

ת"ס

BSW

"כי כפי מה שיחסר לאדם
ידיעות משארי החכמות, לעומת
זה יחסרו לו מאה ידות לחכמת
התורה, כי התורה והחכמה
נצמדים יחד."

תשכו

G E S H E R

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"The essence of our knowledge of the Deity is this: that He is One, the Creator and the Revealer of Commandments. And all the varied faculties of the spirit are only so many aids to the solution and the detailed description of this knowledge; their purpose is to clarify it and present it in a form that will be at once the most ideal, noble, rational, practical, simple and exalted..."

"How shall man obtain a conception of the majesty of the Divine, so that the innate splendor residing within his soul may rise to the surface of consciousness, fully, freely, and without distortion? Through the expansion of his scientific faculties; through the liberation of his imagination and the enjoyments of bold flights of thought; through the disciplined study of the world and of life; through the cultivation of a rich, multifarious sensitivity to every phase of being. All these desiderata obviously require the study of all the branches of wisdom, all the philosophies of life, all the ways of the diverse civilizations and the doctrines of ethics and religion in every nation and tongue."

RABBI ABRAHAM ISAAC KOOK

FROM THE EDITORS' DESK

The profane need only be sanctified to make it holy, for all chol is potential kodesh (Orot haKodesh Vol. 2, p. 311). Unfortunately, very few college classes at Yeshiva make any attempt to integrate Torah with secular knowledge, to involve the chol with kodesh. Attainment of this intellectual and spiritual integration is left up to the few individuals who are both capable and willing. GESHER hopes to be a forum of such integration, a bridge spanning the gap. Towards this end we have included articles of Torah thought in English, articles by members of the faculty and student body integrating their secular field of interest with Judaism, and finally, articles of general Jewish interest.

Though the contents of our articles are quite varied, we have but one goal, להגדיל תורה ולהאדירה.



The editors of GESHER wish to express their gratitude to Rabbi Dr. Meyer S. Feldblum for giving of his time and of himself in advising and guiding us in the preparation of this publication.

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Kodesh and Chol...

• Joseph B. Soloveichik

How must you and I relate to the world in order to live a life of *Kedusha*? The staff of Geshet feels deeply honored to be able to present this analysis of the dynamics of *Kedusha* by our teacher and *rebbe*, Harav Joseph B. Soloveichik.

SACRED AND PROFANE: KODESH AND CHOL IN WORLD PERSPECTIVES

In the same fashion that *Kodesh* and *Chol* form the spiritual framework of our *Halacha*, so do *Kodesh* and *Chol* determine the dichotomy of living experience into sacred and profane. This double classification of values and experience is not a Jewish one alone. The sacred and profane realms — Religion and Secularism — are cultural distinctions among peoples in all ages, from primitive animists to modern theologians.

Universal though this classification may be, this dualism has often been misapprehended. The *halachic* conception, as to the essence of *Chol* and *Kodesh*, is, as a matter of fact, diametrically opposed to universally accepted formulation, in the circles of religious liberalism, Jewish, as well as non-Jewish.

For many religious world-interpretations, secularism, as conceived theologically and empirically, is a state of uncertainty and fear, unrest and apprehension. It is a limitless, fathomless bourne in which man drifts and wanders, as a straying, wind-tossed leaf. He finds no contentment or peace, no anchor or haven. He is the child of a jesting fate.

Originally delivered as a *yahrzeit shiur* in memory of his father, Rav Moshe Soloveichik, this article first appeared in *Hazedek*, May-June, 1945. The Editors would like to thank Rabbi Aaron Lichtenstein for his help in preparing the article for publication.

Religion, however, in contradistinction to mundane vulnerability, is a state of security and impregnability. It is a *festung* of peace and abiding hope, barricaded to the indifference of nature and the fluctuations of life. In this state man finds purpose and direction, anchor and a haven. He becomes the child of a merciful Providence.

Such a view has shaped the general outlook of many pragmatic expositions as to the essence of the religious act. These behold in religion a refuge of repose for man who is shattered by the numerous, discordant forces of the secular world; religion offers happiness and comfort. In such a spirit William James speaks of the "religion of the happy-minded" that serves him as a model of the religious attitude. It is no wonder that one of the most popular Psalms in religious circles is "the Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want." The idyllic canvas of green pastures and still waters upon which the Psalmist paints in quiet, soothing colors the *gestalt* of the God-worshipper, harmonizes with the pragmatic analysis of the religious act, as one bringing man consolation and hope.

Man, upon entering the religious domain, unburdens himself of the many responsibilities and duties which press upon his mind, and he is relieved of the task of eternal vigilance and self-observation. Perhaps such a philosophy is advantageous for the popularization of religious notions and ideas among the masses. It is easier to "sell" religion to the non-believer if you praise your merchandise as a transcendental "drug" or "opiate" conducive to the eradication of pain and misery. However, at the same time, it dispossesses the religious act of its zest and flavor, its multidimensionality and colorful content. It lures the religious act into the domain of *hedone*, to what Kierkegaard calls "technical wisdom."

The religious experience, however, is beyond granting man an hedonic status or spiritual complacency. To the contrary, the religious experience is fraught with pitfalls and continual challenge. *God, if man finds Him, does not relieve the God-seeker of his imperatives but imposes new ones.* Religion enriches life, gives it depth and multi-dimensional visions, but does not always grant man the comfort and complacency that nearly always spell superficiality and shallow-mindedness. The equation of a happy and concomitantly

profound life is inadequate. The domain of sanctity is more intensely provocative and tortuous than the secular. The *homo religiosus* is wanting in mental balance and harmony to a greater degree than the mundane type. His mind seethes with anti-nomies and anti-thetic problems and questions that will never find their solution.

The error of modern representatives of religion is that they promise their congregants the solution to all the problems of life — an expectation which religion does not fulfill. Religion, on the contrary, deepens the problems but never intends to solve them. The grandeur of religion lies in its *mysterium tremendum*, its magnitude, and its ultimate incomprehensibility. To cite one example, we may adduce the problem of theodicy, the justification of evil in the world, that has tantalized the inquiring mind from time immemorial till this last tragic decade. The acuteness of this problem has grown for the religious person in essence and dimensions. When a minister, rabbi, or priest attempts to solve the ancient question of Job's suffering, through a sermon or lecture, he does not promote religious ends but, on the contrary, does them a disservice. The beauty of religion with its grandiose vistas reveals itself to man, not in solutions but in problems, not in harmony but in the constant conflict of diversified forces and trends. Unhampered by theological doctrine and dogma, the Greeks, in such an understanding, could freely divinate religious faith as "divine madness."

The ideal of Greek ethics was the harmonious personality; the balanced man, and the complete, proportionate nature. Aristotelian psychology and ethics derive from this ideal. Even as a physician, Aristotle analyzed sickness as disharmony and disturbance of proportion. However, the history of culture will attest, in many instances, that the creative geniuses of humanity have not always been harmonious personalities. Creation springs from primordial chaos; religious profundity springs from spiritual conflict. The Jewish ideal of the religious personality is not the harmonious individual determined by the principle of equilibrium, but the torn soul and the shattered spirit that oscillate between God and the world. In his substrata of spiritual experience, the *homo religiosus* endures constantly the diastrophic forces of mental upheaval and psychic collision.

Moses sees the burning bush. On the one hand, he covers his face in apprehension; he would escape the awesome sight. Yet, on the other hand, some mysterious, invisible force fascinates him and irresistibly draws him near. And he says to the great silence, "I will draw near and see this wondrous sight."

This is not harmony and this is not the balanced attitude of the Stoic philosopher. It is, rather, the ideal of a personality torn between two powerful poles of fear and hope, dread and love. And is not the history of Israel a panorama of fluctuations, flight from God and the return? And the exodus from Egypt, the Revelation, the golden calf, the erection of the Temple, the episode of the spies, and later, in the age of the Prophets, the constant alternation of serving God and deserting Him, do they not all symbolize heterogeneity and a chain of discrepancies rather than uniformity and homogeneity? It would appear that the supreme religious experience of Revelation did not suffice to grant full security and religious contentment to Israel; for they sinned while yet in the desert of Sinai, while yet in the shadow of the mount.

It is an empirical fact that *Kedusha* elevates man, not by vouchsafing him harmony and synthesis, balance and proportionate thinking, but by revealing to him the non-rationality and insolubility of the riddle of existence. *Kedusha* is not a paradise but a paradox. The dangers involved in the realm of *Kedusha* are, by far, more hazardous than those predicated in the secular sphere.

This interpretation of *Kedusha* is reflected in the halachic code. The *Halacha* requires of man a more vigilant attitude in regards to *Kedusha* than to *Chol*. Laws, like *פיגול*, *נותר*, *שומאח*, *היסח הדעת*, *פיגול*, *נותר*, *יוצא*, and many others that affect only the sacred, not the profane, indicate the halachic view that *Kedusha* can be easily corrupted. *Kedusha* intrinsicates *Shmira*, continual and total awareness and diligence lest man fall from his high estate.

Moreover, religion, if corrupted through amoral applications, turns *volte-face* and becomes a negative, destructive force. When the golden calf was inscribed with the Ineffable Name, it became a negative force, not merely a neutralized force, wreaking havoc in the Jewish camp.

We have witnessed how the corruption of great ideals gave birth to evil forces in religious and ethical impregnation, more dangerous than evil fathered by evil. Love, the exalted concept of religion, was distorted into the persecution of heretics. The Dignity of Man, the lofty concept of the Humanists, was transformed into the deification of man and the worship of the dictator. The spiritual concept of the state recrudesced into the fascist corporate state and to the consequent nothingness of the individual. *Kedusha* entails *הורותה ולדתה בקדושה*, the conception and fruition of a divine concept in the constant awareness of sanctity. The *Halacha* is prescient to the fact that pitfalls are present in religious values. It pre-supposes that *Kedusha* involves both positive challenges and negative forces. It is aware that the struggle and challenge lie not in the seeking of religious values but in their keeping. This, then, is the halachic conception of the states of *Kodesh* and *Chol*.

PLACE-CONSCIOUSNESS

The two fundamental dimensions of *Kedusha* are *מקום וזמן* — "Place-consciousness" and "Time-consciousness." The halachic violation of *יוצא*, *נותר*, *זמן ומקום*, *חוי* are defections in place or time. *Kedusha* may be profaned by such defections. What is this first dimension, that of place-consciousness?

It is an anthropological truism that man passed from a nomadic stage to a pastoral stage, and then from an agricultural one to urbanization. From the functional standpoint man has arrived at certain gains through this sociological evolution. The resident or settler has produced a more advanced culture than the nomad. Civilization is, primarily, the product of landed peoples. It was for this reason that Jeremiah urged the Rahabites, a nomadic tribe, to settle and prosper; for they had created nothing as a nomadic people.

In what ways is the settler who has his own "place" superior to the nomad who has none of his own? First, the nomad is an exploiter, a parasite. He moves from one pasture to another, from one feeding ground to another. When favorable ecological conditions turn, he lifts his tent and travels anew. He has neither the desire

nor intent to cultivate his land, for he has no land of his own; and he can always find new pastures. Secondly, the nomad has no mental "bond" with his land. Since he has offered it nothing, it offers him nothing. He does not feel a symbiotic relationship between himself and his land. He has no "place-consciousness."

The settler, however, is a producer and creator. This is his land; he tills and cultivates it. He prays for rain; and he combats the elements that would drive him from his land. He does not wish to find new pastures, for these are integrated with his existence. The settler has a land attachment. His land has become part and parcel of his mental set. He lives in a symbiotic relationship with his land. He has tilled it and it has produced. He loves it and merges in it. He has "place-consciousness."

In the fratricide of Abel by Cain we figuratively observe the above contrast and its results: Cain was stronger than Abel because Cain was a farmer, a settler, while Abel was a shepherd, a nomad. Cain rose and slew his brother because he was the stronger; he had land-attachments, and he fought for them. Abel, the nomad, was "weak" and knew not how to defend himself, for he had no "mental-bonds" that would incite him to an act of defense. And the most fitting punishment for Cain was for him to become a nomad, wandering the earth, restless and derelict.

Nomads and settlers can be understood in a symbolic sense, in terms of spiritual values. Some people's relation to or appreciation of spiritual values and treasures resembles the relation of the nomad to his pastures, in both ways. First, he is a spiritual parasite; as long as nature feeds his flocks, he associates with his place, with certain values. But let his resources and well-springs become exhausted and he lifts his tent and travels anew. Likewise do many appreciate values as long as they can enjoy them, as long as these values render satisfaction. This is the hedonic approach. As soon as an experience loses its value from the hedonic standpoint, it is deserted. Secondly, these people do not display any "place-consciousness" in reference to spiritual norms and values. They are not fused with their ideals. They are not implanted in the deep strata of spirituality and sensate life, even when they enjoy and receive spiritual values. They have no world-perspective of their own.

Early Jewish history passed through the phase of the nomad and into the phase of the settler. Our Sages have denoted this when they summarized the peregrinations of the *Shecinah* from Egypt to Palestine, from *Shiloh* which was called *Obel*, symbol of the nomad, to the Temple which was called *Bayis*, symbol of the settler. The Jew did not attain full *Kedushas Makom*, a sanctified place-consciousness, until he settled on his land, in a true Jewish world-perspective.

A world-perspective is not a cognitive approach to the world; it is not merely a matter of knowledge. One may be acquainted with any culture although the object of one's knowledge need not be identical with one's personal outlook. Cognition does not make for a *Weltanschauung*. The latter rests, not on cognitive foundations, but on a practical act of integration with the self. *Knowledge, together with appreciation and valuation, comprises a world-perspective.* One must become integrated with his knowledge to call it his own. One must live symbiotically with his culture to make it a living experience. He must place himself in the "thickness" of his knowledge and experience it. World-perspective is an all enveloping "sensation" and a dynamic act of valuation. The modern theory of value, since Lotze, Windelband, and Rickert, the fathers of modern axiology, declares truth to be, not a correlative to some ontological entity, but a value that reigns supreme. If one says "my culture," it implies not only the culture of "my acquaintance" but a culture which "I appreciate and value, love and admire, and finally even worship."

The modern exponents of *Weltanschauungslehre* see in philosophy, not just a theoretical discipline, but an intimate personal experience and world view. They stress the personal relationship of the philosopher to his philosophy. (And this is the real meaning of philosophy, as derived from the Greek: *love of wisdom.*) In this point they demarcate between the scientist and the philosopher. The scientist is impartial; the philosopher is a passionate lover of his views.

Thus, the "spiritual nomad" is impartial, has cognition but no love for or integration with a culture. Thus, he is not "place-conscious" in the sense of belonging to any particular culture or world-perspective. In the settler, however, we observe the merger

of the worshipper and his God, of the philosopher and his wisdom. One who has no such personal integration with a world-perspective is a nomad. He has no place consciousness, no sense of "belongingness." He can have no *Kedusha*.

One may be acquainted with many cultures. Yet, the question is always pertinent: "What is my *Makom*, my place? What is my world-perspective?" For knowledge alone means nothing. The spiritual nomad may have universal knowledge and yet remain cultureless, for he does not experience his knowledge. It is only when knowledge becomes an integral part of his existence and consciousness, through the medium of mental-bonds, that it may be truly said that the spiritual nomad has come home, to a place of his own.

The tragedy of many modern Jews today lies in the fact that they are deserting an ancient heritage, and, moreover, severing spiritual bonds with values which man admires or worships. They desert the realm of Jewish values but have not acquired new ones. Their tragedy lies not in their dearth of knowledge, for, quite to the contrary, modern Jews have much theoretical and practical knowledge; rather, it lies in the fact that they are lacking in the living *experience* of values, the passionate merger of the worshipper with the object of his worship. Indifferent knowledge and a sceptical approach to ideals and norms will never result in a multi-dimensional personality. The modern Jew is a spiritual wanderer, and this spiritual wanderer includes not only the non-pious Jew but even a certain type of observant Jew, for piety which is not based on Torah and knowledge does not constitute the ideal of Jewish religiosity.

The religious *telos* finds its full realization in the passionate religious life, permeated with enthusiasm and rapture, which opens to man new vistas and enchanted horizons. Religious inspiration awakens a vision of God, as the frame and space of the world. "I live in God; I think, feel, and exist through Him; He permeates my life and gives it meaning and content." The dualism that is so prevalent in other religions, namely, the division of a profane and sacred domain, is transcended. The entire universe is converted into one, monistic realm, the domain of God. Street and home, the synagogue and the shop merge. The whole of man's life becomes dedicated to God.

Thus, the Jews gave God the remarkable attribute of *Makom*, Place. The Lord is envisaged as the *Mekomo Shel Olam*, the repository of the universe. What is this attribute of "place" for a God Who is infinite and omnipresent? By intuiting the attribute of *Makom*, the *halacha* revealed to the world a revolutionary concept of God. He is not transcendent, mysterious and inapproachable, but our immediate Companion. We live in God and experience Him in His full immediacy. As the settler experiences his home, as man intuits space, so does the Jew intuit God. He does not arrive at Him through philosophical speculation or metaphysical inference. But he meets Him through experience and intuition. הקדוש ברוך הוא, הוא מקומו של עולם, ואין העולם מקומו. God is the repository of the universe. All is contained in Him. He does not repose in me; He is not just one phase of my world-perspective; He envelops all. If the universe is unthinkable without a space frame (and this is, indeed, the crux of Kant's a priori concept), so much more so is the Jewish world incomprehensible without an all-embracing God.

It is these two elements, cognition and integration, that make for a world-perspective, and for the Jew, a *Kedushas Makom*. Without the idea of place-consciousness, the state of *Kedusha*, sanctity, can never be acquired or held. For the approach to God is only through the application of place-consciousness. When one implants himself in the cultural sphere of the Torah and merges with its intrinsic trends, he may claim that he has found God. Without the all-enveloping and all-inclusive space intuition, the ideation of divinity is almost impossible. Even the atheist experiences, at times, the mysterious feeling of the pantheist, of being enveloped by God.

"בשר בשדה מרפה לא תאכלו." The definition of *treifa* was given by the Sages as any object that transcends its own boundaries. Such a one is a torn body, a soul bereft of place. The Jewish attitude denies self-transcendence of *Kedusha*. It requires of holiness to be space and boundary conscious. Place-consciousness is a basic condition for the realization of the *Kedusha* ideal.

TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS

The other dimension or principle of *Kedusha* is *Zman*, "time-consciousness." Bergson's tremendous influence upon modern philosophy

is partly due to the fact that he formulated a new interpretation of time, the so called pure "duree," duration. He contrasted this concept of time with that of the physicist, which is pure chronometry, time quantified and frozen in geometric space, time associated with space in motion and, in modern physics, with the time-space continuum.

Thus, Bergson speaks of fleeting time, living and immeasurable, beyond the scientist's mesh. No clock can be applied to this qualitative time which is transient, intangible, and evanescent, and, on the other hand, creative, dynamic, and self-emerging. In this "time" there are no milestones separating past, present, and future. It is not uni-dimensional, as is physical time, but multi-dimensional, penetrating and overlapping past, present, and future.

With this qualitative time, Bergson contrasts quantitative time. This is time measured by the clock, by the rotation of the earth on its axis, and by its revolution about the sun. This "time" is uniform, empty, and non-creative.

While Bergson limited himself to a philosophical and metaphysical analysis of time, we may proceed further and posit this dualistic time concept as the prime norm of human life that carries with it practical implications and ethical aspects. Man encounters the alternative of moulding time in a quantitative or qualitative pattern.

There are some people who live in quantitative, dead time. They measure time by the clock and by the calendar. For them there is no merger of the past and the future. The present itself is a lost moment. A year is endless. How much more so centuries and tens of centuries! These people are deprived of an historical consciousness; for history is the living experience of time.

The man, however, who lives in qualitative time has a different criterion for the experience of time than the quantitative experimenter. He measures time, not by *length-extensio*, but by pure quality, creativity and accomplishment. While for the man with a quantitative apprehension, all fractions of time are equal because all represent physical "t's"; for the man of qualitative apprehension, there is no equality among temporal fractions of time. Moments are hetero-

geneous. One may live an entire life-span quantitatively, not having lived even a moment qualitatively. And, contrariwise, one may have lived a moment quantitatively and have lived through an eternity qualitatively. The alternative is up to man himself. *The time norm is the highest criterion by which man, life and actions, should be judged.*

Oriental history has given us the best example of such an alternative. Oriental culture and technology is much older than that of Europe or America. Yet qualitatively America is — as regards technology certainly — older than China, for America has created more in one hundred and fifty years than China in five thousand. History is not concerned with quantity but accomplishment. History ultimately is not a composite of calendar time but a qualitative living entity. Wherein did the Orient fail, until recently in keeping "time" with the Occident? There is one answer: in the differing time-consciousness of these two civilizations. China apprehended time as a fact while America envisaged it as a norm.

Those historians who fell in love with the Orient for its Stoic calmness and indifference to the passage of time and who felt the breath of eternity there have misapprehended time and eternity. Eternity is not to be conceived in quantitative uniformity but in qualitative creativity and mutability.

What is true for entire cultures is equally true for individual personalities. There are some people who are always "time thirsty." There are others, however, who are "time saturated." One who fathoms the spirit of time becomes a *Yotzer Olamot*, a creative personality. The problem of the creative personality today is one of time; it is too short. The finite character of time is one of the most crying tragedies of men's life. Yet, if a man lives by quantitative measurements, the problem of time is reversed; he is surfeited by it.

The individual who measures time in purely quantitative terms is an essentially passive personality. He is a recipient and not a giver, a creature rather than a creator. His prototype is the slave. The slave has no time-consciousness of his own, for he has no time of his own. The awareness of *הוֹמֵן גֵּרָמָא*, the full intuition of the qualitative moment, is alien to him. Absolved by homogenous, un-

changeable time, he lacks affinity for a duty whose execution depends solely on time, on a "now" and "not later"; upon a "today" and "not tomorrow"; upon a night whose dawn cancels the opportunity, upon a day whose sunset eliminates the possibility. He does not understand the full impact of such dicta as, "אם לא עכשיו אימתי?" "If not now, then when?" "If the hour beckons, do not delay."

The basic criterion which distinguishes free-man from slave is the kind of relationship each has with time and its experience. Freedom is identical with a rich, colorful, creative time-consciousness. Bondage is identical with passive intuition and reception of an empty, formal time-stream.

When the Jews were delivered from the Egyptian oppression and Moses rose to undertake the almost impossible task of metamorphosing a tribe of slaves into a nation of priests, he was told by God that the path leading from the holiday of Passover to Shevuoth, from initial liberation, to consummate freedom, (*Gilui Shekima*, Revelation) leads through the medium of time. The commandment of *Sefira* was entrusted the Jew; the wondrous test of counting forty-nine successive days was put to him. These forty-nine days must be whole. If one day be missed, the act of numeration is invalidated.

A slave who is capable of appreciating each day, of grasping its meaning and worth, of weaving every thread of time into a glorious fabric, quantitatively stretching over the period of seven weeks but qualitatively forming the warp and woof of centuries of change is eligible for Torah. He has achieved freedom.

We may say then that qualitative-time-consciousness is comprised of two elements: First, the appreciation of the enormous implications inherent in the fleeting moments of the present. No fraction of time, however, infinite, should slip through the fingers, left unexploited; for eternity may depend upon the brief moment. Secondly, the vicarious experience, while in the present, of the past and future. No distance, however removed, should separate one's time-consciousness from the dawn of one's group or from the eschatological destiny and infinite realization of one's cherished ideals.

הוא היה אומר:
האב זוכה לבן בנוי, בכח ובעושר ובחכמה ובשנים ובמספר הדורות
לפניו והוא הקץ שנאמר: קורא הדורות מראש, אע"פ שנאמר ועבדום
ועינו אותם ארבע מאות שנה ונאמר ודור רביעי ישובו הנה.
(עדיות, ג')

Rabbi Akiva said "The father endows his son with his beauty, strength, means, wisdom, years, and the number of generations to come. And this is the *Ketz*, the Redemption; as it is written, 'And they shall enslave them and afflict them for four hundred years'; and it is written, 'In the fourth generation they shall return here.'" How are we to interpret this comment of the *Mishnah*? The various commentators of the Talmud have found it obscure. Let us attempt to resolve this *Mishnah* in the light of what we have said.*

We may conjecture that Rabbi Akiva delivered such a message in the chaotic, strife-torn days of his time. Israel tottered precariously on the brink of the tentative explosion of Bar Kochba's revolt which Rabbi Akiva had prophesied and urged so zealously. "A star hath flared forth from Jacob" that would illumine the dark days of Israel whose sun had been eclipsed by the rising might of Rome. In that abysmal period there were many who counselled moderation and self-control. They pointed at the immature character of such a rebellion; that the time had not yet come to take arms against the might of Rome. In effect, the revolutionists were ranged against the "evolutionists." The old problem of whether man should interfere with the historic process or paths of "fate," in actively determining the course of the same had come to a head. It was a time to accept or reject a policy of *laissez faire* toward history. It was a time for meeting and confuting the objections of the moderators who warned of the immaturity and jeopardy of a *Bar Kochba*. And in countering their cries of a hands akimbo policy to the historic process, Rabbi Akiva delivered this grand view of the two-fold approach to time, *Minyan HaShanim* — *Mispar Hadoros*.

* I am indebted to Rabbi Reines "Orah v'Simchah" for certain aspects of this interpretation.

It is undoubtedly true, if time is measured quantitatively by the *סנין השנים* that only seventy years separate the *Bar Kochba* revolt from the destruction of the Temple, and it is too short a period to bring about a national renaissance and prepare a nation for political autonomy. But, if time is measured qualitatively, by the *מספר הדורות*, what the "generations" accomplish in time, if time be not measured by the clock but by the creativity of a nation, then, in seventy years, a nation may condense an epoch, an eternity, and even become worthy of liberty and autonomy. If the past is alive, *אב זוכה לבן*, "the father endows the son," then the future is already born.

As a divine proof, he quoted two contradictory decrees as to the duration of the Egyptian Bondage. One decree involved four hundred years, the other, four generations, considerably less. This, in effect, is the substance of Rabbi Eliezer's reconciliation of the apparent contradiction of the two decrees. In *Pirke de Rabbi Eliezer* he offers the explanation of "merit," *כאן שזכו וכאן שלא זכו*. The alternatives of the decrees are resolved in terms of time-consciousness. If the Jew is "meritorious," worthy of and alert to the qualitative creative consciousness of time, the decree extends the exile to the fourth generation. However, if the Jew has not attained this kind of time-intuition, but measures time by quantification, the Egyptian exile will extend to a fourth century. The two decrees do not denote irrational divine judgments but an evolutionary cycle of metamorphosis.

The children of Abraham, who had brought the message of liberty to the peoples of the world, had to pass through two transitory periods; from freemen into an oppressed people, and, again, from a man-swarm of slaves and bondsmen into a chosen people. Their metamorphosis from a slave people and a slave mentality into a free people and nation of priests prepared to witness the greatest miracle of all time — the Revelation — was a problem of evolution.

Should the Jew develop the qualitative consciousness of time, his transitional period would expire in four generations. With a qualitative consciousness of time, he could create a Prophet, a Moses, in

four generations. But if he measured time quantitatively, by the sands of time sweeping endlessly over the pyramids of the Pharaohs, then even four hundred years would be too little. Then he would share with the Sphinx the unchanged scene of the Egyptian desert. Then would the Lord apply His own criterion of time: "For a thousand years in Your sight are as a yesterday."

The ideal of *Ketz*, of the "end of the road," can never be realized if it be sought after in quantitative terms; then the process is snail-paced and the stages demarcated by infinite coulisses of time. The process would be akin to the paradox of Zeno, of the tortoise pursuing Achilles. If time be quantitative, a uni-dimensional composite of discrete, infinitesimal moments, then the tortoise will never overtake Achilles and the Jew will never attain Salvation.

Ketz, Redemption, is not something static and distant toward which man gravitates, for as such it would be only an ever regressing mirage in the deserts of time; rather, it is an ideal or norm which man himself quickens into life. Only by qualitative criteria of norms and creativity can man shorten the distance and span time with great leaps. Modern technology has conquered space. *It is the ideal of Ketz to conquer time.*

And this was, in effect, the revolutionary message of Rabbi Akiva who urged his people to revolt against the Romans. The concept of a slow historical process that was so popular among the peoples who lived under the influence of Greek philosophy, the endless morphological evolution from matter into form, from a lower to a higher eidetic stage, carries weight and significance so far as time is lived through quantitatively. Then the forces of history move with an extremely slow pace; years, decades and centuries are nothing but drops in the sea of eternity. What does a century mean in geological evolution? A nation, not comprehending the Janus-face of time or the alternatives that time proffers, may be subject to the same laws and regulations of the cosmic process in nature. Under the aspect of *סנין השנים*, "quantitative years" any rebellion is a priori doomed to a still-birth. If man leaves his fate to the principle of blind, mechanical causality and circumstantial determination, he can never attain salvation and redemption. *Ketz* is non-existent for him as chaos and confusion are precluded in the realm of nature.

The Jews have inherited from Abraham the alternative to מנין השנים. The prophecy of the "generations" challenges man, not to live in time, but to mold it, to give to the indifferent *chronos* new aspects and a new interpretation. Time is computed according to man's own creativity and self-determination. All laws of immutable and unalterable causality fail if man participates in the mysterious unfolding of the *chronos*. A qualitative time experience enables a nation to span a distance of hundreds and thousands of years in but a few moments. To consider time from the aspect of מספר הדורות, of the "generations" which live in it, entails the mystery of *Ketz* — *Geulah*.

If the idea of a *Bar Kochba* revolt is not ripe, continued Rabbi Akiva, then we can never achieve the realization of *Ketz*. If *Ketz* is possible, then quantitative measurements of time are irrelevant and non-existent. In the seventy years from the destruction of the Temple until the outbreak of the *Bar Kochba* upheaval, the Jewish people may have lived through an endless continuum of time, he concluded. "והוא הקץ." And then will be your Redemption!

Stefan Zweig writes of this same time-velocity that accelerated his event-filled life. In the *World of Yesterday* he relates what is, in effect, a contrast of quantitative time with qualitative time:

"My father, my grandfather, what did they see? Each of them lived his life in uniformity. A single life from beginning to end, without ascent, without decline, without disturbance or danger, a life of slight anxieties, hardly noticeable transitions. In even rhythm, leisurely and quietly, the wave of time bore them from the cradle to the grave.

"But in our lives there was no repetition; nothing of the past survived, nothing came back. It was reserved for us to participate to the full in that which history formerly distributed, sparingly and from time to time, to a single country, to a single century."

For the man of the street ancient history is something dim and distant, viewed in the *daemmerung* of the mythological coulisses of time.

The man of the street has no personal relationship with, no consciousness of continuity and interdependency between the glorious

periods of antiquity and the emerging present. Even medieval and modern history from which not many years separate us, appears mythical, romantic and elusive — a refuge for escapist.

But the Jew of the *Masorah* has a different conception of Time. Revelation and Tradition erase the bounds of time. Distance in time is non-existent for him. Thousands of years may have elapsed but he walks back and forth from antiquity to modern times. The chief success of the old *Cheder*, although deficient in many respects, lay in this spirit of compenetration of a distant past and a dim future with an immediate present.

For Jewish boys and girls, Abraham is not a mythical figure, but an ever-present inspiration. They live through his tribulations and wanderings. They travel with him from Syria to Palestine. They feel the fear and trembling of Isaac on the *Akedah*. They escape with Jacob to Haran. They are imprisoned with Joseph in the pit. They rejoice in his ascendancy to high office and fame. They lead the Jews with Moses in the desert of Sinai. They sing with David. They are exalted with the prophets. They laugh with Rabbi Akiva. They meditate with the *Rambam*. These figures are not dead or historical "have-beens" for the children of the *Cheder* or the adults of the *Halacha*, but dynamic, living heroes who visit the Jew from time to time, bringing him comfort, inspiration and hope.

כל בי שמשו הוה אתי (רבי) לביחיה (כתובות ק"ג). In moments of mental elevation, of spiritual exaltation, in times of *Kedusha*, the figure of *Rebbi* would appear to the Jews.

Upon this phenomenon of an historical continuum was founded the strength of *Masorah*, conceived as an historic stream of Jewish spirit whose tributaries of past, present and future merged in each other. This is real historical consciousness. This is qualitative consciousness. Quantitative time creates but archeological consciousness of periods gone by that do not infiltrate into one's own ego existence.

When the Jew, on the holy Day of Atonement, sought to symbolize the contrast between the temporality of the moment and time as one living, creative stream, and the consequences of each, he prepared two sacrifices, שְׁעִיר לַה' וְשְׁעִיר לְעֹזָאזֵל. The kid consecrated

to God was confined to one environ, the *עזרה*, the courtyard of the Temple. If the kid were sacrificed outside of its appointed place, it would become *שחוט חוץ*, a profaned offering. The *שעיר לעזאזל*, the kid condemned to the wastes of the desert, however, became a wanderer, with no appointed place. The one entrusted with the Temple offering, the *שעיר לה'*, was the High Priest, the representative of Tradition, time and eternity, of *Masorah* and *Yerusha*. The one who led the *שעיר לעזאזל* into the desert was the *איש עתה*, the "man of the moment."

Thus, there were two distinctions between the two "kids." The *שעיר לה'* was under the aegis of the High Priest, symbol of Eternity and qualitative time-consciousness; and also confined to the *עזרה*, symbol of *קדושת מקום* "place consciousness." On the other hand, the *שעיר לעזאזל* was under the supervision of the *איש עתה*, symbol of Temporality and quantitative consciousness, confined to no place and welcome to none. These two were contrasted with each other both in terms of time-consciousness and place-consciousness. Place and time went hand in hand.

And what did this *Isb Itz* do to sustain himself while following the homeless scapegoat? He stopped at the "ten booths" set up on the way from Jerusalem to Tsuk, the Sages tell us. On each *Sukkah* was placed water and food. The time unconscious man wanders from one resting place to another, seeking sustenance for the moment. He has neither place-consciousness nor time-consciousness. He is a "spiritual nomad." He has neither culture, religion, nor a philosophical outlook of his own.

Thus, in this rite, the Jew depicted the true *halachic* world perspective of place and time consciousness. Only the *שעיר לה'* who had both was a fitting consecration to God. The other became a nomad with no past, present, or future. He had no other fate but the wastelands.

The timeless wanderer has no *שדה אחוזה* or *קברות אבות*. He cannot say *קדשה לשעתה וקדשה לעתיד לבוא*. For him there is no place merger — God's Chosen House which leads to time consciousness and eternity. *בית הבחירה* is synonymous with *בית עולמים*. The Chosen House is the Eternal House.

