

# The CLARION

YESHIVA'S EXCLUSIVE ADDRESS FOR POLITICAL NEWS AND VIEWS

◀ SPRING - FALL 2002 • סתיו תשס"ג - אביב תשס"ב ▶

Israel struck first at Iraq's nuclear program two decades ago.

A year after Islamists jolted the West into a clash of civilizations

## WILL WE 'FINISH' THE JOB?

- Benjamin Netanyahu on Toppling Saddam ◀
- Poverty as 'Violence' That Feeds Terrorism ◀
- Root of the Times's Mideast 'Slant' – An Old Rebbe? ◀
- Berlin: Our Strange – and Estranged? – Bedfellow ◀
- Media Bias, or Bias Against the Media? ◀
- America's Frum 'Most Influential' Citizen Speaks Out ◀
- Symposium: Religious Values in Secular Culture ◀

**Cover:** On June 7, 1981, Israel Air Force F-16s, escorted by F-15s, destroyed the French-built Osiraq nuclear reactor near Baghdad. Shown are (top) a pilot's view as he lined up the target on his screen, and (bottom) the view upon Operation Opera's successful execution. (LAF)

**Opposite page:** Background photos, from September 11<sup>th</sup>, show horrified Manhattan pedestrians watching the collapse of the World Trade Center (top), and (bottom) elated supporters of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. (New York Times)

**Page 16:** Hitler is saluted by the Reichstag (top). Photos (bottom) are of Jewish children who perished in the Holocaust.

**Page 17:** Then-Ambassador Daniel Bernard of France chatting with Britain's Queen Elizabeth II. Photos (bottom) are of Israeli children who have been killed during the current Palestinian intifada.

*Photos in this issue include those courtesy of: AP, Reuters, White House, State Department, Defense Department, Yeshiva University Department of Public Affairs, Prime Minister's Office (Israel), President's Residence (Israel), Netanyahu.com, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Yad Vashem, Simon Wiesenthal Center, Ha'aretz / International Herald Tribune, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations*



# The CLARION

JOURNAL OF THE J.P. DUNNER POLITICAL SCIENCE SOCIETY AT YESHIVA UNIVERSITY

SPRING - FALL 2002 • סתיו תשס"ב - אביב תשס"ג

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The CLARION, official journal of the J.P. Dunner Political Science Society, is celebrating over three decades as a premier undergraduate publication at Yeshiva University – America's oldest and most comprehensive educational institution under Jewish auspices and one of the leading research universities in the nation.

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*Views expressed herein are those of their authors, and do not necessarily reflect the position of Yeshiva University or the J.P. Dunner Political Science Society.*

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Though extensive efforts have been made to credit outside sources of material, should an error or oversight have occurred, please contact *The Clarion* and accept our apologies.

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*The Clarion* welcomes submissions of all types. However, due to the volume of material received, we regret our inability to acknowledge or return declined contributions.

One copy of *The Clarion*, published periodically and distributed throughout Yeshiva University, is offered free of charge. Additional copies may be purchased directly from *The Clarion*.

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**Editor's Notes:**

*The Clarion* wishes to thank **Dr. Jeremy Zilber** for serving in place of our consummate faculty advisor, **Dr. Ruth A. Bevan**, during her recent absence.

■  
*The Clarion* expresses its gratitude to the **Yeshiva College Student Association** and the **Yeshiva College Dean's Office** for their generous support.

■  
Due to logistic obstacles, planned interviews with Knesset Speaker **Avraham Burg**, Ambassador **Daniel Kurtzer** and Dr. **Sari Nusseibeh** will regrettably not appear in this issue of *The Clarion*. We look forward to their inclusion in the future.

■  
With format and focus always evolving in response to new times and technological abilities, as well as a constantly changing staff which inevitably results from a fluid student body, continued publication of *The Clarion* has always presented a formidable, if welcome, challenge.


The unprecedented events of the past year – let alone Yeshiva's presidential crisis and student budgetary constraints – have only made our work that much harder. *The Clarion* would thus like to take this opportunity to thank those who've helped us maintain our operations and quality, and our readers for their demonstrated loyalty and patience.

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**► INSIDE JOKE**

**SEEING DOUBLE?**

*Which one is the White House press secretary, Ari Fleischer, and which is a YC professor?*



*(Is it just us, or has Dr. Zilber's passion for American politics and the media seemed to have manifested itself even, well, physiologically?)*

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
► FIRST SHOT

# Welcome to the Era of Shattered Illusions

By DAVID J. MICHAELS

What a difference a year makes. It seems like a distant world, that time not too long ago when the biggest concern of American moms and dads was elbowing through the throngs to get their kids the latest Harry Potter book. George W. Bush – that born-again cowboy prone to frequent naps, bouts of public daydreaming, and the (very unintended) invention of new words – was mocked for having instituted “Jesus Day” and been quick to execute criminals as governor of Texas. Seeking to wrest lingering attention away from Florida’s butterfly ballots, this laidback new president actually kept his PR people busy dispatching tirades against the White House’s previous inhabitants, whose apparent last acts in office were pranks like removing the all-important “W” button off of keyboards at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

People like me were easily enthralled with smooth, charismatic political virtuosos (à la Clinton, Netanyahu) – irrespective of their propensity for inconsistent policy or scandalous behavior – and were presumptuously dismissive of salt-of-the-earth folks like Dubya and that old *sabra* “bulldozer”



Our Editor worked in former President Bill Clinton’s office last summer

named Arik, who could “only” boast of principles and ethical clarity. In the name of worldly open-mindedness, an editor of a journal such as this might have used his platform to herald a new globalized world of tolerance, prosperity and peace – and would certainly have tried to play down narrow “Jewish” issues like antisemitism and the continuing assault on Israel.



A younger David Michaels with Sharon back when he was still a “hawk’s hawk”

Back then, box cutters were allowed on planes, nuclear power plants and water sources were largely unprotected, and anthrax inspired dread only because of a heavy metal band by that name. Civil liberties were considered so sacrosanct that while any number of vile

things could be uttered or promoted on TV, a public suggestion of “racial profiling” would have left us utterly revolted. Having managed to alienate many blacks, Arabs, Hispanics, liberals, panhandlers, squeegee people and Mets fans alike – and publicly embroiled in an ugly marital conflict – Rudy Giuliani was not an uncontroversial mayor, much less so a venerated hero worthy of knighthood, international acclaim and \$200,000 speaking fees.



Rudy Giuliani, George Pataki and Mike Bloomberg embrace Sharon during their solidarity mission to Jerusalem last year

American Jewish loyalty to the Democratic Party was so impregnable that you’d think it was mandated by an Eleventh Commandment, and many of us remained giddy over the thought of having “one of ours,” Joe Lieberman, a step away from the Oval Office.



The day Al Gore selected Lieberman as his running mate was billed as “miraculous” by many American Jews

Finally, pretty much the whole world had convinced itself – despite Muslim fanaticism’s having long been spreading like wildfire from Kashmir to Chechnya, Nigeria to the Philippines, Afghanistan to Indonesia – that Arab terrorism could be contained to Israel, and that Islamist militancy was thus “their” problem, maybe even somehow “their” fault.

Well, as you know, things have changed a bit. A stunning Israeli offer to divide Jerusalem was rewarded with brutal *jihad*. A year ago, planes crashed through Americans’ illusion of sheer




9/11/01: “A day that shall live in infamy”



invincibility. President Bush – heeding the Biblical directive to determinedly pursue justice – has made the long overdue statement that there is no “good” terrorism and “bad” terrorism, and more importantly, he’s doing something about it. Bush’s moral compass led him to reject “the ancient evil of antisemitism, whether it is practiced by the killers of Daniel Pearl or by those who burn synagogues in France,” and (though there’s something to the assertion by Senators Bob Graham and Richard Shelby that Iran-sponsored Hizbullah might be a more urgent target) is now appropriately setting our sights upon the Butcher of Baghdad himself. And, for his part, in governing Prime Minister Sharon has shown remarkable conviction, moderation (in contrast with *true* Likudniks like Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld) and political savvy alike.



Sharon with Vice President Cheney in Jerusalem (top), and the prime minister being welcomed by President Bush during one of the Israeli's seven visits to the White House since becoming premier



At the same time, not everyone has been shaken out of what is, at best, a very stubborn naïveté. Even after we watched, from Amsterdam Avenue, citizens of some 80 nations being felled along with the Twin Towers on September 11<sup>th</sup>, Americans, Australians, Britons, Germans and Frenchmen have been attacked in Pakistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen, respectively. (And, as we go to press, it appears that al-Qaeda has now attacked Israelis in Kenya). Labor’s



Netanyahu agreed to serve as foreign minister only if his party head – the sitting chief executive – agreed to end his term with early elections, thus making him and Sharon an odd couple indeed

Benjamin Ben-Eliezer undermined Israel’s morale and strategic unity with his incredibly foolish retreat from Sharon’s coalition, and Bibi has similarly displayed an arrogant self-promotion that is simply disgraceful. As if Palestinian propagandists like Edward Said, Hanan Ashrawi, James Zogby and Saeb Erekat weren’t enough to contend with, we Jews have produced the likes of Yossi Beilin, Meron Benevenisti, Amos Oz, A.B. Yehoshua, Michael Lerner and (British parliamentarian) Gerald Kaufman.

Antisemitism (increasingly without the classic mask of “anti-Zionism”) has come to unite extreme leftists and rightists, white supremacists and Islamic radicals, UN bureaucrats and human rights activists, anti-globalists and “progressive” intellectuals. Forget the culture of hate pervading the Arab world; we need only look to enlightened Europe to find *shul* burnings (France), war crimes trials (Belgium), economic boycotts (Scandinavia), genocide accusations (Switzerland), academic divestment campaigns (Britain), media incitement (Spain), and harassment of diplomats (Greece).



Shimon Peres with the EU's Javier Solana

Whether in New York, Durban or southern Lebanon, the UN has been effectively hijacked by the Arab-dominated Non-Aligned Movement into serving as a tool for relentless, high-profile molestation of Israel. With the Nobel Prize club having become a home to




On October 21, at the Karkur junction in northern Israel, yet another bus of commuters was incinerated

unsavory characters like Arafat and his apologists (including Kofi Annan, Jose Saramago and our own Jimmy Carter), it’s no wonder the Swedes and Norwegians need to pay off award takers with some \$1 million.

Things are so dire that even mainstream watchdogs like Abe Foxman and Simon Wiesenthal say that antisemitism has reached pre-Holocaust levels. Elie Wiesel, seen by many as the voice of the Auschwitz generation, said simply, “For the first time since 1945, I am scared [for the Jewish people].” For gosh sakes, our *staunchest* allies are Evangelical Christians anticipating – if not actually hoping to hasten – our collective conversion or

annihilation in a bloody apocalypse that is to envelop the Holy Land. But, after all, beggars can't be choosers!

Still, if only not to give birth to self-fulfilling prophecies, we mustn't slide back into our ghettos, resigned to a simplistic, paranoid, "fait accompli" view of the world. Knowing when to utilize soundbites and when to engage in lengthy history lessons (much in the spirit of Abba Eban, whose stirring oratory was such an asset for Israel), we have to convince others by persuasion and can't allow ourselves to go around hysterically blasting everyone as an enemy. Whether it's with Germany (long recognized by Israelis, but not American Jews, as our best friend in an increasingly powerful EU), Turkey, India, the Netherlands, Romania, the Czech Republic, Uzbekistan, Italy, or even Morocco and Jordan, we have to lobby, recognize and *acknowledge* expressions of sympathy, and, above all, cultivate mutually-beneficial partnerships.



President Bush, in 2001, celebrated Chanukah at the White House

We have to better understand and master the media – which is more often plagued with ignorance and carelessness than with intentional bias – and look at it with greater sophistication. Even aside from pro-Israel journalists like Alan Keyes, A.M. Rosenthal, George Will and Charles Krauthammer, it's time to recognize that the American press (at least in editorials) is, compared to its counterparts around the world, generally fair and sympathetic. Based on level of influence and frequency of inaccurate or slanted reporting, we have to prioritize our media "targets" and see them in greater perspective. Fact is, sensitive observers can discern over time that, as a whole, the *New York Times* is better than the *Washington Post*, CBS and NBC are more professional than ABC, the




Muhammad al-Dura's televised killing was used to hurt Israel's image internationally

Associated Press is less sloppy than Reuters and AFP, CNN is less skewed than the BBC, and while the *Wall Street Journal*, FOX News and MSNBC are quite good, the coverage in *USA Today*, *Newsweek*, *Time* and NPR is admittedly often abysmal. Our criticism has to always

be calm, collected, specified and constructive – or it will do much more harm than good.

We have to promote Israel based on the facts; we have to show it for what it is: not only a vibrant outpost of




Israel's interception of an illegal arms ship en route to Gaza, Karine-A, dealt Arafat's credibility a new blow with Western leaders

democracy, innovation and tenacity, but – perhaps more importantly – the Mideast's *real* underdog. We have to keep hitting home the message that Arafat is a corrupt tyrant and terrorist

agitator who proved at Camp David that he won't even take "yes" for an answer. We have to acknowledge Arabs' and Muslims' legitimate grievances – even as those are mostly the fault of their autocratic dictators and theocratic regimes.

We have to question the double standard not only applied to Israel vis-à-vis its enemies, but also the wildly disproportionate focus



15-month-old Ariel Yered, with father at his bedside in April, became one of hundreds of "settlers" who have sustained critical injuries in shooting, bombing and mortar attacks

on this particular conflict when so many far bloodier wars have taken place in the region and are now occurring in other parts of the world. We have to make unquestionably clear that – as Israel has been besieged since 2000, and was certainly besieged before 1967 –


Jewish settlements, even aside from their historic legitimacy and strategic importance, clearly can't be made "the problem." As for complaints about defensive measures like checkpoints – funny, but I recently flew to Seattle, and neither I nor any of my fellow passengers (members, notably, of the community attacked, not the one attacking) decried as "humiliation" the inconvenient (and often



American special envoy Anthony Zinni confers with a besieged Yasser Arafat

intrusive) three-hour pre-flight security checks we all had to undergo, and I've heard no moans of "collective punishment" even from daily NY-to-DC commuters, who are no longer allowed so much as use of restrooms during their flight. Don't get me wrong: I can understand Palestinian annoyance over the ongoing Israeli presence within their territories, but such military administration is a direct and necessary result of the real *psychological* occupation still maintained by terrorists over Israeli civilians from Eilat to Metulla.

We have to dispel misimpressions created by greater casualty figures (which usually don't include, for reasons beyond me, all the attacks on Israeli civilians from the Oslo accords' signing in 1993 until the start of current onslaught) on the Palestinian side by pointing to the fact that, unlike the Arabs' death toll, the Israelis' losses have been overwhelmingly comprised of women, children and other noncombatants. We need to contrast Israel's incredible morality and restraint with the crushing anti-guerilla tactics of Russia and the US, the rampant xenophobia facing Muslims in France, and the uncompromising position against militants maintained by Britain. We have to highlight the absurdity of Israel being judged by merciless Third World brutes or, for that matter, by Benelux humanists who have no conception of watching their cafés, hotels, shopping malls, and school buses being blown up for half a century.



A 9/11-inspired El Al hijacking was foiled this month, as was an earlier Palestinian plot to blow up Tel Aviv's Azrieli Center (above)

Also, aside from directly advocating Israel's positions, there are other ways we can bolster the Jewish state. Initiatives worthy of support include the promotion of American oil independence (via domestic drilling or energy-efficient vehicles), advancement of 856,000 former Arab-Jewish refugees' neglected legal rights, endorsement of admitting allies into groups such as the EU and NATO, support for other nations' struggles against terror groups, and helping to better mobilize Jewish communities



European Jewish groups are slowly becoming more vocal, with demonstration in London, Paris and Brussels (above)

abroad (in particular, those of Europe).



Sharon at his residence with visiting Secretary of State Colin Powell

Like most Israelis (as noted by respected writer Yossi Klein Halevi), even as I am newly "hawkish" on fighting terror, I remain "dovish" in expecting that Israel will, ultimately, still have to make very painful sacrifices for

peace. That having been said, however, now is clearly *not* the time for further Israeli concessions and negotiations, which would undoubtedly do much more to push off peace than to secure it. Right now, terrorism must be fought and defeated – on all fronts. Ending mass-murder is not, or should not be, a partisan cause. Overly "cautious" liberals (and, of course, perennially shortsighted opportunist Jacques Chirac) should be reminded of the words of Dante, who said that "the hottest places in hell are reserved for those who, in a time of moral crisis, maintain their neutrality." They should remember the German Pastor Martin Niemöller, who bravely warned during World War II that those who idly allow an injustice to be perpetrated against one group will ultimately fall victim to the same fate. No less, they should heed the timeless Talmudic teaching that, indeed, "he who is merciful to the cruel is destined to be cruel to the merciful."



The brutal Ramallah lynching of two Israeli reservists (above) and the destruction of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus evidenced the extent of popular Palestinian rage






Finally, just as we support Israel, we must let President Bush know that should he stay course, our backing and gratitude for him will be unwavering – now *and* in 2004. The president should be empowered to follow his proven moral intuition and, though alliances can be important, he must be ready to act alone if necessary – much like our father *Avraham* had to overcome a whole world of opposition when he alone came to recognize the one G-d, and similarly reminiscent of when lone Blue-and-White jets took Saddam's Osiraq nuclear reactor out of commission (to global condemnation) in 1981. President Bush has made unprecedented strides in recognizing and combating the evil that is terrorism – and if history has taught us anything, it is that evil cannot be appeased, and certainly must not ever be ignored.




Bush as photographed on the first anniversary of September 11

On a much more local level, we've seen a lot of "politics" on campus recently. In particular, the utterly pathetic YU presidential search has exposed just how dangerously far we, at Yeshiva, have collectively strayed from our original path. Rather than faithfully blending Torah Judaism with the best of general knowledge and culture, we have become a bipolarized community, absorbing a lot of rubbish that filters in from *both* the so-called *charedi* camp and the secular



Rabbi Warhaftig helped hundreds of Mir yeshiva students escape to Shanghai during the Holocaust, and was a signatory to Israel's Declaration of Independence

world, respectively. We've understandably been preoccupied with things like frequent FBI warnings that another "spectacular" terrorist attack may occur at any time. But whether demonstrated by remembering our homeland after endless exile, or clandestinely studying Torah even in the Warsaw ghetto, or refusing to leave the side of a disabled friend in a crumbling Tower One (as did a *heilige Yid* named Abe Zalmanowitz on 9/11) – Jews have singularly known that life, and the communal responsibilities inherited with it, goes on.



Rabbi Soloveichik's role was crucial after his renowned brother, "the Rav," died in 1993

On that note, I think it's fitting to remember here two leaders – giants in Torah *and* engagement in the modern world, particularly political activism – whom our community has recently lost: *Moreinu bargaon haRav* Ahron Soloveichik, our saintly *rosh yeshiva*, and Dr. Zerach Warhaftig, who unassumingly contributed so much to the creation and spiritual development of the State of Israel. I had the special privilege to meet both these great men, but consider it a profound personal failure that I did not actively draw myself closer to them. As Orthodox flagships like YU (and the Mizrahi, which was intended to serve as a bridge, not a fringe) increasingly fail the rest of *am Yisrael* – and thus ultimately themselves – may the memories of these towering (and often unappreciated) figures be for a blessing, and, even more so, a very urgent inspiration. ■

*Dovid Michaels*, the J.P. Dunner Political Science Society's new president, served as Editor-in-Chief of the 2002 issue

אבסוכו אא קבני אלסין אבסוכו אא אא קאמא הנל אאוי.  
 אא אאוי הנל, יאיר אנכר אאוא ויאא אאמא, אאמא!  
 קבוכה אא אבם ואלל אאמא –

► WORDS OF WISDOM

**“To Laugh, or To Cry?”**

*With religion-inspired violence and the fight against terrorism stoking what increasingly resembles a clash of civilizations, here is a compilation of particularly thought-provoking quotes from public figures and the international media*

**"I think Muhammad was a terrorist."**


- Evangelist **Jerry Falwell**, talking about Islam's founder on CBS's "60 Minutes." Falwell's comments provoked widespread denunciations and Muslim demonstrations abroad (*Newsweek*)

**"Bush says he wants 'regime change' in Palestine, he wants to oust Arafat, now in Iraq, and he wants to oust Saddam. The Axis projects Iran next and then North Korea. What is this, an updated version of 1984 or an American version of Hitler's and Bush I's New World Order?"**

- New Jersey poet laureate **Amiri Baraka**, responding defiantly to calls for his resignation after publicly reading his "Somebody Blew Up America." The controversial poem includes a phrase, "Who Told 4,000 Israeli workers at the Twin Towers/ To stay home that day?/ Why did Sharon stay away?" (*New York Times*)

**"I have always... been put off by those who heard the sound of breaking glass, in every insult or slight, and conjured up images of Hitler's Kristallnacht at any disagreement with Israel... But I have to say that while they still seem to me unwarranted, they seem rather less alarmist in the world of today than they did a year ago."**

- Harvard President **Lawrence H. Summers** publicly decrying the emergence of antisemitism in "progressive intellectual communities" (*New York Times*)



*Déjà vu? Mourning for destroyed Torah scrolls of the Marseille synagogue burnt down in March (AP)*

**"I told him, 'If you catch this guy Bin Laden, I would like to be the one to execute him'... I am sure he thought I was just speaking rhetorically, but I was serious. Bin Laden had attacked my city, and as its mayor I had the strong feeling that I was the most appropriate person to do it."**

- Former New York Mayor **Rudolph Giuliani**, recalling in his new book, *Leadership*, how he responded when President Bush asked, three days after September 11<sup>th</sup>, "What can I do for you?" (*Daily News*)

**"...When I see the racism in this cartoon booklet, of the Arab Lawyers' Union, I must say that I am a Jew - for those victims are hurting. I know that you people will not understand easily, but you are my friends... and I will not accept this fractiousness to torpedo the conference."**

- UN High Commissioner **Mary Robinson**, expressing rare solidarity with targets of anti-Zionist hostility at the 2001 World Conference Against Racism held in Durban, South Africa (*Jerusalem Post*)

**"Right now, aren't the Israelis and the Palestinians both terrorizing each other?"**

- AOL Time Warner vice chairman and CNN founder **Ted Turner** in remarks to the *Guardian* which drew heavy protest and a clarification by the media mogul (CNN)

**"How about Jesus? That's another good Spanish name. They wouldn't name a hurricane Jesus, would they? If there were a headline that said 'Jesus hits Philippines,' a lot of people would be upset."**

- Anti-Defamation League chairman **Abraham Foxman** reacting to plans to name a 2001 hurricane "Israel." Max Mayfield, director of the National Hurricane Center in Miami and chairman of the UN's hurricane naming committee, argued, "We have four billion people on the planet, and [only one has expressed] a concern about the name Israel." He called Israel "a good Spanish name." (*Jerusalem Post*)

**"I always see two Jewish communities in America. One of deep intellect and one of shallow, superficial intellect."**

- House Republican leader, **Dick Arney**, distinguishing between liberals and conservatives, at meeting with Jewish leaders in Florida (*Time*)

**"After all, this is the guy who tried to kill my dad."**

- President **George W. Bush** adding, in a Houston speech, a personal element to his enmity towards Saddam Hussein (CNN)

**"I see this as something which reminds me of the Book of Exodus, where the Egyptians tried to beat into submission the Israelites, but Moses fought against it. Marwan reminds me of Moses."**

- **Shamai Leibowitz**, Orthodox Jewish grandson of controversial Israeli philosopher Yeshaya Leibowitz, on why he has joined the defense team of intifada leader and Fatah head Barghouti (*Ha'aretz*)

**"[Marwan Barghouti should be] taken into a field and shot in the head... [If it were up to me, Yasser] Arafat would be dead in 15 minutes, along with all of his gang."**

- Comments NRP head and infrastructures minister, Brig.-Gen. (res.) **Effi Eitam**, was reported to have made at a Tel Aviv synagogue (*Ma'ariv*)



Freedom fighter or terrorist ringleader? Barghouti while a free man (AP)

"I regard the current situation as... forcing Israel into postures that are incompatible in the long run with our deepest ideals... This kind of prolonged conflict, together with the absence of hope, generates hatreds and insensitivities that in the long run are corrupting to a culture."

- British Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, in comments to the *Guardian* which some Jews decried as contributing to "anti-Israel propaganda" in Europe (*Guardian*)



"Five bucks on..." Sizing up each of the contenders' strengths, The Daily News surmised:

Bush — Can outrun him.

Saddam — Has three doubles, so you're not sure whom you're chasing."

"A president against a president and vice president against a vice president, and a duel takes place... and in this way we are saving the American and the Iraqi people"

- Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan, apparently suggesting a Bush-Saddam spar - with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a referee - as a method of solving the American dispute with Baghdad (AP)

**"Stop saying that there is antisemitism in France. There is no antisemitism in France and, moreover, there are no antisemites in France."**

- French President Jacques Chirac to Olivier Guland, editor of the French Jewish newspaper, *Tribune Juif*. Chirac went on to label as "rumors" Guland's list of several fresh antisemitic bombings in the Paris area alone. (Israel National News)

ANNEE 2000	
Type d'acte	Nombre
Agression physique	15
Alerte à la bombe	1
Cambriolage	1
Cocktail molotov	17
Courrier	59
Distribution publique	4
Graffiti	18
Incendie	8
Insultes	12
Intrusion menaçante	4
Jets d'objets et gaz	16
Menace	31
Profanation	2
Saccage	6
Tentative d'incendie	2
	196

*See no evil? The French Jewish community's tally of hostile incidents in 2000, mostly from the last few months of the year alone.* (CRIF)

**"If Iraq came across the Jordan River, I would grab a rifle and get in the trench and fight and die."**

- Former President Bill Clinton, at a Toronto Hadassah/WIZO event, pledging to personally defend Israel (*New York Post*)

**"...Neither [George W.] Bush nor [British Prime Minister] Tony Blair has provided any evidence that such [Iraqi] weapons [of mass destruction] exist. But what we know is that Israel has weapons of mass destruction... Why should there be one standard for one country, especially because it is black, and another one for another country, Israel, that is white?"**

- Former South African president Nelson Mandela apparently theorizing that racism inspires hypocrisy in Western foreign policy (*Newsweek*)

**"The residents would be given 24 hours to leave, and then troops will come in and bulldoze all of the buildings... The point is to make the automatic destruction of the village the fault of the Palestinian terrorists who had advance warnings of the specific consequences of their action."**

- Harvard law professor Alan M. Dershowitz, proposing that Israel institute a policy of destroying a pre-determined terrorist-harboring town in response to each new Palestinian suicide bombing (*Jerusalem Post*)

**"No, there is no ban whatsoever. Certainly not on inter-racial. And not on inter-religious."**

- Then-vice presidential candidate and self-described "observant Jew," Senator Joe Lieberman, answering radio talk-show host Don Imus's question as to whether Judaism prohibits "inter-racial or inter-religious marriage or dating." (*Jewish Week*)





*'Nuff said! Lieberman was accused of backtracking on issues like school vouchers, the Middle East and Hollywood morality*

**"A monstrous war crime that Israel has tried to cover up for a fortnight has finally been exposed... The sweet and ghastly reek of rotting human bodies is everywhere, evidence that it is a human tomb. The people, who spent days hiding in basements crowded into single rooms as the rockets pounded in, say there are hundreds of corpses, entombed beneath the dust, under a field of debris, criss-crossed with tank and bulldozer treadmarks... Israel was still trying to conceal these scenes yesterday... As the evening hush fell over these killing fields, we could suddenly hear the children chattering. The mosques, once so noisy at prayer time, were silent."**

- A description of the post-battle Jenin refugee camp by Phil Reeves of the *Independent*, on April 16, 2002. After a United Nations report confirmed that no IDF massacre or mass burial took place in Jenin, Reeves finally wrote that "even journalists have to admit they're wrong sometimes," on August 3



*When this truck (above) blew up in Jerusalem on Yom Kippur last year, Israeli officials suspected PLO involvement. "That really hurt that they would just think that right off the bat," [Faisal] al Hamad said.*

- Photo and caption to "Crazed Palestinian Gunman Angered By Stereotypes," in the *Onion*, a satirical newspaper

**"This [Jewish media] stranglehold has got to be broken or this country's going down the drain... They [Jews] swarm around me and are friendly to me. Because they know that I am friendly to Israel and so forth. But they don't know how I really feel about what they're doing to this country, and I have no power and no way to handle them."**


- Tape-recorded remarks by Southern Baptist leader Billy Graham to former President Richard Nixon in 1972. Graham claimed no recollection of the private conversation, but apologized to Jews with whom he said he "sought to build bridges" throughout his career. (*Forward*)

**"The people of this great nation are not fooled by Yasser Arafat and the con artists he employs on American television. Americans know that Yasser Arafat is nothing more than Osama bin Laden with good PR."**

- Former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressing the mass "We Stand With Israel" April rally in Washington (JTA)

**I find it shameful that *I'Oservatore Romano*, that is, the newspaper of... a pope who not too long ago left a note in the Wailing Wall apologizing to the Jews — accused a people exterminated by the millions by Christians, by Europeans, of extermination. I find it shameful that the survivors of this (Jewish) people — people who still carry a number on their arm — are denied the right to react, defend themselves, avoid being exterminated again, by that same newspaper... I find it shameful that [our priests] choose the side of the very people who launched terrorism by killing us on planes, in airports, at the Olympics; and today these same people make sport of killing Western journalists — shooting them, kidnapping them, slitting their throats, beheading them... With the Israelis, I've argued often and bitterly, and in the past I defended the Palestinians quite a bit, maybe more than they deserved. But I am with Israel, I am with the Jews... And even if all the inhabitants of this planet think differently, I will continue to think this way.**

- Journalist Oriana Fallaci writing on European hostility towards Israel in the Italian news magazine, *Panorama* (David Harris/AJC)



*Going backwards? Pope John Paul II placing a note in the Western Wall during his 2000 visit to Israel*

► R E T R O S P E C T

## As The Clarion Goes On, A Look Back


The Clarion is unique among the various publications at Yeshiva University. New times bring fluctuating budget limitations, technological methods and staff leanings, all of which have had an indelible impact. While The Clarion's format, style and focus have changed often, its singular professionalism, breadth and quality – and, of course, Dr. Ruth Bevan's guidance – have remained consistent. Admittedly notorious for its erratic printing schedule, it has nonetheless withstood the test of time. One thing is quite clear: There has never been

a shortage of people inquiring about when The Clarion will "finally" come out

– even if among those are undoubtedly eager contributors to its pages, nearing graduation. In any event, to our veteran fans and our first-time readers alike, we welcome you to take a stroll down with us down memory lane...

The following sampling of Clarion covers are from the past fifteen years. They range in staff, sponsorship and funding – though most issues were put out by Yeshiva College students, some were collaborative efforts and one was released exclusively by Stern College's J.P. Dunner Political Science Society. Note The Clarion's progression from magazine in 1988 to newsletter in 1989 to journal in the mid-90's. As you can see, we have aimed for the best of all worlds, incorporating in our periodical, photographs and features that might be found in a popular newsmagazine along with essays and studies that would have fit well into a classic academic publication. Though we can only print a handful of covers here, we urge you to dig through archives of old Clarions. From communism to terrorism, Afghanistan to Europe to the Mideast, and Qaddafi to Clinton, you'll be sure to find some very good reading made all the more fascinating by your ability to look back on how dramatically some things have changed, even as others have stayed very much the same...





Y.U. CLARION

# The Y.U. Clarion

Yeshiva University Political Science Monthly Vol.1 No.2 December 1989

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## The Future Of A Jewel

by David Sheffey

Islands, for the most part, are not often known as economic boom towns or financial trend setters. Perhaps the one exception that comes to mind, is Japan. Not to be underestimated, however, is the island of Hong-Kong.

Hong Kong is currently classified as a British Crown Colony. With the termination of Britians 99 year lease

## Africa -- Grown Up?

by Segal Magorin

Israel, independent since 1948, was still in its pioneering phase when black Africa gained independence. Nonetheless, Israel's infinitesimal compared to Russia and the United States, sent hundreds of trainers and technicians to assist Africans in their struggle for progress and development. The 1960's in particular were the height of African-Israeli cooperation. Israelis worked modestly and side by side with the African people rather than merely providing advise. With 30 embassies in Africa, it is no doubt that Israel's presence was a recognized and respected force.

In the early 1970's, 30 African nations broke off their relations with Israel, and Israel was sent packing. Regardless, Israelis who gained the respect of Africans during the "golden period" left a very positive

*Continued on page 2.*

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## Famed Phantom of Terrorism

by Karen Prusansky

Abu Nidal, Abu Iyad, Abul Abbas, Yabba dabba doo', Abu Musa, and Abu Bakar are all word jumbles with little significance to some, while to others they are an intrinsic part of everyday conversation. I do not wish to compare Fred Flinstone with Abu Iyad, rather I want to discuss Sabri Al-Banna better known as Abu Nidal (Father of Struggle). Abu Nidal, the

deranged leader of the Fatah Revolutionary Council, is responsible for the murders of over 500 people, and claims these deaths as his 'achievements'. Throughout the abysmal underworld of terrorism, Abu Nidal ranks, amongst his rivals, as most treacherous and vicious.




The Fatah Revolutionary Council was created in 1974 under the leadership of Abu Nidal, after he split from Yasir Arafat's Fatah wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Since then there has been war between Abu Nidal and Arafat. Yasir

*Continued on page 12.*


**INSIDE HIGHLIGHTS**

- Update Berlin
- Interview: Abbanhan Banno






▶ FLASHBACK



“Today I want to be a prophet again. If international finance Jewry... should succeed once more in plunging the peoples into a world war, then the consequence will be not... a victory of Jewry, but... the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe!”

- German Reichsführer, ADOLF HITLER, 1939

*die Vernichtung der jüdischen Rasse in Europa!*



*international*



*finance*



*jewry*



**those who choose not to learn from history**





**“Why should the world be in danger of World War Three because of those people... that [expletive] little country, Israel”**

- French Ambassador to Britain, DANIEL BERNARD, 2001

*ce petit pays merdeux Israël*



*those*



*people*


**will be doomed to repeat it**



## ▶ INTERVIEW

**Malcolm Hoenlein, A Frum Voice for Jewish America**

We sat down with Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, at the beginning of the year to discuss a whole range of topics on the minds of Jews worldwide. In recent years, controversy surrounding the 53-member Presidents' Conference has emerged about issues such as the need for, or relevance of, such an umbrella organization; whether all of its member groups meet uniform criteria for "major" operations and a "national" orientation; and whether the Conference's chairman (now media mogul Mort Zuckerman) and executive (Hoenlein) have too much leeway to present their own often conservative views as the consensus position of the Jewish community at large.



