i.e., the Nazi era (342). Two caseworkers, Michael Heinisch and Michael Wieczorek in dealing with these youths, seek to understand the current social pathology.

Heinisch traces the skinheads' xenophobic feelings to a lack of security. Foreigners are seen as contenders for jobs and state money. Wiczorek sees the youths' neurosis as stemming from postmodern boredom. The skinheads use right wing crime and scapegoating as a desperate attempt to engage in meaningful activity. Both caseworkers conclude with similar results. When these young men are given stability, such as a steady job or steady girlfriend, they drop out of the life of crime and lead a respectable life. Notes Anjana Shrivastava, postmodern passivity and fragmentation will not make these youths into footsoldiers of radical political parties. These type of skinheads will never bring fascists into government (Shrivastava 12).

Thus, the problem of Neo-Nazism is in fact more psychological than actual, both on the side of the boys involved and the German people. The extreme right activity provokes memories in Germans, memories of guilt that they are grappling with. There are two responses to this guilt - the ahistorical (passive) and the "remembering" (active). Through the ahistorical approach, Germany seeks to come to terms with its past by, ironically, not dealing with the past. Germany wants to rid of descriptions such as, "aggressiveness, *Angst*, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, and sentimentality" (Johnson 19). Instead, Germany wishes to be perceived as a passive, democratic country, a "regular" member of the European Community waving the blue EC flag. As Marc Fisher writes, Germans want to be seen as a "bigger version of Switzerland" (Powell 50). Just living daily, making tools, riding the autobahn, and minding their own business. The first line of their Constitution reads, "The dignity of the human being is inviolable." This is Germany's most important democratic principle. In 1992 and 1993, for example, thousands of Bosnian refugees fled to Germany. Though this influx of refugees was the last thing Chancellor Helmut Kohl needed after unification with its concomitant economic decline, to close the borders would be unthinkable (Powell 50). Their federal defense force, the *Bundeswehr*, teaches its soldiers that they have to take moral responsibility for their actions and if necessary, question their orders (Edwards 13). Ted Werner, a 32 year old architect notes, "Germany is one of the most modern and industrialized countries. We all live very comfortably, everything works smoothly. But when we go abroad, we Germans are shy; we make ourselves small and stay in the background" (Powell 50).

Disengaging itself from the past means silencing the talk of the past to many Germans. In a recent *Der Spiegel* poll, sixty two percent of Germans agreed that "46 years after the war's end we shouldn't talk so much anymore about the persecution of Jews" (Breslau 30). Correspondingly notes former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt:

The French don't remind themselves what misdeeds Napoleon wrought in Europe. The memory has to be kept alive for a few more generations, but not forever. Should the memory of the Hundred Years' War between the French and the English be kept alive? Should the misdeeds of the Swedes in Germany under Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Year's War be kept alive? No, of course not. The next two or three generations mustn't forget Hitler's crimes, but a third testament of the Bible is not required (Marks 52).

November 9 is the day commonly observed as the night of Kristallnacht when Jewish property in Germany was reduced to shards of glass. Now it is being remembered as the day the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. The film "Europe, Europe" was not nominated by the German Export Film Union for an Oscar, though its prospects were bright. Many see this film selection as a part of the German denial mood, fitting into the new concept of Germany (Breslau 30). This philosophy of the ahistorical Germany was encouraged by Adenauer. Although old enough to remember Bismarck, nonetheless, he never spoke of the past, only about the present. This has led to the new Germany, in which today's Germans maintain an almost illusory distance from the past (Kaplan 32).

Furthermore, in seeking to disassociate with the past, determined to be viewed as this new country, Germany is extremely careful with its language and rhetoric concerning the past. For instance, the Bosnian refugees were first accommodated in camps. The German government agonized over what to call them. It came up with "collection lodgings." When the English language press used "collection camps" instead, the German government, "went ballistic," notes Marc Fisher (Powell 49). Another example Marc Fisher writes about in his book, *After the Wall*, concerns an article he wrote about the German-Romanian treaty that led the way for the deportation of Gypsy refugees. Almost immediately the chief of the foreign department at the Federal Press Office, Henning Wegener called in a complaint. He preferred the word 'readmission' or 'retransfer'

as opposed to 'deportation' which is attached with, "...disturbing historical connotations" (Fisher 280). Germany prefers the title of "the Federal Republic," in contrast to "Germany" (Fisher 318).

This new concept of Germany has taken root. West Germany today is the most, "complacent, satisfied, petit bourgeois nation in Europe, if not on Earth" (Kaplan 32), the opposite of Hitler's socially disturbed, ravaged era. In fusing with former West Germany, East Germany has also jumped over its past. German political culture stresses modernism and emphasizes the middle class. According to this cultural image, Germany has no poor people, and no elite. Instead, everyone is on the same middle class level. A true form of democracy has taken shape. In actuality, Germany has produced a prosperous middle class, evidenced by luxury cars driven on the streets, the immense shopping malls, the people walking around with expensive clothing, handbags and electronic devices. Hamburg is noted as the media capital, Munich the fashion capital, Frankfurt the banking capital, and Bonn the political capital. The Germans of today are Adenauer's children - successful, somewhat superficial, and most importantly, ahistorical (Kaplan 34). This ahistorical approach though is insufficient. By shutting the door to the past, Germans are living in their illusory glass world. One day the glass will break; Germany will have to pick up the pieces, they will have to confront the past. Germans cannot expect others to forgive them if they cannot forgive themselves. Forgiveness begins with the mind, then reaches into the soul, a cathartic process which lets one live in the present. Germany must now bare its soul and remember the past.