CREATIVE TESHUVA

Tonight, on the *Yahrzeit* of my father, Rabbi Moses Soloveitchik, it seems to me as if my father were yet alive, although four years have come and gone since his death. It is in a qualitative sense that I experience his nearness and spirit tonight. I cannot explain the *דמות דיוקנו של אבא*, the spiritual picture of father that hovers near me tonight, as in a yester-year of physical existence.

Our Sages have said, "גדולים צדיקים במיתתן יותר מבחייתן" "The righteous are exalted in death more than in life." If time be measured qualitatively, we may understand how their influence lingers on after their death and why the past is eternally bound with the present. Yet, how do their mortal lives acquire a new significance in death?

Qualitative time-awareness reduces in effect, to interspersing the text of chronology with values and creativity. These values appear in their true perspective when the stream of time undulates them away to the shores of yesterday. From the vantage point of the present, we first evaluate the significance of the past. When we are no longer at one with our values, we first begin to appreciate, evaluate, and even worship them. It is through this effect of contrast that we first arrive at qualitative time-consciousness, a multi-dimensional continuum of past, present, and future. It is through contrast that quantitative time must have a stop and qualitative time a renewed impetus. And so is it with persons or values. When they have disappeared from the stage of the present, they take on a new and profound significance in contrast with the changed scene. Then the hills become smaller and the mountains larger, as time and perspective recede.

There is a concept dating from Plato that the basic values of man's personality (taken in a broad sense) are not fully evaluated in his lifetime or while he has them. An example of this concept is health. While one is imbued with the euphoria of health he is not keenly aware of his physical state. He fails to appreciate the treasure of health. It is only when one has first become ill that he first realizes what health means.

In his pessimistic temperament Schopenhauer contended that we understand health through sickness, pleasure through pain, and good through evil. This awareness through contrast is also apparent in the concept of home or fatherland. We have the striking example today in the sentiments of soldiers overseas. Many had to leave America to first discover it. In the byways of New Guinea Americans first pined for the thoroughfares of Main Street. In the vastness of the Pacific, sailors longed for their country lakes and streams. Americans first begin to evaluate their fabulous pre-war living standard in the strictures of war economy. Men pine for peace in time of war.

What is it that breeds complacency in man to his vital values while he has them? Because these values form such an integral part of his physical and mental make-up they become identical with his psyche, and he, therefore, loses the perspective that only an Archimedean point of distance and contrast may give him. Man is most shortsighted when he would view his own psyche. Man walking the circular earth sees only a plain.

It is in this light that our Sages envisaged the great man's role. His inspiration may flourish on after his death for those with a qualitative appreciation of time and history.

And this concept of contrast carries weight not only in a mundane sense of health, home, and also for certain religious values, but also for the highest value in man's life — awareness of God. God from afar fascinates one more than God in one's immediacy. The modern Jew has first understood the prophet's cry, *מרחוק ה' נראה לי*. It is today that "The Lord appears to me from afar." Many a time in our history we did not appreciate the nearness of God or his significance as much as we do today when, in many respects we are so distant from Him.

It is this same concept of contrast, of first becoming aware of the Lord "from afar" that is intrinsicated in *Teshuva* — Repentance. The traditional view is that the *Teshuva*-idea is penitence. For the Christian theologian, *Teshuva* is a transcendent act dependent upon the grace of God Who is All-Merciful and Benevolent. The erasure of man's sins is, from the rational standpoint, incomprehensible. Only

the supernatural, miraculous intercession of God on behalf of the sinner may effectuate this cleansing. The task of the sinner is to repent, to mortify himself, to practice castigation, to cry and implore for divine mercy and pity. The convert, according to this concept, is a passive, pitiful creature who begs for and attends divine grace.

The *halachic* interpretation of *Teshuva* differentiates between Penitence and Purification — *Kapara* (catharsis) and *Tabara*. *Kapara*, Penitence and Absolution, is similar, in effect, to the universal concept of conversion, *in toto*. It is not a psychological phenomenon but a theological one, transcendent and non-rational. To alter the past is an act which denies the laws of causality and regulation in men's life.

But the *halachic* concept of *Teshuva* contains yet another element: *Tabara*, purification. This concept is not one that predicates the removal of sin but its exploitation. The *Tabara*-idea is, rather, to change the vectorial force of sin, its direction and destination. When the sinner of the first category attempts to forget his sin and beseeches God to erase it, the Jewish repentant strives to "remember" his sin, *כי חטאתי לנגודי תמיד*. He strives to convert his sin into a spiritual springboard for increased inspiration and evaluation. This act is not super-natural but psychological. It conveys one law in mental causality; although a cause is given, the effect need not equal the cause. The effect need not be predetermined. Man himself may determine the vectorial character of the effect and give it direction and destination.

In the biographies of great men we frequently encounter the fact that certain personages rose to tremendous heights because of a prior rapid descent. They transposed misdeeds into springboards of a heroic life and lofty ideas. Great nations possess the same ability. In a time of cultural decadence and mental disintegration, historical errors may, if the proper spirit of renaissance captures the national conscience, be transformed into a driving force which gravitates towards the finest and best in human life. National renaissance rises phoenix-like from the ashes of cultural dissolution. Ascent presupposes descent. *ירידה צורך עלייה*.

This faculty can best be understood in the light of "contrast."

Sin reveals to man the beauty of good. Crime reveals the glory of the ethical. Mental disintegration reveals the enchantment of spiritual perfection. Values lost are more fascinating than ideals which are fully realized. The halachic concept of *Teshuva* vouchsafes us the revelation that there are new values accessible to man from the springboard of sin, and that in attaining them the spirit of man can and does not only conquer sin but exploits it as a constructive, creative force.

Tabara does not entail the act of reinstating man into a former status of repeating the past, in copying previous good deeds and performances. It must activate one, not alone to return to a former status of innocence and righteousness (for then the contamination itself serves no purpose or *selos*, but is superfluous), but must convert and elevate one to a new stage. It must energize an ever ascending spiral in man's spiritual state.

ה' ה' אני ה' קודם שיחטא ואני ה' אחר שיחטא. "I am the Lord before man sins and I am the Lord after man sins." But man's comprehension and awareness of the Lord after the sin is much superior to the idea of God that he cultivated in his purity and innocence.

„אמר רבי עקיבא: אשריכם ישראל לפני מי אתם מטהרים. מי מטהר אתכם, אביכם שבשמים שנא' וזרקתי עליכם מים פהורים וטהרתם ואומר מקוה ישראל ה', מה מקוה מטהר את הטמאים אף הקב"ה מטהר את ישראל. (יומא פ"ה:)

In Jabneh, the first Yom Kippur in Exile, the Jews were left without the Temple and its ceremonial rites requisite for Atonement, *Kapara*. The Jewish community was perplexed and disconsolate. They could not imagine that the beautiful ideals incarnated in the symbols of the day could be realized and effectuated without the performance of the High Priest, without the ceremonial of the two kids, without the ceremony in the holy of holies, and without the public confession and sacrifices. They could not see how to dispense with all the glory and pomp which used to be displayed in the Temple on the Day of Atonement. The act of *Teshuva* and *Kapara* was closely associated in their minds with all these external and ceremonial acts. How

can a Jew attain absolution and dispensation before God without the intercession and worship-forms of the High Priest? It seemed as if, in the smoke of the destroyed Temple, the Jewish vision of *Teshuva* and Yom Kippur had also disappeared.

Then rose Rabbi Akiva, the majestic מצחק, the unswerving "optimist," and he said: There is no need for such mournfulness and helplessness. Indeed, we have been bereft of the Temple and its divine dispensation of grace for the atonement of sin. But we have lost only *Kapara*, Atonement and Penitence, but not *Tabara*, Purification. Besides *Kapara* we still possess a lofty idea, far superior to Absolution. Indeed, we have been bereft of the ceremonies and sacrifices that are relevant to the transcendent act of the erasure of sin by supernatural grace and incomprehensible divine benevolence that alter the past and disrupt the causal chain. The attainment of *Kapara* will not be as complete and perfect now as it was when the cult worship acts of the High Priest brought man into contact with transcendent and incomprehensible divinity. But we Jews have brought another message of *Teshuva* to man, that of *Tabara*. There is nothing transcendent, miraculous or non-rational about *Tabara*. It rests, not without, but within causality. It is the discovery of a causal principle in spiritual and mental life — that the conflict created in a negative—A may give birth to a positive B, by the rule of contrast.

The act of *Tabara*, in which sin is not eradicated but, on the contrary, becomes part of my ego and is arrested and retained in its negative emergence and corruptive powers, awakens a creative force that shapes a new and loftier personality. There is no place here for worship or sacrifices. The performance of *Tabara* is not directed at a transcendent divinity but at God, as our Father, Companion, and intimate Counsellor Who does not require any mysterious cult ceremonies or sacrifices. This *Tabara* is based on an intimate relationship between man and God, *creature* and Creator, son and Father. And this communion of God-man has not been affected by the loss of outward ceremonial rites.

לפני מי אתם מטהרים, לפני אבינו שבשמים.

This natural concept of conversion which is not dissimilar to

the unfolding process of mental life has not vanished with the disappearance of the Temple. On the contrary, it now has enhanced meaning and content. 'שנאמר מקוה ישראל ה' The word *Mikveh*, in its literal translation, signifies hope. God is the "hope of Israel." But Rabbi Akiva associated another meaning with *Mikveh*, that of purification symbolized by a water reservoir. And indeed, hope and purification are synonymous. When man stumbles and falls, becomes contaminated with sin, he should not despair nor resign himself; but he should cultivate hope, not only for regaining but "gaining" by his experience new visions and vistas. *Mikveh* is both hope and purification. Purification is nothing more but the anticipation of a more glorious future. *Our ideal is not repetition but re-creation on a higher level.* And 'קב"ה מטהר את ישראל *Teshuva* contains hope and *Tahara*. Such an idea of *Teshuva* is not limited to any Temple or act of worship. All one requires is "before God," striving towards God.

This concept of contrast and growth must serve as a practical preachment for the rabbinate today. Many rabbis have confided to me that the secular world they enter, once having left the environs of the Yeshiva, jolts their values and threatens their ideology. This reorientation to new environments has become gradually one of the major problems of the young rabbi. But it is just this contrast that can serve as the true perspective for one's traditional values, not alone to regain and reaffirm former comprehension and intuition, but to vouchsafe a new focus and enhanced endearment of values. It is only through this contrast of values with values, profane with sacred, that one may begin to grow in fortitude and self-realization. The secular world may serve even more than the religious to foster new concepts and overtones in the old. It must be understood that true consciousness of *Kedusha* comes in the dissatisfaction with the secular world, through the principle of contrast. It is ever and anon the prophet's revelation, "The Lord appears to me from afar." And the Lord from afar is dearer and more intriguing than the Lord from near.

In concluding this *Yahrzeit* address, I recall the *midrash* of the Sages: (*Midrash Koheleth*)

"Before a man departs this world the Lord sends the angels to his sojournment to discover what men have to say of him. As soon as the man dies, he immediately enters his heavenly home."

While a man lives, we must question ourselves, in a positive effort to discover what he means to us, for we are all too unaware of the significance of what we enjoy. However, once the man dies, "he immediately enters his heavenly home." Once a personage has vanished from our lives, then the niche he filled stands starkly empty before us. We need no longer make an effort to understand him in his full significance. It becomes revealed to us in a great effulgence of light. 'מטתו פורחת באויר *Teshuva* Then his gestalt hovers in the higher spheres.



• Norman Lamm

At Yeshiva College the student is confronted with both *limudei kodesh* and *limudei hol*. Rabbi Norman Lamm Associate Rabbi of The Jewish Center and visiting assistant professor of Jewish philosophy at Yeshiva University examines the views of Rav S. R. Hirsch and Rav A. I. Kook on the encounter between Torah and Hochma, Kodesh and Hol.

RAV HIRSCH AND RAV KOOK:
TWO VIEWS ON LIMUDEI KODESH AND
LIMUDEI CHOL

From the very beginning of Jewish history Judaism has, for better or for worse, experienced some interaction with its surrounding culture. A great part of the Bible is a warning, both explicit and implicit, against assimilating the cultic pagan practices.

However, with the rise of Greek philosophy and the prominence given to reason and a more sophisticated culture, some Jews began to expose themselves to the non-Jewish modes of thought and fall under their influence. Gradually, individual thinkers, such as Philo in Alexandria, and later, as in the "Golden Age" in Spain, whole schools concerned themselves with the direct confrontation of traditional Judaism and Western thought.

With the Emancipation, this confrontation was no longer confined to a few individuals or even schools. The interaction between Judaism and the culture of the host people was now of major import to the Jewish community as a whole. The variety of responses to this massive challenge of Western civilization is represented by the spectrum of Jewish allegiances extant even today. They range from a complete abandonment of Judaism and Jewish loyalties to an

utter and complete rejection of Western philosophical and scientific ideas. In-between there exists a graduated fragmentation, a kind of Maxwellian distribution of interpretations.

The purpose of this essay is to present two versions of one particular type of response to the challenge of modernity, one that is more than a mere arithmetic decision on the proportion of Jewishness to be admitted in the make-up of the "modern Jew."

The modern Orthodox Jew in America represents the product of such a response resulting from the confrontation between authentic halakhic Judaism and Western thought. He is a novel kind of Jew, a historical experiment in the reaction to the great dialogue. His survival and success may very well have the most fateful consequences for Jewry and Judaism throughout the world.

What is the peculiar nature of this new type of Jew? "Synthesis," a word long favored in the circles of Yeshiva University, the major school of American Orthodoxy, is the term we shall use for the response to the Jewish-Western dialogue.

What is meant by Synthesis? What are the religious and cultural dimensions of the personality formed as a result of the encounter between traditional Judaism and modern non-Jewish culture, or in the language of the Rabbis, between *Torah* and *Hokhmah*?¹

There are, in the framework of what has come to be called Orthodox Judaism, two main theories of Synthesis that share certain fundamental features and yet diverge from each other in significant ways. These interpretations are to be found in the writings of two distinguished Jews of modern times who were deeply concerned by the confrontation of Torah and Wisdom. In a great measure they also represented and realized in themselves these ideals — for Synthesis is not an abstract theory that can be discussed, much less realized, *in vacuo*; it is an event or process that takes place in the personality. One of these individuals is a West European, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888). The other is the late Chief Rabbi of the Holy Land and originally an East European, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Hakohen Kook (1865-1935).

Hirsch was one of the giants of German Jewry. As a leader and

educator he was eminently successful. He was personally responsible for the flourishing *Denkglaubigkeit* — or enlightened Orthodoxy — that survives him to this day. Thoroughly Jewish, and also a completely modern Western man, he aspired to bring about a harmony between — or "synthesize" — the two traditions and outlooks. He tried to formulate a Jewish Humanism, demonstrating that the Humanism so popular in the Europe of his day had Jewish roots. Hence, his superman, the *Yisroel-Mentsch*. And hence, too, his great educational program of Synthesis under the slogan of *Torah im Derekh Eretz*.

Torah and Wisdom were not regarded by Hirsch as deadly enemies placing upon us an either/or choice between them. It is true that he gave Torah primacy over secular education if a choice had to be made.² But from his critique of Maimonides and Mendelssohn who approached Torah "from without," and from his development of his autochthonous attitude to Judaism,³ we get the impression that Hirsch believed in the original identity of Torah and the secular disciplines which now appear but in different forms. One cannot speak, therefore, of an essential conflict between them. But if no conflict is theoretically or essentially possible, neither can there be any meaningful dialogue between them. They can cooperate, even as the limbs of the body cooperate and coordinate; but they cannot interact and speak to each other, even as a sane and balanced person does not talk to himself. Hirsch does not say this explicitly, but it is, in the opinion of the writer, an inescapable conclusion and one that will appear more significant when contrasted with the position of Rav Kook. The Synthesis of Hirsch is pleasant, harmonious, charming, and creative. The secular studies help us in understanding Torah more deeply,⁴ even as the Torah tells us how to contemplate nature and listen to history.⁵ Considering the long estrangement of Jews from secular studies since the Golden Age of medieval days, and the unhappy record of the relations of science and religion in European history, this was a courageous attitude and a refreshing approach. His stature must be assessed from this background, as well as against the contemporary isolationism of East European Jewry. Hirsch tried to show, in the words of his translator, Bernard Drachman, that "Orthodox Judaism was not maintained

solely by the superstitious or narrow-minded older generation, who had never been initiated into the science or the culture of the age."⁶

Yet it is precisely a statement of this sort that makes us wonder about the sufficiency of the Hirschian interpretation of Synthesis for contemporary Orthodox Judaism. For Hirsch it was important to produce a Westernized Orthodox Jew in order to refute the charge that Judaism is a collection of old superstitions. For Drachman in the America of his day, at the very end of the Nineteenth Century, a college education and a Ph.D. were social necessities, lest Torah Jews be classified as narrow-minded. Surely modern American Orthodoxy has progressed beyond the stage where it has to prove itself, where an English-speaking Orthodox Rabbi with a University education is an unusual phenomenon.

Perhaps this statement by Hirsch himself will allow the reader to feel the temper if not the contents of his particular brand of Synthesis: "Pursued hand in hand, there is room for both [Jewish and general studies], each enhancing the value of the other and producing the glorious fruit of a distinctive Jewish culture which, at the same time, is 'pleasant in the eyes of God and man.'"⁷ He seems to be delighted that he can avoid those intellectually bloody conflicts between religion and science, that he can steer clear of the ragged edges of discord between Torah and Western Wisdom. "Hand in hand" they will walk, and appear "pleasant" in the eyes of all. There is something placid as well as idyllic and utopian in this vision. It is too easy, too gentlemanly, too "cultured," or — if one may say this — too bourgeois.

The slogan *Torah im Derekh Eretz* would not be appropriate to the Synthesis envisioned by Rav Kook, as it emerges from his *Orot ha-Kodesh* (Jerusalem, 1938) and his courageous address at the opening of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.⁸ Torah "with" *Derekh Eretz* or secular wisdom implies that they keep a respectable distance from each other, like neighbors who remain courteous as long as they do not become too intimate. Torah "and" *Derekh Eretz* would be more fitting for the Kook version of Synthesis. For there is a decided difference between these conjunctions.⁹ Torah "and" *Derekh Eretz* suggests a meeting of two powerful personalities,

the two of them coming to grips with each other, with the very serious question of whether this engagement will be an embrace or a wrestler's head-lock.

For Rav Kook, the educational problem is treated in a metaphysical frame. The categories with which he operates are those of *kodesh* and *hol*, and the issue transcends, therefore, the demonstration that Orthodoxy is not narrow-minded or superstitious.

Rav Kook speaks of two tendencies of the Jewish spirit. One is directed inwards; it is a deepening of the sacred, and is represented by the traditional *yeshivot*. The other is an outward one, relating the within to the without. Just as the intensification of the sacred is embodied in the old-type *yeshivah*, so is the relating of the sacred to the secular the function of the university.¹⁰ We must forgive Rav Kook if, despite his courageous criticism and warnings issued at the time, he allowed himself the extravagance of imagining that the Hebrew University would fulfill the lofty mission he assigned to it; hindsight is always wiser than foresight. But his analysis is valid.

It is this second tendency, the centrifugal motion of the sacred to the secular, that is of utmost consequence to us. The merging, or synthesis, of Torah with Wisdom is not meant to make up for some lack in Torah, but rather to create something new and original in the world of the spirit through these combinations.¹¹ Kook tells us that the sacred is not antagonistic to science, but first he reminds us that it vitalizes all, it is that which gives life to the secular disciplines.¹² *Kodesh* and *hol* are functionally and indissolubly related to each other. "The sacred must be established on the foundation of the profane."¹³ They are related to each other as matter to form — the secular is matter, the sacred form — and "the stronger the secular, the more significant the sacred."¹⁴ Just as the body must be healthy in order for the spirit to flower, so secular knowledge should be of superior quality if the sacred is to benefit.¹⁵ This intimate relationship of sacred and secular is given its strongest expression when Rav Kook writes that the *yesod kodesh ha-kodoshim* comprises both the element of the sacred and the profane.¹⁶ This implies the significant notion, which Kook later states explicitly,¹⁷

that there is nothing absolutely profane or secular in the world. There is no absolute metaphysical category called *hol*, there is only the holy and the not-yet-holy. This Kook version of Synthesis is the very antithesis of secularism, which recognizes the sacred only in its insularity. Kook's centrifugal *kodesh* is so over-powering and outgoing, that *hol* or the profane loses its absolute character even before its encounter with the sacred. It is, as it were, fated from its creation to submit to the sacred.

Having denied the absolute character of the profane, does this imply a blurring of the distinction between *kodesh* and *hol*? The answer is an emphatic No. Rabbi Isaiah Horowitz, in his famous *Shnei Lubot ha-Berit*, asks: why in the *havdalab* is the distinction between *Yisroel la-amim* mentioned? The other distinctions — between light and dark, Sabbath and weekday, sacred and profane — are all appropriate to the *havdalab*, but that between Israel and the nations seems irrelevant. He answers that there is a significant difference between Israel and the nations in how they conceive of the distinction between sacred and profane, etc. The non-Jew conceives of an absolute separation between them. The Jew, however, believes that the gulf between *kodesh* and *hol* is meant not to introduce a permanent and irreconcilable dualism, but to allow the sacred to be confirmed in its strength and purity so that it might return and sanctify the unholy.¹⁸

This is how Rav Kook conceives of the relationship of *kodesh* and *hol*. There is a *havdalab*, so as to allow for the intensification of the sacred in its centripetal motion;¹⁹ and this itself is prelude to its outward, centrifugal movement, where it reaches for the profane and transforms it into the sacred, a transmutation for which it has been waiting from the moment of creation. The fact of *קידוש* leads to the act of *קידוש*.

This brief survey of Hirsch and Kook can give only the barest idea of the similarities on the one hand, and the differences on the other. Both men and the *weltanschauungen* they represent are relevant to our day and the shaping of Jewish destiny. Each represent a different version of the Synthesis which is the most characteristic aspiration of modern Orthodox Judaism and the major

purpose of such institutions as Yeshiva University. Hirsch, the aristocratic pedagogue, and Kook, the Kabbalist, both inspire admiration and deserve our gratitude. Yet basically, Hirsch is the cultural thinker and educator, while Kook is the metaphysician and mystic. Hirsch's Synthesis is one of coexistence, hence essentially static. Kook's is one of interaction, and hence dynamic. Hirsch is an esthete who wants Torah and *Derekh Eretz* to live in a neighborly, courteous, and gentlemanly fashion. Kook is an alchemist who wants the sacred to transmute the profane and recast it in its own image. From the point of view of Kook, it is not enough to raise a generation of Orthodox Jews who will also be cultured Western men, admirable as this ambition may be. It is not enough to bear the two cultures as parallel lines which can meet only in infinity. It is urgent that there be a confrontation and an encounter between them. In the Kook version of Synthesis, there must be a qualitative accommodation of both studies; for secular studies are not inherently and eternally unholy, and the *limudei kodesh* are sterile unless they have something not-already-sacred to act upon. The *limudei hol* are part of the drama of *kiddush*.

For Hirsch, the direction of the interaction is from the profane to the sacred, that is, the secular disciplines are employed to order, define, and assist the sacred and place it upon a firm scientific basis. For Rav Kook, who demands interaction as the central theme of Synthesis, the motion goes in both directions. The less important one is the kind we have just mentioned, the rationalization, explanation, and adornment of the sacred by the profane. Kook calls this a right-to-left-motion. Far more significant and consequential is the left-to-right motion: the radiation of *kodesh* towards *hol*, ennobling it, raising it to the loftiest levels, sanctifying it, impregnating it with meaning and purpose.²⁰ Thus, whatever the interaction between *kodesh* and *hol* in the Hirschian brand of Synthesis, it will be something on the order of using chemistry to clarify a problem in *Yoreh Deah* or mathematics to settle a problem of the *luah*. The dynamic relationship demanded by the Kook-Synthesis emphasizes the use of *Halakhah* in defining for the chemist or mathematician how to shape his approach, his purpose, his significance in the world. It requires the mastery of Torah so as to teach the *Ben Torah* how to grapple

with the mundane, stubborn issues of ordinary life and make them yield to the light of Torah. The encounter of Torah and Wisdom has, as its goal, to "create in the world new souls, and give life a new, thriving, healthy form."²¹ In a word, Hirsch's *Torah im Derekh Eretz* aimed at bringing both disciplines together in one person; Kook's *Kodesh-hol* dialogue strived to bring them together in one personality — in shaping it, inspiring it, vitalizing it.

Fifty or seventy-five years ago, in the conditions that prevailed in this country, Synthesis, even of the Hirschian type, was a utopian, wild, audacious vision. It was the kind of idea which practical, hard-headed men dismiss as visionary, and which visionaries are much too impractical to implement. To hold forth this Synthesis as an ideal was an act that demanded courage and boldness. Today, because of the efforts and influence of a number of dedicated individuals, including the founders of Yeshiva University, Synthesis as such is no longer a dream, no longer an experiment. American Orthodoxy today is a realization of Hirsch's vision — and, given the conditions of our society, nothing but a Hirschian Synthesis can be the first goal. American Jewry has produced not only individuals but a whole community of people who live *Torah im Derekh Eretz*. Considering the vicissitudes of these past 75 years — the uprooting and the immigration, the *Hurban Europa* and the State of Israel, the economic growth and the social changes, the scientific revolutions and intellectual displacements — such an achievement can be classified only as heroic.

Yet this ideal is transcended by the Synthesis envisioned by Rav Kook. It is a far more difficult task, far more dangerous, far more uncertain. Because Kook's dynamic conception affects personality, rather than mere coexistence in a person, as with Hirsch's more static version, it can operate only in chosen individuals rather than on a broad, public scale. For a Kook-type Synthesis requires a deepening of scholarship, the development of singular thinkers who, steeped in Jewish learning, especially Halakhah, will be able to sanctify the profane which they will know with equally thorough scholarship. Rav Kook has set a high goal: להשקיף על החול מתוך אהבה, ²² i. e., to view the secular from the vantage of the sacred.

Hirsch's Synthesis is not easily attained, Kook's much less so. Tension is an indispensable concomitant of Synthesis of any variety. Anxiety and doubt and perplexity are necessary side-reactions of the act of Synthesis. Thus Hirsch writes to his fictitious young friend: "Do not think our time so dark and helpless, friend; it is only nervous and uncertain, as a woman in childbirth. But better the anxiety that prevails in the house of a woman about to give birth, than the freedom from anxiety, but also from hope and joy, in the house of the barren one."²³ These words of comfort and encouragement strike home to those in American Orthodoxy today who are concerned by the constant self-examination and critical self-evaluation in its ranks. They are signs of creation and birth.

Rav Kook speaks of Synthesis and the accompanying anxiety in similar terms.²⁴ He quotes Isaiah, וּפֶחַד וְרַחֵם לִבְכֹךְ, "and thy heart shall tremble and be enlarged" (Is. 60:5). The dynamic Synthesis of Kook is fraught with danger and risk. *Pabad*, fear, is inescapable. The centrifugal motion of *kodesh*, the sanctification of the profane, suffers from a historical ambivalence, as when it appeared in the controversy surrounding the translation of the Torah into Greek. Whenever there is an encounter of sacred and profane there must be *pabad*, for who knows but that instead of the *Kodesh* converting the *hol*, the *hol* will master the *kodesh*, as in Anatole France's story *Thaïse*. If it is security and freedom from fear that is sought, then it is sufficient to withdraw into hermetically sealed ghettos or vanish into easy assimilation; the confrontation between Judaism and world culture is then either avoided or ended. But if neither world is to be relinquished, and they are even allowed to act upon each other, then one must accept *pabad* and the sense of crisis and all the neurotic tensions that come with it. He who enters into this dialogue of Torah and Wisdom must tremble at the risks inherent in this kind of Synthesis, even while acknowledging that it is his duty to undertake it. Many human casualties have already resulted, and there are more yet to come, from this historic program of Synthesis. Rav Kook was not troubled by this phenomenon. On the contrary, he reminds us that those who approached the encounter without *pabad* were failures — most of their descendants were assimilated and subsequently lost to our people. Only if there is

pabad can there be hope to experience the second part of the Prophet's verse: וְרַחֵם לִבְכֹךְ, "thy heart shall be enlarged," true joy and exultation.

NOTES

1. מדרש איכה (הוצ"ב) פרשה ב' על הפסוק "מלכה ושריה בגויים אין תורה", אמר לך אדם יש חכמה בגויים תאמין... יש תורה בגויים אל תאמין.

2. S. R. Hirsch, *Judaism Eternal*, ed. Dayan I. Grunfeld (London: Soncino, 1958), vol. 1, p. 170.

3. *The Nineteen Letters of Ben Uziel*, trans. Bernard Drachman (New York: Bloch, 1942), Letter XVIII. Hirsch is severe in his criticism of Maimonides who, he maintains, merely "reconciled" Judaism with Greek philosophy, i.e., philosophy was superadded to Judaism, distorting it in the process, rather than allowing a philosophy of Judaism to issue from within the Jewish tradition autochthonously. Maimonides was "the product of uncomprehended Judaism and Arabic science" and "was obliged to reconcile the strife which raged in his own breast" (p. 181). He blames Maimonides for emphasizing abstract rational principles as opposed to action and deed as the highest expression of Judaism. "This great man is responsible, because he sought to reconcile Judaism with the difficulties which confronted it from without, instead of developing it creatively from within... He entered into Judaism from without, bringing with him opinions of whose truth he had convinced himself from extraneous sources and — he reconciled!" Yet it is not entirely fair to accuse Maimonides of "reconciliation," with the implied derogation of without-ness. Maimonides, like Saadia before him, believed in the common origin of reason and revelation, hence of philosophy and Torah (cf. Julius Guttmann's Introduction to Chaim Rabin's translation of the *Guide* [London: East and West Library, 1952] pp. 9-31). All discrepancies must then be considered as only apparent and these are to be "reconciled," but this can hardly be subject to the accusation of stepping out of the realm of Judaism to introduce, subversively as it were, alien ideas. Once the original identity of Torah and Wisdom is granted, such a charge is irrelevant. When Maimonides makes use of Aristotelian terminology and methodology, he is no more "without" the pale of Judaism than is Hirsch himself when he employs the dialectical modes of Hegelian thought popular in his day, albeit without mentioning their source (cf. Noah H. Rosenbloom, "The 'Nineteen Letters of Ben Uziel,'" *Historia Judaica* [April, 1960], pp. 23-60, especially p. 58).

4. Zvi Gurzweil, "Samson Raphael Hirsch," *Tradition* (Spring, 1960), p. 296. Compare the attitude of R. Elijah, the Gaon of Vilna, as reported by his student, R. Barukh of Shklov. The Gaon urged that as much of secular knowledge be translated into Hebrew
כי כפי מה שיחטר לאדם דיעות משארי החכמות, לעומת והשם יתקשרם

יחסו לו מאה ידות בחכמת התורה, כי התורה והחכמה נצמדים יחד (הקדמה לספר איקלידס, האג, חק"מ). The last clause is particularly significant.

5. *Nineteen Letters*, p. 197.

6. *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

7. *Supra*, n. 2.

8. Reproduced in : "חזון הגאולה", ילקוט דברים של הגרא"ה קוק ו"ל (ירושלים : תש"א) עמ' רס"ד-רע"ג.

9. Cf. the difference between הרכבה מוגת and הרכבה שכנוי in *Guide for the Perplexed* 2:22.

10. *Ib.* "חזון הגאולה", *loc. cit.*

11. *Orot ha-Kodesh*, vol. I, p. 63.

12. *Ib.*, p. 3.

13. *Ib.*, p. 145.

14. *Ib.*, p. 145; also p. 64.

15. *Ib.*, p. 65.

16. *Ib.*, p. 64.

17. *Ib.*, p. 143 — לדעת שאין באמת חול מוחלט בעולם.

18. For further development of this theme, see Norman Lamm, "The Unity Theme and its Implications for Moderns," *Tradition* (Fall, 1961), p. 61.

19. This requirement for the sacred to deepen within itself before it undertakes the venture of sancitification of the non-sacred has certain practical consequences. It necessitates, for instance the existence of the "old fashioned" *yeshivot* which are fully devoted to Torah study, alongside the "modern" *yeshivot* where the actual interaction takes place. Cf. the remarkable letter by Rav Kook in *Iggerot R'iyhah* I, 206-7, also quoted in הרב בנימין אפרתי, "הסניגוריה במשנת הרב קוק" (ירושלים : מוסד הרב קוק תשי"ט) עמ' 105-6.

20. *Orot ha-Kodesh*, I, pp. 68f.

21. *Ib.*, p. 63.

22. *Ib.*, p. 143.

23. *Nineteen Letters*, p. 201.

24. *Supra*, n. 8.



...In World Perspectives

● Irving Agus

What should be the task of the Jewish historian today? Wherein lies the key to the understanding of the enigmatic survival of the Jewish people in their millenium of existence upon the European continent? Dr. Irving Agus Professor of Jewish History at the Bernard Revel Graduate School indicates for us some of the main factors of Jewish survival and outlines a guide for future study.

JEWISH GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES

Jewish self-government, one of the most important phases of life of Western Jewry, especially in the Middle Ages, has been sadly neglected by modern historians. These historians are inclined to consider the life of the Jews in medieval Europe as completely passive, a mere reaction to the attitudes and whims of the princes of church and state. It is asserted that the Jews lived, multiplied, and prospered in Europe merely because they were tolerated and occasionally granted lebensraum, depending on the fluctuating humanitarian and religious attitudes of the rulers of Europe. Therefore, the attitude of the church leaders was studied with great care, the humanitarian feelings of the various ruling princes were carefully delineated, and the strength of anti-Semitic propaganda studiously evaluated. Little attention was paid, however, to the cohesive and dynamic forces within the Jewish group itself, and to the sources of power and vitality which the people displayed.

The survival of a people rarely depends on the weakness of negative factors; rather it is the result of the overwhelming strength

of positive factors. The Jews were no exception. In the fierce struggle for national existence that raged in Europe from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries, the Jews proved highly successful. Their numbers increased at a higher rate and they maintained a higher standard of living than that of any other national group. The average Jew managed to raise a family of six to ten children, marry them off at the tender age of twelve to fourteen, and support the married couple for five to ten years. It took tremendous strength of character, enormous economic powers, and superb organizational and political action, to enable this explosive process of living to continue with but rare interruptions for over fifty generations. Such outstanding success could not have resulted from negative factors alone — merely because the Jews were tolerated by some of the political rulers of the day — it had to stem from positive factors: great inner strength, powerful personal and communal qualities, and a superb system of group organization and cooperation.

