

The Commentator

Literary Magazine



Meredith and Lind.

The Technological Satan

By MANFRED WEIDHORN

The unexamined premise on which modern industrial civilization rests is the belief in progress and in the ultimate beneficence of science. This premise, however, is misleading. If by "better off" we mean "happy," where will we find the happiness-meter to verify such an assertion? Are we not consequently guilty of a fallacy? For the advantage we have over our forebears is physical comfort, not necessarily happiness. The belief in progress thrives upon the confusion of these two states of being.

Let us consider a serf of peasant in 971 C. E. He knows hunger, pain, misery, but he accepts these as his G-d-given lot. He knows no envy of the lord of the manor because the society he lives in is stratified, and he cannot imagine himself in another social role. He sets his hopes on the hereafter. He works with his primitive agricultural implements and his miserable nag, but he does not brood over not having modern devices because he cannot conceive of International Harvester or General Motors. He is too busy working all day long to worry over contrivances he has not got. Men tend to accept the century in which they were born, and when they do not, they often pine after the past, not the future.

Now let us look at man today. If he is poor, he may nevertheless have a TV, a broken down old car, and a dwelling place somewhat better than a medieval shack. Yet he knows as much deprivation, uncertainty, and anxiety as his medieval counterpart; and to his vexation is added the sense—instituted by the general culture—that poverty is not inevitable; that his lot is not ordained by God, his society not stratified; that he lives deprived amid a general affluence to which he has as much right as anyone else. Trapped in the revolution of rising expectations, he knows envy, frustration, rancor, in addition to the ancient miseries of the poor.

As for the well-off middle class person today, he may have all the appurtenances of happiness, except perhaps the thing itself. Now, I do not know who is happy or how we compare different people's happiness. We can only make educated guesses from necessarily incomplete data. The diaries, letters, essays, of men of past centuries suggest that happiness, however defined, was not unknown to them. Conversely, the prevalence of our many social ills, the growing complaints about depersonalization and alienation, and, of course, the horrors of modern war—all these suggest that the impact of science on human behavior has probably not been for the better. America is the most technologically advanced society in the world, and yet to many it seems to be, with its anxieties and violence, on the verge of a collective nervous breakdown.

Despite these difficulties, the average man thinks that, because of gadgets and comforts, the quality of life is better now than it was a thousand years ago, and the antiquary thinks it worse. I myself think it to be probably the same. We have solved some problems only to find them replaced by others, and indeed the second generation of problems may often be the by-product of the resolution of the first. The sum of the problems is, I suspect, unchanged. Though we no longer worry about lightning bolts, we may be hurt by faulty electric wiring; the saber-tooth tiger is gone, but the mugger prospers; diphtheria spares us so that cancer can get us. Living with other people and nations, and above all with oneself, is the same headache it has always been. The arts, especially the art of living, exhibit no remarkable progress. In one sense, the world has been utterly transformed; in another sense, the inner life of man has been left untouched by the tidal wave of science. *Plus ça change, plus ça reste.*

At this point, the man of science, properly aroused, will object: "Oh, but you haven't been talking about science. Your quarrel is with technology and industry." But, I reply, can we any longer accept from the scientist such moral hand-washing, such monastic self-segregation from

impulse; the Christian concept of Original Sin; the Freudian concept of inborn aggressiveness. Man is taught the wonders of electricity, and by means of it builds Auschwitz; he is apprised of the mysteries of the atom, and his first application of his new knowledge is Hiroshima. As Will



the world in which he lives and which he so alters? Is there really such a thing as a cloistered "pure science"?

What the scientist and the humanist have in common is a quest for the truth about man and the universe. And there the resemblance ends. The findings of the humanist are, strictly speaking, useless. An expert in twelfth century music, for instance, may spend a delightful career entertaining himself and a few hundred persons by publishing his findings, but the rest of the world moves on as if he never existed. The scientist, by contrast, can hardly make a discovery in any field that is not put to practical application. Though he may wash his hands of the physical, psychological, and sociological fall-out of his discovery, we may not, for we are too busy trying to cope with it. The marvelous findings of "pure science" do not remain the objects of contemplation or adoration but are quickly transformed into technology, and technology in turn into the vagaries of manufacturing and the vulgarities of advertising. For the results, look around you, taking special note of the untold millions of lives sacrificed to the Industrial Revolution and of the unassimilable statistic that in this most scientific and "advanced" of centuries, an estimated 100,000,000 persons have died unnatural deaths in wars and civil wars. Anyone who thinks that science is justified because he and his friends are living a better life than they would have a thousand years ago is juggling figures in the calculus of human suffering.

Willy nilly, then, the man of "pure science" is part of his society, and he does not sufficiently take account of the race he thinks he is enlightening or improving. Shakespeare's Caliban speaks for this race of man when he says to his teacher, "You taught me language, and my profit on it is, I know how to curse." Terrible words, these; they express the Jewish concept of *Yetzer Horah*, the evil

Durant said sadly, "One art alone has made indisputable progress, and that is the art of war."

Too many Calibans are among us, or, if you will, too much of Caliban is in everyone of us, for this awesome mastery of nature to be put at our disposal. How can the scientist claim moral immunity? Would we grant such immunity to a man who places a psychotic individual at the controls of an operating bulldozer? or a man who places a loaded submachine gun

at the disposal of a five-year old child? That is what pure science has done and continues to do. How futile it is to say that all we need is more and better technology! Caliban will not allow it; he prefers the technology and the politicians he deserves.

Like certain aspects of Christianity and of Communism, science is perhaps too good, delicate and dangerous for this world. It has not failed, but man has; he is not worthy of it. Nor is this the first time in history that a wonderful idea miscarried, that a new dawn turned out to be only a morning after. For science now appears to some of us as, at best, a gigantic irrelevance, a terrible illusion, and, at worst, a calamity. As we wonder whether our days will end prematurely in an atomic holocaust or an ecological disaster, or whether we will be spared these only to survive into an Orwellian 1984, a Huxleyan *Brave New World*, or simply a Kafkaesque nightmare, we cannot but condemn a science married to a technology, out of control and enslaved by the politics and economics of Caliban; a science which, by multiplying and magnifying man's powers for mischief, has confronted us with a doomsday of our own making.

Christopher Marlowe wrote better than he knew when, on the very eve of the Scientific Revolution, he dramatized the story of a man damning himself by seeking forbidden knowledge. Though his Dr. Faustus, achieving mastery over the world by means of supernatural powers obtained through black magic from Satan, is a medieval figure, the tale has an eerie modern application. On the very eve of the possible end of the Scientific Age or even of the human race, we can readily believe that science is a specious gift by which Satan contrived to have man damn himself.

I am not so much setting forth my own beliefs as expressing an attitude which has long been growing among thinkers in the Humanities, at least from the time of Dostoyevsky's *Notes from the Underground*, and which is now being found even among scientists. "Was it all worth it?" says much of modern literature, turning the old questioning of theodicy into a questioning of science. Living in a pre-scientific age, Sophocles wrote, "Not to be born is best, and second best is, having been born, to die quickly." Samuel Becket, living in a world drowned in the works of science and the curses of Caliban, concludes in a similar vein that the only meaningful human choice is silence; death-like silence.

The Youth Revolution

By MARK MEIROWITZ

For the most part, the moratoria are over and the verve of the student movement can be analyzed in retrospect. It is quite obvious that from the destruction wreaked by campus radicals there has not ensued the kind of positive reaction that had been forecasted. But worse, the entire educational structure of America has been affected crucially, to the detriment, perhaps, of future, incoming classes at the universities. Prof. Sidney Hook has stated this precisely when he writes that "The stormy years of student uprising have resulted in both a failure of nerve and an eclipse of intelligence" within the educational establishment. From the trauma of student riots and revolts it was only natural for American education to be affected in some fundamental way.