Bjorn Krondorfer, in his book, Remembrance and Reconciliation, discusses the German ethos of guilt and forgiveness. Krondorfer notes that while the Jewish ethos moves from remembrance to redemption, the German ethos on the other hand, intermingles guilt and forgiveness. West Germans have tried to atone for its Nazi crimes by paying retribution, financially assisting Jewish communities in Germany and Israel, securing diplomatic ties with Israel and conducting educational programs. Undoubtedly, Germany as a whole has condemned the Nazi period. Older Germans have tried to paint themselves as involuntary subjects of the Nazis' whim. Yet, Germans are missing the phraseology to symbolize the memory of the Holocaust. They cannot move themselves from destruction to redemption. This is due to the fact that Germans engage in

"unacknowledged guilt and desired forgiveness" which lacks both vision and authorization. Moreover, notes Krondorfer, the concepts of guilt and forgiveness are seen in conflicting behavioral patterns. One German yearns for forgiveness yet rejects the idea of guilt, whereas another German feels guilty when he meets Jews, while believing that no human can ever grant him forgiveness. Still other Germans exemplify the behavior of the "Adenauer children" - those who want to remain ahistorical, seeming apathetic to guilt and forgiveness. According to Krondorfer, these people view remembrance as a "Jewish" unwillingness to forgive and forget. They, therefore, react angrily when reminded of the past. Some of them harbor anti-Semitic feelings while rejecting their feelings of guilt and the Christian concept of forgiveness. Others show pride in Germany's reparation payments but then voice their resentment against it or exaggerate the amount. Consequently, guilt and forgiveness are caught in a circular trap. Forgiveness presumes guilt, however covertly experienced, and guilt seeks forgiveness however covertly desired. Forgiveness will not diminish the Holocaust, nor will it resolve people's feelings. Repressed memory leads to unresolved feelings. The German ethos of guilt is fixated in the past. A need to look ahead to the future, to engage in an era of remembrance is what Germany requires (Krondorfer 56-58).

There are Germans who understand this idea and are grappling with the Nazi past by taking the "remembering" approach. As historian Hinnerk Bruhns remarked, the way to identify with history is, "...by choosing the path of lucidity and courage" (8). This is the path chosen by President Richard von Weizsacker who declared that Germany must accept the past. It is also the path embraced by historian C. Meier who feels that Auschwitz is an important part of Germany's social identity. A "lucid" account of Germany must include all aspects of Germany whether they be positive or negative (Bruhns 8).

Germans have actively sought to connect with the past. In 1992, almost every week there was another Holocaust commemoration. In Berlin, the 50th anniversary of the Wannsee Conference was marked by a gathering of Jewish and German dignitaries. The villa itself was converted into Germany's first Holocaust museum (Breslau 30). Nowadays, the past is more openly talked about. High school students study W.W.II in literature and art courses. Many of them take field trips to concentration camps (Wagner 24). According to Rob Edwards, Germans want to talk

about nothing else than the war. The nation has become so obsessed with this topic they even created a new word to describe it: *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* ("overcoming the past") (Edwards 12).

The '68 generation, born long after the Holocaust, have raised questions from son to father, daughter to mother, grandchild to grandparent. Answering these questions, for many older Germans, is a way to come to terms with the past, of ridding their guilt, a psychological process that many Germans involved in the Third Reich have to endure. As Manfred Rommel states, "I didn't kill anybody. But I remember when I was 11 in the Hitler Youth. I admired the Fuhrer very much. I also believed the Jews were very dangerous. But I am now ashamed of those feelings" (Edwards 12). A time of remembrance has overtaken Germany.

This new age of remembrance will help Germany break free of its current stigma. Germany must show the world that it can deal with the recent xenophobic attacks. They must also create a bond with the Jewish people. For many Germans, when they think of a Jew, they automatically think of the Holocaust. Through further open communication and learning of the beauty of Jewish culture and history, Germans will acknowledge Jews as people and not just Holocaust survivors.

Being German is a heavy burden to carry, yet it weighs on all from those who accept the past, to those who deny it, on the young and the old alike, across the political spectrum. On the right there is both a sense of threat and of being threatened. Germany is a place in need of a national pride, national identity and self confidence that must involve tolerance. On the left is an aura of sadness, a collective sigh of anguish, a feeling of everlasting guilt. As Thomas Mann remarked in 1945, the Germans, "condemn themselves-[a] character trait that cannot be discounted." The German notion of self identification is still tainted with blood (Fisher 318). Should young Germans, born after the war be forever stained with this blood? Is it fair to always see Germany in a prism of its ghastly past? Yes. As George Santayana once remarked, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." For Germany this saying is of important significance.

Fifty years after the war, Germany is in a state of flux. Germany knows what it does not want to be. What it will become is a question that Germany must figure out. The determination to evolve as a quasi-European, post-Fascist nation at peace with its past is a step in the right

direction for the new Germany - a step closer to its needed legitimization and self identification.

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## The Morality of the Welfare State

*Elana Siderer*

For over thirty years, since the resurgence of the welfare state in the 1960's under President Lynden Johnson, there have been many disagreements over its morality. Liberals utilize the political theory of John Rawls in an attempt to provide a modern justification for the welfare state. Libertarians, on the other hand, use the political ideas of Robert Nozick to support the claim that the concept of welfare, in and of itself, is not moral. In discussing its ultimate justifiability, it is imperative that one first evaluate the theories that attempt to justify the welfare state, as well as theories which try to discredit it.

In 1971, Rawls put forth his theory which justified the welfare state which had not yet been implemented. In his theory, Rawls rejects the Utilitarian view that a productive society, where only a minority of the people are happy and the rest of society is poor, is a just society. Instead, Rawls introduces the "difference principle" whereby all social and economic inequalities are to be arranged to benefit the worst-off members of society (Rawls, 1971, p.43). This principle clearly supports the redistributive policy of the welfare state, whereby, money collected from the rich is given to the poor, thus raising them to a minimum standard of living. According to Rawls, only when a society follows a redistribution policy to help the worst-off is that society a just one. He attempts to prove this by showing that his principle of justice would be chosen by a hypothetical group of people constituting what he calls "the original position" (Rawls, 1971, p.12).

The idea of the original position is based on the concept of the contract doctrine that Hobbes and Locke put forth hundreds of years ago. Hobbes and Locke asserted that in order for individual rights to be

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legitimate, they must be acknowledged as rights by everyone. Therefore, when formulating his theory, Rawls created the original position which functions under a "veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1971, p.12). The veil of ignorance is there to assure that the people in the original position will make just decisions that are representative of everyone, since they are unaware of their class positions or their economic situations. According to Rawls, since the people in the original position function under the veil of ignorance and are risk averse, they will all agree on principles of justice that provide for the worst-off members of society, because they may be a member of that group. Rawls describes the fact that everyone agrees to these principles in such a situation as "justice as fairness" (Rawls, 1971, p.12). He says that the first principle that they will agree upon is one of equal, basic liberties which provides the right to hold personal property. The second principle agreed upon is one in which social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit to the disadvantaged. In addition, they are to be attached to positions and offices which will be open to all under the conditions of equality of opportunity (Rawls, 1971, p.14-15). It is within this second principle of justice that Rawls introduces the difference principle which has become the modern day justification for the welfare state.