It is these positive factors which ought to engage the full attention of the Jewish historian. His main concern should be with the most basic problem: towards the end of the ninth century, the Jews of Western Europe numbered ten thousand, or, at most, twenty thousand; they were situated in a sharply hostile environment, openly professing beliefs for which members of the majority group would be burnt alive; how could such a group multiply over five hundred times in little more than a millenium, while the other peoples of Europe multiplied but some twenty times?¹ The concern of the historian should be not only with the problem of why the majority group allowed the minority in its midst a much greater measure of freedom than it enjoyed itself. Rather his major concern must be with the elements — personal, organizational, religious, educational — that enabled the minority to wrest such freedom and opportunity for success from the reluctant majority.

It is obvious that one of the most important factors in the survival of a group is organization, or government. It is the ability of the group to fuse the strengths, self-sacrificing spirit, and capab-

1. Irving Agus, *Urban Civilization in Pre-Crusade Europe*, I, p. 13. Note 1. Yeshiva Univ. Press 1965.

ilities, of each individual into a unified force directed towards the common cause which figures most prominently in the ability of a group to survive. Whether the fusion is due to tyrannical control, the force of an electrifying leader, or springs naturally from the galvanizing forces of intensive education, it is still this fusion which gives the group its reserve of power with which to meet all emergencies.

In the case of a simple, solitary group — a group living in a compact mass, in a particular area, and separated from its enemies by a clearly defined geographical boundary — this ability to fuse all its forces and direct them towards a common goal enables the group to place an army on its borders, and to spur the army to heroic action in defense of the group. On the other hand, a complex national group — one whose members are scattered over a wide area among the members of other groups — has unusually complicated problems of offense and defense. It must carry on its struggle for existence with highly refined weapons and must employ subtle methods of self-assertion. Basically, however, the efficacy of these refined weapons and subtle methods depends on the same ability to mobilize, organize, and galvanize all its forces as that of the simple nation in activating its army. It is true that the fighting forces of the complex people are not easily identifiable; they are not embodied in a tangible army bearing real weapons. But they are, nevertheless, real and mighty forces, often more effective and powerful than armies and weapons. Nor is the governmental body at the head of these forces easily identifiable; it possesses no king or strutting courtiers; it does not rely for its effectiveness on police, jails, or executions; nevertheless, it is a mighty governing body of great effectiveness and efficiency.

As we said above, the success of a people in its struggle to survive depends in the main on its ability to govern itself. The fact that during the period under consideration Western Jewry was highly successful in its struggle for existence, indicates excellent organization and remarkably efficient government. Indeed, during this period, Western Jewry did constitute an organized and well-governed nation even though it was scattered among several states. It enjoyed a full measure of self-government, organized every detail

of its group life exclusively on its own patterns, and behaved as a well unified and fully disciplined people. The individual Jew was governed almost exclusively by his own government. It was the Jewish organization which levied taxes on him, collected the taxes, and disposed of the revenues as it saw fit. The Jew's disputes with his fellows were litigated in Jewish courts. The financial protection of his wife and her property rights were determined by Jewish legislation. If his children were minors at the time of his death, his estate was managed by trustees appointed by a Jewish body. His business relations, and his general behavior towards his fellows, were supervised and controlled by the Jewish government. If he was attacked or incarcerated, either by brigands or the king, it was the obligation of the entire Jewish community to rally to his defense and bear the cost of his release. The individual Jew was the subject of the Jewish government only; his life, activities, rights, and obligations were ruled exclusively by the laws of that government and within the lebensraum obtained for him by that government. In the very midst of a Christian society, the Jew could proclaim sincerely, "Our Father our King, we have no other king but Thee."

Who organized this government? How did it actually govern? On what legal principles was its authority based? How did it compel obedience? What was its constitutional form? What was the secret of its vitality? These are the questions which should engage the attention of the Jewish historian. These are the questions which should challenge and stimulate every intelligent Jew, for in the true answers to these questions may well be embodied a clearer understanding of this essential part of the essence of Judaism.



● Jerry Hochbaum

Only recently (April 22) *Time* magazine published a survey of the views of certain Jewish leaders on the ticklish problem of a Jewish-Gentile dialogue. After describing Jewish-Gentile relationships from a sociological viewpoint, Rabbi Dr. Jerry Hochbaum, assistant professor of Sociology at Yeshiva College, analyzes his results as they relate to the question of "dialogue" from an *halachic* perspective.

JEWISH GENTILE CONFRONTATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

In recent years there has been much discussion and debate about the desirability of a dialogue between Jew and Gentile. The controversy, almost wholly confined thus far to religious issues, has generated a great deal of heat but has shed little light on the reality of the Jewish-Gentile confrontation in our society. The writer believes that for a full comprehension of this vital question and its ramifications it is necessary to frame the issue in social terms. Only in this way can we establish the necessary background against which to deal with the delicate religious questions. Our purpose here will therefore be to sketch in broad strokes the sociological profile of Jewish-Gentile relationships and then to briefly describe their implications.

When we speak of Jewish-Gentile relationships, we are not referring to the personal relationships between individual Jews and non-Jews. The perspective here being sociological, we are concerned instead with the nature of the inter-action between the

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groups, the inter-relationship between the Jewish community and non-Jewish society. Because this level of analysis is more abstract, it is not frequently used even by the professional analyst. However, precisely because it is more abstract it is most fruitful in comprehending Jewish-Gentile relationships. Indeed, these structured relationships between the groups shape and determine the behavior of the individual Jew and non-Jew, as they relate to each other.

But it is not only the confrontation but the context of the confrontation which should interest us. Jews have always dwelt among non-Jews. The major part of Jewish history, our entire Goluth, has been spent in non-Jewish societies. What is distinctive, however, about the Jew living in the Western world, particularly the United States, is the different profile of his society. Historically, Jews lived in rural, agricultural, traditional, closed societies. Ours, in contrast, is an urban, industrial, secular, relatively open, egalitarian society. This puts the Jew on a new footing in relationship with his non-Jewish neighbor and generates problems for the Jew not yet resolved, because they are unprecedented in the Jew's historical experience both in terms of the challenges they present and the number of Jews they affect. Salo Baron has said that only in America in the last century has the problem of emancipation finally caught up with the Jews. This belated emancipation has, of course, entirely transformed the character of Jewish-Gentile relationship.

Since the primary goal here is to describe the relationships emerging between Jew and non-Jew, our values and preconceptions must not be allowed to distort our perception of the social reality of our situation. Only after we have diagnosed sociologically the nature of Jewish-Gentile relationships, analyzed the social forces that shape and mold them, projected the direction they appear to be taking, can we orthodox Jews discuss intelligently how to cope with the revolutionary changes modern society has wrought in Jewish-Gentile relationships, and perhaps, ultimately, re-fashion them in accordance with Halochah.

The problem can be formulated even more precisely by utilizing some elementary but fundamental concepts that sociologists use.

One is "social structure," which refers to the inter-action between individuals in society, the enduring, permanent inter-relationships which are characteristic of all societies. Another is "culture," which refers to the values and norms of the group, the ideas and ideals that serve as the group's design for living.

Both these concepts are applied when the sociologist describes the relationships between the dominant and the minority groups in a society. "Acculturation" is the process by which the minority group learns the culture of the dominant group — its laws, values, norms, folkways, and customs. "Assimilation" refers to the process by which the minority group becomes fused and amalgamated socially with the dominant group. This can range from acceptance as a neighbor and friend, to membership in their exclusive cliques and clubs, all the way to intermarriage, the most complete type of assimilation.

It is therefore important to differentiate between the different degrees of assimilation and acculturation. In thinking of assimilation it is useful to distinguish between secondary social relationships — the more formal, impersonal associations such as exist in economic and civic activities — and primary social relationships, the more intimate and personal ties which characterize informal social life and close friendships. A significant distinction can also be made in acculturation between the "extrinsic" culture — the manner of dress, expression, and general external demeanor the society requires — and "intrinsic" culture — the hard-core mores and values upon which the society is based.

Acculturation and assimilation are, of course, very closely inter-related. Both may occur simultaneously but generally speaking, acculturation precedes assimilation. Once the minority group assumes the cultural patterns and traits of the surrounding environment this facilitates their acceptance socially by the dominant group. Assimilation then proceeds in steps, from secondary relations to more intense primary relations, culminating in intermarriage and the extinction of the minority group. Both processes are always in operation and are best illustrated in the history of some of the older ethnic groups in American society.

To understand Jewish-Gentile relationships, and those between any minority and dominant group, it is necessary to understand the conditions under which acculturation and assimilation occur and the extent to which they occur. Because the case of the Jew, despite its unique features, reflects the overall pattern of Americanization in our society, we shall briefly describe the process by which all religious and ethnic groups have become Americanized in our society.

According to Oscar Handlin, the noted American historian, immigrants of all kinds, when coming to these shores, sought to re-establish the traditional way of life they knew in the Old World. In the ghettos in which they settled, they tried to create a separate social existence for themselves and maintain their national, religious, and ethnic unity in the face of the alien culture in which they were now enveloped. Religion and the church, essential parts of their heritage, helped them achieve their solidarity. The second generation, however, did not see themselves as foreigners. They aspired to be Americans. They were no longer at home in the immigrant family or comfortable in the immigrant culture. Yet they were not fully at home in America either. Many of these second generation Americans resolved their dilemma by forsaking the immigrant culture and its heritage, shedding its foreign ways — its language, dress, and customs — and learning and accepting American culture. Those who rejected the immigrant cultures extended the rejection to the immigrant religion as well. Among the second generation, there was therefore widespread alienation from the religious fold of their parents.

STAGES OF ACCULTURATION

New forces and forms emerge in the third generation. They are Americans and do not suffer the ambivalence and alienation of the generation that preceded them. They do, however, suffer another problem, more subtle but equally acute. What kind of Americans? How can they identify and locate themselves in a society emergent from diverse national and ethnic populations? Will Herberg, in his book "Protestant, Catholic, Jew," maintains that because religion

was the only thing a person was not expected to change in his acculturation to American society, religion becomes the differentiating element for the third generation. They turn to religion to define their place in American society in a way that will sustain their Americanism and yet confirm the ties that bind them to their forebears. Thus, the context of belonging and self-identification in American society becomes the religious community. American society as a melting pot — eradicating all cultural differences and assimilating the diverse ethnic and religious populations — never materializes. Instead what emerges is a triple melting pot, three distinct communities, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, in which Americans assume their social identity. Being a Protestant, Catholic, or Jew in American society becomes less a theological and more a social distinction. Within these religious communities one finds a fully developed network of organizations and informal social relationships that keep the individual within them throughout all the stages of his life cycle, from the cradle in the sectarian hospital to the sectarian grave.

In spite of their structural differentiation, the three religious communities are not divisive forces culturally in our society. Each upholds the common code of our society, the ultimate values which integrate and unify us. The official religions support and sanction the American Way of Life, the common faith of all Americans. Commitment to the religions of Americans becomes in reality commitment to the American Religion.

For the Jew this means he is socially, but not culturally, segregated from the rest of American life, acculturated but not fully assimilated. From nine to five o'clock each day he inter-acts with Gentiles in his office or place of business and engages in numerous secondary relationships with them. Afterwards, however, the "five o'clock shadow" separates their worlds. The Jew retires to the Jewish neighborhood or his suburban home for his social life, intimate friendship, and family activities. The Jewish community thus remains structurally distinct in American society because the Jew remains within the confines of his group for his major primary social relationships.

Religion, as was implied earlier, is the major vehicle supporting

this ethnic cohesion and solidarity. Because religion provides a legitimate location and status for sub-groups within American society, Jews built and organized their communities around the synagogue. The synagogue thus becomes less a Beth Midrash and Beth Tefillah and more a Beth K'neseth, the social nucleus of the group, a place of assembly for Brownies, Little Leaguers, Inter-Collegiates, and Golden-Agers. As Glazer and Sklare have shown, the synagogue, whatever its sectarian label, becomes engaged in increasing commitment to the group, supporting "Jewishness" rather than Judaism. In summary, what has evolved in Jewish life in this country is a *socio-religious* community, within which the Jew locates himself, and is located, socially.

Even with his religion as a differentiating element, the Jew, however, is increasingly amalgamated within the mainstream of American culture. Certainly he does maintain certain characteristic Jewish values, although in a modified and sometimes distorted form, e.g. a passion for education and social justice, a liberal social and political philosophy, a deep commitment to family and group. But these values are no longer rooted in his religion. More significantly, they do not suffice to differentiate the Jewish group as a moral community. What does occur is that the Jewish socio-religious community refracts the national culture through the prism of its own cultural heritage and this unique blend becomes an *American* Jewish sub-culture.

This pattern of structural segregation and normative fusion cuts across all of Jewish life, of course, in different degrees. As we move up the status hierarchy, from the lower-middle class to the lower-upper class, the higher ranking Jews have greater access to American society and culture. The higher the social rank of the Jew, the more likely it is that Gentile society becomes his normative standard and the yardstick for his self-evaluation. In one study of a small Midwestern city, Jews were divided into two groups, "clubnicks" and "lodgeniks." Clubnicks were the upper-class members of the Jewish country club; lodgeniks the lower-middle class Jews who belonged to the less prestigious B'nai B'rith lodge. The clubniks were found to positively evaluate Gentile associations and ways and this was reflected across the board in all their activities

and attitudes — in their number of Gentile friends, membership in non-Jewish organizations, the practice of name-changing, Christmas observance and intermarriage in family. Through these socially high-ranking Jews, such attitudes and practices also percolated downward to the rest of the Jewish community.

Acculturation has even penetrated deeply into our religious institutions, with variations, of course, between the orthodox, Conservative, and Reform groups. The Reform have, in fact, achieved the Protestantization of the ministry. The rabbi is no longer the traditional scholar-sage, but like his Protestant counterpart, a preacher, pastor, and priest. The Conservatives have re-shaped the synagogue into a middle-class American institution, assimilating and incorporating middle-class standards and forms of worship. Even the orthodox are straining to catch up. Acculturation, if not complete, is certainly substantial.

The picture we have described is not static; it is fluid and ever-changing. In addition to this rapid acculturation, the Jew has also been socially mobile, remarkably so. The Jew has succeeded, much more rapidly than the other ethnic and religious groups in our society, in obtaining extensive education, attaining prestige in his professional endeavors, earning high income, and rising socially. As a result of his very rapid acculturation and social advancement, the social distance between Jew and Gentile, so characteristic of Jewish history, begins to diminish. We are now invited to join their clubs, play poker and golf with them, break bread with them. This intensive social intermingling, these increasing primary relationships, begin to flow toward, and culminate in, intermarriage, the rate of which has increased significantly in the last decades.

This rise in intermarriage in our society is not the result of personal aberration. Nor is it the desire to escape persecution and the disability of being a Jew, for these disabilities are disappearing in our society. People who intermarry are also not status seekers. Intermarriage in the United States is occurring more and more on the college campus between students who claim they fell in love. Because this type of intermarriage reflects our growing acceptance in society and is the symbol sociologically of absorption, the

final step in assimilation, we would be prudent when we speak of a Jewish-Gentile dialogue to assess whatever merits it may have within the social context in which it will be taking place.

It is also very noteworthy that this pattern of creeping assimilation that has just been described is most pronounced in the social circle with which Jews in this country are intimately related, the intellectual community. Earlier in this article we referred to American society as consisting of three communities, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish. A fourth, smaller but significant far beyond its size, should now be added: the intellectual community. A good many individuals in academic life and the professions are part of this separate society, organized rather loosely around a hazily defined intellectual culture. This intellectual community is in many ways supra-ethnic and supra-religious, or, as Disraeli put it, "a blank page between the Old and New Testaments." It attracts individuals from many religious and ethnic backgrounds, but most wear their religion lightly, if at all. Because religious differences are not so vital within the intellectual community, assimilatory pressures are more acute there. The intellectual takes his friends and his spouse wherever he finds them, provided, of course, they share his commitment to ideas, music, literature, and art. As social relations between Jew and Gentile are more intense in this neutral society — if we may call it that — intermarriage among Jewish professionals and academicians far exceeds the national norm, running as high as 60% in one study.

To summarize the sociological picture — historically, the Jewish and Gentile communities were self-contained social systems existing side by side. In American society, their structured interrelationship resembles a heart. Structurally, the two communities are separate and discernible entities, like the auricles. Culturally, they have begun to fuse — visualize the lower part of the heart. Indeed, as I have tried to show, the process of fusion cannot be localized. Socially, it remains always potentially malignant.

TORAH GUIDELINES

Halochah — here we are switching from the sociological to the prescriptive level — always sought to maintain the social unity and

normative integrity of K'lal Yisroel. The Torah perceived certain types of social relationships as being pregnant with danger for the Jewish community. It attempted to eliminate or at least minimize these dangers by directly or indirectly minimizing social intercourse with the non-Jew. Halochah tried to prevent the cycle of social intercourse, cultural contamination, and intermarriage, and ultimately dissolution of the group, by removing the possibility of the first step ever maturing to a substantial degree.

When Jews and Gentiles lived in self-contained communities, such regulation was possible. Both Jews and non-Jews held stereotyped views of each other based on their religious systems and these guided their behavior together. Halochah could thus define and control Jewish-Gentile relationships. In these closed societies, the "we-they" dynamic was especially relevant, i.e., in-group solidarity generated a sense of differentness and apartness from the outer group. As a result, we can assume that the standard of conduct applying to the Jew's relations with the non-Jews was different from that applying to his relations with fellow-Jews, even if Halochically unjustified. Jews also felt very deeply that the idolators were morally inferior to them, *am hadomeh l'chamor*.

In America, we are dealing with a new type of Gentile, not a pagan or idolator or even a Christian of the medieval mold. Being Protestant or Catholic and even Jewish, as I have tried to show, is a social as well as a theological classification. Furthermore, Gentiles in our society are our fellow-citizens, employers, neighbors, and even personal friends. For the third and fourth generation American Jew, they are no longer the alien camp. In this new social climate in which we function, we are forced to recognize their rights and our responsibilities to them. We are both committed to a set of democratic values, the American Creed, and it is these norms, rather than the older social stereotypes and religious definitions, that serve as guidelines for Jewish-Gentile associations.

If Halochah sought to reduce social intercourse with Gentiles to prevent normative adulteration, in the American case acculturation has already taken place. Furthermore, the set of democratic values which Jews and Gentiles share set the stage for ever-increasing

association, more and more intimate in character, endangering, in turn, the existence of K'lal Yisroel.

This is the basis of our dilemma and the background against which the Halachic and ideological questions about Jewish-Gentile relationships must be viewed. On the one hand, there is no escaping the social reality of our open, democratic, egalitarian society. The Jew, integrated economically, politically, and culturally, cannot avoid close association with the non-Jew. Yet these associations constantly pose the threat of an accelerated acculturation and assimilation. The challenge facing us requires re-examination of Halochah in seeking guidelines for our association with Gentiles. But it is equally imperative that we devise social means to enable us to maintain our traditional community intact, normatively as well as socially.

Until these conditions are met, until the sociological community we have described becomes fully restored as a religious one, the Jewish-Gentile dialogue is dangerous and the Talmudic injunction *al hanizak l'harchik etz atzmo* is applicable. Indeed, what appears to be more crucial at this time is a dialogue between the committed Jew and the non-committed Jew. The orthodox Jew must reach out not only to the Reform Jew but to the Reform democrat as well, whose entire ideological commitment, quasi-religious in character, is misplaced in political life.

Until we have created a more sound social and normative structure for Jewish communal life, we have one precedent to guide us in our association with non-Jews. Abraham, the founder of our faith, also experienced the paradox of our situation (and in a way it is ironical how Jewish history has turned a full cycle). Said Abraham to the people of Canaan, *Ger v'toshev onochi imochem* — I am a stranger and a sojourner among you. On the one hand, Abraham argued that he was a full-fledged citizen entitled to the rights, privileges, and opportunities that all residents of Canaan held. Yet Abraham also publicly announces to the people of Canaan that he is a *ger*, a stranger; *Avrohom Ho'ivri*, from the other side of the river, from another universe, with his own G-d and his own destiny.

So with us. Our position should be *gerim v'toshevim anachnu imochem*. Yes, we are citizens in this society, deeply involved in its welfare and the welfare of our fellow citizens. But we are also *gerim*, strangers, spiritually apart, committed to an historical faith revealed in another place and another time. What better guide could we have than Avrohom Ovinu?



The benefits accruing to observance of Jewish ritual as *Mitzvot Hashem* range from the physical to the metaphysical. In this article, Rabbi Dr. Menachem M. Brayer, Associate Professor of Biblical Literature and Consultant Psychologist at Yeshiva, describes the psychologically beneficial effects of Jewish communal ritual in general, and *Hilchot Availut*, the laws of mourning, in particular.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEREAVEMENT

A Jewish Psychological Perspective on Hilchot Smachot

I — ON JEWISH RITUAL

מות והיים ביד לשון (משלי יח, כא)
עת ללדת ועת למות (קהלת ב, ג)

When Faith becomes an intrinsic part of one's being it then has the capability to help transform man, whereby he is actually living, and activating, a Self-representation of Faith and not just of mechanical routine-like obligations, or standard-type fulfillment of certain prescribed tenets, out of fear of punishment. Such rituals were long ago condemned by Isaiah, Amos or Malachi — our Prophets, as being undesirable and lacking in sincerity.

Religious experience is an animated emotional expression of one's existence and need or search for belongingness. It is a definite, voluntary act of one's whole-hearted yearning, cleavage, and striving to unite oneself with the Supreme Creator. Nothing is forced, Man is willingly living his faith. Judaism calls this action — "*Kiyومت HaMitzvot*," a complete identification with the Source, as a funda-

Presented by permission of the author from the text of a paper entitled "Workshop on Mental Health and Judaism; Ritual — Normal or Neurotic Behavior" read before the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies.

mental need for human belongingness and at the same time, Self-affirmation of one's existence. And this endowment of a Liber Arbitrum — the gift of Free Choice — בחירה — is a "*conditio sine qua non*" in Jewish Theology. Man is truly His Sole Master, his own guide and translator of the supreme Will. Not "to be G-d," as Sartre claims, but to become Partner with G-d in the process of continuous creation in this universe. — שותף להקב"ה במעשי — בראשית — is man's goal.

Not Self-aggrandization to an absolute level, but a *de profundis* recognition that he is Man, earthly and mortal, but still the highest expression of Divinity in the *ex nihilo creatio* — being created in the Divine Image — in the closest similitude to G-d. חביב אדם (שנברא בצלם אלוקים) (אבות ג, יח)

The performance of prescribed rituals in the process of carrying out one's religious experience has a positive aspect of self-discipline, psycho-physical control, a voluntary and organized form of a Regimen Sanitatis, of striving to do good, and to be good, since Religion is in itself a good lesson in self-discipline, in Ego Control.

Religion uses the ritual garment as a mechanism to give form, shape and structure to its objectives. Ritual observance has a disciplinary effect in its positive connotation, by giving man a chance to perform, physically and emotionally, the verbal, theoretical tenets of the Law; by keeping alive, and by translating words into deeds, ideas into reality, the inner Self into its true human relatedness.

We speak therefore mainly of community rituals, where the individual feels part of the group, knows that the very same ritual, at the very same time, in the very same fashion, through the very same expressive forms, by his very same coreligionists, is being performed and is equally shared by all other Jews all over the world.

This logical — symbolic meaning may be understood by some and not by others. Nevertheless, the performer is aware of its existence and acceptance by his equals of the very same ethnic or national group. Thus, the Symbol becomes Reality and the unknown known.

Many such rituals act as safety-valves for man's pent-up energy which must come out in a channeled form of expression, subliminal

in nature, as well as a controlling device and Super-Ego function, to censure the unacceptable Id forces and inner pressing drives conflicting with the evenbalanced function of the Ego.

Searching for such Ego — integration or Religious Maturity is the aim of both Religion and Psychiatry. כי מצאי מצא חיים ויפק רצון מה' (משלי ה, לה)

If primitive rituals may be expressed and understood as archaic forms of man's fears, sense of guilt, or pagan rigorous rites of initiation, and sexual aberrations, Judaic monotheistic lore converted and transformed such primitivism into socially acceptable, and educationally purposeful forms, where intellectual achievement and sublimated, desexualized, aim-inhibited interests and motives substitute for an infantile libido.

When Religious ritual takes care of man's healthy needs in the area of interpersonal relations, as in group worship and communally-performed ceremonies, it also takes care of man's dependency needs on his fellow men and G-d alike.

Such religious experiences involve man's past, present and future together, and also give man the possibility to develop intellectually and to crystalize his humanistic outlook for positive attitudes towards his group and himself.

The communal rituals are the warmest and most memorable experiences of one's faith, the rituals of Jewish Holidays, the *Shofar* blowing with its inspiring call for repentance in a filled Shul on Yom Kippur; the colorful, richly charged symbolic table of the Sedder night, where the two generations cohesively integrate in the national-religious spirit of freedom and liberation; the green of Shavuoth; the decorated *Sukkah* outdoors with its exotic-agricultural echo; the candles of Sabbath with their cozy, enveloping warmth of a Sabbath meal sprinkled with traditional chanting in groups; the full family participation in the Hanuka lighting of the candles with all its secondary, memorable components; the Purim grager and Hamantashen; the joyous, group participation in a festive Synagogue or Simhat Torah, where the scholar and the plebeian, the Rabbi and the congregant, men, women and children, young and

old emerge together in a millenium-old custom of Torah dances and holiday songs, all barriers and class-differences cast aside — where just the identification, relatedness and Jewish belongingness are the main features of the rite. Where else can the individual bring out more effectively his emotional and religious fervor, ecstatically and freely, if not through symbolic rituals, where one gives meaning and actuates concretely the representation of the symbolism?

This social and community value of Ritual is just another aspect of its meaningfulness.

II — ON HILCHOT AVAILUT

The Talmud devotes an entire tractate to the problem of bereavement, claiming that the Lord Himself performed the mitzva of *Nihum Avelim* and that the Lord shows countenance to the bereaved. הקב"ה מראה פנים לאבל (בראשית רבה א)

Halvayat Hamet — attending the dead to the grave is amongst the commandments of no prescribed limit. אלו דברים שאין להם שיעור... (Mishna Peia 1, 1.) and is considered as a *Hessed shel Emet* — the highest form of expressed lovingkindness, since the dead cannot reciprocate any expected reward for the living.

The source is in Genesis 47:29, when our Patriarch Jacob asks his son — Viceroy Joseph — "Deal kindly and truly with me, when I sleep with my parents — bury me in their burying place." (See Rashi.) The idea of a family plot whereby the togetherness in life between the beloved is extended post mortem, is an old Jewish historical fact, dating back to the Patriarchal period. (Mearat Ha-Machpelah.) ושכבתי עם אבותי וקברתני בקבורתם

הנאהבים והנעימים בחייהם ובמותם לא נפרדו (שמואל ב', א, 23)

The Jewish respect and sanctified harmony of the family transcends even eternity. — *Auch am Grabbe pflanzt man die Hoffnung.* (Schiller).

The ordinances of God exist so that man "Shall live by them" (Lev. 18:5) וחי בהם

The Torah does not request human sacrifice over the fulfillment of its commandments but rather, the *בידך אפקיד רוחי*; in Thy hands I deliver my spirit. Torah was written for man to live by it — and not to die by it. (סנהדרין 74). ולא שימות בהם

The human being always stays in the center of G-d's universal design, since man is considered G-d's partner as the Crown of Creation. נור הכריאה

The Vidui of final reconciliation of the mortal with his Creator through Confession, is part of the Jewish law and has valid psychological meaning in terms of man's peace of mind, even in the last moments of his life, for whoever confesses — has a portion in the world to come, *Olam Haba*, a comforting time in life's epilogue.

Man plays his finale with the the Psalmist — in Thy hand I deliver my spirit," with the conclusive outcry of the *Shema*.

So important is the sanctity of life, that even in the last minutes of Gesisah (coma) Jewish law requests that the patient be treated as a living person in all respects, and all means of euthanasia are strictly forbidden.

Death, in Rabbinical language is merely "the departure of the Soul." יציאת נשמה.

The post funeral rites, the *Shiva* calls, the Minyan in the home of the bereaved family with full community participation, strengthens the familial and community ties, reassuring the bereaved of moral, emotional and spiritual support, by active participation and identification. Societies, Landsmanchaften, Synagogue members and other organizations take part and add to the sense of familial cohesion and bridge the friendship in a solemn, sincere bond.

The Jewish concept of immortality and *Olam Haba* will add to the comfort of the bereaved if they believe in these religious tenets, knowing that the spirit of the departed continues its existence in the higher spheres of the *Olam Ha-Ne-shamot*. הנשמה צרורה. בצרור החיים

It is the duty of the clergy and the psychiatrist not to allow the

bereaved to indulge in excessive grief and thus become a living victim of morbidity and death in disguise. With plausible and acceptable memories of the departed, the living must free themselves from any distorted emotional involvement with the deceased which are harmful to the living personality.

צדיקים במיתתן קרויין חיים (ברכות יח)

— "These are the righteous who in their death are called living."

Judaism considers us the servants of life, and as such, we are commanded not to despair but share sanctity thru fortitude.

Grief must be faced and accepted with courage, by knowing and continuing to live the way the departed would have wanted us to live, not in self-pity, desolation or despair, but as brave bearers of future promise and unshaken faith, that life here is only a prelude to a more harmonious symphony — the celestial Immortal world. Man is to prepare himself in this worldly, noisy antechamber in order to enter later on the palace of quietude and everlasting peace.

III — FREUD AND THE RELIGIOUS RITUAL

When the second temple in Jerusalem was destroyed, many Jews began to withdraw into depression and in mournful isolation from life, refusing to eat and drink, but bewailing the lost sons and daughters of Israel and the burned Temple. Then Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: — "My sons, I know that it is impossible not to mourn, but to mourn excessively is forbidden."

The indulgence of grief, says Disraeli, is the blunder of a life. Man must know, that one life at a time is enough, and that by returning his soul, entrusted to him as a loan for a specific time, back to the Father in Heaven, man may find consolation in this Divine trust offered to him, so that he may return the jewel clean and pure as given to him. . .

העולם הזה דומה לפרוודור — התקן עצמך בפרוודור כדי שתכנס למרקלין (אבות ד, כא)

Indeed, reaction to a loss is very painful. looking into the future

alone is also painful. A loss of a child, or one dear in the family enhances so much the appreciation of the departed. We suffer when we can no longer give concretely our love to the dead. Not the fancy mausoleums and decorated gravestones, not an expensive coffin and a cascade of colorful flowers, but the plain white shrouds, the simple aron (coffin), the traditional and mystical *Shir shel Pegayim-Yoshev beSeiser*, the lamenting tune of *El mole Rahamim*, and the conclusive *Kadish* — which is not a eulogy, nor a lamenting poem, no death is mentioned, and no morbidity expressed, but a strong religious affirmation of the Jewish credo to the Lord of this universe whose Name we extoll, whose Will we affirm, whose judgment we accept, and whose justice we believe in.

יתגדל ויתקדש שמה רבא בעלמא די ברא כרעותה...

It is based on the idea of redemption and ultimate healing of suffering mankind. It asks for abundant peace from heaven and a happy life here, with a definite tone for optimism and glory not of sorrow and despair. The intensity of grief should never become an index of its permanence.

חשב אנוש עד דכא ותאמר שובו בני אדם (תהלים צ, ג)

— You turn man to his spiritual depression and You say "Return, you children of man. Life is a complex combination of happiness and tragic storm. Who is to deny the great joy and fulfillment of the master after the conclusion of his task — the mission to imitate G-d and come closer to the Eternal? ...

ואתם הדבקים בה' אלקיכם חיים כולכם היום (דברים ד, ד)

This is the power of Jewish ritual, man's emotional impoverishment by the loss of someone dear, and his need to reestablish ties, not easily substituted for the one who is lost, is counterbalanced by man's strong affirmation in his faith that the Lord is right, although we don't seem to comprehend His mysterious ways, and we take up life again with a greater sensitivity and appreciation of others and of life, knowing that the dead did not die in vain where love has prevailed, and gradually find consolation in the new affirmation of G-d's will that we go on living. In the words of Bialik —

"And in their death they commanded us life — the life for ever." ובמותם צוו לנו את החיים — החיים עד עולם. And our Talmud tells us of the great Divine gift — of forgetting. Man achieves through such experience a sense of maturity and stronger reality testing — "It is a natural law Death acts as a conditioner, (רש"י בראשית לו, לה) reinforcing in the living the wish and power to continue and to live. Freud's assertion that one tries to identify himself with the dead out of guilt or other considerations, is actually seen the other way around, that this wish of identification with the deceased, through *keriah*, *shiva*, *sheloshim*, and *aveilus*, in general is an expression of one's effervescent wish for self preservation acted out by a substitute symbol.

The deceased cannot praise the Lord, and are free of the Torah commandments. Judaism never believed in a cult of the dead, it rather, dwelled on the respect for the human soul and its body, both interacting in one's religious performances.

עבדו את ה' בשמחה (תהלים ק, ב)

לא המתים יהללו י' (שם קמו, יז)

No mutilation or immolation is permitted by the Levitical code. G-d's image must remain intact. We light a *Yahrzeit Licht* to symbolize the eternal bondage of man's soul with its Source — the Divine spark is returning to the Divine flame, whereby both fire and light are characterized in the Hebrew *Or* — אור. Judaism teaches us to respect this True Essence in us — the representation of the Divine Light, therefore we have Laws of *Kibud Hames* — as a terrestrial projection of the Divine Image.

בדמות אלקים ברא אותו (בראשית ה, א. מורה נבוכים א)

To tone down the depressing and morbid features of mourning, Halacha found attenuated circumstances in the Rituals of Mourning, whereby we follow Rabbi Shimon in אבלות. Religion being based on Life and continuation.

הלכה כדברי המקיל באבילות (ערוכין מו)

The deeply disturbing emotional experience of mourning calls for new ego resources of strength and solace. We are taught that

repression of grief is harmful, and that cathartic ventilation and expression of one's sorrow surely has a deeper therapeutic effect.