With his broad knowledge, conviction, and often blunt style, Hoenlein didn't disappoint. It remains a bit of an anomaly that the ranking American Jewish professional leader, who was dubbed in the *Forward* by an unnamed diplomat as "the most influential private citizen on American foreign policy-making" is, in fact, a yarmulke-wearing, politically right-of-center Jew living in Flatbush, the Orthodox enclave in Brooklyn. Though his very role in a forum incorporating the flagship agencies of Jewish streams ranging from Reconstructionist to Orthodox – but not Agudath Israel – is telling, when asked if he subscribes to YU's philosophy of *Torah u'Madda*, Hoenlein – of *yekke* ancestry – opts for the Hirschian *Torah im Derech Eretz*.

Before being elected to his current fulltime position in 1986, Hoenlein was the founding executive director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York, and the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry, respectively. He received his B.A. in political science from Temple University and his Masters degree from the University of Pennsylvania's international relations department, where he completed his doctoral course work. A national defense fellow at Penn's Near East Center, Hoenlein taught in the political science department and served as a Middle East specialist at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. In addition, he served on the editorial staff of ORBIS, the Journal of International Affairs. A recipient of numerous awards, including the Private Sector Initiative Award from President Ronald Reagan in 1983, Hoenlein has written and traveled extensively, and serves on the boards of many communal, educational, business and civic organizations.

- [Let's begin] with a little bit of a background, [and] let Yeshiva students get oriented with your upbringing, your education, how you've gotten to this point in Jewish service.

Uh, I don't know, I ask myself the same thing, how I got here. Let's see, I was born in Philadelphia... and I was a child of people who survived Nazi Europe, came from Germany. My grandparents perished during the Holocaust; the Holocaust has been a profound factor in my choice of professional careers, in my commitment to Jewish security. **I went to day school and to the Yeshiva of Philadelphia...**

I was also very active in the early days of the Soviet Jewry movement, in the early 60s, that's why I organized a Philadelphia Union of Jewish Students. I became the first chairman of the North American Union of Jewish Students. I was involved with Young Israel, with Hillel, with many other activities. And I also began my political activities at a very early age, [believing] from early on... that [such activism] was key to the protection of the rights of Jews [in] the future, [and] in the future that

**Jews could not be placed in a position where they would... not have some say over their own fate.** And certainly the State of Israel was an important factor in that, changing the thinking of our generation; the Soviet Jewry movement, which I was privileged to play an important role in [was important]. I came to New York – previously I had worked for the Jewish community in Philadelphia, in charge of their international youth, its religious and other programs... – to be the head of the Conference on Soviet Jewry in New York and organized the first Solidarity Day and other activities. And I had the privilege to visit Russia the year before...

After that... in 1976, I became the first executive of the JCRC, which had been formed after many years of attempts and efforts, and a lot of groundwork had been done to create a central body that a lot of national agencies and others had opposed because they feared [it might] impinge on the national agencies which were largely based here. We started in 1976 and I left in 1986, with a very substantial agency... that had done many pioneering things: We started the first task force to deal

with missionaries... We did the first voter registration drives. We did the first missions [with] congressmen in an organized way... I think we broke the ground, we did a lot in the area of intergroup relations, with Hispanics, Chinese and other groups. **We also did the rally when Arafat came to the UN, with a quarter of a million people;** we did many things within those ten years that I think continue to have significance today. [The JCRC] is reaching its twenty-fifth anniversary soon.

And then in 1986, I was invited [here] – my predecessor here [at the Presidents' Conference] died... I think we've helped to [advance] the Conference[s]... agenda, and to deal with international and national issues of concern to the Jewish community; we don't domestic or political issues, as you well know.

*- Alon Pinkas, the consul-general of Israel in New York, he was quoted – or there was a [Ha'aretz] report of a telegram that he sent to his superiors at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, implying that [there has been] too much focus by Jerusalem on meetings, on so-called "bagels-and-lox" meetings, of American Jewish organizations in New York... That rather they should put more of their resources into attracting the media [instead of] the [Jewish] establishment –*

No, that's not what he said. He said, [they should be also] going out to other communities, going to smaller Jewish communities.

*- [Actually, the report did claim that the Conference was referred to], and I believe he also mentioned that they should be sending representatives out to mainstream, to middle America... And the question is, what do you see as the role of the Conference of Presidents today, what do you see as the priorities of the Conference of Presidents?*

One has nothing to do with the other. What he was doing, **in a facetious comment** – and he wrote us a letter, in fact, and wrote a letter to the paper to make clear that his reference was not to the Conference, and that he thought it was important for the people to come here, but also to go elsewhere – that was the week we had a large concentration of ministers here. His reference to "bagels and lox" I think was ADL, so you better check the quote before you use it. I don't think the quote has anything to do with the Conference... but I do believe that it is important for those who come to visit the United States to get out to visit other communities and for the greatest number of members of our community and the general public to be exposed to Israel's message.

*- I think he mentioned specifically [targeting, for example,] the FOX News network, and that some of these networks alone reach*

*millions of viewers... Anyhow,] in terms of the priorities of the Conference...?*

Look, I think the Conference was established to deal with the question of strengthening the US-Israel relationship, to deal with the major Jewish communities, and those other national and international concerns that would range from the war on terrorism - where we played an upfront role, especially in dealing with Islamist fundamentalism, for almost a decade.

The Conference visited Uzbekistan back in the mid-90's when **no one understood why**, and we specifically said because these are the moderate states that would be on the front line in the battle against Islamist fundamentalism. We work constantly on the issue of



Hoenlein and other leaders met Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal al-Saud

strengthening the ties – at the executive, congressional and other levels – between America and Israel, and trying to serve not as messengers for either government, but... communicating the issues of the American people, to work with the media, to work with the business community and others who impact policy.

We work with the United Nations on Israel-related as well as other issues, and then countries' specific things, like the **crisis in Argentina now or the "Iran Nine,"** where we coordinated the effort. Or Jews who are in danger in Europe, and that's why we're

convening in London as we did in Berlin, to try and help the Jewish communities of Europe face the challenges... both [regarding] the common agenda we have with the EU emerging... ever more important and influential in the Middle East and worldwide, and also because of the internal problems that they face, to share our experiences and to reinforce one another and identify common areas of involvement and concern.

*- [With periodic expressions from overseas of resentment for American Jewish involvement in their internal affairs,] do you feel that communities abroad have welcomed the role that you've had until now?*

Absolutely, **they not only welcome it, they want more;** they encourage it. We had [at our meetings there] representatives from 20 countries join us in Berlin, and this year we expect the same. But – during the year – they visit with us, they often urge us to help them to [reach] their own governments or to deal with the circumstances they face. They look at America – not so

much us – but the fact that we live in the United States, which is the superpower, which has great influence and where **Jews are free to exercise their voices to much greater degree than, let's say, in the European Jewish community**, because of the numbers, and the system of government. Ours is unique, where lobbying – these are foreign concepts in those countries – where people can actually have a say, people who are concerned, can have a disproportionate say –

*- Do these communities, particularly in Europe, do they feel that they've been given enough independence, that they've been empowered to mobilize themselves, to represent themselves – meaning, do they feel that their role is being lessened by the involvement of American Jewry in their concerns?*

First of all, we don't lessen – the opposite; first of all, we don't go into a country unless we do it in consultation with the communities in that country. We don't do anything but [try] to enhance their role, and to try and emphasize and support them and show that the American Jewish community is behind them, and not just Western but in Eastern [Europe] and countries that are not yet democratic.

*- What's been the response of the Conference to the economic problems in Argentina?*


Well, we've had a series of conference calls, and we're working together with the agencies there like [the Joint Distribution Committee], the Jewish Agency – we're working with the JDC on trying to deal with the economic problem; there it is not a question so much of antisemitism. We had worked earlier with the World Bank, and with others [o]n an economic program which was announced just a few weeks before the collapse of the government, to provide aid to poor Jews.

The poverty situation there is deteriorating, and the **number of Jews below the poverty level has quadrupled** and is likely to increase, and... as necessary we will be there to see what role we can best contribute, but it's not just going to be in Argentina – other countries as well. Those countries often turn to us for help whether its maintaining their schools or other specific issues, and wherever we can we have to give assistance. We've also visited some of these countries, like El Salvador and Costa Rica – because these are the two countries that maintain their embassies in Jerusalem and we want to reinforce it and find ways to help.

*- What is it your role, and the role of other Conference leaders, in helping the Israelis with their agenda? Specifically, in terms of Jerusalem – it received widespread publicity when you and,*

*subsequently, the previous chairman, Ron Lauder, made separate comments to the effect that Jerusalem should remain united, despite the fact that a subsequent sitting Israeli government seemed willing to divide Jerusalem. Do you find that your statement, and chairman Lauder's statement, deviated from the previous practice of American Jews to let the Israeli government handle their own affairs, or to follow in line with –*

Jerusalem has to be united, that is the position of the Conference of Presidents; that has always been our position – the undivided



*Hoenlein in Jerusalem's King David Hotel with (R-L): Benjamin Netanyahu, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Conference Chairman Mort Zuckerman and the previous chairman, Ronald Lauder*

capital of the State of Israel. How it's

ultimately divided is up to negotiations, but it is our position that Jerusalem remain united, with the holy places under Jewish control. That has been the longstanding position of the Conference of Presidents. The issue at that time, was not at all that position. The question was, that there was a particular rally coming three weeks before an election, the question was the propriety of the participation of the chairman of the Conference in that event.

*- And there was also a speech that you gave at a synagogue previous to that –*

Absolutely. And it was not a subject of any discord, because people know what was said. It's a position that I stand by. And it was a position that was quoted not by me, but by an organization that put out my speech, took one section of it and reproduced it, and it's a position that I stand by, and it doesn't contradict anything that the Conference has ever done stood for. We have had a strong position on Jerusalem, we remain, I think, committed to that position on Jerusalem. Jerusalem is the "*ir shechubra la yachdav*" – it's the thing that unites us, the city that unites us, but also the concept, the idea...

You see how the issue of *Har Habayit* touches all parts of our community, as it should, and it's an issue which we have all been very much involved in, the [archaeological] desecrations on *Har Habayit* – trying to press governments of Israel to do more to protect it. And to work with the governments of Israel, subsequently, to implement that protection, to identify the problem, to help mobilize support for the efforts of the archaeologists and others... This is our heritage, this is



what we leave future generations – you know, Jerusalem is at the core of it. **If we are prepared to write off, or to diminish, the significance of Jerusalem – what are we doing?** We have to think of the long-term consequences of our actions... It doesn't mean we override or dictate to governments of Israel, we don't –

*- But you do disapprove of any Israeli attempt, willingness, to cede parts of Jerusalem, or even the Temple Mount, to Palestinian control, or ultimate Palestinian sovereignty?*

That's not the issue, the issue is that negotiations are going to be carried out by governments of Israel, not by us. We do not sit at the negotiating table – the people of Israel sit at the negotiating table. And when it comes to decisions – **I think Jerusalem, by the way, is different from other issues**, I think that Jerusalem is something that belongs to all Jews, I think that all Jews have a right to have a say in its future and certainly the sanctity and the sovereignty of its holy places, the places that hold such special significance to Jews. How it's ultimately resolved I can't tell you today, I don't know – that's why governments that are elected, democratically –...

Do governments make mistakes? Yes. Do people have a right to disagree with government positions? Yes. But they have to recognize that the ultimate decision rests with those governments. And the same thing is true, I believe, on security and defense issues: I believe that it is the people of Israel that have ultimately to make that decision. That does not mean that people don't have a right to have a say in it, and it does not matter whether you believe "not one inch" or "every inch," we're not going to make the decision. Our fundamental job is to see to it that Israel enters negotiations from a position of strength, and achieves security. How they define that is up to the generals and the government and the people of Israel to decide. I think all Jews have a right to have a say, if they do it in responsible ways, if they realize that their words have consequences, that their positions have consequences, and we should do nothing to undermine the ultimate fulfillment of those positions that the government of Israel decides.

*- Back to the Conference of Presidents itself. There was controversy several months ago, about whether the Conference should or will maintain itself in its current form – specifically, certain parties took issue with several smaller of the member organizations, questioning whether they fit the requirements or the standards of the Conference. One organization that I've seen mentioned is the RZA, the Religious Zionists of America, in terms of whether it's fully operative. Whether all the members of the Conference will be maintained as they are now.*

It's a complicated answer, because it has a number of aspects to it. One, there was a review process which took almost two years, it was approved by the full Conference. They adopted a process of procedures, a document that included guidelines for membership and as part of it that asked for a review of current members, just it set new requirements for admitting new members, part of that process of review showed that several of our organizations – questions were raised about several of the member organizations. They resisted very strongly the idea of being made adjuncts rather than full members, it's a matter still before the Conference – no decision has been made about any organization. But it's really up to the members; if they want to set certain standards now...

Everybody felt now, with the war on terrorism and everything else, **its not a time we have to bring [this] up...** We also have a lot of applications, and again we require two-thirds vote. I think it's a very positive sign that people value their participation in the Conference, and are concerned about losing their vote – their [tenure]. And the fact that the other members want to set standards, because they recognize the importance – **it's a conference of "major" American Jewish organizations, and that should have some meaning.** And that was all this was meant to do, it was not along ideological or any other lines, as some people, newspapers charged out of ignorance, not out of fact.

*- Do you feel that the Conference represents the full spectrum of – in proportion to the reality of the American Jewish community?*

It [might] not represent every part, but it's a broad spectrum – it has all the religious streams, it has Peace Now, [the Zionist Organization of America]... Every organization has one vote. If you start **with weighted voting, it would become unwieldy** and impossible, and the wisdom of the founders of the Conference in... doing things in the way that they did, I think... has stood the test of time, and that issues are not decided really on votes in the Conference, it's a consensus, and you know when you have it, you know when you don't. If you ready come to a vote, it becomes divisive.

*- Do you feel that there's a vacuum in terms of future Jewish leadership in this country?*

I think that there is a problem, both on the professional level – I think that lay leadership continue to produce outstanding people. [But] I think there are a lot of good, committed young people who want to come into the field, I think we have to do more to reach out to them. I think we have to **make conditions such that it's**



**attractive to them.** I am concerned about the professional leadership in the future, even to some degree now. I am concerned that too many of the important leaders operate outside of the framework of the organized Jewish community, and we have to do more to draw them and make it attractive to them, and to make it meaningful to them.

*- Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, some have accused American Jews of being torn between dual loyalties. Do you feel that that's accurate? Is it something that we're self-conscious about? Specifically -*

I mean, some nutcases will always –

*- Well, not even a nutcase, actually a legislative aide -*

**So – so? – it's a nutcase. Why do you even, why do people give any dignity to this fringe kook?** I mean, [it's] totally irrelevant – and, the very fact that we reference it, is ridiculous. The fact is, quite the opposite; I think American Jews have seen, because Israel has seen this, having been right and having been fighting this battle that America now is engaged in for more than fifty years, that people relate to what Israel has said, they relate more to what we have been saying, and that what we were saying was not because it was a defense of Israel, but a defense of the things we care about: Western values, democracy, freedom, that people – all the polls show that support for Israel is at an all time high. Identification with what Israel is going through is at an all time high.

So, this is *narishkeit* to even give any credence to the [reported derogatory comments]. I think, in the beginning, after September 11<sup>th</sup>, people were asking why, and they were looking for simple solutions and answers – “why would they do this to us?” This was so hard and such a shock that people couldn't, and even the government initially couldn't, properly respond to it. And so we did things – on the governmental level – of **lifting sanctions on the Sudan, or reaching out to Iran**, [these] were all things that were going around until we... settled in for what I think is a very successful and meaningful policy, executed in a very effective way by President Bush and the administration and the armed forces.

But Americans had this new sense of vulnerability – this was more profound than Pearl Harbor. September 11<sup>th</sup> changed all the rules by which we viewed the world... Americans never thought about their borders – **we worried about our streets, but never our borders.** And here you had a whole new set of circumstances, so initially people said, well, it must be because of Israel – or

it was a couple of antisemites and anti-Israel people [who] used it as an advantage to say, “well, this wouldn't have happened if it weren't for our [relationship] with Israel,” and Osama bin Laden played on that theme, not because it was real; **his eyes were never focused on Jerusalem, it was always on Riyadh.** He did many other things, we had many wakeup calls; he didn't blow up the USS Cole or Khobar Towers or any of the other things because of Israel – this is against America, it's against the West, it's against Western values, and Israel is the moon to America's sun. It's because Israel reflects the same values as the United States that it is seen as [an] alien and enemy presence in the region. So people initially looked at that, but I think that has dissipated.

*- If American Jews aren't, in fact, worried about being accused of dual loyalties, why is it that aliya has remained a taboo for so much of American Jewry?*

It's not a taboo, it's just not a reality. I mean it's, unfortunately, not seen as an option to American Jews – [like] Jews throughout history [in] circumstances where we get very comfortable and sometimes perhaps lose sight of our priorities. All of us, I think, who live here are to a degree guilty of it. I mean, there are people for whom Israel is not the answer, [and] for a variety of reasons do not opt for *aliya*, and I don't think that you should talk in the context of *aliya* in the negatives, meaning just a response to crises and Jews who have to go there, but [rather,] ***aliya* is the ultimate fulfillment**, and it should be seen as a positive expression by people – not just something you have to do to escape bad circumstances in other places...

*- Do you feel that attitude is reflected in the response of many American Jewish leaders to calls by successive Israeli presidents, specifically Ezer Weizmann and Moshe Katzav, for aliya by Western Jews?*

Well, we're getting there. For instance, in Buenos Aires, **if the Jews there had listened, then they'd [have been] better off... in Israel** – and they're going to Israel now to have better lives, [while] they thought that they were going to have lives... they were going to enjoy in Argentina – you know, they get a wake up call. But again, it shouldn't be because there's an economic crisis, American Jews should go because, for Jews, the maximum fulfillment of our Jewish identity, of our Jewish religious belief, of our independence is in a Jewish state. And it is not a taboo subject, it's just unfortunately not given the significance and the priority that it should. There are now funds being set up by a number of *shuls* and [groups] to help people to go on *aliya*, to make it

financially more feasible, and [these] are very important and wonderful things.

*- How has the American Jewish outlook on the question of security and civil liberties changed since September 11<sup>th</sup>?*

I would say that there are inconveniences, and there has to be new flexibilities – when you deal with a wartime situation, there is a reality that we are confronting which is a danger to the American people and American security, and hence that will require us to **sometimes do things that may be distasteful** and uncomfortable. I think we have to protect the rights of citizens, but it also means that people will have to put up with certain inconveniences, it may be that certain groups and others may be subjected to more scrutiny than others, but it should be done within the bounds of law and appropriateness.

*- Do you think that plans for oil drilling in Alaska should go forward?*

That's not an issue we deal with. We do believe that there should be energy conservation, we believe there should be efforts to decrease our dependence on foreign oil, and that can be done in many ways, but –

*- Did not the chairman, Zuckerman [endorse it] –*


**No, he did not –**

*- He did not attend a press conference with supporters of oil [drilling, domestically] – ?*

He went there to make clear that our position was that we do not take a position on the specifics of the legislation... but to urge that meaningful legislation be adapted to lessen our dependence on foreign energy sources, and that means through all means, including conservation, domestic drilling, other things like that, but no position on specifics... We've never taken a position on that.

*- Have you been satisfied with the performance of President Bush since September 11<sup>th</sup>?*

More than that, I'm very impressed by his performance, by the fact that **he really gets it**, he understands things, he sees it in very clear terms, in terms of



Hoenlein was among Conference leaders meeting President Bush

good and evil, and he knows who's on which side. He has an understanding that this is an interlocking [terrorist] network, and that you cannot just deal with one [group] and one country, and leave the others in place, that this has to be – as he said, he's committed to rooting out, routing out the totality of the international terrorist network, the global reach, and I think that's very significant; I think he's done a good job so far in terms of both mobilizing the American public and also in terms of international support. So the answer is yes.

*- Whether in terms of the intifada, [UN conference in] Durban, Geneva [conventions] or the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> war on terrorism, do you feel that Joe Lieberman would have been in a position, as an Orthodox Jew –*

I don't know. **I don't know what he would have done** or not done. Right now, we have to deal with what is, not what would have been or could have been or should have been.

*- Much has been said of Muslim fundamentalism. As you said, you've spoken about it for many, many years. Do you feel that it's accurate to describe people like Osama bin Laden and organizations like Islamic Jihad and Hamas as Muslim fundamentalists? Do you feel that their actions are in keeping with the fundamental, original teachings of Islam, or do you feel that they're distortions of the original teachings of Islam?*

We don't call them Moslem fundamentalists, we call them Islamist fundamentalists, which are people that distort Islam for extremist political ends. In that regards, yes, he is, and yes, so are Hamas, Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, Saddam Hussein, Iran – all of them are part of a network that – **Saddam Hussein never went to a mosque; he wrapped himself in Islamic theology in order to gain support**, become the fulcrum of this movement. Iran has used its mullahs and clerics, to spread this message of terror and fear, and now has developed this dual system of terrorism and missile-delivery, and developing their chemical, biological and nuclear capacity, as has Iraq –

When you look around the world – and you see the fighting in the Philippines, in Kashmir, the killing of Christians in Pakistan and Indonesia, in Sudan – the fact [is] that these are people fighting under the banner of Islam, and it is up to Moslem leaders to renounce them, to denounce them, to disassociate from them; it is also up to them to stop supporting dictatorships, which is what people are rebelling against, and [the reason] people are frustrated because they don't have freedom of expression and the right to economic benefits... We have to understand the nature of **Islamist**

fundamentalism, to understand that there are vast differences between each of the countries, but [also] that they are in fact working together, that there are links between them, that this is a worldwide phenomenon, and that it has to be addressed in absolute terms, and that it's first and foremost **Moslems who are the victims of it, and Moslems who have to be forefront in the fight** against it.

*- With Iran implicated in ongoing Lebanon-based terrorism, and now with the capture of the Karine-A arms ship, do you feel that Iran – which is recognized by the State Department as the foremost state-sponsor of terrorism – do you feel that Iran should be our next target in the war on terrorism?*

I think that Iran, and others – that **there are a whole series of countries that should be targeted – I think Iran is a primary place...** and that the people – I think – of Iran want change. I do not believe that Khatami is any different that Khomeini or Rafsanjani, that they are all the same in that they put on this... show, good cop/bad cop, but that there's been no change either domestically or internationally. I think Iran is a regional superpower today, with huge military capacity, and that only a concerted effort by the West, including the Europeans, in dealing with it – I think **the [Iranian] people would be ready to replicate what happened in Kabul** [local uprising].

We saw it in the huge demonstration after a football game, when a 100,000 people took to the street – **they didn't take to the street because they lost the football game**, this was a legitimate way of giving vent to their anger and frustration, and I think a number of the local imams are beginning to get the message. The problem is that the government, and all of the army and everything, is in the control of the extremists, and it is naïve on our part to think that we can win them over or [that] opening up to them will change things; the way to deal with this is that **the government of Iran should be changed.**

*- The author and journalist, Yossi Klein Halevi, has made a parallel to Christian-Jewish relations, particularly over the last century, saying that just as Christian-Jewish relations – particularly the Christians' outlook on the State of Israel – has undergone transformation, so too there is hope for Muslim-Jewish relations. Do you feel that that's an accurate assessment?*

There [have been] positive periods in Moslem-Jewish relations in the past, and I don't see any inherent reason that Moslems and Jews shouldn't get along. The problem is that we are seeing another generation of Moslems being educated in this hatred, in this incitement, in the

*madrasas* – the tens of thousands of *madrasas* that exist – [and] the media; just now, we see Saudi Arabia with this long series of pictures during Ramadan, television broadcasts across the Middle East, in Abu Dhabi, in Saudi Arabia television, of Sharon drinking blood, and blood libels, and the same thing in Egypt now, with this whole series of the **Protocols of the Elders of Zion.**

*- Prime Minister Sharon, among many other Israeli officials, has tried to make a comparison between Osama bin Laden and Yasser Arafat. Do you feel that that comparison would be accurate?*

Well, its accurate in what their goals are, and sometimes in their methodology, but each of them – each of the movements is different in both geography and the conditions in which they operate – but the fact that both are anti-West, anti-democratic, **liars**, people who violate all the fundamental principles, values that we hold dear – there are similarities.

*- If Yasser Arafat is a threat to the West and to Western values, how can the Conference of Presidents not take a stand on the possibility of the establishment of... another state-sponsor of terrorism on Israel's borders?*

First of all, Bibi as well as Sharon as well as others, have acknowledged that **there will be a Palestinian entity.** We have not endorsed that, but all of the prime ministers of Israel I think have recognized there is a reality, and to ignore that reality is a mistake. The question is, what will the nature of it be, what will its borders be? How do we contain the armaments? How do you prevent – if now, before they're a state they're doing all these illegal shipments of weapons, let alone the Karine-A, **how do you protect [Israel then]?**

I mean, ultimately... if after the establishment of a state they continue such activities, where they will be closer to Israel, and when after you made the territorial concessions – I think those are the issues that have to be wrestled with... The whole world has accepted the idea that there will be a Palestinian entity, [but] it's not going to happen until there's a reliable partner that can be held to account for the actions that they take. Arafat has always been safe because people assume he's better than the alternative; I think the difference today is that people are not sure that that's true. And that **the way to deal with him is not to annihilate or to kill him** – which they could have done many times – but to isolate him and to show the world what he's really about, and for the Palestinian people ultimately to rise up and say we want a leadership that will lead us to an era of peace, that will make changes that will better our lives.



- Sari Nusseibeh, a more moderate Palestinian intellectual, has been appointed by Yasser Arafat as the leading official responsible for Jerusalem. He's been called a "pragmatic Palestinian," considered by some to be someone that the Israelis can deal with, and by others as a "Trojan horse." What's your view on Nusseibeh? Is he relevant, is he a person that Israel can deal with?

Well, Sari Nusseibeh is certainly relevant, the question is, what's in people's hearts we don't know. But he did make some courageous public statements, it's not a question of what you say privately, it's what he's said publicly. But you know, the words "Trojan horse" are the words used by his predecessor, Faisal Husseini, shortly before he died of a massive heart attack. When he was talking about Oslo – **he said that the Oslo agreements were a "Trojan horse,"** that in fact all of this was just a fiction to enable him under the guise of Oslo to create a Palestinian state so that they could then begin the next stage of the war against Israel. So that term has particular significance for the people holding that position.

- With the economic crisis in Argentina, do you feel that there's anything that should be learnt in terms of Israel? Are there patterns that – economic patterns –

I'm not an economist, but I certainly think that one can see how a powerful country with a lot of resources can end up in this kind of terrible situation. I think that Israel is not exactly parallel, but I think there are precautions that are being taken. But I am very worried about Israel's economic conditions, especially because of the decrease in tourism and the impact that that has had, and the impact – [throughout] the world – of the [faltering] high-tech [market], which is such a critical part of Israel's industry, and the lessening of investment in those areas. Israel's economic infrastructure is still sound – [but] with **unemployment reaching 10%**, with the demands of the budget, I'm very concerned, and I think in many respects it's a bigger danger than the external dangers. The internal dangers of economic wellbeing, and of divisiveness within Israel is by far the greatest challenge that Israel will ultimately face.

- Much has been said of what's been perceived as Israel's shortcomings in public relations. Do you feel that the media is inevitably liberal, or predominantly liberal, or do you feel that certain Israeli actions or inactions – specifically, the building of settlements, the imposition of closures on the Palestinian civilian population, assassinations – just today, a Palestinian terrorist from Tulkarem, Raed Karmi, was killed in an assassination; just yesterday, the Palestinians claim there were demolitions of 600 Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip, in Rafah –

First of all, it's not a question of the media being liberal – **you can be liberal and fair** – the problem is the media being ignorant or inaccurate or biased, that's the problem, that they always have to lean over backwards in the way things are portrayed. Even with the Karine-A, which is such a profound event – the incredible military achievement, it's been so downplayed, the significance of the arms shipment and how it would have changed qualitatively the strategic situation and quantitatively too... How late they have come to getting it, or in the case of Rafah not talking about the **illegal arm shipments that come through those very buildings**, that are a cover for the entrances and exits of these underground tunnels that are built along Rafah's border because it's a way of smuggling in arms from Egypt to the Gaza Strip. And moreover it's not that Israel is held to a higher standard, it is that Israel is held to a double standard, and that's the real danger. And what we have seen is this constant distortion, misrepresentation – deliberate or otherwise – but the net impact is the same –

- Distortions by the media?

By the media, by the individual reporters, by the networks, **by CNN in particular**, BBC, NPR – "Liberal" is not the issue. I think on the part of some there is intentional, on [others'] part it's ignorance – part[ly] it's the underdog story or what makes good news – and that's why Arafat did it, **Arafat's plot was to have children in pools of blood** because he knew it would attract international sympathy. Even **the story of Muhammad al-Dura was never really told**, in that the likelihood is he was killed by Palestinian bullets, not Israeli bullets. But the whole story of how Arafat manipulated the children, and was abusing them and putting them in the front line, in the line of fire, in order to draw fire, wasn't told until very late, after months of witnessing this. So there are many examples of the [media's] failure, and you can see the pictures of the staged things with the press, having kids then line up with the stones and the burning tires, in order to get the picture, and then as soon as they left, things ended, the demonstrations.

- Do you feel that the targeted killings and the closures have helped [Israel's case] –

Targeted assassinations have helped to prevent terrorism; I think that they are very important, not because Israel wants to do it but because Arafat has refused to do it – this is his responsibility. He is committed to arresting these people, putting them in jail, trying them, and holding them to account for their terrorist acts, and if **he won't do it**, Israel has its first and primary obligation to



protect its citizens. And this is proven to be a way without civilian casualties of just going after those directly responsible. The closures are also something that Israel wants to lift, and every time they have an opportunity to ease the closures, they do. But how do you ease the closures if the result is that they're taken advantage of immediately and the terrorism increases. So these are measures – Israel has very few options, short of anything that would involve massive numbers of civilian casualties on the Palestinian side, which Israel is trying to avoid.

- Have largely symbolic actions like surrounding Chairman Arafat's Ramallah compound with tanks and preventing Arafat from attending Christmas mass in Bethlehem helped Israel's PR?

Well, that's not purely symbolic. There is a message; the world has to understand that this guy refuses to live up to anything, and until he does, at least one demand – arrest the two guys who killed a minister in a government of Israel [Ze'evi] – something that by and large, world public opinion understands, that you cannot allow ministers in your government to be assassinated. The two guys [are] living in the same city where Arafat finds himself, and he refuses to do anything about it. Well, until he does, and until he gets the people responsible for Karine-A, he has to be shown and he has to be limited, and going to Bethlehem – which **I, frankly, at first had reservations** about, the more I learnt about it, the more I came to understand the government's position.


- This week, [reacting to an anti-settler remark] a rightist [Knesset] member [Tzvi Hendel] called the US ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer, a – he used an [epithet]... Do you feel that the American ambassador is doing a good job in his first -

We condemned it, he has apologized – do I think he's doing a good job? I think one **can question the propriety, the comment** that he was criticized for and he has said that the comment was taken out of context. And Mr. Hendel has apologized for his ["little 'Jewboy'"] comment, which I think was inappropriate, and we've had exchanges with Mr. Kurtzer and I think that he is doing a good job, at least I hope –

- Do you think that the Israeli ambassador David Ivri, who has been recently criticized [by columnist Tom Friedman] for not taking a more active [role publicly]-

It's very **easy to criticize people in these positions**. They have many responsibilities; he has done a great job in the defense department, even if he's not the most articulate spokesmen, he has credibility in Washington. You know, different people have different strengths. Do we need spokesmen in this country? Yes. Do we need people in Israel who are better spokesmen? Yes. I think that the *hasbara* problem stems largely from the fact that they dismantled the *hasbara* a number of years ago, when Shimon Peres, among others, said that **"we will be sold by what we do, not what we say."**

We found ourselves then with a new situation, a new war, and had to restructure the whole PR program. But I think the Foreign Ministry and others deserve more credit than they get for what they're doing, I think we have a lot of new initiatives in this regard; it's a combined effort of all those who support Israel, care about Israel, in the media – but the results speak for themselves: **70% of Americans stand by Israel. We have the largest margins of support ever**, that's what we've won. ■



YU-affiliated past Conference chairs (L-R): Rabbi Herschel Schacter (with Richard Nixon); Rabbi Israel Miller (and Gerald Ford); Julius Berman (meeting Margaret Thatcher)

## ▶ OPINION

**Poverty Is 'Violence' That Feeds Terrorism**

By VEENA THADANI



Recent events have focused our minds on terrorism. There have been questions and speculation about the causes of terrorism, its origins and sources, the conditions under which it may be fostered. What are the "breeding grounds" for terrorism? Is there a connection to be made between terrorism and social and economic conditions of acute poverty and oppression, extreme inequality and injustice?

Poverty alone doesn't breed terrorism, but extreme poverty and terrorism have in common some traits, particularly implicit or explicit violence, that make them the moral issues of our times.

Terrorism is difficult to define. It has been likened to pornography: communities may have different standards, but you know it when you see it. Despite the disagreements over the definition of terrorism, most formulations focus on the deliberate use or threat of destructive violence intended to convey a political message – the continuation of politics by other means, to paraphrase Clausewitz. It is the explicit political content that distinguishes terrorist acts from other violent acts motivated by profit or passion, such as robbery and murder.

We are not accustomed to thinking of poverty as a form of violence – structural violence rooted in a wider sociopolitical context in which social and economic hierarchies legitimate patterns of domination and exploitation. We tend to see poverty as an economic problem, a problem of scarcity or the failure of economic growth. The gains of economic growth, however, refracted through a system of structured inequality merely accentuate poverty; it is a pattern of economic growth that itself generates poverty, a socially created and socially sustained, entrenched poverty. The poverty that is thus socially created reflects the complex sociopolitical realities and their potential for violent domination and oppression: evident in the violence of the state (and the interests of dominant classes embedded in the state) when it upholds the ownership rights of one sector of the community against the demands of another; for example, when food stocks are protected

in the face of famine. As Amartya Sen has said, "starvation deaths can reflect legality with a vengeance."