There are, however, a number of difficulties in Rawls' theory as a valid justification for the welfare state. First, while Rawls asserts that an individual has inviolable rights that not even the welfare of society can override, many argue that his proposed difference principle violates those rights of the rich who are instructed what to do with their money. To this argument, Rawls does not offer any solid proof in support of his redistributive principles. Further, the whole premise of the actions of the original position is based on the assumption that people are naturally risk averse, which is another belief which he does not attempt to prove.

In direct contrast to Rawls' theory of justice, where government intervenes for the benefit of the whole society, Robert Nozick proposes his theory of justice which emphasizes the need for a minimal state (Nozick, 1974, p.29). Nozick's theory is based on a negative libertarian view of society which emphasizes the idea that freedom is freedom from the state. In addition, Nozick wants to ensure that the individuals' rights are not infringed upon in the slightest—whatever the gains to others may be. Therefore, Nozick attacks Rawls' theory on the grounds that the difference

principle violates the property rights of the individual (Nozick, 1974). Nozick states that after the wealth is distributed, the people will voluntarily adopt the market principle over Rawls' principle of distribution. In Nozick's view, to force the people to continue distributing their wealth is a violation of their individual rights.

In contrast to Rawls' original position, Nozick has his own hypothetical concept of society. The society that he describes is one without a centralized authority, where each individual is isolated and engaged in no common action. He bases his ideas on what John Locke describes as the "state of nature" (Nozick, 1974, p.10). Nozick suggests that in place of a central government, individuals choose to serve on mutual protective associations that come to the defense of the members whose rights have been violated (Nozick, 1974, p.12). Individuals choose to be on these associations through the "invisible hand process." This process, which was first conceived by Adam Smith in 1776, suggests that the way that people interact leads to social interest (Nozick, 1974, p.18). Thus, they come to form mutual protective associations. These associations are very much in accordance with having a minimal state, since the members of the protective associations intervene when needed, instead of a central government. Ultimately, the dominant protective association forces the less powerful into their association (Nozick, 1974). He claims that since the people will be justly compensated, their rights as side constraints will not be violated. Nozick describes the rights as side constraints as the unbreachable, moral spaces surrounding a person. According to Nozick, Rawls' theory is not moral, because he feels the redistribution of wealth violates a person's rights as side constraints.

Nozick further claims that his theory is just because it is the only political theory consistent with Immanuel Kant's basic moral principle of categorical imperative. This principle states that an individual should be treated as an end rather than a means to helping the poor.

Nozick's theory, like that of Rawls', also contains a number of problems. To begin with, according to the invisible hand theory, an individual's rights are not considered violated if he is "justly compensated." However, this does not take into account that there are certain aspects of life which cannot be replaced monetarily. A second flaw in Nozick's theory is that, while he does mention rights as side constraints, he never offers a theory as to why they are just. He merely claims that they



are axiomatic, or self-evident (Nozick, 1974). The third, and, perhaps, most problematic aspect of Nozick's theory is his claim that society is composed of isolated individuals in the state of nature. He does not take into account the fact that people interact with their families and are influenced by them in some way or another.

After studying the political theories of both John Rawls and Robert Nozick, I have come to the conclusion that the argument posed by Rawls is the more viable of the two. While he places the utmost importance on the rights of individuals, he still allows for redistribution principles which promote the betterment of society. I feel that Nozick is too narrow in his view on the moral state of the individual, to the extent that he does not take into account the moral actions of a society as a whole. Rawls' argument is presented in a logical manner and he attempts to defend himself from every possible angle. While his theory does rely on a number of assumptions, for example, that people are risk averse, they are assumptions that I find logical and probable. Nozick's theory, on the other hand, is based upon a number of premises that I have great difficulty accepting. For example, I do not agree with the assertion that individuals are isolated from each other with little interactions. I believe that the very nature of people is to be social, and, therefore, find the state of nature theory highly unrealistic. Further, I completely disagree that an individual's property can be confiscated if he is properly compensated. In my opinion, it is a clear violation of his individual rights—far worse than taking a small percentage of his money and giving it to the poor.

Thus, I believe that the welfare state is moral and just. While it may not be the ideal situation, I believe that welfare has the potential to vastly improve society—provided that society is based on a society that is moral and just.

## Foreign Policy: Corporate Piracy, Human Rights and Proliferation of Military Equipment

*Molly Saiger*

Following in Japan's footsteps, China is creating yet another "Asian miracle." The country has been rapidly expanding in all four sectors: state, collective, private, and foreign-funded. A new elite is being created, composed of the owner-operated, suburban executives, and state capitalists. With financing coming from the government, there are tremendous advantages to both state and populace. The strong state structure provides financing on the one hand, and a strict order of governance and control on the other, in which there is no capitalistic or economic freedom. This same system is present, in varying degrees, in countries such as Singapore and Indonesia, as well as in Japan. According to Theda Skocpol, while economics may run the state, the political structure within which it operates is equally, if not more, important. The state has allowed for private interest, but has acted as a buffer to corporate power.

China is also trying to achieve a competitive place in the international market and to modernize its internal structure. This struggle is apparent in its foreign policy, especially in its relationships with the United States and the former Soviet Union.

China was once the center of Soviet policy in Asia. In 1949, two major shifts occurred: the Soviets conquered Eastern Europe, and revolution conquered China, placing the Communists in power.

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"The soil makes different wine from the same grape, and so the inevitable contrasts produced by these two very different societies soon transformed China from a triumph in Soviet eyes into a challenge" (Mandelbaum 23). The two countries then became rivals in every sense, attempting to totally diminish each other, and risking their entire identity. The Americans entered the conflict in 1971, sending Henry Kissinger on a secret mission to Beijing. Now a new "triangle" replaced the former bilateral relations between the Soviets and China, adding a new player. At first, the triangle did not seem to pose a threat to the Soviets, who trusted Nixon and Kissinger when they promised not to favor China. But in 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security advisor, traveled to Beijing to discuss, among other issues, security cooperation. It was apparent that the US was choosing Beijing over the Soviets and that the security meetings were an attempt to isolate the Soviets. It was not until 1982 that Sino-Soviet relations normalized, with Brezhnev and then with Gorbachev. With formal recognition of each other, conflict eased and trade increased tremendously (Mandelbaum 26).