דאגה בלב איש ישחנה (משלי יב, כה)

Empty words, stereotyped condolence and the non-Jewish innovations of flowers, food and other gifts are mere standard, dry, empty and pagan formalities, conventional and meaningless in nature. Sincere involvement, a friendly sharing in grief, extending a warm hand in need are more meaningful and traditionally Jewish than all other assimilatory intrusions into this personal and sensitive realm. נחום אכלים הוא גמילת חסדים עם החיים ועם המתים (רמב"ם)

Hassidic practice is that on a *Yahrzeit* of a Rebbi or Hassid, one doesn't lament or spend his day in melancholic ideation or guilt-ridden thoughts; it is rather paradoxically, a day of solemn celebration. It is called *Hilula* — not *Yahrzeit*. In the typical brotherly spirit of Havrusa, a meal (Seudah) is prepared, and then, *simbedik*, the ritual of drinking LeChayim, for the continuation of life, after a *Siyum* of a *Perek Mishnayot* for the elevation of the Soul, studying and discussing the spiritual heritage of the deceased Tzadik to be perpetuated by his followers. Indeed, this is the meaning of *Hasharat Hanefesh*. "Death," says the Kotzker Rebbe, "is merely moving from one home to another, if we are wise, we seek to regard the latter as the abode of beauty," because of our strong belief in resurrection and a future world.

One can be neurotic for any possible reason and therefore perform his rituals also in a neurotic fashion, just as the neurotic acts out his neurotic behavior in all other non-religious functions of life.

Early religious training is important since it inculcates in the child not just fearful authority and blind submission, but rather a strong character training, a disciplined *modus vivendi*, based on flexible tenets of a moral code, of ethical values, of socially acceptable behavior to be chosen, and lived — by a guided, didactically sound religious counselling.

Through *faith*, man is able to ascend the ladder of perfection, for the "sanctification of human relations" as A. Adler claimed, and

מי יעלה בהר ה' ... נקי כפים ... זה דור ...
thereby grasp the Ultimate. דורשיו ... (תהלים כד, ג-ו)

The healing powers of religion and our rituals are essentially based on faith and hope. They stem from man's inner sanctum, from within, thereby, man frees himself of his orgiastic, id forces, and tries to transcend to the Infinite. Against the devastating forces that try to destroy the Ego, man employs the help of religions to regain his homeostasis for freedom, his equilibrium for the achievement and fulfillment of his creative abilities, and then reach and find his true Ego Ideal. חירות על הלוחות. אל תקרא חרות אלא (חירות אבות, ב)

A religious reality, where man finds and is consciously aware of his *Raison d'Être*, where man can draw from this rich reservoir fresh, new, creative resources to go on living for himself, for others, and for the Will of G-d whose world he is continuously improving לתקן עולם במלכות שדי — such a religion cannot be a neurotic one. When man is taught to recognize his limitations along with his great potential, to live and let live, to experience the greatest experience of love — *Ahavat Hashem* and *Ahavat HaZulat*, such a religion is a true way of life, a *Torah Hayim* whose gates are never invaded by despair, morbidity and suicide, but is open for the continuous search for the Ultimate — for the true meaning in life. דרכיה דרכי נועם. וכל נתיבותיה שלום (משלי ג, יז)

Religion must help man achieve full maturity, to feel free to make use of his *Liber Arbitrum* — the Divine Celestial gift of free choice, where man becomes his own master, gains Ego control and continues performing his religious observances with no guilt or anxiety at all. Whenever ritual is performed as a result of fear of punishment it is considered in Judaism as the lowest level of one's sense of religiosity. In W. R. D. Fairbairn's words (British J. Medical Psych., vol. 28, 1955, p. 156) "what the patient really needs in psychotherapy is Salvation for his crushed Ego by internalized bad objects of his past experiences and destructive emotions which were not yet abreacted." הצילה משאול נפשי.

Guilt has also a positive aspect, it is the remorse for the iniquity and destructiveness caused, and this, is deeply rooted in the im-

portance of having integrated Values — upon which both Psychology and Religion rest. (הרטה תנאי לתשובה (רמב"ם הלכות תשובה).

One must conceive man in his multiphasic structure of his personality.

Religion never fragmented man. It is the entire unity of one's Oneness that must be involved in the religious experience, or in a psychic evaluation. (בי זה כל האדם (קהלת יב, יג).

Psychiatrists have long recognized the therapeutic influences and positive effects of *group religious experiences*, where the patients, as coreligionists, are brought together in a religious congregation. Here, they are praying, saying Kadish in unison, performing responsive reading and singing together, worship and give expression verbally and emotionally in communion, thereby benefiting from this spiritual catharsis effectively, knowing that their prayers and supplication are heard, received and accepted. — במקלות אברך ה'.

Loneliness and Isolation are counteracted by togetherness, identity and communal belongingness.

שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד כי מימיני כל אמוט (תהלים טז, ח).

Judaism never conceived the performance of Ritual in "complete isolation," as Freud claimed. "It is easy to see wherein lies the resemblance between neurotic ceremonial and religious rites, it is the fear of pangs of conscience after their omission in the complete isolation of them from all other activities. One might venture to regard the obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart to the formation of a religion... to describe religion as a universal obsessional neurosis." (Collected papers, II, Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices.)

Refuted by the reality of our world 25 years after, Freud's fetish of Science as the key to civilization's redemption was not only a utopia, but was factually disproved when it became a tragic destructive tool in the hands of mankind's enemies and foes of modern culture, destroyers of our great civilization, from Nazism and its present neo-nazis and bigots — the so called torch-carriers of scientific warfare and civilization's discontent. Man still didn't reach

maturity, regardless whether he remained religious or not. Our present cosmic-searching era of confusion and existential pessimism today, is not much better than the ignorant childhood days of the human race — the origin of religion according to Freud. At least we were able then to dream and hope for a better morrow... The isolated cases of neurotic ritualists in Freud's practice were the few patients he saw, and these patients in Vienna, I doubt if they know what a Synagogue, a *Yom Tov*, a *Seder*, a *Simbat Torah* or a *Sukah* was.

I don't know of any Jewish ritual to be performed "in complete isolation." We are asked to worship in group — *Tzibur* — במקלות במקלות ברכו אלקים (תהלים כז, טח).

Judaism and isolation or withdrawal are antithetic to each other. A *nazir* — a religious hermit — is considered a sinner, who has to bring an offering, because he retreated and refused to partake of what G-d has offered in life.

מאשר חטא על הנפש (במדבר ו, יא).

The *Tzibur* — the community is an integral entity in the ritual, fulfillment whether it is for a *Kadish*, or Bar Mitzva, a wedding, a *Brit Milah*, Prayer, Torah reading or even a Funeral — *Levayat Hamet*, a Minyan of 10 is always an *ad minimum* requirement for such a religious performance.

Denude Ritual of Life of its colorful and decorative forms and its place is reduced to dull, morbid and depressive features, of pessimism leading to despair and even suicide.

The emphasis on the future and the hopeful rays of *Emunah* and *Bitachon* are essential traits in Judaic lore, as antidote agents for despair and depression.

עצבות דוחה את השכינה (לתורת החסידות).

Man cannot come close to Divinity through melancholic moods or fits of depression. The *Schebinah* cannot dwell in sadness, since its quintessence is Joy and true *Simcha*. אין השכינה שורה אלא מתוך שמחה של מצוה (שבת ל).

Therefore, an exaggerated sense of guilt runs counter to the true concept of *Teshuvah meAhava* — voluntary repentance. Rid yourself of exaggerated guilt, but not of guilt itself — of the moral sense of Ego censorship and emotional balance of feeling the rights and wrongs in the factual contravention of moral and social standards. The whole element of *Teshuva* is based on this introspective assessment of what Maimonides called *bakarat bachet* (ה'ל' ב תשובה, ב, ב insight and recognition. Such moral remorse for breaking accepted socio-religious or ethical norms is more than welcome, it acts as a barrier for possible social ostracizing or isolation.

Pain is a signal, just as Anxiety is (Freud). It is indeed good to be reminded. Man always surrounded himself with symbolic reminders, yellow and red lights in his roads of life for a free and smooth movement. Pain has a purpose. WeP don't build on an unyielding foundation of despair.

The journey into the Self — the true *chesbon Hanefesh* is very painful, but very therapeutic. Thru the zigzag mazes and ups and downs in life man matures and becomes stronger, because life is never empty, unless we misapprehend it, and see only the thorns instead of the roses. It is only the emptiness in us and self dejection. The result of dejection is Death. Abject loneliness is man's worst enemy.

We are therefore traditionally inspired with the ritual of the Shalosh Seudot' Zemiroth of *Mizmor le David*... גם כי אלך בגיא... צלמות לא אירא רע כי אתה עמדי.

A Jew feels, and should be taught, that he is really never, never alone... שוייתי ה' לנגדי תמיד.

Even if we accept the psychoanalytic claim that Ritual is defensive in nature, it still doesn't make it neurotic. Since every other form of dependency in one's functioning could be within the realm of the normal or of the neurotic, depending upon one's personality make-up and Ego-defences in his daily life functioning.

One can make use of ritual in a neurotic fashion, just as he can use his job, his marital life, his social involvement, or his

money spending, in a distorted, non-acceptable manner. But one can also make use of the rituals in a healthy way, whereby he regulates and coordinates certain of his religious beliefs, concretizing and translating them into representative, meaningful and reasonable symbols.

עץ חיים היא למחזיקים בה... (משלי ג, יח)

Life in itself can be approached in a neurotic or in a healthy fashion, depending on the degree of fulfillment of one's needs, when accepted and approved by one's free will. Religious rituals are not a forced yoke upon the believer, he does not feel himself as an Atlas, carrying the universal weight under the spell or magic curse of an angry authoritative figure. Take away the element of *Simha* — joy, from the ritual, and you lost the very core — the heart of the religious experience, as required by Judaism.

— Worship the Lord thru joy, (as truly understood in Hassidism). אין עומדין להתפלל אלא מתוך שמחה של מצוה (ברכות לא). במעשי ידיר ארנן (תהלים צב, ה)

Religious rituals can be most helpful in maintaining one's sense of optimism and faith for a better morrow. They can act as the dynamic force for continuing living for a purpose, by inspiring courage, hope and determination, and thereby removing or at least, controlling difficulties, which are deeply imbedded in one's psychic activity.

They help man to regain his homeostasis and emotional balance as well as his inalienable right to be, to exist and to function as his own Self, to experience a true, free, and self-accepting relationship with the Ultimate — all embracing reality, regarded as personal, and related to the One — His heavenly Father. כל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים (אבות ב, י)

Ritual and ceremonies performed in their communal, group context act as positive conditioners for man's social involvement, strengthening his ties with the group, and reinforcing his identification with his peers, in an inter-personal relationship, having the same faith, the identical hopes and strivings, searching for the same truth — for man's spiritual elevation and betterment.

Therefore why Rabbi Akiva considered the commandment of "Love your friend as yourself" —

ואהבת לרעך כמוך — אמר ר' עקיבא זה כלל גדול בתורה (ירושלמי נדרים פט)

as a basic and unique principle in Judaism — man's ideal for non-Egocentric thinking, whereby religion is not considered a Freudian neurosis but rather a successful means of dealing with it.

For it is not good for man to be (live) by himself.

לא טוב היות אדם לבדו (בראשית ב, יח)

Isolation, withdrawal and denial are not considered in Judaism successful mechanisms of defense, since Judaism emphasizes man's cohesive relationship, and clearly defined place in the social mosaic of which he is a rightful and integrated citizen.

הלל אומר אל תפרוש מן הצבור (אבות ב, ה)

Love of fellowman is a primary condition for the fulfillment of Love of God. Both expressions of man's deepest affection, the Hebrew *Ahava* — are employed identically in the Torah's quest for man's love to his fellow man and his love to God.

Thus rituals have meaning to both individual and the group alike, fulfilling the need to elevate primitive unconscious human motivations to higher goals of human endeavor.

There is no favoritism, nepotism, hierarchy or privileges in Jewish rituals when performed in accordance with the tradition, and this integrative, community-identification, and collective solidarity strengthens and solidifies one's position within the society, and reinforces in man the sense of importance and collective responsibility. The monologue becomes thus a Dialogue, the individual then can easily pray his daily prayers in a plural form aware of this social mosaic of which he is considered an important part. It is both a gratifying revelation and a fulfilling experience.

The rituals prescribed by Jewish law for the mourning period must be recognized by psychiatry as a recognition of man's need to cry and give free expression to his pain. That this process of

"working through" bereavement is a slow process, developmental, with a prologue — grief, a mezzo-period — the week of mourning, loneliness, sadness and feelings of ambivalence of love and anger intermingled and an epilogue — the gradual return to the outside world, when the Chinese wall of retreat is broken down, and extrovert, socially directed trends reappear and are reactivated. Contact with society and the world is now reestablished.

Our Rabbis fully understood man's need to express grief, to be consoled and accepted. That's why the Book of Job was canonized in the Bible. The entire process of Shiva, Shloshim and the Year's Kaddish is actually a reaffirmation of man's existence, of his right to live, to relate, to function and above all, to give free expression to human suffering — the best test in spiritual strength and true faith. This is the true meaning of the Biblical *nisayon* — a Divinely given Task and test in Faith.

נסיונו של אברהם אבינו ונסיונו של איוב

In bereavement the Clergyman can be of much more help than the Psychiatrist, because of his religious identity, the spiritual authority, his personal involvement and identification with the mourner. He can help, as the Kaddish indicates, to reaffirm his belief in the right Divine judgment, not always understood by mortals, reaffirm his belief in life and its purposeful meaning, utilizing the endless resources of religious faith and Jewish optimism, for another try, for a better world.



• Nosan Mikroy

In this article the problem of commitment (or lack thereof) on the part of today's Jewish youth is analyzed in the light of modern psychological theory. Nosan Mikroy, a junior, spent his freshman and sophomore years at the University of Denver, and the past three years in various Yeshivot in Israel.

TORAH AND YOUTH: CHALLENGE AND COMMITMENT

The current theological bickering over the issue of whether "G-d is dead" seems to have missed the real issue, which is the growing suspicion not that God is dead, but that Man is dead. We have lost our capacity for wonder and awe; the capacity, or the will, to respond to the challenge of faith with positive commitment. We have ceased to be personally and vitally involved, and have become instead the mere passive, if uncomplaining, recipients of a growingly burdensome Tradition. The phenomenon of one who is inspired and excited by Torah is met by many with a sense of shock or even suspicion. At the heart of this problem, it is to be suspected, is the failure to make the Jewish religion relevant and challenging to those who are singled out to be the bearers and perpetuators of its tradition: the youth. Today's Jewish youth can best be characterized as uncommitted and unconcerned. The maintaining of religious practice has become a thing which is not motivated by any strong conviction or sense of value, but rather by some vague notion of guilt and dimly remembered duty. We are not facing the challenge of youth with the challenge of Torah, nor are we meeting the committing of youth with a reply of commitment and affirmation.

Dr. Erik H. Erikson, professor of human development at Harvard, and one of the most exciting theorists and writers in child and adolescent psychology, has for some time been developing a hypothesis which when fully formulated can do much towards helping our understanding of adolescent development; and which also can have far-reaching implications for religion.

The development of man, according to Erikson, is to be viewed as the emergence at certain critical periods in growth of "ego qualities"; criteria by which the individual shows the integration of the emerging "self" and the achievement of a social identification. In adolescence, this "ego quality" (or as we might say, the developmental task) is the establishment of a favorable ratio between a sense of identity and role confusion. The emphasis is on the establishment of a *ratio*, an emerging quality, rather than a defined accomplishment, since adolescence is basically a time of challenge and confusion. Much depends on the developmental stages and the adjustment to them made as a child. A sense of trust, developed (hopefully) during infancy and early childhood, is the reliance on the integrity of oneself and others. In adolescence this sense of trust is challenged, as the adolescent finds the sameness and continuity earlier relied on — both in himself and in others — are called into question again. Physically and emotionally he has to relive this process and re-establish the sense of trust. Erikson sees religion as the institutional safeguard which supports (or, adversely, can also help to challenge and suppress) this emerging of trust. Religion, properly functioning, results in the insight that individual trust must become a common faith, individual mistrust a commonly formulated evil".

There is the simultaneous emergence at each developmental stage of certain essential strengths, or "basic virtues". These virtues seem to be the result of the favorable integration at each stage of the ego tasks, such as Trust, Identity, etc., which are appropriate to that stage of development. It is essential to realize, furthermore, that these virtues do not develop in isolation, but "can arise only in the interplay of a life stage with the individuals and the social forces of a true community". The "basic virtue" or strength of adolescence is Fidelity, which Erikson defines as "the strength of

disciplined devotion". It is the search for something and somebody to believe in and be true to. It is the propensity for commitment.

At this point we can begin to analyze the problem of the failure of Judaism today in winning this commitment from Jewish youth. If a sense of fidelity, a need to believe and to commit oneself, is the virtue which emerges in the adolescent quest for identity, then the problem is not that our youth are incapable or unwilling to commit themselves; but that we have given them nothing worthy of commitment — and more important, we have failed to give them a sense of their own worth and to convince them that they are needed.

Erikson clearly defines the significance of this relationship: "Ego strength emerges from the mutual confirmation of individual and community, in the sense that society recognizes the young individual as a bearer of fresh energy and that the individual so confirmed recognizes society as a living process which inspires loyalty as it receives it, maintains allegiance as it attracts, honors confidence as it demands it." (*The Challenge of Youth*, p. 9). Understand this statement as it relates to the Jewish community and the Jewish tradition, and you can see the heart of our crisis. Judaism today is marked precisely by its failure to meet this search and to confirm this strength on the part of its youth. It is no accident that adolescence marks for most the turning away from Torah Judaism, or at least the relegation of its ideals and claims to a more or less submerged unconsciousness. There is in our society in general today no such "mutual confirmation". We certainly do not recognize our youth as "bearers of fresh energy" which may revitalize our way of life. We instead react to youth with a sort of hysterical uneasiness and establish impersonal institutions — most notably the school — for the purpose of containing all this "fresh energy" and force it into a sort of passive submissiveness that will eventually permit the "adjusted" adolescent to be released into society as relatively harmless animal. But, as Erikson warns us, man as an animal is nothing. "Man survives only where traditional child training provides him with a conscience which will guide him without crushing him and which is firm and flexible enough to fit the vicissitudes of his historical era." (*Childhood and Society*,

p. 95). It is exactly at this point where we are failing the American Jewish youth. The usual emphasis of Torah Judaism as it is presented today to our youth does nothing to aid in the quest for identity; it does not guide and direct, it suppresses and stifles. It is certainly not "firm and flexible", it is reproving and demanding. It does not respond to fidelity with affirmation, nor to commitment with confirmation. This is, in all probability, the result of the historical evolution of Torah Judaism in this country. Social institutions, just as individuals, develop "defense mechanisms" by which they protect cherished and habitual modes of behavior. Orthodox Judaism is on the defense in America — it seemingly cannot tolerate signs of rebellion and challenge on the part of the youth. The question is, are we reading the signs correctly? The adolescent mind, according to Erikson, is an ideological mind, questing for values and ready to be confirmed and guided by rituals and guides. Our adolescent desperately desires to play the game, but he must know the rules — he is eager to commit himself to the ideals we profess, provided that he can be convinced that it is worth the risk of commitment.

"To enter history", says Erikson, "each generation of youth must find an identity consonant with its own childhood and consonant with an ideological promise in the perceptible historical process . . . no longer is it merely for the old to teach the young the meaning of life, whether individual or collective. It is the young who, by their responses and actions, tell the old whether life as represented by them has meaning; and it is the young who carry in them the power to confirm those who confirm them and, joining the issues, to renew and regenerate, or to reform and rebel." (*Challenge of Youth*, p. 24). We must have faith in the ability of youth to participate as partners in the revitalizing of Jewish life; we must enable youth to respond to Torah as *challenge* and not as *coercion*.

The relationship to a "significant other" is an important aspect of the adolescent search for identification and identity; the process whereby he finds his own identity reflected and confirmed in the mirror of acceptance and trust of those who have meaning for him. How does the "rebbe" — the teacher of Torah and example

of its ideals in the eyes of youth — fit into this picture? Traditionally, the "rebbe" has been something more than just a lecturer in Talmud who leaves his class with the ringing of a bell to retire to the privacy of his home or to another job. The Gemara stresses the relationship of the rebbe as a father to his students, one who is vitally interested in their spiritual and physical welfare. That relationship, it seems, has virtually disappeared. If there is to be a significant encounter between the adolescent and the individual with whom he seeks to identify, Erikson says, there must be a "mutual sizing up and a mutual plea for being recognized as individuals who can be more than they seem to be, and whose potentials are needed by the order that is or will be". If the teacher of the adolescent does not see his role in this light, but rather sees it in terms of forcing his authority and imposing his will on his students, of coercing rather than inspiring and demanding rather than guiding, then inevitably he will only succeed in blocking the identification process and destroying any love that may have been nurtured for the ideals of Torah. He will kill the desire and even the ability to involve oneself in the process of commitment. The adolescent responds not so much to what we stand for, but to what we *seem* to stand for.

Erikson aptly sums up what we have been discussing in these words: "Adolescent development comprises a new set of identification processes, both with significant persons and with ideological forces, which give importance to individual life by relating it to a living community and to ongoing history, and by counterpointing the newly won individual identity with some communal solidarity". Our new era calls, not for a new Torah (as some have mistakenly advocated), but for new insights into the application and meaning of Torah; it also calls for new insights into the nature of youth whom we hope to reach. Our involvement with youth must be in the nature of a dialogue; there must be mutual trust and confirmation, and there must be mutual challenge and commitment.

(The basic books in which the theories of Erikson presented in this article are discussed are the following: *Childhood and Society*, W. W. Norton & Co., 1963; and *The Challenge of Youth*, Doubleday & Co. (Anchor paperback edition), 1965.)

Reflections on Torah

• Lawrence Kaplan

For the secular intellectual "alienation" is one of the more trumpeted philosophical problems of our day. For the halachic Jew, who has been given the privilege of relating to his Creator every moment of the day via Halacha, a deeper spiritual and existential crisis is the crisis of *hester panim*, the apparent lack of response on the part of the *Ribono Shel Olom* — God's silence. When Larry Kaplan (now doing graduate work in history at Harvard University) wrote this article in 1965 it won the Ephraim Fleischer Memorial Award.

WHEN GOD IS SILENT: HESTER PANIM IN THE BOOKS OF EICHA, JOB AND HABAKUK

The gravest religious crisis that can confront the man of faith is the phenomenon of *hester panim*, of God's "hiding his face," God's silence.

Surely the cry "My God, My God, Why has thou forsaken me?" is the most agonizing and despairing cry that resounds in the entire Bible. For the man who has lived in the shadow of God's presence, for whom God's care and concern, God's justice and love, have been living realities to be suddenly abandoned and forsaken, deserted, is to experience a crisis of such awful and soul-shattering dimensions that his faith may be broken and crushed. For he who has encountered God in both nature and history to see both these spheres suddenly emptied of all Divinity, nay, even handed over to the forces of evil, is to come face to face with the horrible possibility that his faith has been a snare and a delusion.

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If God is only "in His heaven," then all cannot be "right with the world." Religion begins when God descends from heaven and embraces man with His loving concern. Religion begins with the intimate relationship and bond that God, Himself, has established between Himself and man. And if God breaks that bond, withdraws from this earth, and ascends, once again, into His heaven, then religion must end. And for the religious individual who no longer can discern God's presence in his own life and that of mankind, who no longer experiences God's constant "being with him" אהיה עִמָּךְ (ehyeh emcha), it seems as if religion *has* ended.

Such a crisis confronted the Jewish people in the years preceding the destruction of the first temple. The people of Israel, the chosen people, the people of whom God speaking through his prophet, had said, "You only have I known of all the peoples of the earth," the people who had *seen* God's special covenant with them being actualized and realized throughout the entire course of their historical existence, was now weak and emasculated. Ever since the battle of Megiddo, when Pharaoh Necho defeated King Josiah, the independence of the Judean commonwealth was, for all practical purposes, lost. And with the conquest of Judea by the Babylonians, the destruction of the temple, and the forced mass exile that followed, there could be no doubt that God had "hidden His face." It seemed as if the Jewish people and the Jewish religion were dead, or, if not quite dead, at least rapidly dying. And how could it be otherwise? Had not God withdrawn His sheltering presence from His people and left them exposed to the destructive forces of a Godless world?

Was there any way out of this despair? What reply could the Jews make in the face of *hester panim*? Indeed, was there any reply they could make?

I wish to suggest that in the book of *Eicha*, especially in the crucial chapters three and five, the prophet Jeremiah formulated, out of the depths of his own experience, the Jewish response to the crisis of *hester panim*. I also wish to show how Job, when confronted by the same crisis in a parallel situation, responded in substantially the same manner as Jeremiah. And, finally, I wish to examine the book of *Habbakuk* in terms of being God's answer to

this most challenging, baffling, and soul-corroding of all religious crises.

II

"I am the man, that hath seen afflictions
by the rod of His wrath."

Only in the third chapter of *Eicha* does Jeremiah's bitter lament first strike a note of personal suffering and anguish. In the first two chapters Jeremiah laments over his people's bereavement and loss. In the third chapter he speaks of his own losses. "I am the man — *ani hagever*." Speaking both as a prophet and as the personification of his people, Jeremiah cries out that God has *abandoned* him. Both as a prophet — for God gave him the thankless task of admonishing and rebuking a people that would not listen to him, that persecuted him and nearly killed him — and as the personification of his people — for as the people's prophet, the suffering and anguish of the Jews in the face of "hester panim" becomes Jeremiah's own. Nay, God has not only abandoned him but has become his personal enemy. "He was unto me as a bear lying in wait, and as a lion in secret places." And as his despair reaches almost unbearable proportions, his faith nearly cracks. "And I said, my strength and my hope is perished from the Lord."

Suddenly, though, in the midst of remembering this bitter galling experience, Jeremiah recalls something to mind and is comforted.

I remembered my affliction and my misery
the wormwood and the gall
My soul hath them still in remembrance
and is humbled in me.
This I recall to my mind,
therefore have I hope.

What can be this sudden revelation that infuses such hope in him?

Surely the Lord's mercies are not consumed,
Surely His compassion fail not.

They are new every morning;
Great is Thy faithfulness.
'The Lord is my portion,' saith my spirit;
'Therefore will I hope in Him.'

But has not Jeremiah just spoken of God's awful wrath which, at that very moment, is oppressing him? How can he then say that God's mercies are endless? Did Jeremiah see God's mercies revealed in the destruction of the temple?

How can Jeremiah assert that a man should wait for the salvation of the Lord when he has just said that God has cut off his prayer for redemption? How can he speak of salvation at all, when salvation is *dead*, is no longer a living force in his life?

Here I wish to suggest that, if we are to understand Jeremiah's internal movement from despair to hope, we must differentiate between his faith and his belief. Faith is placing one's trust in a God whose presence one experiences daily. "And the people saw God and they had faith in God." Belief is intellectual assent to the fact that God is present even though His presence is hidden. When we live in faith, we experience with the fullness of our entire being, our reason, our senses, our emotions, our will, God's care and concern made manifest clearly in history. When we live in belief, all we can do is to acknowledge that God's care and concern abides, for He has hidden His presence and we cannot discern His abiding care.

Jeremiah could no longer experience redemption as a living reality. He still believed in a God that redeems. And this belief was enough to give him hope. God's goodness may have been hidden from sight; yet the fact remained that God is good. And that fact was enough to give him hope.¹

But belief is only possible if faith has preceded it. Belief in a God that cares is only possible if at some point one has experienced God's care. Jeremiah, at the moment of *hester panim*, could retain his hope in God for he remembered how God had once seized hold of his entire being. The Jewish people in exile could believe in God's redemptive powers, for they remembered "the great hand of God" which took them out of Egypt.

We may go further than that and say, together with Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz, that belief is not only possible when preceded by faith but is a necessary outgrowth of it.

In the encounter man is shown not that God happens to care at one particular moment but that He is a caring God. Therefore, even after the actual experience of the encounter has passed, the *knowledge* remains with man that God does not withdraw, that He does not abandon man, that the relationship of concern is not severed, even though it is no longer experienced. The knowledge follows logically from the encounter.²

Yet if belief follows logically from faith, *psychologically* it is a different matter altogether. For when the encounter with God is no longer possible, one's faith can turn into a despairing abdication of one's responsibility for searching out another alternative in place of the existential aspect of religion, indeed as it threatened to do with Jeremiah — that is, faith can turn into despair *unless* one can "recall to mind" and internalize in one's self the logical implications of one's previous encounter with God and the necessary consequence of belief.

Belief follows faith and yet Jeremiah cannot rest content with belief alone. He may, indeed, believe in God's concern, yet he yearns to experience it once more. If need be, he will live by his belief yet he yearns to return to his living faith. In chapter five, then, the concluding chapter of *Eicha*, Jeremiah no longer laments his fate but addresses a prayer, a plea to God.

Remember, O Lord, what is come upon us
Consider and behold our shame...
Thou, O Lord remainest for ever;
Thy throne from generation to generation.
Wherefore doest Thou forget us for ever;
and forsake us for so long time?
Turn Thou us unto thee, O Lord
and we shall be turned;
Renew our days as of old.

While it is, then, the faith that results in belief that enables the prophet to move from despair to hope, he will always pray to God to return to him, enabling him to return to God in the *faith* of his days of old.

III

The same psychological, religious response to the crisis of *hester panim* that characterizes *Eicha* characterizes the book of *Job*. Job's description of his pains and travails are strikingly similar to that of Jeremiah. Both Job and Jeremiah walk in the darkness, have God for their enemy, are abandoned by their people, and afflicted with acute physical suffering.³

And Job's response is of a piece with that of Jeremiah. "Though he slay me, yet I will place my hope in Him."⁴ Job who has known God's blessing as of old still believes in God's redemptive power though God has afflicted him sorely. "I know that my redeemer liveth," he exclaims in a moment of hope.

Yet Job, while willing to believe, also refuses to remain content with belief. He cannot rest content with God's silence.

Who would see to it that I know where
to find Him . . .

I would present Him with my arguments
and He would answer me
and I would understand
what He would say unto me

Nor can he rest content with God's absence.

Oh that I were as in the months of old⁵
As in the days when God watched over me;
When His lamp shined above my head
And by His light I walked through darkness;
When the Almighty was yet with me
And my children were about me.

To be sure, Job's protests are much stronger than Jeremiah's prayers. For while Jeremiah can acknowledge that God has just cause for "hiding His face" in his situation, Job can see no justification for such action in his. But the response to the crisis is, as I have said, essentially the same.

IV

We may ask, is such a response possible? Can the tension between the willingness to rest in belief if need be, and the unwillingness to rest content with that same belief, can that tension be maintained? Will not the willingness to rest in the belief of God's goodness and concern eventually result in resting content with that belief? Is it not likely that with the passage of time, the believer will be content with the mere knowledge that God is present and no longer seek to experience His presence? And the other possibility is present as well. The unwillingness to rest content in belief may lead to an unwillingness to believe at all. If one yearns for God to envelop him with His loving care and one's yearning remains unfulfilled, then this very unfulfilled yearning can lead to a denial of the fact that God does care even when "in hiding."

Is it possible, then, to maintain the tension, the delicate balance between acceptance and dissatisfaction?

It is possible, for it is God Himself who guarantees the maintenance of the tension. Moreover, God embodies this tension, viewed from His own perspective of course, within Himself as well.

God presents us with this guarantee in the book of *Habbakuk*. Habbakuk has complained to God that injustice has triumphed and justice is trampled upon because God has hidden Himself from His people. And God replies with a dual answer. He demands that the righteous man live by His faith.⁶ And He promises to manifest Himself by executing judgment upon the wicked.⁷ This dual reply would seem to contradict itself. If God will show Himself in judgment, what need is there for the belief that results from faith? And if that belief is necessary, then is it not necessary precisely because God will continue to remain hidden?

But it is the same tension at work again, the tension which man can live by, which man must live by, for this tension exists in God Himself, and thus is its dynamic realization guaranteed. For the very moment when God "hides" Himself, he begins the process of redemption. On the day the temple was destroyed, the Messiah was born.

Here, then, in *Eicha*, *Habbakuk*, and *Job*, our view of the

response to *hester panim* both the response of man and the response of God coalesce into a unity.

In a time of *hester panim*, man promises to live in his belief yet never giving up his demand for redemption. And in a time of *hester panim* God, on His part, confronts us with the demand that we live out this crisis by our belief, confident and trusting in His promises of redemption.

NOTES

1. My distinction between belief and faith might seem to correspond to the well-known distinction between "belief that" and "belief in." This is not so. "Belief that" refers to a belief that a certain proposition is true, e.g. "I believe that a prime mover exists." "Belief in" refers to a belief that invites one to place one's trust and confidence in another person e.g. "She believes in him." In this sense, "belief," as I am using it, is "belief in" since when one believes that God is concerned about man, even though that concern may be hidden, one is led to place his trust and hope in God, that is he is led to "believe in" God. Faith, of course, is also a form of "believe in," occasioned by direct experience of God's presence.
2. Eliezer Berkovitz, *God, Man and History*, Jonathan David, New York, 1959, pp. 40-41.
3. Cf. Eicha 3:2, 4, 10, 14 and Job 19:8, 11, 13-20, 21.
4. Note the use of the word *אחיל* (*ochil*), Eicha 3:21, 24, 25 and *אֵיחַל* (*ayachail*), Job 13:15.
5. Note the use of the word *קדם* (*kedem*), Eicha 5:21, Job. 29:2.
6. I have interpreted *emunah* in the verse "the righteous shall live by his faith" to mean the belief that results from faith, not faith itself. As there is no separate word for belief in Hebrew, *emunah* can take on either meaning depending on context.
7. The verse "For the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord as the waters cover the sea" which follows directly upon God's pronouncements of the coming destruction which he will execute upon the wicked is, contrary to the assertion of some modern critics, perfectly in place. We have only to assume that these pronouncements are part of God's answer to Habakkuk's question "Why *hester panim*?" If our assumption is correct, these pronouncements then should be understood, as I have understood them, to mean that through God's destruction of the wicked, He will make manifest His glory to all the inhabitants of the earth and no longer will His justice be hidden. "Daat Hashem," knowledge of the Lord, refers to a personal intimate relationship with God. Cf. Hosea 2:22.



The Jew has always been troubled by the apparent aversion of *אֵהְלֵי שָׂם* to *יְפִיּוּתוֹ שֶׁל יִפְתָּ*, of the beauty of this world to that of the next. The relationship between Halacha and beauty is analyzed in this article by Menachem Kasdan, a senior.