The depth of global poverty is widely recognized, if not its causes, much less its remedies. The abject poverty of over a billion people, one person in six worldwide, concentrated mainly in Africa and Asia, is a kind of poverty that is difficult for us to grasp – where people are chronically hungry and malnourished, and lack the basic requirements of safe water, housing, medical care. The United Nations Development Program has defined not a "poverty line" but an "absolute poverty line" based on the minimum caloric requirements of a nutritionally adequate diet required for a person just to survive. The daily experience of a staggering number of people is one of an increasingly acute poverty. On a statistical reading alone, the twentieth century has not brought the promise of development and modernity to the poorest of the world's people; numbers of the absolute poor have increased rather than declined – representing a pattern of entrenched poverty anchored in the structural violence of our societies, nationally and internationally.


The attention paid to lives ravaged by deprivation and destitution is in stark contrast to the intense media coverage of terrorist violence. The resources given to wars that have been launched – a war on terrorism, a war against poverty – reflect similar preoccupations. The dollars devoted to the war on terrorism eclipse many times over the war on want. Notwithstanding the extent of poverty and the scale of hunger-related deaths (by one estimate, 30,000 children die as a result of malnutrition every day), it is terrorist violence, staged as spectacle, acts of audacity and rage, that shock, outrage, and command public and media attention – a drama that is missing in the silent suffering of the masses of the poor, with few bold headlines, public outcries, political agitations or protest rallies to mark their demise. ■

*Dr. Veena Thadani is a professor of political science at Yeshiva College*

## ► WORLD VIEW

*The Case for Quickly Toppling Saddam*

By BENJAMIN NETANYAHU



September 11<sup>th</sup> alerted most Americans to the grave dangers that are now facing our world. Most Americans understand that had al-Qaeda possessed an atomic device last September, the city of New York would not exist today. They realize that we could have been grieving not for thousands of dead, but for millions.

But for others around the world, the power of imagination is apparently not so acute. It appears that these people will have to once again see the unimaginable materialize in front of their eyes before they are willing to do what must be done. For how else can one explain opposition to President Bush's plan to dismantle Saddam Hussein's regime?

I do not mean to suggest that there are not legitimate questions about a potential operation against Iraq. Indeed, there are. But the question of whether removing Saddam's regime is itself legitimate is not one of them. Equally immaterial is the argument that America cannot oust Saddam without prior approval of the international community.

This is a dictator who is rapidly expanding his arsenal of biological and chemical weapons, who has used these weapons of mass destruction against his subjects and his neighbors, and who is feverishly trying to acquire nuclear weapons.

The dangers posed by a nuclear-armed Saddam were understood by my country two decades ago, well before September 11<sup>th</sup>. In 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin dispatched the Israeli air force on a predawn raid that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq. Though at the time Israel was condemned by all the world's governments, history has rendered a far kinder judgment on that act of unquestionable foresight and courage.

Two decades ago it was possible to thwart Saddam's nuclear ambitions by bombing a single installation. Today nothing less than dismantling his regime will do. For Saddam's nuclear program has changed. He no longer needs one large reactor to produce the deadly material necessary for atomic bombs. He can produce it in centrifuges the size of washing

machines that can be hidden throughout the country — and Iraq is a very big country. Even free and unfettered inspections will not uncover these portable manufacturing sites of mass death.

We now know that had the democracies taken pre-emptive action to bring down Hitler's regime in the 1930s, the worst horrors in history could have been avoided. And we now know, from defectors and other intelligence, that had Israel not launched its pre-emptive strike on Saddam's atomic-bomb factory, recent history would have certainly taken a far more dangerous course.

I write this as a citizen of the country that is most endangered by a pre-emptive strike. For in the last gasps of his dying regime, Saddam may well attempt to launch his remaining missiles, with their biological and chemical warheads, at the Jewish state.

Though I write as a private citizen, I believe I speak for the overwhelming majority of Israelis in supporting a pre-emptive strike against Saddam's regime. We support this American action even though we stand on the front lines, while others criticize it as they sit comfortably on the sidelines. But we know that their sense of comfort is an illusion. For if action is not taken now, we will all be threatened by a much greater peril.

We support this action because it is possible today to defend against chemical and biological attack. There are gas masks, vaccinations and other means of civil defense that can protect our citizens and reduce the risks to them.

Indeed, a central component of any strike on Iraq must be to ensure that the Israeli government, if it so chooses, has the means to vaccinate every citizen of Israel before action is initiated. Ensuring this is not merely the responsibility of the government of Israel, but also the responsibility of the American government.

But no gas mask and no vaccine can protect against nuclear weapons. That is why regimes that have no compunction about using weapons of mass

destruction, and that will not hesitate to give them to their terror proxies, must never be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. These regimes must be brought down before they possess the power to bring us all down.

If a pre-emptive action will be supported by a broad coalition of free countries and the UN, all the better. But if such support is not forthcoming, then the US must be prepared to act without it. This will require courage, and I see it abundantly present in President Bush's bold leadership and in the millions of Americans who have rallied behind him.



I recognize this courage because I see it on the faces of my countrymen every day. Millions of Israelis who have been subjected to an unprecedented campaign of violence have stood firmly behind our government

in the war against Palestinian terror. We have not crumbled. We have not run. We have stood our ground and fought back.

Today the terrorists have the will to destroy us but not the power. Today we have the power to destroy them. Now we must summon the will to do so. ■

*This piece by former Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu**, written after the first anniversary of September 11<sup>th</sup>, is exclusive to The Clarion and the Wall Street Journal.*

*Mr. Netanyahu wrote this article while still a private citizen, but he has since been appointed Foreign Minister of Israel. Though he was scheduled to be interviewed by The Clarion, unexpected Likud primaries and plans for early general elections prevented a meeting from taking place.*



Netanyahu... (L-R): as Premier, with Arafat, Clinton and King Hussein; in-flight with family; meeting Boris Yeltsin; at the Lubavitcher rebbe's grave



...Inspecting Ground Zero, with his father; visiting Joschka Fischer; on NBC's "Today Show"; conditionally joining Ariel Sharon's cabinet



## ► E P L U R I B U S U N U M

***America Must Be Aggressively Engaged Abroad***

By ZACK STREIT

In the post World War I era, the United States seemed determined to take a back-seat role in the realm of international politics. Political analysts recklessly threw around the term “isolationism” in reference to the Americans’ “involvement without commitment” and their seeking out “advantages without obligations” in the International arena (Schoner). Keyhole diplomacy, a phrase that grew out of America’s participation without commitment on select committees including the opium, slavery and counterfeiting commissions at the 1919 League of Nations Convention in Geneva, became a trademark of the Republican Era of Normalcy, spanning roughly from 1921-1933 (Schoner). Most notably, however, the 1937 Neutrality Act, forbidding United States citizens from selling arms, providing loans, and sailing on the ships of belligerent nations, personified the prevalent foreign policy obsession with retaining sovereignty and forgoing entangling alliances that would lead to tying precarious international knots (Neutrality).

As the war against fascism raged across Europe in the early 1940’s, the United States assumed a quiet, cautious stance thousands of miles away from the cacophonous clashes in sync with their hallmark isolationist legislation. But this strategy met an abrupt end on December 7<sup>th</sup>, 1941, when the Japanese pummeled Pearl Harbor. In the aftermath of the ambush, the United States would undergo a massive foreign policy overhaul, brining coalition building to the forefront of their policy agendas. According to the Dean of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government Joseph Nye, “The lesson that the US had to be involved in international affairs was seared into the American collective memory. Isolationism ceased to be credible” (Nye 23).

In light of the assault on the World Trade Center, Pundits have quickly highlighted numerous parallels between the two calamities. Most notably though, many point to the inflammatory remarks of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle in a *USA Today* interview on President George Bush’s foreign policy prior to the attacks: “I think we are isolating ourselves and in so isolating ourselves, I think we are minimizing ourselves. I don’t think we are taken as seriously as we were a few years ago,” (Wright A4) he declared. Daschle’s unhappiness ostensibly emanated from the Bush administration’s reluctance to act aggressively as a Middle East peace broker, to thwart the AIDS virus diffusion in Africa, and the potential rift in Russian and European relations that would emerge as a result of Bush’s zealous pursuit of an antiballistic missile system (Mitchell A10). Meanwhile, other critics have also castigated Bush’s failure to ratify international treaties including the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, a rough copy of a pact on germ warfare, and a proposal initiating the long sought-after International Criminal Court. Yet a closer look at some of these criticisms exposes a number of problematic issues.

The fault of the AIDS epidemic in Africa lies solely in the “catastrophe of African politics and mores,” (Foreign 14) countered an editorial in the *National Review*. Solving this problem may more than simply infusions of cash. So, “What would the majority leader suggest – a new imperialism?” (Foreign 14). If senate democrats propose viable long-term plans instead of flinging monetary dispersals at a problem than a solution will likely materialize. Short of providing a comprehensive resolution, Daschle should refocus much of his criticism internally, as he has failed to solve the problem as well. Moreover, Daschle should know that due to recent expansions in bioengineering facilities worldwide, the germ-warfare pact proves almost impossible to enforce; “one American expert on chemical and biological weapons even called it ‘a sieve’” (Foreign 14). Again, Daschle needs to do more than just lambaste the president for actions he perceives as compulsory; he needs to offer solutions instead of adding to the problem.

No long after Daschle’s ranting about the dangers of abolishing the ABM treaty, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that he might likely acquiesce to the Republican objective. So, why did Daschle oppose the Bush objective? Well, Representatives of leftist politics, for one, tend to typecast missile defense as inherently evil. But, according to James Mann, the senior writer-in residence at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Demonizing missile defense won’t work, because, in the abstract, it’s hard to argue that the overall purpose is a bad one.” Indeed, “If you have the technology, what’s wrong with having a system that will shoot down missiles

directed at the United States or at American troops overseas?" (28) he wonders. I fail to recognize how a missile *defense* system could be construed as something destructive. After all, such a system would only buttress American national security.

Seeing as though the missile *defense* system would enhance our safety, coupled with the likelihood that Putin will condone the president's objective, we need to examine the second commonly proposed problem with missile defense. Namely: how will creating a missile defense mechanism impact our Euro-Asian relations?

The top-helm of the Bush administration insists that our international colleagues exaggerate their phobia of discarding the ABM treaty. The Europeans panic at the notion of a system devised to shield the United States from enemy or rogue missiles, claiming that it may chip away at the underpinnings of the NATO alliance – the objective of mutual defense against a shared threat – by effectively fortifying America. As a result, the Europeans estimate that Americans will likely stray from their rooted tradition of internationalism, the steering wheel of foreign policy installed by President Woodrow Wilson. Moreover, the Japanese fret at the possibility of a missile defense system, which could potentially trigger China's rapid amplification of its missile arsenal to the point of jeopardizing Japanese security (Mann 28).

But the Bush top-brass believe that these fears are overstated, as they regularly cite President Regan's unilateral deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe to offset the Soviet Missiles poised to strike in the early Eighties. Secretary of State Collin Powell recounted the story under heavy fire at his senate confirmation hearing. "There was a heck of a hullabaloo. Our European allies at the time were going nuts,' the (new) secretary of state recalled. 'It took quite a selling story.... But lo and behold, we were able to do it by convincing our friends that this made sense'" (Mann 28). The incumbent governmental officials seem to be doing just that, convincing our allies that it does indeed make sense. And Americans have begun their negotiations from the top down. Putin's probable agreement may likely provide impetus for other nations to follow suit

Which brings us to the questions: What is at the heart of the difference between Daschle's stance on foreign policy and our present Executive Branch? Assuming the majority leader knew of the aforementioned rebuttals before he issued his diatribe, what prompted him to make such calculated remarks? The answer unearths two theoretically different foreign policy methodologies with substantial implications in the concrete world.

The difference between the two branches amounts to more than a simple standoff between pro-active engagement and solitary confinement, as Daschle may have wanted us to believe. Rather the differences stem from two different forms of internationalism: "the traditional variety" and what former editor of the *National Review* John O'Sullivan brands "supra-nationalism" (Foreign 14). According to O'Sullivan, traditional nationalism endorses alliances and pacts with detailed goals and delineated obligations. Member nations are often granted veto powers over resolution of the collective and may always exercise the option of withdrawing. Supra-nationalism, on the other hand "commits those who are reckless enough to go along with it to vague, open-ended projects, with transnational enforcement, bureaucracies, and no mechanism for demurral or even escape" (Foreign 14). While traditional internationalism favors national sovereignty, supra-nationalism sanctions "unelected and irresponsible administrators and bureaucrats" to codify and enforce international law (Foreign 14). Specifically, the latter camp seems to favor an International criminal court and imprudent funding showers on intricate problems that require far more than dollars; they require sense.

If Bush subscribes to traditional internationalism, and I believe he does, then Daschle's labeling him an isolationist translates into a misnomer. The majority leader likely sought to expose the current administration's unilateralist tendencies. The inaccurate appellation notwithstanding, Daschle should know that unilateralism has always played a vital role in American foreign politics, making the world a better place for it. For starters, Wilson's Fourteen Points, the unilaterally driven and eventually multilaterally accepted agenda delivered at the Versailles peace conference in the early Twentieth Century, formally ended World War I. Some thirty years later, the Truman Doctrine unilaterally committed the United States to an extensive effort to obstruct the spread of Communism by mid-century. In 1956, President Eisenhower unilaterally thwarted France and Britain's military campaign to topple Nasser and capture the Suez Canal. President Bush Sr. averted the African elephant's extinction by unilaterally declaring a United States ban on ivory trading (Glennon B02). So, if unilateral American acts have effectively made the world more amiable, why should other nations condemn them? Leftist American politicians and much of the world at large have

tendencies to turn a blind-eye on the wide-spread advantages of unilateralism (see above for an appetizer), choosing only to acknowledge such acts as proliferations of American hegemony. However, Michael Glennon, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars who has over thirty years of experience advising Congress and the executive branch on matters of international law and policy, avers, "that the real reasons for the persistence of American unilateralism have little to do with advancing our hegemony" (B02). The following examples bring this view to light.

Consider the American rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on climate control, which undoubtedly offended other nations and impaired American diplomacy, because the proposal met such widespread multilateral endorsement. To supplement their aggravation, making matters worse for Americans, irate nations bellowed that nixing the proposal would bolster the American economy. Notwithstanding, multilateralism by no means magically metamorphosizes a deleterious plan into a constructive proposition. According to Glennon, "The fact that a groups of nations favors a given solution to some problem does not mean that that solution advances the interests of every other nation – or even members of the group," (B02). Although global warming is a pernicious problem, the Kyoto Protocol only minimally affects those responsible for emitting the toxic greenhouse gases. The prime ozone decimators – China, India, and other Third World nations – fall outside the resolution's reach. Moreover, vetoing the protocol only enriched the American economy relative to the dramatic decline slated for the American market upon the treaty's ratification. In reality, the allegations emanated from foreigners' unhappiness that American wealth went unscathed (Glennon B02). So, not only would the pact have had little likelihood of improving the ozone layer but the Kyoto Protocol in no way advanced American hegemony. If anything, the accord would have slighted the American market.

Furthermore acting multilaterally can pose serious problems, even amongst inveterate allies. "The United States," argues Glennon, "sacrificed military efficiency for political consensus in waging a committee-run war in Kosovo" (Glennon B02). The North American Treaty Organization's target-selection protocol allotted all eighteen coalition members equal-opportunity veto rights over every intended American target, as a panel of representatives reviewed the minutiae of each projected strike in advance. Simply stated: the coalition had the option of prohibiting American military personnel from attacking a target essential to the protection of American military personnel. Had the need for a ground force strike emerged, the "coalition-warfare" could have abruptly transformed into a "bureaucratic nightmare" (Glennon B02). While the United States needs the assistance of other countries for a variety of reasons, ranging from locality to alliance-building, Americans must first and foremost provide for the welfare of their troops prior to the objectives delineated by a bunch of old men in a stuffy, dark, smoke-filled conference rooms.

Finally, the United States acts unilaterally not in a greedy power fit, seeking to augment their command over the international community, but rather to ensure American sovereignty by precluding others from seizing control over our homeland. The Senate's initial refusal to formally join the League of Nations, a feat that largely fueled the isolationist allegations pit against the United States, stemmed from the compelling fear that the League could easily strong-arm America into a war against their better judgment. On the Twenty-First Century front, the United States has, for the most part, objected to the treaty that would sanction the founding of an International Criminal Court. The reasoning is simple: this global court could easily shackle and convict American troops guilty of following the president's orders on an international peace-keeping mission if the court saw fit (Glennon B02). What's more, Americans resent the idea of other nations' troops falling prey to the same international bind.

Even though the Europeans know, as should Daschle, that the United States remains committed to numerous international, multilateral accords, including those affecting copyrights, world finances, cultural property and food, other nations continue to criticize American unilateralism remit complaints. Bush has even mentioned his support of organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the North Atlantic Free Trade Organization, and NATO. "In fact," contends Jeffrey Gedmin, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, "the percentage of treaties Mr. Bush says he wants to review, reject, or consider withdrawing from is tiny" (13) in comparison to those he complies with. While the ample evidence contradicting the assertions of Daschle and a host of International players raises an eyebrow as to how so many have drawn such conclusions, the fact that the nations heralding such accusatory proclamations attempt to camouflage their unilateralist tendencies via bursts of professed love for multilateralism is far more disconcerting.



The French, for instance, bald-facedly pursue unilateralism. During the Bosnian war, the former French President Francois Mitterrand darted off to a private meeting in Sarajevo without consulting with the international coalition formed at that time. In 1995, Jacques Chirac independently decided to test nuclear warheads in the Pacific Ocean (Gedmin 13). Most recently, France refused to sign a declaration of democracy, pledging the cooperation and support of 106 democratic countries in newly emerging democracies, at an international conference in Warsaw (Glennon B02).

And the European Union is no better. When Bush decided to reassess American policy toward the North Koreans, the EU dispatched a delegation on its own accord to meet with the rogues in an attempt to pressure the United States into diplomatic negotiations. They also relentlessly bash the United States for their snubbing the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court proposal, despite the promulgated destructive effects of both. In fact, Gedmin extrapolates that "Our European partners seem less troubled by unilateralism per se than by US unilateralism" (Gedmin 13). The swelling EU desire to constrict United States power should come as no shock to Americans. Shortly after the collapse of the Kyoto negotiations at the Hague *The Economist* noted that, "Some European ministers made it clear that they wanted Americans to feel some economic pain more that they wanted a workable agreement" (qtd. in Gedmin 13).

Although diplomats shun discussions of power calculations and rivalries affecting trans-Atlantic political decisions, such underhanded objectives adversely charge the political sphere. In the political domain, America, the established superpower, prefers to remain unfettered, while the EU's ambitiously courts multilateral dogma as a means of equalizing the global battlefield. These inclinations are only natural given the paradigmatic clash between the ruler and the second-in-command. However, "The outcomes of such rivalries can be damaging," explains Gedmin, "as when the EU assisted this spring in voting the US off the UN Human Rights Commission," (13) leaving the regimes of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, to fend for international human rights – a testament to UN credibility, being as these very regimes appear on Bush's list of polities harboring or promoting terror organizations.

The exposed advantages of American hegemony coupled with European hypocrisy and the resulting devious scheming would seem to point America in the direction of isolationism. Yet such a tactic would, at the very least, prove financially horrendous, when a third of America's largest companies earn their revenues abroad and \$1.6 trillion changes hands in the foreign exchange daily. Indisputably, America cannot embark on super-scale global trade negotiations and lacks the means of stabilizing the world markets in a financial crisis without Euro-Asian cooperation. According to Jeffrey Garten, dean of the Yale School of management, "In a world in which politics, economics, and social issues are so intertwined America's go-it-alone machismo is sowing the seeds for a backlash from the very countries whose cooperation we will need on a host of global economic issues" (Garten 34).

And Garten does not even touch upon all the humanitarian efforts that oppressed, indigent people around the world require so desperately. Tony Blair, the prime minister of England, perhaps put it most eloquently on the eve on NATO's intervention in Kosovo: "We live in a world where isolationism ceased to have a reason to exist...we cannot turn our back on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure" (Lloyd 6). Yet, Before the World Trade Center Tragedy, the Bush Administration seemed intent upon embracing the rejuvenated realpolitik and relegating Blair's call to multilateral arms, which is strikingly similar to Clintonian foreign policy. Bush's focus, according to leftist pundits, seemed to stray from humanitarian intervention and curbs on pollution, which Kissinger -- the politician most closely intertwined in theory and practice with realpolitik -- labels a "psychotherapeutic exercise" (Lloyd 6) in foreign policy conduct, settling on the advancement of national interests, such as a sweeping tax cut and abolishing the ABM treaty. Enter 9/11.

In the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> tragedy, Blair's proclamation seems prescient. In the matter of an hour, the approximate time between the towers' imploding, the president was forced to swallow a bitter pill: Americans can no longer assert their supremacy in the globalized world without actively partaking in its well-being. "In the new era," explains Robert Cooper, a senior advisor to Blair, "foreign policy will be about the rule of law and the promotion of democracy; the influence of ideas and culture; and the growing importance of international institutions" (Lloyd 6). As much as the United States might like to focus solely on domestic policy, they must be attentive to the needs and wants of the world at large, which struck swiftly and violently.

As we moved from devastation to calculated retribution, the American retaliation has headlined the international agenda. That the United States will unquestionably root-out terrorism by probing deep into areas thought to swarm



with terrorist atrocities and wreak comprehensive exterminations on those jeopardizing peace and stability is a given. But doing so requires treating the world as a global entity hostile to terrorism; and if the United States wants to treat the world as such, then we must not shirk the responsibility accompanying that view. If America ventures upon ignoring a state's sovereignty by transcending borders in our search to eradicate terrorism, then we must ensure terms amenable to the countries we seek to invade (excluding, of course, those countries run by terrorists or terrorist harboring regimes). According to editor emeritus of *The New Statesman* John Lloyd, "a police force needs an authority for which to work and that authority needs a base and a mandate" (Lloyd 7). This mandate must span beyond simply ensuring terrorism's demise; we must ensure its eradication, purging the possibility of its resurgence. This interminable initiative requires that Americans incorporate multilateralism into their unilateral, nationalistic agenda.

We have embarked upon a political climate in which globalization rules supreme. No longer can we claim obliviousness to the world beyond our shores. We are bearing witness to the dawn of an era where unilateralism and multilateralism slowly dissolve into a chaotic nebulous. America must now rise to its guardian post, defending stability and security in this increasingly diffuse, globalized world. Daschle should heed this phenomenon, focusing his commentary and legislation on buttressing the vital American stance. Other nations should stop assenting anti-American sentiments. The world needs the US's engagement now more than ever. The sooner they acknowledge that, the better. ■

**Zack Streit** serves on the Advisory Board of the J.P. Dunner Political Science Society. He is also co-Editor-in-Chief of the Commentator, Yeshiva College's student newspaper.


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► BRIEFING

## Germany: Strange – and Estranged? – Bedfellow


Germany has been in the news a lot recently. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the *Bundesrepublik* was happily emerging as an economic and political superpower within a European Union of ever-increasing cohesion. At the same time, desperate to shed its Holocaust image and to show continued gratitude for the Marshall Plan, it carefully maintained its position as a devoted ally of both the United States and Israel. Slowly but surely, Germany was cultivating a reputation as not only a repentant, remade nation determined never to allow fascism to resurface, but an almost-philosemitic people craving to reach out to Jews, and collectively fascinated with their culture and history. Berlin buzzed over plans for a stunning new Israeli embassy, Jewish heritage museum and central Holocaust memorial. It hosted Jewish music festivals, built new centers of learning, and singularly opened its arms to Jewish immigration, particularly from the former Soviet Union. In an effort to mend fences after a recent bumpy period, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has pushed through a historic proposal to grant Germany's singularly expanding Jewish community equal legal status – and thus government funding – as its Lutheran and Roman Catholic counterparts. Finally, as war looms in Iraq, the Germans seem poised to grant Israel's request for patriot missiles, though – in a reversal – apparently not the Fuchs offensive armored personnel carriers.



Aerial view of the acclaimed new Jewish Museum of Berlin

With the emergence of an unprecedented terrorist threat to the West, however, usually pacifistic modern Germany has been put in the awkward place of being expected to significantly contribute to a very militarized US-led global anti-terror campaign. Likewise, with the intifada raging and Muslims pouring into the European continent, Germany has tried to toe a fine line of expressing unabated commitment to Israel's security while not offending Arabs – domestically and abroad. Finally, the quick reemergence of anti-American resentment and pro-Palestinian sympathy across Europe has forced Berlin to awkwardly, and not very assertively, stem the dominant political tide within its own European circle. Among politicians and in the media, German voices taking exception to their country's "automatic" support for American and Israeli policies have been getting louder. In addition, antisemitic or xenophobic acts have sometimes occurred. As a result, ties with Washington and Jerusalem have become considerably strained.

With survivors of the Nazi concentration camps still alive, it is an odd feeling indeed to present your ID while entering a German consulate, wearing a yarmulke and *tzitzit*. Entering the office of Stefan Schlüter, the deputy consul-general in New York, we endured the even stranger experience of being greeted by a large poster of chassidim praying at the Western Wall directly behind his desk. But Schlüter's friendly, inviting demeanor quickly took the edge off our encounter. (During a subsequent meeting, the diplomat – who says he never even met a Jew until he was about eighteen – surprised us with his Hebrew proficiency and knowledge of kosher sushi restaurants in the UN's vicinity). And during the course of our interview – as well as while following the increasingly frequent controversies surrounding various German positions and statements over recent weeks – it became clear that Germany's ties with America and Israel are strong, if inevitably troubled by both new disagreements as well as the touching of old nerves. In any event, the deputy consul was clearly in a special position to discuss issues of concern to us. Before reaching his plum post in New York, Schlüter had served at the German consulate in Los Angeles as well as Berlin's embassies in Argentina and Algeria. Longer than his other positions, however, he served as the spokesman of the German embassy in Tel Aviv, where, in fact, one of his two children, Danja, was born.



*- In the recent German federal elections the American Iraq policy came under heavy criticism, [and] negative statements concerning President Bush put further strain on what once was a close relationship between the United States and Germany. Do you think the damage is permanent?*

No. As you correctly pointed out there existed – and, I would like to add, still exists – a close relationship between our two countries. The fundamentals on which this relationship is founded remain the same: shared values, common interests and – above all – a

long and trusting friendship. We do disagree over how to best deal with the threat Iraq and Saddam Hussein pose to international peace and



Thousands of Germans gathered to mourn after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks

security. But these are concerns that could and, in my opinion, should be discussed among friends. The current debate in the United States incidentally shows that some of the concerns that were voiced in Germany are shared by many people in this country.

As we face new challenges, the unwavering commitment to transatlantic relations as well as the close partnership and friendship with the United States will remain core elements of German foreign policy. Germany has proven to be one of the staunchest allies of the United States in our joint efforts to fight international terrorism. Today **more than 10,000 German soldiers are deployed** worldwide, and German special forces are fighting side by side with their American counterparts against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Against this background I am more than confident that the current irritations will only be temporary.

*- With regard to the Middle East, there seems to a fluctuation in the German position vis-à-vis Israel and the [Palestinians], including the role of Chairman Arafat, [as well as] the Palestinian reforms. Could you also comment on reports that Foreign Minister [Joschka] Fischer dropped his multi-aspect Mideast peace plan and the issue of Palestinian statehood?*

Firstly, there is a basic German position with regard to a solution in the Middle East which has not and will not change one iota: our commitment to the existence of the State of Israel and its unconditional right to exist in peace, freedom and safety within **secure and recognized borders** and without fear of terrorism.

Secondly, at the same time, we strongly believe that there cannot be a military solution to the conflict. A peaceful, viable and democratic Palestinian state is the best guarantee for Israel's security. Therefore, Foreign Minister **Fischer has introduced his so-called 7-point-plan** in April you alluded to in your question. This plan raised – internationally for the first time – among other things, the necessity of building a democratic Palestinian state and democratic institutions. Foreign Minister Fischer has pointed out several times since then that **Israel and Palestine will always be closely linked** to each other and have to live together side by side in peace.

Thirdly, the main elements of this plan have been re-introduced by Germany into a “road-map” that the European Union has formulated for the Middle East peace process in the next three years. The general scheme of this road map has been endorsed by the so-called “Quartet” at [its] New York meeting in

September. This group consists of the US, the EU, Russia and the UN secretary-general.

The idea of two states, Israel and a democratic Palestine with elected, transparent and accountable institutions is also the centerpiece of this plan. On the future role of President Arafat, **Germany proposed as early as July the nomination of an emergency [prime minister]**, already in the pre-election phase of the reform process, as Palestinian international interlocutor. This idea has also become part of the EU road map endorsed by this Quartet. Even the Israeli government, meanwhile, has accepted the general idea of the road map, in particular the three-year timeline leading to a Palestinian state and a final solution to the conflict. As you see, there is no fluctuation at all in German positions, especially not vis-à-vis the Palestinian chairman and Palestinian reforms.

*- How would you rate the state of relations between Germany and Israel in general?*

In one word: excellent. After the historic meeting between Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and German Chancellor Adenauer here in New York 50 years ago it took some time to finally establish formal diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel. Quite understandably the first exchange of ambassadors in 1965 was heatedly discussed in Israel and also led to considerable protests.

Today we have established relations based on official contacts as well as on countless private initiatives that are rather rare between two peoples as geographically



*Ben-Gurion and Adenauer's 1960 meeting*

separated as ours. Economically we are Israel's **second-largest trading partner** after the United States; the scientific, the technological and the cultural cooperation is very close. There are over 50 cooperation agreements between German and Israeli universities, 100 official sister city partnerships and a very extensive youth exchange program. All this has led to an incredible network of personal contacts as well as, in many cases, friendships. I personally had this experience as I served for three-and-a-half years as the spokesman for our embassy in Tel Aviv.

On the political level, our moral obligation to honor the memory of **the Holocaust has always guided our relations** with Israel. Israel knows that we are a steadfast ally, defending Israel's vital interests in all multilateral and international institutions.

- Has the issue of the German suspension of military sales or aid to Israel been resolved?

**There is no embargo and there never was.** In Germany, embargos can only be imposed on the basis of UN decisions and/or EU acts. Export licenses for arms exports to Israel are handled in individual proceeding based on legal stipulations. Both governments maintain a high-level exchange of opinion and information on all matters, which is an expression of the special relationship between Germany and Israel.



Germans have generally been more sympathetic to Israel than most other Europeans

- Foreign Minister Fischer is widely regarded as a friend of Israel. What about reports that he privately called for the cessation of American funding to Israel [should] Israeli policies continue?

**Reports of this type from December last year are without any basis** and were resolutely repudiated by the Foreign Office at that time. Foreign Minister Fischer definitely is a good friend of Israel. This is reflected in a number of very positive comments from Israel welcoming the election results in Germany as they ensured four more years of Joschka Fischer at the helm of the Foreign Office.

- In the recent German election campaign, criticism of Israeli policy as well as of members of the German Jewish community played a role. [What would your reaction be to concerns raised by these statements]?

Any attempt to make antisemitism or criticism of Israeli policy an issue in the election campaign **clearly failed**. They have been vigorously repudiated by both the German public and the political establishment. I would also like to mention another positive development. For decades we have had a number of **right-wing splinter groups who never made it** into our federal parliament, since a party must garner at least 5% of the vote to achieve parliamentary representation. In the 1998 elections these groups

won a combined 1.5% of the vote. This year they practically vanished, ending up with a mere 0.5%.

- While this [certainly might] be a positive development, there are still reports of periodic acts of anti-Jewish assaults. A police spokesman in Berlin even suggested some time ago that it would be safer not to be recognized as a Jew. How does the Jewish community live in Germany in those circumstances?

Last year we had two very troubling incidents in which persons who could be recognized as Jews (**one lady wearing a Magen David, one gentleman wearing a kippah**) were assaulted and beaten. The statement you mentioned was immediately repudiated by the spokesman of the Berlin police department, who stressed that as a Jew one could and should move about freely and safely everywhere in Germany. This is also the experience of many friends in the German Jewish community and the experience of a great number of rabbis who have traveled to Germany and have told me that they never felt stared at, let alone felt threatened for wearing their *kippahs*. The Jewish community in Germany, by the way, has about 100,000 members and is the **fastest-growing Jewish community** in Europe.

- There has been quite a debate around the planned Holocaust memorial in Berlin. Do Germans no longer want to face the past?

Right next to the Brandenburg Gate **in the center of Berlin a huge area has been set aside** where the Holocaust memorial will be built. Yes, there has been a debate about the memorial, but it dealt more with the "how," less with the "if." For me, the most moving Holocaust memorial – and **I get goose bumps every time I think about it** – is the relatively small children's memorial in Yad Vashem in Jerusalem.

Coming to the second part of your question, I do think that Germans are well aware of their past and have no intention of negating it. I just met with a group of German teachers of history and English and we discussed Holocaust education and attitudes of German students. This conversation showed me that there is no reason for concern that Germans want to forget about their history. In my opinion, and this view is shared by most Germans, **we [the current generation of Germans] can't be held personally responsible for what happened, but we do have a distinct responsibility** to ensure that antisemitism, xenophobia and any kind of persecution of minorities doesn't have a place in Germany – or Europe, or the world, for that matter – anymore. ■



## ► CROSS - ATLANTIC



## *Towards Common European Defenses?*

By ELIEZER ROSENBLATT

As plans for European integration go underway, many questions emerge regarding the role of the rising super-state-like entity. There is little doubt as to the EU's desire to become an active and influential leader in the world alongside the United States, but its capability of filling those shoes raises many question marks. So far, the EC has shown a very weak foreign policy, causing it to lose credibility not only to the very parties it tries to help, but in the eyes of the rest of the world as well. Moreover, disagreement within the member states as to the exact role the EU should play has led to a dead end in military policy. For that reason, the military issue has to a large degree been pushed aside in favor of focusing on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

The root cause of the European Union's foreign policy woes is its identity crisis: power is too decentralized for it to be a full-fledged super-state, but the union is also too integrated to be a mere association of member states. Though there is a trend in EU policy to forming a single federalist state, there is also resistance on the part of members to relinquish their independence. Each still has its own policies and wants its own voice to be heard. For example, during the Gulf War in 1991, the member states each adopted a different position. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Britain was strongly in favor of using force in order to defend Saudi Arabia from takeover. The country therefore placed a significant military contingent under American command. France also committed its military, but more strongly emphasized a diplomatic resolution so that good relations with the Arab oil producing countries could be maintained. Germany, however, did not send its troops because of constitutional limits as well as a postwar tradition of pacifism. Ireland remained neutral throughout the crisis, but Belgium, alongside Spain and Portugal, stood in complete opposition to Britain and France's actions. Not only did they refuse to allow any of their naval vessels to be used for most operations, Belgium even refused to sell ammunition to the British.<sup>1</sup> The European Community's inconsistent response demonstrates its failure to act as a strong united body.