In more recent years, China has regained its position as the most important East-Asian economic partner of Russia. However, all the work that has been put into the Sino-Soviet relationship could be futile if the states that make up the former Soviet Union can spread to the countries of Eastern Europe, as well as those in Central Asia, creating a wave of instability. Such conflicts could be detrimental, interrupting the economic and political stability throughout not only Asia, but the world. China is very concerned with the possibility of such instability, and therefore has joined together with Russia in preventing trouble in the Asian rimland. If tensions should be escalated again, the competition between the two will also undoubtedly escalate, possibly returning to pre-1971 levels.

In 1992, President Clinton came to power stating his intent to improve the US economy. As only a strong domestic policy will provide for an effective foreign policy, the president suggested a policy of maximizing--a policy that would open up free markets, rather than containment. In addition, the US has always seen its relationship with various countries in bilateral terms. Individual agreements are made with various countries and contain a "high ideological content."

This policy is in direct opposition to Chinese foreign policy. "Beijing sees its individual policies toward the United States, Japan, and

Russia as part of an interrelated strategy implemented with little ideological content" (Mandelbaum 64). Their policy is based on the following presumptions: Firstly, that economics is key to overall national power; secondly, that East Asia could remain comparatively stable, while instability and conflict will occur in other regions; thirdly, that money will flow into China from ethnic Chinese and other foreign powers because of its rapid growth. The US restraint on Japan, among other things, has resulted in China's ability to advance. Japan poses a serious economic challenge as well as a potential security threat if it were to regain military power.

Just one month ago, on Nov. 25<sup>th</sup>, President Clinton secured a major deal with the leaders of seventeen other Asian Pacific countries, all members of the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Agreements were made eliminating many tariffs on various exports by the year 2000. In some of the APEC countries, tariffs have grown to about 20 times that of the US tariffs. A goal for free and open trade was set to be accomplished over the next twenty-five years. Free trade is of extreme importance considering that, "more than 80% of global trade in information technology occurs among the APEC member nations, which account for 50% of the goods and services produced in the world. Technology products are a \$1.8 trillion economic sector worldwide, with global trade amounting to \$500 billion a year, fueling perhaps 200, 000 export-related jobs in the United States alone" (Purdum A12).

China has become so obsessed with its economic advancement that individuals, not laws, currently rule the country. People are trying to make as much money as possible in the least amount of time, with no care for the legality of their actions. This has resulted in corruption both internally and abroad. Corruption among government officials and their relatives has soared. A significant number of cars are being stolen from Hong Kong, and illegal trade in South Korea is on the rise. Major scams are being uncovered, such as "the mislabeling of products made in China to circumvent textile quotas based on product origin, the growing trade in narcotics, the trafficking in the parts of endangered species, or piracy in the southern and northern waters off China's coast" (Mandelbaum 70). Issues of concern to the US include the protection of intellectual property, the proliferation of weapons, and human rights.

Although the proliferation of weapons and the technologies of

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advanced weaponry are of great importance to the US, the protection of intellectual property and other trade-related issues have taken top priority. US policy has been not to allow "differences over individual issues—however significant—derail the entire relationship. Human rights is very important, so is peace in the Korean peninsula, nonproliferation, trade, and many other issues" (Purdum A6).

Corporate piracy, the unauthorized use of copyrighted software programs, is another great concern. Massive piracy is taking place with computer programs, music recordings or video cassettes. According to statistics published by the Software Publishers Association (SPA) and the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the average software piracy in Asia is over 90%. This means that for every legal copy made in Asia, nine illegal copies are made. An estimated 4.3 billion dollars is lost in revenue each year in Asia alone, and an approximate 12 billion dollars worldwide. The Phyllis Schlafly Report, as quoted by Pat Buchanan, claimed that for each billion dollars lost each year in revenues, twenty thousand American jobs have been lost as well. In another SPA/BSA report, the following figures were quotes:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Loss to US \$</u>	<u>% Illegal</u>
Indonesia	118,320,000	99
China	526,740,300	98
Japan	2,075,809,729	67
Hong Kong	132,688,750	62

Based on these statistics, Japan clearly has a greater advantage over the US economically, but the illegal actions of China far exceed that of Japan, as well as the other countries of East Asia.

The Chinese government has tried to deal with the issues of corporate piracy and military acquisitions, but has avoided issues of human rights abuses. After the chaos in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, China has come to the conclusion that the only way to advance is to follow the path of economic growth first, with political liberalization following only later. If at any point the state looks weak in the eyes of the Chinese people or the international community, China may also suffer the same fate as those countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet bloc.

A. M. Rosenthal has written many articles encouraging Americans

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to boycott Chinese products. In the December 24<sup>th</sup> issue of *The New York Times*, he criticized the US government for inviting Wang Jun and General Chi Haotian to meet with President Clinton at the White House. Mr. Wang is the Chinese Army's chief arms broker and weapons dealer; Gen. Haotian gave the orders to kill dissidents during the Tiananmen Square incident. Rosenthal, as well as many other, have criticized the government for its hypocrisy when dealing with Beijing.

Businesses and universities are also in the spotlight for doing business or accepting donations from Asian countries. A prime example in the business world is the pressure being put on Disney for its co-production of a film about the Dahli Lama. The Chinese threatened to deny Disney future business deals, so Disney would lose a huge market, if they continue filming this movie. The Dahli Lama was a Tibetan religious leader who resisted Chinese control in the 1950's and became a godlike figure to the people of Tibet. As stated earlier, the economic growth in China means a loosening of government control in various areas, and "the authorities seem nervous about losing control over the media" (Faison A12). This is an issue of both media control and human rights. The Chinese government took control of Tibet in 1951 and has tried to rid the Tibetans of much of their culture, including their reverence for the Dahli Lama. A film on the virtues and strength of the Dahli Lama would make China appear weak and overpowered by the West.

In early December, The University of California was offered a few million dollars to fund a center for Chinese culture, contingent upon naming the fund after Chiang Ching-Kuo, "the former President of Taiwan who...was among the Chinese Nationalist leaders who have been blamed for the repression of thousands of political dissidents"(Golden A1). This form of donation is becoming very popular, especially among Ivy League colleges in the US. Administrators have found themselves in a quandary because the amounts of money they are being offered are very tempting. The Asians have chosen this form of recognition to gain support for their governments. By accepting the money, the universities or institutions are said to be denying or excusing the abuses of that government.