THE VOICE OF GOD IS IN BEAUTY: JUDAISM AND AESTHETICS

The aesthetic experience is the experience of the beautiful, for, by definition, aesthetics deals with beauty. Since calling something beautiful means assigning it a value, an understanding of the Torah's set of values must be our point of departure for the ultimate understanding of the relationship between Halacha and beauty.

I

The Torah recognizes two standards of values in this world: an absolute, metaphysical standard, and a relative, human standard. The absolute set of values recognized by the Torah are those "spiritual" values which are, in one form or another, manifestations of the *Ribono Shel Olam* in this world. These spiritual values are not empirical; they cannot be analyzed in a test tube, viewed through a microscope or calculated on a blackboard. But they are real. Love and hatred, exhilaration and despair, logic, awe and humility — surely these value experiences make up valid and substantial portions of any human life even though they lack physical referents.

Unless we accept the incorporation of values into this world as an objectively real aspect of Creation, we cannot grasp Abraham's question of *הַשׁוֹפֵט כֹּל הָאָרֶץ לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה מִשְׁפָּט*. If justice as an absolute, not relative, value does not intrinsicate Creation as a manifestation of God, Abraham's question is absurd. If humanity created the

value "justice," how could anyone imagine, let alone demand, that the Eternal measure his actions by it? If, however, justice is a manifestation of the Divine, Abraham can indeed be perplexed by a decision ("unjust") that, כביכול, contradicts the very nature of the *Ribono Shel Olam*.

Every aspect of creation — a manifestation of God — uniformly contains God's absolute values; e.g. of justice and goodness. Indeed, God sees even the so-called "evil urge," as "very good."¹ The distinction between good and evil exists only in the human mind. Only man's limited comprehension causes him to imagine that certain aspects of this world are "good" and others, "evil." To illustrate this, imagine an electric blub lighting up a house with two windows, one red and one blue. The light emanating from the blub is of one hue. However, the observer standing outside of the house will perceive two lights emanating from the room (red and blue), though in truth only one is really there. Similarly, the absolute unity of the value or values of this world are fragmentized into "positive" and "negative" values only in the human mind which cannot grasp the totality of Creation.

Thus the Talmud² tells us that, although in this world we recite one blessing upon being informed of a fortunate incident (הטוב והמטיב), and a second, different blessing upon being informed of an unfortunate incident (דיין האמת), in the future world to be, only the blessing over the fortunate or "good" incident (הטוב והמטיב) will be recited for all cases. Since any experience of this world, while seemingly "good" or "bad," is, ultimately, an experience of God, it is necessarily a "good" experience in an absolute sense. Perceiving (or perhaps better, *conceiving* of) an experience as "bad" is peculiarly mortal; our knowledge is limited, our vision, restricted. In the future world, says the Talmud, all experiences will be blessed with הטוב והמטיב for we shall comprehend the absolute, indivisible nature of things.

In describing the absolute *moral* nature of this world in a metaphysical sense (e.g. "good"), we have noted the *relative* nature of this world in the eyes of the ordinary human being ("good" and "bad"). This very same breakdown of absolute metaphysical and relative human values applies in the realm of beauty.

II

In the mighty act of creation, Divinity utilized... beauty. As the Psalmist tells us, "Thou art clothed with splendor and with beauty" ... Thus, to the extent that man is sensitive to beauty in the world, he is detecting the handiwork of Divinity, he is discovering the traces of Divine love. "The voice of God (can be detected) in power; the voice of God is in beauty."³

We have here established the absolute metaphysical beauty of this world — the beauty of nature, God's creation. Now we must ask what of relative human beauty — the beauty of the arts, man's creations? How does the Halacha approach aesthetics?

We must first recognize that, although throughout the ages certain objects have always been described as beautiful, this beauty is relative and not absolute. Every society and every age has recognized different values in its understanding of beauty. There are (cultural) worlds of difference between renaissance, impressionist, and pop art. The music of the East often baffles a Westerner — as does the allurements of obesity and elongated necks hold for certain primitive peoples. The Halacha's approach to this relative standard of beauty has been twofold — a positively oriented "encompassing action" as it were, applying the principles of aesthetics to Judaism, while simultaneously engaging in a negative reaction, a recoil from any beauty that does not relate to Judaism. No casuistry can deny the fact that Judaism is deeply distrustful and suspicious of beauty for its own sake.

The encompassing action of Halacha is seen in many historical as well as contemporary areas of Jewish tradition. According to the Rambam many *halachot* involving the Temple service are primarily related to aesthetic considerations.

In order to raise the estimation of the Temple, those who ministered therein received great honor; and the priests and Levites were therefore distinguished from the rest. It was commanded that the priests should be clothed properly with beautiful and good garments, "holy garments for

glory and for beauty" (Exod. XXVIII:2). A priest that had a blemish was not allowed to officiate; and not only those that had a blemish were excluded from the service, but also — according to the Talmudic interpretation of this precept — those that had an abnormal appearance; for the multitude does not estimate man by his true form but by the perfection of his bodily limbs and the beauty of his garments, and the Temple was to be held in great reverence by all...

The duty of the Levites was the performance of vocal music; and a Levite became therefore disabled for service when he lost his voice. The object of the singing is to produce certain emotions; this object can only be attained by music, as was always the case in the Temple...

Since many beasts were daily slaughtered in the holy place, the flesh cut in pieces and the entrails and the legs burnt and washed, the smell of the place would undoubtedly have been like the smell of slaughter-houses, if nothing had been done to counteract it. They were therefore commanded to burn incense there twice every day, in the morning and in the evening (Exod. XXX:7, 8), in order to give the place and the garments of those who officiated there a pleasant odor. There is a well-known saying of our Sages, "In Jericho they could smell the incense" [burnt in the Temple]. This provision likewise tended to support the dignity of the Temple. If there had not been a good smell, let alone if there had been a stench, it would have produced in the minds of the people the reverse of respect; for our heart generally feels elevated in the presence of good odor, and is attracted by it, but it abhors and avoids bad odor.

The anointing oil (Exod. XXX:22-33) served a double purpose: to give the anointed object a good odor, and to produce the impression that it was something great, holy, and distinguished, and better than other objects of the same species; it made no difference whether that object was a human being, a garment, or a vessel. All this aimed at producing due respect towards the Sanctuary, and indirectly

fear of God. When a person enters the temple, certain emotions are produced in him; and obstinate hearts are softened and humbled. These plans and indirect means were devised by the Law, to soften and humble man's heart at entering the holy place, in order that he might intrust himself to the sure guidance of God's commandments.⁴

From an absolute perspective all the scenes, sounds, and odors of the Temple service are indistinguishable. Man alone differentiates between the aesthetically pleasing or offending, for only in terms of the bio-intellectual aspects of man does any meaning accrue to aesthetic values. Hence, as a living, dynamic guide for man, the Torah provides for these humanly meaningful values. The Torah not only provided passively for the incorporation of relative aesthetic values, but commanded that such beauty be actively interwoven into the fabric of religious observance.

On the words "This is my God and I will adorn him," there is the well known Talmudic comment, "Make beautiful objects in the performance of His commandments, make a beautiful *Succah*, a beautiful *Lulav*, a beautiful *Shofar*." Aside from the ritual fitness of these ceremonial objects, the observant Jew must make further efforts to beautify them.⁵

The different decorations of a *Succah* in North and South America reflect different cultural as well as geographical climes. In a similar vein the *Amora* Rabbi Judah, who, in interpreting the verse "Bow before the Lord in the beauty of holiness" groomed himself (i.e. beautified himself as the verse implies) before praying to God,⁶ certainly did not put on a tuxedo and top hat! His conception of a well groomed individual necessarily related to, and was dictated by, the mores of the society in which he lived. Nonetheless, his mode of dress was as valid a fulfillment of "Bow before the Lord in the beauty of Holiness" in his society as formal attire would be in ours.

The above should suffice as examples of the Halacha's appreciation of the differing human conceptions of beauty. The Halacha's

distrust of beauty and the limitations imposed upon beauty as a result of that distrust will now be dealt with. However, for this analysis we must first understand the dynamics of the aesthetic experience.

For the artist as for the mystic "[this] world is in itself meaningless, yet it is pregnant with meaning."⁷ In creating a work of art the artist attempts to "capture something universally significant in the particular"⁸ via the manipulation of symbols. The aesthetic experience is the individual's reaction to the implications of the artist's symbols. Since the interpretation of a given symbol differs with each individual (due to his unique psychological makeup or frame of reference), the aesthetic experience of each individual differs from that of his friend. This may be understood best in terms of "psychical distance."⁹

Psychical distance is that phenomenon whereby an individual, upon reacting to aesthetic or artistic symbols, undergoes a filtered experience, experiencing some feelings to the exclusion of others. For example: the individual viewing the painting of a lonely ship enmeshed in the whorls of a violent hurricane and battered by a raging sea, may experience the exhilaration and awe of the moment, but due to the recognition of the distance between himself and the reality of that picture, i.e. the recognition that he, the observer, is not *really* on that boat or in that dangerous situation, he will not experience the fear of the moment. This is known as "psychical distance." The country yokel who is so intensely caught up in the play he is watching and who is *not* cognizant of the distance between his own reality and the reality of the play and therefore cries out to warn the hero of some imminent "danger," is *underdistanced* with reference to the play. At the other extreme, most people have so little comprehension of the symbolism of modern art that they remain completely indifferent when shown examples of it. These people are *overdistanced* with respect to modern art.

As already mentioned this "psychical distance" is really dependent upon the psychological makeup of the individual involved. Thus what to the artist may symbolically represent "spiritual" values (in the broadest sense), may be experienced by the common man in a

purely sensual manner, for the artist's symbols may arouse the sensual areas of the observer's psyche. Any art forms and any experiences, aesthetic or otherwise that may, not usually do, arouse hedonistic urges in the human being are absolutely forbidden. When the Biblical injunction "And you shall guard against *anything* evil"¹⁰ is interpreted in the Talmud to be an injunction against gazing upon women or various aspects of the beauty of nature, anything that *potentially* may lead to evil is meant.¹¹ "That one should not think such thoughts during the day as may lead to impurity during the nighttime."¹²

Unquestionably the experience and/or objects of art in question are really "good" in an ultimate, metaphysical sense since, by virtue of the initial creation they are manifestations of the Divine. But for the corruptness of the mind's-eye they too would be spiritual experiences. Indeed, for some they are. Thus, Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamaliel, who unintentionally gazed upon a beautiful woman cried out, "How wondrous are Thy creations, O Lord!" for such was his frame of reference that worldly beauty caused him to marvel at God's handiwork. And Rabbi Akiva, in the same situation recited, "Blessed be He that it is so in His world," the special blessing that is *always* recited upon apprehension of the beauty of God's world.¹³

Not everyone however, can intuit the absolute in relative value situations. Those who cannot inevitably misinterpret the significance of relative values. The result is for most a perverted sense of values. But even such uniquely gifted individuals as Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamaliel, individuals whose personalities were thoroughly suffused with Torah, who saw God's glory in the comeliness of His creatures, even they were enjoined from indulging in such intentional contemplation; how much more so we! What *might* lead the common man astray is forbidden even to the spiritual giant, for the spiritual giant reaches his level precisely because he assumes the maximum commitments of the *zaddik* in addition to the minimum burdens of the simpler soul.

Glitter does not imply gold, and therefore, stated bluntly, there is an ethical censorship of the aesthetic. The Torah fully recognizes the potency of relative values in the human situation. Therefore,

despite the inherently spiritual nature of all beauty and all art forms, where their *relative* effects might injure religious commitment they must be studiously avoided.¹⁴

III

"He who is walking by the way reviewing his learning and breaks off his learning to say, How beautiful is that tree...him scripture regards as if he were guilty of his life."¹⁵ The crucial phrase is "and breaks off his learning." Where the beautiful causes one to break off from the search for ultimate truths — then one is forbidden to indulge in it or pursue it, and he who does is truly "as if he were guilty of his life." But, were the beauty of this world is recognized as a continuation of one's learning, of one's search for God, where beauty can adorn Judaism and thereby lead to a more wholesome fulfillment of the Torah — then a blessing is to be recited over the beautiful (ברוך שככה לו בעולמו) for it is recognized as one of the most important values imparted to this world by the Creator.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ *Midrash Raba* on Genesis 1:31.
- ² *Pesachim* 50a.
- ³ Spero, Shubert, "Towards a Torah Esthetic," *Tradition*, Spring-Summer 1964, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 56.
- ⁴ *The Guide of the Perplexed of Maimonides*, trans. M. Friedlander (New York: Hebrew Publishing Co.), vol. 3, pp. 223-224. I wish to thank Rav Feldblum for directing my attention to this section.
- ⁵ Spero, p. 56.
- ⁶ *Berachot* 30b.
- ⁷ Scholem, Gershon, "Religious Authority and Mysticism," *Commentary*, Nov. 1964, vol. 38, no. 5.
- ⁸ Arnheim, Rudolf, *Art and Visual Perception* (University of California, 1954) p. vi.
- ⁹ For the following interpretation of the phenomenon of psychical distance see Edward Bullough's.
- ¹⁰ Deuteronomy 23:10.
- ¹¹ *Avoda Zara* 20a.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 20b.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 20a, b.

¹⁴ True beauty is spiritual and finds expression in the reflection of Torah values. The same verse that teaches us to create an aesthetically pleasing relationship with the *Ribono Shel Olam* by interlacing religious experience with beauty, teaches us to emulate His ways. "As He is compassionate and merciful, so must you be compassionate and merciful." (See *Shabbat* 133b.) True beauty results from man's actions, not his paintbrush. "How good and how beautiful it is for brothers to live together [peacefully]" says the Psalmist. A life of goodness (rather than the "good life"), constantly reflecting the values of God is undoubtedly the noblest work of art.

¹⁵ *Pirkei Avot* 3:7.



• William C. Berkowitz

Inherent in Judaism is the acknowledgment of a universal commitment. In this delightful essay William Berkowitz, a Senior at Y.C., indicates the manifestations of Jewish universalism as expressed in the Shema and in the personalities of the *Avot*.

THE SHEMA AND THE JEWISH UNIVERSAL IDEAL

The Shema, the *vade mecum* of the Jew until his dying moment, expresses his unyielding loyalty to God. As he pronounces its words, the barriers obstructing his contemplation of God are broken, and he is thrust into a sphere of consciousness where he stands alone, facing his Master.

But beyond serving as a springboard for personal spiritual elevation, the Shema proclaims the singular *raison d'être* of the Jewish people; it contains a lucid message for us to bring to the world. This message is clearly shown by paraphrasing the first sentence. "Hear, Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is One," can be stated: understand, Israel, that the Eternal, Who is at present recognized only by us (thus, "our God"), will, in the future, be universally acknowledged (and thus "One"). This interpretation is borne out by Rashi in his comment in *Parshat Vaethanan: Hashem*, who is now our God, and not the go dof the nations, will ultimately be *Hashem ehad*." That the promulgation of God's name is the task of the Jewish people is indicated by the Torah's addressing the command to Israel and not, like all other commandments, to the individual or segment of the people. Since the details of this commandment are spelled out in the rest of the Shema, the call of Israel is most lucidly formulated in the first sentence of the specific

tion. "And you shall love the Lord your God, with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might." In Yoma (86a), the Gemora raises an obvious question: if this sentence expresses a positive commandment, how is one to perform it? There are no prescribed procedures, as with other positive commands. And the Gemora answers: "that God's name should become beloved through you." This, in turn, is accomplished when each Jew learns Torah regularly and sets an example of ethical behavior for the society about him. Through him, says the Gemora, people come to associate such conduct with the practice of God's Torah, and thereby God's name is sanctified, and ultimately unified throughout the world.

That the task of inculcating God's name belongs specifically to the Jewish people is indicated in many of our prayers. The first of the two *brochos* introducing the Shema proclaims the Eternal's dominion over the Creation. It is a universal *brocho*, containing a message for all mankind, and thus does not mention the term "Israel." The second, both in the morning and evening service, expresses the great love of God for the people He has chosen to bear this message to all the world. Again in the *Aleinu* we profess our gratitude to God for His separating us from the nations of the world to grant us the recognition of His name and the task of transmitting it. The thematic connection of the *Aleinu* to the Shema is indicated by the use of the letters *ayin* and *dalet*: in the opening verse of the Shema, the *ayin* in *shema* and the *dalet* in *ehad* are written larger; both paragraphs of the *Aleinu* begin with *ayin* and end with *dalet*. Together, *ayin-dalet* spells *ad*: "witness," for both the Shema and the *Aleinu* testify to the greatness of God's name, and Israel's charge to glorify it. Again, this task is reiterated constantly in the first words of the Kaddish: "Elevated and sanctified be His great name, in the world He created according to His will..."

II

Beginning with the deeds of the Patriarchs, we can note the acknowledgment of a universal responsibility throughout Jewish history.

The first manifestation of Israel's didactic intercourse with the other nations was the activities of Abraham. At the outset of the account of his life we find him and Sarah convincing people of the unity of God: "V'et hanefesh asher asu b'Haran" (Gen. 12:5). It was at this early point that the roots of Jewish universalism took firm hold in our heritage. Abraham's very nature led him toward others, and for good reason. He is called "Ivri" because he stood alone — on one side — in a hostile world of idolators. Having cast aside his own pantheistic notions, on the strength of his comprehension of God's revelation to him, he emerged the sole vessel containing the precious knowledge of God's Oneness, and was profoundly aware of his responsibility to promulgate it to his fellow men. In a sense, he anticipated our commandment "hochayah tochiyah et amitecha" — to take an active interest in our neighbors' spiritual well-being.

It is only in light of Abraham's innate gravitation toward others that many of his strange acts can be understood. Would any person jeopardize his bond with God and the divine promise of reward, to bargain for the lives of fifty sinners? Who today would enter a foreign war with a small group of soldiers to redeem a single kinsman? To Abraham, these events were inescapable; he could no more turn his eyes away than the most sensitive protester today can abandon his cause.

Strangely, however, this paramount characteristic of Abraham was not reflected in the personality of his son Isaac. Rather, we see in Isaac overriding introversion. Blind since the Akedah, he lived in a narrow, vertical world, dedicated solely to the worship of God and a personal elevation of His name. Consequently, Isaac's relations with people were less direct than his father's. Whereas Abraham dealt constantly with the nations about him, Isaac alone of the Patriarchs was prohibited to leave Canaan by the word of God. Whereas we are told of the closeness of the relationship of Abraham and Sarah, we note that Isaac and Rebecca were in different spheres. Indeed, her first view of him was as he was praying in the fields. Instinctively, "she took off her veil and covered her face." And this "veil" remained between them all their lives. It

was this lack of communication in a true sense that enabled her to instigate Jacob's deception at his father's deathbed.

Far from taking him to task for his introversion, the Torah extols Isaac, thus teaching that there are some who, though their psychic nature precludes an active involvement in the affairs of others, set an example for society by their personal behavior. Isaac thus emerges a pillar of spiritual strength, unshaken by the harrowing experience of the Akedah, serene despite his impairment and the grief from a recalcitrant son, Esau.

With the birth of Jacob, a third Jewish personality appeared, comprising the characters of both Abraham and Isaac. At first, he seems to be more like Isaac. He is called "ish tam" and "ish halak," a person without cunning. He seems hardly the type to deal with the nations of the world. Yet, when necessary, he was capable of utilizing the stealth of an Esau and the diplomatic skill of an Abraham bargaining with Efron. We admire the aplomb with which he allayed his father's suspicions to win the blessing of the firstborn. We note, too, how he succeeded in mollifying the passionate Esau twice, at the sale of the birthright and at Esau's pursuit upon his return from Haran. During the interval between, once again, Jacob's diplomatic talent is clear; the Torah spares no detail in relating how he matched the trickery of Laban measure for measure, emerging the victor in a twenty-one year battle of wits.

Throughout his life, Jacob demonstrated the traits of both his father and grandfather: he was at once universal in outlook and personal dealings, yet he was able to withstand the pressures of other cultures, such as that of Edom, that would have swept a weaker figure into the vast tide of conformity and broken the chain of tradition begun by Abraham.

Like Abraham, he was quick to rise to a task. In Chapter 29, we find him aiding the shepherds to roll the stone from the well, though he himself had no need for the water. His primary thought was always to set an example of unpretentious righteousness to the world. Thus, his instinctive reaction to the act of vengeance committed by Simon and Levi in Chapter 34 was: "You have discredited

me, to cause me to stink among the inhabitants of the earth." That is, their act undermined Jacob's mission for God to the world — to exemplify the ethical ideal of society, so people would come to believe in God through him.

As the Torah continues its narrative of the events leading up to the development of an Israelite nation, it reiterates with increasing clarity, a duality of character — a universal outlook and individualist behavior.

Again in Moses we see a cognizance of the world position of the Jewish people intertwined with a recognition of the need for restraint in its dealings. The same Moses that received and transmitted God's words:

guard yourself, lest you make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land where you are coming, lest they become your pitfall. . . . Lest you make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, and (when) they will go astray after their gods and they will sacrifice to their gods, they will call unto you, and you will eat of their sacrifices; and you will take from their daughters for your sons, and (when) their daughters go astray after their gods, they will induce your sons to follow their gods.

(Ex. 34:12-16)

also proclaimed Israel's mission to set an example to the world. Perhaps the most convincing of his three arguments before God in defence of the people in the incident of the Calf was, "why should Egypt say, 'with evil intent has He taken them out, to kill them in the mountains and to destroy them from the face of the earth,'" since their destruction would effect a distrust among the nations of the God of Israel — *a billul*, rather than *kiddush*, *HaShem!*

The Torah thus presents in stages the development of the most common type of Jewish personality among the leaders in our history. We find in the rest of the Bible very few figures like Abraham or Isaac, the two opposite extremes. The great leaders of Israel have seemed always to reflect the same two traits: a drive to in-

volve themselves in the affairs of the world, as well as the power to retain their individuality in the face of the magnetic cultural attractions in which their vast role is set. It is perhaps the message of the Torah in tracing the accounts of these leaders that both qualities are virtually essential to the fulfilment of the goal prescribed for us in the Shema. The two seemingly contradictory traits noted in the great Jewish figures represent the manifestation of their constant efforts to fulfill the command to "love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might." The Jew must be constantly involved in the affairs of the world about him, ready at all times to speak with his fellow man in his language, to proclaim to him the great message only the nation of Israel has been chosen to bear, and to exemplify in his daily life amid the nations about him the life prescribed by the Torah for all mankind: a life of piety, honesty, and scholarship. Yet he must keep in mind that this message is a specifically Jewish one; the task of the Shema demands full adherence to the commandments of the Torah. Such a task necessitates restraint in our dealings with the world, lest we get submerged in our own universalism. It is only to us that the task was given, for God is now only *our* God, and it is to Israel as a unique nation and as a whole that the Shema was addressed — *Shema Yisroel, Hashem Elokeinu, Hashem Ehad.*



• Isaac Boaz Gottlieb

Dr. Cassuto has gained many adherents, both in Israel and abroad, in traditional as well as in non-traditional circles, for his refutations of "Biblical Criticism" in ways that often do not conflict with tradition. In this article Isaac Gottlieb, a senior, reviews Cassuto's book *The Documentary Hypothesis*.

THE DOCUMENTARY HYPOTHESIS BY U. CASSUTO

In this book, which comprises a series of lectures delivered at the Hebrew University, the author examines the documentary theory as it relates to the book of Genesis. The hypothesis postulates that the Torah is a combination of documents originating from different sources. Dr. Cassuto lists all the arguments used by the documentarists in Genesis, under five "pillars." They are:

- A) the use of different names for the Deity;
- B) variations of language and style;
- C) contradictions and divergences of view;
- D) duplications and repetitions;
- E) signs of composite structure in individual sections.

A. Names of the Deity

A. From the beginning of Genesis until Chapter II, verse 4, the sole name for God is *Elokim*. At verse 4, the tetragrammaton is used almost exclusively until the end of Chapter III. In the story of the Flood, the names are alternated. On the basis of this fact,

the theory assumes a source J (after the first letter of the tetragrammaton) and a source E (*Elokim*) which were juxtaposed by an editor, R. (Redactor). The alternation of names was the cornerstone of the Documentary hypothesis. Of course, once the J and E sources were differentiated, they were analyzed by the critics as to their relative naivete or sophistication in their conception of the Deity, morality, and a host of other topics. Any Biblical theology which ran through these source-lines was considered invalid since of course they were juxtaposed by a later editor.

Cassuto differentiates between *Elokim*, or forms of it, which is used to designate the Godhead, even as it applies to gods of other nations (e.g. *Elohei Haneichor*) (Gen. XXXV, 2) and the tetragrammaton, which designates only the God of Israel. He then points out that in the prophets, only J is used; in the legal literature — those portions of Chumash and Ezekiel that deal with precepts — likewise only J. In the Wisdom Literature, (Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes) only forms of *Elokim* are used. In the narrative portions of Chumash both names are found.

The legal literature applies to the Jews; hence, the name J is used, which signifies the God of Israel. In the Wisdom Literature,

the author sees an affinity with such literatures of other nations contemporary with the Tanach. These literatures always utilize a general name for the Deity, e.g. *ntr* in Egyptian, *ilu* in Babylonian, even though they possessed other names for the gods. In accord with the practice of all Near Eastern literatures, and also because of the universal applicability of such writings, the general name *Elokim* is used.

The narrative portions in Genesis which often use both names interchangeably, present the greatest problem to the author. Based on the connotations of the names previously established, Cassuto attempts to classify each story as a national one, or as a narrative of universal application.

Cassuto's approach, therefore, is to maintain that the usage of the names was by choice since each name connotes different aspects of the Almighty. We are not dealing with several documents maintaining differing concepts of the Deity; rather, we are dealing with one Deity who wished to inform us of the differing roles He plays in the world. Never having heard of the Documentary hypothesis, the Abravanel already attempted to explain the significance of each name and the reason for each particular usage.¹

Cassuto's original addition is

literatures to arrive at the conclusion that *Elokim* is a general name while J is restrictive to laws and narratives solely applicable to Jews.

In many narrations the distinction is clear. However, in certain places, one could reasonably disagree with Cassuto's interpretation

B. Variations of Language and Style

Proponents of the hypothesis feel that each document has its own linguistic style. Consequently, once the characteristics of each document are clearly outlined, we should be able to determine from which document a certain section originates. Cassuto agrees with this logic, but makes three important qualifications: (a) we cannot determine the different documents such as J and E solely on the basis of stylistic changes, and then proceed to classify all the sections as belonging to a J or E on the basis of these stylistic differences. This would be a classical case of circular reasoning; (b) nor may we emend the texts in order to make them conform to our theory; (c) we shall not consider words and forms mechanically as if they were divorced from their context.

The author proceeds to take some of the grammatical differ-

of the narrative. At these points, one feels that there must be additional meanings behind each of the names to account for their usage. Nevertheless, the road to understanding has been laid. How smooth the pavement will be depends on the merits of the interpretation in each case. the comparison with other Semitic

ences between sections which have been construed as evidence of various sources and shows that the grammatical changes are due to different shades of meaning conveyed by a particular form. In relation to the idiomatic expressions *ברית הקים* and *ברית ברית*, the author shows that they signify two unrelated concepts, and he shows their respective use in context.

In the usage of *אני* and *אנכי* in different verses, the author cites complex grammatical rules which he arrived at after thorough study of the usage of each. He finds that the usage is consistent with these rules.

In this section the author exhibits a marvelous sense for detecting shades of meaning in the subtlest grammatical change, and his ear is attuned to Biblical style. He also points out that in this area of stylistic changes the

critics have often fallen into the trap of circular reasoning.

Here too, as in the previous section, usage is not proof of

varied authorship but evidence of meticulous authorship, the usage being determined by nuances of meaning or grammatical syntax.

C. Contradictions and Divergences

The third pillar of the critics consists of internal divergences in the Biblical text. Discrepancies in the area of ethics and religion, disparate viewpoints in regard to modes of worship, varying customs in the community and explicit contradictions between *psukim* are pointed to as evidence of multiple authorship. As earlier observed, once the critics have determined which line of thoughts a particular document ascribes to, they proceed to classify the documents on the basis of their established delineations.

To list all the discrepancies would be impossible; the author therefore lists the basic problems in Genesis and attempts to deal with them. The critics have pointed out that documents J, E, and P (the Priestly code)² have varying conceptions of the Deity. The tetragrammaton is the national, or in the term of the critics, the tribal God. The concept of this Deity is anthropomorphic. God in E is further removed from mankind. There is little attempt at corporeality, and God reveals himself not in daylight

but only in visions. In P, God is portrayed as a transcendental concept. The text of P records little revelation of God to man. It simply states that God spoke to man.

Cassuto agrees that there are disparities among the sections regarding conceptions of the Deity. He offers the possibility that different types of traditions were incorporated into the Torah; at any rate, this does not prove the existence of documents, and the sections "contain nothing that could not be found in a homogenous book."³ At this point, Cassuto seems to have a notion of a homogenous work which at the same time embodies varying traditions. We will investigate this notion more fully, as Cassuto himself elaborates upon it in other sections of the book.

Another answer to the apparent discrepancies in conceptions of the Deity is the distinction between the Divine names previously cited. Here too, the basic approach would be to show that usage is consistent within the context where a particular name appears.

The author quotes the incident of Rebecca's and Jacob's conspiracy to obtain Isaac's blessing. The critics have pointed to this incident as a condoning by that particular document of poor ethics. Let it be noted here that such an observation has served far more harmful purposes than delineation of a document. It is of such stuff that polemics of anti-Semitic nature, under the guise of scholarship, are fabricated. Nonetheless, to judge the moral level of the Torah on the basis of a particular incident cited by it is analagous to determining the moral fiber of a newspaper editor by the news stories rather than the editorials.

Cassuto makes this point, but does so to the detriment of Jacob and Rebecca. He feels that indeed they "certainly committed a great sin"⁴ and that the Torah tells us this in the following narratives. The Torah's judgment is never explicit; a lesson taught by implication exerts a more lasting influence. The author notes that Jacob's exile from his home was a punishment. There is a parallelism between this incident and Jacob's treatment at the hands of Laban. Jacob took advantage of the darkness in Isaac's eyes; Laban took advantage of the darkness of night to substitute Leah for Rachel. One sister for another, in contrast to the substitution of one brother for another. Poetic justice is likewise meted out to Rebecca.

With the same words — שָׁמַע בְּקוֹלִי⁵ — she advises Jacob to disguise himself, and with those words she tells him that he must flee to Haran.

That the Torah does not always pass judgment on the morality of the narratives is true. To wit, the numerous places *Chazal* tell us, "Whoever says that so-and-so sinned is in error." Obviously, in such places inferences as to the ethics of the situation could be drawn either way, were it not for Rabbinic interpretation. The concept of מִדָּה כִּנְגַד מִדָּה is likewise a universal in Jewish thought. The only point of contention is the author's propriety to invoke this concept in this specific incident. A straightforward reading of the Biblical text (assuming a non-documentary stance) provides ample justification for Rebecca's actions: Esau's sale of his birthright, Rebecca's prophecy that רַב יַעֲבֹד רַב יַצְעִיר.⁶ The only reference in the text itself to a misdeed is Isaac's statement to Esau: בֵּא אֲחִיךָ בְּמַרְמָה.⁷ The question here seems to be whether Jacob came *in* slyness, or *with* slyness; was his whole coming unjustified, or merely the fact that he claimed to be his brother?⁸ It goes without saying that the classical Jewish commentaries are sensitive to the whole matter. However, they seem to have been guided by the Rabbinic dictum that טַעֲשָׂה אֲבוֹת סִיּוּן לְבָנֵיהֶם. Nonetheless, the difference

in interpretation of the word מַרְמָה by Rashi and ibn Ezra does indicate a difference in views on the matter.

Cassuto cites the variant listings of Esau's wives as an example of clear contradictory passages. On the face of it, ascribing each list to a different source-document would solve the problem. Yet, to shift the blame for incongruity from the source to the final Redactor is to further complicate the problem, for the editor should have preferred one over the other. Besides, both portions are gen-

erally ascribed to the same source P. This would force the critics to conclude that source P intentionally gave two listings. Knowing no reason for P to do so, some critics note that P, rather unthinkingly, threw together two "family records" that he had on hand.⁹

Cassuto claims that two divergent traditions were current in Israel regarding Esau's wives, and the Torah found room for them both. It is up to the reader to choose one of the versions or to reconcile them as he deems fit.¹⁰

D. Duplications and Repetitions

Cassuto extends this idea of various oral traditions into the chapter on duplications and repetitions of the Biblical narratives. Duplications refer to repeated treatment of an identical subject, such as the oft-quoted story of Creation, whereas repetitions means the duplication of a motif in different narratives where the people and places are different. The critics consider such narrative variations on what was originally a theme unique to one narrative.

Cassuto feels that the first narrative of the Creation is the tradition of the learned, which endeavored to show that the world was created by one God. The second section incorporated the

traditions which were popular among the common people regarding the origin of mankind, with the intention of stressing the moral lessons in the story of Adam and Eve. Cassuto feels that the Torah employed Pagan stories, purified of their objectionable parts, wherever such narratives were instrumental in teaching some positive value.

In the two episodes of Creation, Cassuto says that the first section shows the transcendence of God above His creation, whereas the second section contains a graphic and dramatic narrative that attempts to capture the heart of the reader and inculcate moral teachings through portrayal of

actual happenings, rather than through abstract moralizing.¹¹

The critics maintain that the three "variations" of the episode involving the wives of the patriarchs stem from several sources. Cassuto proceeds to show a parallelism between the incident of Avraham and Sarai in Egypt, and the later events of the twelve tribes in Egypt and the subsequent exodus. Likewise, he draws a parallel between Jacob's journeys and the route of conquest described in Joshua. After drawing these parallels in sufficient detail, Cassuto returns to the original problem of the repetition of the same motif three times. Here, too, he offers the theory of several oral traditions. Perhaps the three tales stemmed from one source originally, perhaps they did not. Since the deeds of the fathers are a sign unto the children the narrative served some purpose and was therefore included.

At one point, Cassuto seems to say that the same story was pre-

E. Composite Sections

We now come to the last of the challenges, namely, that of composite sections. The critics claim that we find internal parallels in many of the narratives. They attribute this to the work of an editor who had before him roughly similar narratives from sources

presented three times on the basis of the principle of "Chazaka!" This too would seem to indicate that the event actually did occur three times, which is not what the author implied by citing the existence of similar oral traditions. Also, the drawn out parallel between the narratives of the Patriarchs and the later history of the Jews is interesting, but seems irrelevant to the question of variants. Did the Torah include the narratives of the patriarchs because of the parallels to later Jewish history regardless of the truth of the narratives? Though the answer of varying oral traditions should suffice (as it did to explain away contradictory passages), the author nonetheless offers the allegory interpretation in addition to the Semitic style of repetition which was used for emphasis, and the Talmudic concept of *chazaka*. These varied approaches are not complementary and do not form one cohesive line of thought.