Even at attempts to bring about peace to regions in conflict, the indecisiveness of the EC greatly diminished its role as influential leader. Europe's failure to resolve the civil war in the Balkans was a critical indicator of its inability to settle conflict. Yugoslavia was created after the First World War and included several states with different ethnic traditions. Following the Second World War, internal ethnic, religious and nationalist tensions were controlled by the Tito regime. However, at the end of the cold war, these tensions soon prevailed and in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. The Serbs living in the region rejected the declaration and took control of Croatia. Similarly, when Bosnia voted for its own independence in 1992, Serb troops declared a "Serbian Republic" and implemented a program of ethnic cleansing against the Muslims and Croats.

The European position had originally been to try to keep Yugoslavia united, but due to German pressure, the EC's official position shifted to support the new states of Slovenia and Croatia. This move consequently undermined the EU's credibility among the Serbs, and as a result, Europe was unable to broker a ceasefire between the parties. Europe sent in unarmed monitors, imposed sanctions on Serbia, and supported an arms embargo on Bosnian Muslims, all in the hopes of bringing stability to the region. Nevertheless, it wasn't until the 1995 American-led NATO strikes and the U.S.-brokered peace accords signed in Dayton, Ohio, that quiet came to the region.<sup>2</sup> Europe's "wishy-washy" opinions and shifting allegiance had caused it to lose its status as a functioning player on the world stage.

### EDC

In the 1950's, attempts were made at forming a European army. Known as the European Defense Community, this French proposal was to have also included a common Minister of Defense for the European countries. This would

<sup>1</sup> McCormick, J. *Understanding the European Union*, p. 206

<sup>2</sup> McCormick, J. *ibid.*, p. 204

have meant a united European foreign policy and a push towards the establishment of a united Europe. Britain, however, was opposed to the idea, and the proposal for the EDC eventually died in 1954 when the French National Assembly turned it down.<sup>3</sup> The failure on the part of France to achieve the support of its own government demonstrates the complications the EU has to face in attempting to pool sovereignty.

### EPC

In 1969 at the Hague Summit, the EC decided once again to try to politically unite European countries. In 1970, the policy of European Political Cooperation was agreed upon by the leaders. An intergovernmental Council of Ministers comprised of six foreign ministers from the member states would meet to discuss and coordinate foreign policy. However, EPC was only a voluntary agreement, and since no laws were adopted on foreign policy, the participating countries could still act independently. Furthermore, the policy was neither integrated into the other European treaties nor did it create any new institutions. This demonstrates that the original intent of the pact was to discuss how foreign policy should be agreed upon rather than what that policy should be. The responsibilities as leader of the council shifted every sixth month so that each country could have a chance at the helm. For larger countries such as Britain and France, providing leadership posed few problems. But for the smaller or neutral countries such as Ireland and Luxembourg, policy coordination was difficult.<sup>4</sup>

### CFSP

The 1993 Treaty on European Union, also known as the Maastricht Treaty, meant a new political reality for Europe. The treaty establishes three policies that would pave the way for European political integration: 1) A reformed and stronger European Community; 2) a Common Security and Foreign Policy; 3) and increased cooperation in home affairs and justice (JHA).<sup>5</sup> These “pillars” would bring the European Union ever closer to becoming a single entity. But it is the second pillar, the creation of the CFSP, which is most significant for political union. The establishment of a common foreign policy demonstrates a shared attitude towards world affairs. Furthermore, by limiting the member states’ ability to formulate their own policy, the Treaty is also diminishing their individual sovereignty for the sake of strengthening the Union. Article 15 of Maastricht expresses the intent of the EC: “The Council shall adopt common positions. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions”.<sup>6</sup> As opposed to EPC, where the Council of Ministers searches for ways to coordinate foreign policy, it is the expressed purpose of the CFSP to *dictate* the foreign policy of all the member states. The Treaty later underwent many revisions that increased the cohesive effect of the CFSP. For instance, the Amsterdam Treaty saw the creation of the role of High Representative for the CFSP. This official would signify a single voice for the member states to the effect that such a move would also improve the efficacy and profile of the Union’s foreign policy.

A major component of the CFSP is the creation of a common defense policy. The European Security and Defense Policy, as it is known, brings about important consequences. Under this policy, should the EC and member states decide to do so, they could set up a united military. However, from the developments of the Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999, it is apparent that that is not the direction in which the EU is heading. The issue that drew the most attention at that conference was not the creation of a strong defending army, but the development of crisis management tasks. Known as the Petersberg tasks, these include humanitarian and rescue operations in addition to peacekeeping and combat-force tasks. The EU’s objective is not to establish a strong defense, but to enhance its ability to respond to and resolve world crises. Therefore, the focus of the EC on crisis management demonstrates its plans to become a strong figure in world politics. In the words of the Council, “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”.<sup>7</sup>

There is even an indication that the EU has no real intention of creating a strong military even for the purposes of peacekeeping by the fact that civilian crisis management is a major focus of the European Commission, while military options are not. Four civilian areas have been targeted by the Feira European Council:

<sup>3</sup> McCormick, J. *ibid.*, p. 205

<sup>4</sup> McCormick, J. *ibid.*, p. 205

<sup>5</sup> McCormick, J. *ibid.*, p. 80

<sup>6</sup> European Communities, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union”, p. 17

<sup>7</sup> Council of the European Union, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy”.

### 1. Police

Member states have committed themselves to provide 5000 policemen by the year 2003 for crisis management. Additionally, they should be able to deploy 1000 of them within thirty days if the need arises.

### 2. Rule of law

A goal has been set to appoint 200 experts to deal in crisis management. Programs have also been developed to strengthen the administration of justice in conflict centers. Additionally, as a means for resolving the lack of readily available personnel, the commission has launched a program for setting up a network of training institutions in member states that would equip personnel for deployment in peacekeeping missions. The training modules would need to be compatible not only with each other, but with those of the UN as well.

### 3. Civilian administration

Based on its own experiences, the European Commission has attempted to identify key areas for support to civilian administration facing crisis. The Commission is currently examining the *twinning model* that is being used with applicant countries in order to derive information regarding the building up of resources for deployment in crisis regions.

### 4. Civil protection

The Council has adopted a *Community Mechanism* that would provide for the co-ordination of national civil protection bodies and early warning and information exchange. It would also establish co-operation for the training of civil protection personnel and the formation of necessary databases.<sup>8</sup>

This focus on crisis management sheds some light on the EU's direction. Among the improvements made to its conflict management policies, the EC plans to ensure compatibility between EU and UN programs so that the two can work together. This is important since much of Europe's conflict prevention activities are executed through the UN. The EU contributes the most to the UN's regular budget. Though as of 1999 it shared only 28% of world GNP, it contributed 37% of the 2001-2003 UN budget. This can be compared to the United States whose share of GNP was 28.6%, yet it only contributed 23%. Additionally, between the years 2001 and 2003, the EU contributed 40% of the fund for UN peacekeeping missions, compared to the American contribution of 28%.<sup>9</sup> In terms of the missions themselves, in February 2001, the EU provided 6,768, 17%, of the total personnel for UN operations.<sup>10</sup>

Another indication of the EU's avoidance of military campaigns is its program for conflict prevention. The program states that the EU will "set clear political priorities for preventive actions, improve its early warning, action and policy coherence, enhance its instruments for long and short-term prevention, [and] build effective partnerships for prevention".<sup>11</sup> However, there is no mention of the formation of any military force. Furthermore, in an official publication that describes the "main root causes of conflicts" the EU lists poverty, demographic pressure and competition for scarce resources.<sup>12</sup> But this does not include the entire scope of causes. The factors listed here are social, and can be solved through humanitarian means. What the EU publication leaves out are problems that can only be solved through military means. One such instance was the war in the former Yugoslavia. No one would suggest that providing aid to the Serbs would have calmed the ethnic tensions. The fighting there was only quelled after a forceful military strike led by the United States. The EU's failure to mention military action in its program suggests its desire to avoid military intervention; a symptom of a weak position in regards to international conflicts. There is little doubt that this is due to disagreement within its member states as to what kind of leading role the EU should play. This is easily reflected in the dispute over whether to strike Iraq during the Gulf War. Furthermore, such "Atlanticist" countries as Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal strongly support cooperation with the United States. Consequently, they would back the U.S. in military strikes if the need arose. However, they are at a standoff with "Europeanist" France, Italy, Spain, and Germany, who push for the independence of European policy. These countries would hesitate to send a military force unless European interests were threatened.

<sup>8</sup> Europa: The European Union Online, "Civilian Crisis Management".

<sup>9</sup> Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, "EU-UN Statistics", p. 1

<sup>10</sup> Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, "EU-UN: Helping keep the peace", p. 2

<sup>11</sup> Council of the European Union, "2356th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 11-12 June 2001".

<sup>12</sup> Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, "EU-UN: Helping keep the peace", p. 2

## WEU and a European army

Another result of the Maastricht treaty is the revitalization of the Western European Union. Originally known as the Western Union, this security pact dealt with the collective self-defense of Britain, France, and the Benelux countries. In 1949, with the creation of NATO, the WU's functions were shifted in order to avoid the duplication of roles. Five years following the creation of NATO, the WU became the Western European Union as Germany and Italy joined. One of its objectives was to allow Germany to contribute to the defense of Europe without taking part in a full-fledged European army.<sup>13</sup> Despite the establishment of the Union, it was NATO that played the main role in providing security to Europe.

Throughout the 1990's, the WEU began expanding throughout Europe. Accordingly, it was declared at Maastricht to be "an integral part of the development of the [European] Union." Today, there are ten full members of the WEU: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Britain. It also has five observers, three associate members, and ten "associate partners" from Eastern Europe.<sup>14</sup>

Though the WEU has no troops of its own, it does have several advantages. First, it has a system of governing bodies that have been refined over the 50 years of its existence. It has a presidency and a Council of Ministers that is made up of the foreign and defense ministers of the member states. There is a Permanent Council of ambassadors that meets weekly in Brussels to discuss WEU activities, and a Parliamentary Assembly that meets twice a year in Paris. Second, the EU could use the WEU to develop its own defense policy that is independent of the United States. Third, not all member states of the EU are part of the WEU. Therefore, the EU could use the Western European Union to develop its defense capabilities while at the same time respecting the neutrality of Ireland, Finland, and Sweden (McCormick, 212). Despite the potential for the EU to use the WEU as a springboard for establishing a full-fledged military, disagreement between the member states has led to a standstill in such developments. The WEU's secretary-general in 1991, Willem van Eekelen, felt that the organization should be absorbed into the EU. His successor, Jose Cutileiro, argued that it should become the military arm of the EU, while still remaining a separate entity. Additionally, while some leaders feel that the WEU should develop into the defense arm of the EU, others feel that it should become a branch of NATO.<sup>15</sup> Because of this lack of resolve, for the present time, the WEU has been relegated to peacekeeping tasks and crisis management.

We can therefore see that indecisiveness within the EU, in regards to its policy as well as its nature, has greatly weakened its ability to become a major player in world affairs. This indecision has not only caused it to lose credibility, but has also resulted in the EU being unable to present a strong policy. The disagreement from within as to the nature of the role it is to play has forced the decision makers to take a wavering stance. For that reason, even when there is a desire to build up a strong military, such an action is prevented because of the need to accommodate the opinions of the member states. The only thing left for the EU to do is to focus on policies that would not precipitate controversy: peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. ■

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<sup>13</sup> McCormick, J. *ibid.*, p. 211

<sup>14</sup> McCormick, J. *ibid.*, p. 212

<sup>15</sup> McCormick, J. *ibid.*, p. 213



## ▶ FIT TO PRINT

## A Man of the Times Answers Back

For someone who's received all too many letters featuring the words "yemach shemo" after his name (causing him relief to be back enjoying the relative "safety" of his Metro Section column and, finally, to decline most invitations to participate in public Jewish forums on Israel and the media), Clyde Haberman is remarkably soft-spoken, friendly, even self-deprecating. (He began our dialogue with a reminder to his novice interviewer that while "everyone loves to talk about grand concepts of journalism, there are a few basic things like: Don't bring along a felt-tipped pen, the water's gonna wipe out your notes."). Sure, he's very opinionated and can be quite frank, but despite his prestigious position at what is likely the world's most influential newspaper, Haberman comes across as fundamentally down-to-earth, modest and – despite the tough front he puts up – evidently affected by the beating he's taken, like most other *New York Times* correspondents (especially in the Middle East), from many members of his own Jewish community.

Though Haberman obviously differs from many Jews, particularly religious and political rightists, on a whole variety of issues, he clearly values his Jewishness and considers himself one who is sympathetic to Israel, something borne out in the emotional language of two particularly notable pieces last year: his front-page article, "As Violence Rises in Mideast, Its People Sink Into Despair," on the day he left Israel (September 9), and his "Do You Get It Now?" essay three days later, in the wake of the terror attacks on the United States. (Also, while he may seem quite adamant in his "evenhandedness" at various points in our interview, in other discussions, Haberman unreservedly disagrees with the *Times's* refusal to use geographic terms like Judea/Samaria, and expresses irritation when made aware that his own use of words like "terrorist" were replaced with "militant" in the *International Herald Tribune*, the overseas daily of the *Times* and the *Washington Post*.) His family and education's early influence on his worldview emerges in the uniquely intimate and quite telling portrait he generously provides here for a readership with its own deeply-held, often critical outlook on the *New York Times's* Mideast coverage.



Clyde Haberman, in Jerusalem's Zion Square last December, listening to speakers during the New York politicians' blitz solidarity visit

Clyde Haberman has been writing the "NYC" column for the *Times* since September 1995, when he returned to New York after nearly 13 years as a foreign correspondent. As the *Times's* Tokyo bureau chief from 1983 to 1988, Haberman mostly covered Japan and South Korea, but also traveled extensively to other parts of Asia to write about political changes in the Philippines and pro-democracy uprisings in South Korea. Subsequently based in Rome, he spent a great deal of time in Eastern Europe covering the collapse of Communism, and then in the Middle East during the Persian Gulf War. Finally, heading the *Times's* Jerusalem bureau from 1991 to 1995, he covered Israel's historic agreement with the PLO and the dramatic rise of Islamist terrorism. Before joining the *Times's* foreign staff in 1982, Haberman was a Metro reporter, and for several years headed the newspaper's City Hall Bureau. Earlier, he had been an editor for the Week in Review section, and recently, after the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, he wrote the news summary in "A Nation Challenged", the special daily supplement. He has been with the paper since January 1977, before which he worked for the *New York Post*, covering a wide variety of local and national stories, including the bloody Attica prison rebellion in 1971 and Jimmy Carter's successful 1976 campaign.

- YU people are obviously familiar with your writings, we read the *Times* religiously – but [we could use] a little bit of a background, in terms of where you come from... where you're family is from, what role Jewish observance has played in your life and in the life of your family.

My family is from a little town in the Carpathian mountains called Kalnik, near Munkacz – it's now called Mukacevo, its in Ukraine now, western Ukraine. When my father was born there... in 1912 – there was no Czechoslovakia yet – it was still part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it became part of

Czechoslovakia; after the war it got kicked around a bit, it went to Hungary for a little while, and it was one of these little strips of land that belonged to this or that country depending on who won which war... **[Both my parents] came from very religious families**, and they came here separately in the early 30s, [and] married. I think my father was an illegal alien, he stowed away on a ship in New York harbor – I think the statute of limitations has run out; so has life, unfortunately. Anyway, they were quite observant.

- When you say observant, they were Orthodox?

[Yes,] but you know, with a more modern twist in the sense that – not that there were any bends in the [observance, like] keep[ing] kosher at home and non-kosher out, or any other accommodations – we were fully kosher and all the rest, but it was clear, in my father’s family I could see from the few remnants that survived the war, and from old pictures, [though they] were chassidim – I forget what sect... – my father rejected all that, that he didn’t want to do, and he became more religious as time went on, but basically we grew up in an Orthodox household. There were some exceptions, we would answer the phone on *Shabbos* –

- I assume they probably had to work on Saturday and –

I think my father early on had to work, and during my own rebellious period it was a source of amusement to me at one point... and later understanding [that] you had to make a living. But at one point he worked in a butcher shop, and there’s a picture of a very dashing, young Leo Haberman in this butcher shop, and **there is a very clear sign of pork bellies at some price or another – doesn’t mean he ate them**, but he certainly worked around it... (I’ll leave the judgments to others, I don’t make the judgments...). But we always kept kosher.

And **I went to Yeshiva Rabbi Moshe Soloveitchik**, which has since stopped functioning, but is now... I believe an auditorium of YU... (If you go to 186, between Saint Nick and, I think, Audubon Avenue – I dropped by there a few times, out of nostalgia)... The first yeshiva I went to was called “Torah ve’Emunah” – that was in the Bronx, and we moved from the south Bronx where I was born to northern Manhattan, [the] Inwood section (just north of where you guys are), and during the years we lived there I went to Soloveitchik. My older brother went to a yeshiva called Salanter in the central Bronx, and my younger sister did not – she went to public school. (I don’t know why they did that, I think it was **a classic sexist thing of not giving the girl** –).

None of us, to my parents’ endless... dismay – **we all fell away from [Orthodoxy]**. I’m probably the closest – I know I am – to Jewish life; I mean, I’m not *frum* in any way, but culturally definitely, whatever that means).

- *When would you say -*

Pretty early, around fourteen. I found – I can’t give explanations as to why, it’s easy to do pop psychology and say it was this or that, or it was one overbearing *rebbe*, you know, who was an absolute pain –

- *Do you think that that was a factor – generally...*

No, a couple of people specifically, but again it was a different era. Remember, we’re talking – when I was graduated from Soloveitchik I had just turned thirteen, my birthday is in May and graduation was in June, ’58. So we’re talking well before any of you guys were alive, probably even before many of your teachers now were alive – I hate to do the old-man routine – but maybe if I grew up in that atmosphere, and it was 2001 or 2002, it would be different. **There’s a much more intense religious revivalism now**, in society; it’s kind of foolish to pretend that we’re not products to some degree of our circumstances and what’s around us.

[Religiosity] wasn’t that strong, at least I didn’t feel it as strongly, in ’58. That having been said, as I occasionally bumped into or heard from old classmates, most of my 35 or classmates seemed to me to have remained far more religious-traditional, whatever word you want to put on it, than I did.

- *The students at the schools that you went to at that time, were their families mostly Orthodox?*

Mostly, some not; some did it because they didn’t want to send their kids to public school, not because they were dangerous or any of the reasons now, but they wanted to maintain a Jewish environment. Some of them – a fair number of them – were Holocaust survivors. Again, when I was born in ’45... there was a clear sense of Jewish identity for some, [though] I wish I could go back and speak to the parents of some of these friends, because I wouldn’t be surprised if there was also a great rejection of religion on the part of some of them, even while sending their kids to Jewish schools – and not just Hebrew school after secular school – **there had to have been a number of them who were cursing G-d at that point.**

- *Did you find that the Holocaust played a role as far as -*

Not as large as you would think, given the era. I mean, the Holocaust has always been a presence in my life in a funny way, I mean, somebody who was born ten days after the war ended in Europe... so clearly I experienced none of this, my parents experienced none

of this having come to this country in the early 30's. But most of my father's family was wiped out – some of my mother's, but mainly my father's. But more than that, just given the tenor of the times, **I mean, I'm older than the State of Israel.** There were kids, whose parents – you know, the blue tattoo on the left arm was very much a part of my growing up, a couple of my classmates were born in DP camps... The oldest of them would have been born in '44, so clearly by then the Germans were in retreat...

- *But you didn't feel any reaction [to the Holocaust], take away from the whole Jewish -*

No, not at all, not at all. I just wasn't as "impressed" by it as perhaps I should have been... I was already aware of a certain level of religious hypocrisy in my feeling, I was a little bit bothered by rather intolerant, **"because-that's-the-way-it-is"** responses to reasonable questions, from inquiring young minds about why this and why that.

I have a vivid memory in my eighth grade, after we all began to decide on we're heading afterwards. –The Talmudic Academy still exist in YU? MTA's still there?

- *Sure, sure. A few branches subsequently closed down, but the main thing -*

Okay, I wasn't sure. It wasn't as segmented then. When some of us chose TA, I was in a group that went elsewhere – I wound up going to Bronx [High School of] Science – and I'll never forget my eighth grade teacher (for sure not alive anymore, but I won't name him anyway), asking **all the boys who were going to go to TA to sit down front** – "over here on the left," I remember. I don't remember numbers, let's say there were a dozen out of the 35 or so, and "the rest of you," he said, **"you can go to hell."** And that was actually a verbatim quote –

- *Really?*

Yeah. Again, it's glib to say, "Aha, that was the moment when..." – that was the "aha" moment – but **it always stayed with me.** Let's just say I wasn't impressed with his worldview.

- *So would you say that your formal Jewish education ended –*

I continued by taking studies at the Jewish Theological Seminary, after Bronx Science... for about a year, and

then I stopped. We could debate whether I stopped out of laziness – **I won't deny that there's a lazy streak in me** – it could be that... I can't explain it, I can't even remember now.

- *So you didn't find something in the Conservative stream, that you felt lacking in –?*

No. **The shul I chose not to go to is an Orthodox shul.** I never found – Conservative, the Masorti movement actually does appeal to me in many ways; at one point, where we lived... there was a Conservative synagogue we visited, it was really the only near one in Inwood, within relatively easy walking distance. But I never, never found any appeal in the Reform movement – **I don't even begin to understand Reconstructionism,** I don't even know what it means – I just found something sterile in the Reform part, it was just a little too like a church for me. And they're changing too, its pretty clear they're reintroducing elements of [ritual], including *kippot* and all the rest.

I'll give you an example of the kind of thinking that turned me off. It happened with my father in his later years. They had moved, in the great Jewish tradition of that generation, to Florida. And he suffered a stroke, from which he never recovered very well. My mother told me at one point – and at this point I probably was in Israel, where I was based, you know – anyway, to move around he needed this electric-powered chair... Walking would have been too hard. [He] walked to this *shul*, it was about six-tenths of a mile from where they lived. Not a long distance, in New York blocks, we're talking maybe twelve or twelve-and-a-half blocks. Not a big deal. But for a recovering stroke victim, you might as well have asked him to cross the Sahara.

But **going to shul was huge – huge – in my father's life,** the central part of his existence. And so he began to take the chair to *shul*... And one day, some fellow congregation members began to berate him for operating this electric vehicle on *Shabbos*. (My parents never got into the *Shabbat* pronunciation). According to [*Halacha*], those folks were correct. [But] **my blood boiled when I heard this** story, because that to me is mindless religion... Is it better that he stop join the congregation? I mean, one can debate this – I know – for ever and ever, I'm not casting judgments on those that disagree with me. It just bothers me – and that's one of the things that always irritated me, was a rather dogmatic approach to religion – I just didn't like the judgment that was clearly being made by them, and I

thought that it was wrongheaded. **Better to stay home and daven by yourself**, than to join the community because you are bending a rule – it just seemed to me that the hierarchy of values is sometime askew. **That it's a rigorous adherence to formula rather than to spirit.**

To the degree that religion can do that, that's the part that I guess I resented. Now, of course, a good argument has been used, "**How do you get to choose, Haberman?** Who appointed you?" But that example is the point that I've always had a problem with, frankly, since I was of reasonable thinking age, and that included back in school. It just seemed to me, we were being told always "because, because, because" – and that may have changed in recent years, but at that point, there was just an awful lot of 'this is how it is.' Catholic friends who went to parochial school found the same absence of satisfaction... from the nuns and the priests, the same "this is the way it is." I don't pretend to know a lot about Catholic education. But it seems to me that [Rudy Giuliani] was among those who emerged saying "Okay, you defer to higher authority" because that's how you define freedom, saying freedom is deferring to a higher authority. That's a boy with a real Catholic upbringing...

- *And you didn't find that you could reach your own balance between -*

Yeah, I never did. **Maybe I didn't search hard enough.** I occasionally go to *shul* now, certainly on *yahrzeits* but even other times –

- *Your parents were accepting of your –*

They didn't like it, no. They weren't accepting. My father was really raging. He already had my brother fall away, and he was not at all happy... I mean, Judaism has managed to absorb a fairly broad range of religious views over the years. One of my concerns now, actually, is whether or not we're losing some of that, whether there are certain orthodoxies that one is not allowed to question anymore. It's almost as if, in this period of greatest prosperity and freedom and tolerance that Jews have ever known, the sense of embattlement seems singularly high. Part of it probably has to do with fears about the future, because of intermarriage, high rates – I know that well – and I understand it completely –

- *Do you oppose intermarriage?*

No – how can I? – **I have intermarried. But I understand the objections.** I understand my parents' complete distress, total distress over it. But it wasn't something I embraced and went racing for... I just happened to fall in love with a particular woman. Particularly my mother, who got to know her better because my father's stoke kept him from thinking very clearly and functioning very well – he did not have a graceful last decade of his life – [she] began to realize that **at some level people are people...**

But intermarriage is a concern, I understand the concern. I just have been surprised that there's a broad streak of what to me are rigid orthodoxies – on Israel, on religious observance... [more] than I would have expected at this point in our lives, and it's almost as though many Jews are... troubled by, disbelieving in the general acceptance we have. **The State of Israel, while embattled, is still pretty darn strong,** clearly the dominant military power in the Middle East –

- *Somehow that hasn't kept it from feeling and being vulnerable...*

Absolutely vulnerable, and Israel does have and probably always will have existential threats – I don't doubt it. **But sometimes the threats aren't quite as large as some would have us all believe. And here we are, where we have eleven or twelve Jews in the United States Senate** – something like that – including two from a state that hardly has a significant Jewish population, Wisconsin, where a Jew ran for vice president two years ago, and unless there's this hidden wellspring of antisemitism that we've all missed, his presence on the ticket seems not to be the reason the ticket lost. Could be, in a race that close you never know – but... that's because of electoral peculiarities in the American system, that ticket got the most votes from the popular vote. If we ran our democracy the way almost all other democracies were run, a Jew would be vice president right now.

- *Do you think Joe Lieberman will be on the ticket in 2004?*

Who knows. I mean, **you might as well ask me to pick next year's World Series winner.** I have no clue.

- *But you obviously don't think he's out of the running, definitely not because he's Jewish?*

No, definitely not because he's Jewish, at least with him. I mean, **could the Satmar *rebbe's* son run and**



**expect to win? I don't think so.** Could Colin Powell run and break the race barrier? Absolutely. Could Al Sharpton? No.... All I'm saying is, it depends which Jew, and Joe Lieberman is interesting. You know, he's not me, he's not some Jew who goes through the entire year without wearing a *kippa*. All I'm saying is, if [his being Jewish] hurt, somebody has to show me how, because the election was lost not because – it was because of electoral peculiarities; they won the popular vote.

So, despite all this, you get a sense of embattlement among Jews that I have not seen in a long time, and much of me understands it, but some of me is troubled by it because it strikes me as, you know, are we a people that can't take yes for an answer? And there's some element of truth to that, perhaps we can't take yes for an answer. We're happier to some degree being – I swear to G-d, there are people (I know its going to sound terrible, it'll read terrible, you'll get letters, I'll get letters when it appears in the paper, I know it) – **I swear to G-d, there are Jews who are more comfortable with [there being] Jewish victims in Israel.** That doesn't mean that they want to see Jews die necessarily; I'm not saying that they sit there praying for people [to die] – no, that's ridiculous – but there's a certain comfort level with “we're the victims.” On one level, we are, but not nearly as much as some would have us all believe.

*- You've also spoken in the past about the Yad Vashem aspect – that being the first site, when Israel hosts diplomats... -*

Yeah, yeah, that bothered me... While I was a regular correspondent in Israel, from '91 to '95, among other things, it was a period when Israel established or reestablished relations with countries that had basically boycotted Israel for decades. Some of this had to do with peace talks that began in '91 in Madrid, but some of it also had to do with – the Soviet Union had just collapsed, and a lot of [its former members] suddenly felt free, and some of it was to establish ties with Israel, some of it was in fact Israel benefiting from a stereotype, it was sort of exploiting the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, if you will. Some of these countries apparently thought that perhaps good relations with Israel was a road to Washington's heart, and that Jews are very influential in America, so you better get friendly with them, and that meant getting friendly with Israel. So to some degree, Israel didn't mind exploiting, if you will, a certain antisemitic concept.

Anyway, suddenly there were relations with all sorts of countries, all sorts of prime ministers and foreign ministers and presidents were making their first visits to Israel. And – I didn't cover many of these, they're not news for us, although I did do stories on occasion on how Israel was establishing relations with a lot of countries, but I just didn't write every time somebody showed up, [as] every country gets visitors. But I did [periodically]; as a general rule, the itinerary was: brief welcoming ceremony at Ben-Gurion Airport, go to the hotel (usually the King David), drop your bags, and immediately go off to Yad Vashem, to go see the Holocaust museum and memorials there. And then came the usual round of normal diplomatic stuff.

It began to trouble me; I don't remember when along the line, but somewhere it began to dawn on me that Israel was basically saying to the people, this is what we came from, you have to understand us because this is us. And part of me began to reject that. Again, I understand why they're doing it – some of it makes sense, but part of me began to feel, this is not the centrality of Jewish existence. It is being made the most central focus of our lives, and that troubled me, because clearly we had several thousand years of rich, rich traditions... I guess the point I want to really make is, **I no longer felt it right to define ourselves by those who would have destroyed us**, and that's what I felt these obligatory Yad Vashem trips were doing.

I made this point in a speech I gave soon after I returned to New York from overseas (Israel being my last stop) in '95 – I gave a talk to a group called the Jerusalem Club, something like that – and former Mayor Koch –

*- The Jerusalem Foundation? Teddy Kollek's organization –*

Maybe the Jerusalem Foundation, maybe you're right, I think you're right... And former Mayor Koch was in the audience – he and I knew each other, I had covered him in the late 70s, early 80s, before I went overseas – I mentioned this thing about Yad Vashem, basically saying what I said just now, and he was very troubled by it, and challenged me during the question-and-answer period, about what other point is more central, what is more important than the Holocaust? And I thought, you know, I understand it – some of it may be generational (at that point I was 50, part of the post-war generation, he is [older] by more than 20 years, he's late 70s now, about 77-78, he fought in World War II).

I can't expect a nonreligious person like him to feel much differently. Again, I keep saying this – I understand it, I understand it, but the truth is, I do – I don't believe I have a monopoly on wisdom. I just feel, again, that certain orthodoxies are being imposed on us and some of them I don't quite understand. There's this controversy starting now... I haven't been to the museum yet to see it..., over some exhibit that's coming up at the Jewish Museum, over some art exhibit that uses Nazi icons. And I already see that some professional Jews are starting the drumbeat of "we can't allow this." To me it's very reminiscent of the screaming over the sensational exhibit at the Brooklyn Museum that some Catholics did. I believe somebody was troubled by the fact that there's a... concentration camp made out of Legos; this trivializes it. This is [ridiculous]; I don't understand, why is that trivializing? Yeah, if there were dancing guards, maybe – I mean, how come nobody's picketed "The Producers"? When the movie came out in '68, that was truly shocking. We were not that removed from the Holocaust, not 55 years later as we are now. But I thought it was hysterically funny. I don't know, I think there are people that have an investment in outrage.

- Jonathan Mark wrote in the Jewish Week that your writing recently has been a "textbook," a "one-man crash course in journalism." How did you come to this field?

Well, I think Jonathan Mark was more than generous with those remarks. He wrote them back in August, when I was back in Jerusalem on temporary assignment. It was obviously gratifying to read his words, but I'm sure you can find plenty of people who absolutely cannot stand anything I write. That's the nature of the game. I became interested in journalism as a freshman at the City College of New York, back in 1962. At the time, **I had no interest in newspapers** at all, except as a reader, and I wasn't exactly a voracious reader of anything other than the *New York Post's* sports pages. Newspapers reflected the city's sociology back then a lot more than I believe they do now. In part, that's because there were still 7 or 8 daily papers in the city in 1962, a number that would shrink to 3 within 4 years (and later grow to 4 with *Newsday's* entry into the city market). So readers of the *Daily News*, the *Daily Mirror* and the *Journal-American* were likely to be working-class Irish and Italian. Upper East side blue bloods favored the *Herald Tribune*. The *Times* drew tweedier, Ivy League types. And the *Post*, then a liberal paper and a far cry from the screaming right-wing sheet it is today, was, if you will, the "Jewish paper." But I

wasn't fully aware of all that back then. Mostly what I knew was that the *Post* had great sports writers.

In my first year at CCNY, I was drawn to an ad looking for people to join the main college paper, called the *Campus*. I guess **I'm living proof that advertising works**. The ad was cleverly written, and made "newspapering" sounds terribly glamorous. So I applied, and was immediately smitten. I loved every aspect of it. I loved the camaraderie and the sense of romance. I discovered that I greatly enjoyed writing, and found that sometimes I could even do it well. And when I realized that one can do what he loves and even get paid for it (not very well paid, perhaps, but paid), I was absolutely hooked. Forty years have passed, and I've never been seriously tempted to do anything else. Perhaps it's a sign of my basic immaturity.

- How would you compare your experiences as bureau chief in Jerusalem with other postings abroad?

Comparing different assignments can be difficult. It's like comparing countries. Each one has aspects that are both appealing and unappealing. My three main foreign assignments were in Tokyo, for five years-plus; Rome, three years-plus; and Jerusalem, for four years. From each of those cities, I covered many other places, especially during my time in Rome, which coincided with the collapse of Communism in eastern Europe and then the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf war. I spent most of [the] time outside Italy. While living in Tokyo, I also covered South Korea intimately, and spent time elsewhere in Asia, especially the Philippines when the dictator Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown.