The fundamental change is most noticeable in analysis of the influence of fringe groups on campus. Causes are widespread; there are as many groups as there are causes. There is a flurry of activity on the campuses of America—we are surely not experiencing the apathy of the 1950's. However, the activity of today's youth seems to be directed in totally different directions from that of their predecessors.

The revolts against the universities, ostensibly because they represented a microcosm of the society, represented a new strategy for achieving one's aims. Sit-ins, blockades, pickets, and similar tactics became the *modus operandi* of the student movement. But more severe is the resort to crass violence within our educational institutions. Students has always protested—for that is concomitant with the spirit of idealism—but only recently has violence and similar obstructive tactics become couched in an ideological and legitimizing framework.

"Do Your Own Thing" and similar stresses on human individualism in current literature demonstrate a rapid departure from the traditional bent of former years. In the past, stated simplistically, a person could "do his own thing" certainly it was so in the democratic state, but there was always the consideration of the context in which such activity was carried out. One did not willy-nilly commit an act for the sake of the act itself or for some wild notion—there was a stronger notion of conformity—or at least the recognition of the society as an influential factor in the life of the man. Today,

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however, wanton individualism has professed that man may do what he wants, when he wants, for no reason at all—the Yippie concept; plainly speaking—irrational behavior is legitimized.

One would have hoped that the youth revolution of today would be more enlightened than the protests of the past. It is fact that we have quantitatively progressed within our technological age. Culture is now the property of the masses, as compared to when it was exclusively in the realm of the elite!

But the youth revolution of today lacks the quality and meaning that one would have preferred, or could have dealt with intelligently. In fact, the shallowness of technological values is well-mirrored in



the current youth movements. Jerry Rubin and Abbie Hoffman are better book sellers and advertisers than their 'pig' rivals; They sell more books, in fact even steal manuscripts; and earn more royalties. And what makes it all worthwhile is that they are writing 'revolutionary' books. And so on throughout the movement with its empty and constantly repeated rhetoric, using such well-known words as 'repress,' 'oppress,' 'pig,' 'establishment' until one is nauseated. The movement has co-opted the establishment and has outdone its predecessors: the parents in the society.

In all fairness, I should qualify my remarks to exclude from opprobrium the idealistic young people who, in searching for identity, are caught up in the movement and follow along with it. When Mark Rudd stated after the affair with the Columbia gym that he did not even know where the gym was prior to the protest, one must more carefully analyze the mo- of such leaders.

The danger in all this is precisely the ability of charismatic leaders to seize the reigns of leadership on the basis of youth support. In the McLuhanesque 'cool age,' a candidate ought not be too well defined or have a protruding image. And the youth are very much a part of this Zeitgeist and will soon form the leadership and significant voting circles of the country.

Let us hope that the situation will stabilize. What will probably develop is the combination between legitimate change and the status-quo element of the society. But wonder what the next generation will be like: the children of today's young. That will surely be a different world.

Parables For The Future

The City And The Sea

By MICHAEL KRAMER

"... From every side they were met, prepared in heart as in fortune to follow me over the sea to any land where I might take them to settle. And now the morning star was rising over Ida's loftiest ridge with the day in its train..."

—Aeneid II.

When Aeneas set sail from the dying shores of Troy, he had no idea what tales the future would tell. Priam's citadels burned behind him with the flames of deceptive destruction. The ocean before him smiled with a calm serenity. As his band of refugees rowed intently out to sea, he gazed at his aged father Achises, whom he had borne on his shoulders from the crumbling wall of the city, and then turned his gaze to watch his homeland fade from view. And as they sailed, the recent past became less and less real to him. Soon it would become but faded images to be hazily remembered where ever he would go.


But where was he headed? How was he to know of the vagaries of the sea, how the waves would smack the sides of his vessel, how the winds would toss him to and fro until he would land buffeted to the foreign shores of Carthage. And how could he possibly conceive of the tender and fatal love of the Tyrian queen, Dido? (How many men can have women dying for them?) And how could he foresee the phantasmic journey to the inferno, the darkened land between Acheron, Cocytos, Phlegethon and Styx? All that he possessed were the cryptic words of a wraith, the ghost of his wife Cræusa: "She is dead in Troytown; in Italy empire awaits him."

So Aeneas sailed onwards. With his head still turned towards the ruins of Troy, he wondered where he was going. With his eyes still glued to the desolation of his past, he dreamed of the future. His mind imagined things unbounded; his eyes saw only the destruction of a city.

The city destroys. Within its confines everything is dead. The mysteries of the universe, those things which lie beyond men's minds, are nowhere to be found. Everything in the city has already been created, everything is known by men, and a vital spirit cannot be appreciated in tall grey facades or in long grey asphalt. (The living beings that scamper about in the stagnant movement of the city are lost; they have nowhere to go, nowhere to grow, no place to develop.) The city is the past, and everything in it already has been. There is no future in the city. This is the story of two people, two lost lovers, who escape from the shadows of the caves of the city to search for the light on the other side of the great sea.

It would be unfair to say that he was unhappy in the city, but he wasn't overflowing with joy either. He rambled along with no definite goals, trying this, attempting that, all haphazardly, with a fickleness that changed his attitude from day to day. He

had a girl, to be sure, who was not unpleasant to look at nor was too unpleasant to be with, but she too failed to instill any real vigor into his life. (Love, though it is not quite as mysterious as some say, still refuses to be tied down to any logical framework, and in his case, refused to unleash any arrows to help him along on his aimless way.) From time to time he thought of a love he had known once before. He had been much younger then, and the frailties of youth, unable to bind the two together, let her wander away. Now he had no idea that he would come upon her again. In fact, he had no idea at all of what was going to happen. But he left the city as summer crept in and headed out towards the sea.



Her life was a jigsaw puzzle with all unmatched pieces. She imagined herself in a bottomless mine, straining to release herself before she would be overwhelmed. She was loved, but she could find no security in that love. The city was a cage which not only barred her from the outside, but also from the inside, from discovering herself. From time to time she thought of someone that she had known a long time ago. She was much younger then, decisions were much easier to make, and she had decided to leave him. Now she had no idea that she would come upon him again. In fact, she had no idea at all of what was going to happen. But she too left the city in summer and headed out towards the sea.

As Chance would have it (and Chance is as capricious as Love) the two runaways met at the same beach by the side of the great sea. They stood far apart on the beach, each one not quite sure of the situation.

They approached slowly. Each precarious step followed the other until they stood face to face on the sands. They stood, silently gazing at each other, for quite a long time, and the twilight came upon them. All through the evening they stood trying vainly to pronounce some simple salutatory syllables. And as the night came to replace the dusk, they exchanged very awkward greetings.

Then they talked. They spoke of the past, of times in the city together and apart. He confessed; she confessed. They found that there was much to say after such a long silence. And they discovered that they could understand each other. Soon they forgot all about the past, the shadows crept back toward the city, and only the future could interest them. Before them the great sea's waves pounded on the beach. The black of the night and the black of the sea became one mysterious tomorrow. They talked the night away.

The story ends there on the sands of the beach on the shore of the great sea where the two had gone from the city of ruins to find some kind of future for themselves. It was still nighttime, and they sat in the dark, staring out into the black depths before them. They had no idea what tales the future would tell. Their only hope lay in an unsure spark within them, a ghostlike image that promised them kingdoms. The morning star invaded the blackness of the waters and shone on the two lovers end on the Great Sea. The sea was calm.