The American public finds it immoral to continue economic discussions and meetings with the Chinese until the internal problems, namely human rights abuse, cease. This view, although noble, is unrealistic and would have grave consequences for the US foreign policy

worldwide. The US cannot afford to be isolated from China, just as China could not survive without the US. The Chinese also need the US markets, technology, and foreign investments. Without such capital, their growth will slow or even fall behind competitors. In addition, China needs the US to maintain stability in the region. With the US keeping an eye on Japan, as well as the developments in countries such as Korea and the republics of the former Soviet Union, China has been able to develop at an incredible speed.

The US government has come to the realization that it must become more involved in the "Pacific Community." They have therefore supported the APEC, as well as the formation of ASEAN forum, both to be held annually. Although Clinton has preached cutbacks in the domestic defense spending, he realizes the necessity of keeping US troops in the Asian Pacific. With the nuclear capabilities and potential in countries such as South Korea, the US cannot afford to leave. The government realizes that isolating the Chinese and not allowing them "Most Favored Nation" status only creates problems. China has great military capabilities, a seat in the U. N., is located in the heart of strategic Asia, and is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Having isolated China for approximately a year and a half following the Tiananmen Square incident, pressed for human rights and denied MFN status, the US now realizes that it must change its foreign policy. "In dealing with those abroad, trade and arms control issues are negotiable; external demands for rapid political liberalization on the mainland are not. If the United States pushes the human rights agenda too hard, it will find that its traditional allies will not follow" (Mandelbaum 82).

The US must temporarily drop the human rights issue if it wants to continue favorable trade agreements. While it may seem like a "sell-out," there is no other way to both maintain security and protect our interests, domestically and abroad. Additionally, the US must recognize that all bilateral agreements have international consequences. All possible repercussions must be thoroughly examined before making any promises or deals with any one country. A US withdrawal from the Pacific would result in an escalation of violence or instability in the region, disrupting trade and security. The US position is therefore vital to a stable and productive Pacific.

Every country must be made to feel as if their agreement and deals

being made in the Pacific are to their advantage as well. Russia must gain capital and security, and Japan and the US must work out trade agreements which will not disrupt already sensitive relations. In dealing with China, all issues must be given equal weight so as not to unbalance the fragile situation. The US must try and please everyone, while simultaneously securing itself what it needs economically to be competitive in the next century.

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## Analysis of Modern Executive Power

*Ann Horowitz*

There are always two ways of interpreting legal documents: according to the letter of the law or according to the spirit of the law. The constitution of the United States is rather vague in its description of the desired nature of executive power and, as a result, we must call into question the strong character into which the modern presidency has evolved. History seems to prove that the executive office has grown immensely since its conception and that presidents have exhausted and exceeded their strict constitutional limits. However, while they may have gone above and beyond the *letter* of the law, they have been warranted to do so by the *spirit* of the law, and are hence justified in doing so.

Political scientist Harvey Mansfield titled his book *Taming the Prince*, and the elusive meaning behind the title is an appropriate microcosm of the elusive messages in the book. Taming the "prince," a play on Machiavelli's Prince, indicates that essentially the president is a Machiavellian ruler who needs only to be "tamed" by the constitution. However, one can also interpret the title in a way that merely describes a strong executive who is entirely constitutional and subdued by the law. Such is the nature of Mansfield's argument. Upon closer analysis, however, it is apparent that Mansfield's vision of a true executive is one whose power may surpass the law, should the need arise. Mansfield masks this with terms like "democratized" and "constitutionalized," probably because he realizes the danger in blatantly promoting a form of leadership that can negate the constitution.

Mansfield's seeming ambiguity in conceiving the modern executive's power can be simply explained as two analytical points of view.

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The first, termed a constitutional executive, possesses all of the attributes of a strong executive in a manner that is completely consistent with the law, the constitution, and democracy. The second is the Machiavellian executive who embodies the notion that strong executive power is indispensable to the modern republic. This gives the executive the liberty to go above the law when necessary in the name of performing his presidential tasks. Mansfield attempts to turn the unconstitutional prince into the constitutional executive, but what he actually does is disconnect justice from necessity and then defend necessity.

Out of a critical balance of fear and necessity, the framers of the Constitution instituted the potential for a strong executive branch. The triad structure of the American government provides for an elaborate system of checks and balances; of necessity, the executive branch plays a pivotal role in the internal balance. Checked jointly by the legislative and judicial branches, the executive is broadly provided for in its definition of powers in the Constitution, but just as widely guarded against by both society and the Constitution.

The modern executive exists in and solely because of the modern republic. The modern republic has therefore created executive power to be dependably democratic, as well as legal and constitutional. In an analysis of the growth of the presidential office, Robert Dahl paints an eloquent analogy: "The presidency is like a family dwelling that each new generation alters and enlarges. Confronted by some new need, a president adds on a new room, a new wing; what began as a modest dwelling has become a mansion; every president may not use every room, but the rooms are available in case of need."

The presidency started off as being a clerkship, a symbolic office, and Washington's legacy was his stately embodiment of that role. Following that, however, each new president helped to turn his office from a passive, symbolic one into a more active and powerful one. The presidents that are noted as having stretched the Constitution and taken many new, unprecedented powers are—not coincidentally—the same presidents that we as Americans regard as our greatest leaders.

As president, Thomas Jefferson himself undertook the responsibilities that had previously been assumed by Hamilton (Washington's Secretary of Treasury). Andrew Jackson then took the next

step. He justified his use of the veto against congressional majorities by claiming that the national leader elected by, and responsible to the people, was the only official elected by votes cast over the whole nation, and he was therefore the most legitimate representative and spokesman.<sup>1</sup> Jackson's view of the presidency was a radical break with tradition and he faced much opposition. Henry Clay claimed that Jackson was creating a revolution in which the concentration of power was being shifted into the hands of one man.<sup>2</sup> Time disproved Clay's accusations. There was no revolution, and the base of power in this country continues to operate within a balanced and divided structure.

