

# A PORTRAIT OF SPINOZA AS A MAIMONIDEAN RECONSIDERED

Alexander Green

## ABSTRACT

Warren Zev Harvey wrote a bold and now famous paper over thirty years ago entitled “A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean,” defending the dominant influence of the philosophy of the medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides on the thought of Baruch Spinoza. However, since then, he further developed his thesis by publishing numerous articles showing that Spinoza was not only developing the ideas of Maimonides, but also was unique in synthesizing many different competing strands within medieval Jewish philosophy more generally, including those of Abraham Ibn Ezra, Levi Gersonides, and Hasdai Crescas. In other words, one can even be a Maimonidean by adapting the views of Maimonides’s critics who nonetheless continued his philosophic legacy within the discourse that he began. While the thought and character of Baruch Spinoza has been continually scrutinized and reinterpreted in every generation since his death, I argue that Harvey’s emphasis on the diversity of Jewish sources within Spinoza’s thought aims to be a model for a political liberalism that is rooted within the texts of the Jewish tradition, while also one that advocates an intellectual pluralism.

Over thirty years ago, Warren Zev Harvey wrote a bold and now famous paper entitled “A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean” in the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, defending the dominant influence of the philosophy of the medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides on the thought of Baruch Spinoza.<sup>1</sup> Since then, he further developed his thesis by publishing numerous articles showing that Spinoza was not only developing the ideas of Maimonides, but that of the tradition of medieval Jewish philosophy more generally, and even of the occasional kabbalist. In this group, Harvey includes the writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra, Abraham Abulafia, Levi Gersonides, Joseph ibn Kaspi, Isaac Pollegar, Hasdai Crescas, and Abraham Shalom.<sup>2</sup> According to Harvey, we should read Spinoza not simply as a modern critic of medieval Jewish philosophy (like Descartes’s and Hobbes’s critique of Aristotelianism), but as a student and innovator within that discipline. While Harvey often writes as a historian of ideas, showing the interplay of ideas through different thinkers, my article will seek to discern a common thread among his many disparate papers and to show how

his writings represent a new development in the attempt to reconstruct the genealogy and the complexity of Spinoza's thought that also carries with it practical implications. In what follows I will seek to answer a few important questions about Harvey's reading of Spinoza. First, how does Harvey understand the place of Spinoza's thought within the tradition of medieval Jewish thought when referring to him as a "Maimonidean"? Second, what are the boundaries and limits of the category of "Maimonidean" itself? Is Spinoza merely completing the arguments that Maimonides did not take to their logical conclusion or is he also revising—and perhaps radically so—some of Maimonides's teachings? Lastly, why put a stronger emphasis on the "Jewish" side of Spinoza at the expense of his debt to seventeenth-century European philosophy?<sup>3</sup> Harvey makes the case that Spinoza was not a radical heretic that rejected Judaism for a universal rationalism and liberalism, but a loyal member of a tradition of Jewish philosophical thinking who makes a distinct contribution to that tradition by both synthesizing and criticizing different facets of it. I suggest that his writings on Spinoza often emphasize the similarity of Spinoza's thought to previous medieval Jewish thinkers, while perhaps unfairly downplaying his innovation, in order to argue that the modern rationalism and liberalism is not in conflict with medieval Jewish thinking, but can be seen as a development of it, as exemplified in the thought of the often misunderstood Spinoza.

#### A NEW SPINOZA REVIVAL

The thought and character of Baruch Spinoza has been continually scrutinized and reinterpreted since his death.<sup>4</sup> Examples include the first generation of Jews and of course also Christians in the seventeenth century who knew of Spinoza and rejected him as a heretic for critiquing the traditional concepts of God, prophecy, and scripture. There were many diatribes directed against him by his early Dutch readers, such as branding the *Theological-Political Treatise* as "a godless document" (Jacob Thomasius), an "atheistic book . . . full of abominations" (Willem van Blinjenburgh), and "a book forged in hell."<sup>5</sup> Spinoza's thought took on a new life in eighteenth-century Germany, where German romantics interpreted Spinoza's identification of God and nature, not as a limitation or denial of the biblical God, but as a testament to and realization of the biblical God. Goethe referred to Spinoza as "most theistic, even most Christian," and the German poet Novalis famously dubbed him a "God-intoxicated man." German Idealists (such as Kant and Hegel) and liberal Jews in the nineteenth century also began

to adopt Spinoza as a hero championing the values of individualism, freedom, and reason, which was done without converting to Christianity, a source of pride for liberal Jews. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a very different Spinoza was venerated by Zionists, from Moses Hess to David Ben-Gurion, who reclaimed Spinoza as a proto-secular Zionist, basing their interpretation on the famous statement in *TPT*, chapter 3 that “unless the foundations of their religion were to make their spirits effeminate, they will someday, given the occasion—as human affairs are changeable—erect their imperium once more, and God will choose them anew.” Warren Zev Harvey’s interpretation of Spinoza, I propose, is a fifth attempted revival of Spinoza, a Spinoza whose philosophy does not reject the Jewish tradition, but is a development of different strands within medieval Jewish philosophy. As Harvey suggests, much of the time, these references in Spinoza’s writings are not stated; however, there are times when Spinoza is explicit in his reverence for some of the medieval Jewish thinkers. For example, he praises Gersonides as “a very erudite man” (*vir eruditissimus*) (*TPT* annot. 16), Ibn Ezra as “a man of very liberal disposition and no mean erudition” (*liberioris ingenii vir et non mediocris eruditionis*) (*TPT* 8.1.7), and approvingly quotes Hasdai Crescas (Letter 12 to Ludwig Meyer). Yet at the same time, Spinoza openly censures Maimonides as “babbling . . . [only] twisting Aristotelian trifles and their very own fantasies out of Scripture” (*TPT* 1.10.3), while adapting many of his ideas without referencing him. But if Harvey is not the first to show the connection between Spinoza’s thought and his medieval Jewish philosophic predecessors, then how does his reading differ, and why do I consider it such a significant paradigm shift?

