

CHRONOS

The History Journal of
Yeshiva University

2022-2023

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Dear Reader,

Welcome to the 2022-2023 edition of *Chronos*, The History Journal of Yeshiva University.

For over a decade, *Chronos* has been the venue for Yeshiva University students to showcase their scholarly research into the expansive realm of historical studies.

The *Chronos* Editorial Board is proud to present this year's edition, which features themes that range across a vast landscape of historical intrigue—from little-known national movements to the compelling coffeehouse scene.

American author John Jay Chapman once remarked on the study of history: "One of the deepest impulses in man is the impulse to record, to scratch a drawing on a tusk or keep a diary...The enduring value of the past is, one might say, the very basis of civilisation." We stand in awe of the unwavering passion that our contributors have evinced in the name of this noble impulse.

This year, we received an overwhelming number of eminently worthy submissions, each of which demonstrated a drive to comprehend the past and its implications for the present. How we wish we could have published them all!

We extend a heartfelt thank-you to our contributors, editors, and esteemed History professors for your invaluable contributions, and for your dedication to creating this exceptional edition of *Chronos*. We would like to give special thanks to Doctor William Stenhouse for his contribution.

We are confident that the writings presented in *Chronos* 2023 will entertainingly invigorate the reader's appreciation for history's rich tapestry.

Wishing you enjoyable reading,

Ilan Y. Bocian
Editor in Chief

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CHRONOS

“Preach All One Truth”: Religious Persecution Under Mary I and Elizabeth I

Sheindl Berger

In the years after the Protestant Reformation began, religious questions permeated both individual consciences and state politics. Catholics and various Protestant factions competed to guide the souls of as many Europeans as they could convince. Rulers, being responsible for not only themselves but their entire countries, attempted to convert their subjects to whichever form of worship they deemed correct. Religious toleration was difficult to justify when people’s eternal souls were at stake. Generally, Queen Mary I (r. 1553–1558) of England is remembered as “Bloody Mary,” the queen who burned innocent Protestant martyrs and invited Catholic Spain to violate the sovereignty of England. Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558–1603), on the other hand, is recalled as a positive figure who purported to have no interest in the religion of her subjects. When compared, the actual religious policies of these two women are, at times, similar in their treatment of dissidents, differing mainly in context and eventual outcome.

The official Protestant Reformation in England began during the reign of King Henry VIII (r. 1509–1547). He founded the Anglican church in 1534, with himself at its head, during his long battle to divorce his first wife, Catherine of Aragon. However, Henry was not known to truly prefer Protestantism to Catholicism, and any religious reform he implemented was extremely limited and conservative. During the reign of his son, King Edward VI (r. 1547–1553), religious laws were put more in sync with actual Protestant doctrine. The 1552 *Book of Common Prayer* ensured that new English-language rites would be performed in all English churches. In 1553, the Forty-two Articles outlined the country’s new official theology.¹ The contents of the prayer book and Articles implied a preference for Calvinist (or Reformist) beliefs among the dominant ruling elite of Edward’s

¹ Christopher Haigh, *English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society Under the Tudors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 168, <https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.01871>.

reign.² These reforms were unpopular among the common people who missed the familiarity of Latin worship and traditional communal activities, which centered around local churches. During this time, rebels called for a return to certain of Henry VIII's laws, which kept many of the visible aspects of Catholicism intact.³

It was in this atmosphere that Mary ascended to the English throne in July 1553. The first Duke of Northumberland, John Dudley, attempted to proclaim Mary's cousin, Lady Jane Grey, queen instead. Most of the population, though, supported Mary, and she quickly secured the throne. Author Christopher Haigh believes that Mary's Catholicism was one of the major reasons she was attractive to the people. Her reign was expected to bring a return to the old religion, with celebrations of the Mass proliferating as soon as she was established in London.⁴ Historians Robert Tittler and Judith Richards write that "Mary herself assumed that the majority of her subjects were still fundamentally Catholic. In her view, the true Protestants were not only a minority, but were themselves dominated by a hard core of desperate and determined heretics, whom she regarded as 'soul-killers' for the false religion they taught."⁵ The Mass was reinstated by Parliament in October, and the supremacy of the pope was reasserted in November 1554.⁶ England's official religion was Catholicism once again.

On August 18, 1553, only a few weeks after her ascension, the Queen made a proclamation on religion. This document could be interpreted as a statement calling for religious toleration, which Mary felt obligated to make until she was in a better position to enforce Catholicism.

² Haigh, *English Reformations*, 180–181.

³ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 174, 183.

⁴ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 205–206.

⁵ Robert Tittler and Judith Richards, *The Reign of Mary I* (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2014), 32.

⁶ Tittler and Richards, *The Reign of Mary I*, 32–33, 37.

Certainly, it does not legislate on religious belief, yet it is just as hostile to Protestantism. After the Queen makes her personal beliefs clear, the proclamation says,

so doth her highness much desire and would be glad the same were of all her subjects quietly and charitably embraced. And yet she doth signify unto all her majesty's loving subjects that of her most gracious disposition and clemency her highness mindeth not to compel any her said subjects thereunto unto such time as further order by common assent may be taken therein...⁷

When the Queen of England told her subjects that she wished they were Catholics, those who were not could hardly be comfortable, even if she promised not to compel them. Furthermore, this promise would only hold until “common assent” approved of compulsion, which Mary fully expected to happen soon. The Queen additionally prohibited “some evil-disposed persons” (i.e., Protestants) to “interpret or preach any Scriptures,” or “print any books.”⁸ This action outlawed attempts to spread Protestantism and criminalized much of its practice.

The sentence of burning for heresy (Fig. 1) was reinstated in late 1554. The deaths that followed solidified the Queen's legacy in history as “Bloody Mary.” Three hundred and thirteen people were burned from 1555 to 1558, primarily English men and women who refused to conform to Catholicism in practice or declared belief.⁹ Despite the reputation it would receive later as the ultimate expression of Catholic evil and intolerance, at the time, these burnings seemed to inflict on most English people reactions of ambivalence. Few citizens were such ardent Protestants to the extent that they would resist or rebuke official policy. Catholics and those who leaned towards the old religion were concerned about heresy, and capital punishment was the obvious solution.¹⁰ In

⁷ August 18 proclamation, in Tittler and Richards, *Reign of Mary I*, 101.

⁸ August 18 proclamation, in Tittler and Richards, *Reign of Mary I*, 101.

⁹ Tittler and Richards, *Reign of Mary I*, 40.

¹⁰ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 230–234.

sixteenth-century England, executions in and of themselves were nothing to be ashamed of and, indeed, remained popular events, even during this time.¹¹ The powerfully negative status of the Marian burnings came into being because of the memories of radical Protestants who lived through them, especially John Foxe, whose *Acts and Monuments* (known as the *Book of Martyrs*, first published in 1559) enjoyed much prestige as a religious book for Protestants.¹²



Figure 1. An engraving depicting an execution by burning based on John Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*.¹³

About 800 English Reformists (including Foxe) fled abroad during Mary's reign, mainly at the beginning of 1554.¹⁴ These were some of the most extreme believers of Protestantism—they had the most to fear from a regime that had not even begun to burn victims yet—and they held the strongest conviction that living under Catholic rule and the influence of the pope was equivalent

¹¹ Tittler and Richards, *Reign of Mary I*, 41.

¹² Tittler and Richards, *Reign of Mary I*, 40.

¹³ Wood engraving from John Foxe, *Book of Martyrs: A Universal History of Christian Martyrdom* (Philadelphia: Key, Mielke & Biddle, 1832).

¹⁴ Tittler and Richards, *Reign of Mary I*, 42.

to submitting to devilry. The way that these expatriates experienced and responded to the Marian burnings influenced English Protestant self-perception and radicalization. Writings of exiles in Geneva show how martyrdom was worked into the general history of the Reformation. In the words of scholar Jane Dawson,

Since they were fighting as fellow soldiers with the martyrs, the exiles increasingly categorized the tribulations of all English Protestants at home and abroad as different points in a continuum of suffering, stretching from personal disruption to facing the stake. Whilst not undervaluing the blood of the martyrs, every ‘faithful’ Protestant was portrayed as a victim of persecution who was suffering for the gospel.¹⁵

This attitude meant that any ruler who legislated against what these Protestants believed to be the true religion was an evil tyrant, and that it was the responsibility of the faithful to resist and reform.¹⁶ Such a perspective would have consequences for religious conflicts during the rule of Mary’s successor, Queen Elizabeth I.

One of the difficulties with comparing Elizabeth’s reign to Mary’s is the drastic difference in length: Elizabeth’s nearly forty-five years with Mary’s five. This wide span of time allows for far more crises and the development of religion and popular opinion. Another difference is that Mary stood at a defined extreme of the religious spectrum: as a traditional Catholic with a hard stance on heresy. Thus, the people who could be persecuted under her were lumped into one category—Protestants—even if only radicals were affected. Elizabeth sat much closer to the center. She contended with Catholics, on the one hand, and extreme Protestants, or Puritans, on the other. As historian Susan Doran writes, “When Elizabeth came to the throne in November

¹⁵ Jane E. A. Dawson, “‘Satan’s Bludy Clawes’: How Religious Persecution, Exile and Radicalisation Moulded British Protestant Identities,” *Scottish Journal of Theology* 71, no. 3 (September 2018): 271. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930618000327>.

¹⁶ Dawson, “Satan’s Bludy Clawes,” 285.

1558...the religious situation was very difficult and complex. The country was not only divided between Catholics and Protestants, but also the Protestants themselves had different views about the nature and character of a reformed church as a result of the varied experiences of Mary's reign."¹⁷ The Queen's centrism could lend itself to wider toleration as a greater variety of people would find similarities to her. Or, it could mean the opposite: that there was more opportunity for persecution.

Scholars have long speculated and disagreed over Elizabeth's personal religious beliefs.¹⁸ For the purpose of this paper, it is enough to know that she was a Protestant, unacceptable to Catholics, but without the reforming spirit of the Calvinists and the returned Marian exiles. Services were to be in English, she rejected transubstantiation, and she wanted the monarch to once again be Supreme Head of the Church of England.¹⁹ And yet, like her father Henry VIII, she enjoyed the glory and splendor of Catholic accouterments.²⁰ Of course, when speaking of an intelligent and cunning woman, such as Elizabeth I, it can be hard to tell what was true belief and what was political savvy intended to at least be acceptable to both sides. With some difficulty, the Queen achieved most of what she wanted in what is called the "Elizabethan Settlement": Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy were passed by Parliament in 1559, establishing Protestantism in England at the cost of replacing pesky Catholic bishops with radical Protestants, increasing their power and influence.²¹

The Elizabethan Settlement was also based on the Royal Injunctions of 1559 and the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion of 1563. The Act of Uniformity had "imposed compulsory

¹⁷ Susan Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion 1558–1603* (London: Routledge, 2002), 5.

¹⁸ Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 6–7.

¹⁹ Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 7, 10.

²⁰ Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 8.

²¹ Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 10.

attendance at church on Sundays and Holy Days and sanctioned a new Prayer Book, which contained a few changes from its 1552 predecessor...it allowed all types of Protestants to participate in the communion service with a clear conscience.”²² The Royal Injunctions, however, promoted certain traditional practices and accessories that were outrageous to the Reformists.²³ The bishops’ Thirty-Nine Articles subsequently set out to delineate the regime’s official stance on religious beliefs, though they too felt the need to satisfy more moderate Protestants whose theory was sometimes more aligned with Catholicism than their own.²⁴

All of this, then, was unsatisfactory to Reformists who wished the English Church to be fully removed from anything resembling popery. Some of these radicals came to be referred to as “Puritans.” To them, the Prayer Book and its liturgy kept too many hints of the Mass in it, churches and services were not austere enough, and official doctrine was too far removed from Scripture. The Vestments Controversy, which came to a head in 1566, pitted nonconformist ministers against officials, enforcing Elizabeth’s attempts at uniformity around the issue of clerical dress. The nonconformists rejected the fancy and distinct clothing required by the Queen. Such preachers were repressed and removed from their positions. Printing on the arguments was limited. However, there was nothing like the danger seen under Queen Mary, even for the most radical Presbyterians who wanted to change the entire organization of the Church.²⁵ Protestants were executed under Elizabeth’s rule when they wanted to create an entirely new church, which only a handful of very extreme Puritans did.²⁶

²² Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 14–15.

²³ Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 15–16.

²⁴ Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 17–18.

²⁵ For the above paragraph, Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 23–44.

²⁶ Doran, *Elizabeth I and Religion*, 47.

Based on Dawson's article, however, it can be assumed that Reformists felt themselves to be persecuted by the Queen, even as they held power over the country's religious doctrine. A monarch hostile to the "true" interpretation of Christianity was, after all, a tyrant. Puritans and Presbyterians who differed even from mainstream English Calvinism had even more reason to feel this way. By today's standards, they were religiously persecuted, as they were not able to practice their beliefs without fear or repression. However, compared to the bloody religious wars of the rest of contemporary Europe, and what their counterparts had undergone during Mary's rule, they lived a charmed life. In 1585, Elizabeth said to the Archbishop of Canterbury,

Again, you suffer many ministers to preach what they list, and to minister the sacraments according to their own fancies—some one way, some another—to the breach of unity...I wish such men to be brought to conformity and unity, that they minister the sacraments according to the order of this realm and preach all one truth; and that such as be found not worthy to preach, to be compelled to read homilies such as were set forth in our brother King Edward his time and since.²⁷

A policy of conformity does not mesh with complete freedom of practice, but the Queen wanted to educate Protestants until she could cease to persecute them. Since most ordinary people in England at this time held Catholic sympathies, but were generally willing to follow the moderate official religion, this was a perfectly livable situation for most. Haigh summarizes the state of Catholicism during Elizabeth's early reign:

Ten years after its official proscription, English Catholicism was a curious and confused spectrum of attitudes and behaviour...The imprisoned prelates had preserved themselves

²⁷ Elizabeth's speech to bishops and other clergy at Somerset Palace, February 27, 1585, in Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose, eds., *Elizabeth I: Collected Works* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 178.

from schism, but lost the opportunity for Catholic worship and fellowship. Many middle-rank clergy and parish priests had refused the supremacy oath...but all had to be cautious, and could not offend the laymen upon whom they depended. Most parish incumbents had served on, evading the oath if they could and taking it when they must; some said mass in secret...some taught Catholic doctrine...Among the laity a few had been firm recusants from the start...But almost all were ‘church papists’ who conformed sometimes...So there were organized groups of Catholics, with their own priests and mass-centres; there were parish communities who conceded as little as they dared to the heretical times; and there were embattled souls who held to what they could remember of a receding faith.²⁸

Devoted Catholics mostly had little choice other than to outwardly conform. Priests might be deprived of their positions and even imprisoned, but many found ways to perpetuate their religion in secret. As Haigh writes, “But as times changed and generations passed, as memories faded and rosaries were lost, as new ministers cajoled and bishops imposed penances, survivalist Catholicism was diluted by conformity, until...it disappeared completely.”²⁹ And so Elizabeth’s Reformation was more complete and more permanent than any of her predecessors’. Why did this happen for her and not for Mary? The clear answer is placement in time. When Elizabeth died in 1603, it had been nearly seventy years since Henry VIII first broke from Rome. Most of those who remembered the old ways were dead as well, and England simply evolved out of Catholicism. Mary’s five years returned the church to traditional Catholicism, but they could not educate a new generation sufficiently. Another answer is the behavior of the opposition. Under Elizabeth, the large number of English Catholics simply followed the new rules, perhaps hoping that, in time, the queen would

²⁸ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 256–257.