Rome and Tokyo, each in different ways, were great cities to live in. Tokyo was a more fascinating place from a work perspective, perhaps in part because it was my first foreign assignment (and it holds the same allure as the first person you ever fell in love with) and in part because Japan was such an alien culture for me that every day involved new discoveries -- some wonderful, some not so wonderful, but all of them exciting.

Israel was different. At the same time, it was familiar and unfamiliar. **I think many American Jews, if they're honest with themselves, are surprised at how alien Israel can feel at times.** It's far less Western and more Middle Eastern than many Americans are used to. I'd been to Israel before, but

only as a short-term visitor. I loved living in Jerusalem. So did my family. But I found that familiar/unfamiliar dichotomy to be disconcerting at times. And [to] be perfectly honest, and at the risk of offending some of your readers, **I can't imagining living there full time except in Jerusalem.** I'm a city boy, and all the other Israeli cities hold little or no appeal for me.

For the *New York Times* correspondent, Israel presents another problem. You can't get away, except of course on vacation. **We cover the country so closely that the correspondent simply can't leave**, as the correspondents for most other papers can, to see what's cooking elsewhere in the region. The pressure cooker of daily life in Israel, the relentlessness of the pace and the inability to periodically go elsewhere combine to make it an extremely demanding place. Israelis themselves, as you know, feel a great need to get out from time to time to ease the pressure. The *Times* correspondent is no different. Only he, or she, can't pick up and leave.

There are a couple of other points that make the Israel assignment special. You could consider them a combination good news/bad news story. There is so much interest in news from there, certainly at my paper, that you are filing (our term for sending dispatches) almost every day. That has been especially true over the last year and a half of endless fighting. You could call that good news, because **it means you're in the paper all the time, often on Page One.** It's not so good news from the perspective of being able to step back and take broader looks at the place. I felt that keenly when I went back there for two months last summer. One of the great joys of being a *Times* foreign correspondent was that for the most part, you could set your own agenda each day. **In Israel, the agenda usually sets you. It can be oppressive sometimes.**

The other big area of difference is the nature of the readership. You don't need me to tell you that Jewish readers of the *Times*, of whom there is no shortage, read the stories from there microscopically, **almost "Talmudically."** Many also pick up the paper each day spoiling for a fight. They hunt for errors, no matter how petty. They hunt high and low for signs of anti-Israel or even anti-Jewish bias. I assure you that if you read a daily newspaper that way, you will be certain to find whatever sin you set out searching for.

This is not to say that Italian-Americans didn't find fault with me when I was in Rome. Any article that dealt with the Mafia (and there weren't all that many) was sure to draw letters from Italian-Americans offended that I once again bought into the "myth" of the Mafia. It was no myth. Ethnic Japanese, Koreans and others had their own sensitivities.

But nothing compared with the assaults directed at the correspondent in Jerusalem. I don't want to fight old battles here. In fact, I refuse to do so. Let me just say that I found many readers to be unobjective, often ill-informed, imbued with an outsized sense of possessiveness when it came to the *Times* and – sad to say – utterly lacking in anything approaching good manners. Indeed, often enough, **they lacked anything approaching decency when it came to expressing their views.** People are usually shock[ed] when I tell some of the foul invectives that have been hurled at me (and sometimes my family). So, yes, that part is not pleasant. Then again, it shows that people are reading you. I guess that's the good-news side of it.

*- Do you feel in terms of reporting in general, and your reporting in particular, do you feel that Jews, if you could say, obsess, over details -*

...Over Israel, over details. I'm told by people at the Foreign Desk that **it's not unique to Jews**, I'm told that – Indians living here, I'm told that either those who are already American citizens or relatively new immigrants are singularly sensitive to our coverage of south Asia. And that precedes the current crisis, I heard this a couple of years ago... that it's anti-India, that it slants toward Pakistan. I don't see it, I think you don't see it. I don't know how closely you read it.

I gave another speech... early on after my return, out in Seattle, at the Henry Jackson School of Government out there... that dealt with the Middle East. One of the first questions I got when it came to Q&A was a guy... asking why are we so biased against Irish Catholics in our coverage of the conflict there. And our fellow who was there at the time, and old friend of mine, Jim Clarity, who's an American Catholic of Irish background, clearly doesn't like Irish Catholics, and so, I mention that, because it suggests singular attention by that man and maybe others that, if you have a very strong conviction about a conflict that's particularly bitter – be it the Israeli-Palestinian, be it the Indian-Pakistani blood battle, I mean this is a blood rivalry, as strong as that between Israelis and Palestinians, L-rd



knows, be it the Northern Ireland troubles – you’re likely to see, if you read closely enough, something you don’t like. **If you presume ill intention on the part of the newspaper, you’re likely to see malevolent motivation in everything that’s written.** I certainly have had that thrown at me over the years – not so much during my coverage or my return this year, in fact very little – but definitely in my time there [previously].

*- Do you feel that the – a lot has been said about the historic, the Jewish predominance of the [Times]. A sort of self-consciousness [that affects reporting] -*

It’s all there. You can quote from Max Frankel’s very thoughtful piece in our 150<sup>th</sup> anniversary issue – I’m sure you saw that – there’s no question there was a self-consciousness on their part [back during World War II]; it’s certainly there, maybe there are lingering manifestations of it. I would argue that **it’s tended to work to the Jews’ collective advantage.** There’s more understanding, perhaps, of Jewish issues, because we’ve tended to cover it in a bit more detail than others because we’ve had more Jewish editors, more Jewish reporters, because Jews of my generation went into journalism in disproportionate numbers.

*- Do you personally feel that it is possible – both for the US and Israel – to effectively fight terrorism?*

...The short answer – and it will probably be so short as to be simplistic – is that the US and Israel can of course fight terrorism and sometimes defeat it. But there will no doubt be **other battles to fight the next day.** I, for one, **do not agree that Israel and the US are in the same fight.** Like it or not, agree with the label or not, Israel is still generally perceived around the world as an occupying force. The Palestinians have immediate, day-to-day (and I’d even dare add, legitimate) grievances. **This is not a defense of blowing up pizza shops in downtown Jerusalem.** Far from it. All I’m saying is that terrorism springs from many sources, not the least of them being deep-rooted despair over one’s situation. And I don’t think that Osama bin Laden’s grievances against the United States deserve to be put on a par with the Palestinians’ grievances against Israel.

[While] I understand that when it comes to specific terrorist actions there may be that feeling [that bin Laden and Arafat are comparable], I think it’s a convenient overlooking of the fact that Israel continues – **and I don’t care** what euphemism is used, has been

used over the years, “why do you call it occupied territories, they’re administered territories” – **to occupy two-and-a-half, actually three, million people** who don’t want Israel running their lives.

Now, we can argue Biblical imperative, we can debate security issues – and, L-rd knows, people who are much more knowledgeable than I am, and more importantly, Israelis, disagree on this, a little less so now – but **Israelis themselves are quite schizophrenic** on the subject. An overwhelming majority says the government has to get tough, and every poll says [the public wants it] getting tougher than it has been in cracking down on terrorism. And that’s fine. But an almost equal number of them, two-thirds or more, say they want some kind of peace agreement that will finally separate themselves from the Palestinians and [they want to] be done with the Palestinians. And if that means withdrawing largely from Judea and Samaria – or the West Bank, as some other people prefer – so be it. They don’t share other Jews’ version of Biblical imperative.

That’s why I say that the fights are not the same, despite political efforts both in Washington and Jerusalem to make them appear as one. But again, I want emphasize that I am no way justifying any form of terrorism. There are people who will **distort any expression of sympathy for the daily plight of the ordinary Palestinian** into a justification for the vicious killings that have taken place. I trust you to understand the context in which these remarks are offered, and make it clear to any of your readers who may be prone to self-serving distortions.



Many American Jews feel the media has, intentionally or not, allowed itself to be used as an anti-Israel propaganda tool

*- Do you think there is equivalence between the two sides in terms of who’s been responsible for the hostilities, who’s gone further in terms of trying to get to a final settlement?*



I think that there's no question in my mind that **Arafat deserves virtually all the blame for the failure of what happened at Camp David.**

*- And we have for the first time last week the State Department naming Fatah as, you know, having been involved in this arms shipment?*

There's no question – although some of those weapons are defensive weapons – that they –

*- They're illegal under Oslo –*

They're definitely illegal under Oslo. A lot of things being done are illegal under Oslo. **A lot of the settlements – if they are not illegal, they are certainly violating the spirit of it.** There's nobody that I know who covered [the Mideast], that thought that this continued and rather endless expansion of settlements falls remotely within the spirit of what was supposed to follow Oslo.

The argument of natural growth is to me, quite frankly, a specious argument, because it suggests that any time that **a population grows, somebody else has to make way for it.** By that logic, it means that people should leave their houses, give up territory because chassidic families have ten kids. Certain minority populations in this city have ten kids. I mean, it's government encouraging large families, it's government policy. If the Israeli government would say, "no, we're not expanding," maybe people would reconfigure the kind of families they have or make do, or build a third floor on the existing house, or do all sorts of things that people do all around the world, rather than take the next hilltop. The answer in the territories is, "we need the next hilltop," rather than **"we'll build a third floor because we have two more kids."**

*- But [at Camp David, the Israelis] did offer 95% -*

Listen, as I said, I believe Arafat is strategically – **I question what Arafat wants to do strategically...**

*- How have the events of September 11th changed you? Will New York City recuperate from this blow?*

I'm not sure I can really say that I was changed by September 11, other than much of what I've written about has obviously changed. But I assume you're not talking about that. Frankly, other than those poor souls most directly affected by the disaster, I think a lot of

the talk about how we are all changed has been overblown. There was a tendency in those first days to pronounced everything as dead: irony is dead; criticism of the government is dead; personal ambition is dead; and so on and so on. All nonsense, of course. There's unquestionably an enormous hole left in lower Manhattan, both physically and psychically. But the city didn't go out of business, for goodness sake...

*- Do you feel that Rudy Giuliani did a good job as mayor, particularly since September 11th? How will Mike Bloomberg fare?*

In general I think Giuliani was a good mayor. And no question, in the first few weeks after September 11, he performed majestically. But Giuliani's personality is such that he believes **all good originates with him,** and anyone who criticizes him is by definition the enemy (not to mention corrupt and intellectually dishonest). There certainly are New Yorkers who share that view, a large number of them Jews on the political (and possibly also religious) Right. **Some of the most ill-mannered mail that I've received has been from right-wing Jews reacting to columns critical of Rudy.** They seem to take it almost as personally as they do any negative comments about Israel, both real and imagined.

The reality is that Giuliani, while a strong leader, was also [sometimes] **an abusive one.** A good example was the way he and surrogates tried to capsize our democratic processes after September 11, with an abortive effort to suspend the November elections. The thrust of this effort was that we somehow could not get through this crisis without Giuliani at the helm. **Americans never suspended elections during even the cataclysms of the Civil War or World War II.** Now we were being told that this event was so big that we needed to upend our democratic institutions. When that effort proved a non-starter, Rudy and his allies turned to a campaign to try extending his term. That failed, too.

I think what disappointed me most was not that Giuliani would try to glorify himself during this crisis – that is part of his nature – but that many New Yorkers had so little faith in our processes and in our resilience, indeed in our democracy. For me, this readiness to trash democratic processes is at least as worrisome as the terrorists' attempts to kill us.

As for Bloomberg, let's wait and see. He's off to a fine start, in my view, even if I may disagree with him on this or that issue... I don't like making predictions, if only because I'm usually wrong.

*- Last year, Rabbi Haskel Lookstein – considered a centrist in the Orthodox community, long one who favored the Oslo peace process – joined others in calling for a Jewish boycott of the New York Times, citing the Times's "biased" coverage of the Mideast conflict.*

I will say again that I consider the *Times* coverage of Israel to be, on balance, quite fair. I say "on balance" because I think that's the only way to look at it. You can always take a single article or photograph or dumb error and say: **See? They're biased. They're antisemites. They're self-hating Jews.** This proves it. In fact, it proves nothing except that **this newspaper is a collection of human beings** – people who can see things in different ways because that's the nature of humankind, as is an occasional error the nature of humankind. That having been said, I also know that no matter how hard I protest that we are fair, on balance, I will never be able to persuade a certain segment of American Jewry, no matter how many facts I marshal, no matter how many clippings I bring to the table. Their minds are made up, and that's that. **So I've stopped trying to show them the facts. Life's too short.**

As for the Lookstein boycott, I thought it was misguided. Between you and me, I wonder how many self-proclaimed boycotters took at least one peek at the *Times* or its website during those 10 days. This was, after all, the period immediately following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terror attacks; it was kind of hard to resist the *Times's* comprehensive coverage. **I suspect that just as there are fasting people who sneak in sips of water on Yom Kippur, there were closet *Times* readers during the High Holy Days.**

May I say one more thing about the boycott? At the risk of seeming arrogant, I didn't lose a second's sleep over it. We had a lot of other things on our plate last September 18, when the boycott started.

*- What could you tell students seeking to better understand the pressures and difficulties of being a journalist? Is "objectivity" possible? In particular, with the Palestinians seen as the "underdog" militarily, what can Israel and its supporters do to better present their case?*

It's not my job to help Israel or its supporters present their case. That's why they hire teams – huge teams of high-paid public-relations experts, who are getting a hefty slice of those dollars that American Jews donate. I will say that I've always been perplexed by the insistence of Israel and its American supporters that the issue is simply one of PR, *hasbara* – this notion that somewhere there lies a magic press release that will enable Israel to dissolve all its problems. **That misguided attitude is itself part of Israel's problem.** There are substantive issues to be dealt with in this conflict – not mere PR gamesmanship.

*- What would you advise students who hope to become journalists themselves? Is there a conflict of interest for a Jewish reporter in the Mideast?*

No, there's no conflict of interest. There's a conflict only if you believe that there's only one permissible way in which all Jews may view Israel, its internal tensions and its dealings with the Arabs and the rest of the world. But since I've never noticed conspicuous unanimity among Jews on anything, there is no such thing as one way, and therefore there is no such thing as a conflict.

There are sometimes tensions between one's Jewishness and the demands of covering the Mideast. That's probably inevitable. But I'll let you in on a little secret. Everybody in this world has a background and a past, and reporters of all religions, ethnicities, races, sexual orientations and so on occasionally have conflicts. **It is the vanity – and the mistake – of many Jews to believe that their internal conflicts are somehow unique.** I can assure you that this is not true.

The essence of a good reporter is not to be free of a past, for that is impossible. The essence is an **ability to set one's background and personal preferences aside** to cover a story fairly. That's what makes a good reporter.

*- What are your plans for the future? What issues do you hope to focus on in your "NYC" column?*

No specific plans. I'm just delighted to be back writing my column after what was effectively a half-year away, between the demands of the Mideast and my role in covering the war, the anthrax attacks and other related post-9/11 issues. ■

## ▶ BOOK CRITIQUE

## *On Media Bias and Bias Against the Media*

By JEREMY ZILBER

According to its publisher, Bernard Goldberg's bestselling book, *Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the News*, "exposes a (liberal) bias so uniform and overwhelming that it permeates every 'news' story we hear and read – and so entrenched and deep rooted that the networks themselves don't even recognize it." As a former Emmy-winning reporter for CBS News, Goldberg has suddenly been garnering significant attention from politicians, pundits, and journalists. In fact, it is rumored that he may soon wind up with his own television show solely on the book's notoriety. (He's currently making the talk show rounds and reporting for HBO's "Real Sports"). Many see *Bias* as vindication of the frequent accusations made by prominent politicians such as Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Newt Gingrich, George Bush, and even Bill Clinton – all of whom claimed the liberal media were intent on undermining their policies and sabotaging their careers. Goldberg's argument comes on the heels of several national surveys indicating that American journalists are overwhelmingly liberal Democrats – with the vast majority supporting stricter governmental regulation of business, an array of social programs for minorities and the poor, abortion rights, and a host of other liberal policies. In light of the preexisting evidence, *Bias* appears to be the icing on the cake: an insider's "tell all" account of how the news is systematically and intentionally slanted to the left. In one of the more noteworthy passages, for example, Goldberg recounts an instance in which a high ranking CBS executive confided in him that "...of course there's a liberal bias in the news. All the networks tilt left... we all know it."

Unfortunately, Goldberg makes many of the same mistakes that professors often find themselves correcting in weaker undergraduate papers: he treats anecdotal evidence and personal experiences as if they are objective windows to "the truth." But, like the rest of us, even "insiders" are prone to misunderstand some of what they see and hear, exaggerate the significance of relatively trivial information, and misread events in ways that make them seem more consistent with prior expectations. Cognitive psychologists have documented countless types of systematic errors that almost all humans

make when receiving, processing, and recalling information. Goldberg is certainly not immune from these errors, and his interpretation of events is just that: his personal interpretation. Other journalists and media insiders have vehemently denied his allegations and argued that reporting is generally fair and favors no particular ideology over another. So why should Goldberg's interpretation carry more weight than any other reporter's sense of the profession? Fortunately, academia can help make sense of conflicting stories.

The fact of the matter is that *virtually all scholarly evidence* indicates that news reporting is, on the whole, fairly neutral. Most reporters merely repeat what they've been told without favoring either side of a public debate, and most try to give roughly equal time to Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, "pro-" and "anti-" voices. And with good reason. As I have noted elsewhere in my own research on the media, "the news process involves more than just the reporter; editors and owners (who tend to be more conservative than reporters), support staff, and even advertisers will all play some role in shaping the final news product. Rarely will reporters be allowed to decide the headline or placement of their stories. Thus, the larger process of selecting, writing, and editing stories will usually weed out whatever traces of partisan bias might otherwise have appeared in a reporter's work." Numerous academic researchers (most of whom have no personal stake in the outcome of their research) have meticulously studied virtually all aspects of news reporting, and the most common finding is that news generally favors no particular party or ideology. Instead, the most common journalistic biases are tendencies to focus heavily on certain types of stories (crime, disasters, celebrities, human interest stories, etc.) at the expense of complex technical issues, and a tendency to adopt a negative or cynical approach to covering politics and politicians of *all* ideologies. Thus, it should come as no surprise that Clinton, a Democrat, complained bitterly while in office about what he perceived to be unfair and harmful media coverage.

Journalists, including the liberal ones, are well aware of the liberal bias charge, and many undoubtedly bend over backward to portray conservative politicians and causes favorably in order to avoid the appearance of bias. An aspiring political reporter will almost never want to be labeled "biased" for fear that certain politicians – those who might view the reporter as hostile – will refuse interviews or deny the reporter access to other potential sources of news. And since access to well-placed sources is the key to good reporting, most serious journalists (even the ideological ones) simply aren't willing to take this risk.

A related scholarly finding is that most partisans and ideologues perceive the media as hostile toward their own point of view. That is, liberals tend to see the media as having a conservative bias, and vice-versa. Regardless of Goldberg's own ideology (he claims to be left-of-center, but I have personally heard him make statements that sound fairly conservative), what this tells us is that consumers of the news have a hard time being objective judges of the news they are consuming. Otherwise, we would expect very little difference between liberals' and conservatives' interpretations of the stories they hear and read. Academics, on the other hand, usually go to great lengths to ensure objectivity in their research, checking and double-checking the validity of their measures and data, and circulating drafts of their work to other academics and experts before publishing any results. Given this, why should anyone accept Goldberg's individual judgments when they seem to contradict most academic studies?

Consider, for example, the nature of Goldberg's "evidence," which consists almost entirely of anecdotes and observations made while working at CBS News; from these he generalizes to the entire news industry. Even if he is correct to say that a liberal culture permeates CBS News, this is hardly sufficient evidence to say that the news media are universally liberal. In fact, most newspaper owners are quite conservative, and the vast majority of newspapers' political endorsements have historically gone to Republican candidates. Consider, too, the overwhelming dominance of conservative radio talk show hosts (Rush Limbaugh, G. Gordon Liddy, Oliver North, Alan Keyes, etc.), the recent rise of Fox News (owned by outspoken conservative Rupert Murdoch – who also owns the *Post*), and the availability of any number of conservative websites and magazines, and it is hard to take seriously the charge that Americans receive only one side of the story. Yet this seems to be precisely the charge Goldberg wants to make. (One might also ask how it is possible for Goldberg's book to have received so much attention from the very media allegedly conspiring to keep his accusations quiet.)

Indeed, when actually put to the test, at least one of Goldberg's claims turns out to be flatly false. Goldberg asserts that the media make a point of identifying conservatives as conservatives, but fail to identify liberals as liberals. This, he claims, supports his thesis that conservatives are treated as outside the mainstream, while liberals are accepted as the mainstream. However, Geoffrey Nunberg, a senior researcher at the Center for the Study of Language

and Information at Stanford University, has conducted a quantitative study of newspapers and finds that, to the contrary, liberal politicians, celebrities, and groups are statistically more likely to have their ideology mentioned than conservatives. This holds in both a sample of national newspapers and a sample of three papers often accused of a liberal bias: the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times*.

But perhaps the greatest weakness of Goldberg's argument is its presumption that bias exists whenever a news organization fails to give equal attention to the liberal and conservative sides of a debate. To Goldberg, the news is biased because it doesn't give equal time or equal standing to conservatives. Academia says he's wrong about that, but let us assume for the moment that Goldberg's assessment is correct. Would equal time for conservatives really eliminate media bias? Only if one accepts the absurd proposition that traditional liberals and traditional conservatives are the *only* valid voices. But what about Libertarians, Socialists, Greens, militias? What about independents and those who are altogether uninterested in politics? These are significant forces in America – shouldn't they have an equal opportunity to be heard? And what about voices from *outside* the United States? After all, they outnumber us 20 to 1; does that mean we should see 20 quotes from non-Americans for each quoted American?

Because there is no way to identify an objective center or impartial truth, it is virtually impossible for anyone to claim a clear bias in one direction or another. Such an assertion would seem dubious if it were made by the even the most scrupulous team of researchers with a million dollar grant and a bevy of eager research assistants – let alone by a man whom some believe has an axe to grind with Dan Rather and CBS News. The best research to date suggests that, while reporters do tend to be more liberal than average Americans, the news generally allots equal time to Republicans and Democrats and tends to shy away from making normative judgments, relying instead on a "he said/she said" format in which neither side is explicitly or implicitly declared a winner. It is thus unfortunate that a collection of anecdotal stories recounting one reporter's personal experiences should be allowed to overshadow years of scholarly evidence to the contrary. One might even label it an anti-academic bias. ■

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## ► MUSINGS

***Will Terrorism Change the Media?***

By JOE HIRSCH

The most immediate and widely felt repercussion of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks was its dramatic effect on the American psyche. Placated by a decade of unprecedented economic growth and domestic civility, Americans disengaged themselves from the monumental political and social developments taking place in countries around the world, choosing instead to indulge their self-imposed ignorance of foreign affairs. Those attitudes changed, perhaps forever, with the unimaginable and unexpected assault on American business, security and, most notably, democratic values. Although the country has witnessed quick, visible signs of change – from surging patriotism to improved security measures – one critical fallout from the events of 9/11 has yet to be determined: To what extent will this traumatic awakening affect news-making decisions and production? As a result of the tragedy, news organizations and the citizens they represent appear ready to accept a new informational age that will reshape the subcultures of news content, political humor, and media restraints. Pledges of reform echo across newsrooms, but it remains to be seen whether news executives will follow through on these promises. The success of this initiative will depend on how sincerely the media embrace an issue-oriented style of coverage that is unbound by the bottom line and other constraints. Some media have shown encouraging signs of change, but it seems inevitable that other groups will continue to follow the old, entrenched standards of coverage. In the wake of the terror attacks, these news organizations stubbornly resist the obvious need for an overhaul.

News content was dramatically affected by the terror attacks. Television news executives wisely voted to drop regular programming and run continuous coverage of the crises in New York in Washington. Newspapers produced in-depth stories on homeland security and the military effort, while the weekly periodicals, wanting to do their part, profiled heroic stories of courage and resilience. Absent from the evening broadcasts and the front-page were the tabloid-style stories that dominated the news prior to September 11. Coverage reflected global concerns, a reassuring sign that the public's sudden appreciation of foreign affairs had penetrated the media establishment as well. Yet while the content of the news has changed, the attitude of media executives has not. They believe in a style of news that captures the events as they occur, in real-time. Live, fast coverage must be delivered quickly to impatient audiences, for whom the presentation of news is just as important as the news itself. The current trend of reporting on issues of national importance will likely endure, but not without some amendment by producers and publishers eager for a flashy product. Faced with the prospect of a dry, protracted war on terrorism, media purveyors will seek new ways to infuse the tired, repetitive storyline with fresh excitement. Even as the media adopts a more global outlook, they will retain the same tired rules of news presentation like sensationalism, hype, and drama, just to name a few. Instead of hyping stories of blatant unimportance, the media are likely to inflate war-related issues like the threat of biochemical warfare, potential security threats, and new concerns over the sagging economy. Worse, the media have shown no signs of backing up their claims. Foreign bureaus remain pitifully understaffed and financial cutbacks have strangled TV stations in several major U.S. markets. News executives can offer to fit the establishment with a veneer of change, but these efforts are meaningless unless they resolve to fix the decaying attitudes at its root.

Though not readily perceived as a legitimate source of information, political humor is remarkably effective when it comes to setting the public agenda. Whether delivered by political satirists or stand-up comedians, humor actually makes politics more interesting and comprehensible. Popular programs like "The Tonight Show" and "Politically Incorrect" influence political views through their comedic renditions of current events. They are, much like the conventional providers of information, a source of news for certain apolitical audiences. Traditionally, the producers of these shows take a no-holds-barred approach to politics, showing little mercy as they roast politicians for their blunders *de jure*. The terror attacks changed those rules, and the writers and producers agreed that it was no longer acceptable to launch personal attacks on elected officials and the institutions they represent. With one notable exception – the gaffe created by "P.I." host Bill Maher after he declared the U.S. government "cowardly" for bombing Afghanistan – the institution of political humor has reinvented itself. Unlike the swift but superficial changes to the news industry, the transformation of political humor will likely persist. After witnessing the government's courageous and decisive response to a crisis of unprecedented size, satirists and political humorists

alike have toned down their rhetoric and have become more forgiving of their elected officials. In a memorable act of heartfelt sincerity, host David Letterman dedicated his first show after the attacks to the bravery of New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, one of Letterman's favorite political targets. Letterman's decidedly optimistic attitude even spread to his smirking, cynical colleagues, a telling indication that changes in political humor will ultimately stick.

The media has long struggled to reconcile the competing tasks of providing news and protecting civil liberties. Critics lament how some reporters, in the name of "news," coldly and intrusively violate the privacy of individuals. When the story focuses on government-related issues, the media face an even greater challenge: To report on the behavior of government without compromising security interests. The events of September 11 spawned a new era in reporting where, at the behest of national security advisors, the media willfully agreed (for now) to self-censor their coverage of the war on terrorism. Putting aside concerns that this request undermined the First Amendment, the media collectively subordinated themselves to the national interest. At first, the agreement between news organizations and government officials seemed secure. U.S. military action was reported cautiously and interviews were scrutinized for hidden propagandist messages. The networks even withheld the release of one of Osama bin Laden's hate-spewing videotapes until they received clearance from the Bush administration. Recently, though, the media appear to have betrayed this pact, questioning the effectiveness of the military campaign in Afghanistan and producing negative reports on the recent efforts to improve domestic security. Many news agencies have launched deep, unrelenting probes into government affairs, an indication that "restraint" is not part of the media's vocabulary. Of course, as citizens of the United States, the media does not seek to sabotage its own government and will set limits on how far they can go. But it seems likely that the press will fall prey to its own formula of ratings-driven coverage and forget their agreement to self-regulate coverage.

After the trauma of September 11 and the shared effort to heal emotional and physical wounds, the United States has gained a valuable but painful education in human behavior. No longer boastful of their own invincibility, Americans finally recognize the necessity for change – in policy, accountability, and attitude. September 11 showed a stagnate, complacent country that it must re-adjust to a new reality, one that poses new threats and challenges to the future. Like the rest of the country, the media must reshape their standards to meet the new world order – an undertaking that must include reforms in current attitudes and tactics. Some media, having taken this message to heart, have achieved notable success; others appear unmoved and unwilling to change. Even as the effects of the tragedy resonate clearly throughout the country, these organizations stubbornly cling to their outdated ways of thinking. Their blasé approach to the events of September 11 shows that while the subject of coverage may change, the attitudes of some media will disturbingly remain the same. ■

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## ► BIG APPLE

## On Media Coverage and the NYC Mayoral Race

By SAUL EPSTEIN

In his book, *Out of Order*, Thomas Patterson criticizes the media for not serving as an objective voice in their coverage of elections, particularly presidential primaries. Instead of discussing all the candidates' issues and reporting about the campaign in its entirety, reporters selectively choose what to report on based on who they perceive will win the race they are covering. This behavior dates back to the infamous Truman-Dewey campaign of 1948, when all the reporters wrote off the incumbent even though Truman built up strong support in the last two weeks of his election. Editors of the *Chicago Tribune* decided to publish the headline, "Dewey Defeats Truman" based on the impression they had of who would win the election, without paying attention to the changing sentiment of the voter.

Even after this mistake, Patterson claims that the press continues to "assign candidates an image that is consistent with their position in a race."<sup>16</sup> Reporters will point out faults and failures in a losing candidate and focus on the positive attributes of a candidate in front. Sometimes these portrayals are factual and present a fair picture of the candidate. Yet, Patterson notes, journalists will sometimes change the tone of their coverage of the candidate's begins to succeed. He points to a number of examples of this phenomenon, including in the 1980 Republican Presidential primary. When George Bush won the Iowa caucuses, the press claimed that Bush's strength came from the "ambiguous positions (he took), which allowed the voter to see in him what they wanted to see". After he lost in the New Hampshire primary to Ronald Reagan, reporters looked negatively at his ambiguity as "voters were have said to deserted Bush because they had only 'vague reasons for supporting him". Patterson has no problem with reporters describing the strengths and weaknesses of candidates in their coverage of the campaign. However, if journalists did present an unbiased picture of a candidate, "their portrayals would not swing abruptly when the candidates' fortunes change".<sup>17</sup>

Although Patterson focuses on presidential primaries and elections in general, his observation regarding media coverage of elections should remain true on any level. If the media has a bias in their reports based on their prediction of the outcome of the election they report on, they should change the tone of their coverage in races for any elected position. While very few races receive as much coverage as the presidential election, the attention given by the press to the New York mayoral election could come very close. In the largest city in the United States with 4 major daily newspapers and countless weekly publications, candidates for mayoral elections get followed by journalists, and have every move of theirs scrutinized. In the 2001 mayoral election, the expectations of the new mayor were very high. Following September 11, all citizens praised the behavior of Mayor Rudy Giuliani, and *Time* named him "Man of the Year" for how he handled the crisis. The new mayor would have to rebuild the city's economy and morale following the devastating attacks on the World Trade Center.

The 2001 mayoral election also serves as a good test for Patterson's argument based on the change in opinion by the voters regarding their choice for mayor. After a bitter primary, City Public Advocate Mark Green emerged as the Democratic nominee. His opponent, billionaire business executive Michael Bloomberg, was running for public office for the first time. In early June, opinion polls had Bloomberg trailing Green by 38 percentage points.<sup>18</sup> Ten days after the primary, on October 21, A Quinnipiac University Polling Institute survey had Green's lead on Bloomberg down a 51-35% advantage. The day before the election, November 5, the same poll had the election as a dead heat with both candidates getting 42% of the vote.<sup>19</sup> Bloomberg's victory could not have been expected early on in the election, but seemed more possible as Election Day got closer during the last week. According to Thomas

<sup>16</sup> Thomas Patterson, *Out of Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 97.

<sup>17</sup> Patterson, 99.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Saul, "Mike Cuts in Dems Lead", *Daily News*, 8 October 2001, 39.

<sup>19</sup> "New York City Surveys" Quinnipiac University Polling Institute <<http://www.quinnipiac.edu/polls/nycpolls.html>>. (19 December 2001).

Patterson's claim, the media coverage should tend to portray Michael Bloomberg in a negative light throughout the election, and present Mark Green's candidacy as a successful one that is doing everything right. In the days immediately prior to the election, there could possibly be a small change towards more of a positive tone of reports in newspapers regarding Bloomberg's campaign, especially following Mayor Giuliani's endorsement. With Green's lead shrinking in the last week, the press should also change minutely in how they present the Democratic candidate.

In order to analyze the news coverage of the 2001 mayoral election, I focused on articles published in the *New York Times* and the *Daily News*. Specifically, I looked at every article that mentioned either mayoral candidate from October 21<sup>st</sup> till the day of the election, November 6. With the runoff election for the Democratic nomination occurring on October 11, and with the results in question for the next few days, the news focused mostly on the bickering between Fernando Ferrer and Mark Green. Once Ferrer conceded the race, news coverage exclusively focused on Green and Bloomberg and their battle in the final stretch. Various articles printed at other points of the election prior to this time were analyzed based on references made in the original articles looked at.

With two weeks left till Election Day, as mentioned above, Bloomberg had already cut into the commanding lead that Green had against him in June. Yet, it seems like the media might have still looked at Bloomberg as the underdog with little chance of winning. Therefore, they decided to focus on different types of stories based on their perspective on the election's outcome. The stories written about Bloomberg seemed more centered on his personal attacks against Green. On October 24, both the *New York Times* and the *Daily News* concentrated their coverage of the mayoral race on one of Bloomberg's advisors accusing Green of being a Communist and a defender of Stalin based on a book Green had written close to twenty years ago.<sup>20</sup> The articles mentioned this attack in the context of covering a speech Green gave about his economic strategy in Midtown Manhattan. Bloomberg's website posted pictures from that day of Bloomberg making a number of speeches and campaigning.<sup>21</sup> Yet, no reference was made in the news media regarding his campaigning in Manhattan. The choice to contrast Bloomberg attacking his opponent to Green talking about issues gives the impression that Bloomberg is desperate and searching for any chance of gaining ground in the polls. Green looks like the favorite and the candidate who has an agenda that he will implement as mayor. For the first week of this study, the media's coverage of Bloomberg made virtually no mention of any of Bloomberg's issues, paying attention to the attacks he made against Green and the record amount of money he had spent so far in the campaign.