#### HOW TO BEGIN TO READ MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Harvey’s placement of Spinoza in the tradition of medieval Jewish philosophy represents a manner of approach that strives to balance the various approaches to Spinoza’s thought as presented by Shlomo Pines, Harry Wolfson, and Leo Strauss.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, he is not willing to fully accept any of the three, and is openly willing to criticize each. As such, he strongly emphasizes the need to keep in mind multiple narratives in order to comprehend the complexities of the world and to not be satisfied with one alone. In comparing different historiographies of Jewish philosophy, he states, “I will not seek to convince the reader that one view is better than the other and certainly not that one is ‘true.’”<sup>7</sup> Each narrative is a story which attempts to put the parts together distinctively, seeing

patterns between things and connecting different events while trying to form a unique whole. But if there are multiple narratives, how can one choose specific parts of one narrative over another, and on what basis can one decide that one narrative is better than another in making sense of Spinoza?

One narrative that Harvey embraces is Shlomo Pines's historical-philological method. Pines rejected the notion that there is a single "Judaism" that defines the tradition, other than the view that Jews adapted elements from their surrounding cultures for their own uses.<sup>8</sup> Pines states that "precisely for that reason there is a temptation to emphasize the continuity of Jewish culture . . . It nevertheless seems to me, that this continuity . . . is to be considered a problem and not a given fact."<sup>9</sup> As Harvey explains, philosophy takes on a new form in conjunction with each host culture, both influencing that culture and being influenced by it. There is thus a need to understand each philosopher against the culture of their times. One must read medieval Jewish philosophers like Maimonides, who largely wrote in Arabic, in the context of Arabic-speaking Islamic philosophers like Al-Farabi, Avicenna, Ibn Bajja, and Averroes. A history of Jewish philosophy represents the varying encounters between philosophic and Jewish traditions.<sup>10</sup> Thus for Pines there is no one narrative that describes Jewish philosophy over time with essential and continuous elements. This explains why Pines was skeptical about the creation of the Department of Jewish Thought at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, since it advocated a falsely continuous and independent Jewish historical narrative of thought from the Bible until today.<sup>11</sup> As Harvey reports Pines telling him in the 1980s, "the discipline of Jewish thought could not be justified academically, but could perhaps be justified from the point of view of fostering national culture."<sup>12</sup> There is one element that Harvey does not accept in Pines's model of Jewish philosophy, which is that the role of a scholar is just to uncover the roots of the Jewish component in its surrounding philosophic culture.<sup>13</sup> By way of contrast, Harvey holds the view that the historian cannot avoid also being a storyteller since there is a human desire to understand through continuous narratives and thus the scholar must be willing to construct them himself.<sup>14</sup> Just like Plato's philosopher must return to the cave after being liberated, the historical scholar must likewise return to the drawing board to create a new historical narrative which is "true," or at least necessary, relative to the dominant mood in culture and thought of his own time and place.

In light of his subtle revision of Pines's model, Harvey also follows the narrative of Harry Wolfson, who defended the existence of a separate medieval tradition from Philo to Spinoza. Wolfson's approach had the distinctive char-

acter of synthesizing the Bible and Greek philosophy, which is not the same as the premodern and modern ways of approaching the world.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, Wolfson proposed the thesis that there are three periods of Western philosophy: the Greek, which includes the pre-Socratics and the classical Greek philosophers, the medieval, which begins from Philo and ends with Spinoza, and the modern, which begins from Spinoza onwards. The first contained philosophy without scripture, the second was philosophy as the handmaid of scripture, and the third was philosophy liberated from scripture. Wolfson argues that the strongest of the three is the medieval tradition, in which Philo leads a “Jewish revolution in philosophy,” as Harvey phrases it, transforming Greek philosophy in a biblical light, and thereby Hebraicizing Greek philosophy.<sup>16</sup> As he laid out in an early essay, Wolfson stated that the premodern is incomplete without the Hebraic element, lacking a personal God and presenting a model of nature that is “static and structural.”<sup>17</sup> In contrast, modern philosophy in rejecting scripture is just rehashing questions asked by the Greeks.

There are two elements of Wolfson’s interpretation of the history of philosophy that Harvey adopts. The first is that there is a distinct tradition of Jewish philosophy from Philo to Spinoza that needs to be recovered.<sup>18</sup> In the 1920s, Wolfson bemoans the fact that the spirit of Jewish philosophy sits rotting in untouched manuscripts collecting dust in European libraries.

I thought of these shabby tomes which incarnate the spirit of Saadia, Halevi, and Maimonides, of those unpublished works of Gersonides, Narboni, and the Shem-tobs, scattered all over the world and rotting in the holds of libraries; and I was overcome by that feeling of sadness and sorrow which to our forefathers was ever present throughout their exiled life amid the foreign splendors of European cities.<sup>19</sup>

This is an implicit overturning of Hegel, whose description of the progress of *geist* is tied to a secularized Christian understanding of history. In this view, medieval philosophy is regarded as essentially Christian, and it has rendered useless and obsolete all previous philosophy, such as that of Judaism or Islam.<sup>20</sup>

The second element that Harvey adopts from Wolfson is that medieval philosophy is a tradition common to Jews, Muslims, and Christians. For Wolfson, Jewish philosophers spread Hebraic philosophy to Christianity and Islam, and served as a bridge between those worlds.<sup>21</sup> One cannot ignore one or two of the three, and must carefully study the similarities and differences between all of them. In this light, Harvey points to the importance of recent collections such as *Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions*,

edited by Arthur Hyman and James Walsh and *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, edited by Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, all of which achieve this objective.<sup>22</sup>

At the same time, there are two elements that Harvey explicitly rejects in Wolfson's approach. The first is Wolfson's critique of modernity as a secular project that rejects religion.<sup>23</sup> In contrast to Wolfson, Harvey does not end his chronology of the Philonic tradition at Spinoza, but argues that it is still alive in modern and contemporary Jewish thought. This may explain the courses he taught each year at the Hebrew University on a specific theme (such as love, prophecy, the problem of evil, or political theory) "from Philo of Alexandria to Today."<sup>24</sup> While Harvey's primary work is in medieval Jewish philosophy, he emphasizes that there is a discernible line of continuity running between medieval and modern Jewish thought.<sup>25</sup> The second element of Wolfson's thought that Harvey is hesitant about fully accepting is Wolfson's contention that the aspect of Philonic tradition that it is worth reviving today is the spirit of pragmatism (which of course relies on the criterion that in order to determine if an ideology or proposition is true is if it works satisfactorily). For Wolfson, one can find such a pragmatic philosophy or attitude of mind even in the anti-Aristotelian thought of Judah Halevi and Hasdai Crescas.<sup>26</sup> In this regard, Harvey inclines more towards Leo Strauss's emphasis on the question of political philosophy, and the determining importance of liberal democracy, over the Jamesian focus on pragmatism.