²⁹ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 252.

restore their church.³⁰ The minority of hardline Protestants under Mary left much more of an impact with their displays of faith. Modern thinking would suggest that a third answer is the queen's treatment of dissidents: Mary's violence would only lend sympathy to Protestants and undermine her own cause. However, as written above, executions did not have this effect on anyone not already aligned with Protestantism. Additionally, Elizabeth herself did not always refrain from these methods either.

Nearly two hundred people, mostly priests, were executed after 1577 for crimes related to Catholicism.³¹ Just as determined Protestants had fled to continental Europe during Mary's reign, many conservatives left Elizabeth's England, subsequently training as priests at special academies, particularly at Douai, France. In the 1570s they began to return to England to shore up and minister to the remaining Catholics.³² This was unacceptable to Elizabeth and her government. In 1581, it was made treason to leave the Anglican Church for Rome. In 1585, the priests were banned from entering the country, and again it was made treason to support or patronize them. Executions accelerated with the onset of war with Catholic Spain in 1585 and then slowed again after 1593. Fines meant to enforce church attendance were high, though they were rarely paid.³³ This was a period in which Catholics lived in fear for their lives as well as their immortal souls.

Upon Elizabeth's death in 1603, the English population was reliably Protestant. The small group of Catholics, when they could worship, did so outside of the Church of England. The Elizabethan Reformation was successful and, therefore, retains a more positive legacy than the Marian Restoration. Those who recalled the persecutions of Elizabeth's reign were drowned out by the satisfied majority, or in the case of separatist Puritans, even left the country for the New

³⁰ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 252–253.

³¹ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 263.

³² Haigh, *English Reformations*, 261.

³³ Haigh, *English Reformations*, 263.

World. Mary's persecutions occurred quickly, over a short time, with a series of executions that happened to live on in the memories of those who wrote history. She restricted freedom of practice to those who followed her own religion. Elizabeth's policies allowed more room for interpretation and involved compromise in rituals, which meant that over time, complaints decreased, and people conformed. This was not freedom of practice, nor was she innocent of violent measures, but she had the advantage of a long life, and the executions took place over decades when public opinion was firmly in her camp. Those affected simply did not have the power to keep these memories alive, nor turn the dead into popular martyrs, as John Foxe did. Thus, Bloody Mary lives on in history as a representative of the evils of Catholicism, while Elizabeth will be remembered as the hero of triumphant Protestantism.

Sepúlveda's Misconstructions versus Las Casas' Ignored Rebuttals: The Battle for Spain's Conscience in the New World

Ilan Y. Bocian

I. Introduction

The successful conquest of the Nasrid Kingdom of Granada in 1492 freed Spain from eight-hundred years of Islamic rule, allowing the Spanish Crown to concentrate its efforts and resources on transatlantic exploration and the spread of Christianity.¹ Historian Anthony Pagden maintains that during the conquistadors' conquests in the New World, Habsburg Spain's "principal ideological concern became...its self-appointed role as the guardian of universal Christendom."² In order to uphold this role, it was vital that the Crown be perceived to act, in all circumstances, in strict adherence to Christian ethico-political principles. To that end, Charles V (1500–1558) often consulted advisors on fraught matters related to the policies of the Holy Roman Empire, including those dealing with the colonies abroad. For the first time in history, a powerful nation paid close attention to the characteristics of the peoples whom they encountered, causing new questions to arise that merited careful consideration. Some areas that gave rise to deliberation included the essence of Amerindian man, the capacity of Amerindian man to become a good Christian, the ability of Amerindian man to assimilate into the Spanish kingdom, and the nature of the interaction of the Spanish conquistador and the Other as instantiated in the Amerindian.³ Scholars, ecclesiastics, and philosophers were summoned to join the discussion, and two fronts with diametrically opposed convictions manifested rather quickly. Some denounced what they regarded

¹ "The Conquest of Granada," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, April 27, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Spain/The-conquest-of-Granada>.

² Anthony Pagden, "Dispossessing the Barbarian: The Language of Spanish Thomism and the Debate over the Property Rights of the American Indians," in *Cambridge University Press eBooks* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 79–98, <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511521447.005>.

³ Lewis Hanke, "The Dawn of Conscience in America: Spanish Experiments and Experiences with Indians in the New World," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 107, no. 2 (April 1963): 83–92. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/985435>

as the brutal exploitation of the Amerindians, while others were more preoccupied with the acquisition of wealth, even at the expense of the Amerindians' welfare.

In 1550, Charles V convened a *junta* (administrative council)⁴ of leading theologians, jurists, and officials in Valladolid, the royal capital of Spain. The council heard conflicting arguments posited by two rival men: the Humanist and theologian, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490–1573), and the Dominican friar, Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484–1566) (Fig. 1). Sepúlveda applied the Aristotelian definition of Natural Slavery to the Amerindians and supported their forced conversion to Christianity by way of Augustine of Hippo's (354–430) Just War. Las Casas stood in vehement opposition to these ideas, arguing that "all [violent] conquests [of the Amerindians] must stop if the royal conscience was to be kept unsullied [because such war would be] iniquitous, and contrary to our Christian religion."⁵ In looking at Sepúlveda's position, we will consider his usage of the Aristotelian doctrine of Natural Slavery and Augustine's conception of Just War. We will find that Sepúlveda misconstrued these theoretical treatises in order to advance his own imperious agenda. Finally, we will see how the Valladolid dispute stands as a stark illustration of how the willful distortion of canonical writings can vitiate the social and political responses to alien cultures. We will conclude that such distortion had ramifications that extended far into the future.

⁴ "Definition of Junta," in *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, April 30, 2023, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/junta>.

⁵ Lewis Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern World* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1975), 38–39.




Figure 1. Bartolomé de Las Casas (left) and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (right).⁶

II. The Amerindians as the Other

For eminent historian Tzvetan Todorov (1939–2017), the collision of the Old World and the New World in 1492 was “the most astonishing encounter of our history,”⁷ for it marked the shattering of boundaries of a heretofore known world—in particular, the socially insular and religiously parochial Iberian Peninsula—and the revelation to European society of a larger humanity, rich with an opalescent diversity of culture. Nonetheless, the conquistadors ignored the intriguing constellation of cultures before them and instead saw the ethnic peoples they

⁶ Alejandro Justiparan, “De Las Casas /Sepúlveda: Debate Sobre La Situación De Los Indígenas,” *El Historionauta*, November 1, 2019, <http://www.historionauta.com/2019/11/de-las-casas-sepulveda-debate-sobre-la-situacion-de-los-indigenas/>.

⁷ Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans. Richard Howard (1982; repr., New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), 4.

encountered as “culturally virgin, a blank page awaiting the Spanish and Christian inscription.”⁸ In effect, the conquistadors homogenized the Amerindians as the collectively inferior Other.⁹

The Other is a psychosocial construct that may be defined as “a subject’s condition of non-conformity...[such that he] becomes marginalized [and] alienated.”¹⁰ Todorov defines Others as “outsiders whose languages and customs [one does] not understand, so foreign that in extreme instances [he is] reluctant to admit they belong to the same species as [his] own.”¹¹ Underlying the designation of the Amerindian as Other was the perceived moral superiority of the Christian ethos over the indigenous ethos. Since, at this time, Europe “was a multiple acephalous federation secured by the transcendental authority of Christendom, the hierarchy of Christian/pagan was the most pervasive organizing principle for difference.”¹² (In fact, the term “pagan” is derived from the Latin word, “paganus,” which means “a rustic villager,” thereby imbuing the term with a secular, alien connotation.)¹³ This prejudice solidified the Amerindians’ position at the bottom rung of the Euro-Christian hierarchical social structure and served to sanction their inhumane treatment. Furthermore, if the Other refused, or failed, to accede to the new Christian ethos, the “civilized” felt that they had *carte blanche*, and perhaps the responsibility, to exclude and subjugate the Other.

Still, “the basic humanity—albeit in a ‘barbarous’ form—of the Amerindians was not doubted,”¹⁴ nor was their capacity to eventually adopt the Christian faith and integrate into Spanish

⁸ Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, 35–36.

⁹ Bartolomé De Las Casas, *An Account, Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies, with Related Texts* (Hackett Publishing, 2003).

¹⁰ Alan Bullock and Stephen Trombley, eds., *The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, third ed. (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 620.

¹¹ Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, 3.

¹² David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 115.

¹³ “Pagan | Etymology, Origin and Meaning of Pagan by Etymonline,” Etymonline, last accessed May 3, 2023, <https://www.etymonline.com/word/pagan>.

¹⁴ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 113.

civilization. The Valladolid debate may then be regarded as an effort by the Spanish Crown to understand the Amerindians' Otherness in terms of whether it precluded their ability to become good Christians and civil Spaniards. The Spanish Crown established the New Laws of 1542 to prevent the enslavement of the Amerindians within the *encomienda* system (a form of labor organization that became effectively tantamount to enslavement),¹⁵ in addition to ensuring their merciful treatment, with the aim—or perhaps the ulterior motive—of their conversion to Christianity.¹⁶ For the conquistadors, who had a penchant for violence and a proclivity to visit their primal *machismo* instincts upon the Amerindians, the New Laws sought to halt the self-gratifying savagery of conquest, thereby incensing the conquistadors. Luckily, the conquistadors employed the arguments similar to those of royal historian Sepúlveda in order to rationalize their desire for dominion over the Amerindians, as Sepúlveda was an articulate and persuasive proponent of enslavement, Just War, and forcible conversion.

III. Sepúlveda's View of the Situation Abroad

Sepúlveda's reading of the Amerindian as an abject savage heavily influenced the Spanish Crown's legitimation of the conquistadors' subjugation of the Amerindian Other. Writings such as those of Dominican priest Tomás Ortiz (unknown–1538) to the Council of the Indies promulgated this notion:

On the mainland they eat human flesh. They are more given to sodomy than any other nation. There is no justice among them...They have no respect either for love or for virginity. They are stupid and silly...Most hostile to religion, dishonest, abject, and vile, in their judgements they keep no faith or law...I may therefore affirm that God has never

¹⁵ Ronald W. Batchelder and Nicolas Sanchez, "The Encomienda and the Optimizing Imperialist: An Interpretation of Spanish Imperialism in the Americas," *Public Choice* 156, no. 1–2 (July 1, 2013): 45–60, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9953-9>.

¹⁶ Campbell, *Writing Security*, 113.

created a race more full of vice and composed without the least mixture of kindness or culture.¹⁷

Sepúlveda never set foot in the New World, and thus lacked any first-hand knowledge of even a single Amerindian, let alone any direct observation of their governing structures or cultural practices.¹⁸ And yet, regardless of his suspect evidence, Sepúlveda deigned to write that the Amerindians were prone to “all kinds of passions and abominations...Before the Spanish arrived they waged war among themselves almost constantly...they considered a victory empty if they were not able to satiate their prodigious hunger with the flesh of their enemies...[they] are so cowardly.”¹⁹ Sepúlveda condemned their “incredible sacrifices of human beings, their horrible banquets of human flesh, and their impious worship of idols.”²⁰ Sepúlveda’s description of the Amerindians in such a manner—as the undeniably inferior Other—vivified the arguments that he advanced at Valladolid.

At Valladolid, Sepúlveda employed the arguments delineated in his Latin manuscript, *Democrates secundus, sive de iustis belli causis apud Indios* (c. 1545)²¹ which, according to Pagden, is “the most virulent and uncompromising argument for the inferiority of the [Amerindian] ever written.”²² *Democrates secundus* is a fictional dialogue between an educated Greek named Democrates, who serves as Sepúlveda’s mouthpiece, and an ignorant German pacifist named Leopoldus. Democrates advances four key propositions in favor of Just War against the Amerindians: (1) their status as barbarians, and thus as Natural Slaves; (2) their committing of

¹⁷ Lewis Hanke, *History of Latin American Civilization; Sources and Interpretations* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), 150–151.

¹⁸ Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 48

¹⁹ Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 47.

²⁰ Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 47.

²¹ José A. Fernández-Santamaría, “Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda on the Nature of the American Indians,” *The Americas* 31, no. 4 (April 1, 1975): 434–51, <https://doi.org/10.2307/980012>.

²² Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

crimes against Natural Law; (3) the necessity for humanitarian intervention in light of the widespread practice of human sacrifice and cannibalism; and (4) their position as infidels in urgent need of instruction in the Christian faith.^{23,24} Sepúlveda was a Renaissance humanist schooled in the classical antiquities, permitting him to claim that his ideas were couched in the logical reasoning of his ancient intellectual forebears: Augustine, Aquinas, Ulpianus and, most importantly, Aristotle. None of Sepúlveda's ideas, nor those of any of his contemporary ideological counterparts, for that matter, had ramifications more serious than his attempts to apply the Aristotelian concept of Natural Slavery to the Amerindians.

IV. Sepúlveda's Misrepresentation of Aristotle

Renaissance Europe was wholly enamored of Aristotle. In the words of Aristotelian scholar, Jonathan Barnes, "an account of Aristotle's intellectual afterlife would be little less than a history of European thought."²⁵ Sepúlveda maintained that Aristotelian philosophy was a natural science that informed "all the activities of the human life, including politics, law, and the moral principles that God implanted in the mind of all men as a reflection of His eternal law."²⁶ It is within Aristotle's philosophy that lies the crux of Sepúlveda's primary argument: that Amerindians are Natural Slaves, the Spanish Christians are Natural Masters, and the enslavement of the Amerindians is, therefore, fully justified. The main thrust of Sepúlveda's calling for a Just War against the Amerindians follows from his distortion of the Aristotelian doctrine of Natural Slavery.

²³ "Juan Ginés De Sepúlveda: Democrates Secundus. Zweiter Demokrates." Frommann Holzboog, last accessed May 3, 2023, <https://www.frommann-holzboog.de/reihen/78/781/781001110?lang=en-gb>

²⁴ Bonar Ludwig Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy: 1550–1551* (San Francisco: San Francisco State University Press, 2001), 99.

²⁵ Jonathan Barnes, *Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

²⁶ Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, *Epistolario de Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda*, trans. Angel Losada (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1966), 234.

In essence, Aristotle’s deterministic concept of Natural Slavery, as presented in Book I of his *Politics* (350 BCE), is that nature predestines one sector of humanity to be enslaved, while the other sector is destined for freedom. Moreover, if a person is a slave by nature, then it is actually to his benefit to be enslaved, as he may have no capacity to be anything else.²⁷ In the words of Sepúlveda, “what greater benefit and advantage could befall those barbarians than their submission to rule of those who with their prudence, virtue, and religion have converted them from barbarians and barely men into humans and civilized men to the extent that they can be?”²⁸ With such logic, a slave’s freedom might present a crucial problem, as he would either fall into a life even more abject than slavery, or return to enslavement of his own volition.