Abraham Lincoln is said to be the president that took presidential power to its outermost boundaries. In his inaugural address, Lincoln vowed to faithfully execute the laws of the Union in all of the states—as the constitution itself had expressly enjoined upon him, "unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall...direct to the contrary."<sup>3</sup> This statement captures the essence of the presidency and the justification for the power it has taken. Maintaining the Union was, for Lincoln, the crucial issue, and if violating the Constitution or disregarding congressional sentiment was needed in order to do so, then by right of necessity he was justified. In 1864 he asked, "Was it possible to lose the nation and yet to preserve the Constitution?"<sup>4</sup>

Lincoln understood the Constitution, and he knew exactly when and how he was transgressing it. However, he also had the wisdom to realize that certain circumstances carried with them enough potential danger to warrant the use of unusual power. The two Constitutional clauses upon which he acted were: "the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States..." and "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." The lack of detail in these statements leave the president with much latitude for broad interpretation. The success of a president depends, among other things, on his knowing that he may only go *above* the law in the name of *preserving* the law. The system

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<sup>1</sup> Dahl, p.92

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.93

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.95

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p.95

will not tolerate a president who exceeds his Constitutional limits for the sake of his own self-aggrandizement.

In addition to the emergency powers given to the president during times of war or crisis, the Executive Branch has also single-handedly taken on the responsibility of foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson wrote, "The nation has risen to the first rank in power and resources... Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the greatest powers of the world, whether he acts greatly and wisely, or not..."<sup>5</sup> Every president since Roosevelt has given a major part of his attention to foreign affairs, and Congress, the courts, and the people have long since shown that they expect initiative on foreign policy to lie with the Chief Executive.<sup>6</sup>

The twentieth century has been an era of Caesars: Churchill, de Gaulle, Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, Khrushchev, etc. How would the United States have been able to maintain its status as the most powerful and democratic nation if not to have a single leader (as opposed to hundreds of members of congress) join the ranks of powerful men? Even as the masters of foreign policy, however, presidents do not go unchecked. Wilson's Peace Treaty and League of Nations Covenant was to be his greatest triumph and ended up being his greatest defeat—at the hands of a hostile Senate.<sup>7</sup>

In this century, the president has come to play yet another role: the president, not the Congress, now initiates legislation and uses his skills to ensure congressional support for his policies. Following Wilson, presidents such as Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson already took for granted their obligation to originate legislation. Although as late as the New Deal, Congress occasionally spoke of the president's role in legislation as being a usurpation of their authority, objections of this kind have almost disappeared.<sup>8</sup>

The strongest proof in defense of Mansfield's modern doctrine of executive power is the fact that for over two centuries the American System has remained resilient. As stated before, it is no coincidence that

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p.98

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p.98

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p.98

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p.99

the presidents that are hailed as heroes are the very same presidents who have boldly extended their reaches into areas that were considered off-limits by strict interpreters of the Constitution. The extenuating circumstances of their times necessitated a certain degree of power, and they simply would not allow themselves to be paralyzed by the very document that they were sworn to protect. In the instances where the president in office has shown a less noble motive for his use of power, neither the system nor the people have been tolerant of it (as seen in the case of Johnson and Nixon).

From its beginnings, the office of the presidency has been in perpetual evolution. The growth of this office has occurred parallel to the growth and emergence of the United States as a dominant world power. These two are inextricably connected, and one is dependent on the other. A strong nation cannot exist without a strong leader. The beauty of the democratic system is that it allows for a strong leader while maintaining an inherent check against tyranny. Examples such as the Civil War and the New Deal prove an expansion in presidential power that one should be conscious of, but not that should be feared. It is quite obvious, looking retrospectively, that a less aggressive approach taken in either situation would have simply failed to meet the nation's needs.

The founding fathers created the Constitution with the knowledge that the world would not always be as they saw it. It was crafted to be an elastic, living document, one subject to amendment and broad interpretation. In the era of George Washington, the people required a symbolic president, and he served his purpose well. In the modern era, we, the people, demand a strong president, and the Constitution does and must continue to provide for that. The executive branch will continue to evolve in the future, as it has been doing, in accordance with democracy and the need of the people.

## Russia's Role in NATO Expansion

*Leebie Mallin*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in 1949 as a defense alliance directed against the Soviet Union. While the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992, NATO continues and is currently being redefined in terms of goals and membership. The United States is presently seeking to expand NATO by accepting select East European states. It has no intention, however, of including Russia into NATO. Should Russia be included in NATO? This question forms the argument of the present paper. Although it first appears otherwise, a close look at the issues of Russian expansionism and internal Russian affairs, makes it clear that it is vital for any NATO enlargement to include Russia. Moreover, if Russia is excluded, no NATO enlargement should take place.

In December, 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated the following : "NATO was formed in the shadow of the Soviet threat. Meeting that threat was its primary goal for almost half a century. But its founders also created NATO to be a permanent alliance that would meet emerging threats to our security and deter new ones from arising...The alliance always has been open to members that share its principles and that could contribute to its goals. It has always been dedicated to as much of Europe as would eventually become free (Christopher, 902)."

A permanent NATO "dedicated to as much of Europe as would eventually become free," however, is problematic. The collapse of Sovietism has left, technically speaking, all states formerly incorporated into that Empire itself "free." Should NATO membership be extended now to Russia? Admitting Russia, along with its neighbors, into NATO, is viewed by many as unacceptable. The argument against Russia's entry into NATO is substantial. Russia has a long record of an aggressive, imperial

foreign policy and currently faces political instability.

Those that fear a Russian membership in NATO, do so because they feel that the Cold War was not simply a political struggle of democracy over communism. Instead they view it as a struggle to contain an imperialist Russia. Thus, Christopher's criterion for NATO membership notwithstanding, in this view even a democratic Russia should not be a part of NATO. In fact, the role of NATO remains unchanged from the time of the Cold War; to control Russia (Sergei, 18).

Most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, formerly under Soviet Russian Satellites throughout the Cold War, are so interested in joining NATO because of their continued fear of potential Russian aggression. Bronislaw Geremek, a democratic politician in Poland, expresses this fear: "At the moment Russia is weak. But we know that this is a transitional period. The Soviet empire could be succeeded by the Russian empire. In some years, Russia will become a super power again- and the memory of this period of weakness will have an important psychological impact on a new generation of Russian leaders" (Mandelbaum, 10). German Defense Minister Ruhe stated that Russia's admittance into NATO "would so dilute the alliance as to render it meaningless." Underlying Ruhe's remark is this view that NATO still serves its original function, namely , protecting Russia's neighbors from Russian aggressive behavior (Brzezinski, 31).

Significant to the argument against Russia's joining NATO is nuclear capability. Russia, though now weak, is still Europe's only nuclear superpower. Furthermore, Russia may no longer have troops in Central Europe, but it still has conventional forces near the borders of Norway and Turkey. The possibility exists that Russia will once again use its military might in conjunction with an aggressive foreign policy.