Following from the last point, we see in Harvey's thought a subtle indebtedness to Leo Strauss' narrative of medieval Jewish philosophy in which political philosophy is a central focus.<sup>27</sup> Strauss goes even further, arguing that medieval Jewish philosophy is not primarily about metaphysics, morality, or theology, but is mainly about political philosophy.<sup>28</sup> Harvey also credits Strauss for reawakening the tension between philosophy and religion, exemplified in the two cities of Jerusalem and Athens through his recovering of the esoteric dimensions of Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*. He credited him with knowing how to "read the *Guide* more like a medieval Maimonidean than like a modern historian. He knew how to approach the *Guide* as a puzzle, doggedly seeking to uncover its esoteric teaching, and even worried about the morality of divulging it."<sup>29</sup> But Harvey strongly rejects Strauss' conclusions that not only are philosophy and religion irreconcilable, but also that it is impossible to adhere to both, which ultimately forces one to choose a side.<sup>30</sup> He explains that

There are either . . . patriots in Athens and traitors in Jerusalem, or traitors in Athens and patriots in Jerusalem. The former are philosophers who outwardly profess to be Jerusalemites, but who see in religion only a noble lie, a useful political tool for getting the multitude to observe the laws of society. The latter are theologians who see in philosophy a useful tool for advancing the cause of religion.<sup>31</sup>

As a result, Harvey rejects Strauss's supposition that there is nothing inherently Jewish in the narrative of medieval Jewish philosophy except its successful pedagogy of incorporating Greek philosophy into a Jewish culture that was initially hostile to it, but concerning which there is no distinct teaching that it has to offer about either philosophy or politics.<sup>32</sup> Many of Harvey's works on medieval Jewish philosophy have been written partially to reject this narrative and to show that there is a longstanding tradition of medieval Jewish political philosophy, which includes Judah Halevi, Moses Maimonides, Nissim of Gerona, Levi Gersonides, Hasdai Crescas, and Isaac Abravanel. In doing so, Harvey also shows that these Jewish thinkers began with the Bible and as such, offer a genuinely philosophical debate about which political model the Bible advocates, if any.<sup>33</sup>

#### SPINOZA'S DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

Harvey came to view Spinoza as one of the most important disciples of the medieval Jewish philosophic tradition. As such, Spinoza was able to synthesize many of its diverse components and adapt them to the needs of modern liberal democracy. Like Wolfson, Harvey sees Spinoza as the endpoint of medieval Jewish philosophy; in his view, Spinoza's ideas are rooted in the long tradition developed since Philo, the pinnacle of which was reached in the work of Maimonides.<sup>34</sup> This is clear in the way Harvey opens his article, "A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean" with the statement "in what follows, I try to sketch a portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean, as the last major representative of a tradition that mightily dominated Jewish philosophy for almost five centuries following the appearance of the *Guide of the Perplexed*."<sup>35</sup> Even when Spinoza was not explicitly citing Jewish sources in the *Ethics* (let alone medieval Jewish philosophic sources), according to Wolfson, he was "reconstructing the *Ethics* out of scattered slips of paper figuratively cut out of the philosophic literature available to Spinoza."<sup>36</sup> Harvey, however, is critical of Wolfson for making medieval Jewish philosophy too homogeneous and for not being willing to divide it into disparate parts, sources, and influences, an endeavor, which Wolfson saw little relevance.<sup>37</sup> For Harvey, Pines's approach helps correct this weakness in

Wolfson's methodology and allows one to read Spinoza as a pluralist within the medieval Jewish philosophic and mystical traditions. While Harvey titled his article, "A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," he could equally have written on "A Portrait of Spinoza as a Gersonidean" or "A Portrait of Spinoza as a Crescasian," since he regarded Spinoza as having absorbed the thinking of a number of medieval philosophers before him. Though less pronounced, the influence of Strauss on Harvey's reading of Spinoza had the effect of showing him the political utility of the transformation of Maimonidean ideas for the purposes of liberalism, rather than simply being a rejection of all Hebraic ideas or impulses, as Wolfson laments.<sup>38</sup>

The influence of medieval Jewish philosophy on Spinoza becomes clearer when looking into Spinoza's biography. While Spinoza may have received a traditional Jewish education in the Talmud Torah school in Amsterdam, what may have benefited him even more decisively was the fact that the Amsterdam Jewish community cultivated leaders who possessed a philosophical inclination. Not only that, but they valued the study of medieval Jewish philosophy. This included Saul Levi Mortiera (1596-1660), a student of Leon Modena in Venice who used some of Maimonides' ideas in his attack on kabbalah, and Manasseh ben Israel (1604-1657), who himself appropriated some of Maimonides's arguments in his defense of creation.<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, Harvey's reading is based on the fact that there is less of a dichotomy between the "early" and the "late" Spinoza, which some scholars use to delineate between the more "Jewish" and the thoroughly "secular" Spinoza. Especially among those who came after him, many readers assume that Spinoza abandoned his Jewish roots after being excommunicated.<sup>40</sup> As Ze'ev Levy argues in *Baruch or Benedict*, "the Jewish thinkers, except Crescas, exerted little influence on the shaping of Spinoza's general philosophic system."<sup>41</sup> This reading implies (whether it states it explicitly or not) that the early parts of the *TPT* are leftover from his yeshiva days as reflected in the Hebrew quotations and statements critical of Judaism in that section, while the lack of Hebrew and lesser amount of Jewish sources in the later chapters of the *TPT* and very few in the *Ethics* reflect a shift away from Spinoza's Jewish roots. To Levy, this suggests that the *TPT* was a later development of an earlier polemical treatise written in the context of the Jewish community.<sup>42</sup> But Harvey's interpretations challenge such readings by strongly arguing that medieval Jewish thought consistently informs Spinoza's writings throughout his life, and are evident in the entire corpus of Spinoza's writings.