On what grounds, however, could one justify the enslavement of certain peoples and not of others? One position holds that the virtuous person should not be enslaved, while the vicious person should. A second position holds that the rational part of the slave’s mind is either underdeveloped or entirely undeveloped.²⁹ While the slave’s perceptiveness is developed at least to the extent that he can obey the rational commands of others, his mind is not developed to the extent that he can avoid worsening his own life and the lives of those in his midst.³⁰ Thus, for the Natural Slave, who has not developed rational capacities, it is to his advantage to be ruled and to relinquish decision-making vis-à-vis his time, his earnings, his ability to move from place to place, and even his own sexuality. Importantly, however, there cannot be a Natural Slave without a Natural Master—one who is fully rational, self-controlled, and possessed of moral virtue.

²⁷ Wayne Ambler, “Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery,” *Political Theory* 15, no. 3 (August 1987): 390–410. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591787015003007>

²⁸ Daniel R. Brunstetter, “Sepúlveda, Las Casas, and the Other: Exploring the Tension between Moral Universalism and Alterity,” *The Review of Politics* 72, no. 3 (September 2010): 418. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670510000306>.

²⁹ Gregory B. Sadler, “Aristotle, Politics Book 1 | Natural and Unnatural Slavery | Philosophy Core Concepts.” YouTube, September 11, 2018, educational video, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nIObYIJVwS8>.

³⁰ Sadler, “Aristotle, Politics Book 1”

V. Sepúlveda's Misappropriation of Augustine

Sepúlveda held that there is no basis for reasoning with the irrational mind of the Natural Slave, and thus the only way to Christianize those who refuse to accept Spanish hegemony is through warfare. In Sepúlveda's words, "those whose natural condition commands that they obey others, shall be subdued by force of arms should they refuse the latter's *imperium*, and should no other recourse be left."³¹ In service to this view, Sepúlveda misappropriated Augustine's Just War theory. Augustine abhorred war, yet believed that war could be justified in its opposition to evil that is insurmountable by other means.³² To limit their brutality and number, Augustine formulated a set of criteria to assess the morality of wars. In the section of Augustine's theory entitled *Jus Ad Bellum* ("Ethics of Declaring War"), the *casus belli* must be just, demonstrating that Augustine had a "deep sense of the wrongs of the conquered...deplored the miseries attendant upon warfare, and condemned outright any war for the extension of empire or the satisfaction of the lust for power."³³

Sepúlveda advocated war against the Amerindians on grounds that blatantly violate Augustine's criterion of *just cause*. First, the *raison d'être* of those who fought just wars was to resist aggression, free victims of oppression, or protect innocents. It was, ironically, the Spanish who posed a threat of aggression to the Amerindians, and not the converse. Second, Sepúlveda sidestepped the high probability that Spanish warriors would abjure Augustine's call for *right intention*, as the Spanish conquistadors were notorious for their lust for power, violence, and pursuit of material wealth. In the words of historian Lewis Hanke, Sepúlveda felt that the "war

³¹ Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, *Democrates Alter*, ed. and trans. A. Losada (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1947), 19, 22.

³² Roger Dawson, "Just War Theory," *Thinking Faith*, October 11, 2013, https://www.thinkingfaith.org/articles/20131011_2.htm.

³³ Stanley Windass, "Saint Augustine and the Just War," *Blackfriars* 43, no. 509 (November 1962): 460–68. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-2005.1962.tb00863.x>

against the barbarians will be just, even though the individual soldiers or leaders may be moved by greed, and booty they win.”³⁴ Third, Sepúlveda advocated war as a precondition for Christianization, which transgresses Augustine’s standard of *last resort*, after nonviolent approaches have failed.

VI. Las Casas’ Rebuttal to Sepúlveda

Las Casas dismantled Sepúlveda’s arguments point-by-point in his *Apologia*, written in direct opposition to Sepúlveda’s “shaky theological propositions” propounded in *Democrates secundus*.³⁵ Using theological and philosophical texts, *Apologia* defends the Amerindians in the face of Sepúlveda’s call for war and subjugation.

First, Las Casas countered the notion that the Amerindians were irrational barbarians—the foundational premise for Sepúlveda’s argument that the Amerindians are Natural Slaves—by declaring that they lived in peaceful, advanced communities governed by scrupulous laws comparable to those of the ancient Greeks and Romans.³⁶ Las Casas extolled the Amerindians’ intricate and beautiful languages.³⁷ While Sepúlveda had written that the Amerindians “are inferior to the Spaniards just as children are to adults, women to men, and, indeed, one might even say, as apes are to men,”³⁸ Las Casas held that the Amerindians were rational men, and “not demented or mistakes of nature, nor lacking in sufficient reason to govern themselves,”³⁹ a rebuttal that negated the Natural-Slave conception as it related to the Amerindians.

Second, Las Casas opposed the notion that Spain should punish the Amerindians for their crimes against Natural Law— namely, sodomy, idolatry, and cannibalism—by maintaining that

³⁴ Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 63.

³⁵ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 99

³⁶ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 100.

³⁷ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 100.

³⁸ Sepúlveda, *Democrates Alter*.

³⁹ Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 17.

such punishment required jurisdiction possessed by neither Pope Paul III (1468–1549) nor King Charles V.⁴⁰ Christian monarchs could not punish those living outside of their territories, and Christian rulers only had the right to punish heretics, but not mere pagans.⁴¹ Indeed, the Amerindians were pagans but not heretics, which they would have been branded had they repudiated Christianity after having been schooled in it.⁴²

Third, Las Casas opposed the idea that wars would, in the words of Sepúlveda, “save many innocents, whom [the Amerindians] immolate every year, from great injustices.”⁴³ Since Las Casas could not defend human sacrifice, nor deny the prime importance of preventing the deaths of innocents, he cited Church Fathers Augustine and John Chrysostom, both of whom condemned the use of force to punish crimes against nature.⁴⁴ Las Casas saw the Amerindians as an evolving race who needed to be brought to Christianity and a more civilized existence through kindness, not with force.

Fourth, Las Casas contested Sepúlveda’s notion of war as a means by which Spain could prime the Amerindians to readily accept Christianity. Sepúlveda cited as proof multiple stories of the Hebrew Bible: the flood; the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah; the instruction by God to destroy the Canaanites, Amorites, and Perizzites; and Mattathias’ slaughtering of the man who approached the altar to worship false idols.⁴⁵ Las Casas countered this argument by explaining that the Bible could be interpreted in an unlimited number of ways, and thus Sepúlveda’s attempted proofs were not dispositive. Las Casas again distinguished between pagans and heretics, explaining that the Amerindians were pagans, and therefore should not be violently punished, but

⁴⁰ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 100.

⁴¹ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 100.

⁴² Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 100.

⁴³ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 100.

⁴⁴ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 100.

⁴⁵ Hernandez, *The Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy*, 103–105.

peacefully converted. Las Casas' counterpoints are all the more convincing when one considers that Sepúlveda had never crossed the Atlantic, let alone resided in the New World for tens of years as did his archrival Las Casas, who wrote that "God had deprived [Sepúlveda] of any knowledge of the New World."⁴⁶ Ultimately, Las Casas's arguments failed to receive enough acceptance to influence the cruel *modus operandi* of the Spanish conquistadors. History proved itself to favor Sepúlveda's aggressive approaches, consequences of which we still observe today.

VII. Conclusion

The ironic denouement of the Valladolid debate is that no moral triumph materialized. While Las Casas presented powerful arguments in defense of the Amerindians, the subsequent actions of the conquistadors, who resorted to brutality in their pursuit of wealth and power, overshadowed Las Casas' pronouncements. The tragic destruction wrought by the conquest of the Americas became a reality that eclipsed the abstract debates of the Valladolid conference. Las Casas' arguments have faded into the recesses of history. By contrast, Sepúlveda's willful and opportunistic distortion of the canonical writings of philosophers long venerated by Europe withstood the test of time: five centuries of maltreatment of the Amerindians have stood as a woeful testament to Sepúlveda's *de facto* victory at Valladolid.

⁴⁶ Hanke, *Aristotle and the American Indians*, 48.

Aspects of Maimonides' Historiography

Chaim Book

I. Introduction

Moses ben Maimon (1138–1204), commonly known as Maimonides, or Rambam, was one of the most prominent and influential medieval Torah scholars (Fig. 1). Born in Córdoba, he worked in Morocco and later in Egypt as a preeminent astronomer, ethicist, philosopher, halakhist, Talmudist, community leader and physician, serving as the personal medical doctor of Saladin. Maimonides' writings are systematic and contain a wealth of information on almost every topic. His major works include the *Commentary on the Mishnah*, medical guidebooks, ethical treatises, his profound work of philosophy, *The Guide for the Perplexed (Moreh Nevuchim)*, and his magnum opus: the almost canonical fourteen-volume *Mishneh Torah* which organized all of the Jewish tradition for the first time. His work received wide acclaim, bringing him letters from international Jewish communities; his collection of responsa, in addition to his original texts, shed fascinating light on his personal perspective, theology and halakhic thought.




Figure 1. Medallion depicting Moses Maimonides.¹

¹ Maimonides medallion, photo by T. Horydczak, approx. 1950, sculpture over the door of the gallery of House chamber, U.S. Capitol; retrieved from Amymcools, "Happy Birthday, Moses Maimonides!," Ordinary Philosophy, March 22, 2018, <https://ordinaryphilosophy.com/2018/03/30/happy-birthday-moses-maimonides-2/>.

II. Maimonides' Sources and "Sense of History"

For a man who was so intellectually broad and who was "able to learn the truth from anyone who said it,"² it is surprising that Maimonides dismissed the value of historical writings several times. In his discussion on the principles of Jewish faith, found in his *Commentary on the Mishnah*, he compared heretical works to books, "such as those found among the Arabs: books of chronicles, on the government of kings, genealogies of the Arabs, and books of songs, and similar books which have no wisdom and material purpose, but are only a waste of time."³ The *Commentary on the Mishnah* was his first work, but he seems to have consistently maintained this viewpoint throughout his life. At the outset of *The Guide for the Perplexed*, the reader is cautioned not to read the Bible (and in subtle reference to *The Guide*) "as you would glance through a historical work or a piece of poetry."⁴

This defiant marginalization of medieval Arabic historiography provoked the great twentieth-century Jewish historian Salo Baron to declare, "Whatever the reasons, Maimonides undoubtedly was consciously 'unhistorical.'"⁵ Baron was equally uninspired by Maimonides' Theory of Accommodation that contextualizes the biblical law as "a set of rational polemics against an improbably described near-universal pagan culture."⁶ He agreed with his nineteenth-century predecessor, Heinrich Graetz, that such a theory can be characterized as "flat."⁷ Ultimately, however, Baron was able to reconstruct an entire systematic history from the Maimonidean corpus,

² Joseph I. Gorfinkle, "Introduction," in *The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics - Shemonah Perakim: A Psychological and Ethical Treatise*, by Moses Maimonides (Ishi Press International, 1966).

³ Rambam, *Ramban on Mishnah Sanhedrin*, trans. Sefaria Community Translation (Sefaria, n.d.), 10:1.

⁴ Moses Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, trans. M. Friedlander (Sefaria, 1901), part 1, chapter 2.

⁵ Salo W. Baron, "The Historical Outlook of Maimonides," *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 6 (1934-1935), 11, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3622274>.

⁶ Abraham P. Socher, "Of Divine Cunning and Prolonged Madness: Amos Funkenstein on Maimonides' Historical Reasoning," *Jewish Social Studies* 6, no. 1 (1999): 9, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4467564>.

⁷ Socher, "Of Divine Cunning and Prolonged Madness," 9.

although he concluded that such a “historical outlook,” was unoriginal and merely represented the traditional knowledge of “a twelfth-century educated Jew.”⁸

Appreciation of Maimonides’ use of historical materials can help reveal his overall evaluation of the field of history. If he engaged in historical works, he must have found some use for them. The bulk of his historical material comes from his selections and interpretations of the Bible, Talmud, Midrash, and traditional Jewish sources. Maimonides primarily used Judaic texts as his historical sources, yet he also placed value on science—among other subjects independent of the Jewish tradition. According to Kenneth Seeskin, “though [Maimonides] is prepared to reject anything that contradicts established scientific results, historical legends such as those dealing with Abraham’s discovery of monotheism rarely do. And since many of those legends support Maimonides’ own convictions, he has no reason not to take them at their word.”⁹

Maimonides additionally gives a high level of credence to human rationality in his evaluation of history. When offering a reason for his claim that Adam received the six commandments from God, his support “is that human reason approves of them and such a reading is evident from ‘the general tenor of the Scriptures’”¹⁰

Maimonides was an “omnivorous reader, a master of bookish learning endowed with an extraordinary memory and uncanny knack for learned syncretism or synthesis.”¹¹ In a letter to the rabbis of Provence, he writes, “I have also read on the subject idolatry; it seems to me that there has not remained a work this topic written in Arabic [or] translated from other language which I

⁸ Baron, “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides,” 7.

⁹ Kenneth Seeskin, “Maimonides’ Sense of History,” *Jewish History* 18, no. 2/3 (2004): 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20100932>

¹⁰ Seeskin, “Maimonides’ Sense of History,” 3.

¹¹ Isadore Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides: (Mishneh Torah)* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 51.

have not read, examined its contents and grasped its full meaning.”¹² In *The Guide*, he wrote that “the meaning of many of the laws became clear to me and their causes became known to me through my study of the doctrines, opinions, practices, and cult of the Sabians”¹³

Baron is under the impression that Maimonides “does not seem to have this literature very critically and most of his assumptions seem to be based upon spurious or otherwise unreliable writings.”¹⁴ For example, the cult of the Sabians, which Maimonides considered a polytheistic universal community, was actually a small remnant of a gnostic sect of the second or third century A.D.¹⁵ The work from which Maimonides learned of the Sabians is *Nabatean Agriculture*, a tenth-century text by Ibn Wahshiyya. In his systematic fashion, Maimonides organized a full theory concerning the origin of paganism, which he repeated in various formulations throughout his writings.

The theory that Maimonides proposed was that idolatry began as an “intellectual lapse,”¹⁶ when people thought that God can be worshiped through images. Schwartz and Schlossberg inconclusively trace this to a similar conception utilized by Abd al-Djabbar, an earlier contemporary Muslim theologian. They concede that even if this was not the direct source, it illuminates the “twelfth-century cultural and religious climate that promoted rejection of image worship”¹⁷ from which Maimonides may have been influenced by.

Nonetheless, as Alex Jassen conclusively demonstrates, the bulk of his historical material was from careful selection of the traditional rabbinic sources. Moreover, even when outlining

¹² Alex P. Jassen, “Reading Midrash with Maimonides: An Inquiry into the Sources of Maimonides’ Account of the Origins of Idolatry,” *Australian Journal of Jewish Studies* 21 (2007): 176; Baron, “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides,” 14.