J, E, and others. This editor, or redactor, would choose several passages from one source, continue the story from a second document, and then return to the first. Hence, certain verses (or fragments of verses) stem from one source, and the remainder from

others. Internal parallels result from having two verses, albeit from different documents, but referring to the same action, included in the same narrative.

Cassuto takes the narrative of Isaac and the blessing of Jacob, which has been identified as stemming from two sources by Herman Gunkel, in his commentary on Genesis. Cassuto shows that were we to divide the sentences as suggested, neither source presents a narrative of any meaning. Besides problems of understanding, Cassuto shows that the grammatical structure of certain passages is unintelligible unless it is assumed that the previous passage was originally part of the same narrative.

In his concluding chapter, Cassuto summarizes the earlier points. He also attempts to deal with expected criticism of his work — that although no single "pillar" is strong enough to support the documentary hypothesis, the general impression offered by all the material is that the Bible stems from several sources. To all this, Cassuto answers that he has not only shown the pillars to be weak; he has shown them to be non-existent, and hence, even a combination of them will not support the documentary theory.

What does Cassuto offer in its place? As he hinted earlier, his theory of the Bible's composition rests heavily on oral traditions.

Some of these traditions became the Biblical narratives; others formed the Midrashic literature. These traditions were far more extensive than the material which was incorporated into the Torah. The differences in the nature of the material and the populace which preserved it until the time of its incorporation would solve many of the problems which earlier criticism formerly assumed to be signs of a fragmentary composition.

Cassuto's approach follows two main currents. By far the greatest number of problems raised by the documentary theory are countered through interpretation, clarification of grammatical syntax, and the realization that the Bible was given in a Near Eastern culture, following stylistic patterns of that age. However, the idea of oral traditions has come up in the book time and again, especially to explain contradictions and repetitions.

The theory of oral traditions is referred to as the Scandinavian or Uppsala school. Wellhausen's Documentary theory was rejected because it based itself upon the Hegelian rationalism and the evolutionary concepts of the nineteenth century.¹² In the words of an historian of ideas,

There are... implicit or completely explicit assumptions or more or less unconscious mental habits, operating in

the thought of an individual or a generation. It is the beliefs which are so much a matter of course that they are rather tacitly presupposed than formally expressed and argued for, the ways of thinking which seem so natural and inevitable that they are not scrutinized with the eye of logical self-consciousness, that often are most decisive of the character of a philosopher's doctrine, and still oftener of the dominant intellectual tendencies of an age.¹³

Cassuto himself in the introductory chapter points to parallels between theories of Biblical composition and Homeric composition of the Iliad and Odyssey. Identical theories were proposed in both fields, and theories discarded or updated in Biblical study found their analogy in Homeric study. This leads Cassuto to the suspicion that "the investigator's conceptions are not based on purely objective facts but that they were appreciably motivated by the subjective characteristics of the researchers themselves."¹⁴

Such suspicions do not rob the questions of the critics of cogency where they possess it; it leads some to feel that the answers do not lie in a rehashing of the documentary theory or in its embellishment, but rather in looking at the Torah from a totally fresh vantage point, discarding the

"implicit assumptions" of a previous age regarding the progress of peoples and religion. We have seen that barbarity can rage in the midst of enlightenment, and recent archaeological finding nullify the pat assumption that cultures always progressed from the simple to the sophisticated.

The theory of oral traditions discards the notion of a final redaction from various written sources, each one more advanced than the other both in date and in *weltanschauung*. Instead, the Scandinavians (and Cassuto) feel that oral traditions were current simultaneously among the Jewish people. There were different schools of tradition-bearers, hence the differences of style and outlook in various portions of the Torah. This theory also places the origins of the traditions much earlier than had been assumed by the Documentary theorists, and assumes a more conservative view towards the Masoretic text. Taking into account current archaeological data, the oral traditionists are quite ready to assume the authenticity of many of the narratives in Genesis, a point long denied by the Documentarists. Also, the Oral traditionists scoff at the many emendations made by the Wellhausenians, realizing that the early traditions were preserved with earlier Semitic vocabulary and grammar which was later antiquated.

Yet, with all the accommodations made to a more traditional viewpoint, there is much that is unacceptable to an Orthodox mind. In place of a written source P, Oral-traditionists identify a P-school of tradition-bearers. Also, oral traditions eventually had to have a written fixation and amalgamation too.

Yehezkel Kaufmann treats the Oral-traditionists in a footnote:

...the Scandinavian school reject the scheme of classical criticism with regard to the chronological order of the sources and their composition, while accepting the documentary analysis in itself. They assert that the "documents" were oral traditionists that existed side by side...How this school conceives the manner in which the Torah came into being is quite unclear in details... (The religio-historical views of this school are even more paganistic than those of classical criticism.)¹⁵

To identify Cassuto with all of the views of the Scandinavians is unfair. He does not elaborate at all on his exact theory in the work under study. Nevertheless, in his larger Italian work, he fixes the time of the editing of the sources in the Davidic mon-

archy.¹⁶ Many scholars treat him of a piece with the Scandinavians, and the difficulties in assuming their views probably apply to much of Cassuto, too.

A prominent scholar, in a critique of the Upsala school, writes: "... when all is said, the Pentateuch as we have it is literature and it must have come to be what it is by literary processes."¹⁷ In this sentence lies the crux of the problem. We may prove that Moses ascended the mountain, and we may be able to trace his footsteps coming down, but we will never empirically prove that the Torah was given to him by God. Accepting this cardinal principle of faith, much of the discussion with critics becomes a *לשיטתך* type of argument, "according to your view." Nevertheless, many of Cassuto's interpretations may be added to our view. Whether the gap between the critical position and the orthodox stand will ever, or need ever, be bridged is a complex question.¹⁸ Perhaps Cassuto has not carried us all the way across the bridge, but he has shown us that not all is green on the other side. More important than his blows at the pillars of the Documentary hypothesis are his contributions to the better understanding of our own edifice.

NOTES

[EDITOR'S NOTE: Lest our position be misconstrued by some, we wish to make our purpose in printing this article very clear. There is no place in Judaism for "Biblical Criticism." For us, as Jews who accept Divine revelation and therefore *a priori* reject "Biblical Criticism," the latter (particularly the neo-Wellhausian approach) is a misguided and often malicious misinterpretation of the Torah.

Three factors however, motivated the inclusion of this article in *Gesher*. The first two are in the category of *דע מנה להשיב*, of "know what to answer the non-believer." Whether we like it or not we are confronted by "Biblical Criticism." We must clearly understand the general philosophic underpinnings of the "Critical" approach. Secondly, Bible "critics" raise many specific problems, and make it seem as if they were the first and only ones to spot the problems, and by implication, to answer them. *ל"ן* were certainly aware of the problems and Bible "critics" do not have the last word in understanding Torah. However, insofar as they cause us to search for answers — even if only to analyze assumptions — these questions have some value.

Finally, much insight may be gained by viewing the absolute laws of the Torah in terms of the period in which it was given. For

example at the same time that the Torah proclaimed that parents should not be killed for the crimes of their children and, that children should not die because of their parents' misdeeds (Deut. 24:16), the Hammurabi Code prescribed that in certain cases the punishment for causing the accidental death of another's child was the death of one's own child! The profundity of the Torah's ethical code is vividly illustrated by such comparisons. Of course, not all comparisons are so black and white. Nonetheless such comparisons often help to deepen our appreciation of the Torah.]

1. *Perush Hatorah* (Warsaw, 1862), p. 8.

2. According to the Documentarists, P is the source of the ritual laws (Leviticus) and the historical commentary and genealogies in Genesis.

3. U. Cassuto, *The Documentary Hypothesis* (Jerusalem, 1961), p. 57.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

5. Genesis 27:9, and 27:44.

6. Genesis 25:23.

7. Genesis 27:35.

8. See Ibn Ezra, Gen. 27:35.

9. E. A. Speiser, in *The Anchor Bible* (N. Y., 1964), p. 281, says: "The fact remains... that P exercised little if any editorial super-

vision" [in the listing of the wives of Esau].

10. Rashi reconciles the two listings. "אהליבמה היא יהודית." Rashbam says that Judith died without sons and Esau married Ohalibama after he came to Seir. In the same *parsha*, Speiser emends *bat zivon* to *ben zivon*. The *ibn Ezra* on that *pasuk* (36:2), bothered by the same problems which troubled Speiser, arrives at the same explanation without textual emendation.

11. All commentaries have likewise understood the two stories of Creation as portraying different aspects of the *briah*. For a most recent explanation of the significance of each *parsha*, see Rav J. B. Soloveitchik, "The Lonely Man of Faith," *Tradition* (Summer, 1965).

12. The views of one of the chief exponents of the Scandanavian

school, Johannes Pedersen of Copenhagen, who explores the underlying philosophic notions of the Wellhausian schools are summarized in C. R. North's article, see note 17. Among others who discuss these notions are M. Z. Segal, *Mavo HaMikra* (Jerusalem, 1950) p. 130, and E. Feldman "Changing Patterns In Biblical Criticism," *Tradition* (Spring 1966).

13. A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*, (Cambridge, 1950), p. 7.


14. Cassuto, p. 12.

15. Yehezkel Kaufmann, *The Religion of Israel*, trans. and abridged by M. Greenberg (U. of Chicago, 1960), p. 156.

16. U. Cassuto, *La Questione della Genesi* (Florence 1934).

17. C. R. North, "Pentateuchal Criticism," *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, ed. H. H. Rowley p. 78.

18. See *Mavo HaMikra*.



One of the foremost Protestant theologians of our time is Reinhold Niebuhr. In an age when "ecumenicism" and "dialogue" are major theological issues in non-Jewish circles, Niebuhr's eminent position means that his ideas are of consequence to the Jewish community. Hence we have included this review of Niebuhr's thoughts on, and relation to, Judaism and Jews. The reviewer is Larry Grossman, this year's valedictorian.

REINHOLD NIEBUHR ON JUDAISM AND THE JEWS

I — NIEBUHR AND JUDAISM

Reinhold Niebuhr bases a great deal of his theology on the Old Testament. To be sure, Niebuhr does not in any way downgrade the importance of the New Testament; in fact, he puts special stress on the Jesus episode. Yet, it is clear that the Hebrew roots of Christianity are considered important in Niebuhr's theology.

The primary contribution of the Bible, according to Niebuhr, is its conception of purposeful history. Obviously, both Christianity and secular utopianism are indebted to the Bible.¹ The idea that body and spirit are united, in which blood and soul are synonomous, is an original Jewish concept which becomes the au-

thentic Christian picture of man. On this basis, Niebuhr criticizes those Christians who preach dualism as Christian dogma.²

Niebuhr repeats the standard analysis which Christianity has always made of Judaism. There are two Jewish strains, the legal and the prophetic. Christianity is a direct development of the latter component. The characteristics of the prophetic elements are a recognition of the judgment of God in history and a longing for reconciliation with God even after judgment.³

An important step in Niebuhr's analysis is his interpretation of exactly what the prophets were saying. The ideal of prophecy "is

that a particular nation, Israel, should serve not its own purpose but the will of God, according to the covenant between God and His people. But the prophetic consciousness discerns that this ideal possibility is not fulfilled... the basis of the sin of Israel, according to the prophets, lies in the temptation of the nation to identify itself too completely with the divine will of which it is only an historical instrument. Israel makes this mistake particularly; but the prophets discern the same mistake in each of the great empires who become executors of the divine judgment upon Israel."⁴ Pride is, to Niebuhr, the ultimate sin, whether it be on the individual or national level. Even a feeling of pride in doing the acts of religion is to be condemned. The Hebrew nation remains complacent in its self righteousness even after hearing the prophetic message. When the prophets realize that it is indeed part of human nature to feel pride, they emphasize the Godly power of punishment. Yet, what salvation can there be for man if he is naturally egoistic, and therefore deserving of punishment? The prophets formulate Messianism as an answer. Somehow, through Godly intervention, mankind could be saved.⁵

Yet, says Niebuhr, the exact relationship of God's justice and

his mercy remains unclear. The Old Testament tradition contains references to both attributes of God. The dilemma presents itself: how can God both punish and show mercy?⁶

Thus Judaism poses the question which the drama of Jesus must answer. In one sense, Jesus was the fulfillment of the Messianic ideal. Yet, Jesus is not the Messiah that the Jews expected. He rejects entirely the conception of nationalism which had always been present in Jewish prophecy, and adopts the universalist strain of the prophetic tradition.

Jesus reconciles the justice-mercy dichotomy in Judaism by embodying within his person both the "power" and "mercy" of God. God must exact full retribution. However, his quality of mercy towards mankind causes him to incarnate himself and suffer in order to pay for man's pride. Niebuhr's interpretation of the crucifixion is thus highly literal. "The Father sends the Son into the world to become a sacrifice for sin. But it is also the wrath of the Father which must be propitiated. There can be no simple abrogation of the wrath of God by the mercy of God. All the various efforts of theology to rationalize the mystery of the atonement in commercial and judicial theories of God's justice... none of them completely effaces

the central truth embodied in the doctrine of the Atonement."⁷ The point to be stressed here is that to Niebuhr, the Christ story, which is the essential episode of Christian religion, comes at once as a response to and a fulfillment of original Judaism. Niebuhr is not surprised that the Jews refused to accept Jesus who was actually transforming Jewish Messianism rather than carrying it out.

Aside from the adoption of universalism, the basic change which Jesus stood for was the abolishment of Jewish legalism. Niebuhr feels that the prophetic strain of Judaism was always in conflict with the legalistic element. It is obvious which side Niebuhr favors. "Legalism is a kind of arrested and atrophied religion of history. This legalism is therefore type and symbol of every form of legalistic religious consciousness which binds the counsels of God prematurely to a law which is contingent to time and place. The Talmudic reinterpretations, applications, and extensions of the Torah seek to do justice to the endless variety of problems and occasions for which the original law seems to be inadequate. But the policy of adding law to law cannot solve the essential weakness of law as the disclosure of the divine purpose in history."⁸

Jesus, or shall we say Niebuhr, rejects religious law for these

reasons. Firstly, details of rituals do not give man universal insights into his role in history. In addition, forced law is valueless. Therefore, law is left as a personal matter between man and God. Finally, law must be deemed insignificant because it is easy for man to observe the law and still be guilty of the unpardonable sin—pride.⁹

Niebuhr, in his evolutionary explanation of Judaism and Christianity, does something very interesting. He uses one component of Judaism as a club to beat the other. Niebuhr freely admits that his preoccupation with reliance on God and fear of pride is a Jewish concept. Using this idea, he denies the validity of ritual law and national religion.

Niebuhr constantly defends the "Jewish" aspects of Christianity against the classical component. For one thing, Jewish prophets spoke out against social injustice, while the Greeks, with all their sophistication, ignored this facet of life.¹⁰ The Greeks conceive of their supreme beings in purely rational terms. Only the Hebrews had the insight to look for God emotionally, to search for an "encounter."¹¹ Indeed, it is Judaism which has produced men like Buber and Rosenzweig "who perceived the realities of both human and divine 'selfhood' and of the dramatic character of history more

acutely that any Christian theologian."¹²

Niebuhr sees scientism as a descendent of Greek modes of thought and, therefore, hostile to true religion. The Jewish element is the "side of our culture which has been progressively relegated to the status of superstition with the onward march of science."¹³ "It is precisely this dialogic life of the self which the Hebraic tradition both assumes and illuminates and which the Hellenic obscures and destroys."¹⁴

Niebuhr's references to modern Jewish theology are not complimentary. He feels that "post-exilic Judaism exhausted its spiritual resources in maintaining the integrity of a nation, scattered among the nations of the earth... It has been 'prophetic' in its passion for justice but not usually prophetic in its understanding of the basic character of collective pride as a cause of injustice."¹⁵ Niebuhr makes the judgment that "in modern Judaism there are both legalistic and mystical tendencies but no strong forward-looking historical tendencies. The sense of history expresses itself retrospectively... The tendency to find a premature security, a premature righteousness and a superficial sense of meaning in law is a recurring tendency in all life and culture."¹⁶

Niebuhr, in his rejection of

legalism and substitution of Atonement, in his universalism and historicism, is in the mainstream of the Protestant attitude toward Judaism. Yet a basic divergence must be noted. Whereas, most theologians admit their debt to Jewish insights and proceed to ignore them, Niebuhr is deadly serious when he invokes Judaism as the prototype of an "encounter" theology. He feels no need to make Christianity as different from its Jewish origins and as close to modern science as possible. Because of this openness, Niebuhr leaves room for constructive dialogue between the two religions, something which is ruled out implicitly by many of his contemporaries who see Judaism as a meaningless archaism:

II — NIEBUHR AND THE JEWS

Dr. Niebuhr has written little on the subject of Jews. In what he has produced, Niebuhr shows himself to be sympathetic and friendly to the Jewish people. However, there are several unresolved problems which Niebuhr, as any serious Christian theologian, must face in regard to the Jews.

Whenever writing on this particular theme, Niebuhr is careful to allow for his subjectivity, and often points out his own reluc-

rance to seem to pass judgment on another faith. "Let us begin," he writes, "both Christian and Jew, by admitting that the commitment of faith does not permit a completely objective view. The presuppositions on the basis of which we reason, determine the reasoning not only of those who are explicitly religious but of all secular faiths... We cannot climb over our presuppositions but we need not be their prisoners."¹⁷

According to Niebuhr, the phenomenon of anti-Semitism is not a particularly Christian fault, "for this history simply proves the perpetual pride of any majority dealing with any minority. But the Christians are certainly too complacent about the failure of their allegedly superior universal faith to inculcate a charity which transcends the religious community."¹⁸ The fact that Jews are different from the majority both religiously and ethnically causes them to be mistreated by that majority. Niebuhr places little significance on any specific Christian doctrines as causative factors of anti-Semitism.¹⁹

Dr. Niebuhr has offered a double strategy for combatting the evil of religious intolerance toward Jews. The first step is authentic tolerance of Jews all over the world. This must not be simply a device to bring them closer to conversion. To quote

Niebuhr, "The problem of the Christian majority, particularly in America, is therefore to come to terms with the stubborn will to live of the Jews as a peculiar people, both religiously and ethnically. The problem can be solved only if the Christian and Gentile majority accepts this fact and ceases to practice toleration provisionally in the hope that it will encourage assimilation ethnically and conversion religiously. Such provisional tolerance always produces violent reactions when ultimately disappointed, as in the case of Luther..."²⁰

In a crucial passage, Niebuhr writes that missionary activity among the Jews is wrong not only because it is doomed to failure, but also "because the two faiths despite differences are sufficiently alike for the Jew to find God more easily in terms of his own religious heritage than by subjecting himself to the hazards of guilt feeling involved in a conversion to a faith, which, whatever its excellencies, must appear to him as a symbol of an oppressive majority culture."²¹

The implications of such a position are profound. A Protestant theologian is admitting that the manner in which the Jew finds God is valid enough so that he, the Christian, feels no compulsion to convert him. This is no mere extension of the denominational

outlook to Judaism. Niebuhr does recognize certain basic differences between the Jewish and Christian faiths. Yet, he recognizes the authenticity of the Jewish religious experience and its right to free expression without fear of Christian attempts at missionary activities.

The second step of Niebuhr's plan is Zionism. Even if tolerance could be achieved, Dr. Niebuhr recognizes the dangers of assimilation and appreciates Jewish desires to persist as a separate religious and ethnic entity. The fact that tolerance and Zionism are indeed compatible is shown by the example of Louis Brandeis. Niebuhr points out that Justice Brandeis always fought for Jewish rights in America, and was himself the symbol of the Jew who had overcome anti-Semitism and achieved success. Yet Brandeis was one of the leaders of American Zionism. Many Jews living in America, according to Niebuhr, are far too apologetic about Zionism.²²

The problem of assimilation is a product of modern liberalism. When the Western world offers the Jew toleration, it offers at a price. "Does the liberal-democratic world fully understand that it is implicitly making collective extinction the price of its provisional tolerance?"²³

The concept of Zionism brings with it the problem of the parti-

cularist-universalist tension within Judaism. Interestingly enough, Dr. Niebuhr has changed his position on this matter. In 1942 Niebuhr attacked Jewish religionists and secularists and Christian missionaries for trying to solve the problem of the Jews by adopting complete universalism and rejecting survival as a particular national entity.²⁴ In 1944 he still held this view. In the midst of the war, Niebuhr gave his reactions to the ideas of Waldo Frank, who called for Jewish rededication to the prophetic ideal. Niebuhr felt that it would be meaningless to ask of the Jews to live by prophetic universalism while the physical survival was in danger. Physical security, specifically Zionism, is the prerequisite to a rekindling of Jewish universalism. "I do not see how it is possible to develop this prophetic overtone of high religion in the Jewish community fully if the nation does not have a greater degree of socio-political security."²⁵

After the establishment of the State of Israel, the opposite fear appears in Niebuhr's writings. Now that the particularist tendencies in Judaism are being acted out, the universal elements must not be lost sight of. Niebuhr writes that he appreciates the point made by the American Council for Judaism, that a Jewish State might undermine the re-

ligious substance, that is the universal element, of Judaism.²⁶ Niebuhr recognizes the necessity for a state, "but a sympathetic Christian cannot but observe that the Jewish ethic and faith, so impressively universal in the diaspora, so fruitful in leavening Western civilization, is not morally safe when it becomes embodied in a nation like all other nations..."²⁷

Despite these apprehensions, Niebuhr has consistently supported Zionism and the State of Israel. He castigated the Allied Powers for their hesitation to save Jews from Nazi terror. In 1942 Dr. Niebuhr named the establishment of a haven for Jews as "one of the most important among the many problems of post-war reconstruction."²⁸ The reason for its high priority is the fact that the Western World must be held partially guilty for the sad state of European Jewry. "It is, in fact, a scandal that the Jews have had so little effective aid from the rest of us in a situation in which they are only the chief victims."²⁹

After the war, Niebuhr interested himself in the political struggle for a Jewish State. Admitting that "my convictions are broadly Zionist",³⁰ Niebuhr condemns British policy in 1946. In the wake of the King David Hotel bombing, which caused the British to place more restrictions on the Jews

of Palestine, Niebuhr spoke out against the self-righteous attitude of Great Britain. "Thus the King David Hotel bombing, terrible as it was, might well have been considered against the background of the tragic history of recent years with its millions of slaughtered Jews."³¹ Niebuhr goes on to compare the British reaction to the bombing to President Hoover's reaction to the Bonus Marchers of the Great Depression.

Following the Suez crisis of 1956-57, Israel lost face in the world and was termed an aggressor by many. Dr. Niebuhr attempted the difficult task of, if not excusing Israel, at least explaining its actions on the basis of security needs. Rather cleverly Niebuhr begins by extolling the accomplishments of the State and leaves the political question for last. He presents the economic and social accomplishments of Israel, which seem to be straight out of a travel folder. In addition, he adds an accomplishment which he comments on elsewhere in his writing, the amazing spectacle of secularists and religious Jews living together with a minimum of strife between them. Dr. Niebuhr feels that only in such a give and take situation does the State have a chance to survive. A nation functioning under the legal norms of the Old Testament, he feels, could not exist very long.³²

The crux of the Suez issue, according to Niebuhr, is the fact that the United States, instead of strengthening Israel as a bastion of anti-Communism in the Middle East, is trying to appease Nasser. Dr. Niebuhr predicts that such a course will not satisfy Nasser, but will lead to results similar to those which followed the Munich appeasement of 1938. He points out the absurdity of condemning Israel while when Nasser refuses to let Israeli ships through the Suez Canal we merely "express disappointment about Nasser's continued intransigence."³³

Soon after the publication of this article early in 1957, the magazine in which it appeared printed a letter from an irate reader accusing Niebuhr of being a Zionist stooge, and claiming that the State of Israel has nothing at all to do with Judaism. In a short reply, Niebuhr points out the necessity for a State of Israel, whether it be part of authentic Judaism or not, since "a sense of pity for the homeless, whether individuals or nations, ought really to moderate our passions and give us some sympathy for a people who have lived for centuries in insecurity and have borne the brunt of Spanish inquisition, Hitler's mania, and Nasser's hysteria."³⁴

It is interesting to note that time and again, Dr. Niebuhr goes back to this basic justification for a Jewish State, that there is a need for a haven for homeless Jews where they will not be burdened with minority status. As a Christian, this is indeed the only possible justification he can give. Niebuhr writes quite frankly that "many Christians are pro-Zionist in the sense that they believe that a homeless people require a homeland; but we feel as embarrassed as anti-Zionist religious Jews when Messianic claims are used to substantiate the right of the Jews to the particular homeland in Palestine..."³⁵ To say that Israel is a fulfillment of Jewish prophecy is *ipso facto* unacceptable to any Christian, who must believe that all relevance of ancient prophecy has been shifted to the Christian community.

Niebuhr's views on Jewish questions show him to be perceptive and humane. Despite built in preconceptions which Christianity imposes upon its adherents about the absolute adherence to his own faith and sincere concern for the welfare of Jews. Such a course it not a smooth one, but for the sake of both religions, it is a necessary one.

NOTES

1. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Human Nature* (New York, 1941) p. 24.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 13, 151.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
7. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Human Destiny* (New York, 1943) p. 56.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
10. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Self and the Dramas of History* (New York, 1955) p. 83.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
13. Gordon Harland, *The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr* (New York, 1960) p. 59.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
15. Niebuhr, *Human Nature*, pp. 215-216.
16. Niebuhr, *Human Destiny*, p. 41.
17. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Pious and Secular America* (New York, 1958) pp. 97-98.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 86-87.
19. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Survival and Religion", *Contemporary Jewish Record*, VII (June 1944), 240.
20. Niebuhr, *Pious and Secular America*, p. 88.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
22. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Jews After the War", *The Nation*, 154:8 (February 21, 28, 1942) p. 254.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
25. Niebuhr, "Survival and Religion", p. 245.
26. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Our Stake in the State of Israel", *New Republic* 136:5 (February 4, 1957) p. 10.
27. Niebuhr, *Pious and Secular America*, p. 110.
28. Niebuhr, "Jews After the War", p. 255.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
30. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Palestine: British-America Dilemma", *The Nation*, 163:9 (August 31, 1946) p. 238.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 239.
32. Niebuhr, "Our Stake in the State of Israel", pp. 10-11, *Pious and Secular America*, p. 109.
33. Niebuhr, "Our Stake in the State of Israel", pp. 11-12.
34. *New Republic*, 136:9 (March 4, 1957) p. 23.
35. Niebuhr, *Pious and Secular America*, p. 109.



Israel

• Justin Lewis

Yeshiva high schools have been growing quickly in Israel in recent years. How they are developing, and to what extent American Orthodoxy has influenced their growth is investigated in this article by Justin Lewis, a Y.C. graduate who is receiving his MS in Jewish religious education from FGSE.

AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON RELIGIOUS ISRAEL HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION

Generally, we think of Israel not analyze the many fine influences that emanate to the *Yeshivot Ketanot* of the Independent School System (Agudah) and other non-affiliated institutions (Hasidic and Sephardic) that exclude all general subjects from their curriculum. A separate paper should be devoted to their development patterns.

Before we can examine direct and indirect influences, it is necessary to consider the differing educational milieu of both countries. Let us begin with a brief survey of elementary education.

In America, yeshiva education has not yet been envisaged as a practical system of education for the masses of Jewish youth. Only U'Mada-oriented schools, we will

be cited in order to establish this point. Most yeshivot (excluding some Sectarian Orthodox and the majority of Hasidic institutions) have high standards of acceptance based on intellectual capacities and achievements. Furthermore, financial considerations alone reject many otherwise fully qualified candidates. Moreover, until recently no yeshiva existed for either the mentally or physically disabled. Now in all America only a few such institutions are struggling for their very existence — all of them in the greater New York City area. As of the writing of this paper, no yeshiva for the blind in all America was known to be functioning.

In Israel, religious education has to be for the masses.¹ This is inherent in the society itself and expressed legally by the Compulsory Education Act of 1953 that requires all children to attend schools from the ages of five to fourteen. A State Religious School System was set up along side the State (irreligious) School System. The former has grown in enrollment from 18% of the total pupil population within this age group in 1948 to 32% in 1965. A separate Independent School System that receives about 89% of its budget from the State of Israel, but which is independent from supervision from the Ministry of Education, comprises

about 7% of the student body. Together these two main religious trends plus all Sectarian Orthodox and Hasidic groups contain over 40% of the total number of students² covered by the Compulsory Education Act — as compared to about 10%-12% of Jewish youth in all Day Schools and Yeshivot in America, religious and secular.³

This education for the masses allows for a variety of schools and institutions on the secondary level of learning that are unheard of on the contemporary American Day School scene. Not only are there classical religious schools with formal training in general subjects that prepare their students for college and/or *yeshivah gedolah*, but there are also vocational, trade,⁴ and agricultural yeshivot,⁵ and religious high schools⁶ for boys and girls equivalent to American Day Schools. There are even religious teacher's seminar high schools and/or yeshivot⁷ that prepare their graduates to alleviate the shortage of qualified teachers by teaching in the two major religious school trends.

Despite this basic difference in the exigencies of the educational framework, many American influences can be seen and analyzed in Israel and can be compared and contrasted in their rate and form of development in the light of

the unique problems of both countries.

The secondary level of education in Israel shows a number of interesting influences garnered from high school yeshivot in America. Not least among these is the avid pursuit of general subjects as a necessary aim of Jewish education. (This is in contrast to the condescending attitude of many East European yeshivot toward a general studies education.) However, various other factors enter into the picture in this area. The attitudes of the Central European Hirschians and the Jews from Eastern (Sephardic) origin is obvious as well as the necessities of life in a twentieth century society. Also, the positive approach of Rav Kuk, z'l, who saw any activity or knowledge useful in rebuilding the Land of Israel as innately Holy,^{7*} sets the tone for a more affirmative position on general studies. Moreover, the American yeshivot's aim of providing comparable facilities in the "English Department" to those found in public schools, is a trend noticeable in Israel yeshivot. In the latter, attempts are being made to assure parents that their children can learn Torah in a traditional manner — yet keep up with others in non-yeshiva or non-religious schools in regard to *Bogrut*⁸ Test scores and college matriculation.

Another, more personal aspect of this American influence, can be seen in the teaching personnel in Israel's secondary educational framework. Actually, it is not a simple matter to keep exact tab on all the American teachers in all the variety of religious secondary schools and/or yeshivot in Israel. However, even the following partial figures will give us an idea of a general trend to employ American-trained personnel.

The pace setter in male yeshiva high school education is Rabbi Neriah, the Dean of all fourteen B'nei Akiva Yeshiva High Schools in Israel. In personal correspondence, he reported thirty-seven American "rebbe's" and teachers for the year 1965-66. This is an increase of eleven new American faculty members over the previous year.⁹ These American teachers comprise 12% of all the staff in the Yeshivot B'nei Akiva System. However, this figure should be understood to be quite a solid contribution since over a third teach in both the Jewish and General Studies Departments. However, Rabbi Neriah writes that his American educators have turned his entire school system toward a new direction (much to his chagrin.) Prior to mass American participation in Yeshivot B'nai Akiva, the goal was to direct "modern Orthodox" youth

to the *yeshivot gedolot*. Now, doubtless due in large part to the American trained "rebbe's" themselves — who unlike their Israel and European counterparts — are college trained, college is viewed by the graduates in a positive light. Over the years, the mere trickle to universities from Yeshivot B'nei Akiva graduates has risen considerably. In 1955, when only sixty-two boys graduated from such institutions, only nine went on to the army and to university; thirty-eight to *yeshivot gedolot* and fifteen to army and to various occupations. In 1965, when four hundred ninety-seven went into from twelve such schools, one hundred ninety-even went into the army with plans to subsequently attend college; two hundred thirty-four entered *yeshivot gedolot*, and the remaining ninety-one joined the army with plans to enter the labor force and the various trades upon completion. When one considers that college is expensive for the vast majority of Israelis, and that *yeshivah gedolah* is free and inviting, these figures show us a new trend which at least in part can be attributed to the growing influx of American trained "rebbe's" and teachers with their positive orientation towards college and general studies.

Another interesting secondary yeshiva school system is the Yeshivot Torah U'Melacha — the

vocational, crafts, trade, and agricultural schools with headquarters in Kefar Avram near Petah Tikvah. Both this system and the previously mentioned chain of Yeshivot B'nei Akiva are Mizrahi affiliated and envisage themselves as the ideal synthesis of traditional learning with the modern exigencies of Israel life. It is the desire of both to expand and to build until every little kefar and distant immigrant and border village have at least one institution of secondary level Torah learning. In realization of this lofty ideal, two new such Yeshivot B'nei Akiva have been constructed each year in the past four years in different parts of the country. This philosophy of winning over the country to Torah by building secondary and higher institutions of learning everywhere in the Land is inspired in part by one famed American Hasidic leader — the Lubavitcher Rebbe. One who has conversed with different Habad leaders on the educational scene in Israel cannot help but hear this idea expounded repeatedly. Indeed, the whole chain of Yeshivot Torah U'Melacha was impressed by Habad's success with "Oriental" Jewries by their trade schools in Kefar Habad. Therefore, it was decided to appeal to this growing segment of the population who want a trade-oriented yeshivah by opening up a number of such

secondary yeshivot throughout the length and breadth of the Land. To date, only seven such yeshivot operate. Yet, numerous other affiliated or independent vocational yeshivot exist that have been inspired by this understanding of the necessity to attract the masses of Israel's youth. Indeed, here is another respect in which the pupil (Israel) has far outdistanced the master (U.S.A.) Israel trade yeshivot, in part set up by American groups,¹⁰ have gone far beyond American academic high school yeshivot in accommodating popularizing, and democratizing secondary Torah education. Perhaps the reason for this is the tacit frowning upon the trades and crafts in today's American Jewish community. In Israel, however, a large segment of population (mainly Sephardic groups) look upon such an education as the ideal terminal point in their children's formal training.