Many point out that shortly after the Cold War ended, Russia returned to its aggressive tendencies. In December, 1992, Russian-piloted planes from Uzbekistan contributed to the fall of the Tajikstan government, which was composed of Islamic and democratic groups. Russia then replaced the government with pro-Communist rulers. In March, 1994, Russia cut off gas supplies to Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. Former CIA Director Robert Gates says that Russia has taken such actions in order "to make a bad situation worse so that these countries are forced to come to Russia for help" (Fedardo, 43).

Peter W. Rodman, a foreign policy official for the last four U.S.

Republican Presidents, considers the Russian "menace" a foregone conclusion: "Some will lament that (in expanding NATO to Central Europe) we have drawn a new line dividing the European continent. Nonsense. Russia is already getting back on its feet geopolitically, even before it gets back on its feet economically. The only potential great-power security problem in Central Europe is the lengthening shadow of Russian strength, and NATO still has the job of counter-balancing it. Russia is a force of nature; all this is inevitable" (Mandelbaum, 10).

Russian domestic instability aggravates the possibility for external aggression. Political scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder contend that countries going through the transition from dictatorship to democracy undergo a mix of "mass politics and authoritarian elite politics." As a result, democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than countries under authoritarian rule (Mansfield and Snyder, 79-80). This is quite evident today in Russia.

The events in 1993, namely the violent siege of the Russian Parliament building and the support that nationalists gained in subsequent Parliamentary elections, point out that Russia is not stable. In the June 1993 Presidential primary one fourth of all Russian voters supported radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. As a result, Zhirinovskiy made it quite clear that he feels ethnic Russia must regain its empire and subordinate minority groups (Duffield, 768). Even though Yeltsin ultimately managed to win the 1996 Presidential election, for many weeks it was too close to call. There was a very real possibility that the Russian people would vote in Zuganov, of the Communist party.

Even mainstream democratic leaders in Russia have taken on imperialistic attitudes regarding former Soviet republics. Many also interpret former Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev's decision to forcefully put down the Chechnyen revolt as an attempt to show the world that Russia still has a powerful army (Mansfield and Snyder, 96). Yergeni Primakov, who is notorious in the West, was named Foreign Minister of Russia. During the Persian Gulf War, as Gorbachev's special envoy to the Middle East, Primakov advised that the Soviet Union should demand an immediate peace so that it could maintain its strong ties with Saddam Hussein. Yeltsin chose Primakov precisely because of his anti-Western views. In order to win the June 1996 election Yeltsin strove to become more conservative so that he could gain back the support given to



Communists and hard line nationalists (Russian's New Face, 42).

At first glance the exclusion of Russia from NATO seems to be legitimate. After a more thorough analysis, however, it becomes clear that the justifications used to keep Russia out of NATO, point out why it is vital that Russia be included. Russia has a record of imperialism. It now faces domestic problems and thus needs NATO. Any exclusion from an expanded NATO, will lead to an even more aggressive and less stable Russia.

The overwhelming majority of the Russian people do not believe that the Cold War was a fight against an imperialist Russia. Rather, they feel that Russia, together with the West, won the war against Soviet Communism. They hope that Russia, along with NATO, will build a more just and secure world. It is not true that Russia is destined to hinder peace in Europe. There is indeed no such thing as a Russian genetic predisposition to aggression. The Russian historian, Martin Malia, has argued that democracy and free markets can develop in Russia. He said "Nations are not constants. It is pseudo-wisdom to deduce future prospects mechanically from past precedents" (Mandelbaum, 6).

A close look at Russian history indicates that it is an exaggeration to say that the Russian people have a never ending desire for expansion. For centuries Russia did not expand at all and, in fact, was conquered by the Vikings, the Mongols, the Teutonic Knights, and the Swedes. Russian actions in Siberia and Muslim Central Asia were not more imperialistic than Spain's conquest of America, Great Britain's imperialism in North America, India, and Africa, or the United State's expansion against Native Americans, Mexicans, Hawaiians, and Filipinos. In fact, Russia did not get involved in the colonization of Africa, while the European democracies did. Furthermore, during the Napoleonic wars, the Revolutions of 1848, and the First and Second World Wars, Russia did no more than fight for the status-quo regarding Western Europe (Lind, 29-30). Moreover, Russia has suffered two traumatic invasions by Western imperialists - that of Napoleon and that of Hitler. Since, in reality, there is no particularly Russian imperialism, it can not be used as a reason to exclude Russia from NATO.

#### Instability

Instability is also not a basis for denying NATO membership to Russia. NATO was created during the Cold War to serve as a deterrent to Russian

military expansion. Therefore, in the post-Cold War era, if NATO is expanded without Russia it will imply that the West does not intend to form a partnership with Russia and instead seeks to solidify its own political gains. Doing so would bring to Russia the "defeatist complex" that once brought Hitler and Mussolini into power (Markov, 18).

Those that point out Russia's instability as an excuse to leave Russia out of NATO must keep in mind that membership in NATO is what Russia needs precisely because of the internal problems it now faces. If West Germany had not been accepted into NATO, it might not have become the stable democracy that it is today. Membership in NATO also worked as a stabilizing factor in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey (Asmus, 30). The West should not repeat the mistake it made after World War I by treating Russia the way that it did the Weimar Republic in Germany (Joffe, 52).

Even after Yeltsin's reelection, Russia is unstable and needs NATO. Just three months after appointing Alexander Lebed as head of the Security Council, Yeltsin fired him for insubordination. In Russia, the murder rate is double that of the United States. According to Russian government statistics, by late 1995, 8000 criminal gangs existed in Russia. The fastest growing service industry is personal security. The press is still not truly free (Remnick, 37). Yeltsin's continued ill health could lead to a permanent crisis. After the recent elections Mikhail Gorbachev said: "I lived through the last days of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko and I know how illness in power leads to danger" (Remnick, 44).

There are still many nationalists in Russia who are *derzharnik*, proponents of a strong state. They claim that Russia's security and well-being depend on a strong state. They further assert that it was the West that brought about the breakup of the USSR and that current economic problems are the result of efforts by the West to keep Russia weak. Russian hostility toward the West is further fueled from a feeling that their country is being excluded from a European security plan. The West must prove to Russia that such fears are unwarranted (Matlock, 42). America must realize that Russia is currently going through a period of difficult national redefinition. The job of the United States should be to encourage the Russian leadership to understand where Russia's real interests lie. This can only happen if America makes it clear that the door is open to cooperation and partnership. This way, Russian nationalists will find it difficult to claim that America is hostile.