¹³ Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, part 3, chapter 29.

¹⁴ Baron, “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides,” 14.

¹⁵ Amos Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History* (University of California Press, 1993), 144.

¹⁶ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 225.

¹⁷ Jassen, “Reading Midrash with Maimonides,” 178.

aspects of his Theory of Accommodation, Maimonides is not afraid to admit his secondhand knowledge of the ancient pagan customs, which he thought could clarify the polemical role of the commandments.¹⁸ Even though he placed stronger emphasis and value on Judaic texts, and spent less time delving into other historical references, it is indisputable that there was some sort of general purpose for history, which Maimonides pursued throughout his writings.

III. Theology and History: Avoiding Anachronisms

When analyzing the historical perception of Maimonides, there are a few questions that must be considered. First, we need to take care to avoid anachronisms. Today's modern rigorous academic field of history is not how it was in Maimonides' time. Aristotle, who perhaps held the greatest influence on Maimonides, did not write any histories. Instead, he speaks of the study of history as inferior: "Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular."¹⁹ Even Baron agreed that it would be "wholly presumptuous to judge the amount of knowledge of any medieval writer from the point of vantage of modern historical scholarship based upon centuries of untiring critical research and the application of historical methods unknown to the medieval mind."²⁰

As we will examine in depth shortly, Kenneth Seeskin posits that Maimonides held a strong commitment to the stability of human nature. Similar conceptions of human nature can be found in early historians such as Thucydides, who wrote that the

absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it

¹⁸ Seeskin, "Maimonides' Sense of History," 7.

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. S. H. Butcher (Project Gutenberg, 2013), chapter IX.

²⁰ Baron, "The Historical Outlook of Maimonides," 5.

does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time.²¹

Having an “appreciation for human action in time is not the same as believing that our conception of this course of action alters our conception of what it means to be a human being.”²² Instead, “it would be better to say that what Maimonides lacked is not a sense of history but the sense of history that measures change in terms of conceptual revolution.”²³ Medieval people, like Maimonides, had a conception of how the world and humans worked, in addition to projecting that worldview as a universal truth that always applied to the past, present, and future. Although the above perspective does not fully explain why Maimonides felt the leeway to entirely construct his own version of historical facts, and contains other difficulties that will be outlined below, it does highlight the critical recognition that Maimonides’ approach to history differed significantly from that of other scholars of his era.

Not only did Maimonides differ in his evaluation of history from contemporary scholars, he also diverged from ancient historians. Thucydides and thinkers like him had more evidence at their disposal and approached history in a more critical fashion than did Maimonides. For Maimonides, “rather than a secular study of human motivation, he views history as a religious narrative that moves from oppression to eventual redemption.”²⁴ Maimonides was not trying to study history in order to learn what it means to be human. Rather, he studied the subject to enrich his religious life. For the most part, history and theology were not viewed as distinctly separate fields until the nineteenth century. To gain a better understanding of Maimonides’ purpose in

²¹ Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (Project Gutenberg, 2021), Book I, Chapter I.

²² Seeskin, “Maimonides’ Sense of History,” 137.

²³ Seeskin, “Maimonides’ Sense of History,” 137.

²⁴ Seeskin, “Maimonides’ Sense of History,” 137.

analyzing history, it is essential to examine his theological beliefs. Maimonides primarily thought of himself as a theologian. Much of what we would consider a historical outlook and historiography would actually fall under his categories of theology. As Seeskin points out,

the focal point of Maimonides' view of history—or, to put it more precisely, of the past and of possible links between past events—is the fate of the Jewish people...Overall Maimonides sees history, the past, sacrally, as was the medieval wont. It is the story of how a small nation entrusted with a sacred doctrine struggled to survive in a hostile world, a history, therefore, of abiding (sacral) verities.²⁵

Shubert Spero, a religious Maimonides scholar, also has trouble with saying that Maimonides lacked a sense of history: “For, if we are correct that the concept of history is central to Judaism, then it would appear that Maimonides and perhaps most of medieval Jewish thought badly misunderstood the biblical and rabbinic heritage!”²⁶ Spero notes that, to understand Maimonides, we must comprehend “not only the basic assumptions of Scholastic and neo-Aristotelian philosophy, but also the main thrusts of the biblical and rabbinic tradition,”²⁷ which “almost compel its explicators to deal with history at various points.”²⁸ Thus, we need to consider to what extent Maimonides values and utilizes history from a theological standpoint.

Salo Baron traces Maimonides' conception of history from the periods covered by the Bible and the Talmud as they closely coincide with the traditional Rabbinic view, noting that “Maimonides has little to say about the five centuries from the rise of Mohammed to his own birth.”²⁹ Any attempt to discover how Maimonides viewed his own times, future times, and

²⁵ Seeskin, “Maimonides' Sense of History,” 132.

²⁶ Shubert Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” *Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought* 24, no. 2 (1989): 128, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23260740>.

²⁷ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 128.

²⁸ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 128.

²⁹ Baron, “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides,” 82.

history's continual importance can only be accomplished with an understanding of his overarching theology.

There are a few applications where Maimonides employs history for theological purposes. These examples prove his primary need for historical study as only to better his theological pursuits. Maimonides introduces his major work on the halakhah, the *Mishneh Torah*, with a historical chronology of the transmission of the Torah tradition. He organizes the development of the tradition up to his time by listing the forty generations from Moses to R. Ashi (to whom he attributes with the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud). This historical documentation clearly is motivated by theological persuasion and serves as his religious authoritative affirmation. With this account, he hopes to ensure that people realize the validity of his halakhic and traditional authority in his revolutionary enterprise. Maimonides was attempting to replace the necessity of all other traditional Jewish works:

That a person will not need another text at all with regard to any Jewish law. Rather, this text will be a compilation of the entire Oral Law, including also the ordinances, customs, and decrees that were enacted from the time of Moses, our teacher, until the completion of the Talmud, as were explained by the Geonim in the texts they composed after the Talmud.³⁰

Additionally, as Baron notes,³¹ Maimonides divides the transmission of the Jewish tradition through forty generations in “two or four periods of almost equal duration.” He divides history into religious categories rather than as pure chronology. This fits into Maimonides’ general outlook

³⁰ Moses Maimonides, “Introduction to Mishneh Torah,” trans. Eliyahu Touger, Chabad, accessed May 5, 2023, https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/901656/jewish/Introduction-to-Mishneh-Torah.htm.

³¹ Baron, “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides,” 113.

of consistent thinking and reflects a perception of “the meaningful guidance of human and Jewish destinies by the Creator of all.”³²

In addition to his use of history for personal credentials and general context, Maimonides utilizes history for halakhic issues themselves. Most of the halakhic problems he discusses are dependent upon historic elucidation—such as the calculation of the sabbatical (*shemittah*) years, the events surrounding Hanukkah, idolatry, marriage, prayer and the special rabbinic enactments of the Second Temple period.

Another task that turned Maimonides’ attention to history was his method of researching the reasons for the commandments (*Taamei Hamitzvot*). He was convinced that the institution of the various commandments was a monotheistic variation of pagan practices.

We will attempt to probe the extent to which Maimonides viewed the world, human action, and history as predetermined. History would be particularly meaningful if every event is a direct production of Divine Will. We also need to discuss Maimonides’ eschatological vision for the world and how that would factor into determining any meaning for the history of the world. If human action contributes to an eschatological progression, then understanding history and human nature will clarify what methods are effective and what actions still need to be taken. Similarly, if reward and punishment can be readily discerned in this world, understanding history can be useful in clarifying the correctness, or incorrectness, of human actions. Finally, a theology of miracles is necessary for attributing significance to irregularities of history. These theological issues highlight the blurring of the lines between history and theology, and they undermine the rigidity of the accusation on Maimonides’ lack of historical consciousness.

³² Baron, “The Historical Outlook of Maimonides,” 113.

Many thinkers came to the realization that the most creative medieval historical thought might be found outside the genre of historiography.³³ Interestingly, in response to a discussion about the theologian Hugh of St. Victor (Maimonides' Christian contemporary), Medieval-English Historian R. W. Southern expressed a similar viewpoint: "His historical thoughts came to him not through writing history but through writing theology and biblical commentaries."³⁴ For Maimonides specifically, however, it is even more complex: to arrive at a reductionist understanding of his ambitions is to cheapen his brilliance and his multilayered objectives. As Doctor Isadore Twersky writes, Maimonides presents himself

not only as a jurist or legalist but also as a theologian describing the triumphal age of theological fulfillment, a physician suggesting a regimen of health, a moralist defining the golden mean and its exceptions, a philosopher outlining principles of metaphysics and natural science, a jurisprudent seeking the rationale of the commandments, and in many other ways.³⁵

Despite this, we will attempt to outline a perspective on these ideas and how they relate to his overarching view of history.

IV. The Eschatology of Maimonides: Realistic Utopianism

It is clear that Maimonides provides a great deal of latitude to human action and free will in a world which is largely undetermined. In the second part of *The Guide*, Maimonides develops a unique philosophy of science. According to Funkenstein's understanding,³⁶ the laws of nature are not completely determined, even in God's mind. Every law of nature, by definition, must contain an element of indeterminacy. While there may be a purpose of the universe, it does not

³³ Socher, "Of Divine Cunning and Prolonged Madness," 25.

³⁴ Socher, "Of Divine Cunning and Prolonged Madness," 25.

³⁵ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 228.

³⁶ Funkenstein notes that Maimonides does not say so explicitly.

govern the particulars. This understanding allows for miraculous acts of divine providence. As Funkenstein explains, “miracles are mostly, but not always, taken from the reservoir of the remainder of contingency on all levels of nature.”³⁷ These are dubbed “miracles in the category of the possible.”³⁸

Maimonides placed heavy emphasis on humanity’s free will. To quote Spero, “Maimonides’ understanding of Providence or God’s involvement in human history derives essentially from his deep conviction that man’s uniqueness resides in his capacity to make free moral choices, a gift from God which He is not about to rescind or compromise.”³⁹

The fact that Maimonides does not accept a deterministic and providential worldview would explain why he believes that history should serve little theological purpose. Yet, despite this naturalistic approach to the world, Maimonides still believed in the coming of the End of Days. This belief should ostensibly contribute a theological purpose to the world’s proceedings.

There are two perspectives on Maimonides’ eschatological vision that have bearing on how history is interpreted. The first view was most famously suggested by Gershom Scholem and continued by Kenneth Seeskin and Menachem Kellner. According to this view, Maimonides views history and the nature of man as unchanging, even with the coming of the Messiah. The Torah, and the monotheism it projects, are universal truths that will be unaffected by the coming of the Messiah. The Jewish tradition has much mixed evidence on the End of Days. Maimonides certainly believed that the Messiah would come. However, as Spero notes,

With the same boldness with which Maimonides decided between conflicting views of talmudic rabbis in Halakhah, so did he carefully select from the variety of different

³⁷ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 141.

³⁸ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 141.

³⁹ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 129.

teachings on the redemption, a very clear approach, consistent with his basic philosophic outlook on the nature of God and destiny of man, as well as with the stated eschatological promises of the Torah.⁴⁰

Maimonides depicts a realistic utopia in which sovereignty will return to Israel under the rule of a Torah observant king. The Messiah will influence both gentiles and Jews to accept the truth of monotheism and see the foolishness of their ways. In those eschatological days, there will be no war or famine so that people can devote themselves to philosophical study and the worship of God. Yet, as Scholem explains, the dawn of the Messiah will not be apocalyptic. There will still be class distinctions and natural cycles of birth and death—even for the Messiah. “And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb” is simply an allegory.⁴¹ In Maimonides’ words: “Do not presume that in the Messianic age any facet of the world’s nature will change or there will be innovations in the work of creation. Rather, the world will continue according to its pattern.”⁴² In sum, as Scholem says, the changes wrought by the Messiah will be mainly restorative: prophecy, sovereignty, and the persistent unchanging laws of the Torah will be reinstated. According to Seeskin, this is based on Maimonides’ read of Ecclesiastes 3:14: “Whatever God does lasts forever.” For Maimonides, the world is a reflection of the wisdom of God and “any change in the natural order would be evidence of the imperfection of the creator.”⁴³ Seeskin summarizes:

Maimonides is open to the possibility of temporal change as long as it is political rather than conceptual. While the Messiah will improve the quality of life, he will not introduce new ways of looking at it. On the contrary, the standards for separating truth from error,

⁴⁰ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 134.

⁴¹ Isaiah, 11:6.

⁴² Moses Maimonides, *Mishneh Torah, Kings and Wars*, trans. Eliyahu Touger (New York City: Moznaim Publishing), 12:1.

⁴³ Seeskin, “Maimonides’ Sense of History,” 135.

justice from criminality, and the sacred from the profane will be the same as those employed in ancient times.⁴⁴

Maimonides did not believe in a Hegelian dialectic in which God becomes revealed with increasing clarity as history progresses. There is no development that would make the study of earlier history a theological study on the progress of Divine understanding; the world is static and unchanging, as God does not become more revealed through history. There is no objectively better future than the present. As Seeskin passionately writes:

We desperately want him to say that while Abraham started a tradition that we carry on, it is a mistake to search for a fixed set of beliefs that we share with him. Instead we get the articles of faith set forth in Perek Helek. Even if we were to eliminate those dealing with Moses or the Torah, how many can we ascribe to the patriarchs with any degree of certainty? How many can we ascribe to ourselves in an age when modern scholarship makes a powerful case for multiple authorship and no case for Abraham, Moses, or an Exodus from Egypt?⁴⁵

Moreover, with this restorative conception of the Messiah, human action cannot have any immediate effect on bringing the eschaton to the physical world. Scholem describes:

Maimonides nowhere recognizes a causal relationship between the coming of the Messiah and human conduct...Man is in principle completely capable of mastering his task and thereby mastering his future—in contrast to the apocalyptists who do not attribute this ability to man. The anti-apocalyptic vision of Maimonides says only that the Messianic age

⁴⁴ Seeskin, "Maimonides' Sense of History," 135.

⁴⁵ Seeskin, "Maimonides' Sense of History," 141.

will strengthen man's capability by favorable conditions of universal peace and universal happiness, but not that it will make possible that capability for the first time.⁴⁶

This static view of history presents difficulties. When explaining the reason for the exile and punishment, Kellner argues that Maimonides' opinion is remarkable because he does not say that Israel was punished for their sins by God.⁴⁷ Rather, for Maimonides, sin allows for natural defeat to take its course, but is not the direct cause of the retribution. These questions are so strong that they lead Seeskin to develop an important rule that would shed light on Maimonides' fierce opposition to the study of history. "I suggest that when Maimonides asked himself this question, he had no answer except to say that we cannot fathom the will of God."⁴⁸ In his famous Letter on Astrology, Maimonides quotes the verse in Isaiah "For My plans are not your plans, Nor are My ways your ways."⁴⁹ The feeble mind of man cannot make the audacious presumption that he is able to discern the ways of God.