His argument for the continued relevance of Jewish sources throughout Spinoza's thought is based on three pieces of evidence. First, Spinoza wrote both the *TPT* and the *Ethics* at the same time, beginning the *Ethics* in 1660, interrupting his work on the *Ethics* to finish the *TPT* and publishing it anonymously in 1670, and then completed the *Ethics* by 1675. This infers that they arise from the same period in Spinoza's life. Second, Spinoza includes a large Hebrew quotation of Maimonides' *Guide* II 25 in *TPT* 7.11.21, suggesting that he was reading and thinking about that work while he was writing the *TPT*, and therefore also while he was writing the *Ethics*.<sup>43</sup> Last, as Leon Roth points out (and as Harvey footnotes at this point in the discussion of "A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean"<sup>44</sup>), even if this quote is an exception and even if Spinoza studied all of these classical Jewish works only in his youth, this still does not prevent them from having had a lasting impact on his later thought and from him recalling them later.<sup>45</sup> While Spinoza likely had these medieval Jewish thinkers at the back of his mind throughout his writings, one reason that he did not explicitly mention them may be that his audience after his excommunication was no longer the Jewish community, but a Christian liberal audience (which may explain his high praise for Jesus).<sup>46</sup> But while his audience may have changed, the inspiration and roots of his ideas may have not.

Consequently, Harvey argues that Spinoza's writings may be better fit into a long tradition of medieval commentaries on Maimonides's *Guide*, joining a distinguished line of thinkers such as Shem Tov Falaquera, Joseph ibn Kaspi, Profiat Duran (a.k.a. Efodi), Asher Crescas, and Isaac Abravanel. As Harvey explains, "it is barely an exaggeration to call all subsequent medieval Jewish philosophy 'Maimonidean.' Even Hasdai Crescas . . . , Maimonides' radical philosophic critic, called him 'the Master,' and while dismantling his philosophy from the inside, worked perforce within it."<sup>47</sup> Thus being a Maimonidean carries with it much room for disagreement, and is a much larger conception encompassing more than those who merely followed Maimonides's philosophical or theological opinions in an "orthodox" fashion.

Here are some examples of how Spinoza, according to Harvey, continued and developed many of the central ideas within medieval Jewish thought even when he did not explicitly cite his sources, or acknowledge their Maimonidean provenance.

1. Garden of Eden: intellect, imagination, and the nature of ethics: Maimonides and Spinoza both use the story of the Garden of Eden (Gen 2-3) as a metaphor for human nature (Maimonides, *Guide*, 1.1-2, 73, 2.30, *Spinoza*, *TPT*,

4.4.33 and *Ethics*, 4.68s). Both argue that the story and “the fall” represent the tensions that human beings face when struggling between the pursuit of the intellect (“true and false”) and the desires of the imagination (“good and evil”). Both see the imagination as dangerous and as a force that leads one away from man’s true perfection, though necessary for the masses and for politics. Harvey boldly continues to aver that ethics for Maimonides originates in the imagination and is thus conventional (though not relativist), and is an argument that Spinoza follows, since normativity only exists in the intellectual knowledge of God.<sup>48</sup> Maimonides and Spinoza differ though on the extent to which the Bible can serve as a guide leading its religious adherents to intellectual perfection, Maimonides arguing that this is the purpose of the Bible as divine law, while Spinoza sees the Bible as purely a political law that commands obedience to justice and charity (Spinoza, *TPT*, 13.1.9-10).

2. God as intellect and the attack on divine corporeality: Maimonides and Spinoza both agree that God is an intellect that self-cognizes and is not a body that eats, walks, and sleeps as physical beings do (Maimonides, *Guide*, 1.68 and Spinoza, *Ethics*, 2.7s).<sup>49</sup> They differ on the reason why the Bible uses anthropocentric language to describe God. For Maimonides, this is a concession to human weakness and is also so as to guide individuals to a noncorporeal understanding of the divine, in which case it must begin by speaking in their language, quoting the Talmudic expression, “the Torah speaks in the language of the sons of man” (*b. Yev. 71a* in Maimonides, *Guide*, 1.26). For Spinoza, the divine anthropocentrism is a result of the ignorance of the prophetic authors themselves who were deficient in proper philosophic education, and reflected the ignorance of the society in which they lived (Spinoza, *TPT*, 2.1-3).

3. God as equivalent to nature: Spinoza built on Maimonides’s and Aristotle’s understandings of God as self-cognizing intellect (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 12.7 and Maimonides, *Guide*, 1.68) and added the attribute of extension—to be sure, a very significant addition. Perhaps one can also say that Spinoza felt he was taking Maimonides’s argument to its logic conclusion: that if God cognizes extended space, then God being the object means that He must also be extended, leading to the conclusion that God is equivalent to nature. According to Harvey, Spinoza’s attribute of extension was also an adaptation of Hasdai Crescas’s thesis that space is infinite and that God permeates His entire creation.<sup>50</sup> Harvey also draws on the argument of Moshe Idel that Spinoza was influenced by the gematria that *elohim* and *ha-tebà* are both 86, which was originally argued by Abraham Abulafia and was quoted frequently by later kabbalists.<sup>51</sup>

4. Love: Maimonides and Spinoza both see the ultimate purpose of human life as knowledge of God and nature through a passionate love of God, what Maimonides refers to as *`ishq* (*Guide* 3.51) and Spinoza as *amor Dei intellectualis* (Spinoza, *Ethics*, 5.21-42). Harvey suggests that Spinoza's term may have been a Latin translation of Rabbi Abraham Shalom's (d. 1492) *ahabah elohit sikhilit* from his popular philosophic work, *Neveh Shalom*.<sup>52</sup> However, Harvey qualifies this observation by pointing out that the result of this passionate love differs in its consequences for Maimonides and Spinoza. For Maimonides, this love leads to a renewed sense of awe regarding the lack of certainty on the fundamental questions of physics and metaphysics, which is why Harvey refers to Maimonides as a "critical epistemologist."<sup>53</sup> Contrastingly, Spinoza's passionate intellectual love of God leads him to certainty about physics and metaphysics, without any scepticism or doubt.<sup>54</sup>

5. Prophecy and miracles: Spinoza builds on Maimonides's science of prophecy in which prophecy is a combination of the perfection of the rational faculty and the perfection of the imaginative faculty (Maimonides, *Guide*, 2.32). But for Maimonides the biblical prophets exemplify this ideal, while for Spinoza, the biblical prophets *only* perfected their imagination and not their rational faculty (Spinoza, *TPT*, 2.1-3). As a result, for Spinoza the Bible is not a reflection of the laws of the natural world as constructed by God, but is instead useful only as a form of popular ethics (Spinoza, *TPT*, 13.1.1-12). Similarly, "miracles" are what the masses ascribe to phenomenon in the natural world that they cannot explain through natural causes, which for Maimonides is a result of the Bible not wanting to explain all the intermediate causes to the ordinary reader, while for Spinoza this absence demonstrates the ignorance of the biblical authors with regards to intermediate causes (Maimonides, *Guide*, 2.29, 48 and Spinoza, *TPT*, 6.1.64).<sup>55</sup>