Now what about the education of girls on the secondary school level in Israel? Similar to America, Israel has developed elaborate yeshivot for boys before considering a similar buildup for the members of the opposite sex. This lag, however, should not be seen as a direct influence of American yeshiva education in Israel, but rather as a manifestation of a traditional approach in Jewish education emphasizing mass male

education at the expense of developing a parallel system of female education. The Beit Ya'akov schools in Israel — which are the direct linear descendents of Sarah Schneider's Beis Yaakov in Poland (which in turn received inspiration from the Hirsch *Realschule* in Frankfurt) are not influenced to a noticeable degree by their American counterparts. In fact, the influence often works in reverse, since some American graduates of Bais Yaakov high schools attend the Jerusalem Seminary of Beit Ya'akov and are absorbed physically and spiritually into this particular educational milieu. Very few are those who are American products who teach in the Beit Ya'akov schools — on any level.

A few years ago, several Israel educators affiliated with the State Religious Trend began to notice the lack of a more "Modern Orthodox" secondary school system for girls. These educators, who were impressed with the results of Central High School for girls in Brooklyn, felt that such an institution was necessary for their own girls in Israel. Of course, a major motivating factor was the need for yeshiva trained "Modern Orthodox" women to marry the similarly trained "Modern Orthodox" men.

As a result, the first Ulpana for girls was set up in 1960 in Kefar

Pines. It immediately succeeded in attracting girls from many of the finest families of Mizrahi background in Israel — as well as a few American pupils from similar family backgrounds. The institution which has a curriculum closely patterned after Central High School for Girls in Brooklyn, grew so quickly that in 1964 another Ulpana had to be opened. Apparently, this new departure in Israel education offers an interesting developmental pattern for the years ahead, Israel secondary school yeshiva system for girls based on the curriculum of an American "Modern Orthodox" school.

In conclusion, we have seen that religious high school education in Israel has a mass appeal since it is broken down into

various types of institutions — day high schools, academic yeshiva high schools, Beit Ya'akov, Ulpanot, vocational, trade, and agricultural yeshivot, teacher's training high schools, etc. We have noticed the trends in the development of these various types of institutions. Due to our interest in secondary Israel Torah U'Madah-oriented schools, we have not analyzed the many fine *yeshivot ketanot* (high school age religious schools that exclude all general subjects from their curriculum). These approximately seventy schools, mainly centralized in and around Jerusalem and B'nei Brak are either Hasidic or "Sectarian Orthodox" directed. A separate paper is needed to discuss adequately their development patterns.

NOTES

1. Religious education in America comparable to even minimum religious education in Israel of necessity is limited to the day school or yeshiva for no similar system of supplementary Hebrew School religious education exists there.

2. *Israel Education Ministry Yearbook*, Jerusalem 1965.

3. See Schiff, *the Jewish Day School in America*, Jewish Education Committee Press, N. Y. C., 1966.

4. Vocational Schools: Boy's Town sponsored by Torah V'Daath

N. Y. C., Habad, Yeshivot Torah U'Melachah sponsored by Mizrahi.

5. Agricultural: Kefar Avram, Kefar Saba sponsored by Mizrahi.

6. Religious high schools: Up until September, 1965, all such institutions were Mizrahi, Poalei Agudah, or Independently run. Now two such Agudah high schools function.

7. Religious teachers seminar high schools: Givat Washington sponsored by Mizrahi, Yeshivat haDarom sponsored by the Rabbinical Council of America, Yad Benyamin sponsored by Poalei Agudat Yisrael.

7*. *Editors Note*: For an analysis of Rav Kook's views on secular studies see Rabbi Lamm's article.

8. The *Bogrut* Exam is similar to the New York States Regents and the College Board combined, in its importance for being accepted into college and for receiving stipends.

9. Quoted from the contents of a letter received from Rabbi Neriah, Dean of the Yeshivot B'nei Akiva.

10. Boy's Town in Jerusalem with nearly 2,000 students in all its branches was founded and maintained by an American Yeshiva — Torah V'Daath of New York City.



• Joseph Wikler

AN INWARD GLANCE

To The Editor:

I am inspired by the interest in *Yeshiva chizuk* and school policy demonstrated by the talks and ideas present now at YU. Although I believe that much needs to be accomplished on the administrative level, I feel that a great deal also needs to be done on the individual level.

If we engage in a little introspection, we will find that all is not so well. By examining what one does with his free time at night, during intersession and during the summer, one can determine how Jewish he is. If he never opens up a *sefer* if not required to, but always sees at least one

Although this letter was originally sent to the editor of *Commentator* (see Feb. 18 edition), its message warrants its reappearance here. If "words issuing from the heart penetrate the heart," these words of *muassar* by Joseph Wikler, a senior, should indeed be beneficial for our development as *Bnai Torah*.

section 231) of "All Your Inclinations Should Be For The Sake of Heaven."

Secular ideas are not only part of our college curriculum but of our life. Rabbi Lichtenstein, Dr. Feldman and Rabbi Fulda recently warned us of the great danger that we all face: the unconscious assimilation of *goyish* (secular) ideas and ideals into our own basically religious *hashkefot*.

When we stop to think how little time each day we live as a Jew it is frightening. Of course we *daven* and attend our Hebrew divisions, but of what form is our *batalah* — all secular? Our evenings are spent at study, but what are the topics at bull sessions? The skating rinks and Bimbos rather than the *Bet haMedrash* are the places where tensions are relieved. The underlying current of our lives and thoughts is non-Jewish, and even when it is Jewish, it is secular. After college the majority of our boys will never again open up a *sefer* except perhaps on *Shabbat*. Almost every second of their waking hours will be entrenched in non-Jewish culture and thoughts. Are they not actually in the category of *tinok shenishboh* (a Jew captured and raised by non-Jews), being swallowed up in non-Jewish cultures? The five year program, or a year in an Israeli Yeshiva after college could help us all.

But I have shown only one as-

pect of the problem. To many it even when it is Jewish, it is secular may seem that by going to *shiur* in the morning and spending the rest of the day in other pursuits we are merely developing with the times and retaining what we can in the great whirlpool of American life. Unfortunately the natural result of un-Jewish thought is un-Jewish practice. And so it is that too few of us will consult *Halachah* before we make a decision, and almost certainly not before each action. "Blessed art Thou... who has commanded us to be *osek* in matters of *Torah*" we say daily. One explanation is that we must perform our daily activities from *negel vassar* in the morning to *kriat Shema* at night through *Halacha* and with a *Torah* outlook.

How many of us can say that we live for God or for Judaism, not only for ourselves? Certainly those boys who use indecent language, show no respect for other students' privileges, try to fool their teachers, or mock some part of their Jewish studies or their *Rebbeim*, cannot claim to be *bnei Torah*. But neither can any person who, does not set specific times for learning beyond that required for *shiur*, acts in a manner not befitting Judaism in the dormitory or off campus, does not think of matters of Judaism in his spare time, does not try constantly to improve himself religiously, neith-

er can he call himself a *Torah Jew*. Knowing all the *Torah* in the world does not permit the transgression of embarrassing or cursing someone. A Jew must be complete and consistent, for you cannot fool God.

Upper classmen should feel it a pleasant duty to explain to the newer students the importance of good *hashkafah*, of learning in the *Bet haMedrash* nightly, (even doing all their Jewish homework there where there is an atmosphere of *Kiddushah* and a group of

people willing to help), listening to the nightly *mussar shiur* in English at 9:40, using proper language, and trying to learn to pray and do *mitzvot* with *kavanah*.

One last point. Certainly the *Chavrusah* campaign of SOY and the high school Big Brother program of *Bnai Avraham* are programs befitting *Bnai Torah* oriented Jew. These groups could be essential forces in *chizuk hayeshiva* and Judaism in general if only they had the proper assistance.

Joseph Wikler '66



ג ש ר

יו"ל ע"י הסתדרות תלמידי ישיבת ר' יצחק אלחנן
ישיבה אוניברסיטה

סיון תשכו כרך ג' מס' א' יט למדינת ישראל

המערבת

עורכים כרמי הורוויץ, מנחם כשדן
עורך משנה שמחה פזנר
עוזרים למערכת אברהם לוונגליק, מיכאל יהושע



תוכן הענינים

- 5 הקודש והחול יוסף דוב הלוי סולובייצ'יק
על קדושת המקום וקדושת הזמן מאת מורנו הגר"ד סולובייצ'יק
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The Rav has privileged us recently with several essays which are major contributions to Jewish religious thought. Aryeh Strikovsky a doctoral candidate at the Bernard Revel Graduate School examines the world of thought of the Rav in the light of his earlier and more recent essays.

מעולם מחשבתו של מורנו הרב י. ד. סלוביצ'יק שליט"א

שני מאמרי המחשבה החשובים ביותר שנכתבו על ידי הרב סלוביצ'יק הם איש ההלכה¹ והמאמין הבודד². שני מאמדים אלו משקפים את השינויים שחלו במחשבת הרב סלוביצ'יק בזמן שחלף בין פרסום שני המאמרים. לכן מבחינה מתודולוגית אדון קודם במאמר הראשון ואמסור את תכנו בקצרה.

מטרת המאמר היא שרטוט דמות איש ההלכה במונחים פילוסופיים כלליים, ובו בנה הרב סלוביצ'יק לאיש ההלכה בנין מפואר שנועד להראות את עליונותו המוחלטת על בניני אנשי הדעת והרת למיניהם.

השיטה המתודולוגית של מאמר זה היא בהתווית טפוסים טהורים של איש הדת ואיש הדעת, ואיש ההלכה העומד על גביהם והממוג את הטוב הדיאלקטי שבשניהם.

איש הדעת פועל בגבולות שהוקבעו לו על ידי קנט במחיצות החלל והזמן. גישתו היא אפירורית-אידיאלית ואפוסטריורית-אמפירית. הטפוס האפירורית-אידיאלי פועל בשטחי המתמטיקה והמדע הטהור, ואותו קנט העריץ ביותר. איש הדעת מתרכז בחוקיות שבבריאה. החלק הבלתי חוקי שבבריאה שאינו נתפס בנוסחאות והגדרות אינו מעניינו. אדם זה צופה על הבריאה אדיש וחסר אמוציות. האוביקטיביות היא מטרתו³. לחבה יתירה זוכה כאן איש המדע הטהור שאינו מתעניין בשמושיות שתצא ממחקרו.

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החושב והפועל במושגים מופשטים, לדוגמא מובאים כאן יוצרי הגיאומטריה האי-אוקלידית.

איש הדת משורטט במיטב הצבעים של האקסיסטנציאלסטים הדתיים כברט וקירקגור ושל חכמי הקבלה והחסידות. אדם זה חי בפלורליזם אונטי, הוא חי בעולם שפל שאינו אלא בבואה לעולם שמעליו. הוא קרוע בקרעים נפשיים עמוקים בין קטבי נשמתו. תמיד הוא נמצא במאבק פנימי ומחשל בכך את אישיותו¹. הוא מנסה לחרוג העולם הזה על ידי המנעות מהנאות העולם או על ידי קבלת הנאותיו, גופו בעוה"ז ולבו ונשמתו משוטטים בעולם עליון רוחני ומשלם. כמדען, אף הוא רואה את החוקיות שבבריאה, אך הוא מנסה לחרוג מעבר לתחומי הישות שלפניו. הוא בוער באש קדש נוכח חזיונות הטבע. אישיות זו משתדלת לבטל את עצמה באור פני מלך חיים, ומנסה להעלות את העולם הזה לאלהים. איש הדת הוא טפוס כללי אלא שבפרטים הוא מצייר כמיסטיקאי היהודי, ובתור שכזה הוא מזדהה עם סבל השכינה בגלותה ולבו חמר על צמצום זה.

העולם סובל את הסתירות שבין איש הדעת ואיש הדת. העולם מראה טפח מחוקיותו לאיש הדעת, ומכסה טפחיים ומלבה בכך את אש הקדש שבאיש הדת. בדרך זו איש הדת ואיש הדעת מזדהים עם שני צדדים אלו של הבריאה.

כמה פילוסופים ערבים בימי הבינים דגו על איש הדעת החפשי מדת ואיש הדת חסר הדעת. כאן הרב סולוביציק מעניק זכות קיום מציאותית לשניהם, זכות המאושרת על ידי הכפילות של החוקי והנסתר שבבריאה.

את איש ההלכה מכתיר הרב סולוביציק בדת שבדעת ובדעת שבדת. כאיש הדעת הוא אפריורי ושואף להתאים מושגים הלכתיים מופשטים עם תכנים שבחיים הריאליים. כאיש המדע הטהור הוא עוסק גם בהלכות שאין להם שמוש מעשי². הוא נמצא בעוה"ז ואינו חורג לעבר עולמות עליונים המאצילים והמשפיעים. הוא פועל בתוך החיים הארציים ואין לו עסק עם חיי הנשמות שאחר המות. יפה לו שעה אחת של תורה ומעשים טובים בעולם הזה מכל חיי העולם הבא. איש ההלכה מחמיר בהלכות פקוח נפש. קדושת החיים הופכת חלול שבת לחולה, למצה רבתי³.

בנגוד לגישה השמושית-מוסרית של קנט, מעמיד המחבר עבור איש ההלכה גישה עיונית נורמטיבית. איש ההלכה מרגיש עצמו בעולם בני ומגדר של הלכה, אין פחד לעיניו ודרכו סלולה לפניו. אין הוא נזקק

לסגופים ואיננו מנסה כאיש הדת לחרוג מתחומי אישיותו אל על, לשם הבנה נוספת של איש ההלכה יהא עלינו להגריר את מהות ההלכה.

ההלכה בצמצומה קובעת מדות שעורים וחציצין. ההלכה היא האוביקטיפיקציה של הדת. יציבות הדת דורשת את חוקיותה, חוקיות הדומה למודלים גיאומטריים מצויה בהלכה, הלוגיקה של איש ההלכה קובעת את דרכה. לא בשמים היא, ובפמליא של מעלה מתפלפלים בתורה הארצית שבה אנו עוסקים. כשנחלקו בפמליא של מעלה בהלכות נגעים, נקרא רבה בר נחמני לפסוק את פסק ההלכה, בעשותך מצוה אין עליך לכהן אלא את המחשבה של עשית המצה⁴, ואין לך לטפס בעולמות רחניים קבליים העומדים וחופפים מעליה. אדרבה, העולמות העליונים עומדים ותלויים בך, האדם⁵, הנמצא פה בעולם הזה.

אין העולם עבור איש ההלכה אלא ארבע אמות של הלכה. הטבע דובר אליו דרך ההלכה, וכל תופעה טבעית מזכירה לו את ההלכה הכרוכה בתופעה זו.

סערות הנפש הפוקדות את איש הדת אינן פוסחות לגמרי על איש ההלכה. אך ההלכה היא תרופה ללומדה, ולומדי התורה יודעים כיצד להתאים למשברי רוחם את ההלכות המתאימות לאחוי קרעי נפשם, וסערות הנפש מתכנסות במסגרות היציבות של ההלכה. בדרך זו איש ההלכה ניצל מטלטולי הנפש התמידיים הנישאים בכף הקלע של נשמת איש הדת. יציבות נפשו מביאה ליציבותו הדתית⁶. עבודת ה' של איש ההלכה נובעת מתוך הבנה מחדירה, ויפה כחה על כחות הנפש מכח התפעלות רגשית גרידא.

רדיפת הצדק של איש ההלכה היא מוחלטת⁷, ההלכה שולטת בכל ענפי החיים. מעולם לא הגבלנוה לארבע אמות של בית המדרש. אין פלגיות בין בית הכנסת לחיים. כנגוד מובאים כאן אנשי דתות אחרות שהפליגו לעולמות עליונים רחניים. ובעולם הזה עשו כל רע. בכנסיותיהם התפללו והתודו ובדרכי החיים הרסו ופשעו⁸.

ההלכה פתוחה לכל. כל מי שחפץ יכנס לביהמ"ד וישתלם במעלות התורה, לא נוצרה אצלנו כתתיות תורניות. איש ההלכה אינו זקוק למתוכים, לא לנשמות ולא למתים, לא למלאכים ואף לא לצדיק החסיד. המקובל עולה אל האל-לקים, אך האל-לקים מורד לעולם הזה על ידי איש ההלכה⁹. הכנסת תורה בתכני העולם הזה עושה את איש ההלכה לשותף להקב"ה במעשה בראשית.

בעיני איש ההלכה אין הבריאה ככבלים על מלך אסור ברהטים. לפי

הגדרת ר' חיים איש בריסק העולם נברא, לא למען טובו או חסדו, אלא למטרת רצונו. בהשלטת תכני התורה בעולם הזה מביא איש ההלכה גאולה לעולם.

איש ההלכה וגם בעל התשובה אינם חיים במישור הזמן הפיסי שבו העבר אין העתיד עדיין וההווה כהרף עין. הם חי במושג זמן נעלה שבו העבר והעתיד מכונים זה את זה, ועתיד של תשובה וחרטה הופך זדונות לזכויותו.³¹

כשם שאין מושג הזמן של איש ההלכה זמן ישיר אחיד, כן אין אישיותו חלק מההומו ספייאן. הוא אדם המעלה הקשור לתורת ה' ונמצא בתהליך מתמיד של תשובה והודככות ודבקות בה.

כידוע הרמב"ם יחס לנביא שני כחות. כח מדמה וכח ויכולת אינטלקטואלית. שפינוזה בצטטו קטע זה ממו"נ הזכיר רק את הכח המדמה, ולעג בכך לנביא בעל הדמיונות. הרב סולוביציק עשה את ההיפך, והזכיר רק את ההכנה האינטלקטואלית של הנביא. מכאן הדרך פתוחה, לרב סולוביציק, להניח על דאש איש ההלכה שנעשה כבר לאיש האלהים את כתר הנבואה.³²

המסקנה-המשותפת מדברי הרב סולוביציק היא שכתר הנבואה מחכה לאיש ההלכה הרציונלי ולא לאיש הדעת המיסטיקאי.

* * *

כבר צינתי מקודם את השפעת הקנטיאניזם והניאו קנטיאניזם על חלקו האינטלקטואלי של איש ההלכה שאינו אלא העברה של שיטת המחשבה של איש הדעת, כי איש ההלכה הוא תרכובת של איש הדעת כמות שהוא (בשיטות המחקר) ואישיות דתית השונה בכמה דברים מאיש הדת, ואיש הדעת הוא דמות קנטיאנית בכל רמ"ח אבריה. ברצוני כאן להצביע על מספר נקודות קנטיאניות נוספות.

קנט הסביר את המציאות בהסבר מתמטי פיסי, ואם המתמטיקאים ואנשי המדע הטהור קבע בפסגת הפירמידה של אנשי הדעת.

לפיכך כשנטל הרב סולוביציק את דמות איש ההלכה, שצוידה בספרות ההשכלה כסגל הבטלנות המעורטלת, והראה שדמותה האינטלקטואלית זהה בשיטות מחקרית עם איש המדע הטהור והמתמטיקאי, הועלה איש ההלכה לפסגת אנשי הדעת, אליבא דקנט השכל הוא המקור היחידי לאמת, ואכן אף בלמוד התורה ההכרעה השכלית של לומדיה היא המקור היחידי להלכה

הפסוקה כי אחר שנתנה תורה לישראל אין משגיחין בבת קול.³³ בבית מדרשו של קנט הכריזו שהמוסר חייב להיות מוחלט, ואין לך מוסר מוחלט כמוסר הטבוע על אדני האמת של ההלכה.

הרמן כהן קבע שהמציא רעיון או אידאה נעשה לבעל מוחלט על אותה המחשבה. שלטון ללא מצרים ניתן לאיש ההלכה על חדושי ההלכה, לא רק שאין הוא משגיח בבת קול, אלא שחכמי הפמליא של מעלה מומינים את רבה בר נחמני לפסוק במחלוקת שבין הקב"ה ופמליא של מעלה.

איש הדת הוא יצור אקסיסטנציאליסטי וקבלי מוחלט. החלק הרתי של איש ההלכה הוא התגלמות של איש דת, שההלכה העמידתו על ברכי המציאות הארצית, העניקה מזור לפצעי נשמתו ורסנה את טלטולי נפשו. יש לצין שאף אחר קציצת כנפיו של איש הדת, וכבילתו בתרי"ג המצות ובלמוד התורה, נשאר בו הרבה מהקבלה, ביחוד משיטות הקבלה של חב"ד ו"נפש החיים", שקלטו הרבה מהרציונליזם של חכמי ימי הבינים. והרי כמה מהמושגים הקבליים הללו: העולמות העליונים קשורים באדם התחתון. רצונו יתברך השתלשל באותיות התורה והאדם מוריד את השכינה לעולם הזה בכח תורתו ועד.

בדרך המתודולגית שונה הסבר הרב קוק מזה של הרב סולוביציק. שהרי במאמר "חכם עדיף מנביא", ציר הרב קוק את איש ההלכה "איש הפרטים" הרואה בתורה מערכת דינים והלכות ומצות המסופים לסעיפים ולסעיפי סעיפים. הנביא הוא "איש הכללים" ומוכיח על מוסר וצדקה ומפיץ אורות ביהדות. ונגודים נוצרים בין החכם והנביא עד שבא משה רבנו, המלכד ברוחו פרטים כנותן התורה וכללים כאב הנביאים, ומשכין שלום ביניהם.

כאן הרב סולוביציק ציר את איש ההלכה לא כמנוגד לנביא אלא כמועמד מוכן לנביאות. הנשמה המרוסנת של איש הדת המקנת בו, ורדיפת הצדק המוחלט שבו מעניקים לו מזהר הנבואה כבר מתחילתו, ודיה התעלותו בקדושה ובהבנת התורה להקנות לו את כתר הנבואה.

כידוע היו נטיות ביהדות לדמוקרטיה רוחנית, שקראו לחפוש המאור הנשמתי שבלב כל אדם מישראל ושראו בכל נשמה פוטנציאל לקדושה עילאה. נטיות אלו יוצגו בעיקר על ידי תנועות החסידות. גם טפוס החסיד שבכחרי או שבפרק קי"ט שבתהילים אינו בהכרח גאון אינטלקטואלי. לעומת זאת היו שנטו לחפש את העילית הרוחנית, ולהעמיד את היהדות כדת לעילית אינטלקטואלית וטהורה. מהספורים המפורדים על ר' מנדלה מקוצק

נראה שהוא רצה להקים את בית מדרשו על מספר מצומצם של תלמידים נבחרים. מלבדו היו תמיד גדולים שנתפרסמו פחות שבו להמון בסתר או בגלוי. הרמב"ם במו"נ ניסח את ההבדלים שבין עובדי ה' האמיתיים ליתר ההמון בהגדרות חריפות ביותר. גם שיטות המוסר שבישיבות הליטאיות העמידו את העולם על בני התורה העיליים ובעלי הנשמה. הרב סולוביציק במאמר זה מזהה למעשה את איש ההלכה עם איש היהדות. מאדם שאינו שולט בים ההלכה שולל הרב סולוביציק את זכות קיומה המלא של המצוה. בנקודה זו הרב סולוביציק הוא הרבה יותר קיצוני מהרמב"ם. שהרי לרמב"ם החשיבה המתמדת בדרכי ה' מהוה כרטיס כניסה למדור העליון של המין האנושי — האלקי, והרב סולוביציק מוסיף על זאת ידיעה בש"ס ושליטה בדרכי הלמוד. ורק את איש ההלכה שהוא גאון תלמודי הוא מכניס לקטגוריה האלקית של הרמב"ם.

כפורטרטים לאיש ההלכה שמשו לרב סולוביציק אביו וסבו. ההרגשה של אצילות גאונות משפחתית באה לידי בטוי במאמרו "מה דודך מדוד" שבו הרשמה מחיצה בין דודו ואביו ז"ל שהיו בחינת משה לבין יתר חכמי התורה שאינם אלא בחינת אהרן. בין הראשונים שהיו בחינת נשואים לתורה לבין האחרונים שאינם אלא מאורסים לתורה. כאן לדעתי נמצא המוטיב האישי לזהו איש היהדות עם איש ההלכה.

יעקב אייגס²⁹ מקדיש חלק מבקרתו על היהדות האורתודוקסית, למאמר "איש ההלכה" של הרב סולוביציק. במאמר זה הוא רואה את נתינת כתר הנבואה לאיש ההלכה כפגיעה בעקביות של מטרת המאמר. הוא מזהה את איש הדת השואף לעולמות עליונים, שנדחה מגדולות איש ההלכה, עם הנביא שאליו מגיע איש ההלכה בהשגת מטרתו. לדבריו "בנוגע לנבואה ד"ר סולוביציק הכניס דרך הדלת האחורנית את מה שהוא הוציא מקודם דרך הדלת הקדמית"³⁰. הוא מזהה את הנביא שבמאמר עם המיסטיקאי. כבר עמדתי על כך שהרב סולוביציק נשמר מזה והבליט רק את הצדדים האינטלקטואליים שבנביא. מבין השורות אפשר לראות שהרב סולוביציק היה מזהה את הנביא בראש ובראשונה כאינטלקטואל הלכתי.

הוא כותב "הרב סולוביציק נכשל להציק את העצמאיות של ההלכה ואיש ההלכה נזקק לממלכת הפילוסופיה הכללית כמו שעשה הרמב"ם. או לחכמת הקבלה כגרא"א וכר"ח מולחין"³¹. איני רואה כל כשלון בכך. אדרבה, כל מבנה המאמר "איש ההלכה" מוכיח שזו לא היתה מטרת הרב. מבנה זה הוא של סינתזה של איש ההלכה הבנויה על האנטיתיות והטוב הדיאלקטי של איש הדת ואיש הדעת והיחוד העליון של איש ההלכה. ובכך הרב סולוביציק הצליח.³²

אילו הרב סולוביציק היה מנסה לבנות במאמר זה פילוסופיה של יהדות היה מקום לקטרוגו של אייגס. אך במאמר זה משורטטת גדלות איש ההלכה ביחס לזו של מתחרי המדענים והדתים, שכל מה שיש להם יש לו ולא כל מה שיש לו יש להם. ואין לזהות השוואות אלו עם הזדקקות לפילוסופיות אחרות.

כל מי שמעיין במאמר נוכח שאין מטרת המאמר להסביר לאיש ההלכה את דרכו. אישי ההלכה המשורטטים באמר זה, לא נזדקקו למשוואות הקנטיאניות והאקסיסטנציאליות לשם הבנת דרכם. הרב אף לא ניסה להסביר את הערך הקדוש שבלמוד הלכות יבשות, מה שניסו לעשות רמח"ל, נשיאי חב"ד ואחרים. המאמר מיועד למעריצי אישי הדעת ואישי הדת שידעו שיש ליהדות אישי הלכה הגבוהים משכמם ומעלה שפעלם בארץ חוטי נבואה שמימיים קשורים עדיהם.

כמה מהרעיונות שבמאמר זה חזרו ונשנו בתוספות הסבדים נוספים במאמרים הספורים שפרסם הרב מאז ועד עתה. בהספד "מה דודך מדוד"³³ מתוארת המתודולוגיה של שיטת הלימוד הבריסקאית. במאמר הספד על הרב גולד³⁴ מתואר הטיפוס הליטאי הקר מבחוץ והמלא אהבת ה' ואהבת ישראל מבפנים. את הטיפוס הזה מכנה הרב בשם "איש ראש חדש". טיפוס זה חשוב למאמר איש ההלכה, כי איש ההלכה צויר כאדם שהלכה כובלת את משבדי נפשו הפנימיים. ואיש ראש חדש מרסן את רגשותיו בקרבו. במאמר "הנכחה"³⁵ הנמיק הרב את התנגדותו לדיאלוג תיאולוגי עם הכנסייה בהשתמשו בהסברים תיאולוגיים מעמיקים.

אולם מכל המאמרים שהופיע בינתיים רק "המאמין הבודד" מכיל הרצאה פילוסופית שיטתית. אע"פ שבפתיחת מאמרו זה הרב כותב שמטרתו להביע את הרגשתו האישית ולא פילוסופיה פסקנית ואוביקטיבית, יש במאמר זה יותר פילוסופיה ויותר אוביקטיביות מרב מאמריו האחרים.

גם במאמר זה כבאישי ההלכה משתמש הרב בטיפוסים טהורים. את שני הטיפוסים העיקריים מוצא הרב בספור הכפול של יצירת האדם (בראשית פרקים א' ו ב') מבקרי המקרא נתחו פרשה זו, והצביעו על הבדלים שבין ספורי בריאת האדם. הרב סולוביציק נטל הבדל³⁶ ספורים אלו, ששמשו למבקרי המקרא כעדות לתעודה האלהית והתעודה היאהוית, ועשאן בסיס למאמרו זה.

בספור הראשון האדם נוצר בצלם אלקים וקבל את התפקיד "מלאו את הארץ וכבשוה". לפי ספור זה הזכר הנקבה נבראו כאחת ובו שולט

השם אֱלֹהִים. כנגד זה, בספור השני מסופר גם על גוף האדם שנוצר מהאדמה, על הרוח שה' נפח באפיו, ועל השמתו בגן עדן לעבדה ולשמרה. בספור זה האדם נוצר לבדו, ורק אחר כך נוצרה חוה מצלעו לעזר כנגדה. ובפרק זה מופיע השם הו' אֱלִיקִים.

את האדם המסופר בספור הראשון מכנה הרב סולוביצ'יק "האדם הראשון" ואת האדם של הספור השני "האדם השני". שניהם נעשים במאמר זה לטפוסים טהורים. אדם הראשון מקביל לאיש הדעת והאדם השני לאיש הדת שבאיש ההלכה. אך קימים גם הבדלים רציניים. האדם הראשון יכול להיות איש הדעת, אך הוא יכול להיות טכנאי מעשי. הוא פרגמטי ביחסו לעולם. הוא משחר אחרי בטחון וחיים נוחים. הוא ממציא המצאות, מדבר מחלות, כובש מדבריות ומנופף בדגל התרבות והציויליזציה. אדם זה אינו נעדר ממושגים אסתטיים. הוא יוצר אידיאות במחו ויופי בלבו. מצפונו מודרך לא רק על ידי הטוב אלא גם על ידי היפה. על גאון טכנולוגי זה נאמרו הפסוקים "ותחסרהו מעט מאלקים וכבוד והדר תעטרהו תמשילהו במעשי ידיך כל שתה תחת רגליו" (תהלים ח, ו ז). פסוקים אלו מביעים את הכבוד וההדר של אדם זה. לאדם המודרני יש יותר כבוד מאשר לאבותיו בהישגיו הטכנולוגיים. אדם זה נושא גם באחריות לעולם שמסביבו. נוסחת חייו היא: אנושיות-כבוד-אחריות-הדר.

בגרעין נשמתו של האדם השני אפשר להכיר את מיודענו "איש הדת" שב"איש ההלכה". אלא שכאן מתוארים צדדי אישיות נוספים. כאדם הראשון, גם אדם זה מופעל על ידי הקוסמוס לחזק ומעש. אך בעוד שאדם הראשון מעונין לדעת כיצד הקוסמוס פועל ומעונין בתוצאות מעשיות, האדם השני שואל על בעיות מטפיזיות "איך זה כך"? "מה זאת"? "מהו?". יחסו לעולם הוא קוגניטיבי חקרני, בדרך זו שאלותיו מוליכים אותו לגלוי האלקות שבבריאה. הוא אינו תופס את העולם כנוסחאות מופשטות, כאדם הראשון, אלא ככלליות שטופת אור, צבעים ומסתורין. ה"אני" שלו קשור לאלקים בקשר שהוא מוצאו בכל קסמי הטבע.

האדם הראשון והשני מונעים על ידי מיסטוריות ההויה, שניהם חותרים לאותה המטרה, — להיות עצמם, בני אדם. הם אינם יכולים לשאוף אחרת כי לכך נוצר טבעם על ידי האל. ההבדל ביניהם הוא רק בפירושים ולא במטרות ובדחפים. "האידיאה של האנושיות, האתגר המזמין אדם לפעולה ותנועה" מפעיל את שניהם.

אדם הראשון שואף לפדות עצמו מממלכת החי חסרת המחשבה

והמעוף, על ידי כבוד והדר. האדם השני שואף להויה אחרת, ההויה הגאולתית. האסטרנאות האיתאיסט משיג באמצו ובכשריו כבוד והדר, אך הגאולה היא ממנו והלאה.

עד כאן היה לנו מעין הרחבה של איש הדת ואיש הדעת. אך החל מנקודה זו עובר הדיון לבעיות החברה של אדם הראשון ואדם השני. בנקודה זו לא נגע הרב עד כה באף אחד ממאמריו.

הקהילה של אדם הראשון מבוססת על החוזה החברתי, המדינה הקואופרטיבית היא דוגמה לכך. הקהילה בנויה על עקרונות כלכליים, חלוקת עבודה, קוארדינציה בין הרבים, צבירת נסיון ורוח צבורית בונה ויוצרת. אך אין קשר פנימי נשמתי בין איש לרעהו. לאדם הראשון ה' לא אמר: "לא טוב היות האדם לבדו" ואם ה' היה אומר זאת היה מעיר: "לא טוב עשות האדם מלאכה לבדו". חוה היתה שותפת עבודה לאדם הראשון, הם היו פועלים ועובדים יחד, אך לא חיים ביחד, לא היתה להם תחושת האנחנו. הם היו שני "אני" הפועלים בשטחים משותפים לאינטרסיהם. תחושת התחברות גואלת ומזככת לא פעלה בהם.

הויה פדויה היא פנימית בעיקרה. היא חודרת לתוככי חבין ה"אני" ומזככת אותו. הויה הכבוד באה בכבוש הטבע, הויה הפדות, בחשיפה עצמית נכנעת לפני ההויה העליונה. האדם הראשון הזמן למלא את הארץ ולכבושה, אדם השני הושם בגן עדן לעבדה ולשמרה. הכבוד גמצא בפסגת ההצלחה אך הגאולה חבויה במעמקי המשבר והכשלון. "ממעמקים קראתיך ה'". אדם השני נוצר עפר מן האדמה, כי ידיעת המקור השפל של האדם היא חלק אינטגרלי של נסיון ה"אני". כאשר האדם השני מוטל בעולם הוא טובל מבידות, הוא נאבק עבור זיהויו משום שהוא חסר בטחון בעולם זה. המונח "אדם" זר לו ובלתי ניתן להתקשרות. אחרי שהוא נתן שמות לכל החיה והבהמה, הוא הרגיש את מלוא בדידותו, ולאדם לא מצא עזר כנגדו. אך בכדי להשיג את הקשר האישי הגואל עם האשה, היה עליו לעבור בדרך כניעה והקרבה. ה' הפיל תרדמה על האדם והאדם נכנע. דרך ההכנעה הוא השיג את אשתו. אך גם זה לא הספיק. הגאולה שבקשר האישי דורשת הקרבה, וצלע מגופו הוקרבה למען החבור האישי הגואל. בשעת המשבר נוצר הגרעין לקהילה חדשה, קהילת האמונה שהגיעה לפריחתה בברית שבין ה' לאברהם. גם הברית העתידה, הגאולה המשיחית, תבא מתוך משבר. בצר לך ומצאוך כל הדברים ושבת עד ה' אלקיך ושמעת בקולו, דב' ד', ל'.