As the ship traveled farther and farther from the Trojan shore, Aeneas turned his back to the towers of Priam and saw his motherless baby son, Ascanius, sleeping calmly on the deck. He thought of his dead wife's riddle, and then he thought of his son. With his head held straight and high, Aeneas walked to the bow of the ship, and with his sore eyes (he had seen so much sorrow) he scanned the expanses of the sea, bound only by the line of the horizon. (And the horizon line is not really a line at all.) The town and the shore faded away.

Time Has Come

The time has come for all good men to return to the ideals of the future. And the time has come for tomorrow to arrive.

And for the promises of yesterday to transform themselves into a reality. And the time has come for a renaissance of sanity.

The time has come for the Campbell soup can

to biograde itself to a fresh red tomato, and for the smell of grass to replace that of concrete;

For a return to the normalcy of peace and a renaissance of sanity.

And the time has come for youth to grow up

and adults to mature; into rational beings. And finally, for the red hills of Georgia to realize the King's dream and Lincoln's promise;

For the non-violent students to finally coordinate themselves while Mr. Wallace kisses Ms. Chisolm, as the black and white world evolves itself into a technicolor renaissance of sanity.

And the time has come for Times to slow down a little and maybe develop a watch that tells how much time the world has left before General Motors chokes us all with its soon to be released, pollution free engine.

And for Elsie's milk to become free of the radioactive fallout that is saving America.

And for the third world to lay down its slogans in exchange for a renaissance of sanity.

And the time has come for a love story to develop between America and Communists; so that they can marry and rule the world as one.

And for Ralph Nader to be declared president

by the auto and drug industries. And seriously, for Benito Mussolini to walk up to Hitler

and shoot him dead. And for Gamel Nasser to publicly announce

his conversion to humanity in an inspirational moment of sanity.

The time has come for the twain to meet, and for the yellows and reds to become the good guys.

And for America's sewers become unclogged with its billion tons of surplus wheat. The time has come for a renaissance of sanity.

And the time has come for the world to get serious, and to stop joking about four billion souls.

And for the seas of humanity to flow together in a common effort.

And the time has come to rededicate ourselves to shaping a better tomorrow based upon a renaissance of sanity.

EDWARD BURNS

Salterrae

Dry men, their earth-parched tongues wetted in dreams

lap at the salted sea.

Washed out waves

flood the horizon's shore

filming the eye with expectation.

But in long loam-filled mouths

the sea does lose its savor,

salivation sticks in the throat;

a taste for brackish water

must be acquired,

and we prefer to float

in the dead sea

of our bathing pools.

PAUL CONNOLLY

Politics And The Utopian Dream

By SHELDON TOIBB

In these mundane days cries for a "new politics" have arisen, a politics which would rejuvenate the political soul in every man. The goals of this politics are to supposedly restore the self-respect and sense of community within an individual, psychological needs claimed to have been lost somewhere in the haste of producing an economic superpower. The advocates of this ideology base their approach on a "de novo" theory of politics. This theory views possible solutions to political and social problems through a totally ahistorical perspective.

The assumptions of these radicals must first be clarified. Contemporary man is never to have been as politically and psychologically downtrodden as he is today. Scientific and material progress achieved through centuries of determination and invention are almost worthless because man, as a social being, has not progressed to the same level as his tangible achievements have. In geometric terms, he is even considered to be proportionately farther from political identification than any time since the birth of this country.

Is this diagnosis more or less a restatement of Marx's theory of alienation? This is probably the case. But going further than Marx, contemporary dissidents romanticize ideals outside the type of society to which they are accustomed. Marx idealized the European proletariat and wanted this class to redirect society. Today, however, the radical critic finds his idol in some underdeveloped people and transforms the nationalization of Bangla Desh into a moral cause *celibris*. Thus these disenchanted individuals find no ideals or values to be salvaged from the existing structure of American society, and that is what makes the "new politics" so dangerous and irrational.

The history of modern civilization basic-

ally centers around the attempts of men to impose their lots in life through molding a government which would answer their needs, whether political, economic or sociological. These attempts have often been struggles, both in ideology and in military conflict. Yet upon reaching the highest plateau of knowledge and physical well-being in man's existence, are we arbitrarily going to renounce all of those forces which enabled man to achieve the successes he is experiencing today? I certainly hope not. For if we reject scientific, economic and political accomplishments for the sake of "consciousness" or "egalitarianism," then what will be our standards in creating the so-called better world?

To go further, what would prevent tyranny by the majority in a state governed by the "new politics?" When helping formulate the theoretical underpinnings of



this country James Madison feared this very possibility.

"A common passion of interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker or an obnoxious individual. . . Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would at the same time be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions."

James Madison,
The Federalist Papers, Number Ten

"Power to the people" would degenerate into power upon the people.

The intolerance of these "Messianic"

political disciples has been displayed numerous times through their racous demonstrations preventing speeches by such leaders as Senator Hubert Humphrey and dignitaries as the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Yitzchak Rabin. Although claiming the late Mr. Justice Black's absolute doctrine of freedom of speech as a justification for their outbursts, they would even deny reciprocal respect for countervailing thoughts as well as oral rebuttals.


This attack on the political idealism presently in vogue is not meant as a total justification of the contemporary political fabric of the United States. Granted there are numerous chasms between those who decide policy decisions and those who feel themselves to be entirely engulfed by them. But it must be remembered that mass media and greater sensitivity to individual life styles and dilemmas are phenomena which are just beginning to mature. Until two decades ago, no one could see right in front of himself a clear video tape presentation of human events that never directly concerned him. Moreover, how many societal values or actions presently abhorred, such as racial inequality, poverty, or indiscriminate killing in wartime, would have been accepted as commonplace in recent years?

The major challenge facing American politics is to discover a way to unite individual ideals with public policy. There is no magic formula to achieve this goal. But personal attitudes must be formed, reflecting a proper synthesis between each individual's ideals and the world of facts surrounding them. To blindly condemn as the "new politics" does is not going to create a better world in which to live.

There are two major factors demanding inclusion in the creation of these new attitudes. The most important one is the realization that the "system" is not as closed as it might appear to be. It is true that in contemporary politics the name of the game is money. But through individual self-determination, changes can be made and influential officials informed of facts and needs that might otherwise never come to their attention. The case of Ralph Nader must come to mind as an example in this area.

Furthermore, moderation must be adopted as a prerequisite for creating political norms. If polarization between groups is reduced through stressing points of agree-

ment rather than the points of disagreement, then more social and political cohesion is bound to result instead of the present social atomisation and alienation. Moderation implies a willingness to work out differences, a point which contemporary interest or ethnic groups refuse to see.



No "new politics" is going to immediately improve the conditions of life around us. These conditions are often too stubborn for idealistic thought. Yet what will conquer them is what conquered the "insurmountable" problems of earlier generations: dedicated efforts toward social and scientific progress combined with the necessary patience and optimism that the historical process will see men's ideals to their realization.