6. Physical self-preservation: in grouping human perfections into four categories, Maimonides does not deny the necessity of the preservation of the body, but ranks it as the lowest of the four and the one which is of the least human concern. He says that "the possession of the treasures acquired, and competed for, by man and thought to be perfection are not a perfection" (Maimonides, *Guide*, 3.54.636). In this regard, Spinoza is closer to the later medieval Jewish philosopher Gersonides in the belief that the distinct drive for human preservation that is rooted in our instinctual biological impulses shared by all living creatures is of greater importance and value than Maimonides allows. What Spinoza referred to as the *conatus* in the *Ethics*, which is a being's striv-

ing to persevere (Spinoza, *Ethics*, 3.6), Gersonides referred to as *hishtadlut* in his biblical commentaries.<sup>56</sup>

7. Biblical hermeneutics: in regard to biblical hermeneutics, Spinoza builds more on the method of Abraham ibn Ezra than that of Maimonides. Maimonides articulates the importance of the Mosaic authorship of the Torah by making it the eighth of his thirteen principles that “the whole of this Torah which is in our hand today is the Torah that was brought down to Moses, our teacher; that all of it is from God.”<sup>57</sup> Spinoza adopts Abraham ibn Ezra’s notion of the “secret of the twelve” (*sod ha-shnem-asar*), which refers to six spots in the Pentateuch that appear to have not been authored by Moses. Though Ibn Ezra’s argument does not prove that Moses did not author the Pentateuch, but merely that some passages were not written by him, Spinoza indicates that he is writing in the spirit of the secret that Ibn Ezra could only begin to disclose. Accordingly, Spinoza develops one of the earliest versions of modern biblical criticism regarding the true historical composition of the Pentateuch.<sup>58</sup>

8. Dogma: both Maimonides and Spinoza believed that there are certain dogmas that are essential for the stability of every political society. Maimonides refers to these as “correct beliefs and “necessary beliefs” (Maimonides, *Guide*, 3.28), and Spinoza refers to them as “dogmas of universal faith” (Spinoza, *TPT*, 13-14). One decisive difference though is that Maimonides’ list of dogmas implicitly maintains a corporeal conception of God such that “God is violently angry with those who disobey Him” (Maimonides, *Guide*, 3.28.512), while Spinoza’s list describes God’s actions in a more ambiguous way (Spinoza, *TPT*, 14.38-47).<sup>59</sup>

9. The Hebrew language: Spinoza attempts to distinguish the Hebrew of the biblical prophets from the original preprophetic Hebrew. In reconstructing it, he argues that this original form represents a perfect geometrical structure of the Hebrew language (like nature in the *Ethics*) against the uncultured corruption of it by many of the biblical prophets and early Hebrew grammarians. Here Spinoza’s conception appears closer to Judah Halevi’s argument in the *Kuzari* (2:2 and 4:25) that language has a metaphysical basis and is a direct reflection of God’s creation, than it does to the ideas of Maimonides and Jewish Aristotelians like Ibn Kaspi who argue that all languages are conventional, including Hebrew.

10. Political theory: Spinoza’s political theory is highly dependent on Hobbes, but Harvey is careful to point out the Maimonidean elements in it. First, the state of nature is not egalitarian for Spinoza as it is for Hobbes—there is still a distinction between the wise and the many. Thus to exit the state of nature is

more difficult for the many who are guided by passions than for the wise, who continue to guide their lives by reason. Second, in the ideal political community, the passions remain the primary human motivation for Hobbes, while Spinoza maintains the ideal of a political community guided by the intellect, stating that “whatever causes men to live in harmony with one another causes them to live according to the guidance of reason” (Spinoza, *Ethics*, 4.40). However he, like Maimonides, is doubtful about the realistic possibility of achieving a mass enlightenment and as a result recognizes the necessity of imagination as the driving force in politics.<sup>60</sup>

11. Zionism: Spinoza made a famous statement at the end of *TPT* chapter 3 that suggested that the obstacle to the resurrection of a Jewish state was rooted in the superstitious nature of the Jewish religion, which he referred to as “effeminating their spirits” (*animos effoeminarent*) (Spinoza, *TPT*, 3.5.67). The possibility of a Jewish state is thus dependent on the ability of Jews to successfully liberate themselves from “the foundations” of their religion which advocates practicing laws which ceased to be relevant once they were exiled from their land (Spinoza, *TPT*, 3.5.1-6), thus keeping them in ghettoized communities in exile, and weakening them as a result of the false conception of nature imbued in their religion. And even if it is possible, it seems that for Spinoza it is also questionable whether returning to a Jewish state is a desirable outcome as opposed to living as citizens in secular liberal democracies. Spinoza nonetheless proposes it as a possibility, though the ambiguity of the statement makes it difficult to discern if he think it is a realistic prospect, which although it may be possible, may not be desirable. Nonetheless, Harvey has found earlier precedents for Spinoza’s famous statement on the possibility of a reconstructed Jewish state at least in the spirit (if not literal meaning) in the work of some post-Maimonidean medieval Jewish thinkers such as Abraham Abulafia, Joseph Ibn Kaspi, and Isaac Pollegar,<sup>61</sup> thus indicating the possibility that the seeds of Spinoza’s “Zionism” were already sown.

To conclude, for Harvey to define Spinoza as a Maimonidean does not mean that he is a blind follower of Maimonides and merely continues his arguments into the modern period, but that he inherits and adapts the philosophic categories of Maimonides’s religious philosophy, while also critiquing and revising some of his conclusions. In other words, one can even be a Maimonidean by adapting the views of Maimonides’ *critics* who nonetheless continued his philosophic legacy within the discourse that he began.