As dramatic as that declaration may sound, it accounts for Maimonides' acclaimed disregard for the study of history and for his remarkable silence about the interval between Muhammad and Maimonides' own time. Maimonides could not use the past to prove right and wrong and explain the will of God. Seeskin says, "That is why even if he had more evidence and more rigorous methods, Maimonides still would not have regarded the study of the past as a science." His letter to the Jews of Yemen, who were in a crisis of persecution, was only able to offer hope and comfort, but could not place any reason into the hand of God. The possibilities of

⁴⁶ Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality* (New York City: Random House USA, 1995), 114

⁴⁷ Menachem Marc Kellner, *Maimonides on the "Decline of the Generations" and the Nature of Rabbinic Authority* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2012), 50.

⁴⁸ Seeskin, "Maimonides' Sense of History," 142.

⁴⁹ Isaiah, 55:8

natural contingencies are great and the only thing worth our study would be the unchanging truths of monotheism and the laws which instill them.

Tzvi Langerman analyzes this view of Maimonides' historiosophy as well, and he discovers it in an understudied portion of Maimonides' work. At the end of his analysis, he describes a lecture he heard from Professor Isadore Twersky which underscores this theme.

I left the lecture with a feeling of unease; my impression was that the entire lecture consisted of Professor Twersky citing again and again the verse from Is. 55:8, "Just as the heavens are high above the earth, so also are My ways high above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts." This is the verse cited by Maimonides in the long excursus cited earlier. I now realize that that verse sums up as nicely as anything Maimonides' historiosophy.⁵⁰

V. Maimonides' Theory of Accommodation and the "Activistic" Utopia

There is another approach to Maimonides' eschatology that has implications for understanding his approach to history. Funkenstein takes a controversial methodological approach to arrive at an eschatological understanding: "We face ambiguity in Maimonides's messianic images. But we ought to study them within the context of his social theories as a whole."⁵¹ Following a similar approach, Spero posits that Maimonides finds a purpose to the study of history, which is based on an eschatological conception that is "realistic, activistic, and relates the processes within history to the restorative and utopian conditions which will appear at its 'end.'"⁵²

Unlike Scholem, this approach develops an objective progression to history which can be accelerated through the actions of man. To understand this approach, we must delve into

⁵⁰ Y. Tzvi Langerman, "Aspects of Maimonides' Historiosophy," *The Torah U-Madda Journal* 18 (2020–2021): 113.

⁵¹ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 137.

⁵² Spero, "Maimonides and the Sense of History," 129.

Maimonides' most famous use of socio-history, which is in his development of his Theory of Accommodation. In what Funkenstein calls a "methodological breakthrough" of historiography,⁵³ Maimonides felt it important to understand the original Near Eastern context of the traditional precepts and commandments. This is based on the idea that God's historical aspirations are altered to fit the psychological conditions of the people of the time.

Based on an "examination of nature and Torah,"⁵⁴ Maimonides concludes that God's providential aspirations work through a "successive and gradual development."⁵⁵ Man cannot "go suddenly from one extreme to the other,"⁵⁶ or "suddenly to discontinue that to which he has been accustomed."⁵⁷ Therefore, "the cunning of God" did not create a completely new form of worship,⁵⁸ but simply adapted His service to the customary forms of Temple, animal sacrifice, incense, fasting, and prayer to "fight polytheism with its own weapons."⁵⁹ In this manner, monotheism was able to be gradually inculcated and spread. Similarly, after the Exodus, God feared that the people of Israel would be unwilling to endure the difficulties of conquering and settling a new nation: "God therefore used another route, longer and more devious, in order to arrive at the original goals."⁶⁰

Spero takes Maimonides' strong emphasis on free choice as the motivation for God to act as the "consummate pedagogue" to allow man to come to Him voluntarily.⁶¹ For Spero, this means that Maimonides' eschatological worldview is active-based; man's activity can hasten the Messiah. He discerns this from a close examination of Maimonides' words:

⁵³ Socher, "Of Divine Cunning and Prolonged Madness," 13.

⁵⁴ Spero, "Maimonides and the Sense of History," 129.

⁵⁵ Spero, "Maimonides and the Sense of History," 129.

⁵⁶ Spero, "Maimonides and the Sense of History," 129.

⁵⁷ Spero, "Maimonides and the Sense of History," 129.

⁵⁸ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 143.

⁵⁹ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 143.

⁶⁰ Spero, "Maimonides and the Sense of History," 129.

⁶¹ Spero, "Maimonides and the Sense of History," 130.

Concerning all these things (wars of Gog and Magog and the coming of the Prophet Elijah) and others like them, no one knows how they will come about until they actually happen...since the words of the Prophets on these matters are not clear. Even the sages have no tradition regarding them...In any case the order and details of these events are not religious principles.⁶²

Spero emphasizes that it is only the “order and details” of eschatological events that are undefined. Nonetheless, “identification of unusual events in history can freely be interpreted as Messianic.”⁶³ Spero goes so far as to say that Maimonides would hold theological significance to the establishment of the modern state of Israel. He concedes that Maimonides “did not articulate a systematic “progress theory” of history,”⁶⁴ but still presumes that “he would have had no difficulty in grafting the pattern of later events onto his clearly enunciated principles, and thus fashion a recognizable progress theory of history.”⁶⁵ This view of Maimonides is not only a “realistic” view of Messianic development, in that redemption would be a natural outgrowth of historical conditions to a utopia that is best suited for philosophical introspection, but it is also what Spero calls “activistic.” For Maimonides, man can actively accelerate the arrival of the Messiah and reach an objectively higher, previously impossible level of philosophical understanding.

Spero’s prime verification for this theory is based on Maimonides’ famous and controversial ruling regarding the renewal of the *semikhah* (rabbinic ordination), the basis for unequivocal rabbinic authority:

It appears to me that were all the wise men in Eretz Yisrael to agree to appoint judges and ordain them, then they would be properly ordained with all the powers accruing thereunto,

⁶² Hikhot Melachim, 11:4.

⁶³ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 135.

⁶⁴ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 136.

⁶⁵ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 136.

including the power to ordain others. And I believe that the Sanhedrin (the authoritative rabbinical court) will be restored before the revelation of the Messiah and, indeed, this will be one of the signs (of his coming), as it is written “And I will restore your Judges as before.”⁶⁶

As Spero writes, “Instead of viewing the renewal of the Sanhedrin as a restorative element to be brought about by the Messiah, Maimonides reverses the relationship.”⁶⁷ The changed order of cause and effect—regarding the Sanhedrin and the coming of the Messiah—showcases the natural progression into redemption.

If this perspective is true, we would be able to qualify Maimonides’ disdain for history to the details and minutiae of history. Maimonides would still value the pursuit of understanding significant changes and developments of humanity and the world.

This perspective is buttressed by Maimonides’ enthusiastic discussion of the rise of Christianity and Islam, which were unquestionably watershed moments for human society but are less discussed in traditional Jewish material. For Maimonides, these religions contribute to his Theory of Accommodation and mark the progression of the world’s appreciation for monotheism and the Jewish people’s unique message.

Seeskin might respond that this approach cannot be accurate because if there would really be a gradual progression of man, the laws of the Torah, which were only based on the Theory of Accommodation, should have to be disposed of once a higher level of man is reached. Instead, Maimonides writes that all the laws will still remain in place with the coming of the Messiah. Even

⁶⁶ Rambam, *Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction*, trans. Eliyahu Touger (Jerusalem: Moznaim Publications, 1986–2007), Chapter 4.

⁶⁷ Spero, “Maimonides and the Sense of History,” 136. This issue became a practical dispute in the sixteenth century. For a quick summary of the controversy of Revived Semikha see Yosef Eisen, “Safed and the Attempt to Revive Semicha,” 2014, https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/2435047/jewish/Safed-and-the-Attempt-to-Revive-Semicha.htm

with the return of prophecy, if a prophet would attempt to introduce change, it would be proof of his inauthenticity, and he would deserve to be put to death. In sum, “History can help us understand the reasons for obeying a commandment, but, in his opinion, it cannot justify changing one.”⁶⁸

VI. Maimonides’ Multilayered Manifesto

These two eschatological perspectives emerge from the mixed evidence throughout Maimonides writings, and reflect two important theological perspectives. David Hartman reflects on the implications of these models: “Changing one’s memory and one’s view of history alters the ventures one will hazard.”⁶⁹ Funkenstein’s approach, which is founded upon an apocalyptic and activist conception of history’s progression, can be dangerous: “Because so much is offered and under such unlikely circumstances one may be prepared to take irrational risks...Consequently, one may commit lives, fortunes and people to reckless adventure.”⁷⁰ On the other hand, such a conception can contribute to man’s commitment to progress; man can be willing to sacrifice everything, knowing he will advance to a new future. If one believes, like Seeskin, that “the human condition can never be transcended,” he can easily fall prey to radical secularism. However, Seeskin’s approach places more value in the “daily struggle” of man.⁷¹ Man is not in an undesirable state that is dependent on an outside force to fix; man is able to fix himself as he is. In such a conception, human progression can also be encouraged: “Modern technology which expands the range of human power is not a threat to religious sensitivity, but is, rather, an expansion of human moral responsibility.”⁷²

⁶⁸ Seeskin, “Maimonides’ Sense of History,” 135.

⁶⁹ David Hartman, “Maimonides’ approach to Messianism and its contemporary implications.” *Daat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy & Kabbalah*, no. 2/3 (1978): 30, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24184717>.

⁷⁰ Hartman, “Maimonides’ approach to Messianism,” 30.

⁷¹ Hartman, “Maimonides’ approach to Messianism,” 30.

⁷² Hartman, “Maimonides’ approach to Messianism,” 30.

Once we understand the deep psychological and theological implications of the two approaches, we can posit that there is intentional ambiguity in Maimonides. Maimonides was a complex thinker who was trying to accomplish various goals with his works. To view all of his writings as an aggregate is very compelling because he was such a systematic, broad, and consistent thinker. Nonetheless, there are different emphases in his writings that shed light on the particular aspirations for each work. As Maimonides himself noted, “it is proper that each group be addressed in accord to its capacity.”⁷³

Seeskin and Scholem come to their conclusion largely based on a careful read of Maimonides’ Messianic teachings in the *Mishneh Torah*. Funkenstein’s deductions are based on a study of Maimonides’ eschatological vision “within the context of his social theories as a whole.”⁷⁴ Funkenstein chose to use the *Epistle to Yemen* as the guide for Maimonides’ worldview, especially when analyzing his explanation of Christianity and Islam. According to Seeskin and Hartman, it is important to consider the audience of the *Epistle*, as it may not reflect his broader theological principles.

In other writings on similar topics, like in his *Commentary on the Mishnah* to Perek Helek, Maimonides has a goal of reeducating a community to regard “disinterested worship of God as the ultimate goal of Judaism.”⁷⁵ Maimonides attempts to push forth his conception that knowledge and love of God, not reward and punishment, is the ultimate theological goal. For this purpose, all Messianism has to offer is “instrumental value” that grants “conditions that free its members of mundane worries and distractions so they could devote themselves to the single-minded pursuit of

⁷³ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 449.

⁷⁴ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 137.

⁷⁵ David Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1985), 173.

god.”⁷⁶ Maimonides also has a second goal of “neutralizing religious fantasy,”⁷⁷ and he attempts to naturalize the world and dismiss miraculous conceptions, such as an apocalyptic Messiah, as much as possible.

In the *Mishneh Torah*, the eschatological discussion arises in a few different places where it is treated “nonchalantly.”⁷⁸ In *Hilkhot Melakhim*, the miraculous powers of the Messiah are limited to *ruach hakodesh* (divine spirit). His conception of Messianism is simply a period of the ideal fulfillment of the Torah. He also presents an alternative version of the role of Christianity and Islam than he does in the *Epistle to Yemen*. Funkenstein understands Maimonides’ presentation to be consistent throughout his works; he sees it as an extension of the “divine cunning” developed in his Theory of Accommodation in *The Guide*. Hartman argues that each work must be viewed independently. In the *Mishneh Torah*, “Maimonides’ treatment of Christianity and Islam is not part of a general theory of history, but rather a post facto explanation of existing conditions.”⁷⁹ He concludes, like Seeskin did, “Maimonides did not propound a theology of history in *Mishneh Torah*.”⁸⁰

The *Epistle to Yemen* was written to a group of Jews who were reaching out to Maimonides for spiritual guidance while they were suffering from intense persecution. As a spiritual leader and not just an abstract philosopher, Maimonides attempts to comfort them. He speaks of the Messiah using miraculous powers to strike terror in the hearts of the nations of the world and subdue them. While in other works Maimonides used “messianism to explain the meaning of Judaism,”⁸¹ “in the *Epistle* he used it to provide a community with hope.”⁸² Instead of describing the nature of the End

⁷⁶ Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership*, 173.

⁷⁷ Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership*, 173.

⁷⁸ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 451.

⁷⁹ Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership*, 188.

⁸⁰ Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership*, 188.

⁸¹ Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership*, 188.

⁸² Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership*, 188.

of Days as he does in other works, the *Epistle* considers what will happen before that time. The concept of “birth pangs of the Messiah was introduced, [yet,] notably absent from his other writings.”⁸³ Maimonides was no longer on an attack of materialism, nor was he philosophically expounding the spiritual goals of Judaism; he was dealing with despair and suffering. The notion of the Messiah was useful to provide hope with the evidence of an approaching redemption. He even includes a family tradition concerning the imminent date of the redemption.

Funkenstein agrees that “Maimonides of the code is much more cautious, in his assertions concerning the Messianic era, than Maimonides of either the *Perush Hamishna* or *Iggeret*.”⁸⁴ However, he argues that “there is no reason to assume that he actually gave up the messianic connotation of the renewal of some elements of the pristine judicial system. He just may have chosen not to invoke them as a definite, binding part of the messianic doctrine.”⁸⁵ In other words, Maimonides had a consistent eschatological perception, but he could not treat all of his personal understanding as theologically definitive.

Twersky notes that Maimonides’ historiography is also presented differently between the *Mishneh Torah* and *The Guide*: “While the *Moreh* introduces historical causation and boldly utilizes a theory of accommodation, the *Mishneh Torah* does not rely on the historical motivation of the laws.”⁸⁶ For example, “the entire conception of Sabainism as the system which the Torah aimed to demolish is conspicuously absent from the *Mishneh Torah*.”⁸⁷ Of course, there are similar presentations of the history of religion, even a “stray explanation of the law.”⁸⁸ However, the

⁸³ Hartman, *Crisis and Leadership*, 188.

⁸⁴ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 154.

⁸⁵ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 154.

⁸⁶ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 431.

⁸⁷ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 431.