Before moving forward with extending NATO, a NATO that as of now does not include Russia, the West should pay heed to the fact that all political factions in Russia are seriously opposed to Russia's exclusion. This is clear from a number of incidents in Russia. In September 1995, Yeltsin went so far as to say that NATO expansion (without Russia) would "light the flame of war all over Europe." Yeltsin even threatened to leave NATO's Partnership for Peace if NATO proceeded with the planned expansion (Cooperman and Trimble, 64). Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister at the time, told reporters that Russia will attack any Eastern European country that joins NATO and allows the alliance to place nuclear weapons in its territory. Although Mikhailov appeared to be drunk when he made this statement, he was clearly stating how many Russian leaders feel (Yeltsin, Zyuganov, 107). Russia has now "conceded" to the admittance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and so far Mikhailov's prediction has not materialized. According to the latest news, Russia is "bargaining" with the United States; Russia will agree to NATO acceptance of a minimum number of Central European states if there are no military installations in these states. Without the force of the military, however, what is NATO membership for these states? It is thus clear that since the United States has already made it clear that NATO will expand, Russian is attempting to draw out negotiations (Gordan, A-1).

Many Russian politicians feel that an extension of NATO to Central and Eastern Europe, could leave Russia with no alternative other than to seek a military alliance with China. Alexander Knonolav, a director of Moscow's center for Military Policy and System Analysis, said that "when the West openly demonstrates that Russia has no role to play, it leaves only one way for Russia to react - to find other allies and to contrive a policy that does as much harm to the West as possible" (Cooperman and Trimble, 64).

Some argue that the tough stands of Russian democratic leaders are only to combat the nationalist leaders that favor Russia returning to an aggressive foreign policy. It is more likely, however, that one of the few things that Russians agree on is to be tough regarding its exclusion from NATO. Russia feels that, as a result of America's support for an expanded NATO, the United States has gone back on the bargain made between the two countries after the Cold War. Russia agreed to pull out of Eastern Europe and allow a united Germany to join NATO in return for America's

pledge not to threaten Russia's security (Schwarz, A-29). As a result of these factors, it is vital that a security arrangement be made between Europe and Russia, i.e.: admittance of Russia into NATO.

It is naïve for the West to assume that it does not have to include Russia as a major European player. Russia's dominance in Eastern Europe was not simply a result of the Cold War and thus the collapse of Communism did not mark the end of Russian influence in this area. Historically, Russia has played a major role in Central and Eastern Europe. Its attempt to liberate the Greek Orthodox people from Ottoman I rule and its pan-Slavism existed before Russia became a part of the Soviet Union. Russian forces entered Hungary in 1848 to quench a revolution against Hapsburg rule. Great Britain and France fought the Crimean War in order to counter Russian involvement in the area. Russia reacted to the revolt of the Balkan Slavs in the 1870s by fighting against Turkey and helping form Bulgaria (Harris, 42). So Russia can not simply be overlooked in Eastern Europe now that Communism is over.

#### Russia Deserves NATO Membership

In the post-Cold War world, aside from the many risks involved in excluding Russia from NATO, there are reasons why Russia merits to be included. Since 1991 Russia has broken with its absolutist past and has been working hard to emerge as a full-fledged democracy. Russia has the structural foundation for democracy; including an elected president, bicameral parliament, and a constitutional court. Over 50 percent of Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) is produced by the private sector. In December 1995 Communists won many seats in a Parliamentary election and Yeltsin was behind in the polls. There was a real fear that Yeltsin would lose, cancel, steal, or not survive the election. Such dire predictions were proven incorrect. Seventy two million citizens, more than 67 percent of eligible voters, participated in the election (Talbot, 59). The result of that election proved that the Russian people have no desire to return to communism or the xenophobia of Russian nationalists.

Russia also deserves admittance into NATO because of its increased cooperation with the West. In June 1994, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace with NATO, the U.S. proposed program of military cooperation. Russia is an active member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and it may be eligible for membership in the Council of Europe (Holbrook, 49). It is also important to note that all

of the changes in Europe's security system from 1987 to present, which have reduced Russian power, have taken place with Russia's agreement (Mandelbaum, 13).

The risks of enlarging NATO as a traditional military alliance may be justified if a major external threat to the Central European states exists. Russia, however, is not interested in, nor capable of presenting such a threat. It has watched passively as NATO troops conducted military exercises in Poland and the Czech Republic.

The Russian agreement with NATO over troop participation in Bosnia peacekeeping operations further reveals the Russian government's compromising attitude. Russia originally was strongly opposed to Russian troop participation in Bosnia under NATO's command. The Russian government signed the agreement though, in the hope that it will improve its deteriorating relationship with Western nations (Pikayer, 1).

Russia also merits NATO membership because of the fact that Russia's military has so far withstood much turmoil in Russia and has been relatively stable. The military has done a remarkable job of remaining above politics. It has followed government orders during the 1991 and 1993 coup attempts. It also carried out its assigned mission in Chechnya, despite being opposed to the mission (Lambeth, 96).

It is true that Russia has problems of instability, but Russian foreign policy is on the whole consistent with U.S. interests. The Duma's statement that agreements to destroy the USSR are invalid, was derided and viewed as embarrassing to most Russians. The U.S., is above all, relying on Russia to responsibly control the arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, reduce nuclear warheads and delivery, and to eliminate chemical and biological weapons (Matlock, 39).

The sign of a sound international security system is its ability to change with the times. Currently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is being put to the test. As the leaders of NATO formulate the details of expansion, they will have to determine if Russia should be admitted. A careful examination reveals that Russia's history of dominance and its struggle with democracy are not valid reasons for its exclusion from NATO.

The idea that Russia is an insatiable expansionist nation is not supported by reality. Furthermore, Russia has already made great strides on the road towards freedom. If NATO extends membership to the other members of the Soviet bloc, while excluding Russia, it could lead to further

turmoil in Russia's already turbulent struggle with the formation of a stable democracy. The risks entailed with the isolation of Russia are so great that Russia should be admitted into NATO. Doing so would guarantee peace and stability in Europe. The underlying cause of the West's hesitance toward Russia has more to do with the remnant of Cold War fear than it does with Russia's eligibility. In order for NATO to secure the Europe of the future, its leaders must not dwell in the past.

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