## JUDAISM AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL: SPINOZA'S MAIMONIDEAN WISDOM

Reading Spinoza as a Maimonidean may also carry important implications for the three practical tasks with which Harvey charges Jewish philosophy today: one, relearning Arabic and Arabic philosophy in order to create a true dialogue between Jews and the Arab world; two, formulating an economic and political philosophy that will point the way to a just and egalitarian society in Israel; and three, reviving the cosmopolitan nature of Diaspora Jewish civilization.<sup>62</sup> These challenges are part of the larger conversation going on in Israel about how to reconcile its Jewish and liberal democratic character. It is important to note that Harvey does not make the explicit link in his writings between his scholarly articles on Spinoza and his practical writings on the implications of Jewish philosophy for Jewish society. I am putting these two parts of his thought in dialogue and suggesting that one can make a direct link between them. By reading his practical writings on Jewish philosophy in light of his writings on Spinoza, it may help clarify the philosophic roots of the former. Many have argued that liberal democratic ideas are not something imposed on Judaism from the outside, but rooted in the Jewish tradition itself.<sup>63</sup> In my reading of Harvey's work, I discern that he makes Spinoza his guide by developing a distinct Jewish and "Maimonidean" language for liberal democracy, given that Spinoza is one of the first architects of liberal democracy and does so through developing the tradition of medieval Jewish thought (even though his position on Zionism is more ambiguous, as Harvey makes clear).<sup>64</sup>

The first challenge of Jewish philosophy for Harvey is to work towards a solution to the conflict with the Palestinians. The ultimate solution, he argues, is not through military might or a political settlement, as the right and the left tend to argue, but instead by finding a common language.<sup>65</sup> One means of creating such a language is by encouraging the study of Islamic philosophy in Muslim countries. As he sees it, the works of philosophical thinkers such as Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes could serve as a counterbalance to the rigid mode of thinking that promotes irrationalism, eschatological utopias, and the inability to compromise.<sup>66</sup> As Harvey cogently articulates it, "the best antidote to the poison of Islamic fundamentalism is Islamic philosophy."<sup>67</sup> Another means of creating such a discourse is by finding the universalistic elements in both Judaism and Islam and creating a common dream that encompasses both. Building on the thought of David Hartman, Harvey agrees that "Israelis and Palestinians must write each other into their own stories and desire to share the house."<sup>68</sup> This

project follows in the footsteps of Spinoza by carrying out a similar “Maimonidean translation,” but in the opposite direction. Just as modern German Jewish philosophy can be seen as a translation of medieval Jewish Arabic philosophy into German, now Jewish philosophy will have to do exactly the opposite by translating the German Jewish philosophic tradition back into Arabic. In other words, just as Spinoza translated Maimonideanism into the modern framework of Hobbes and Descartes and adapted it to modern liberalism, twenty-first-century Jewish thinkers need to follow Spinoza’s method and retranslate Spinoza’s liberal Maimonideanism back into Arabic.<sup>69</sup>

Another facet of Spinoza’s Maimonideanism that Harvey argues is essential for moving toward solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is its nonmessianic and utopian character, allowing for practical reasoning and compromise. Kantian and Hegelian philosophies present an optimistic narrative of historical progress whereby human beings can become more rational, moral, and peaceful over time.<sup>70</sup> However, the wars and violence of the twentieth century have called this belief into question.<sup>71</sup> At the same time, utopianism can also subvert reasoned political decision making, for instance, in the way it was adapted by the school of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, who described the redemption of land as part of the unfolding of the messianic era, a position that has a tendency to stand against the possibility of practical negotiations.<sup>72</sup> Instead, Maimonides’s description of the messianic era is that of an independent political state, which is worldly, pragmatic, and noneschatological. Spinoza articulates similar qualities in envisioning his model for the state.

The second challenge of Jewish philosophy for Harvey is to build a just and egalitarian political philosophy for Israel out of the sources of the Jewish tradition. Spinoza’s model of the good society can serve as an exemplar with regard to the limited role of the priests, and the centrality of a civil religion that can apply to all its citizens. How can Spinoza’s ideas take effect in practical terms? First of all, Spinoza is highly critical of the influence that religious leaders have had in influencing politics, and part of his critique of religion was an attempt to overthrow ecclesiastical authority in Europe. Spinoza attempts to marginalize the power of religious leaders by challenging the most common reading of the Hebrew Bible that the kings are the ones acting unjustly, while the prophets enter to counterbalance and correct the ways of the king by speaking on behalf of God, truth, and ethics. Harvey brings out how Spinoza turns this reading on its head, proposing that in truth the kings are mostly acting justly and for the good of the entire people, but are corrupted by the self-interest of

the prophets!<sup>73</sup> In other words, it's the irksome prophets who are causing all the problems in the state, not the well-intentioned kings. Second, Spinoza preserves the necessity of a civil religion to maintain social order within a secular state (what he calls the “dogmas of universal faith”), which includes God's existence, unity, and forgiveness (*TPT* 14.1.38), and moral maxims such as justice (*tzedakah*) and charity (*mishpat*). This is a development of Maimonides's concept of “necessary beliefs” (*Guide* 3.28).<sup>74</sup> While not all the details of Spinoza's civil religion may be worth applying to the realities of contemporary Israel, Harvey (without sourcing Spinoza) suggests that Judaism can serve as the foundation for the state in three areas. The first is the centrality of the Hebrew language as the language of the state, giving access to the texts of the tradition, the second is the Hebrew calendar as a temporal Jewish framework for organizing everyday life, and the third is the influence of Jewish legal rulings on the court system. Each influences the order of the state while at the same time does not interfere in individual's personal decisions of how to practice Judaism.<sup>75</sup>

The third task of Jewish philosophy is to revive the Jewish cosmopolitanism of the Diaspora that was decimated by the Holocaust, and the centralization of Judaism in Israel and North America. Harvey argues that the genius of Judaism since the Second Temple has been its cosmopolitanism, whereby different communities existed across the world with varied customs and ways of life. Is that a worthy goal after the creation of the state of Israel? Harvey challenges the Zionist ideology of the “negation of Diaspora” (*shlilat hagolah*), which advocates that all Jews should immigrate to Israel, and replaces it with a model that acknowledges Israel as the center of the Jewish world, yet is vitally connected to the vibrant centers of Jewish life in the Diaspora.<sup>76</sup> He even envisions a future time when Jewish communities in Arab countries with their distinct Arabic character are rebuilt and suggests that this could be a way to help Israel make itself an integral part of the Middle East.<sup>77</sup> It is important to note that in this regard, Spinoza's writings do not lead to any such direct conclusion. But, as mentioned earlier, Spinoza was seen to be a progenitor of both modern Diaspora Judaism and of modern Zionism, and perhaps by rooting these different perspectives on the future of the Jewish people within Spinoza's thought, he can serve as a bridge and a common ground for both camps.