The Haviland Bomber

*A good ship, as good as can be expected
When she was launched, received cheers.
Who forethought the destruction
She would wreak
Upon us, herself.*

*The aquiline nose, carved the wind.
Bomb bays: full and plentiful.
And when she aborted her bastard cargo
It was with much bloodshed and shrieks.*

*Her props, sleek and silvery,
Jutted as if to break away.
When she moved;
With feline grace
She pounced, her Pegasus wings cleaving
The azure, black sky.*

*Many were her pilots,
None mastered her.
She was a virgin,
Professionally and non-professionally.*

*Many were tantalized.
Curtisied, their penile guns spewing lust.
But, she devoured them.
Skeletons, shadows, memories, and pale
tombs —
Those were her stepping stones.*

*Demise comes to all, she used to say,
In her more philosophical moments.
The scalpel of death cuts down all.*

*Sheathed in armor
Multi-faceted shields and prayers, too*

*That last flake of flak
In one fell uppercut—tore at her neck,
Swaddled her with pain.
Her innards spilled out and in.
And all those mechanics and all those
experts,
Just couldn't set Haviland's Bomber
aright again.*

ITZCHAK ROSEN

In The Pursuit of Happiness

By CHAIM LOVINGER

Usually the hall light served him well by illuminating the upstairs stairway and the corridor. But the light was good only as long as it remained in the hallway. On the few occasions that its beams managed to slip through the narrow slits formed by the door and doorpost of Adam's room it had not been welcome. It was then, at those infrequent moments, that the bright pinpoint glint tended to irritate his eyes. It was not because his eyes were especially sensitive, though he certainly never intended to stare into the glare; it was just that somehow the trespassing light would find its way directly into his eyes. There were times, when it did that, that he thought it was because of his position on the bed, so he would turn toward the wall and watch the shadows. He had forever been intrigued by the seemingly paradoxical existence of the shadows in the middle of a darkened room, and had been further absorbed in the games that could be made of them. There were other times, when the light shone in, that he lacked the ambition necessary to shift his position. In such slothful moments it somehow had never occurred to him to shield his eyes

or to close the door, and so, blinded by the hall light, he would suffer in silence. But the door was rarely left ajar, much to his satisfaction.

It was while enveloped in the comfortable blackness of his room that Adam's thoughts would penetrate virgin realms. He would create entire systems of logic and discover solutions to unanswerable questions at the mere wiggle of a toe. He would probe deeply into metaphysical problems as if digging with his thumb into a

pie, in the hope of finding the prized piece of fruit hidden within. He would produce the answers, all the while staring blankly at the ceiling with his hands clasped behind his head.

The room was perfectly dark, with Adam meticulously searching the recesses of his mind and soul, when the silence was stabbed by the shrill unnerving yell of his mother calling him to dinner. As he hated being interrupted, he instantly thought of the lack of respect he was being shown. Grudgingly he made his way down the stairs and plodded into the dinette as if just wakened from a deep slumber. Once again no one apologized for pulling him from his work and disturbing the peaceful seclusion, but he did not make an issue of it and began to eat without comment. After everyone else had been seated, his father sat down next to Adam in his usual chair, tugging gently at the knit in his necktie. He was obviously ready to begin what he called the "feast of the family."

This was no different from any other dinner that the family had. It was, informally, an occasion for the older and henceforth wiser members of the family to impress upon the younger members (in this case, (Continued on Page 4, Column 1)

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(Continued from Page 3, Column 4) Adam) lessons of morality, obedience, piety and patriotism (the last often as a corollary of one of the other three). That such lessons, especially when in the sphere of morality, were surely the unfounded and biased notions of the head of the family was a fact long recognized by his offspring. Adam refrained from protest, not in deference to the seat his father occupied as head of the household, but in recognition of the futility of any attempt at argument.

Boredom reigned when the wiser members of the family attempted to impose their morality upon their child. This boredom was brought to a peak whenever, in the course of a normal discussion about just anything in the world, some random interjection was cast into the conversation about the medical profession being a good profitable and pious pursuit. Such sonnets to science were constantly being sung at the feast of the family, but they fell upon deaf ears, for Adam was a true believer in the higher

merit of philosophy and literature. Despite his feelings about these things, he had given up what had once been an avid defense of them, for he had come to realize that any defense of philosophy would be wasted on an audience such as the one before him.

Sometimes he would be gazing upon the faded picture of a tree which was so perfectly transferred onto the wallpaper in the dinette. His father would take notice of his apparent interest in trees, and would point to the various trees outside, seizing the opportunity to identify each one by name. It was the shape of the branches and the formation of the leaves that was supposed to be the key to it all. Or something like that. Adam cared little about black oaks and black locusts, or even about quaking aspens, but his father continued to identify them for his son's benefit, anyway.

Tonight's meal was no different from any other. Though it used to bother him, Adam was now immune to it all. He excused himself when the gossip part of the discus-

sion was reached, which he noticed, this time, was about Harold (who had just been accepted into Yale Medical School, the bright fellow). Happy Harold, he thought.

Seeking his peace, he stepped outside and began to walk slowly about, carefully surveying the neighborhood as he always did. The garbage-filled streets indicated that it was no longer an area lacking in decay and deterioration.

What many considered to be the demise of the neighborhood was brought upon them, said the older residents, by careless or greedy individuals who sold their homes to the wrong people. And the new people did not even like what they had, it was claimed. Adam, on the other hand, disagreed with the entire philosophy behind the mass exodus and the various pilgrimages that many of his older dissatisfied neighbors had made. He was a firm believer in equality, when it was not yet fashionable to be so. He was, then. As for the happiness of his new neighbors, he reasoned that they prob-

ably were happy. He did not believe it to be a bad thing that the complexion of the community had changed. He, did, however, think about the accusations of greed and carelessness that the others had made against their former neighbors. The sacrifice of his own beliefs for a profit was something he would never be forced to do. So he thought.

When he found that he had done enough walking he returned home. Met by a vociferous hello from his mother, he responded with a quick smile that was turned off as soon as her back was turned to him. Adam made his way up the stairs and into his room. Once again on his bed, the door completely closed so as to shut out the light, he lapsed into the pleasant reverie that his mother's call had disturbed. Once again immersed in the splendid depths of philosophy and thought, he began anew, with a new problem. Light, he pondered, is it an entity unto itself, or is it merely the absence of darkness?

Towards A Judaic Psychotherapy

By PHILLIP LERNER

There is often a tendency to claim that the change of human behavior through psychotherapy is the exclusive domain of the science of psychology. This presupposes that psychotherapy is a neutral affair, that it does not involve any moral behavior. However, practically any major attempt to change human behavior must, ipso facto, involve a reorientation towards or away from specific moral values. To the extent that psychotherapy involves ethical norms, it entangles itself with religion which is concerned with the delineation of moral values and proper behavior.


The relationship between psychotherapy and religion, has been the topic of numerous books and articles. However, this discussion has been limited almost exclusively to the relationship between psychotherapy and Christianity. Close to nothing has been done to define any relationship between psychotherapy and Orthodox Judaism which prescribes a unique and highly integrated system of moral values and proper behavior. The reason for the silence of the Orthodox community on this matter is its general distrust of all of psychology. This is probably based on its aversion to the most well-known school of psychotherapy, namely Freud's psychoanalysis.

Freud's theories are viewed by Orthodox Jews as constituting a threat to the very existence of Torah Judaism. His embracing of psychic determination, extending the biologism of Darwin, were threats to the cardinal principles of Jewish faith-free will, man's responsibility before G-d, and reward and punishment. Freud's personal atheism and his reference to religion as a general neurosis seemed to confirm this point of view. Because of the important position of psychoanalysis, this attitude has generalized to all of psychotherapy. It was probably this factor that led Rav Joseph Soleveitchik to declare in this year's *Teshuva Drasha* that all psychiatrists are *kofei ba'ikar*.

It is amply clear that psychoanalysis as a total philosophy is in irreconcilable conflict with Judaism. Even if the objectionable theories of psychoanalysis are not explicitly espoused by the therapist, the impression often filters through to the patient that religion is what shackles and inhibits him and that it would be advisable to reject it. The attitudes of some of the schools which are offshoots of Freudian psychoanalysis are similar. It is thus claimed that many Orthodox Jews referred for psychiatric treatment eventually turn away from the beliefs and practices of their faith.