The few articles that did focus on events that one could see as giving credence to Bloomberg's campaign seemed to emphasize on what Bloomberg did wrong as these appearances. When Governor George Pataki endorsed the Republican candidate on October 24, both papers immediately mentioned the apparent gaffe made by Bloomberg when he said, "I am a liberal". The reporters wrote mostly about the quote, while only briefly mentioning anything regarding why the Governor supported Bloomberg. The articles in both newspapers focused on the critical questions asked of the governor and Bloomberg. When covering a news conference given by Green that day, the *New York Times* only quoted a generically positive statement made by Green saying he is "going to unite the city no matter what rivals or their aids might say".<sup>22</sup> No mention was made of any critical questions asked to Green.

The media in general tended to place the center of attention on the missteps of Bloomberg with no mention of any blunders Green made. The *Daily News* published an entire article about Bloomberg's comment that New Yorkers do not lock their doors.<sup>23</sup> Leonore Skenazy wrote a column in the *Daily News* specifically pointing out the bizarre statements Michael Bloomberg made during his campaigns.<sup>24</sup> No column chronicling such statements by Green appeared during these two weeks. The media did report what some could call a slip made by Green in the week prior to Giuliani's endorsement of Bloomberg. When asked by reporters how he would have handled the response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Green replied, "I would have done as well or better than Rudy Giuliani." Green made this statement in early October a number of times. The media brought attention to this

<sup>20</sup> Michael Cooper and Dean E. Murphy, "The Specter of Joseph Stalin Descends Over Mayoral Race." *The New York Times*, 25 October 2001, D1. Michael Saul and Joel Siegel, "Green's a Red Defender of Stalin-Bloomberg." *Daily News*, 24 October 2001, 9.

<sup>21</sup> "Photo gallery" Mike Bloomberg. <<http://www.mikeformayor.com/gallery.asp?GalleryID=86&PageView=LONG>> (19 December 2001).

<sup>22</sup> Dean E. Murphy and Michael Cooper. "Pataki Backs Bloomberg as Campaign Struggles for an Edge." *The New York Times*, 25 October, 2001, D5. See also Michael Saul, "Bloomberg Says He's A Liberal." *Daily News*, 25 October 2001, 21.

<sup>23</sup> Tamer El-Ghobashy and Leo Standora. "People Leave Doors Open In Our Safe City, Says Mike". *Daily News*, 23 October 2001, 22.

<sup>24</sup> "Mike Says the Darndest Things!" *Daily News* 28 October 2001, 55.



remark only to highlight Bloomberg's latest advertising campaign, and emphasized that this was the Republican's "harshest TV ads of the campaign."<sup>25</sup> The criticism of Mark Green while he had a large lead was minimal. The possibility exists that Green did little to cause the media to find fault in him. The fact that the media decided to focus on the gaffes of one candidate might hint to the fact they chose to portray Bloomberg as losing and doing poorly due to the polls the reporters saw.

Newspapers possibly showed some bias in the way they presented how others responded to the candidates. On October 27, the *Daily News* published an article with the headline, "Firefighter Cop Unions Give Green the Nod for Mayor." After spending the first half of the article focusing on the press conference Green gave following the endorsement, the article reported on a number of crucial endorsements Bloomberg received that day, including one from Fernando Ferrer's campaign treasurer.<sup>26</sup> With this fact buried in the middle of the article with no headline, someone quickly reading the paper could end up with the impression that most organizations are supporting Green. Between October 21, and 31, the *Daily News* and the *New York Times* ran six headlines regarding six institutions endorsing candidates. Five of them were about endorsements Green had received. The sixth headline "Paper Backs Mike, Aims Slur at Mark", was about the *Amsterdam News* endorsing the Republican candidate while accusing Green of "stealing the primary" with the help of "his Jewish Mafia."<sup>27</sup> Bloomberg's website lists numerous press releases of endorsements he received. The media, though, practically ignored these endorsements and decided to bring attention to the one potentially damaging endorsement from a hate-spewing newspaper. The newspapers, possibly unconsciously, decided to make Mike Bloomberg look like the candidate that no one wanted to support because they saw that the voters do not support him.

Before Mayor Giuliani gave his endorsement on October 27, it seems like the New York media tended to portray Mark Green as the successful candidate who talked about issues and received the backing of many important unions and organizations. A reader saw Michael Bloomberg as a rich businessman whose campaign focused on attacking on his opponent without talking about issues, and as a candidate that had no support. Following Giuliani's press conference, the press slightly changed its attitude regarding the candidates. Articles began to appear with headlines focusing on stances taken by Bloomberg. The *Daily News* ran an article discussing the Republican candidate's plan for fighting bioterrorism on October 29<sup>28</sup> and the *New York Times* published an entire article devoted to Bloomberg's strategy to rebuild the economy on November 1.<sup>29</sup> Bringing attention to Bloomberg's position on issues makes his campaign look viable by having a platform, something the newspapers did not show until after Giuliani's endorsement.

One can also notice a change in coverage of the Green campaign. During the first week of this analysis, most of the reporters paid attention to the issues Green talked about. Following the endorsement, most of the articles about Green began to talk about Green attacking his opponent. More coverage appeared pointing out faults in Green's campaign. The *Daily News* ran an article entitled "Green Opens Fire on Bloomy in Education-Theme Ad."<sup>30</sup> Though the article does admit that this was Green's first negative advertisement during the campaign against Bloomberg, it is highly doubtful that Green has never criticized his opponent up to this point. Yet, a headline reporting that Green attacks his opponent appears for the first time in the two weeks prior to the election only after the endorsement of his opponent. The coverage regarding endorsements of both candidates became more even-handed with Bloomberg getting two headlines about endorsements as opposed to one about Green. When covering a union rally for Green, both newspapers point out the lack of enthusiasm by the rally attendees.<sup>31</sup> The *Daily News*, with four days till the election, reported on a secret meeting that Green advisors had before the Democratic primary regarding the possibility of running a smear campaign against primary opponent Ferrer by associating him with the much-reviled Rev. Al Sharpton.<sup>32</sup> It seems too coincidental that the newspaper decided to report such a story that occurred weeks beforehand only when Green's popularity is falling. Rather, as with most articles in the final week

<sup>25</sup> Michael Saul. "Mike Ads Slam Mark On Good-As-Rudy Remark, Job." *Daily News*, 27 October 2001, 7.

<sup>26</sup> Frank Lombardi and Michael Saul. "Firefighter, Cop Unions Giver Green Nod For Mayor." *Daily News*, 27 October 2001, 7.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Saul. "Paper Backs Mike, Aim Slur at Mark." *Daily News*, 24 October 2001, 24.

<sup>28</sup> Michael Saul. "Bloomy Unveils His Bioterrorism." *Daily News* 29 October 2001, 17.

<sup>29</sup> Dean E. Murphy. "Bloomberg Stresses Private Business As Key to Revival." *The New York Times*, 1 November 2001, D1.

<sup>30</sup> Michael Saul and Joel Siegel. "Green Opens Fire on Bloomy in Education-Theme Ad." *Daily News*, 31 October 2001, 6.

<sup>31</sup> Michael Cooper. "A Lukewarm Endorsement and an Exchange of Ads", *The New York Times*, 30 October 2001, D3. Michael Kramer "Payback Time: Freddy's Man Gives Mark Cool Embrace", *Daily News*, 30 October 2001, 7.

<sup>32</sup> Scott Shifrel and Larry Cohler Esses. "Green Aides Met With Dems on Ferrer-Sharpton Plan." *Daily News*, 2 November 2001, 21.

prior to the election, it seems like the reporters selectively changed the type of stories they wrote about the candidates.

One can see the most blatant change in the characterization of the candidates in the columns of the *Daily News*' Michael Kramer. From the time Bloomberg entered the race on June 12, 2001, Kramer does not like the chances of the billionaire in the race or his ability to be a politician, writing a column on the lack of preparation by Bloomberg for an early campaign appearance.<sup>33</sup> With two weeks left till the election, Kramer's attitude has not changed much. He states that one sees through Bloomberg's strategy and campaign that "Bloomberg learned virtually nothing about politics, and the hole he's in today has been dug with his own little shovel." Kramer predicts that Bloomberg will most probably lose and if he does "you'll be able to file his effort in the folder title 'squandered opportunities'."<sup>34</sup> Five days later, although not ready to admit Bloomberg has a chance of winning, Kramer writes that the billionaire's campaign "is finally clicking" and presents the small possibility of Bloomberg defeating Green.<sup>35</sup> Three days following this concession, Kramer admits that Bloomberg is "riding the trend" and the election is turning in the Republican's favor.<sup>36</sup> By Election Day, Kramer does not even deal with the candidates, writing about an opinion poll he takes in a restaurant and the effects of Rev. Sharpton and Giuliani on the election.<sup>37</sup> With no clear winner, Kramer can no longer easily portray the candidates as winners or losers. The misrepresentation Kramer gave of the election and the inconsistencies in his descriptions of candidates make it confusing for voters to get a true picture of candidates.

From this analysis, it seems that Patterson's theory regarding media coverage of primary's rings true in mayoral elections. The reporters portrayed the leader in a race, in our case, Mark Green, in more of a positive light than the trailing candidate, Michael Bloomberg. When the tide changed and the race became tighter, the depiction of the candidates changed. In the last week, Bloomberg was seen in the newspapers as more of a viable candidate who discussed issues, while Mark Green came across as a candidate who was losing ground. Although one could attribute the change in types of stories in the 2001 mayoral election to the swing of opinion polls, the media might also be presenting what actually happened. Green's campaign might have intended to deal with issues only and not go on the attack till a couple days before the election. Michael Bloomberg, once gaining experience and the endorsement of Giuliani, could have run a better campaign in the last week. The time period used to analyze the media's coverage might also lead to a faulty presentation of the media's coverage. Newspapers might randomly change their tone of coverage over time. Although more study is necessary to conclusively show a correlation between the portrayal of candidates with their position in voter polls, one sees from this study that the public's opinions of politicians might have an influence on the coverage of elections. ■

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<sup>33</sup> Michael Kramer, "Not Even Close to Being Ready" *Daily News*, 7 June 2001, 6.

<sup>34</sup> "Bloomberg's Self Destruction Under Pressure" *Daily News*, 26 October 2001.

<sup>35</sup> "Bloomberg's Chasing Rudy Dems in the Five Boroughs. The Numbers Could Add Up." *Daily News*, 1 November 2001, 21.

<sup>36</sup> "Bloomberg's Riding the Trend, but Will it go Far Enough?" *Daily News*, 3 November 2001, 6.

<sup>37</sup> "The Last Word: Zabar's Poll". *Daily News*, 5 November 2001, 2. "The Winners... Rudy and the Rev. Al." *Daily News*, 6 November 2001, 3.

## ► COMMUNITY FORUM

***Religious Values in Secular Culture – A Symposium***

True, *The Clarion* is primarily the journal of Yeshiva's political science society (and thus the department at large). But, while recognizing the importance and unique potential of this sector, we've strived to be even more, enthusiastically inviting participation from across the spectrum of the social science disciplines – which are, obviously, often related. In this issue, we are pleased to include a transcript of a very special event which took place earlier this year: the unprecedented session on "Religious Values in Secular Culture" held by a Yeshiva student delegation at the annual Eastern Sociological Society conference in Boston on March 10, 2002. The studies, and the session, were under the aegis of sociology faculty members Dr. Mareleyn Schneider and Dr. Mervin Verbit.



*Yeshiva's delegation to the ESS conference in Boston (L-R): Shmuel Kadosh, Dr. Mervin Verbit, Arash Nefas (on behalf of Ezra Bogner), Jonathan Spielman, David Michaels. Dr. Schneider is not shown.*

### ***Parents and Their Adolescent Children: Transmission of Jewish Identity Patterns***

By JONATHAN M. SPIELMAN

Sociologists have generally depicted the trajectory of Jewish identity transmission in contemporary America as one of consistent decline. Is this in fact an accurate picture of the population's movement towards increasingly diluted Jewishness? If there is decline, does it occur evenly across various measures of Jewish identity? Is there any point where the decline levels off and the population stabilizes? Is it possible that in some aspect of Jewish identity there is a degree of growth or intensification of Jewish identity? To what can we attribute the movement in either direction?

There are many studies of American Jews that include respondents of various ages, supporting a substantial body of research which notices the distinctions between different cohorts. Yet these different cohorts are not necessarily linked to each other in any causal way. One study of North American Jews conducted in 1993 targeted adult respondents and their teenaged children. The resulting data set constitutes a rare opportunity for further research on the actual changes in Jewish identity that occur within a family.

The data were collected by the Washington office of Market Facts, Inc. from a national sample of Jewish parents with children ages 4-17 and, (where applicable) from their teenage children, age 13-17 via mail-back questionnaires.<sup>38</sup> Adult respondents were included within the study if they had identified themselves as Jewish on a previous screener questionnaire. The data set contains 1,464 adult respondents and 615 teenage respondents. In both instances, these figures for completed and returned questionnaires represent about 70% of those who received questionnaires.

The adult respondents received a much longer instrument, which addressed a variety of subjects such as: personal background, current lifestyle, raising Jewish children, Jewish schooling, and their attitude toward various Jewish educational programs, while the teens responded to a much shorter questionnaire. Since our purpose was to compare the parents to their own children, we limit the analysis here to those questions that were posed both to the adults and to the teenagers. Three of the questions asked of both sets of respondents reported on the respondents' frequency of synagogue attendance, their emotional attachment to Israel, and the extent to which their social circle includes other Jews. These items reflect three dimensions which are frequently used in studies of Jewish identity – an individual's observance, sense of peoplehood, and social context.

In addition, I make use of a more general measurement of Jewish identity based on responses to the question, "How important would you say that being Jewish is in your life?" Given the vagueness of the question, it is not perfectly clear what this item reflects. On one hand, it may be considered some sort of "overall" measure of Jewish identity, which represents how involved the respondents are in various other more specific dimensions of Jewishness. Alternatively, the question may tap something else entirely regarding the individual's own perspective on the significance of his being Jewish. That is, regardless of their participation in other quantifiable dimensions of Jewish identity, in this question the respondents may have provided their own subjective evaluation of being Jewish. This question is obviously less objective and more ambiguous than the other dimensions of Jewishness used in this research, but it remains a useful measurement of the respondents' own Jewish self-image.

We begin by looking at how the two populations of adults and their teens answered this question regarding the "overall" importance of being Jewish. Notice in **Figure 1A** that there is clearly a different distribution between the two cohorts. The teen population appears to clearly move down the scale, creating an overall effect that shows the lower value which they place on their Jewish identity.

In order to focus on the teen population in relation to their parent's responses, in **Figure 1B** we separate out each category of parents and chart how their children responded. Each cluster of bars in **Figure 1B** represents the children of adults in each darkened bar in **Figure 1A**. Note that the final category in which being Jewish is "Not At All Important" contained too few parental respondents to permit analysis.

In each category, over 40% of the teens responded in a manner consistent with their parents. The two categories to the left experienced the most downward movement with a total of 54 and 29 percent respectively of teens moving toward less importance associated with being Jewish. In the categories of "Somewhat" and "Not Very," which offer the most potential for movement up or down, we notice in the teen population a tendency to revert towards the mean. Of the parents who determined that being Jewish was "Somewhat Important," the greatest percent of their teens out of all the categories remained consistent with this position (56%), and 29% of their teens moved down toward lesser importance associated with being Jewish. Mirroring this movement down the scale, of the adults who reported that being Jewish was "Not Very Important" 36% of their teens moved up the scale toward increasing their perceived importance of being Jewish. This reversion to the center may indicate a reluctance among the respondents to sever completely their personal connection to all things Jewish.

<sup>38</sup> Cohen, 8-9.



Synagogue attendance seems to measure a particular aspect of Jewish identity which combines involvement in the Jewish community with observance of religious holidays through communal prayer. Of course, those who attend as frequently as “Several Times a Month” may be additionally motivated by a religious commitment to regular prayer. The inclusive wording of the question embraces all segments of the Jewish religious spectrum and the five response options classify the respondents according to their frequency and impetus for synagogue attendance. Note that in the questionnaire the “Not At All” option includes synagogue attendance only for special occasions such as a bar mitzvah or wedding. Presumably this is because these reasons for attendance seem more likely to stem from social courtesy than from Jewish and/or specifically religious motivation.

From **Figure 2A** it is clear that generally speaking the population of teenagers exhibits a tendency toward lower rates of synagogue attendance than the population of adults. This decrease in synagogue attendance seems to hover at a difference of about four percentage points. The obvious exception, where 7% more teens attend “Only on High Holidays” than adults, cannot be fully understood until we break down the population of teens according to the responses of their parents.

In **Figure 2B** we see that in each category of adult responses, a plurality of teens attend synagogue as frequently as their parents. Yet there is a lot of movement particularly within the attendance category of “About Once a Month.” This response by an adult appears to be the least stable in transmission to their children. Perhaps this category represents an unusual pattern of behavior in that it does not limit synagogue attendance to major holidays yet it also does not indicate any real commitment to regular prayer.

**Figure 2B** allows us to see more precisely how much decrease there is in teen synagogue attendance as compared to their parents. The three parental categories of “Several Times a Month,” “Once a Month,” and “A Few Times a Year” all indicate that almost half (44%, 48%, and 47% respectively) of the teenage children of adults in these categories are attending synagogue significantly less than their parents do. Yet, as evidenced by the minimal movement up the scale towards increased attendance by the teens whose parents reported attending either “Only on High Holidays” or “Not At All,” there is no significant reversion to the mean as we saw in **Figure 1B**. When adults attend synagogue somewhat regularly their teens prefer to attend less regularly, and when adults attend only very rarely or not all their teens do not exhibit any reluctance to adopt the practices of their parents.

Returning to our question regarding the category of those who attend synagogue “Only on High Holidays,” we observe that many teens decided to join this category as a shift away from parents who exhibited higher rates of synagogue attendance. One possible explanation for this movement may be that the teens want to distance themselves from the religious Jewish and social Jewish contexts of their parents, yet they resist leaving the fold altogether. Attending synagogue for one or two days each year may represent the satisfaction of some minimal spiritual or social needs or it may just serve to please their parents for whom synagogue attendance plays a more significant role in Jewish identity.

In addition, I analyze the question that asks the respondents to report on how many of their closest friends are Jewish. This variable may perhaps be influenced by such factors such as where the respondents live, which schools they attend, and what community functions they frequent. These variables are often outside the teenagers’ control, but the question can nevertheless be a useful measure regarding the extent to which the respondents decide to socialize and maintain friendships with other Jews.

The most striking fact about **Figure 3A** is that the teens’ movement towards fewer Jewish friends creates almost a perfect mirror image of the responses of the population of adults. **Figure 3B** indicates that when adults have Jewish friends it can have some degree of influence on their children, as shown by the first two categories of parents who either have only or mostly Jewish friends. Most of the children with parents in the first two categories say that all or most of their closest friends are Jewish (79% and 64% respectively). Yet, when the adults do not have many Jewish

friends, their children clearly will not either. There is only very weak upward motion exhibited in teens whose parents reported that either most or all of their closest friends were not Jewish.

My final dimension of Jewish identity addresses the degree to which an individual cares about Israel. Many items in the study that related to the respondents' attitude toward Israel involved their contributions and frequency of their trips to Israel. I use a question that asked the respondents to evaluate how emotionally attached they feel towards Israel, in order to avoid the influence of economic considerations, which likely affect the degree to which people visit or invest in Israel.

From the overall chart representing the two populations in **Figure 4A**, it seems that generally speaking they are similarly distributed. There is some slippage from parents to children in all categories, but across the board there seem to be very low levels of commitment to Israel.

**Figure 4B** demonstrates quite dramatically the extent to which teens discarded the positions maintained by their parents. Notice that, of the adults who considered themselves "Extremely Attached" to Israel, nearly three-quarters of their teens shifted down to a lesser form of attachment. Of course, when a teenager's parent assumes an extreme position of attachment to Israel, the teens have only one direction in which to move. Yet that argument does not explain why 35% of the teens moved two steps away from their parents, preferring to identify themselves as only "Somewhat" rather than "Very" attached to Israel.

In **Figure 4A** the proportions in the "Somewhat Emotionally Attached" to Israel category seem extremely similar, but this chart is misleading. **Figure 4B** demonstrates that the teens who boosted the total percent of "Somewhat Attached" teens to within 1% of the adults in this category did not mostly come from parents who also felt only somewhat emotionally attached to Israel. Over 30% of the teens in each category, and over half the teens from "Very Attached" parents, expressed weak attachment to Israel. Only where their parents did not report any emotional attachment to Israel did teens prefer any other response (in this case, no attachment) over mild attachment to Israel. One might suggest that, while the teens appear comfortable reducing their attachment to Israel, they resist complete detachment from a country associated with their Jewish brethren. This resistance to complete detachment seems to disappear when their parents have also taken a position of complete detachment.

On the specific dimensions of Jewish identity which we studied, the teens in the NSAJ study tended to report lower levels of Jewish involvement than did their parents. This decline in Jewish identity of one or two steps from the positions of their parents seemed somewhat consistent across our various measures. We observed some reversion towards the mean in the measure of "overall" Jewishness, and on the other dimensions of Jewish identity the teens exhibited some preference for minimal Jewish involvement over absolutely no Jewish involvement.

While the movement of the teenage population away from their parents was for the most part towards less Jewish identity, there definitely was a significant percentage of teenagers who maintained the Jewish identity patterns of their parents. In light of the strong tendency of teens to drop away from the levels of Jewish involvement reported by their parents, the preference of a large percent of them to maintain the Jewishness of their parents demonstrates the tremendous capacity parents have to contribute towards their child's Jewish identity. We also noticed parental influence on teenagers at the opposite extreme – where a parent exhibited little or no Jewish involvement there was very little chance their children would move towards increased levels of Jewish involvement.

To see how the teens responded across the various measures of Jewish identity as compared to their parents, **Figure 5** lists all the potential permutations of a teen increasing, maintaining, or decreasing his level of Jewish involvement on the above mentioned four variables and calculates the percentage of teens in each. The teens in our study did not decrease in just one or two out of four measures of Jewish involvement while increasing in the others. The only double digit percentages of teens in this list are located in the final cluster representing teens who did not

report being more Jewishly involved than their parents in any of the variables. This cluster, only four out of fifteen possible combinations, accounts for almost 55% of all the teens surveyed. This scale, measuring the trajectory of teenage Jewish identity relative to the Jewish identity of their parents, indicates that the teens are generally decreasing across the board in all measures of Jewish involvement.

We began this research expecting to find a decline in contemporary Jewish identity from the adult population to their teenaged children. Indeed, across the specific dimensions of Jewish identity that we studied, the teens exhibit a less intense association with their Jewishness than do their parents. The movement of younger people away from the Jewish identity of an older population may reflect the influences of a secular society, but, in this study, it represents a more specific problem in the transmission of Jewish values from parents to their children. This issue calls for further research in order to discover what parental or other influences impact on the unsteady transmission of Jewish identity.

Charts

Figure 1A. "How important would you say that being Jewish is in your life?" Adult and teen cohorts respond to the same question.




Figure 1B. "How important would you say that being Jewish is in your life?" Teenage responses clustered by responses of their parents to the same question. Each cluster of bars represents 100% of the teenagers whose parents responded with the answer indicated on the horizontal axis.






Figure 2A. "About how often do you personally attend any type of synagogue, temple, *havurah*, or organized Jewish religious service?" Adult and teen cohorts respond to the same question.




Figure 2B. "About how often do you personally attend any type of synagogue, temple, *havurah*, or organized Jewish religious service?" Teenage responses clustered by responses of their parents to the same question. Each cluster of bars represents 100% of the teenagers whose parents responded with the answer indicated on the horizontal axis.




Figure 3A. "Among the people you consider your closest friends, would you say that..." Adult and teen cohorts respond to the same question.




Figure 3B. "Among the people you consider your closest friends, would you say that..." Teenage responses clustered by responses of their parents to the same question. Each cluster of bars represents 100% of the teenagers whose parents responded with the answer indicated on the horizontal axis.




Figure 4A. "How emotionally attached are you to Israel?" Adult and teen cohorts respond to the same question.




Figure 4B. "How emotionally attached are you to Israel?" Teenage responses clustered by responses of their parents to the same question. Each cluster of bars represents 100% of the teenagers whose parents responded with the answer indicated on the horizontal axis.




Figure 5. Relative Inter-Generational Trajectory. The fifteen configurations presented are the possible ways in which a teen could have responded as compared to their parent on all four dimensions used in this research.

Note: The configurations are sorted according to the trajectory of Jewish identity among teenagers as compared to their parents. That is, the first cluster represents those teens that reported no decline in any of the variables, and the third cluster represents those teens that reported no increase in any of the variables. The middle cluster of configurations is organized according to number of dimensions in which teens responded with more Jewish involvement than their parents did.

More	Same	Less	Percent
4	0	0	0.9
3	1	0	1.0
2	2	0	4.2
1	3	0	7.2
3	0	1	1.2
2	0	2	1.2
2	1	1	4.2
1	2	1	9.4
1	1	2	7.7
1	0	3	1.9
0	4	0	6.5
0	3	1	13.8
0	2	2	18.7
0	1	3	15.4
0	0	4	6.6
		<b>Total:</b>	100%

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## ***Continuity and Change: A Study of Modern Orthodox High School Graduates***

By SHMUEL KADOSH

Among the different denominations within Judaism, it is reasonable to argue that the Modern Orthodox approach is the one that most directly addresses the relationship between traditional religion and secular culture.<sup>39</sup> Modern Orthodoxy strives for a harmonious combination of religious and secular knowledge. It attempts to fuse traditional Jewish practice and belief, with modern culture, into an integrated view of life. The Modern Orthodox approach is inherently ambiguous. In its attempt to define itself by two separate, and often-conflicting value systems, it loses the simplicity that both fundamentalist religion, and secularism offer.

As with any religious movement, Modern Orthodoxy is not monolithic. There exists a range of views, as to what exactly is the best balance between tradition and modernity. To what degree should current cultural mores influence our 3000-year-old practices? When does modernity cede to tradition, and when does tradition make way for the modern world? In the Modern Orthodox community, a diverse range of answers exist to address these questions. This diversity exists not only on the theoretical plane, but also in the variety of Modern Orthodox religious institutions. This study examines how graduates of different types of Jewish parochial schools, or yeshiva high schools deal with the relationship between traditional Jewish living and participation in the larger society. In order to investigate this, I developed a questionnaire on a variety of issues, inquiring about religious practice and belief, both current and while in high school. The questionnaire contained 179 variables. I sent the survey to 1500 graduates of nine New York area yeshiva high schools all of whom graduated between 5-6 years ago. To date, I have received 340 responses, which translates into a response rate of 22.8%. I realize that such a response rate may be indicative of selective bias in the responses, and therefore, I limit today's paper to an internal analysis of the data.

While I understand the imprecision of labels, and their inability to capture the nuances of human life, they are often a necessary evil when talking about large groups of people. Broadly, speaking, I sent the survey to three types of Modern Orthodox schools –those to the Right, Center and Left. The right wing schools are more cautious in their embrace of modern society, while the left wing schools are more accepting of modern mores. In this study, I placed all the single gender schools into the “right-wing” category, as this represents more traditional Jewish notions of sexual propriety. The co-ed schools were placed in the Left, and Center categories. To distinguish between the “Left” and the “Center” schools, I utilized the graduates perceptions of the extent to which their schools stressed two traditional Jewish values and two contemporary secular values. Schools that were seen to place greater emphasis on the religious goals were placed in the “center”, while schools that were seen to place greater emphasis on secular goals were labeled as left.

It is well known that the college years are a time of experimentation. Students utilize their college years to explore different possibilities before making lasting commitments to occupations, social groups, and permanent relationships. In addition, for many students college is the first sustained exposure to an environment other than their home communities. How would the Modern Orthodox ideology of balance and synthesis, stand up in the social milieu of universities? Do the graduates internalize the ideology of their high schools, taking what is valuable from modern society, while still maintaining fealty to Jewish Law? Or, when faced with the temptations that open societies offer, do they abandon Jewish Law? Or perhaps, when faced with the liberal attitudes to sexuality, and other values that are often found in college do they reject the modern world completely?

<sup>39</sup> While one may argue that the same holds true for the classical Conservative theology, (i.e. that they also attempt to maintain a fealty to the classical texts, while engaging modernity), this can only be said on a institutional level, because most of the Conservative laity do not adhere to the classical Conservative position.(and hence, a study of Conservative laity would not present the same conflict of modernity and tradition) For evidence of this, see Marshall Sklare's classic work “Conservative Judaism” and the recent studies of the Conservative Movement by Jack Wertheimer.

What light, do the data cast on these questions? For a number of religious rituals, I asked the respondents for their current practice and for their practice during their junior year in high school. I constructed 2 scales from the data, a current practice scale, and a high school practice scale. Both scales had a potential range from 0, meaning that the respondent reported observing none of the rituals in the scale, through 10, meaning that the respondent reported observing all the rituals on the scale. I then subtracted the high school scale from the Current scale, to arrive at a measure of ritual change. A positive score indicates that one observes more now than when in high school. A negative score indicates that one has declined in observance since high school. The distribution of these scores, by high school type is given in Table 1. We see that those who attended “Left-wing” high schools have a greater propensity to change, in either direction, than those in centrist, or right wing schools. The highlighted portion of the table represents the range of people that stayed exactly the same, or added or dropped only one ritual since high school. In the “Left-wing” schools, only 58% of respondents fit into this range. In the centrist high schools 73% fit into this range. *In the right wing high schools 89% of respondents have stayed the same, or adopted or dropped only one practice.*

In addition to exploring ritual practice, I asked the graduates a number of questions about their ideology. The choices for each question ranged from answers beyond the generally accepted spectrum of traditional thought, to answers significantly to the right of mainstream Modern Orthodoxy. The answers for each question were scored from 0 to 100, with 0 representing an extreme right-wing answer, and 100 representing an answer that is on the far left of traditional thought, or beyond. There are 7 questions on the scale. Hence a value of 700 indicates a position on the far left of Modern Orthodoxy, while an answer of 0 indicates a position on the far right. The items in the scale are such, that it is reasonable to suggest that scores of 3 to 400 are closest to the Modern Orthodox outlook. Table 2 is the distribution of the graduates ideology score, by type of school. *An examination of the middle positions, indicates that the right has the greatest concentration in the middle, at 54.% while the Left has the least concentration in the middle, at 24%*

How can we explain the finding that graduates of left wing high schools are more likely to change their patterns of ritual practice after graduation, and that this change is manifested in both directions? I believe that the students’ perception of the values stressed by their schools may give us a clue in this regard. As we see in Table 3, students who attended “Left-wing” schools clearly felt that their schools spend more time/energy stressing “secular/materialistic” goals (such as admission to an ivy league college or achieving career success) than stressing “religious/humanistic goals” such as learning Torah outside of school or following Jewish norms of conduct (i.e. having good *middot*). The exact opposite trend can be seen in the “Right-wing” schools – student’s felt that the schools spent more energy stressing humanistic/religious goals, as opposed to secular/materialistic goals.

One theme in the psychological literature on adolescents is that they tend to see things in clear, unambiguous terms. They have a heightened sense of justice. Things are wrong or right, black or white. Modern Orthodoxy is an attempt to combine two worlds, that of traditional religion, and modern secular society. Its message is inherently one of balance and compromise, it borders intrinsically murky. Attempting to transmit such a nuanced message is a challenging task, the fact that it must be transmitted during the teenage years makes it all the more complicated. A teenager who perceives that his or her school is stressing the secular more than the religious, may begin to view the whole ideology as illegitimate. A cognitive dissonance develops, as the students realize that the schools do not practice what the religion seems to preach. As they reject what they were taught in high school, they move to the Right or Left. However a school where the students feel that the proper balance between sacred and profane is achieved, will remain intellectually legitimate in the students eyes.

As graduates of Modern Orthodox high schools move into their 20’s they tend to move towards more traditional Jewish norms, or towards the more liberal norms of the surrounding society, rather than remaining in the centrist positions that more frequently characterize their high school years. This phenomena is more visible among the graduates of schools on the Left, than among graduates of schools on the Right.

Table 1

Change in level of observance, by type of school

	CHANGE														
	-7.00	-6.00	-5.00	-4.00	-3.00	-2.00	-1.00	.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	5.00	6.00	7.00
Left	2	5	7	3	3	11	17	43	24	11	4	4	4	2	3
	1.4%	3.5%	4.9%	2.1%	2.1%	7.7%	11.9%	30.1%	16.8%	7.7%	2.8%	2.8%	2.8%	1.4%	2.1%
Center	1		2	1	4	4	8	42	15	5	4	2		1	
	1.1%		2.2%	1.1%	4.5%	4.5%	9.0%	47.2%	16.9%	5.6%	4.5%	2.2%		1.1%	
Right		1		2	1	1	6	61	27	4	2	1			
		.9%		1.9%	.9%	.9%	5.7%	57.5%	25.5%	3.8%	1.9%	.9%			
Total	3	6	9	6	8	16	31	146	66	20	10	7	4	3	3
	.9%	1.8%	2.7%	1.8%	2.4%	4.7%	9.2%	43.2%	19.5%	5.9%	3.0%	2.1%	1.2%	.9%	.9%

Table 2

Ideology scores, by type of school (0 = Far right : 700 = Far left)

		IDEAAVG													Total
		50.00	100.00	150.00	200.00	250.00	300.00	350.00	400.00	450.00	500.00	550.00	600.00		
SCGROU Left	Count	4	3	3	3	5	10	6	18	27	29	25	10	143	
	% within SCGRO	2.8%	2.1%	2.1%	2.1%	3.5%	7.0%	4.2%	12.6%	18.9%	20.3%	17.5%	7.0%	100.0%	
Center	Count		1		3	4	9	21	10	13	17	9	1	88	
	% within SCGRO		1.1%		3.4%	4.5%	10.2%	23.9%	11.4%	14.8%	19.3%	10.2%	1.1%	100.0%	
Right	Count			3	5	7	16	22	18	17	11	2	2	103	
	% within SCGRO			2.9%	4.9%	6.8%	15.5%	21.4%	17.5%	16.5%	10.7%	1.9%	1.9%	100.0%	
Total	Count	4	4	6	11	16	35	49	46	57	57	36	13	334	
	% within SCGRO	1.2%	1.2%	1.8%	3.3%	4.8%	10.5%	14.7%	13.8%	17.1%	17.1%	10.8%	3.9%	100.0%	

Table 3

Alumni perception of school's emphasis on achieving various goals, by type of school (means, 1-low, 5 high)

	Following Jewish norms of conduct	Learning Torah outside of school	Achieving career success	Getting into an Ivy League college
Left	3.34	2.74	4.36	4.43
Center	4.19	3.60	4.01	3.22
Right	4.04	3.95	3.62	2.47

## Evolution of a Religion-Based Political Movement – The Mizrachi at 100

By DAVID J. MICHAELS



Though many experts have watched for decades the militancy that has grown out of the continual politicization of Islam, since the horrific events of September 11<sup>th</sup> there has emerged more widespread appreciation of the extent to which religion and nationalism can be a potentially lethal mix. At the same time, it is crucial that we not forget that extremism and zealotry are not phenomena limited to Muslims, and that likewise within many faiths there have been religious movements engaged in dialogue and cooperation with other segments of their societies for the sake of common interests and national ideals.