קהילת ברית האמונה מוכרכת מבודדים מבודדים. ה"אני" מבודד היות

ואין לו "אני" דומה להתקשרות בקרבתו. שותפות עבודה ואינטרסים אינה יכולה לפדות את האדם מבידודות זו. גאולה נשמית יכולה לבאר רק בחברת אקסיסטנציאלית. כאשר דופק הלבבות פעם ומיחד לאור פני מלך חיים, ונשמת כמות נפגשות בנתיב הכיסופים.

הרתה ולידתה של קהילת האמונה היו בצר ובמצוק, חבריה הם אני אתה והוא כביכול. האדם הראשון נפגש עם אשתו בעצמו, אך האדם השני הופגש עם אשתו על ידי ה' שהומינם "לקהילה אקסיסטנציאלית היצוקה בסבל ובמעשה הקרבה". הוא כביכול נכנס כשותף אליה. ה' לעולם אינו נוטש את קהילת הברית. עמה הוא בצרה, ועם חבריה הוא שותף וחבר. רבה בר נחמני הזמן לפסוק הלכה בין הקב"ה ופמליא של מעלה, ורבי יהושע בן חנניא סירב לקבל הכרעת בת קול באמרו: "לא בשמים היא"! ברית סיני נכרתה ברצון החפשי של בני ישראל. עם זאת, ה' מופיע כמדריך, מורה ורועה. "האלקים אשר התהלכו אבותי לפני האלקים הרועה אותי מעודי" ה' היה רועה יעקב חברו. עם זאת חז"ל הכניסו את מוטיב הכפיה "כפה עליהם הר כגיגית" כי ה' שומר על תפקידו כמנהיג ובני קהלת הברית יראים מאלקיהם ונכנעים מלפניו.

התגלות ה' הופכת את החברה הטכנולוגית לחברה אקסיסטנציאלית. כאשר ה' הוא הפותח, נוצרת קהילת הנבואה, וכאשר האדם הוא הפותח, נוצרת קהילת התפלה. בשתי הקהילות קימת התיצבות פנים אל פנים. גם המתפלל וגם הנביא חייבים להתפלל ולהתנבא עבור הכלל. גם התפלה וגם הנבואה אינם מעשי קסם מגיים מסטיים¹⁰. הנביא הוא שליחו החיטובי של ה'. ורק נקי כפים ובר לבב, שחיוו ודי תפלה והודכות יכול לעמוד לפני קונו בתפלה. קבלת עול מלכות שמים שבק"ש קדמת לתפלה, התפלה עצמה היא פרולוג נאצל לזדים הלכתיים. כשאנשי כנסת הגדולה ראו שפסקה הנבואה, ייסדו את מוסד התפלה שיחליפנה¹¹, וכיוון הדיאלוג השתנה.

התקשרות אמיתית נשמית בין אני ואתה, יכולה להיות רק דרך מגע אתו כביכול. אחרת אין לדבר על כך ומגע אישי זה חסר לאיש הכבוד.

וכאן הרב חוהר ומבאר את מושגי הזמן של איש ההדר איש האמונה¹². את הזמן הפיסי המשותף למערך הקוסמי מעניק הרב לאיש ההדר. לכן איש ההדר אינו חש במשמעות הנסיונית של עבר ועתיד ועליו לנטע מהוה להוה.

איש האמונה יודע על עבר ועתיד אינסופיים הגורפים את ההוה המתחמק מאחיותו ללא הפסקה. הוא נעשה אומלל בהרגישו כי הוא יצור מקרי בן חלוף. הדיאלוג החי שלו עם ה'. מבטל את הבדלי הזמן והוא מתקשר עם האתה הנצחי של הדורות.

כאן אנו באים לסינתזה של המאמר.

ה' יצר את האדם הראשון ואת האדם השני, ה' מעונין בשניהם. ההלכה אינה מכירה בתחומים שבין קהילת ההדר וקהילת האמונה. התורה מטילה עלינו חובות לבבות שרק איש האמונה יכול להגשימן כקבלת עול מלכות שמים. ותפקידים מעשיים שרק איש הדר יכול לבצעם, תפקידים הנמצאים בכל מצחן מעשית שבתורה. לפי מרינ' ח"ג פנ"א משה והאבות יכלו לחיות בעת ובעונתן אחת בקהילת האמונה וההדר, הם פעלו בחברה הארצית, ושמרו באותו הזמן על צדקותם המוחלטת בה'. אך מה יעשה האדם הפשוט יותר, הנאלץ לנטע בתמידות בין קטבי אישיותו המיצגים את איש ההדר ואיש האמונה שבקרבו, — אדם זה נע ממרכז למרכז ללא היכולת להקלט באף אחד מהם, ובידודו האונטולוגית של איש האמונה נמשכת. הגאולה דלעתיד לבא תביא פתרון לבעיה זו כאשר אחדות אלקית ואנשית תאחד את איש ההדר ואת איש האמונה במוקד נשמתו כולל.

קשיי איש האמונה עם בדידותו האונטולוגית הם כאין וכאפס לעומת קשיי ביחסים עם איש ההדר. כשאיש ההדר מרגיש צורך בהבעת הנעלה הנשגב שבנשמתו הוא זקוק לעזרת איש האמונה. האחרון יכול לעזור לו כי פוטנציאל איש ההדר נמצא בנשמת איש האמונה, אך הוא לא מתקשר עם איש האמונה, כי הגאווה הדימונית של איש הטכניקה הכובש המרקיע בהישגיו, מסלקת מנשמתו את איש האמונה, ואינה נותנת לבעליה לראות את זכות הקיום של המאמין בעולם "מתקדם" זה.

מאידך גיסא, איש האמונה אינו מסוגל להעביר את נסיונותיו הנשמתיים עם ה' לתכנים תרבותיים מסודרים, כשהוא נתפס באהבה בתענוגים לה' הוא פועל מתוך דבקות מחלטת של כל חלקי היותו, והי חויה שאין לתרגמה להסברים רציונליים¹³. לפיכך הוא אינו יכול לחלק את נסיונו עם איש ההדר.

לפיכך דת איש ההדר בטיה לפי מושגיו דפרגמטיים של בעליה. דת זו היא נהה שאנן ומרגוע מהעבודה היום יומית, והי דת פרגמטית הדורשת עבור כל הקרבה פצוי מיד. דת זו בנויה על יסודות סוציולוגיים שהאדם סגל לעצמו, ואין בה שום דבר מהאמונה ואמיתית שהיא פרי הברית שבין האלקים והאדם, ולכן אין בדת זו כל גאולה לאדם ממגבלות המוגבל והזמני.

מאמר זה שופע מתחילתו ועד סופו באקסיסטנציאליות דתית, ורעיונות הוגי דעות רבים שובעו בו. מהלבנים המשומשות והחדשות בנה הרב בנין חדש ומקורי. ברצוני לבדוק כאן, את המקורות היהודיים האפשריים לרעיונות המבועים במאמר זה.

מושג אהבה הבנויה על התקשרות נשמית אלקית נמצא בתניא „והנה על ידי קיום הרבדים הנ"ל, להיות גופו נבזה ונמאס בעיניו רק שמחתו תהיה שמחת הנפש לבהה הרי זו דרך ישרה וקלה לבא לידי קיום מצות ואהבת לרעך כמוך לכל נפש מישראל למגדול ועד קטן... ולכן נקרא כל ישראל אחים ממש מצד שורש נפשם בה' אחד רק שהגופים מחולקים... כי יסוד השורש כל התורה הוא להגביה ולהעלות הנפש על הגוף מעלה מעלה עד עיקרא ושרשא דכל עלמין וגם להמשיך אור אין סוף ברוך הוא בכנסת ישראל כמ"ש לקמן דהיינו במקור נשמות כל ישראל למהוי אחד באחד דוקא ולא כשיש פירוד ח"ו בנשמות...". (לקוטי אמרים פרק לב).

לפי קטע זה החבור הנשמתי הוא אקסיסטנציאלי ואסנציאלי כאחד. הנשמות הן מחוברות זו לזו ממילא. עליך רק להכיר בכך, ואהבה שאינה תלויה בדבר תתעורר לחברך.

אצל הרב סולוביציק מהות החבור האקסיסטנציאלי אינו ברור. לדבריו האחרו נוצרת כאשר ה' מצטרף ל"אני" וה"אתה". הפעולה המאחדת היא עבודת ה' בצותא. נראה לי שבנקודה זו הרב הושפע מהציור המקביל של בני קהילת איש ההדר שקימת ביניהם שותפות עבודה חילונית. אך היתרון של עבודת ה' בצותא, על עבודת כפים בצותא, כגורם לחבור נשמתו, אינו מוסבר.

לעומת זאת מסביר הרב סולוביציק באריכות את הקשר העמוק שבין ה' ועובדיו. דגם לזה אפשר למצא בדמות הבינוני שביסודות חב"ד. הבינוני הוא אדם השקוע במאבקים פנימיים, ועליו לעמול הרבה בעבודת בוראו עד שהוא משיג קורטוב שמחה של אהבה בתענוגים. את חבלי נפשו של הדבק בה' שדבקו בו' מסתלקת לאחר שהושגה, ושוב נתפסת ושוב נאבדת לרגע, הכניסו המקובלים בהסבר הבטוי „רצוא ושוב" שבמעשה מרכבה.

ההבדל ביסודות האלקיים שבאהבת ישראל בין התניא לרב סולוביציק, מסבירים את ההבדל בתוצאות. לפי התניא האהבה הזאת עוברת לכל אדם בישראל שיש לו נשמה אלקית. לפי הרב סולוביציק האהבה מצומצמת בהיקפה, כי האדם יכול לחלקה רק עם מי שעובד את ה' כמוהו וחותר עמו לאתה המטרה". תהום הבדידות נעשה מחולט כשאיש האמונה איש ההדר נפגשים אינם מוצאים כל מכנה משותף ביניהם.

כנגוד מוחלט למאמין הבודד אפשר לראות את „הויכוח על האהבה" לדון יהודה אברבנאל. דון יהודה אברבנאל מילא את כל ההווה באהבה שופעת, והרב סולוביציק צמצמה לתקופות הנבואה והתפלה שבקהלת האמונה".

גדולי האקסיסטנציאליסטים מסכימים ששעת משבר מקנה לאדם את גדלות עצמיותו.

כאן הרב סולוביציק התנה את ההתקשרות לה' ולחברו ביסורין. כידוע קירקגור עשה מהעקדה בנין אב לכל התורה כלה. הוגי דעות יהודיים מוקיעים את משנת היסורים וההקרבה של קירקגור כתורה נוצרית ועושים מהעקדה חריג מקראי.

רבים מחז"ל הגדילו בשבח היסורים. „יסורין מקרבין את האדם תחת כנפי השכינה" (א). „תביבין יסורין יותר מן הקרבנות" (ב). „חביבין יסורין שהברית כרותה לישראל על ידי יסורין" (ג). „אמר דוד לפני הקב"ה תחיעני אורח חיים! אמר לו הקב"ה: אם חיים אתה מבקש צפה ליסורין" (ד). פרופסור השל האריך בסוגית היסורים בדרכי חז"ל וקבע שבית מדרשו של רבי עקיבא שמח ביסורין ובית מדרשו של ר' ישמעאל וחכמים אחרים בעטו ביסורין". היו גם שיטות ביהדות שדגלו בסיגופים. כל השיטות הנ"ל החשיבו יסורים כדרך להתקרבות לה'. לפי הרב סולוביציק יש צורך ביסורין ובהקרבה אף עבור התקרבות לאדם. אמנם נאמר במשלי „ואח לצרה יולד". אך לא הצלחתי למצא סימוכין בדברי קדמונינו ליסורים והקרבה כדרישה מוקדמת הכרחית להשגת חברות אמת.

הרבה יותר קשה למצא מקור יהודי לבדידות האופפת את המאמין הבודד. הרב סולוביציק הביא ראייה ממש שפרש לאהל מועד לאחר חטא העגל (א). לפי פשוטם של דברים משה עשה זאת בגלל חטא העם, ואכן לפי כמה מדרשים ה' הכריחו לחזור למחנה.

מיסדי החסידות הפליגו בשבח ההתבודדות, אך התבודדותם היתה לצורך חנוכי מסוים ולא בדידות הכרחית שנפלה עליהם. ואם נמצא כמה מגדולי ישראל שחיו בבדידות אישית מתמדת, אפשר להסביר זאת על רקע אישיותם, ואין דאזן מהם לבנין אב לעובדי ה'. יש לצין שהרב בתחילת דבריו קבע שדברים אלו אמורים מתוך הרגשה סוביקטיבית.

השואה בין המאמין הבודד ואיש ההלכה תעמידנו על הרבה מן המשותף ביניהם. המיתוחל בשניהם היא בהתיות טיפוסים נגודיים כתיזה ואנטי תיזה, ויצירת איש הלכה או יהודי אידיאלי שיש בו המעלות של שני הטיפוסים המנוגדים. בשני המאמרים מבוטלת כעפרא דארעא דת הבונה מקלט ונוה לתאבי אמונה שעיפו ממלחמת החיים. בשני המאמרים איש ההלכה או המאמין חיים מעל למימד הזמן הפיסי, ובשניהם היהדות הלכתית מנצחת כדרך החיים האיריאליית.

אך קיימים גם כמה הבדלים חשובים שעל כמה מהם הצבעתי בהערותי

למאמר השני, הטפוסים הידועים לנו מ"איש ההלכה" החיבו את אפקיהם ב"מאמין הבודד". איש הדעת שהוגבל כמתמטיקאי וכמדען נעשה כאן לאיש הדר שיכול להיות גם טכנאי ואמן, האידיאל של קנט הונח במקצת, בעידן האטום והלוינים. איש האמונה אינו יותר דמות אבסטרקטית, שלפי איש ההלכה יכול להיות גם נכרי, אלא יהודי גמור. למעשה אין במאמר השני סינתזה בין שני טיפוסים, אלא הרחבה בתפקידים של איש האמונה שעליו להיות גם בעולם ההדר.

"איש ההלכה" הוא גאון תלמודי אך "המאמין הבודד" אינו גאון תלמודי בהכרח. אם קימת לו דמות אינטלקטואלית הרי זו של איש האשכולות השולט בתחומי למודים רבים.

איש ההלכה דומה לאיש הדעות רק בדרך מחקרו האפריורית, אך הוא אינו יודע דבר מתורת איש הדעת. אך המאמין הבודד חייב לדעת הרבה אודות עולם ומלואו, עליו להיות איש הדר גמור. אמנם ההדר שבו מדגש בכך שהוא מקים תרי"ג מצות שנוגעות בפנות שונות של עולם העשייה, אך כדי להעמידו על מושג הדר נרחב יותר הביא הרב דוגמאות אישיות מהרבנים הרופאים שבמיהב"ג. אם אצל איש ההלכה הזכר שהוא נמצא ופועל בעולם הזה ("היח זה כדי להבדילו מאיש הדת הערטילאי, ולא כדי להשוותו לאיש הדעת. מה שאין כן במאמין הבודד שפעילותו מרוכזת בחיי ההדר").

איש ההדר מיצג הרבה מהנצל שבתורות פילוסופי העמנים המדעי ("ההרב מבטל את תורת הדת הסוציולוגית בפני ההדר הקדוש של הדת ההתגלותית).

במאמר הראשון האישים משורטטים ביחסם עם ה' והקוסמוס אך לא במסגרתם החברתית. במאמר השני מדובר באריכות על טיבן הסוציולוגי של חברת ההדר וחברת ברית האמונה. במאמר הראשון איש ההלכה ממזג את הטוב הדיאלקטי שבאישי הדת הדעת, המיווג עולה בכי טוב, ושמחת יצירה מרחפת עליו. במאמר השני איש ההלכה חי בשני עולמות נפרדים זה מזה. כשהוא בזה הוא מתקשה להיות בזה, וכשהוא רוצה להעביר את מושגיו לאיש ההדר הדיאלוג נידון לשלוק. עצבות טרגית נסוכה על המאמין הבודד כנגד שמחת היצירה של איש ההלכה. איש ההלכה בא ליצג יהדות למדנית, איש האמונה מיצג את יהדות הנבואה והתפלה. משדה ההלכה מחזרות מצות מעשיות שבאו לקדש עולם ההדר ("אך לא הלמוד העיוני של התורה).

תורתו של הרב סלוביצ'יק שבע"פ גדולה בכמותה לעין ערוך מזו שפורסמה

בכתב.

אנו תפלה, שה' יזכה בשנים רבות ופירות ויעזרו לזכות את הרבים בפרסום תורתו.

נספח

עד כה נכתבו שלשה מאמרים עיקריים על מחשבת הרב. הזכרתי לעיל את הקטע בספרו של יעקב אייגס אודות איש ההלכה. הרב אהרן ליכטנשטיין כתב את המאמר על הרב סלוביצ'יק בסדרת ספרי בני ברית". לאחר כתיבת מאמרי התפרסם מאמרו של י. ב. בורוביץ בג'ודאיזם", על "התיאלוגיה הטיפולוגית של הרב יוסף ב. סלוביצ'יק".

מאמרו של הרב ליכטנשטיין מכיל גם ביאוגרפיה של הרב ותיאור אישיותו. חבל שהמאמר הוא קוצר על ידי המערכת. המאמר הוא כפי שהוא לפנינו מיועד לתכניות החנוך הפופלרית של "בני ברית" והרב ליכטנשטיין נאלץ להצטמצם בהסבר מחשבת הרב.

בורוביץ משתדל לסקור את תורת הטיפוסים במאמרי הרב, ומעיר בקצרה על היסודות הפילוסופיים הכלליים שבתורתו.

בין המאמרים השונים שהופיעו אודות מחשבת הרב, מאמר זה נראה להיות החשוב ביותר מבחינת ההיקף העמקה. חבל שהוא לא עמד על ההתפתחות שבמחשבת הרב, הבלטת ביחוד מהשואת "איש ההלכה" עם "המאמין הבודד".

הוא מצביע על כך שהרב נמנע מללכת בתלם של האקסיסטנציאליסטים הפרוטסטנטיים, ורואה את נקודת התורפה של הטיפולוגיה של הרב, בחוסר הבחנה יהודית ברורה. לדבריו איש ההלכה יכול לכלול טפוסים קתוליים ישועים.

הרגשתי היא שהרב במתכוון כחר בטפוסים טהורים מופשטים במקום להשתמש במושגים של בן ישראל ובן נח, העניק בכך לטפוסיו אופייה אוניברסלית. עם זאת קבלו השמות הכלליים הללו תכן יהודי מקורי.

היהודים חיו בשש ציויליזציות ותמיד היתה השפעה יהודית בינם לשכניהם, ותמיד נמצא דמיון רב בין היהודים ושכניהם. במקביל לרבנים הרופאים מימהב"ג, היו גם קדים-רופאים מוסלמים. בעית המאמין הבודד היא כמדה רבה בעית אנשי דת מכל הדתות הנאלצים לפעול בעולם חילוני מתנכר, איש הדת צויר בצבעים אקסיסטנציאליים דתיים כלליים, ובסממנים חבדיים קבליים.

את המפתח לגישה מתודולוגית זו אפשר למצא בפתיחה לאיש ההלכה במאמר "הנכחה". בפתיחה לאיש ההלכה מגדיר הרב את מטרותו:

„תעודתי במאמר זה היא לחדור לתוך כבשונה של תרדעת איש ההלכה ולעמד על מהותו של טפוס „מחור ומשונה“ המתגלה לעולם מתוך ד' אמותיו „המצומצמות“, כשידיו מלוכלכות בשפיר ושליא. ברם כדי לצאת ידי חובתנו במסה זו עלינו לפתח בביאור שרטוט אופייני וקו יסודי בהשקפתו האונטולוגית של איש הדת בהאשואה עם איש הדעת, שמתוכם של השנוים ההבדלים שבין שניהם, נכיר את בעל הויות אביי ורבא“.

קטע זה מבהיר שמטרת המאמר היא הצגת איש הלכה הנראה פרובינציאלי ומצומצם בעיסוקיו ובמטרותיו, באור רחב יותר ומקובל יותר. דרך טפוסים המקובלים על עולם התרבות, תקבל מציאותו האונטולוגית של איש ההלכה הכרה אוניברסלית. בדרך זו, דמויות אישי הלכה מובהקים כר' חיים איש בריסק שידיו היו מלוכלכות בשפיר ושליא, הוקרנו דרך הספקטרום של אישי הדת והדעת.

במאמר „הנבחה“ הביע הרב את דעתו שאין להכנס לכל ויכח תיאולוגי עם הכנסייה“ לפיכך לא נמצא בכל מאמרי הרב טענות כנגד הדוגמות הנוצריות כשלוש הקדוש וקדושת הברית החדשה.

איש ההלכה שהוא יהודי מקורי, מאד בזקורים מקובלים בתרבות המערבית. קאידך גיטא קרני הזקורים הללו אינם משנים את מהותו שגשארית בתחום השפיר והשליא. לכן בורוביץ ראה ערבוב תחומים בצירוף איש ההלכה.

טענתו, שתחת בגדי איש ההלכה אפשר לשים כומר ישועי, צריכה לפני ולפנים, שהרי ברקע מאמרי הרב נמצאת האקסיומה של אמונה שלמה בקדושת התנ"ך ומסורת חז"ל. הרב לא טרח להוכיח אקסיומות אלו, כי הוא לשיטתו, שדברים שבאמונה אינם זקוקים להוכחות רציונליות. קל לחומר, שאין מביאים ראיות לעליונות היהדות על חברותיה הצרות. לפיכך, ברור לרב שאיש ההלכה יקבל את כתר הנבואה, ולא איש הדת הכללי, וקדושת התורה מקרבת את האדם לנבואה, ואין כל קדושה בתכנית הלמודים של הכמרים למיניהם.

אף אם תמצא בני דתות אחרות שבדמותם הרוחנית נמצאים קיום מקבילים לאלו של אישי הדת והדעת, לא הוכחת הרבה. כי אין טיפוסים הדת והדעת אלא אשנבים שדרכם הרב מראה לנו את איש הויות אביי ורבא. ולשיטתו ברור מלכתחילה, שרק מעל ראש איש ההלכה מרחפת רוח הקדש ולא מעל לבני דתות אחרות.

הוא הדין בדמות איש האמונה שב„מאמין הבודד“, ובדמות הרוחנית של ברית קהילת האמונה. גם בני דתות אחרות יכולים לקבוע שעם הצטרפות ה' לחברה טכנולוגית נוצרת קהילת אמונה. אלא ההבדל, שאני כיהודי מאמין שגלוי ה' לאבותינו היו אמיתיים, והגלויים השמימיים שבמסורות דתות אחרות לא היו אמיתיים. אמור מעתה, אין מטרת הטפוסים הטהורים שבתורת הרב, אלא מטרה מתודולוגית בעלמא, ולא רקע חדש להוכחת דת ישראל.

טענה אחרת בפי רובוביץ כנגד מסקנת המאמר „הנבחה“, לדבריו, מהשלב השני בהתפתחות האדם, אפשר להגיע גם למסקנה, שדוקא דרך דיאלוג תיאולוגי, נכיר את עצמנו ואת מהותנו.

בכך איני יכול להתוכח את בורוביץ על בסיס פילוסופי. המחלוקת היא חינוכית. לדעת הרב, חינוך יהודי מתחסן כשהוא מבודד מזרמים דתיים אחרים, ולדעת בורוביץ ההיפך. כמדומני, שכל מחקר השואתי, בין בני ישיבה המנותקים מעולם הכנסייה, לנער היהודי הבא עמה במגע, יוכיח את צדקת הרב.

אין כל יומרה במאמר זה למצות את מחשבת הרב שבכתב, ק"ו זו שבעל פה. ראוי היה שתלמידיו המובהקים של הרב יטלו על עצמם עריכה מקיפה של תורת רבנו — איש ההלכה ואיש האמונה.

NOTES

- (1) תלפיות תש"ב.
 - (2) The Lonely Man of Faith, Tradition, vol. 7, No. 2 1965.
 - (3) הרב סולוביצקי זיכהו כבודך אגב במדה מסימת של שמחת היצירה. למלא חפנים משמחה זו זוכה איש ההלכה.
 - (4) בהערה ארוכה הרב סולוביצקי לועג מהתיאולוגים שציירו את הדת כמרגוע מזעם החיים, אין, לדבריו, לצייר דת ללא התלבטויות ומאבקים פנימיים.
 - (5) המחבר לא פיתח את השיטה המיתודית של איש ההלכה, וקבע מסמרות ששיטה זו פותחת במושגים המופשטים ומגיעה מהם לתכנים שבחיים הריאליים. הנחה זו צריכה לפני ולפנים, אם נטפל כשיטת למודם של חכמי המשנה והתלמוד, ניוכח שאמנם במקרים רבים המושג ההלכתי שנלמד מהפסוק הנדרש, הותאם לבעיה המעשית שעמדה לפני החכמים. אך במקרים רבים הנוהג היה הפוך, הדין היה ידוע לחכמים במסורת התורה שבעל פה והם ניסו למצוא בשכלם את הכלל ההלכתי והפסוקים שיכולים להסביר הלכה זו.
- בדרך הלמוד הישיבתי פותחים בשיטה האפוסטריורית, מעיינים בסוגיא ובודק אינוקטיביט מגיעים לכלל המופשט וממנו בחזרה לסוגיא הנלמדת. השלב השני הזה הוא אפריורי.
- כנראה שהמחבר החשיב לעיקר את השלב השני המתחיל בחק המופשט לעבר

- הסוגיות או שהתשיב את החלק הראשון שבמחקר הסוגיא, לשחזור בעלמא, אע"ס שמבחינת המאמץ של הלומה, שלב זה הוא עיקרי.
- 6) שמעתי כלל זה מהרב שליטי"א משם סבו ר' חיים איש בריסק.
- 7) זה כפסק ההלכה כנגד דרישות הקבלה.
- 8) כך פסקו מקובלים רבים.
- 9) כבר קנט הכריז שהכת המוסרי שבארם נותן בו כח ויכולת להתקים בעולם מבלי לאבד את עצמאותו הרוחנית.
- 10) השוה "משה" לאחד העם.
- 11) השוה הירש ב"חורב" שדרש כנגד הפלוג שבין בית הכנסת והחיים, את הפסוק "מי גם בכם ויטגור דלתיים ולא תאמרו מזבחי חנם". והציע ברטוריקה שלו לפסול את ההיכלות.
- 12) ההשוואה אינה נראית צודקת. שהרי אותן הדתות דורשות ממאמיניהן לשמור על אורחות המוסר גם בדרכי החיים, וסוטים מהדרך שפלגו את בית הכנסת והחיים היו גם אצלנו, אם לא כמו שאצלם.
- 13) השוה את הספור החסידי על הקוצקאי שאמר לו צדיק אחר: "אני עולה בתורתי עד לרקיע השביעי, וענהו הקוצקאי: "כשאני אומר תורה אני משפיל את עצמי כך שכל שבועת הרקיעים יורדים ומשתפלים אלי".
- 14) על הפסוק "ויאמר אלהים יהי אור" ברי א, ג. אומר הרמב"ן: "מלת אמירה בכאן להורות על החפץ בדרך מה תאמר נפשך ואעשה לך... כאשר רצה כי כן הוא הרצון לפניו"...
- אולי אפשר למצא כאן קשר לרעיון האמור של ר' חיים איש בריסק.
- 15) עיין במאמר The Sacred and the Profane שנדפס מחדש בגליון זה של גשר, שם הרב מסביר באריכות רעיון ברגסוני זה.
- 16) עיין במאמרו של א. י. השל: "ההאמין הרמב"ם שהגיע לבואה", ספר היובל ללוי גינובורג, החלק העברי. שם השל מנתח את התכונות שהרמב"ם מצריך לבואה ואת התכונות שהרמב"ם דורש מעובדי ה' ומוצא זהות רבה ביניהם.
- מלבד זאת, רב ספרי המוסר והמחשבה, מבטיחים להולכים בדרכיהם רוח"ק ובואה כשלב עליון בעבודת ה'. וזאת עושה כאן הרב סלוביניץ. עם זאת, הוא גוהר ומוסיף בהערה, שגם לרמב"ם קיימות מגבלות בכך.
- 17) אף על פי שפה ושם היו פוסקים שושענו בפסקי הלכותיהם על גלויים ממעל, כר יעקב ממרויש בעל "שאלות ותשובות מן השמים", והראב"ד בכמה מהשגותיו על הרמב"ם. המגמה שנזחה היתה שאין מבטלין הכרעות הלכתיות שהשכל מחייבן בפני גלויי שכינה. וכבר כתב הרמב"ן על הראב"ד "איננו משגיחין ברוה"ק שלו".
- 18) הדאר תשכ"ב J. Agus, Guideposts in Modern Judaism, עמ' 37-44.
- 19) שם עמ' 44.
- 20) שם עמ' 42.
- 21) עיין במאמרו של הרב הרצבורגר בספר היובל לרב אליהו יאנו כחלק האנגלי, שבו הוא מגן על "איש ההלכה" המתקפות י. אייגס.
- 22) הדאר, גליון ראש השנה, תשכ"ב.
- 23) מאמר ב"תורה ישראל וציון".
- 24) Confrontation, Tradition, vol. 6. No. 1 pp. 5-30, 1654. The Lonely Man of Faith, Tradition, vol. 7. No. 2 1965.
- 25) רב מתנגדי שיטות המקורות מסבירים את הספורים הכפולים שבבראשית, על ידי ההבחנה בין הפרטים השונים, אלא שלפי בעלי התעודות הבודלים אלו הם שנויי גירסאות בין המסורות השונות שבאות לומר אותו הדבר. ולפי האחרותיים, שינויים אלו מצדיקים את החזרה על הספור לתוספת ביאור, או לספר ספור אחר שלא נאמר מקודם לכן.
- 26) החל מחלק זה של המאמר משתמש הרב בטרמינולוגיה האקסיסטנציאליסטית הידועה, ביחוד מהספר "אני ואתה" למרטן בובר.
- 27) בכנס תשובה אחר שמעתי מהרב "כל הגדול מחברו כשלונו גדול הימנו".

- 28) בנקודה זו אפשר למצא סימוכין בפילוסופיה המשבר של סורן קירקגור.
- 29) אפשר לראות בכך תשובה לאיגס שזיהה את הנביא כמיסטיקן שטען שב"איש ההלכה" הרב הכניס את הנביא דרך הדלת האחורית לאחר שהוציא את המיסטיקאי דרך הדלת הקדמית. עם זאת, זוהי סטיה מסוימת גוססת ממחשבת "איש ההלכה" המבטיחה נבואה לכל.
- 30) בכך אפשר לראות סטיה מהקו שבאיש ההלכה המבטיח נבואה לאיש ההלכה המושלם. על פי מה שהסברתי לעיל זוהי סטיה מקו רבים מחכמי ימיהב"ו ובעלי מוסר וקבלה שהאמינו בנבואה בזה"ו דרך עבודת ה' מתאימה.
- 31) השוה לריון על הזמן במאמרים איש ההלכה ו-The Sacred and the Profane.
- 32) קבלת האר"י הרחיבה את הדבור אודות רשות הרבים ורשות היחיד. בעולם הזה אנו ברשות הרבים, ויחידות ה' אינה נראית בעולם מפוצל שחוקיות מוסרית אלהית היא ממנו והלאה. לעתיד לבא תשלט ההשגחה בתחומי "רשות היחיד", ולא ישרור יותר הפצל בין השגחה נסתרת ונגלית, הסתר פנים וגלוי אנפין.
- 33) זהו רעיון המשותף להוגי הדעות האקסיסטנציאליסטים הדתיים.
- 34) התניא שם משתדל לדחות אף פושעי ישראל מכלל אהבה זה.
- 35) למעשה גם התניא מגביל את "האהבה בתענוגים" המלאה של הבינוני לשעות ק"ש ותפלה.
- 36) פסיקתא ווסרתא, עקב, ח, ה.
- 37) מ"ת קיה, טז. ת' יתרו כ, טז.
- 38) מ"ת צד, ב. סנהדרין קא, א. מכ' יתרו כ, כ.
- 39) פסיקתא דרב כהנא, קעט, עב: מדרש תהלים טז, יב.
- 40) תורה מן השמים באספקלריה של הדורות עמ' 116-93. שם הוא צסט מאמרי חז"ל רבים הדנים בסוגיא זו.
- 41) עיין במאמר "מה דורך מדוד" שבו האריך הרב בסוגיא זו של בדידות, וחוסר היכולת של התמון להבנת הגדול האמיתי. גם שם הראיה היתה ממש בגודל לאהרן.
- 42) בתחילת ספר "האמונה והבטחון" (המיוחס לרמב"ן) נדרש הפסוק "שכן ארץ וראה אמונה" על עבודת ה' תוך פעילות בעולם העשייה.
- 43) באחת מדרשותיו בועזית המורח, דדש הרב על הפסוק "צא לשדה" ! צא לעולם הטכנולוגי והמדעי, גם הוא שלך, ואין לך ליעקב להסתפק באהלי שם ועבר. תכן דרשה זו תורגם לאנגלית על ידי הרב ש. ריסקין שליט"א.
- 44) עיין במאמרו של ג. חורגין בספר היובל לפרופסור ש. ק. מירסקי, שבו הוא הרחיב את הדבור על האתגר של ההומניזם המדעי לדת. ואפשר למצא ב"מאמיו הבודד" תשובה לכמה מהאתגרים הנ"ל.
- 45) השוה זאת למושג החסידהקבלי של קדוש קליפת נגה השולטת בעולם המעשה, שדרך קיום המצות ממלים חפצים חילוניים לקדושה, לדוגמא בתפילין מקדשים צור בהמה, וכ"ו.
- 46) Great Jewish Thinkers of the Twentieth Century, B'nai Brith Adult Education Series.
- 47) Judaism, vol. 15, No. 2, 1966, pp. 203-210.
- 48) איש ההלכה, עמ' 654-653.
- 49) השוה לתשובת מגדלסון ללוהר, כאשר האחרון דרש ממנו להגן על דתו או להתנצר.



ת"ד



BSW

כי כפי מה שיחסר לאדם
 ידיעות משארי החכמות, לעומת
 זה יחסרו לו מאה ידות לחכמת
 התורה, כי התורה והחכמה
 נצמדים יחד.



תשכו