This unfortunate situation led one Rabbi Abraham Amsel, a psychiatric social worker, to write a book titled *Judaism*

and Psychology. By drawing on Talmudic and post-Talmudic sources, Amsel sets out to prove that there is a unique Jewish approach to psychotherapy. Judaism believes that every individual has tendencies towards certain behaviors, these due to environmental and genetic factors. However, these predispositions do not stand in the way of free will, but only make it more difficult to act in a particular manner. After successive repetitions, certain behaviors turn into habits which then become so deeply ingrained and so mechan-



ical that the individual may lose awareness of his existence. Amsel rejects the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious mind as the seat of the libido and that of repressed memories.

According to Rabbi Amsel, the formation of habits of fear is the root of mental illness. A lack of trust in G-d and the resulting fear affects a change in one's behavior and makes him susceptible to forming abnormal fear-induced habits. Feelings of uncertainty, dependency, inferiority, depression, etc. all evolve from this fear complex. Psychosis, assuming it is organic in origin, is the product of an alliance between arrogance, selfishness and fear. Since the individual does not bring logic to bear against his improper behavior and allows the formation of habits which cause mental illness, the mentally ill person, according to the author, is a sinner. This is in sharp contrast to the views of Freud who postulated that neurosis results from a too severe superego which is the product of the improper socialization of the child by his parents.

It emerges from Maimonides that in the normal individual, habits can be broken by initially adopting antithetical behavior. For example, a stingy person would be urged to be excessively generous in the hope that his behavior will eventually gravitate towards the middle path. Because Amsel, as most psychologists do, assumes a continuum between normal and abnormal behavior, he postulates this method as the therapeutic way to deal with neuroses and psychoses even though they are merely the products of habit. The first step in his therapy is catharsis, letting the patient ventilate his emotions in an atmosphere of trust between himself and therapist. The therapist must then concentrate on the removal of specific habits and also in the uprooting of the basic fear that underlies these habits. The relevant habits can be undone through desensitization therapy, this being an approximate application of the principle of Maimonides. The root fear must be removed by reorienting the individual's entire value system in order to establish trust in G-d, who is the antithesis of fear. Amsel abstracts a list of *middot*, or character traits, from Judaic literature. It would be the goal of his proposed therapy to achieve a proper balance among these *middot*. The integrity of the character system would then foster the trust necessary for a happy existence, free from mental illness.

Implicit in Judaism and Psychology are two assumptions: first, that the basis for a unique Jewish therapy can be found in Jewish sources, and second, that the method advocated by the author is the most effective one. Dr. Samuel Weiss, a *musmach* of RIETS and a practicing clinical psychologist has rebutted these claims in a series of articles published in *Jewish Life*. Representing many of his fellow Orthodox psychotherapists, he is convinced that Amsel has proven neither of his premises. Weiss is concerned that not only does Amsel distort the understanding of both Judaism and psychology, but his book represents a danger to the well-being of psychotherapy, without providing an adequate substitute. Weiss argues that patients should go to Orthodox therapists who can apply psychological principles selectively, without impugning the patient's religiosity.

Rabbi Amsel posits that psychoanalysis fosters the indiscriminate release of repressions. Freud himself, however, noted that this theory is a distortion perpetuated by laymen and "wild analysts." He understood the need for sublimation rather than for the indiscriminate acting out of impulses. It impugns the professional and religious integrity of Orthodox therapists to imply that this is what they advocate. Judaism and Psychology's approach is also unsatisfactory. The phenomenon of ir-

rational compulsions, such as the need to engage in continual hand washing rituals, cannot be explained through ordinary habit but rather as representations of unconscious needs, guilt feelings, etc. The phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion, where a subject responds after awakening to a suggestion given under hypnosis without knowing why, can only be explained through repression and unconscious motivation. Yet, while "the opposite pole method," which Amsel extrapolates from Maimonides, may be effective for some patients, in others it may cause reaction formation. This is the disguising of negative feelings by the development of a personality trait which is the opposite of the original, unconscious, or repressed one.

The most dangerous doctrine in the book is, however, according to Weiss, the claim that insanity is the result of sin (the sin of not developing proper *middot*). One cannot automatically attach the label of sinner to any sick, suffering individual. How can the concept of sin be applied to schizophrenic children, who have no free will? Similarly, how can it apply to children of neurotic or psychotic parents, who, when they reach maturity, find themselves unable to shake off the unhealthy indoctrination of their parents. To categorical-

(Continued on Page 5, Column 1)

Bull Market

*Her ambition is to break
the so-called bright
delusive butterfly of love
on the proverbial wheel,
To bottle and bond its spirit
popping love's cork
in the proper time and place,
To govern the lusty careless autonomy,
republicanize the human economy.*

*His ambition is to rise
and fall without the risk
of sewing seeds of discontent
in the body politic,
To bed supply with demand
granting love its day
but not its way,
To grip the handle of the screw,
that every man might have his due.*

*Their ambition is, like any man's
never to walk on shifting sands
that leak away like
love's worn strand,
To set an ordered house,
insuring death's flight
is pre-arranged.
There be not a reason why,
Theirs be but to sell and buy*

PAUL CONNOLLY

(Continued from Page 4, Column 4)

ly state that insanity is sin is to stigmatize many righteous people and to cause a catastrophic reaction among the mentally ill.

The two views presented above are clearly diametrically opposed. On the one hand, Amsel rejects all therapy except his own, which he considers uniquely Jewish. On the other hand, Weiss wishes to continue in the traditional manner of psychotherapy, while making necessary adjustments in order to satisfy the requirements of Orthodox Judaism. It seems to me, however, that the crisis situation that exists in the relationship between psychotherapy and Orthodox Judaism cannot be dealt with by either of these approaches; a position between these two extremes seems to be the best alternative.

Orthodox Judaism desperately needs a system of therapy that will simultaneously not contradict its teaching, and will actively foster sincere trust in G-d and commitment to Judaism. What we need is not a Jewish psychology, but a Jewishly-oriented psychology. In this system of psychotherapy, the most appropriate tools from the various schools of secular psychotherapy would be brought to bear in order to accomplish Jewish goals. This is more desired than just the adjustment to the society in which man finds himself. The achievement of the correct balance among the *middot* would still be the goal that the therapist would aim for in the patient. But it is not enough for the therapist to be religious; what is needed is a therapy that in itself is religiously oriented and which seeks to promote religious values. The various tools of the different schools of psychotherapy which have proven to be useful in helping the individual achieve a satisfactory adjustment, would now be used for an additional purpose, the fostering and reinforcement of religious values.

In conjunction with this evaluation of the relationship between Orthodox Judaism and psychotherapy, I propose that the Orthodox community establish a religion and psychotherapy institute. The institute would consist of three sections. First a theoretical division which would research methods of using the principles of existential and clinical psychiatry to simultaneously relieve the individual of distress while fostering the advancement of the goals of the *Torah*. Second, a training division which would produce Orthodox therapists educated in Judaism, psychology, and in the potential relationship between the two. Third, a clinic in which Orthodox therapists would care for Orthodox patients.

The establishment of this program would effectively remove the general distrust of psychotherapy in the Orthodox community while helping to strengthen Jewish commitment. It is not too much to expect that the initiative for such a program come from Yeshiva University. If the motto of Yeshiva is synthesis, then there is no higher form of synthesis than the building of a bridge between religion and psychotherapy in order to achieve their common goal—the true happiness and fulfillment of man.

Baby Guppy

Baby guppy,
Minute ball of life,
Shot from the cannon womb
of your heaving mother.

Alas,
Father, uncles and cousins lie in wait
To suck your life down like a spaghetti
strand.