One hundred years ago, almost to the day, a small but impressive group of Orthodox rabbis in Lithuania, led by Isaac Jacob Reines, joined together to found an organization called Mizrachi, which is a Hebrew acronym for “spiritual center.” The Mizrachi was established to provide an unprecedented institutional framework enabling religious Jews to take part in the Zionist struggle to secure political independence for Jews in their ancestral homeland. Concurrently, Mizrachi leaders hoped to serve as a positive religious influence within a greater movement that was dominated by secularists. What makes the history of the Mizrachi, as flagship of international religious Zionism, a particularly interesting topic for sociologists is the way in which the movement moved, both in Israel and the Jewish world at large, from having marginal influence to being recognized as mainstream only to return to society’s margins.

To enable better orientation, I would like to give a brief overview of the relevant demographics around the time of the Mizrachi’s founding in 1902. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Jewry was heavily centered in the Ashkenazi world, with some nine million Jews residing in Europe, in contrast to only 375,000 Jews in North African and Middle Eastern countries. Religious observance remained fairly widespread throughout the Sephardic world. European Jewry, however, was deeply divided between the mostly secular Jews of central and western Europe and the largely seclusionist Orthodox communities of eastern Europe - which were split themselves along chassidic and traditionalist lines.



Ironically, to a large extent it was persistent antisemitism that prevented countless Reform and unaffiliated Jews from completely assimilating into their respective European societies. Unquestionably, the scenes of racist mobs in Paris during the infamous Dreyfus Affair finally stunned an unobservant, humanistic Vienna-based journalist named Theodor Herzl into founding political Jewish nationalism in the late 1890s. By adopting the nationalistic fervor of many in Europe at the time, Herzl hoped to provide a solution to the seemingly unending vulnerability of European Jews, and at the same time give irreligious members of the community a new sense of cultural identity and purpose.



There is broad consensus that Judaism is not merely a system of beliefs and practices but a framework for nationhood as well. Despite an exile of nearly two thousand years, the Jewish presence in Palestine was never interrupted




and the Land of Israel played a central role in the collective memory, rituals and hopes of Jews throughout the Diaspora.

Deep historic and emotional bonds notwithstanding – and despite the fact that several notable rabbinic figures predated secular Zionists by decades, if not centuries, in mulling the rebuilding of Jewish society in Palestine – the vast majority of Orthodox leaders rejected the participation of the Mizrachi in Herzl’s World Zionist Organization a century ago. To review, classic religious Zionism had two guiding objectives: the restoration of Jewish statehood and the preservation of Orthodox autonomy over matters of religion in society. Nonetheless, some within the Orthodox camp, believing that Jewish vulnerability and dispersion for the duration of the exile were G-d’s will, objected on theological grounds to any form of Jewish “empowerment” before messianic times. Even more so, Orthodox leaders would not hear of any cooperation with the secularists, including many self-declared atheists, in building a democratic Jewish state. They feared not only that the influence of a religious minority within Zionism would be minimal, but that the Orthodox would have to compromise and sacrifice their own values in order to be part of the Zionist establishment.

In taking a more optimistic attitude and what they saw as a proactive, pragmatic stance, the Mizrachi leaders thus found themselves as a minority within both Orthodoxy and the Zionist movement. In their long struggle to win legitimacy, religious Zionists – in the words of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveichik – “were thrown out of the *shtetl* [or small synagogues that dotted Jewish communities]. Others were excommunicated. Many Mizrachi leaders in small towns and villages were condemned to loneliness. People would not extend greetings to them; they would not talk to them. And they carried on with their Mizrachi activities.”

Though it took several years of fighting an uphill battle, the Mizrachi eventually became a force to be reckoned with in Orthodoxy. Zionism was bolstered by growing international awareness of its goals and by ever-increasing support from throughout the Jewish world. Zionists were further reinvigorated by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which expressed British endorsement for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In turn, the World Zionist Organization saw the Mizrachi’s participation in its diplomatic efforts as helping give the movement the image of a cause supported across the Jewish spectrum. Mizrachi was empowered as the all-but-official religious establishment in Palestine, with a great deal of political influence and a formidable educational system. Finally, all but the fiercest of ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionists were decimated by the Nazi concentration camps in Europe.



The Holocaust gave Zionism unprecedented sympathy and a sense of urgency within the Jewish community and beyond. As a direct result, the State of Israel was declared in 1948, and the Zionist organization was transformed into the government of the new Jewish republic. The seemingly miraculous realization of the Zionists’ great dream further vindicated the path taken by the Mizrachi, which now dominated many Orthodox communities in the Diaspora – particularly that



of the United States – and had inherited guardianship over state religion issues in Israel. With its members active in all sectors of Israeli life, the Mizrachi’s own National Religious Party extended its influence by regularly commanding a powerful ten percent of parliament as well as key cabinet portfolios such as education, religious affairs, and the interior.




During the first two decades of Israel's existence, the Mizrachi built a vast network of social services, educational institutions, women and youth activism groups, community newspapers and charitable foundations. Most notably, it established a framework of military and volunteer service through which young religious Zionists were widely seen as bridges in an otherwise polarized society, models of religious and national idealism.

The Six Day War of 1967 was a landmark event in the history of religious Zionism. By not only warding off Arab threats of extermination but "liberating" much of Israel's Biblical heartland, Israelis were




euphoric, feeling an unprecedented sense of invincibility. The expansion of the area of Israel's control, and the reunification of Jerusalem, incalculably strengthened the strand of religious Zionist thought that saw the movement not as a group of moderate pragmatists but pioneers heralding messianic redemption with the revival of Jewish sovereignty and power in Israel. Whereas the movement's old guard had been concerned primarily with maintaining good relations with secular Israelis in the hope of advancing religiosity and unity in society, a new generation was now intensely focused on settling the freshly conquered lands. A hawkish, defiant spirit grew within, and ultimately pervaded, the religious Zionist leadership to the point where, in 1977, the National Religious Party, traditionally aligned with the liberal Labor faction, joined the right-wing government of Likud leader Menachem Begin.

However, disillusionment over Israel's much closer call in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and then the controversial invasion of Lebanon in 1982 soon combined with bitter feuding over the party's hard-line stance against territorial concessions in the context of the troubled Middle East peace process. Factions on the far-right and far-left quit the Mizrachi mainstream, and other reactionaries defected for Likud. In addition, the venting of grievances by a newly mobilized and self-assertive Sephardic Orthodoxy as well as the reawakened Ashkenazi religious Right further eroded the Mizrachi's power base. As a result, the National Religious



Party lost half its parliamentary mandates and was excluded in 1992, for the first time in Israeli history, from the Labor-led administration. Frustration over growing "post-Zionism," religious pluralism, and transfer of territory to Palestinian control boiled over into such violent events as the massacre by a Jewish settler of Arabs in Hebron in 1994, and the 1995 assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by a religious law student. In the Diaspora, the Mizrachi has not been as impotent in decades, likely as a result of several factors: renewed "ultra-Orthodox" strength, an aging leadership, organizational mismanagement (even neglect), and the immigration of many younger religious Zionists to Israel. In a matter of several years, religious Zionism has moved from a widely admired success story to a splintered fringe. In the wake of losing the Mizrachi's centrist presence, the Knesset now is very much a bipolar legislature, with extensive power being held by respective extreme Orthodox and secularist parties.



In summation, it remains to be seen what the future holds for religious Zionism, at least insofar as it is represented by the Mizrachi organization. Ironically, even as Zionism is accepted more than ever before throughout Orthodoxy, and Orthodoxy is accepted as part of the Israeli establishment, the very movement that made mainstream a synthesis of Judaism and politics has lost influence to the point where it is currently excluded from Israel's most conservative government coalition ever. It can certainly be argued that the movement has thrived most when Israeli society has been united by fear of existential

threats, and that religious Zionist ideology has taken a harsh blow with many Israelis all but resigned to live side-by-side with a Palestinian state.

At the same time, the raging Palestinian intifada has pushed the Israeli center rightward, which will likely (barring either extreme passiveness or divisiveness on the part of its leaders) translate into improved NRP performance in the coming elections. Furthermore, some optimists who envision the ultimate reaching of a

Mideast settlement expect that the Mizrachi's original role as a bridge within Israeli society will be revived if the Jewish state finds enough peace to focus inward on its many societal tensions that remain unresolved.

Finally, even in several Jewish communities outside of Israel, which are burdened with the seeming contradiction of "Diaspora Zionism," the Mizrachi is attempting a comeback. I am hopeful that an extensive questionnaire developed as part of our research seminar at Yeshiva and sent to Mizrachi branches in some 30 countries will shed light on the operations, views and plans of religious Zionist leaders worldwide. I expect to find that Mizrachi manages to survive, even thrive, only in communities that offer a consistent, vibrant, undiluted Orthodox-Zionist education to its children. South Africa, Australia, Canada and Belgium will thus likely stand out as outposts of relatively vibrant Mizrachi activity. The Jewish communities wherein I expect to see the most striking changes, however, are those of Argentina and France, whose respective economic depression and ongoing wave of antisemitic violence may yet prove an impetus for renewed Zionism – but the realization, and export, of that idealism through dramatically increased and accelerated immigration to Israel. ■



*Photos (Top-Bottom, L-R): A second plane hits the World Trade Center on September 11; the Mizrachi founders in 1902, with Rabbi Reines in center of front row; a Yemenite Jewish irrimigrant kisses the ground upon reaching Israel; the first Chief Rabbi of Israel, Rabbi Yitzchak Isaac Herzog, visited the displaced persons camp in Zeisheim, Germany in 1946; Rabbi Yebuda Leib Maimon, the Mizrachi leader, famously wrote the Hebrew acronym for the phrase, "with G-d's help," above his signature on Israel's Declaration of Independence in 1948; Holocaust survivors begin new lives in Haifa; then-IDF Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren blows the shofar after the Western Wall's liberation during the 1967 Six Day War; highly motivated army service complements yeshiva study for most young religious Zionists in Israel; religious Israelis came to increasingly dominate right-wing political demonstrations; the writer during a private talk in the home of Rabbi Avraham Shapira, former chief rabbi of Israel and the recognized spiritual leader of newly hardline religious Zionism; mourners at the funeral of a recent intifada victim*

## POLITICAL THOUGHT

**The Me vs. We of Aristotle's Political Community**

By JASON KOSLOWE

Aristotle's conception of the political community, emanating from man's nature as the political animal (*zōon politikon*), asserted William A. Dunning at the dawn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, "leaves no room for such discussion as has figured in later political theory, of a 'state of nature' in which the individual lives a life of blissful isolation from his kind" (278). While, of course, Aristotle had not encountered the liberal individualism of the enlightenment, a fortiori today's hyper-individualism, his theory of the naturally communal individual seems to reject them. It is my thesis that this prima fascia dismissal neglects a deeper understanding of Aristotle's political theory. I believe that not only does Aristotle's naturalistic communalism inherently reconcile with modern individualism, but that his political community provides us with an attractive alternative to postmodernity's fractured communities and the current state of dwindling social capital – the Me/We Community.

Aristotle roots his idea of the *polis* in a naturalistic understanding of the development of human interpersonal organization.

If one were to see how these things develop naturally from the beginning, one would, in this case as in others, get the best view of them. First, then, those who cannot exist without each other necessarily form a couple, as [1] female and male do for the sake of procreation, and [2] as a natural ruler and what is naturally ruled do for the sake of survival... The first thing to emerge from these two communities is a household... But the first community constituted out of several households for the sake of satisfying needs other than everyday ones is a village (Politics 1252a23-31, 1252b9, 15).

Both the household (*oikia*) and village (*kome*) develop in response to certain natural human needs – the household as the combination of male-female association for the propagation of the race, and that between master and slave for sustenance and survival, and the village as the further, permanent association of households for the fulfillment of economic and security needs. The polis arises as the *telos* of the evolution of the human community – "the state springs from the union of villages into an association of such size and character as to be self-sufficing" (Dunning 277).

A polis is among the things that exist by nature, a human being is by nature a political animal (1253a2-3).

In thus arguing, Aristotle applies a principle of his biology – "that the nature of a kind is realized when the instances of that kind achieve their complete development" (Barnes 236). He presents the blossoming of community from household to polis via village as analogous to the biologically natural growth of an acorn to a tree via a sapling. Thus the genesis of society is purposive, "in which people who as individuals lack self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) combine to form communities of increasing complexity, until they achieve the aim of producing a self-sufficient community by the development of the polis" (Barnes 237).

Having understood self-sufficiency as the ability to sustain and reproduce individual life (as implied by the natural reasons for the rise of communities), what compels us to accept the polis as the last and perfect association functioning to achieve self-sufficiency? At this point, the naturalistic argument forces us to admit that people form communities to survive, but not necessarily that they form political communities. Aristotle answers this challenge by redefining self-sufficiency:

A complete community constituted out of several villages, once it reaches the limit of total self-sufficiency, practically speaking, is a city-state. It comes to be for the sake of living, but remains in existence for the sake of living well (1252b26-28).



Aristotle claims that man can live the good life – life shaped by exercise of the virtues of intellect and character – only in the polis. Nevertheless, even if we understand self-sufficiency within the context of the good life, we may still deny that primitive society tends towards *this* self-sufficiency as its goal or completion. As explained by C. C. W. Taylor:

Aristotle's description of the polis as coming into existence for the sake of life, but existing for the sake of the good life, suggests that simple survival and subsistence was the goal which explains the original development of the polis, but that the conception of its as existing to promote the good life is a subsequent development, which presupposes the general adoption of a system of values [– the good life –] itself made possible by the conditions of life in the polis (Barnes 237).

Aristotle seems to have either presupposed an innate human desire for the good life, which undermines the purpose of an argument for the polis based on the natural development of group relationships (since if mankind intrinsically yearned for the good life, and could only achieve this state in the polis, it would strive to create the polis regardless of any system of societal evolution), or abandoned his naturalistic basis for the political community altogether.

I propose to answer this difficulty in Aristotle's reasoning by depicting society's evolution as two part – one stage prompted by physical necessity for survival, the other impelled by aspiration for the good life. The household and then the village indeed arose to sustain and reproduce individual life, and once man reached the subsistence level, he achieved a measurement of leisure (in comparison to the leisure Aristotle extols, that of the contemplative life, which can only exist in the polis, we can term this proto-leisure). In this state he envisioned the good life – his having attained the secure life allowed him to realize his lack of the virtuous life. Now driven to realize the good life, man created the ultimate community – the political community, the polis – as the place where he can strive for and attain the good life.

A more literal (if perhaps less stylistically pleasing) translation of 1252b27-28 fits this rendering of societal development into Aristotle's own words:

Originating in the bare needs of living, it exists for the sake of the complete life.

The polis does not “come to be” for the sake of subsistence living, it rather originates in (and not for) the condition created by obtaining the bare needs of living.

Aristotle suggests this bifurcated process in his adamant differentiation – in kind – of oikeia and poleis. While families and towns result from natural urges, people institute a polis:

Though an impulse toward this sort of community exists by nature in everyone, whoever first established one was responsible for the greatest of goods (1253a30).

Thus, a polis is both a consequence of teleological growth and a product of human freedom and inventiveness.

This essential paradox defines the nature of the citizens of Aristotle's political community. When Aristotle opens the *Politics* by attempting to “see how these things develop naturally from the beginning” (1252a24) he assumes a teleological nature. “But to our surprise, a strict teleology turns out to be indistinguishable from a strict mechanism” (Davis 26). That humans by nature form group associations, and that these communities progressively develop into poleis, forces us to consider human development as automatic, and humans consequently as passive objects of historical progression. Yet, rule over free men as opposed to rule over slaves characteristically distinguishes political rule from rule in the household or in the village.

For rule of a statesman is rule over people who are naturally free, whereas that of a master is rule over slaves (1255b18-19).

“For rule to be political, those who are ruled must in some way assent to being ruled” (Davis 51). Freedom and activity exemplify the type of man – the subject and maker of history – needed to establish a valid polis. Thus the political man – the zoon politikon – must be both active and passive; he must rule and be ruled.

Aristotle's claim that man can only live the good life in the polis deserves explication. The argument from nature, construed as dually staged, maintains that society develops towards the fulfillment of the good life; but what makes the *political* community the locus of that realization? The *Nicomachean Ethics* defines the excellence of the good life as two-fold, in part intellectual, in part moral. The *Politics* explicitly assumes the account of moral virtue arrived at in the

*Ethics* – “activation or complete exercise of virtue” (Politics 1328a27), “an active life of the element that has a rational principle... life in the sense of activity” (1098 a5) – “that is to say, the excellent realization of those capacities which are distinctive of human life, specifically the capacities for practical and theoretical rationality” (Barnes 234).

For if what is said in the *Ethics* is right, and a happy life is the one that expresses virtue and is without impediment, and virtue is a mean, then the middle life, the mean that each sort of person can actually achieve, must be best (1295a35-37).

“The *Ethics* advances a number of plausible arguments for the thesis that a good human life must be a communal life” (Barnes 234). We extrinsically derive benefit from friends, such as help in times of trouble, but moreover, we intrinsically enjoy life with companionship more than life in solitude. More importantly, most of the virtuous actions, such as generosity, kindness, and justice, require interaction with others.

The just man needs people towards whom and with whom he shall act justly, and the temperate man, the brave man, and each of the others is the same case (1177a29-34).

Yet these arguments only prove that man needs to construct some sort of community in order to practice virtue, but not necessarily the political community.

In discussing morality in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle supposes that man should pursue virtue for its own sake. Aristotle uses courage in war as his paradigmatic case of such a virtue; yet, courage reacts to the evil present in war, which itself is at best a necessary evil, used only to produce peace. “Courage, then, can come into being only when preceded by an evil” (Davis 3). In fact, this structure outlines the makeup of all the moral virtues – as such, “moral virtue can be the goal only for a being attempting to overcome imperfection. The imperfection of our condition makes possible our striving and so is good” (Davis 3). We must remember, of course, that man can only apply most virtuous qualities within a community. Thus only in the community whose purpose centers on achieving the good life, in the location within which man can strive for betterment, where he has the freedom to act freely and not simply react to his environment, can man face his deficiencies and practice virtue. As described in the bifurcated development of the polis, only after realizing, in his proto-leisure state, his lack of the good life in the village – life lived in servitude to nature and the need to survive – does man strive for the good life, and thus create the political community for that end. The locus of mankind’s striving for the good life is the polis. As such, the *Ethics* begins by identifying the science of what is best with politics (1094a27-29), and the *Politics* portrays the polis as the only association where man can live the spiritually self-sufficient life, the good life.

The thesis that man can realize (in both senses of the word) the good only through perception of the evil resonates in Aristotle’s depiction of man’s dual nature as a polis-dweller – active and passive, ruling and ruled. Once man frees himself from the reactive nature of subsistence living, he perceives any rule at all as an affront to his dignity and potential wholeness. Man creates the political community in search of this spiritual wholeness as manifest in the good life. “Ironically, political life originates when men organize themselves as a group, and so submit to rule, in order to counteract the sense of injustice rooted in every experience of being ruled” (Davis 102). Thus “political life, built on a desire not to be ruled, requires submission to rule” (Davis 95). Man could never have started the process towards the polis and the good life had he not perceived the evil of being ruled. Yet even within that process he needs to constantly taste the injustice of being ruled to maintain the political system that leads him towards the good life. Since the meaning of philosophical answers in general, or the perception of the injustice of being ruled in this case, fades as the questions that gave raise to them are forgotten, “political life must combine seeking and having” (Davis 59), ruling and being ruled, in order to maintain the cause of its existence – man’s quest for the good life.

The oikia-man, perfect at being ruled, could never, in his disturbingly mechanical reaction to life, truly perceive the common good. He lacks the freedom inherent in man post-proto-leisure needed to prompt exploration into the good life. But the perfectly free man would never strive for the good life; lacking the injustices of being ruled and the questions that they stimulate, he would never ask for the good life.

Aristotle’s description of the task of *phronēsis*, practical wisdom, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, adds another dimension to the duality of the polis citizen:

...To deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for oneself, not in particular areas, such as what promotes health of strength, but with view to living well overall (1140a25-28).

The citizen must thus be a self-aware and active member of the community in order to fulfill *phronêsis*.

Someone who is eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial office is a citizen in the city-state (1275b18-20).

However, to what end, and in what manner, should the citizen 'act?' Should he forward the state's collective, or his own personal, interests?

Aristotle intimates the collectivist approach by placing the polis prior in thought to the individual.

The polis is also prior in nature to the household and to each of us individually, since a whole is necessarily prior to its parts (1253a18-20).

This sense of prior renders A prior to B if and only if A cannot exist without B but not vice versa. Aristotle employs an analogy of a body and a hand to articulate his point – the body exists as a body with or without the hand, but the hand cannot be a hand in the same sense detached from the body as it was a hand while attached. The part thus has no existence, let alone interests, independent of those of the whole. In political terms, this 'prior' understanding not only totally subordinates the independent good of the individual to the greater good of the state, but also implies "that the individual has no independent good, his or her good being identified with his or her contribution to the good of the state" (Barnes 240).

Yet an opposite argument for definitional priorism emerges from Aristotle's treatment of the naturalistic development of the polis from the household and village. A is prior to B in definition if and only if the definition of A is included in the definition of B, but not vice versa (*Metaphysics* 1028a32-36). Since the definition of the polis includes the definitions of the village, household, and individual, all three are prior to it. This corresponds with Aristotle's interpretation of the aim of political organization and of the polis – to promote the good life for the individual citizens.

It is evident that the best government must be that organization in which everyone, whoever he is, might do best and live a blessedly happy life (1324a24-25).

Thus, Aristotle seems to define the good of the state via that of the individual.

In now fusing these two factors, the Aristotelian citizen must actively pursue the good life – either within the active framework of statesmanship or the passive context of law-abiding citizenship – for both himself and the polis.

The city is made up of parts, but in one case the parts are given before the whole, and in the other the whole determines the parts. In the first case the movement is from known parts to an unknown whole and all parts are treated equally. In the second case the movement is from the demands of a whole, an animal, to the parts minimally necessary for the existence of the whole (Davis 75).

A polis remains both "a multitude of citizens" and at the same time "a composite, one that is whole" (1274b38-40); its citizens are simultaneously means to some further end and ends in themselves.

This duality of essential characteristics applies not only to the nature of the polis-citizen, but also to the nature of the polis itself. Traditional Aristotelian scholarship has distinguished in the *Politics* two different, and even discordant, theoretical constructs, a value theory – the ideal, best, or desired state, and a causal theory – the actual, or available states. In this representation of the *Politics*, Books IV, V, and VI describe actual constitutions, while Books VII and VIII treat the ideal state, using Books II and III as prefatory discourse, and Book I as an introduction to the whole work. William T. Bluhm argued against such a division:

It is the thesis of my essay that the traditional interpretation is in error and cannot be maintained. I shall argue that in Book IV (supposedly a purely descriptive book) Aristotle carries forward a delineation of the ideal state, begun in Book I, by identifying in the actual constitution called "Polity" the chief structural principles of the ideal order. The state described in Books VII and VIII merely extends these principles in a quantitative way (774).

Thus the polity, or *politeia*, represents the theoretical and practical ideal polis, in sync with Aristotle's requiring the actual and not just the hypothetical – "the mean that each sort of person *can actually achieve*, must be best" (1295a38).

Aristotle's recognition of the politeia as the ideal state appears rather obvious in Book IV:

What is the best constitution [government], and what is the best life for most city-states and most human beings, judging neither by virtue that is beyond the reach of ordinary people, nor by a kind of education that depends on luck, nor by the unattainably ideal constitution, but by a life that most people can share and a constitution in which most city-states can participate?... It is clear, therefore, that the political community that depends on those in the middle is best too, and that city states can be well government where those in the middle are numerous and stronger, preferably than both of the others [the rich and the poor] (1295a25-30, 1295b33-37).

His position rests on his conception of political virtue, on the citizen as active and passive, having and seeking, ruler and ruled, individual and communal, and ultimately on his theory of the mean.

"Justice," writes Aristotle, "is the political good" (1282b16). This does not signify justice as the ultimate characteristic of the good life (although it is a quality thereof), but rather denotes justice as ultimate moral virtue within the context of communal life.

Now everyone holds that justice is some sort of equality...but equality in what and inequality in what should not be overlooked. For this involves a problem and political philosophy (1282b17-23).

In order to determine how to employ justice, the political good, *epistémê politiké*, political science, must ascertain the nature of equality.

Democracy, rule of the poor multitude, and oligarchy, rule of the wealthy few, contrarily construe equality.

Democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unqualifiedly equal; for because they are equally free, they think they are unqualifiedly equal. Oligarchy, on the other hand, arose from those who are unequal in one respect taking themselves to be wholly unequal; for being unequal in property, they take themselves to be unqualifiedly unequal (1301a23-33).

Democracy is based on a perceived equality of need. Accordingly, the democratic vice is envy (1295b23), and democratic crimes are born of need. Oligarchy, on the other hand, is based on a perceived superiority, wealth. Its characteristic vice is condescension (1295b24), and oligarchic crimes are born of hubris... Both of these ultimately destroy the common good and with it the city. Shared need is not sufficiently good, and a sense of superiority is not sufficiently shared (Davis 80-81).

Aristotle solves the question of equality by mixing the oligarchic and the democratic in politeia – "polity is a mixing of oligarchy and democracy" (1293b34). Just as virtue in general is a mean between two extremes (to borrow an example for the *Ethics*: courage is the proper amount of fear and confidence, avoiding neither extreme timidity or overconfidence), the political virtue, justice, is the mean between the extremes of democratic equality and oligarchic inequality. Justice, and the laws created in its image, recognizes man's inherent equality, that of freedom, which itself enables the establishment of the polis, but does not overlook the intrinsic inequality between people.

Politeia – *tes politeias aristes*, the perfect state – localizes the mean – *as the extreme opposite of both extremes* – of the citizenship and political life in its citizenry. Thus, the middle class seeks not the mediocrity of the middle, but the moderation of the mean. They do not "tend toward arrogance and major vice" or "malice and petty vice" (1295b10-11); they lack the aristocratic egotism that shuns being ruled and quests totalitarian control, and the docility of the masses that lends itself to subservience and submissiveness. They can therefore rotate rulership, thus balancing ruling and being ruled. They can strive for personal betterment without the risks of either democratic or oligarchic crimes, and as the social mean themselves, can, simultaneously, focus flawlessly on the general good. The middle class of the politeia, by mixing democracy and oligarchy, produces the middle life: "*The middle life*, the mean that each sort of person can actually achieve, must be best" (1295a38).

In advocating rule by the middle class majority in Book IV, Aristotle echoes the principle that the people at large, rather than the few best, ought to govern, a position he introduces in chapter 11 of Book III. He poses a question about political sovereignty at the beginning of chapter 10:



There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state: Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant (1281a11)?

In answering this doubt, Aristotle presents the “doctrine of the wisdom of the multitude” (DWM):

For the many, who are not as individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, when they have come together, be better than the few best people, not individually but collectively...For being many, each of them can have some part of virtue and practical wisdom, and when they come together, the multitude is just like a single human being, with many feet, hands, and senses, and so too for their character traits and wisdom (1281a43-1281b7).

Considered individual by individual, the wisdom of the one best man or the few elite outshines each person’s inferior insight, still, considered as a body that can collectively deliberate, the people may make better, wiser, and abler decisions. “For they have the benefit of each person’s knowledge, experience, judgment, and insight – which they can synthesize into collective knowledge, experience, judgment, and insight – whereas the one best man can rely only on his own individual resources” (Walden 564), or the elite on their few individual resources. Jeremy Walden formulates DWM as follows:

The people acting as a body are capable of making better decisions, by pooling their knowledge, experience, and insight, than any subset of them acting as a body and pooling the knowledge, experience, and insight of the members of the subset (565).

We can interpret the DWM as either a simply quantitative, or a dynamic, qualitative argument. The quantitative argument suggests that the aggregation of the multitudinously random and unordered collection of opinions of the citizenry simply outnumbers the information available to the one good man or the oligarchic *crème de la crème*. But taken qualitatively, the DWM implies that the synthesis of the varying individual views and insights, by impacting one upon the other, provides a basis for dialectical and reciprocal questioning and criticism, thus enabling the emergence of a position not only quantitatively, but qualitatively better than any of the single inputs themselves, or of the monarchic or oligarchic deliberative end-decisions.

A current of paradoxical dualism unifies Aristotle’s theory of the political community. Aristotle’s polis, originating as both the end of a naturally teleological progression and construction by man in search of the good life, and fulfilling both a theoretical ideal and a practical realization, manifests itself in the politeia – a mixing of democracy and oligarchy to produce the mean of the middle class. The citizen of this polis reflects the mean in his both active and passive, ruling and ruled, seeking and having, and individual and communal nature.

The theory of the Me/We Community completely harmonizes Aristotle’s epistêmê politikê. Aristotle’s mean does not meet midway between two extremes, but rather, as expressed earlier, consists of the extreme opposite of both extremes. Using our previous example, courage does not contain 50% fear and 50% confidence, or even the midpoint on a theoretical spectrum between those two factors, but rather 100% of both extreme timidity and overconfidence. The polis thus evolves both completely teleologically and is completely constructed by man; the politeia is both fully democratic and fully oligarchic. The citizen’s dichotomy operates in this way as well – he is at the same time oligarchic – active, sovereign, seeking, and *individual*, and democratic – passive, ruled, content, and *communal*. *He exists, simultaneously, on two symphonically discordant levels – the Me and the We*. Aristotle’s citizen must think of himself as utterly individual, completely consumed by his own issues, and entirely in pursuit of his own interests. He will therefore attempt to fully control his environment in an active search for his own personal good life. Yet, contemporaneously, he fully subsumes within the collective, as a part functioning solely for the whole. Consequently, he accedes to being ruled, and passively accepts his role in forming the collective good life.

Aristotle’s Me/We political community embraces individualism, while rejecting the cult of the individual apparent in modern society. Secular liberalism, as a product of the Enlightenment project, “took it as axiomatic that there was only one possible answer to any question” (Harvey 27). In its endeavor to find the ultimate “-ism,” Enlightenment philosophers and political theorists pursued universal human emancipation, and only viewed collective betterment as emanating from and existing for individual advancement. The postmodern concern for the individual, its focus on the local instead of the universal or international, in a world of ever-increasing transience, has continued the modern enterprise to better the individual. Aristotle’s political animal relates to his community not only in as much as it benefits him personally (not simply as a function of the Me), but because his existence is also determined by that of

the community (because he exists as a We as well). Thus, as applicable to our current condition, Aristotle's political community – the Me/We Community, by employing the Aristotelian mean, which, by mixing the excellence of either side of a given idea continuum, posits the existence of both extremes at the same time on different levels, retains the Me of individualism, and restores the We of community. ■

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## ▶ AMERICAN WAY

***Yeshiva Students On Electoral College Reform***

By SANDY COHEN



A survey of opinions of college students toward Electoral College reform was undertaken in April - May 2001 at Yeshiva University. The survey consisted of 100 undergraduates of all disciplines within the University. The purpose of this poll was to determine the outlooks and concerns of how our nation chooses our president, and to determine student views on related questions, such as unfaithful electors. The final results indicate that, in the opinion of most Yeshiva students polled, the Electoral College is not the best system of electing our nation's president.



In the 1992 presidential race, Democratic candidate Bill Clinton accomplished what at the time seemed impossible: winning the Republican stronghold of California. Clinton had campaigned in California like no other national office-seeker had before 1992. In 1996, he again heaped most of his attention on California, campaigning there almost 30 times. What is the reason for all this attention on a single state? If a presidential candidate wins by even a slim majority in California, he takes with him its 54 electoral votes. These 54 votes are 1/5 of the 270-vote majority needed to capture the presidency. There are 538 electors, with each state getting one elector for each Representative and Senator it has, and three more electors for the District of Columbia who elect the president based on each state's popular vote. But over the years, drawbacks to the Electoral College system have become apparent, leaving a majority of Americans questioning our electoral system. I have conducted a public opinion poll to find out exactly what the students of Yeshiva University like and dislike about our electoral system.

The Framers of the Constitution preferred the current electoral system (Republic) rather than a direct popular election (Direct Democracy) because in the 18th Century, travel was difficult and there were no national party organizations. The Framers believed that the people were generally misinformed and misled; therefore nationwide elections were impractical in a land of loosely knit former colonies (Toner B8). They also feared that many regional candidates would divide the vote. Requiring a candidate to win a majority in the Electoral College was a way of obtaining a national consensus. Before any debate could take place, it was assumed that Congress would elect him. However, if Congress elected the president, then the president might feel an obligation not to veto laws passed by Congress. This approach would put a dent in the Checks and Balances system. Therefore, after much debate and even more compromise, the current system was enacted.

The Electoral College has been crucial in three elections. In 1824, Andrew Jackson was the popular-vote leader among four candidates, but none got the electoral majority. So the election was decided in the House of Representatives (as provided in the Constitution), and John Quincy Adams emerged victorious. In 1876, Gov. Samuel Tilden of New York appeared to edge out Gov. Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio in the popular vote. But Hayes was declared the electoral winner, and thus president, by a single vote after a prolonged dispute over the legitimacy of Hayes' electors. Once again in 1888, President Grover Cleveland led in the popular vote but lost in the college and was so ousted by former Senator Benjamin Harrison of Indiana. Four years later, Cleveland got his revenge, beating Harrison unambiguously to become the only president elected to non-consecutive terms (Germand 2759). Three times in the 19th century, the candidate who won the popular vote did not win a majority in the Electoral College. In the 20th century however, the elections of 1960 and 1968 did not produce such a result, but their closeness spurred interest in changing the system. But the election of 2000 indeed sparked the most controversy.