## CONCLUSION

The significance of Harvey's interpretation of Spinoza as a Maimonidean is that it designates Spinoza's thought as a crucial point in the development of the Mai-



monidean tradition of Jewish philosophical thinking, while also revealing how it contributed in the development of Maimonideanism for modern liberalism. While Harvey does not explicitly draw all the connections between Spinoza's interpretive and practical writings, I argue that Harvey's Spinoza provides a way of thinking through one of the most challenging political problems today: the conflict between Jewish and democratic values in the State of Israel and in the Diaspora. There are three challenges that continue to present themselves: a Judaism without liberalism and democracy unleashes many oppressive and unequal forces from within the tradition; a liberalism without Judaism makes it difficult for Jews to defend their own particular identity in the modern world; and unchecked liberalism has a perilous tendency to squash diversity by requiring all groups to conform to one singular liberal model. Harvey's Spinoza mitigates this tension by moderating the radical claims of each. Liberalism becomes part of Judaism through Spinoza's development of medieval Jewish rationalism, which aims to limit the authoritarianism of religion. Judaism becomes part of liberalism through Spinoza's reinterpreting the narrative of the Hebrew Bible as a political document regarding the formation of the Hebrew State as a model for the modern state. Last, Jewish liberalism can maintain its respect for diversity since it draws on multiple and conflicting arguments from the tradition and brings them together not to squash diversity, but to value and sustain the rich diversity of Jewish thought.

## NOTES

1. Harvey, "A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," 151-72.
2. While Harvey is not the only one to make this argument, he advocates it more strongly than others. See "A Portrait of Spinoza"; "Maimonides and Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil," 167-85; "Spinoza Against the Prophets on Criticizing the Government," 83-90; "The Incorporeality of God in Maimonides, Rabad and Spinoza," 63-69; *Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas*; "Spinoza's Metaphysical Hebraism," 107-14; "Idel on Spinoza," 88-94; "Spinoza and the Parable of the Fish of the Sea," 369-75; "Spinoza on Ibn Ezra's Secret of the Twelve," 41-55; "Gersonides and Spinoza on Conatus," 273-97; "Shlomo Pines on Maimonides, Spinoza and Kant," 173-82; "Spinoza's Counterfactual Zionism," 235-44; "Spinoza on Biblical Miracles," 659-75; "*Ishq, Heshek and Amor Dei Intellectualis*"; "Du mysticisme au-delà de la philosophie: Maimonide et Spinoza" (forthcoming).
3. Joshua Parens explicitly states that his recent book is partially a response to Harvey's thesis. See Parens, *Maimonides and Spinoza*, 3.
4. For a slightly more complex portrait of the reception of Spinoza than what I am laying out here, see Schwartz, *Spinoza: The First Modern Jew*.

5. Thomasius, “Adversus anonymum, de libertate philosophandi”; Van Blinjenburgh, “The Truth of the Christian Religion.” See also Nadler, *A Book Forged in Hell*, xi-xii, 231.

6. Harvey compares the different ways that Pines, Wolfson, and Strauss interpret medieval Jewish philosophy against that of Hegel who, using a Christian approach, has no room for medieval Jewish philosophy), in Harvey, “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 27-36. Another way that he frames this tension in his thought is how when coming to teach at the Department of Jewish Thought at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he sought to integrate the historical-philological approach of the “Jerusalem” school of Jewish Studies with analytic philosophic approach that he learned at Columbia. See “Jewish Philosophy Tomorrow: Post-Messianic and Post-Lachrymose,” 119-32.

7. Harvey, “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 27.

8. Harvey, “On Professor Shlomo Pines and his Approach to Jewish Thought,” 4-6.

9. Pines, *Between the Thought of Israel and the Thought of the Nations*, 5.

10. Harvey, “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 31-32.

11. Harvey, “Jewish Philosophy Tomorrow: Post-Messianic and Post-Lachrymose,” 125.

12. Ibid.

13. Harvey, “On Professor Shlomo Pines and His Approach to Jewish Thought,”

14: “Pines sees the task of the student of Jewish philosophy, like that of the researcher in general, as not so much to construct theories as to destroy them. . . . There is something of a Nietzschean tone to these words. The scholar is depicted here as [an iconoclastic figure,] smashing conventions, freeing of presuppositions.”

14. This was based on Harvey’s response to a question at the conference “Spinoza, Judaism, Politics” at University at Buffalo, November 6, 2013.

15. Wolfson, *Philo*, vol. 2, 445-60; Harvey, “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 29-30.

16. Harvey, “Hebraism and Western Philosophy,” 82.

17. Wolfson, “Maimonides and Halevi,” 279-301; Harvey, “Hebraism and Western Philosophy,” 78.

18. Harvey notices a similar attitude of “restoration” and “reclamation” of the Hebraic from Christianity in restoring Jesus as an anonymous and ordinary Jewish preacher in an early article of Wolfson’s. See Harvey, “Harry Austryn Wolfson on the Jews,” 152-58.

19. Wolfson, “The Needs of Jewish Scholarship in America,” 32.

20. Wolfson, *Philo*, 2:441; Harvey, “Hebraism and Western Philosophy,” 84; “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 29.

21. Harvey, “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 29.

22. Harvey, “Jewish Philosophy Tomorrow: Post-Messianic and Post-Lachrymose,” 120.

23. Harvey, “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 30.

24. Harvey, “Jewish Philosophy Tomorrow: Post-Messianic and Post-Lachrymose,” 121, 123.

25. While Harvey is skeptical about the premise that much of modern Jewish thought is Maimonidean, he does imply that it is concerned with the continued Philonic question

of the relationship between reason and revelation. See “The Return of Maimonideanism,” 249-51.

26. Harvey, “Hellenism and Hebraism in Wolfson’s Theory of History,” 83; “Return of Maimonideanism,” 252.

27. Harvey, “How Leo Strauss Silenced,” 387. Harvey does not explicitly credit Strauss in these terms there, but the points he does credit Strauss with are political ones.