Cast quick your needlepoint eyes
To a camp of camouflage,
Aim your translucent arrow self to safety,
little slingshot Israelite,
And prepare to wage yourself a lifetime.

SIKEYEM

The question of freedom, as related to G-d and man, has remained one of the most outstanding philosophical problems. Philosophers have analyzed the concept of freedom, and have dedicated whole treatises to its study. One of the most interesting and controversial explanations of freedom was developed by Spinoza.

Spinoza included the notion of freedom in the framework of his philosophy, using the term by both G-d and man. However, his notion of freedom cannot possibly have the same meaning that popular conceptions do. Therefore it must be analyzed and examined.

Let us start with Spinoza's philosophy of G-d. He begins his *Ethics* with several definitions, explaining and clarifying certain notions. Spinoza writes, "by cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing"

(*Ethics*, Pt. I, Def. I). And, a substance is "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; in other words, that the conception of which does not need the conception of another thing from which it must be formed" (*Ethics*, Pt. I, Def. III).

Spinoza defines "G-d" in the sixth definition of this part: "By G-d I understand Being absolutely infinite, that is to say, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence." And finally, he defines his conception of "freedom": "That theory is called free which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined to action by itself alone" (*Ethics*, Pt. I, Def. VII).

Utilizing his definitions and axioms to build up a whole net of propositions, Spinoza elaborates upon his conceptions of substance and G-d. For him, there can possibly be only one substance. It is not difficult to understand why Spinoza was led to his conclusions. Since substance is conceived through itself, there can be no external cause for a substance, because then the knowledge of the substance would depend upon the knowledge of the cause, and this would not be substance.

Following his definition of G-d, Spinoza concluded that G-d is the only substance. A substance is that which is the cause of itself *causa sui* that whose attributes are all necessary consequences of its own nature. If there were a substance besides G-d, it would have to be explained by an attribute of G-d, possessor of infinite attributes. Because of this, the thing could not be substance, that whose attributes can all be deduced from its own essential nature, for it is being explained by some attribute of G-d. Though this might appear to be a tautology, it must be emphasized that within Spinoza's logical rigid system, these are the only conclusions he could deduce.

Spinoza identified G-d with Nature (*Deus sive Natura*); G-d and Creation together are the totality of Nature. Spinoza could not consider G-d the transient transcendental cause of the Universe; he had to conceive of G-d as the eternal, imminent cause—there can be no distinction between Creator and Creation. Nature is, for Spinoza, both Nature *Naturans*, "Nature actively creating herself and deploying her essential powers in her infinite attributes and in the various modes of these attributes," and *Natura Naturata*, "a passive established system."

In Spinoza's system, G-d can be the only free thing. According to his definition, a thing which exists from the necessity of its own nature alone is free. In other words, a free thing must be self-caused; all of its attributes must be deducible from its own nature. Substance is the only self-caused thing in the Universe, and G-d is substance. Therefore, only G-d is free.

But, what does this "freedom" contain? To answer this, we must further examine Spinoza. Spinoza described G-d as the cause of all things. "From the necessity of the divine nature infinite numbers of things in infinite ways must follow" (*Ethics*, Pt. I, Proposition XVI). Furthermore, "G-d acts from the laws of His own nature only, and is compelled by no one" (*Ethics*, Pt. I, Prop. XVII). All things in nature are determined; their actions must follow from the nature of G-d. However, G-d is undetermined, and acts according to His own nature. In Spinoza's eyes, here lies G-d's freedom. But is this "freedom." Spinoza himself believed that G-d doesn't act from freedom of the will (*Ethics*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXII, Corollary I). And, perhaps even more surprising, he writes, "Things could have been produced by G-d in no other manner and in no other order than that in which they have

must not consider "freedom" by G-d as the ability to voluntarily choose something or some course of action, because in Spinoza's metaphysical structure there is no freedom of will. "G-d acts or creates freely because He acts necessarily."

Whether or not Spinoza's explanation of the freedom of G-d corresponds to popular or religious conception, it must be emphasized that within his rigid, logical scheme, there was no other possibility. It is not a "fault" of G-d's that He lacks divine contemplation of free will, because there can be no such thing. On the contrary, only G-d is free, because He is indetermined.

While we have discussed freedom with respect to G-d, it still remains to discuss the notion of freedom by man.

Upon first inspecting Spinoza, one would conclude that man is never free. A free person would be a contradiction of Spino-

Spinoza And Freedom

By MITCHELL WOLFSON

za's doctrines, for "all things are determined by the divine nature to exist and act in a certain way" (*Ethics*, Pt. I, Prop. XXIX). Man, then, cannot possess the freedom of indeterminism; there is always a cause for man's existence and actions external to him. Also, man can not possibly possess free will, for there is no such thing for Spinoza.

If this is the case, why does Spinoza speak of human freedom? In fact, the fifth book of his *Ethics* is called "Of the Power of the Intellect; Or of Human Freedom"! What type of human freedom does he speak of?

Once again, we must distinguish among various meanings of "freedom" in order to arrive at an answer. Man participates in three domains: the bio-psychical self, the social community, and the cosmic, universal environment. Therefore, there must be three aspects to human freedom: the psychological aspect, the social aspect, and the cosmic aspect. Psychological freedom allows the individual to possess a feeling of a free choice of action. "Every free personal choice has its reason and its cause, but they lie in man himself, in his bio-psychical structure and not outside of man, not in his social and cosmic environment." Spinoza would have to deny the possibility of a free personal choice, and, in fact, he does. For Spinoza, an individual thing in nature can never be the cause of itself because individual things are not substances.

The social aspect of freedom concerns the right of every individual to express his thoughts and beliefs without being constrained or persecuted by his social environment. When considering freedom in this sense, man can be free even under Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza himself felt that if men could control their emotions, "society would obviously have no need of laws . . . and men would freely, without hesitation, act in accordance with their true interests." Even under a system of laws, Spinoza believed, men must be allowed to rationally follow their individual interests—they must be granted social freedom.

The final aspect of freedom is the cosmic aspect. "Man is not only a bio-psychical and social being, he is also a cosmical being . . ." Because of man's situation, we must examine his role in the cosmic scheme, to see if he can possess freedom within the Cosmos. As we have pointed out, "indeterminism" cannot apply by a case where there is a cause for an effect, whether the cause be internal or external. "Indeterminism could be applied to these cases which could not be included in the existential relation 'cause-effect.'" In other words, only an effect which would arise from some kind of "existential nothing" is indetermined. However, every effect which has as its cause some "exist-

Frozen Carpe

We're all caught in the tangled trap
Of aluminum foil and plastic wrap;
We never boil, for pleasure or pain,
We're reserved, preserved in cellophane.

We're then refrigerated like t.v. dinners,
For convenience waited, like fearful
sinners;

But surely the sin is in being reserved,
Passions frozen, feelings preserved.

I implore you, I implore you,
Live as though a million
Million died before you.

Have no fear for growing the dimmer
But let your passions heat and simmer,
And don't be frightened by quickened pace,
Let tears burn experience down your face

In rivers and wrinkles over cheek and
brow.
And tell regret if he ask you how,
"Old freezers do reek more now," a smell
deserved
For plodding in peat, hardened, frozen,
but well preserved.

I implore you, I implore you,
Live as though a million
Million died before you.

SIKEYEM

(Continued on Page 6, Column 4)

Ethics, Music, And Plato's Greece

By ROBERT DILLON

In Ancient Greece, music played a central role in the life of the society. "The tremendous importance of music may be gleaned from the fact that the word 'music' derives from the nine Muses, the goddesses of song and poetry in Greek mythology." The Greeks considered music a creation of the gods, and, in fact, they attributed the invention of the lyre and the aulos to Athena and Hermes.