⁸⁸ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 431.

notion of the “divine cunning”—which is “so central in the Moreh—cannot even be described as peripheral in the Mishneh Torah; it is, for all practical purposes, missing.”⁸⁹

Twersky explains that the difference is based on contrasting objectives and emphases. The *Mishneh Torah* was intended to serve as the applied ethical and intellectual guideline of daily life. This purpose would not be “fructified by historical analysis or by excessive theoretical and psychological explanation. Outer-directed explanations are also less significant.”⁹⁰ In contrast, *The Guide* was a philosophical treatise aimed at demonstrating “that the law is ‘consequent upon wisdom’ and does not contain frivolous actions.”⁹¹ Twersky gives many examples that highlight this distinction. As he explains:

Teleology in history, modeled after its role in nature or biology, is an effective component of rationalization; knowing certain antecedent facts, and in the light of them interpreting later developments, helps eliminate arbitrariness or accident and fashion instead an “intelligible whole” out of events. Historical science, like genetic sciences, looks for some kind of continuity between temporally prior happenings and subsequent events. This, however, all its rationality notwithstanding, has no spiritual-ethical consequences.⁹²

Such an understanding is consistent with Hartman’s distinction. When advocating ethical and intellectual perfection, man cannot focus on his role in the greater plan. He must strive for personal progression. However, at a time of crisis or philosophical introspection, there is a recognized need for understanding the greater narrative that we occupy.

⁸⁹ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 431.

⁹⁰ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 432.

⁹¹ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 432.

⁹² Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 432.

VII. Conclusion: Maimonides' View of His Personal Historical Role

Maimonides sincerely believed that he was living close to an imminent redemption.⁹³ The rise of false Messiahs in his time was itself a sign of redemption, and he gives credence to a family eschatological tradition of the year 1210 for the coming of the Messiah.⁹⁴ Ironically, for all his disdain of history, he bases the motivation for his most creative endeavor, the *Mishneh Torah*, on a historical perspective. In his introduction to the *Mishneh Torah*, Maimonides subtly compares his work to the revolutionary composition of the Mishnah by Judah the Prince (135–217). As Twersky notes,

We may safely surmise that this historical parallel influenced Maimonides either consciously or unconsciously, that he saw many points of resemblance between the era of R. Judah and his own, and that he considered his task to be analogous to that of R. Judah. Both were innovators, driven by a mission and a vision, determined to safeguard the tradition. Just as R. Judah forsook the way of his predecessors and did not leave matters as they were in order “that the Oral Law may not be forgotten” as a result of the troubles and turbulence of the times, so likewise Maimonides, agitated by the political turmoil and demographic displacement of his era and its intellectual discontinuities, “forsook the way of all the authors that preceded him” and blazed a new path, so that “all might be well versed in the entire Oral Law.”⁹⁵

It is clear that a simple dismissal of Maimonides' “historical outlook” cannot be made. Especially when analyzing religious writers, it is important to view their sense of history within the larger context of their personal and theological convictions.

⁹³ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 135.

⁹⁴ Funkenstein, *Perceptions of Jewish History*, 135.

⁹⁵ Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides*, 65.

We have attempted to highlight two overarching approaches to Maimonides' "historical outlook," discuss their different implementations throughout his works, along with their influences and implications. In certain contexts where it is appropriate to stress man's personal role regarding his ethical and intellectual development, man cannot focus on the larger implications of his actions. However, in a time of crisis, or during times of philosophical introspection, it would be appropriate to consider the grand scheme of things. There is much more to analyze about Maimonides' historical views. He was a complex, deep thinker with an impressive repertoire of writings that contained meticulously crafted concepts. He was worthy of the pithy, historically-cognizant epigraph on his gravestone, "from Moses until Moses there was none like Moses."

**History and Heroism:
Tolstoy, Carlyle, and Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik**

Shalom Brauser

In his great novel *War and Peace*, Leo Tolstoy creates a world of diverse characters in early nineteenth-century Russia. As the Napoleonic wars rage and millions of men move across Europe to kill each other, Tolstoy's characters live their prosaic and private lives, which he masterfully infuses with descriptive detail and imagery. Tolstoy's fame as a novelist is well established—*War and Peace* alone is considered one of the greatest novels of all time—yet an important aspect of Tolstoy and his novel is often overlooked: his perception of history. Throughout the roughly 1500-page story, Tolstoy embarks on long and tangential commentaries. He not only describes the events of the time but takes issue with other historians on both their factual descriptions of these events and what they understand to be their underlying causes. His main contention—touched on throughout the book and fully explicated in his lengthy epilogue—is that history, those complex interactions of millions of people throughout time, can never truly be understood. The causes assigned to it are meaningless, and the more one tries to narrow down the exact science of history, the more this understanding is unattainable.

To understand Tolstoy's view of history, we must first turn to Isaiah Berlin's essay *The Hedgehog and the Fox*. Published as a book in 1953, it remains one of Berlin's most well-known essays—perhaps for its intriguing concept of the hedgehog and the fox. Based on the statement of Greek poet Archilochus' that "a fox knows many things, but a hedgehog knows one big thing," Berlin proceeds to classify different famous authors as either a hedgehog or a fox. The first group "relate[s] everything to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel—a single, universal, organizing principle in terms

of which alone all that they are and say has significance,”¹ while the second group “pursue[s] many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or aesthetic principle.”² According to Berlin, the hedgehogs of the world are thinkers with one guiding principle or goal who relate all their intellectual exploits to this one great idea. By contrast, the foxes of the world explore multiple lines of pursuit, in search of not one great idea but of art, beauty, interest, and truth wherever they may find it.

For Berlin, Tolstoy is by nature a fox who strives to be a hedgehog. Quoting from an array of Tolstoy’s letters, notes, diary entries, and of course, *War and Peace*, Berlin paints us a picture of this complex man. According to Berlin, Tolstoy’s interest in history was born well before he wrote *War and Peace*. This interest

seems to have arisen not from interest in the past as such, but from the desire to penetrate to first causes, to understand how and why things happen as they do and not otherwise, from a discontent with those current explanations which do not explain, and leave the mind dissatisfied, from a tendency to doubt and place under suspicion and, if need be, reject whatever does not fully answer the question, to go to the root of every matter, at whatever cost.³

Tolstoy was a man who deeply craved pure, unadulterated truth and, to some extent, dedicated his life to searching for that truth. But he was disillusioned by what he saw as the naive and false political and philosophical systems that abounded in his time. He felt that “history, only history, only the sum of the concrete events in time and space—the sum of the experience of actual men

¹ Isaiah Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays* (London: Vintage Classics, 2013), 436.

² Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, 436.

³ Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, 443.

and women in their relation to one another and an actual three-dimensional, empirically experienced, physical environment—this alone contained the truth.”⁴

But as Tolstoy began his pursuit of truth in history, he began to feel “an acute sense of disappointment, a feeling that history, as written by historians, makes claims which it cannot satisfy, because like metaphysical philosophy it pretends to be something it is not—namely a science capable of arriving at conclusions which are certain.”⁵ History can never be understood clearly, because the factors involved in any one event are innumerable. How can we truly explain the lives of millions of people, their interactions with each other, and the effects of these interactions? One exemplary passage in Tolstoy (quoted at length by Berlin), shows us his biting irony, sense of humor, and sharp criticism of simplistic history as he pithily sums up the whole period of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars:

Louis XIV was a very proud and self-confident man. He had such and such mistresses, and such and such ministers, and he governed France badly. The heirs of Louis XIV were also weak men, and also governed France badly. They also had such and such favorites and such and such mistresses. Besides which, certain persons were at this time writing books. By the end of the eighteenth century there gathered in Paris two dozen or so persons who started saying that all men were free and equal. Because of this in the whole of France people began to slaughter and drown each other. These people killed the king and a good many others. At this time there was a man of genius in France—Napoleon. He conquered everyone everywhere, i.e. killed a great many people because he was a great genius; and, for some reason, he went off to kill Africans, and killed them so well, and was so clever and cunning, that, having arrived in France, he ordered everyone to obey him, which they

⁴ Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind*, 444.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 445.

did. Having made himself Emperor he again went to kill masses of people in Italy, Austria and Prussia. And there too he killed a great many...As for Napoleon, after shedding tears before the Old Guard, he gave up his throne, and went into exile...Suddenly the diplomats and monarchs almost came to blows. They were almost ready to order their troops once again to kill each other; but at this moment Napoleon arrived in France with a battalion, and the French, who hated him, all immediately submitted to him. But this annoyed the allied monarchs very much and they again went to war with the French. And the genius Napoleon was defeated and taken to the island of St Helena, having suddenly been discovered to be an outlaw. Whereupon the exile, parted from his dear ones and his beloved France, died a slow death on a rock, and bequeathed his great deeds to posterity. As for Europe, a reaction occurred there, and all the princes began to treat their peoples badly once again.⁶

Clearly, “history” as it is written and taught is almost a farce for Tolstoy. To Tolstoy, it does not make sense that the actions of a few individuals led to the destruction of millions of lives.

What Tolstoy cannot tolerate by any means is the “Great Man Theory” of history. Napoleon (Fig 1.) was a perfect example of this idea. Many, in his time and especially after, believed that he was a military genius, a visionary, a hero, a man of unbounded ambition and capability who remade the world in his own image. In the words of Goethe,

Napoleon was the man! Always enlightened, always clear and decided, and endowed with sufficient energy to carry into effect whatever he considered advantageous and necessary. His life was the stride of a demigod, from battle to battle, and from victory to victory. It might well be said of him, that he was found in a state of continual enlightenment. On this

⁶ Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, trans. Constance Garnette (New York City: Crowell, 1976), Epilogue, Part Two, chap 1.

account, his destiny was more brilliant than any the world had seen before him, or perhaps will ever see after him.⁷

Stendhal, at the beginning of *The Charterhouse of Parma* (1839), writes that Napoleon “taught the world that after all these centuries Caesar and Alexander had a successor.”⁸ For Tolstoy, this notion is ridiculous. Napoleon was nothing but a cog in the great machine of humanity, naive and foolish enough to believe himself the conductor of these great events, like “a child who, holding a couple of strings inside a carriage, thinks he is driving it.”⁹



Figure 1. Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821), famed military commander and Emperor of France from 1804–1814, and again in 1815 after a short exile.¹⁰

⁷ Johann Peter Eckermann, *Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret*, trans. John Oxenford, vol. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1850), 40.

⁸ Stendhal, *The Charterhouse of Parma*, trans. Margaret R. B. Shaw (London: Penguin Books, 1958).

⁹ Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, Book 13, chap 10.

¹⁰ Jacques-Louis David, *Napoleon Crossing the Alps*, 1805, oil on canvas, Musée National du Château de Malmaison, Rueil-Malmaison.

In Tolstoy's view, one individual cannot turn the tide of inexorable events. When discussing the movement of Napoleon's armies toward Russia in 1812, Tolstoy asks,

What produced this extraordinary occurrence? What were its causes? The historians tell us with naïve assurance that its causes were the wrongs inflicted on the Duke of Oldenburg, the nonobservance of the Continental System, the ambition of Napoleon, the firmness of Alexander, the mistakes of the diplomatists, and so on. Consequently, it would only have been necessary for Metternich, Romyántsev, or Talleyrand, between a levee and an evening party, to have taken proper pains and written a more adroit note, or for Napoleon to have written to Alexander: 'My respected Brother, I consent to restore the duchy to the Duke of Oldenburg'—and there would have been no war.¹¹

But this is not possible for Tolstoy because, in the words of Berlin, this "is the great illusion which Tolstoy sets himself to expose: that individuals can, using their resources, understand and control the course of events. Those who believe this turn out to be dreadfully mistaken."¹² Wars are not begun or ended by the words of a few great men, but by the incalculable results of innumerable interactions of millions of people, each with their unique mentality and experience.

This view greatly contrasts with that idea espoused by many historians over the centuries, namely, the "Great Man Theory" of history. This posits that there are men of exceptional genius, ambition, and charisma, who take the reins of humanity and lead it in new and revolutionary directions. One of the staunchest advocates of this view, and indeed almost the exact opposite of Tolstoy, is Thomas Carlyle. The contrast between the two is illustrated by Ilia Stambler in his article "Heroic Power in Thomas Carlyle and Leo Tolstoy" (2006). Stambler writes that "Carlyle

¹¹ Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, Book Nine, chap 1.

¹² Berlin, "The Proper Study of Mankind," 450.

believes that there exist heroes, great ‘able men’ who stand above the crowd, and are superior, ‘worth any thousand men.’ In Carlyle’s opinion, a hero shapes history and is thus necessary: ‘we cannot do without great men.’”¹³ While Tolstoy believes that great men are, in the words of Berlin, “ordinary human beings who are ignorant and vain enough to accept responsibility for the life of society,”¹⁴ for “Carlyle, it is a matter of fact that ‘[Rousseau] could not be hindered from setting the world on fire,’ or that Luther’s theses brought about almost the whole of modern Western history in its three stages: the Reformation, ‘English Puritanism’ and the English Civil War, and finally ‘the Enormous French Revolution.’”¹⁵ In this view, people, either endowed with superhuman genius or through their perseverance and ambition, become heroes. They write, fight, think, lead, and change the world.

At the risk of philosophizing, these two distinctive views of history embody two opposing concepts of human experience. For Tolstoy, we truly are cogs in a machine, another data point on the infinite graph of human existence, our every move plotted and unchangeable. Free will is an illusion, and the more we try to understand history and all its workings, the more we fool ourselves into believing in a false science that, while possibly reassuring and comforting us, can never ultimately be true. Carlyle and his ideological camp, on the other hand, believe that most, but not all, men are indeed part of the faceless mass whose destiny is shaped by those great men, those who rise above the fray to take their rightful place as leaders of men and arbiters of history. They are the heroes who lead us and inspire us. To be sure, this view still reduces the mass of mankind to objects rather than subjects, buffeted around by fate and great leaders. But it still gives every individual an image to look up to and strive to emulate, a focal point for the desire for greatness.

¹³ Ilia Stambler, “Heroic Power in Thomas Carlyle and Leo Tolstoy,” *The European Legacy* 11, no. 7 (2006): 737–751, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770601023073>.

¹⁴ Berlin, “The Proper Study of Mankind,” 456.

¹⁵ Stambler, “Heroic Power in Thomas Carlyle and Leo Tolstoy.”

Both of these two diametrically opposed positions take for granted that there either are or are not heroes, the great men who rise above the mass of humanity to shape history. But what if there is something in between? Perhaps it is neither, as Tolstoy believes, that we are all unfree, naive objects, nor as Carlyle believes, that certain great men control the destiny of millions. Perhaps true heroism exists but is indeed far more prosaic than either Carlyle or Tolstoy imagine it.

Rabbi Doctor Joseph B. Soloveitchik (1903–1993), in his seminal essay, “Catharsis” (1978), outlines what he calls “Biblical heroism” and contrasts it with “Classical heroism.”

He writes that “classical man was an aesthete...he longed for vastness...he suffered from a sense of frustration and disenchantment; since no man, not even the most accomplished aesthete, can ever cross the Rubicon separating finitude from infinity. In his agony the classical aesthete invented the image of the hero.”¹⁶ So classical man invented for himself a hero, a great man who rose above the quotidian, mundane experience. “The hero is an actor who performs in order to impress an appreciative audience. The crowd cheers, the chronicler records, countless generations afterwards admire, bards and minstrels sing of the hero.” This version of heroism “lasts for a while, vibrant and forceful, but soon man reverts to the non-heroic mood of everyday living.”