Critics argue that there are three problems to the current Electoral College system. First, a president can be elected to office even if he is not whom the people want. Another problem is that electors are not punished for being

“unfaithful” to the candidate they have pledged to support. Finally, each state’s electoral votes are awarded on a winner-take-all basis (Amar B19).

Critics claim that one of the system’s most obvious faults is that a president can be elected without winning a majority of the popular vote. In fact, a president with a minority of the popular vote has won the Electoral College vote 17 times in US history. The most recent model of this notion is President Clinton’s 1992 and 1996 elections where he did not win a majority of the popular vote. When asked which system channeled the popular will best, students responded with a great majority. 67% of those surveyed disagreed with the Electoral College, while only a mere 15% agreed with the system.

Another problem critics see is the “unfaithful elector”. Electors are expected to ratify the people’s choice by voting for candidates who win the popular election within each state. Electors who do not vote in accordance with the people’s choice are considered “unfaithful electors”. Only in seven elections had an “unfaithful elector” actually voted on his own accord. Each of these traitorous acts never really had a diverse effect on the outcome of an election. By law, 26 states do not require an elector to vote according to the people’s choice (Wickman). When questioned if every state’s electors should be required by law to vote according to the people’s choice, 52% agreed and 28% disagreed.

Finally, critics assert the winner-take-all system must change. If a candidate wins a majority of the state votes, he takes all the electoral votes of the state. Because the electoral votes are not apportioned to each candidate’s popular vote count, third party candidates often have difficulty obtaining any votes in the Electoral College. It may take the emergence of a strong independent candidate to get legislators to act and voters to demand action. If, for example, a very popular public figure such as Cohn Powell, who toyed with an Independent nomination in 1996, decided to get in front of the growing public demand for a third party, more attention might be paid to the inherent weakness in the Electoral College system. When questioned about this winner-take-all system, 57% of those surveyed claimed we should get rid of it, while only 26% claimed that it should be kept intact.

In this new Age of Information, as I have found out, problems have also developed to disrupt the flow of the Electoral College process. In the election of 1976, citizens flocked to the polls from the East, voted and listened to the news broadcast of who emerged victorious. As the polls closed in the East, national TV media predicted the outcome before the West Coast vote was completed. Because of the predictions made by TV newscasters, the entire West Coast vote was swayed. Residents of California, waiting to vote, heard the prediction on the radio that Carter was expected to win which persuaded citizens that their vote no longer mattered and most never even made it to the polls (Amar B 19). History always has a tendency of repeating itself, for in the election of 2000, the media posted its predictions and changed them several times which surely swayed the results. When questioned if media predictions should be banned until all votes have been tallied, those surveyed responded 56% in favor of the ban, and 33% opposed to it.

Most people believe that the only way to change the voting system is to pass a Constitutional Amendment, which there have been repeated attempts to do. In 1969, the House overwhelmingly approved a proposed Constitutional Amendment that would have abolished the Electoral College; President Nixon endorsed it and urged the Senate to adopt it. It was blocked and killed by Senators from the small states and the South. Most recently in 1997, Congress debated a Constitutional Amendment to replace the Electoral College with a system of direct popular election (Wilmerding 114). This proposed amendment was rejected after defenders of the Electoral College claimed that a direct election may be “as problematic as using an electoral go-between” (Wilmerding 113). When questioned if changes should take place on a national level, by passing a Constitutional Amendment, or on a state level, have the state legislature pass all changes, those surveyed answered 63% in favor of changes on a national level and 10% in favor on a state level.

In 1978, a 20th Century Fund task force came up with a simple solution. If proposed eliminating the Electoral College but keeping the electoral votes. To deal with main complaint against the Electoral College, the possibility of a candidate’s winning the presidency without obtaining the most popular votes, the task force proposed that the winner of the popular vote nationally be awarded a bonus of 102 electoral votes, two from each state and the



District of Columbia. According to the Brookings Institution's Stephen Hess, the task force cochairman, this bonus would have assured the popular-vote winner would also attain a majority of the electoral vote. This proposal too got nowhere (Wickman).

Advocates of the present system argued before Congress that no election system is perfect, but the current system has borne the test of time. Under the current rules we have had 18 minority presidential terms, presidents who came to office with less than 50% of the popular vote. The list includes some of our best presidents including Lincoln, Wilson (twice), Polk, and Truman (Polsby 116). There have been 18 minority presidential terms out of 47 presidents. If we scrap the present system now, it would be like invalidating each of these past presidents' terms, eras and accomplishments.

When questioned by reformers about a direct popular election, advocates respond with an analogy. Why are professional football teams required to win games in order to get into the playoffs and with Super Bowl? Why not simply select the teams that scored the most points during the regular season? Any football fan can tell you why; such a process would not produce the right winner, and the best teams in the most competitive divisions would have the worst chances of getting into the playoffs. Such a system is not the proper test of the team's talent and ability. This analogy is likened to the presidential hopeful.

Authorities on politics agree that since the balloting for the 2000 election produced another Grover Cleveland, who captured the popular vote in 1888 but lost the Electoral College, there will again be cries for doing away with the college. If there were no college, one theory goes, "candidates might be tempted to shun the smaller states and the sparsely populated areas within big states altogether as they jetted from metropolis to metropolis" (Stout A26). The people in small towns and on farms and the issues dear to them might be neglected. There is no doubt, however, that the Electoral College benefits small states, giving them more power in proportion to their population than large states have. Supporters of the status quo also say the Electoral College magnifies a majority, encouraging a consensus around a new president and the orderly transfer of power.

Advocates also claim that if we were to reform the Constitution's electoral process, and the entire federal principle is illegitimate in presidential elections, then it should be illegitimate for the Senate and House elections as well. Why should a state with half a million people have the same representation in the Senate as a state with 20 million people? Why should every state have at least one vote in the House of Representatives? The Framers knew the answer to these questions: the Federal Principle. It is true that the electoral voting system probably did not work out in precisely the fashion that the Framers anticipated, but it did evolve in conformity to the Federal Principle and the separation of powers.

The Electoral College has performed its function for over 200 years by ensuring that the President of the United States has both sufficient popular support to govern and that his popular support is sufficiently distributed throughout the country to enable him to govern effectively. Although there were a few anomalies in its early history, aside from the election of 2000 none have occurred in the past century. Proposals to abolish the Electoral College, though frequently put forward, have failed largely because the alternative to it appears more problematic than the college itself. The fact that the Electoral College was originally designed to solve one set of problems but today serves to solve an entirely different set of problems is a tribute to the genius of the Founding Fathers.

The American Electoral College was conceived as a democratic institution and, more importantly, has functioned as a democratic institution. The real question is, do Americans want a system compatible with national democracy or federal democracy? Taken as a whole, from the first primary election in New Hampshire through the opening of the electors' ballots, American presidential selection reflects a delicate balance between national and federal conceptions of democracy. Whether Americans decide to keep, change or even eliminate the Electoral College, democracy itself is not at stake, only the question of how to channel and organize the popular will.

Recent developments in this past year's election have drawn out strong support for Electoral College reform. Many Americans feel they go to the polls every year and vote for the president, and in the end, they are in control of the fate of our executive branch. Yet, many others doubt our system, arguing that the Electoral College is and

innovative solution to many problems that faced the Founding Fathers but that the present system is ill suited for the needs of modern America. On the other hand, many defend the system as well, responding that no election system is perfect, but the current system has borne the test of time.

Though I agree and sympathize with each side, I have devised my own plan for Electoral College reform. Due to the fact that so many suffrages have taken place, the sex, race and age of the American voting population has dramatically changed. We need a modernized system to allow for the changes in demographics and liberalization of the American electorate. Therefore, I propose the eradication of the winner-take-all system and have each state's electoral vote count apportioned to the popular vote count of the state. For example: in Maryland, which contains 10 electoral votes, if 50% of the residents vote for Gore, 40% of the residents vote for Bush, and 10% of the residents vote for Nader, then I don't agree that Gore should take all 10 electoral votes for the state of Maryland. Rather, five votes should be apportioned to the 50% vote count for Gore, four votes should be apportioned to the 40% vote count for Bush, and one vote should be apportioned to the 10% vote count for Nader. When I questioned the students taking the poll, they agreed with my plan 57% to 26%. We can begin this reform in only one state. Now, one state out of 50 may seem like the reform would have little if any influence but the reform in a single state can cause numbers to change. And in what better state could we begin this reform in than the capital of controversy, Florida. Besides, the reform in one state can act like a seed crystal and create a chain reaction into many states.

This form of direct election would make citizens realize that each and every individual vote counts, and citizens might start taking a more active role in our nation's government by voting in state and local elections. This reform would actually counteract the telecommunication problem of early predictions that sway the vote because every single vote would count in the long run. Also, this form of direct election could give state governments and incentive to increase voter turnout by eliminating voter registrations and state residential requirements for voting purposes. The more voters a state turns out, the bigger its role in national elections and the bigger their overall share in the national tally. This plan that I have proposed is the most viable, for each of the two sides are entrenched in their positions. The plan I have proposed is a compromise, while still maintaining the Founder's invention of the Electoral College, reforming it to fulfill the needs of the many Americans that believe the system is forsaking them. Winston Churchill claimed that "the Electoral College system is probably the worst possible method of choosing a president, except for all the other" (Polsby 255). ■

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Questionnaire

- 1) Do you know what the Electoral College does? If no, then return the questionnaire. [Yes/No]
- 2) The Electoral College is the best possible method of channeling the popular will. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 3) A Direct election is the best possible method of channeling the popular will. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 4) The Electoral College grants minorities more power than they would have in a direct popular election. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 5) The only way to change the voting system is to pass a Constitutional Amendment. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 6) All electors should be required to vote for the candidate who acquired the most amount of votes in the state they are representing. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 7) The popular vote count still matters even if the Electoral College decides the nation's President anyhow. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 8) US territories should be included in voting for the President. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 9) The media's influence affects the outcome of the election. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 10) Media predictions and results should not be posted until all votes have been tallied. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 11) All votes should be hand counted. [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]
- 12) The winner-take-all system must be changed. (Example: Maryland allocates 10 electoral votes. If 50% of citizens vote for Gore, 40% vote for Bush and 10% vote for Nader, then all 10 electoral votes are awarded to Gore.) [Agree/Don't Know/Disagree]

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## ► WAYS OF THE WORLD

***Reaping the Harvest: Why Fascism Succeeds***

By ALAN GOLDSMITH

**S**wastikas and brown shirts, red banners and arms upraised in salute to a beloved figure. These images often evoke images of fascist and Nazi movements of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, particularly in Germany, Italy and Spain. Those movements lead to unimaginable war, death and destruction. They changed the face of the world. Yet now, in a new century with growing ideals of democracy and Westernization, it appears hard for some to imagine how fascism, far too often considered a relic of a past we are trying to erase from collective memory, remains a prominent threat- not overwhelmingly powerful anywhere, but a presence in places in the world that can neither be ignored nor taken lightly.

What characterizes systems of government or political parties as fascist? That ideology has several central tendencies. It advocates a strong central government, one that dominates and controls both the economy and social life of citizens. Such controls are done in the alleged best interests of the populace, which gives fascism the justification it needs to take methods which consolidate power, such as suppressing freedoms that we now take for granted, particularly those of speech, religion and the press. Often these movements will seize upon the slightest provocation in order to find a way to implement these methods. Such an incident occurred during the early years of Adolf Hitler's Nazi regime in Germany. "A communist agitator played right into Hitler's hands by setting fire to the Reichstag building. Fearing a rash of similar terrorist incidents, and urged on by Hitler, Hindenburg issued emergency decrees suspending free speech and press, which made it even easier for Nazi storm troopers to spread their own brand of terror" (Nardo, 24). Almost overnight, the claws of totalitarianism had gripped Germany, with acquiescence from the last possible voices of reason in the previously democratic government.

Quite often, a fascist group will attempt to gain appeal by setting itself up as an enemy of a greatly disliked group. In all three nations that adopted fascist regimes in the 20s and 30s, Communists were viewed as a growing force with the potential to hurt business and capitalism, while at the same time conflicting with the traditional, Christian values that those nations were based upon. By choosing fascism, residents of those countries showed, ironically, that they were willing to vote one extreme group in so as to prevent another from gaining power. Fascists, for their part, knew this and exploited it to their full potential.

Fascism attacked internal political threats such as political parties, but it also cleverly propagated the idea of threats that existed within the country's borders but did not belong. Why? Because they were really from somewhere else, or were a genetic freak that must be wiped out before it caused damage to normal, ideal members of the population. Jews, Gypsies, the mentally and physically handicapped, homosexuals, and so on. Such individuals were portrayed as outsiders who acted in ways inappropriate for the general society. "Cleanliness, whether moral or of another kind, had its own particular meaning for these people... the odour of those people in cafans often used to make me feel ill. Beyond that there were the unkempt clothes and ignoble exterior" (Hitler, 42). Therefore, a strongly compelling argument could be made to show the necessity of a mass attack on the scapegoated group by the fascists, acting on behalf and gaining their presumed and eventually entrenched authority from the masses.

Fascists took great care to paint the accused as the most sinister, devious and dangerous enemies possible, thereby justifying the harshness of the acts that would be taken against them. "Was there any shady undertaking, any form



of foulness, especially in cultural life, in which at least one Jew did not participate? On putting the probing knife carefully to that kind of abscess one immediately discovered, like a maggot in a putrescent body, a little Jew who was often blinded by the sudden light. In my eyes the charge against Judaism became a grave one the moment I discovered the Jewish activities in the Press, in art, in literature and the theatre... Here was a pestilence, a moral pestilence, with which the public was being infected. It was worse than the Black Plague of long ago" (Hitler, 42). With the seriousness of the danger against humanity now assured in the minds of the spellbound majority, the citizens are more united than ever in their fear and self-righteous anger, to which the fascists can offer answers which, while unconventional, satisfy the public's need for longstanding solutions that come from a source other than the status quo movements, which are usually blamed for allowing the existing problems to have come into being in the first place.

Human beings are far more likely to worry about their own security and prosperity, and that of their country, than about spreading an ideology forth across the world. "Whereas fascism was overtly nationalistic, militaristic and expansionist, Communism was theoretically internationalist and antimilitarist and had no dreams of territorial expansion" (Laqueur, 15). In this respect, fascism had an advantage over Communism- it could truly focus its power and resources towards the immediate economic and military restoration of its country. The success of this method was especially prevalent in Nazi Germany. "As for Hitler's actions to improve the economic situation, he set out put the independent businesses under Nazi control. He outlawed strikes as well as independent labor unions, and the Nazi Labor Front was created. The Nazis also gathered up all of the professional workers, such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and engineers... Hitler had launched a large public works program, similar to Franklin D. Roosevelt's, at the outset of the world-wide Great Depression. Hitler issued the creation of superhighways, huge sports stadiums, public housing, and offices. He also went against the orders of the Versailles Treaty, as he decided to use the government to put the military through the process of rearmament. The result of these public works was that people had little trouble in finding jobs that were just not there a few short years back. From 1933 to 1936, German unemployment dropped from six million to one million" (Osberg). When such driven efforts to strengthen the economy (which is not usually in a prosperous state when a fascist group takes over) succeeds, the benefits are twofold: the new fascist nation is economically and politically powerful, and the citizens are content and loyal to their leaders, who have fulfilled their promises to restore the nation to its former glory.

The world now considers itself more committed to peace, by and large, than it was in the 1930s. The United Nations attempt to resolve international conflicts; Europe, that hotbed of ethnic warfare which ignited both world wars, is now composed of countries which are tied to each other economically and politically through the European Union. Yet, with all the supposed civilization and culture that inhabit that continent, it is once more becoming a breeding ground for neo-fascism.

The most prominent example of this resurgence exists in France, where a party called the Front National, led by former paratrooper Jean Marie Le Pen, has gained increasing influence in recent years, spouting a racist, anti-establishment message that has effective propaganda uses. "Le Pen has won an audience in the industrial deserts created by the official left's austerity policies. The neo-fascists have with considerable success used racism and xenophobia to divert the desperation of impoverished layers and sections of the unemployed along reactionary paths" (Weber). Le Pen and his movement have learned from the success of the Nazis in Germany.

They have found a major problem plaguing their country, that being, as is often the case, economic problems, which are certainly problematic in a country with high unemployment, such as France. Several months ago, figures showed that the French economy had been in decline and increasing in the unemployment rate for five consecutive months, with an 8.9% unemployment rate as recently as this past November ("France and Germany lose jobs").

The Front National has ingeniously taken heed to the widespread dissatisfaction of the French populace with its government, which in general is always blamed when the economy goes south and wine no longer flows as abundantly. They have also focused on two growing problems in France: large increases in crime, which cause the average Frenchman to worry for his own security, and the growing Algerian and/or Arabic immigrant communities, which are following the trend of most immigrant communities today of being less focused on assimilation than immigrants of generations past. "French voters have been horrified by the growth in street crime, in violence, fraud, theft and racial tensions in the inner cities. M Le Pen has exploited this fear and harnessed it to his own anti-immigration stance, implying that much of the crime, and especially the trouble in the inner cities, is the result of allowing so many Arabs, asylum-seekers and dark-skinned immigrants to settle in France. And too many people have been deceived by this overtly racial analysis" ("The Ugly Right"). By tying fear of crime to fear of the 'un-French,' unassimilated Arab community, the Front National has found a way to gain support on a broad base of issues to which it intends to offer sweeping, powerful and emotionally charged answers, including "separation of French families' funds from those of foreigners, (a) ban on building of mosques in France, (and) reintroduction of the death penalty" ("Profile: Jean Marie LePen").

The quotation above by Weber regarding the use of racism by Le Pen are the words of a writer on an international socialist website. But are the words of the Front National and Le Pen so different in their meaning? Le Pen himself has repeatedly attacked immigration. "Massive immigration has only just begun. It is the biggest problem facing France, Europe and probably the world. We risk being submerged," ("Profile: Jean Marie LePen"). We see clearly an example of a fascist who capitalizes on fear, stroking the fires of hatred against those who would 'submerge' France and its citizens. In its own website, the Front National paints a picture of itself as a defender of France against those who would deprive it of its national uniqueness. Successive governments are responsible for the decadence of France and have been powerless in recuperating the situation. Today immigration, unemployment, AIDS and the decrease of birth rate pose a real threat to the liberty and security of the French people and to the very survival of France... The Front National, an assembly of patriotic, lucid and courageous men and women, embodies the fight against decadence. Today, it is the only hope for the French people. Nowadays, the identity of France is threatened by the cosmopolitan view held by the political establishment.

The Front National sees itself as the stronghold and bastion of national identity against cosmopolitan projects aimed at mixing peoples and cultures. Far from being racist or xenophobe, Jean-Marie Le Pen fights to defend the French people so that they are given priority over foreigners and so that their basic rights are respected" (Front National website). While with one hand they deny the racism of their party's leader, they use tactics that clearly attempt to cause a split in the French community, pitting patriots against those who would wish to somehow dilute or destroy France through allegedly dangerous multiculturalism. They therefore give voters good perceived reasons to cast a ballot for LePen, while at the same time allowing him to rationalize such a vote as one that stems from love of France, not hatred of ethnic minorities. The psychological manipulation of the voter is both stealth and seductive.

Though Le Pen had led this party into many elections, and did not even attain the support necessary to gain a seat for himself in the French Parliament, his party gained increasing amounts of support over the years. This culminated in the first round of Presidential elections in 2002, when Le Pen received 17% of the vote, and together with other extreme-right candidates, was able to receive one vote out of every five cast. He now faces a runoff for the Presidency with the incumbent Jacques Chirac, who only received 3% more of the vote than he did.

Over a period of 28 years, stemming back to 1974, when he only won 0.74% of the presidential vote, he was able to slowly convince more voters that his plan was the right one, and since his issues remained similar, he was able to point to government after government that he could claim had not acted to solve the problems that France suffered. He could now claim with some semblance of legitimacy that had France voted for him instead of all the other candidates that they had elected, things would be different.

Le Pen thus has used the democratic system to gain power for himself and his group. As noted by *Star Wars* director George Lucas, “all democracies turn into dictatorships—but not by coup. The people give their democracy to a dictator, whether it’s Julius Caesar or Napoleon or Adolf Hitler. Ultimately, the general population goes along with the idea” (Corliss and Cagle). If LePen can translate this increase in support to an increased number of parliamentary seats, or an eventual presidential victory, could the existing power structure realistically deny power to a man who had won it with the support of the French people? German President Hindenburg, in 1933, could not deny the position of Chancellor to a man whom he had beaten for his own position several years earlier; a man with openly and clearly defined antisemitic views. Le Pen realistically could not be given any less consideration.

Governments usually do not unilaterally and spontaneously get overturned by popular revolts or coups. Quite the contrary, when a government falls, or a system of government changes, it is often done through the existing structure of a nation. Coups are often done by the military; changes in governing are often a result of strong parliamentary groups gaining access to power and then seizing total control through popularly-approved radical measures against national enemies, real or imagined. It happened in Germany, and many other places. And modern-day France is a setting that is ripe for such a revolution. With significant elections yet to come in that country, it remains to be seen whether the populace, the leadership and the world will stand by and allow the forces of intolerance and division to once again draw a dark cloud upon Europe. ■

**Alan Goldsmith** serves on the Advisory Board of the J.P. Dunner Political Science Society

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## ▶ O U T L O O K

***Palestinian Terror, Through A Philosophic Lens***

By SHMUEL HONIG



According to political philosophers, the state of nature is a theoretical world in which man lived before the existence of organized society. The purpose of the social contract is to remove man from the state of nature and place him in such a society. This “repositioning”, so to speak, is accomplished via the contract, in one form or another, through the establishment of a governing body that supervises its subjects. Thomas Hobbes argued that this state of nature is a “condition which is called war...a war of every man against every man”, *bellum omnium contra omnes* (88). Man, he claimed, is by nature inclined to defend and uphold his self interests through violent means when confronted by someone with conflicting, irreconcilable desires. A basic function of the social contract (or state), therefore, is to be a civilizing agent, to subjugate man to a set of laws under one authority, and by doing so, to “domesticate” him. Without a state, says Hobbes, man remains in a constant, aggressive struggle with his neighbor.

*Hobbes Applied*

Simply put, if we were to blindly apply the Hobbesian theory of the state of nature to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East—more specifically, to the case of the Palestinians—the picture might look something like this: the Palestinians have no state of their own, and so remain in their own state of nature. The corruption that exists within the Palestinian Authority, and the hostility amongst Palestinians towards Israel, are both products of this lack of a social contract. The daily acts of brutal terrorism, from mob lynchings to suicide bombings, are demonstrations of man’s proclivity to evil when unbounded by social order. In order to “civilize” the Palestinians, to remove them from their state of nature, we must allow them to create their own state, to forge their own social contract. The establishment of a Palestinian state would bring about the sense of cooperation necessary for peace in the Middle East to come to fruition. Inevitably, peace will become a reality.

*Hobbes Exploited*

Just like any theory, there exist circumstances appropriate for the application of Hobbes’s argument; and then there are all other circumstances. It is one thing to theorize about a hypothetical world void of civil society, extrapolate those ideas to speculate the fundamental purposes of a governing authority, and thus to postulate the most efficient and productive mode of preserving and upholding those purposes. It is quite another thing to use the ideas to actually modify the status quo, to use them as a basis for tampering with a real-life scenario. Reality cannot be ignored, nor can it be simplified. The present situation cannot be reduced to a formula, because it is not a struggle between people # 1 and people # 2; it is, rather, a conflict between Jew and Muslim, Israeli and Arab. The current situation did not develop in a vacuum like Hobbes’s state of nature; there are historical contexts from which it cannot be separated. And unlike Hobbes’s state of nature, where lawlessness means that everyone has equal right to everything, in the Middle East there is, in fact, objective right and wrong. Terrorists are terrorists.

*Hobbes in Question*

It should be noted here that the mere utilization of the Hobbesian theory as an explanation for the necessity of a Palestinian state — whether appropriately applied or not — presupposes its truth and accuracy. On what grounds could we possibly make such an assumption? The debate regarding man’s natural inclinations has lasted from time immemorial, so who are we to determine who is correct and who is not? Perhaps John Locke is right, that the state of nature is “a state of peace, good-will, mutual assistance, and preservation” (270). If so, Palestinian corruption



and terrorism is contrary to their nature. That would supply us with even less reason to demand a Palestinian state to result in a change for the better. But whether we agree with Hobbes or Locke, the actions of the Palestinians, objectively speaking, have been certain all along. Regardless of their conformity to nature or opposition thereof, we would reek of moral repugnance to absolve their perpetrators of responsibility.

### *The Nature of a Palestinian State*

When speculating about the prospective nature of a Palestinian state, one need not look further than the Palestinian Authority today. An upgrade in the PA's status from *de facto* recognition to *de jure* legitimacy would not, *ipso facto*, generate a sincere change in heart amongst its leaders. They who are terrorists today will remain terrorists tomorrow. The question as to how 'nasty and brutish' people suddenly become peaceful and obedient is one that even Hobbes could not answer, and, as such, he did not attempt to. How uncivilized man becomes socialized is a glaring omission from Hobbes's writing. Bearing this in mind—just in case the Palestinian leaders' blatant determination to destroy Israel was not already sufficiently apparent—we can extrapolate an observation of Edmund Burke to "predict" the product of Palestinian statehood. Commenting on the French Revolution, Burke exclaimed "the usurpation which...has destroyed ancient principles will hold power by arts similar to those by which it has acquired it" (567). Clearly, Burke was speaking in a wholly different context; yet the idea is eternal and its truth undeniable. By that token, those who use terrorism and violence as a means for achieving statehood (or to attain power) will undoubtedly employ the same methods in order to maintain it. There are so many obvious examples of such regimes from the previous century alone that it would be both too lengthy and seemingly unnecessary to bother listing them.

### *Benefit of the Doubt*

Leaving room for some doubt, and granting the benefit of it, we will assume for the moment that change within the PA (and its hostile "citizens") is both possible and probable. Such a change could never occur spontaneously. The collective conscience of the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel, like any conscience, would be a function of time. Similar to G.W.F. Hegel's conception of history as the "progress of the consciousness of freedom" (German Philosophers 125), social growth is characterized by the progress of the consciousness of morals and ethics. Just as it takes years for a person to develop a mature sense of right and wrong, so too it would require generations before civil and moral obedience would become manifest in a Palestinian state. Thus change would not be an overnight metamorphosis, but, rather, a long and gradual transition. To wait such an amount of time to see results could not be less pragmatic for Israel; in the meantime, the increased security risks imposed by an enemy state in its midst would put Israel's very existence at stake like never before. Ironically, the State of Israel could be destroyed before meriting to see the Palestinian goodness materialize.

On the other hand, some people never eventually develop a mature sense of right and wrong. The fact that the initial leaders of the Palestinian state would be the same terrorists as the current leaders of the PA, suggests that that state, during its stage of infancy, would already be taking a first step in the wrong direction. The next generation of leaders would be chosen from amongst people already indoctrinated with hatred and antagonism toward Israel and Jews from the time of their youth. As old habits die hard, it should not be considered too radical to expect a perpetuation of violent tendencies. After all, children eat what they are fed, and parents feed what they eat.

### *A Reasonable Proposal*

Seemingly, in lieu of the above, the most effective inauguration of a Palestinian state would be one governed by an international administration. In theory, we could anticipate this government to be free of corruption; the likelihood of such a government facilitating a relatively quick development of moral awareness amongst its citizens is far greater than that of any Palestinian alternative. However, there are obvious difficulties with this proposition: such an arrangement would be no less an embarrassment to the Palestinians than not allowing them to establish a state at

all; in fact, it would be a bigger put down. As a result, the Palestinians would never agree to this suggestion. Perhaps the best reason to abandon it, though, is if they cannot rule themselves, they do not deserve a state.

*Final Thought*

I do not claim to know of a practical solution to end this conflict; however, as I am not a politician, and have not received any formal requests asking for a proposed solution, I am not expected to have one. All I declare is that which I perceive to *not* be the answer. Let this be as a testimony that a Palestinian state will *not* solve anything, that it would only destabilize the region further. If the Palestinians are worthy of their own state, they should be able to prove it before receiving one. ■

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## REFLECTIONS

## New Consciousness, Same Old 'Clarion Call'

By RUTH A. BEVAN

Some thirty odd years ago, a handful of Yeshiva College students decided to found a political science journal. Finding a name for this journal proved exasperatingly difficult. Each suggestion fizzled on the spot. After torturous brainstorming, someone, somehow, came up with *The Clarion*. A pause ensued. *The Clarion*, another repeated. Like a clarion call, the eager would-be editor emphasized, looking hopeful that I, too, would catch the magic in their choice. And so it was that the Yeshiva College Department of Political Science established its journal, *The Clarion*.



Washington's Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer presents his credentials to President Moshe Katzav of Israel. For the first time ever, the American embassy in Tel Aviv and the President's Residence in Jerusalem are inhabited by self-described observant Jews.

Over the years *The Clarion* has assumed various forms. It started out as a set of mimeographed sheets stapled together and distributed around the dorms. In the 80s, one of the editors prevailed upon his father who had a publishing house in California to convert *The Clarion* into a newsstand-worthy magazine with a glossy cover and color photos inside. The one thousand copies of that *Clarion* had to be picked up at the airport. Today's *Clarion* can be posted on a website.

All these changes of format reflect, of course, technological developments – as well as the ebb and flow of finances. What remains constant, however, is that clarion call. To me, that call emanated from a new Jewish consciousness that set in around the late 60s and early 70s. Many YC students during that era had refugee parents, certainly grandparents. In their dress they looked like the sons and grandsons of refugees, in their speech they sounded like and in their manners they behaved like the sons and grandsons of refugees.

They were torn between their families' Old World fears based on harrowing experience and the New World promise of a different life. In 1968, to take a definite date for the sake of perspective, Israel was 20 years old and World War II had ended just 23 years earlier. A YC freshman, 17 or 18 years of age, had been born around 1950 or 1951 – 2 or 3 years after the establishment of Israel. He, literally, "grew up" with Israel, though, for his parents, Israel remained an accomplishment in their time. For all generations of Jews at this time, however, Israel remained fragile and beleaguered, affecting their own sense of security. With the Six Day War in 1967, Yeshiva College basically shut down. Would Israel survive? Yeshiva University contributed volunteers to that war. Students for whom the Holocaust lived on as a searing family memory now agonized over the fate of Israel.

Within such a context, young Orthodox Jews rarely saw themselves as political players. Jews altogether saw themselves essentially as political pawns. Domestically, they continued to feel insecure. Abraham Beame's election as New York's mayor stirred up Old World-derived apprehensions about "Jews in power." If anything goes wrong during that mayoralty, won't the Jews be blamed and suffer? Before the 80s, few students even ventured to Washington, DC – a city once considered virtually impossible to navigate for religious Jews. A student of mine who did dare to enroll in a summer program at Georgetown University made a tape with "survival tips" for potential future YC students. Few students traveled. No one pursued a government internship. Certainly the idea of running for public office could only be entertained by a maverick. How could one even talk politically about a Jewish clarion call in this situation?

That was the *old consciousness*. Within the Yeshiva University community, men like Rabbi Israel Miller, Vice President for Student Affairs, and Professor Joseph Dunner, who, in 1964, established the first full-fledged Department of Political Science at Yeshiva College, worked separately and together to change that old consciousness. Within American democracy, they rallied; Jews had every right to be active citizens, to identify

themselves openly as Jews and as Zionists, to live a “normal life.” Jews should visualize themselves as players; they should become players. This sense of agency came to constitute the *new consciousness*.



Scott Svonkin, vice chair of the Los Angeles County Commission on Insurance, wears a Gore-Lieberman yarmulke while listening to a speech by the then-Democratic vice-presidential candidate

The 70s brought about the transition to this new consciousness, whose outward manifestations were Reeboks, chinos, T-shirts – and eventually baseball caps. A new generation of American Orthodox youth, whose parents now tended to be American-born, increasingly lost touch with Old World inhibitions and identity markers. Current students, born in the early 90s, consider themselves as much a part of the American “system” as anyone else. For them, it is less astonishing than exemplary that the current American ambassador to Israel is a YC graduate and political science major who broke into the privileged ranks of the State Department. Students now routinely secure internships in and out of government in Washington, DC. A good number intend “to go into politics” professionally, including running for elective office. They travel frequently – taking even YC Honors courses conducted in Europe. They go to Israel for their freshman college

year, on school breaks and in the summer. They also hold internship positions in Israel. They are politically engaged. They have a *clarion call*.





Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Dov S. Zakheim responds to a reporter's question during a Pentagon press briefing on May 31, 2001. An observant Jew who reportedly even has rabbinic ordination, Zakheim was briefly floated as a candidate for YU president

*The Clarion* is so much more than just a journal. It represents how young Orthodox Jews at Yeshiva College think about themselves in the context of the world at large. It signifies a legitimate sense of entitlement to speak out politically and to protect their rights. It evidences a hard-won new consciousness. In the Middle Ages, a clarion designated a trumpet noted for its clear, sharp tones. Those students who some thirty odd years ago decided to call their new political science journal *The Clarion* had amazing intuition, for they sensed that a new consciousness was not only possible, but in the making. They wanted to give it voice, and so they have.

Our special thanks to David Michaels for all the thought and work put into this year's *Clarion*. ■

**Dr. Ruth A. Bevan** is the David W. Petegorsky Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva College




Yeshiva students acting for Israel (L-R): Marching down Fifth Avenue; at prayer in the Heights; visiting soldiers in Tekoa



▶ A THOUSAND WORDS



**FIRM RESOLVE** may be the first step to solving a **PROBLEM...**



*President Bush, visiting a Florida elementary school on September 11, being told that the World Trade Center was hit by a second plane*

but so many **NEW PROBLEMS** are being born **EVERY DAY**



*A photograph of a Palestinian toddler dressed as a suicide bomber was found by Israeli soldiers during Operation Defensive Shield*