The irresistible attraction of the Sirens, whose beautiful voices tempted the brave Odysseus, is well-known to all those who have read Homer. The mythical powers of music find some basis in reality, too. Aristotle reports in the Politics, "If enthusiastic people listen to enthusiastic melodies that intoxicate their souls, they are brought back to themselves again, so that their catharsis takes place exactly like a medical treatment."

The Greek musical system was divided into different modes, and each mode, as

of the people, Plato formulated a utopian state, his Republic. The goal of the state was to be an efficient state ruled by the dictates of Justice. And Justice he defines in the third book of the Republic as all the parts of society working together, in a sense, harmoniously.

The process of education which Plato sets down in the Republic is indicative of a preoccupation with music and harmony which reflects the importance of music in Greek society. In books II and III of the Republic, Plato formulates an education based on Music and Gymnastics. Music was to precede Gymnastics, "for children can be told stories before they are ready for physical training." Plato is concerned not with the transfer of knowledge, but with the molding of minds. The education is not to be based on truth, but on what would be useful in forming the minds for the eventual road to the knowledge of the Good. He, therefore, outlaws all those stories which depict the gods and heroes

describe as he refused to describe the Good, which in turn led to the knowledge of the Good. This higher education consisted of arithmetic, geometry, solid geometry, astronomy and harmonics. The order of these is not arbitrary, but it has a specific purpose, that of leading the mind away from intelligible things to a contemplation of the abstract. Plato emphasizes that these sciences are not to be considered practically, but abstractly. Cornford writes, "Knowledge, Plato thought, was to be found, not by starting from facts, observed by the senses, framing tentative generalizations, and then returning to the facts for confirmation, but by turning away and escaping as fast as possible from all sensible experience."

As the highest of the sciences Plato lists harmonics. Plato, here, is using the Pythagorean concept of mathematics and harmony. The nature of harmony of the tones, but an abstract general harmony, the actual nature of harmony. These stu-

be capable of ruling, and there would be no Republic.

Music, though its effects are lost to us, and we can only guess at what was involved, was essential for the ethical existence of Ancient Greece.

Spinoza . . .

(Continued from Page 5, Column 4)

ential something" is determined.

For Spinoza, only G-d approaches the concept of indeterminism, only He can be said to have arisen from some "existential nothing." Therefore, only G-d is free. However, perhaps man, even Spinoza would agree, can be somewhat free in the cosmic sense. Spinoza says that an individual can act in self-determination, if he acts according to his nature. The person who acts in self-determination would be free in the sense that he is acting according to his own nature, although ultimately his actions are deducible from the divine nature. This freedom, though not ultimately "real" freedom, would be more genuine than the psychological freedom that a person sometimes feels.

Spinoza considers the man who controls his emotions a "free man." Once again, we must determine what aspect of the word he means. When a man increases his knowledge and understanding of nature, Spinoza says, he realizes that all of his actions and the actions of others are controlled and caused by external causes. He understands that he and all other individual things in nature are determined. This knowledge will help the person to rule his emotions, for when he is aware that everything is determined, he ceases to blame and hate people. On the other hand, the ignorant person, who thinks his conscious acts of ill-will are the ultimate and adequate causes of his actions, is not free. In psychological terms, the reasonable man attains a certain level of freedom in which he acknowledges the effect of unfree psychical determinism. And, the fool believes falsely that free psychical determinism applies.

There is one final question to discuss. How can Spinoza propose a moral theory if everything is determined? It does not seem to make sense to exhort men to act in a certain way if each one is determined to act in a particular way. And, how can we blame one for performing some action if he could not have acted in any other way? Perhaps we can answer this question by distinguishing between two types of moral theory. If by most theory we mean an exhortatory ethic, one which prescribes the way in which people should act, then under determinism there can be no moral code. If, however, moral theory means "an analysis of the ways in which different types of men behave," then a moral theory is possible even with determinism. In fact, Spinoza meant to expound only an analytic ethic, as can be seen from his letters: "What then? Wicked men are not less to be feared and are not less harmful when they are wicked from necessity." Spinoza did not want to preach; he was only analysing human behaviour and actions.

In conclusion, then, we see that Spinoza's philosophical system does include the notions of divine freedom and human freedom. However, it is most important to clarify the terms used in order to prevent contradictions and inconsistencies and, even more important, we must not de-emphasize the fact that the terms used have different meanings when applied under Spinoza's system. "Indeed, in interpreting Spinoza it is essential to remember that terms and phrases must be understood in the sense of his definitions and not in the sense which they bear in 'ordinary language.'"

Plato utilized music to its ultimate ethical possibilities. Sensing the centrality of music in society and realizing the deterioration of society was related to the deterioration of music, he formulated his political philosophy having music as a basis for constructing his utopian state.

the name implies, was a style or manner of music. Aristotle says in his Metaphysics, "The musical scales differ essentially from one another, and those who hear them are differently affected by each. Some of them are differently affected by each. Some of them make men sad and grave, like the so-called Mixolydian, others, enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed harmonia modes, others, again, produce a moderate and settled temper which appears to be the peculiar effect of the Dorian, the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm."

The Greeks incorporated their music into their lives. Orphism, a mystical cult, named for Orpheus and dedicated to the art of music, established the aim of the purification of the soul. As the Orphics delved deeper and deeper into the study of music, their manner of thinking about music moved toward philosophy and science. Pythagoras, an Orphic scientist, is credited with the discovery that the pitch of a vibrating string is dependent upon its length and the discovery of the octave relationships of tones. The Pythagorean school added to the study of music a more speculative interest in mathematics. Their studies were more theoretical in nature, and they were concerned with harmonic theory rather than with composition and performance. While their predecessors were concerned with the ethics of music, i.e. its social effects, they were concerned with the metaphysics of music, i.e. its ontological makeup.

In the later fifth century, Plato was witness to the degeneration of music in society. While music was advancing scientifically, the populace and the practical use of music was slowly going to ruin. The wilder modes had taken on a new popularity. People were paying more attention to the performer than to the music. "Imitation ran riot, with the attempted duplication of sounds of nature and animals . . . and a mixture and confusion of styles accompanied a continuous search for novel effects was dedicated to senseless pleasure and applause."

Plato looked for a way to cure what was, in his opinion, a very sick society. As Plato was in essence a practical philosopher, he was concerned with the application of his philosophy. It was imperative, therefore, that the person who would attain knowledge return to those still captive in the world of experience and work for the betterment of the people. And as the state of the people in Plato's time was one of degeneracy, to solve the problems

as immoral. The arts in general are condemned by Plato in book X as imitations of imitations, and, therefore, he only admits those works of art which have a social, ethical value and no others.

In regard to music, Plato lists all the immoral modes, rejects them, and then states, "I am not an expert in the modes, but leave me one which fittingly represent the tones and accents of a brave man in warlike action . . . who, in the hour of defeat or when facing wounds and death will meet every blow or fortune with steadfast endurance . . . and another to express peaceful action under no stress of hard necessity . . . so a man behaves always with the wise restraint and is content with the outcome."

He continues, "the decisive importance of education in Music; rhythm and harmony sink deep into the recesses of the soul and take the strongest hold there, bringing that grace of body and mind which is only to be found in one who is brought up the right way . . . And for him who has eyes to see it, there can be no fairer sight than the harmonious union of a noble character in the soul with an outward form answering thereto and bearing the same stamp of beauty . . . So the man who has been educated in poetry and music will be in love with such a person, but never with one who lacks this harmony."