Biblical heroism, on the other hand, is not “an ephemeral mood or a passing state of mind. It is perhaps the central motif in our existential experience...Biblical heroism is not ecstatic but rather contemplative; not loud but hushed; not dramatic or spectacular but mute. The individual...lives constantly as a hero.” Rabbi Soloveitchik goes on to demonstrate how exactly this sort of heroism is the central theme of Jewish existence, that in living according to Divine will,

¹⁶ Joseph B. Soloveitchik, “Catharsis,” *Tradition: A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought* 17, no. 2 (1978): 38–54, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23258674>.

man is constantly heroic. No one sees it, and no one will know it, but perhaps this is precisely what makes it the truest heroism.

One does not need to believe in the Bible, Judaism, or “Divine law” to realize that this model of heroism is a reasonable and nuanced middle point between the two extremes mentioned earlier. History is not determined by “Great Men” who bend the masses to their will, nor is it solely the inexorable and incalculable result of innumerable factors—unquantifiable and unchangeable—that shape our lives as individuals and as nations. Tolstoy is right when he says that the factors of history are unknowable, but he is wrong when he writes that these factors (the actions of innumerable people) must be fundamentally unfree. Carlyle is right when he writes that individuals can take the reins of history, but he is wrong when he writes that these “Great Men” are few and far between. Perhaps, as Rabbi Soloveitchik implies, history is made of individuals who choose to see themselves as subjects rather than objects, who choose to take hold of their own destiny. This often plays out in prosaic and quiet moments, and these actions will never be celebrated by the vast audience of mankind. However, these billions of human choices can, and do, have the power to shape the world. For if every individual chose to see every crossroad in life—however small and insignificant—as a call to the decisive action of world-changing power, then each person would change the world every day. Of course, to believe this is one thing; to live it, is quite another. And perhaps few do live this way. It may be that Tolstoy and Carlyle are right, that this is not the reality, and most people are mere passive instruments in the grand scheme of things. But Rabbi Soloveitchik believes that this need not be the case, and that, with the Biblical image of heroism before us, humanity need not be bound by the “laws” of history. Perhaps history as we know it is the sum of millions of key decisions, unknown and uncelebrated. To write that history would, I think, require even more pages than *War and Peace*.

Political Pragmatism: China's Contemporary Rise to Global Hegemony

Benjamin Golani

Upon observing the state of the People's Republic of China after succeeding Mao Zedong as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978, the renowned military commander, revolutionary, and statesman Deng Xiaoping (Fig. 1), later known as the Architect of China, remarked: “不管是白貓還是黑貓；只要能抓到老鼠，就是好貓”—“No matter if it is a white cat or a black cat; as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat.”¹ This maxim encapsulates the essence of pragmatism, a school of philosophy predicated on the belief that the merit of political ideologies is derived exclusively from their functionality.² By extension, pragmatism promotes effective action over rigorous adherence to ideological doctrines and posits that propositions derive validity from their real-world consequences alone. China's rapid economic growth over the past few decades represents the successful implementation of pragmatist policies at the turn of the century. This success is exhibited in the growth generated by China's departure from Maoism, economically and even socially.³ No singular factor can account for the success of pragmatist policies in engendering China's emergence as a global power; rather, only a thorough historical and philosophical evaluation of pragmatism can account for the rise of the People's Republic.

I. The Evolution of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Theory

Usage of the word “pragmatism” dates back to ancient Greece, where the statesman and historian Polybius (200–118 BCE) referred to his writings as pragmatic, or written to be instructive to his readers.⁴ Polybius derived ‘pragmatism’ from the Greek word *pragma*, meaning “action” or

¹ John Naisbitt and Doris Naisbitt. *China's Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society* (New York: Harper, 2009).

² H. S. Thayer and Sandra B. Rosenthal, “Pragmatism | Philosophy,” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 14, 2023 <https://www.britannica.com/topic/pragmatism-philosophy>.

³ Lucian W. Pye, “On Chinese Pragmatism in the 1980s,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 106 (June 1986): 207–34, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/653429>

⁴ James Lloyd, “Polybius,” *World History Encyclopedia*, July 11, 2012, <https://www.worldhistory.org/Polybius/>.

“affair.” In his documentation of Roman hegemony in the second and third centuries BCE, Polybius writes: “the peculiar function of history is to discover, in the first place, the words actually spoken, whatever they were, and next to ascertain the reason why what was done or spoken led to failure or success. For the mere statement of fact may interest us but is of no benefit to us, but when we add the cause of it, study of history becomes fruitful.”⁵ As suggested by this excerpt, Polybius’s analysis of history was uniquely pragmatic for his day and age, placing a notable emphasis on unveiling “cause and consequence” to assess the utility of ideas beyond their historical context. Polybius may be considered an early pragmatist. Nevertheless, pragmatism only rose to prominence centuries later.

During the Scientific Revolution, French philosopher René Descartes pioneered the methodology of rationalism, arguing that ideas should be clear in their own right and not based on the presumption of a supreme authority or absolute doctrine. As Descartes wrote in *A Discourse on the Method of Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (1637), “My grand conclusion is that it is the mind and the mind alone that tells us what the world is really like. This is the basis of my whole view of ‘rationalism.’”⁶ Though a devout Catholic, Descartes challenged Scholasticism—and by extent, the Catholic Church—by proposing that *because* God instilled man with the ability to reason, anything discovered by man is necessarily of divine origin. To characterize Descartes’s proposition as controversial would be an understatement—the Trial of Galileo in 1610, an event that coincided with Descartes’s rise to prominence, set a precedent for the tendency of the Roman Catholic Church to label scientific results that misaligned with a fundamentalist interpretation of scripture as blasphemous, and to vilify the scientists (known then

⁵ Polybius and Friderich Otto Hultsch, *The Histories of Polybius*, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139333757>.

⁶ René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, trans. John Veitch (Project Gutenberg, 1995), <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/59/59-h/59-h.htm>.

as “natural philosophers”) who popularized such findings.⁷ Not only did Cartesian rationalism offer a rectification of the apparent contradiction between science and Christianity, but recharacterized science as a process by which to discover God’s truth in the universe.

The inception of pragmatism as a rigorous philosophical theory can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when the American philosopher, mathematician, and scientist Charles Sanders Pierce published a series of essays outlining the fundamental doctrines of pragmatism. In *Illustrations of the Logic of Science II*, published in 1878, Pierce proposes a number of claims to this end.⁸ In developing his initial premise, Pierce refers to Descartes’s rationalism: in particular, Descartes’s emphasis on the importance of clarity in discerning the truth of an idea. Since, according to Descartes, our ideas are mere byproducts of God-given consciousness—the means by which we are informed of reality, in order to distinguish between truths and falsehoods—we must separate ideas based on their clarity: unclear ideas must be untrue, and clear ideas may be true.⁹ Note that while unclear ideas *must* be untrue, clear ideas only *may* be true. This subtle distinction is significant in that, at this point, Pierce builds upon Descartes’s deductive reasoning with what he sees as the “missing criteria” for verifying ideas as *certainly* true. The reason for the uncertainty in labeling clear ideas as “true” is a consequence of mutually exclusive premises: if multiple, equally clear theories are based on fundamentally incongruent principles, only one can be true. Case in point, when rolling a die, the six possible outcomes are mutually exclusive; only one theory can manifest in reality. This, Pierce argues, is the importance of the second condition for verifying a theory as true: distinctness. Distinctness is the factor that distinguishes between an idea that *seems* clear and an idea that *is* clear. According to Pierce, for an idea to be distinct, it

⁷ Grace Connolly, “The Scientific Revolution: Breaking the Chains of the Church,” Colby, 19 September 2018, <https://web.colby.edu/st112a-fall18/2018/09/19/the-evolution-of-science/>.

⁸ Charles Sanders Pierce, “Illustrations of the Logic of Science II,” *Popular Science Monthly* 12, 286–302.

⁹ According to Pierce, ‘clarity’ refers to logical consistency.

must “withstand the test of dialectical examination.” Here, the process of scientific inquiry enters the scene to differentiate between contesting theories, thereby identifying one distinct truth.

Pierce asserts that there is a singular truth for every matter of scientific inquiry, and argues that the method of dialectical examination will eventually spur the discovery of these truths “in the infinite long run.” As Pierce writes:

All the followers of science are fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if only pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to every question to which they can be applied. One man may investigate the velocity of light by studying the transits of Venus and the aberration of the stars; another by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter’s satellites; a third by the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by the motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth, and a ninth, may follow the different methods of comparing the measures of statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain different results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes, the results will move steadily together toward a destined centre. So with all scientific research.¹⁰

Pierce views this principle as a general law of the universe: “This great law is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the ‘real’. That is the way I would explain reality.”

As pragmatism made its early rounds in mid-to-late-nineteenth-century America, England underwent a scientific, philosophical, and religious upheaval as Charles Darwin’s *Origin of*

¹⁰ Pierce, “Illustrations of the Logic of Science II.”

Species, published in 1859, embroiled Europe in contention.¹¹ Not only did Darwin’s theory of evolution contest popular notions of divine creation, but it posed a formidable challenge to the widespread idealism of the nineteenth century, a philosophy stressing the central role of the ideal or the spiritual in the interpretation of experience.¹² For early pragmatists, the theory of evolution offered a very rationalistic, non-idealistic view of nature and life—a view centered around the struggles of adapting to one’s environment. Evolution diverged sharply from idealist thought. While idealistic thinkers eulogized what the pragmatists dismissed as abstract mystical doctrines, evolutionary theory characterized the human state as the process of developing techniques favorable to the propagation, preservation, and improvement of life—a much more tangible and rational theory for nineteenth-century skeptics.

Unsurprisingly, the theory of evolution was gradually employed by pragmatist philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. William James (1842–1910), a professor of philosophy at Harvard famed for popularizing pragmatist thought, focused on the *utility* of truth in a “Darwinian world.” According to James, as expressed in his essay “The Will to Believe” (1897), the main function of thought is to help people establish “satisfactory relations with [their] surroundings,” implying that the importance of ideas is contingent primarily on their efficacy.¹³ From an evolutionary standpoint, this proposition attaches a major incentive to discerning the truth, for under such an assumption, identification of the truth is directly associated with progress.

¹¹ Allen Orr, “Darwin and Darwinism: The (Alleged) Social Implications of The Origin of Species,” *Genetics* 183, no. 3 (November 2009): 767–72.

¹² Daniel Sommer Robinson, “Idealism | Philosophy,” Encyclopedia Britannica, February 27, 2023, www.britannica.com/topic/idealism.

¹³ William James, *The Will to Believe* (Project Gutenberg, 1896), www.gutenberg.org/files/26659/26659-h/26659-h.htm.

John Dewey, an American philosopher and psychologist, recognized as the third founder of pragmatism (alongside Charles Pierce and William James), once remarked that “Pierce wrote as a logician and James as a humanist.”¹⁴ By this, Dewey was referring to James’s development of Pierce’s ambiguous conception of the truth, as not only a vague characterization of reality, but as a means to improve the human condition. James specified the meaning of truth as “that which is in the best interest of humanity,” and in doing so, advanced pragmatism from a mere philosophy concerned with the identification of truth to a practical doctrine on how to address the truth after its identification.

By the early twentieth century, pragmatism was widely regarded as an accredited philosophical theory. The next step was to extend pragmatism from the purview of the philosopher to the podium of the policymaker.

II. The People’s Republic Under Mao Zedong: A Context for the Implementation of Pragmatist Theory

By Deng Xiaoping’s ascension to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1978, China was in a state of rampant political, economic, and social decay. It had not always been so; the first decade of Mao Zedong’s regime, from 1949 to the late 1950s, had seen modest signifiers of success.¹⁵ Under Mao, class inequalities were somewhat leveled with Soviet-like collectivization and property-redistribution reforms,¹⁶ a Five-Year Plan was implemented to enhance Chinese agriculture for economic growth, and civil reforms were set in place to accord women new legal rights, including a policy allowing women to leave an unhappy marriage. All of

¹⁴ Thayer and Rosenthal, “Pragmatism | Philosophy.”

¹⁵ Jeff David, “The People’s Republic of China,” in Barron’s *AP Comparative Government and Politics*, ed. Jeff Davis, third ed. (New York: Barron’s Educational Series Inc., 2020), 159–68.

¹⁶ Martin K. Whyte, “China’s Post-Socialist Inequality,” *Current History* 111, no. 746 (2012): 229–34, <https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/12876730>.

this transpired under the inflexible guise of Maoism—Mao’s adaptation of communism to Chinese society.^{17,18}

In stark contrast to the initial years of Mao’s regime, the subsequent two decades were marked by famine, poverty, and totalitarianism. In 1957 and 1958, Mao launched a second Five-Year Plan, more commonly known as the “Great Leap Forward,” a campaign intended to transform China from an agrarian economy to a communist society through rapid collectivization and industrialization.¹⁹ To streamline the agricultural industry, the state forced collectivized farming on state-run communes. Whereas cooperative farming had merely been encouraged beforehand, those who did not comply with the policies of the Great Leap Forward were labeled counter-revolutionaries and persecuted by the state.²⁰ Mao also authorized the implementation of unproven agricultural practices in the countryside in an attempt to multiply grain yields and increase production, which ravaged the agricultural industry.²¹ Forced collectivization was accompanied by government mandated industrialization, which relocated millions of peasant laborers with inadequate training or knowledge for factory work from the countryside to cities that had not yet developed industrial machinery. By 1962, the disastrous policies and reforms of the Great Leap Forward had resulted in the Great Chinese Famine, which is estimated to have killed between 20 and 45 million people.²² Nevertheless, there was no visible accountability from high-ranking

¹⁷ Brendan Koerner, “What’s a Maoist, Anyway?,” Slate, February 5, 2004, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2004/02/maoists-vs-communists.html>

¹⁸ The principal distinction between Maoism and standard communism or Marxist-Leninism was that in China, the peasantry, rather than the proletariat, served as Marx’s ‘revolutionary vanguard’. Mao also placed a notable emphasis on Mass Line, the idea that the leadership must always maintain a connection with the people, attentively heeding to the wisdom of the masses.

¹⁹ The Information Architects of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Great Leap Forward,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, May 4, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/facts/Great-Leap-Forward>.

²⁰ The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Great Leap Forward,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, April 4, 2023, www.britannica.com/event/Great-Leap-Forward.

²¹ Davis, “The People’s Republic of China.”