28. Harvey, review of *Maimonides*, 330.

29. Harvey, “Return of Maimonideanism,” 253.

30. Strauss, “How to Begin to Study,” xiv: “its first premise is the old Jewish premise that being a Jew and being a philosopher are two incompatible things.” Harvey responds in “Why Maimonides Was Not a *Mutakallim*,” 106n6, that this is “the chief flaw in his generally perspicacious approach to the *Guide*.”

31. Harvey, “Historiographies of Jewish Philosophy,” 31.

32. Aryeh Tepper argues in his recent study of Strauss that according to Harvey, Strauss in his later writings came to reject this initial thesis. See Tepper, *Progressive Minds*, 20.

33. Harvey, “Judah Halevi’s Political Philosophy”; “Maimonides on Human Perfection,” 1-15; “Political Philosophy & Halakha,” 47-64; “Liberal Democratic Themes,” 197-211; “Rabbi Nissim of Girona on the Constitutional Power of the Sovereign,” 91-100; “The Philosopher and Politics,” 53-65; “Anarchism, Egalitarianism,” 213-28.

34. Wolfson, *Philo*, 456-58.

35. Harvey, “Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean,” 151.

36. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, 1:3.

37. Harvey, “Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean,” 152.

38. Harvey does not, as far as I am aware, directly suggest a practical implication for his scholarship on Spinoza, but I am drawing this by implication from reading his overall project throughout his articles. I will discuss this more below.

39. Ben Israel, *De Creatione Problemata XXX*, cited in Boyle, *A Free Enquiry*, 46 (“with whom I have conversed at Amsterdam”), which is discussed in Muslow, “Idolatry and Science,” 702. See also Dweck, “Maimonideanism in Leon Modena’s *Ari Nohem*,” 211-44.

40. For a discussion of Spinoza’s Jewish education, see Nadler, *Spinoza: A Life*, 61-115. Much is conjecture and it is unclear what he internalized or actually learned. Emmanuel Levinas critiques Spinoza’s model of Judaism for not understanding Talmud. See Levinas, “The Spinoza Case,” 106-10; Cohen, “Levinas on Spinoza’s Misunderstanding,” 23-51.

41. Levy, *Baruch or Benedict*, 20. This view is also apparent among many other scholars of Spinoza. A few examples include: Feuer, *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism*, 22-88; Hampshire, *Spinoza*, 151; Feldman, “Spinoza,” 556; Smith, *Spinoza, Liberalism*, xiii, 197.

42. The question of whether Spinoza’s *TPT* is a shrewder and more mature version of an earlier and unedited apology written after his excommunication is based on a report of Salomon Van Til, though his sources are unclear and we have no copy of this early work. See Steenbakkers, “The Text of Spinoza’s *Tractatus*,” 29-31.

43. Harvey, “Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean,” 169.

44. *Ibid.*, 169n99.

45. Roth, *Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides*, 63-64.
46. For a further discussion of Spinoza's interpretation of Christ, see Pines, "Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, Maimonides and Kant," 673-79.
47. Harvey, "The Return of Maimonideanism," 249.
48. Harvey, "Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," 155-61; "Maimonides and Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil," 167-85. See also "Ethics and Meta-Ethics," 131-38. For two alternative perspectives, see Novak, *The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism*, 153-75; Parens, "Prudence, Imagination and Determination of Law," 31-55.
49. Harvey, "Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," 162-63; "The Incorporability of God in Maimonides, Rabad and Spinoza," 63-69.
50. Harvey, "Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," 164-65; *Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas*, 24, 29. This has been developed further in an article by Harvey's student Carlos Fraenkel. See Fraenkel, "Maimonides' God and Spinoza's Deus sive Natura," 173-215.
51. Harvey, "Idel on Spinoza," 88-90.
52. Harvey, "Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," 162, 167; "Idel on Spinoza," 90-91; "*Ishq, Heshek and Amor Dei Intellectualis*."
53. Harvey, "Maimonides on Human Perfection," 1-15; "Maimonides' First Commandment, Physics and Doubt," 149-62.
54. Harvey, "Shlomo Pines on Maimonides, Spinoza and Kant," 177.
55. Harvey, "Spinoza on Biblical Miracles," 662-65.
56. Harvey, "Gersonides and Spinoza on Conatus," 273-97.
57. Translation of Kellner in *Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought*, 14. For the Arabic, see Maimonides, *Mishnah im Perush Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon*, vol. 4, *Seder Nezikin*, 214.
58. Harvey, "Spinoza on Ibn Ezra's Secret of the Twelve," 41-55.
59. Harvey, "Shlomo Pines on Maimonides, Spinoza and Kant," 173-82.
60. Harvey, "Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean," 168-69.
61. Harvey, "Spinoza's Counterfactual Zionism," 235-44.
62. Harvey, "New and Unexpected Problems Facing 21st-Century Jewish Philosophy," 181, 186-87.
63. Elazar, *Kinship and Consent*; Ravitzky, *Religion and State in Jewish Philosophy*; Lorberbaum, *Politics and Limits of Law*; Walzer, Lorberbaum, and Zohar, *The Jewish Political Tradition Volume 1: Authority; The Jewish Political Tradition Volume 2: Membership*; Chowers, *The Political Philosophy of Zionism*.
64. See also Smith, *Spinoza, Liberalism*, 25: "With Spinoza begins that line of distinctly modern thought which holds that Jews can be free not only when they have been granted freedom of religion but also when they have been emancipated from Judaism."
65. Harvey, "Strangers in Our Home," 351, 354; "New and Unexpected Problems," 185.
66. Harvey, "New and Unexpected Problems," 186.
67. Ibid.
68. Harvey, "Strangers in Our Home," 347, 354.
69. Harvey, "New and Unexpected Problems," 187.
70. Harvey, "New and Unexpected Problems," 179; "Jewish Philosophy Tomorrow: Post-Messianic and Post-Lachrymose," 128.

71. Harvey, "New and Unexpected Problems," 178, 180.
72. Harvey, "New and Unexpected Problems," 185; "Jewish Philosophy Tomorrow: Post-Messianic and Post-Lachrymose," 129.
73. Harvey, "Spinoza Against the Prophets on Criticizing the Government," 83–90.
74. Harvey, "Shlomo Pines on Maimonides, Spinoza and Kant."
75. Harvey, "Some Thoughts on the Role of Judaism in the State of Israel," 71-81.
76. Harvey, "New and Unexpected Problems," 181.
77. *Ibid.*, 182.

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


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