After the primary education in Music and Gymnastics, they were to go under another process which led to what Plato called 'dialectic,' a process he refuses to

Regret

*Of a winter walker of groping pace
Thinks the better — regrets — and seeks
to trace*

*His unken steps and so turns back
To the white broken shadow of his track.*

*No, the fool, he hadn't worried
That all the time it had flurried
And that behind us trails are never
finished
In falling snow and time diminished.*

*Quick! Before the morning hours pass,
To the window! Steal a look at the glass—
And lo, the night has etched in frost
Some frozen forest of a world now lost.*

SKRYEM

Individualism And The Social Man

By EDWARD BURNS

American culture is a dying force. Its original philosophy of creative individuality is being replaced by the restraints of stifling conformity. This essay is an indictment directed towards those whose unconscious acceptance of social norms are destroying our hope for cultural survival.

Man's obsession with tradition is an outgrowth of his own insecurity. Safety is found in numbers and invulnerability is the unvoiced dream of every individual. Accordingly, by maintaining anonymity among the masses one hopes to escape the social pressures brought to bear on the venturesome explorer. Consequently, people prefer to "fit in" and remain free from criticism rather than break away from accepted molds and subject themselves to the harassment of ridicule.

Unfortunately, man, being a very thick headed beast, often refuses to accept the harsh realities of his own true nature, preferring instead to prevaricate his own concept of personality. As a response to his own obvious conformity, then, he self-righteously maintains that he is a non-conformist. His insistence on this fantasy is so great that he arrogantly proclaims himself to be an individualist. A few examples, however, will expose this myth.

Perhaps the most publicized platform for individualist philosophy is the game of politics. Among youth, the cries for political activism are sounded both often and loudly. But the shouts for peace or war are all mere slogans, adopted by the masses to provide food for their need to be relevant. This, in itself, becomes quite comical in view of the fact that this need comes only as a result of the masses' being told that "relevance" is relevant.

Despite this, certain political issues have become sacred causes to both political liberals and conservatives. However, the very nature of their moral and social implications makes a monopoly by any one philosophy absurd. Civil rights has been the subject of hot debate for almost two decades now. The liberal ideal of complete integration of all races and creeds appears, on the surface, to be in line with all the ethical and moral tenets of the Judeo-Christian philosophies. On close analysis, though, liberal practice is far from being liberal. To deprive a majority of its civil rights in order to insure those of a minority is certainly as immoral as the converse. Yet, this reverse discrimination is practiced daily, as a guilt ridden white society attempts to exonerate itself from a tradition of prejudice.

One can see a trend here; that modern intellectuals are subscribing to a politics without an understanding of its philosophy. Classic liberalism maintains that the rights of all men are sacred. By upholding the rights of special interest groups at the expense of the rest of the community, the pseudo-liberals of today are, in actuality, practicing a grotesque imitation of classic fascism. Why do so many people follow such a heinous perversion of a noble ideal? Simply because liberalism is in vogue. To ignore it would not be chic, but to understand and practice it rationally would be too burdensome.

Jwolips

Madame Compote, bristling with cultivated indifference, swished past her former school chum, Amy (now Mrs. Sonava Beach).

HILLY BESDIN

The conservatives of middle America are equally guilty. In their blanket conformity to an undefined ideal of patriotism, they fail to uphold true patriotism, the responsibility to the needs of one's own country. There are millions of Americans who vociferously support the military arms race for the mere sake of feeling patriotic. That the United States is already capable of obliterating the entire earth a hundred times over is incidental. But that we should have the numerical potential to kill ourselves better than the Russians or Chinese is a symbol of national pride. The fact that the billions of dollars wasted on overkill weapons could be better utilized for domestic social reform, thereby insuring a more stable nation of content citizenry is irrelevant. That conclusion requires a commitment of thought, and conformity is all that these people are willing to give.

Lack of individualism extends far beyond the esoteric profundities of political

not before. On the other hand, stubborn devotion to antiquated institutions by conforming traditionalists serves to hinder the progress of humanity. Clearly, some rational alternative to these two philosophies is essential.

Battles, in these ages are transacted by mechanism; without the slightest possible development of human individuality or spontaneity; men now even die, and kill one another, in an artificial manner.

THOMAS CARLYLE

What we have, then, is a question of morality. For one to live by the whims of others is to deny he is capable of independent reason. This is immoral simply because by relinquishing our right of free choice we also abdicate our right of self-determination. The inevitable ramifications of such actions are obvious.

life than you are? By giving up the rights to master yourself, you simultaneously forfeit your very independence.

Individualism is synonymous with egocentricity. It is difficult to remain popular when your independence is regarded as elitism. But, is popularity more important than truth? Shakespeare wrote in Ham-



science into the every day world of the mundane. In culture and the arts the ubiquitousness of imitation is frightening. One only has to look around to see that he and his tastes are mirror images of every one else's. Styles in fashion are dictated despotically by a few profit motivated designers and are adopted en masse by an indiscriminating public, desiring to be "in style." People who dress like the avante garde think themselves to be different from the rest of society. In reality, they are the most flagrant conformists of all. By following the directions of the Madison Avenue advertising establishment they succeed in becoming mindless copy cats.

The most horrendous aspect of conformity, however, is its destructive power. Disguised in the veil of reform it often attempts to show progressiveness. The collective surge towards modernity, exhibited mindlessly by the masses, often uproots valuable traditions of the past. There is no law that the old must give to the new when the latter is inferior to the former. Tradition becomes obsolete when it fails to maintain practicality,

Man lacks most, a unique responsibility to himself; the need to think. In this modern world of editorialized communication, we have given up independent thought almost entirely. We are told how to look, what to like, when to act, and in whom to believe. If the public ceases to think then its existence becomes superfluous. The world itself is a stagnate body, incapable of evolution. It is man who moves the world forward, but only the man of thought. By accepting the credos of others, man renders himself insensitive to creativity. True, he must learn from others, but only enough to apply his knowledge towards his own innovative goals.

Next in importance, man must accept the responsibility of making decisions. This point is crucial. Society is quickly losing its ability to differentiate between absolutes. Black and white are slowly merging into an indistinguishable gray. We are told that there are no absolutes; that morality is relative; that existence is meaningless. This is existentialist prattling. Right and wrong do exist. Their last bastion is in the mind of the individual who still exercise the power of choice.

let: "This above all: To thine own self be true, And it must follow; as the night the day, Thou canst not be false to any man." Once again we return to morality. Any set of ethics must include the concept of self respect. This is defined as the willingness of the individual to place his own convictions before those of others. This applies even when one's reputation is at stake. It is obvious that man was created to live his own life as he decides. If his actions are only accommodations to the norms established by a collective society, then what is the purpose of his individual existence! In that case, man acts in violation of the force that created him.

The individualist is a vanishing life form. Man's conformity and refusal to assert his own will is turning him into a programmed puppet. He has become a wooden figure, led by the strings of propaganda into wars, hunger and cultural bankruptcy. While the extinction of an independent humanity may not transpire in the immediate future, without a renaissance of self assertion its days are numbered.

A Better Tomorrow

A better tomorrow—is it a dream, or a vision that will fall into the realm of reality? Today men are uncertain. Through the history of mankind, man has always bettered his lot. Will this process continue, or is this era the beginning of its end, rather than the end of the beginning of a resurgence of consciousness?

Are we condemned to the future or will man be able to govern his own fate? This dilemma poses the greatest crisis to the human soul. Human initiative appears to be stymied by the pessimism that any attempt at change is futile. But if no effort is to be made, we will be conquered by the fatal error of passivity.

Men must create that better tomorrow for future generations. The human will cannot be broken if supported by steadfast convictions. Patience may be required; but any goal worth achieving is also worth waiting

The challenge lies ahead, and we must not shirk our duty.

The Editors