²² Thayer and Rosenthal, “Pragmatism | Philosophy.”

officials, who did not dare to report the economic disaster resulting from the policies of the Great Leap Forward, and instead blamed the decline in food output on droughts, floods in farming regions, and other natural disasters. Mao himself insisted that the failure of the Great Leap Forward was a consequence of poor implementation of the plan's original idealistic vision and the insidious efforts of counter-revolutionaries.²³

The ensuing deliberations among the CCP, which centered on how to reconfigure the CCP's fiscal policy, were dominated by moderate politburo members like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who supported market-oriented reforms to end food shortages and restore the Chinese economy. Mao vehemently opposed these developments, and proclaimed that the party, as well as the government, army, and cultural circles, had been infiltrated by counter-revolutionary revisionists and members of the "exploitative bourgeoisie," removing it from the people and their Marxist-ideologue representatives. In 1966, in order to purge Chinese society and the Party of all bourgeoisie elements, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, which the CCP itself, in a document titled "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," has since recognized as "responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People's Republic."²⁴

The Cultural Revolution sought to reinstate devotion to the ideals of Maoism among both the party and the people. The former was achieved by removing senior party officials with questionable allegiances to the communist cause, including Liu and Deng, from leadership positions and replacing them with less qualified Maoist apologists. Similarly, bureaucrats with

²³ Zedong Mao, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (New York: Praeger, 1893–1976).

²⁴ "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China." Marxists.org, June 27, 1981, www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/cpc/history/01.htm.

technical expertise in governance were replaced by cadres composed of ideologically committed, lower-ranking CCP members. In a sense, the Cultural Revolution came to represent the disastrous consequences of selecting party members based on ideological affiliation over merit; by 1976, the CCP was fraught with corruption and instability, which ultimately triggered the end of Mao's reign.²⁵ The state utilized a number of tactics to reinstate widespread devotion to the ideals of Maoism; in a deliberate transition from authoritarianism to totalitarianism, the CCP set forth activists to relaunch fervent class struggle against all capitalist beneficiaries of the system.²⁶

A multitude of violent incidents erupted throughout China as the Red Guards, a student paramilitary organization, mobilized under Mao's guidance, indiscriminately attacked citizens wearing "bourgeoisie clothes" and assisted in the murders of hundreds of thousands of counter-revolutionary intellectuals and party officials. Mao's persona was augmented into a cult of personality, and depictions of the Chairman were imposed on all elements of Chinese society, from public squares to private homes. Party newspapers were propagandized, depicting the mobilization of the masses as a monumental struggle that would spur an unwavering wave of allegiance to the original ideals of the People's Republic. One editorial wrote, "Like the red sun rising in the east, the unprecedented Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is illuminating the land with its brilliant rays."²⁷ In justifying the fervor surrounding the onset of mass mobilization, another CCP newspaper wrote that, "the power usurped by the capitalist-roaders could be recaptured only by carrying out a great cultural revolution by openly and fully mobilizing the broad masses from the bottom up to expose these sinister phenomena; and that the cultural revolution was in fact a great

²⁵ Davis, "The People's Republic of China."

²⁶ The CCP had used this method before the Great Leap Forward.

²⁷ Tom Phillips, "The Cultural Revolution," *The Guardian*, May 10, 2016, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/11/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-political-convulsion.

political revolution in which one class would overthrow another, a revolution that would have to be waged time and again.”²⁸

As was later acknowledged by the CCP, the Cultural Revolution was utterly destructive to the Chinese economy and politics; by its denouement, the decade from 1966 to 1976 had been irrevocably stained with bloodshed, starvation, and economic stagnation. Moreover, and of greater concern to this analysis’ objective, the policies of the Cultural Revolution, particularly when considered in conjunction with the “progress” of the Great Leap Forward, were central in discrediting and stigmatizing communist policies as implemented in China.²⁹ This disillusionment did not emerge from one cause alone, but was engendered by a host of fundamental issues with the CCP’s policies over nearly three-decades. Collectivization, as a system lacking both incentive and a self-enforcing contract between laborers, was proven inefficient and unsustainable. Government-mandated industrialization demonstrated that command economies cannot apprehend supply and demand in the market nearly as effectively as free-market economies, and as a result, invariably suffer from overproduction or underproduction of certain goods—as evidenced by the Great Famine and economic stagnation in the 1960s and 1970s.³⁰ The failure of industrialization further served to expose the many complications of the top-down method; in fact, later CCP policies indicated that the success of industrialization is highly contingent on individual initiative as opposed to state initiative.³¹ Moreover, CCP policies during the Cultural Revolution revealed the disastrous consequences of placing unqualified ideologues in stations of political influence; for the CCP, doing so only led to magnified corruption and mismanagement among the bureaucratic

²⁸ “Resolution on Certain Questions.”

²⁹ Encyclopedia Britannica, “China | Culture, History, Maps, & People,” May 4, 2023, <https://www.britannica.com/place/China/Educational-and-cultural-policy-changes>.

³⁰ Owen Pham, “How Mao’s Great Leap Forward Failed Miserably,” Wondrium Daily, August 6, 2021, www.wondriumdaily.com/how-maos-great-leap-forward-failed-miserably/.

³¹ Top-down method is the theory that the government can artificially spur the growth of industry.

and legislative elite. Such policies are the very antithesis of pragmatism, for they represent a resolute unwillingness to compromise on any particular policy matter that misaligns with preconceived ideological convictions. And as exhibited time and time again by the policies and leadership of the People's Republic under Mao Zedong, such an approach to government is incompatible with any aspiration for modernization or progress. Communism had failed the People's Republic in every possible way, and for the government that succeeded Mao, a perceptible severance from the restrictive doctrines of Maoism was the only conceivable way forward.

III. Pragmatism in Practice Under Deng Xiaoping

When Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao as General Secretary of the CCP in 1978, he inherited a seemingly insurmountable host of challenges: an impoverished agricultural people, an irreparably corrupted government, a stagnant economy, and a nation still recoiling from the ravages of totalitarianism. Nevertheless, Deng's ascension to power marked a historical change in government: Deng famously rejected Mao's uncompromising adherence to the ideological doctrines of communism and embraced the pragmatic approach, justifying the implementation of policies contradictory to the ideals of communism on the basis of their effectiveness. Application of pragmatist theory occasioned rapid modernization and economic growth in China, processes that have continued to exhibit unprecedented success ever since their inception.

In December 1978, at the third plenum of the eleventh Central Committee, Deng launched a series of reforms known as "The Four Modernizations" to gradually modernize China through advances in agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. These policies

became the impetus for China's transformation from an impoverished, agrarian economy into an industrial powerhouse over the past four decades.³²

The first modernization, which was effectively a reversal of the government-mandated collectivization enforced under Mao's regime, prioritized the restoration of agricultural markets. This was accomplished by converting former communes into public township or village enterprises (TVEs), market-oriented companies based in rural communities throughout China. TVEs had an almost instantaneous impact on the economy; due to their flexible organizational structures and varying levels of autonomy from local government oversight, TVEs swiftly contributed to rural economic growth, raised rural incomes, generated fiscal revenues for local governments, and helped bridge rural-urban economic disparities.³³ TVEs were not only a success in terms of per-capita production, but served as a long-awaited solution to the labor surplus issue produced by collectivized farming. Unemployment was reduced as rural laborers hastened to join TVEs.³⁴ Aside from TVEs, farmers launching new agricultural enterprises were permitted to choose to continue farming individually or collectively. Furthermore, profits earned from the sale of produce were consigned to farmers, effecting an increase in productivity among the peasantry.³⁵ Ultimately the sudden success of TVEs and other free-market enterprises posed a threat to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), driving the process of marketization, thereby influencing China's transition from a command economy to a market economy.³⁶

³² Yi Wen, "China's Industrial Revolution: Past, Present, Future," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November 1, 2015, www.stlouisfed.org/dialogue-with-the-fed/chinas-industrial-revolution-past-present-future.

³³ Charles Harvie, "China's Township and Village Enterprises and Their Evolving Business Alliances and Organizational Change," (University of Wollongong Working Paper, 1999), <https://ro.uow.edu.au/commwkpapers/9>.

³⁴ Hiroshi Imai, "China's Growing Unemployment Problem," Japan Research Institute, September 6, 2022, www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/2002/RIMe200209unemployment.

³⁵ Davis, "The People's Republic of China."

³⁶ Harvie, "China's Township and Village Enterprises."

Alongside agricultural reform, the Four Modernizations prioritized the reform of industry, another key component of China's transformation into an industrial powerhouse. The passage of industry-reforming legislation in the late 1970s authorized factories to set prices based on supply and demand in the market, which not only created greater efficiency in terms of what was produced and in what quantity, but incentivized innovation, leading to the production of superior goods.³⁷ This was particularly important in the production of mining tools and military weapons, which expedited the modernization of the Chinese military—a principal element of the third modernization.³⁸ The correlation between dismantling a command economy and the outgrowth of productivity is by no means exclusive to China—the same trend was evident in the Soviet Union in 1985, just years after the Four Modernizations were enacted, after Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Russia and launched a program of economic liberalization.³⁹

Industry reform in the late 1970s and 1980s consisted of two primary elements, encompassing a liberalization of the “factors of production” and the “Opening of China,” or the embrace of globalization. In stark contrast to the inhibitory trade policies of the pre-modernization era, which restricted all but the exportation of manufactured goods, the CCP's “new era” gradually entered China into the global economy, inviting foreign investment through the institution of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), tariff-free regions where multinational corporations were permitted to conduct business in China.⁴⁰ Deng's embrace of globalization had a profound and long-term impact on China's economy. According to a report by the World Bank conducted in the

³⁷ Greg Depersio, “Command Economy: Advantages and Disadvantages,” Investopedia, November 22, 2022, www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032515/what-are-advantages-and-disadvantages-command-economy.asp.

³⁸ Thomas Lee, “Xiaoping's Four Modernizations,” Deng Xiaoping Project, accessed May 4, 2023, <https://dengxiaopingproject.weebly.com/four-modernizations.html>.

³⁹ James M. Boughton, “II The IMF and the Transition from Central Planning,” *IMF eLibrary*, March 5, 2012, <https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781616350840/pt002.xml>.

⁴⁰ Davis, “The People's Republic of China.”

2010s, “SEZs have contributed 22% of China’s GDP, 45% of total national foreign direct investment, and 60% of exports. SEZs are estimated to have created over 30 million jobs, increased the income of participating farmers by 30%, and accelerated industrialization, agricultural modernization, and urbanization.”⁴¹ Aside from offering a promising model for economic growth, these statistics exhibit the steadfastness of the pragmatist theory. During Deng Xiaoping’s reign, the CCP resolved to override the doctrines of Maoism in order to optimize economic growth and productivity, and the results are self-vindicating.

Perhaps the most influential practice the CCP employed to override the doctrines of Maoism was terminating the ideological purges that had gained notoriety as hallmarks of the Cultural Revolution. In accordance with pragmatist theory, state officials were no longer selected based on their ideological commitment to Maoism, but on expertise and effectiveness alone. This policy, (or reversal of policy), reinstated China’s culture of social promotion based on merit and led to the reemphasis of education, prompting Deng to reopen numerous universities across the country. By 1984, college graduates as a percentage of party membership had risen to 50% from just 25% in 1974.⁴²

As referenced above, the fourth element of the Four Modernizations, innovation in science and technology, was partially undertaken to diversify, and ultimately supplant, China’s reliance on the exportation of manufactured goods in order to give rise to an innovation-based economy. The CCP recognized that to do so, a greater degree of privatization was in order, and allowed entrepreneurs to start new businesses and to source capital for these ventures from foreign investors and corporations. The CCP went a step further in 1986, and invested in institutions

⁴¹ World Bank, *China’s Special Economic Zones* (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 2015), www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/Africa/Investing%20in%20Africa%20Forum/2015/investing-in-africa-forum-chinas-special-economic-zone.pdf.

⁴² Davis, “The People’s Republic of China.”

responsible for promoting the development, research, and adoption of innovative technologies. Among these was the National High Technology R&D Program, also known as the 863 Program, a research enterprise promoting initiatives tasked with “closing the technology gap” and incorporating advanced technologies into a diverse array of sectors to ensure China’s financial independence from other nations in technology, science, engineering, and mathematics.⁴³ China’s progress in the energy, high-tech manufacturing, and transportation industries confirms the success of the CCP’s newfound emphasis on technological innovation.⁴⁴

Today, over 54% of China’s GDP is produced by the services sector, which comprises industries such as transportation services, investment services, information services, healthcare, arts, and entertainment. The growth in China’s service sector reflects the emergence of a consumer class with sufficient means to invest in services. This analysis is corroborated by a 2012 survey that indicates that urban households spend upwards of 40% of their consumption on services such as education, health care, entertainment and travel, up from 20% twenty years prior.⁴⁵ Such a trend is indicative of an increased average standard of living—a sure marker of economic growth. Moreover, the private sector has supplanted the state as the primary source of growth and productivity, indicating the emergence of a more innovative, less statist society. State-owned Enterprises have fallen into the background, and the private sector is now responsible for ninety-percent of exports and two-thirds of China’s GDP.⁴⁶ While statism remains a prominent element

⁴³ Brian Sergi, “Energy Innovation in China and the 863 Technology Program,” (Georgetown University Working Paper, April 2011), <https://blogs.commonsgorgetown.edu/bjs64/files/The-863-Program1.pdf>.

⁴⁴ John Kemp, “China’s Five-Year Plan Focuses on Energy Security,” Reuters, March 19, 2021, www.reuters.com/article/us-column-china-energy-kemp/column-chinas-five-year-plan-focuses-on-energy-security-kemp-idUSKBN2BB1Y1.

⁴⁵ Jonathan Eckart, “8 Things You Need to Know About China’s Economy,” World Economic Forum, June 23, 2016, www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/8-facts-about-chinas-economy.

⁴⁶ Andrew Mullen, “China’s Services Sector,” *South China Morning Post*, March 3, 2021, www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3123852/chinas-services-sector-what-it-and-why-it-important-economy.

of Chinese political culture, considering the availability of free public healthcare and nine years of compulsory education, the success of the private sector in the modern age offsets the statist elements with a notable degree of autonomy.

On the GDP front, from 1978 to 2014, China experienced an average GDP growth of nearly 10% per year, in turn raising GDP per capita almost 49 fold, from 155 current US Dollars in 1978 to 7,590 US Dollars in 2014. This growth lifted 800 million people out of poverty—a historically unparalleled achievement.^{47,48} Ultimately, the influence of pragmatist policies on China’s emergence as a world power is undisputed. As evidenced by rapid GDP growth, the emergence of an urbanized consumer class, China’s progress on the scientific and technological front, and an annual military budget of \$2.37 billion, the economic and political influence of the People’s Republic is second to only the United States in the modern era.⁴⁹

IV. Assessing Pragmatism in China: Archetype of Anomaly?

In 1980, the renowned economist Milton Friedman produced a ten-part broadcast series on public television, *Free to Choose*, to advocate for free-market principles.⁵⁰ In this series, Friedman observes Hong Kong, still a dependent territory of the declining British Empire, as a “laboratory” of the free-market system. Hong Kongese capitalists and entrepreneurs, recognizing the lack of natural resources in Hong Kong, utilized the lack of tariffs on imports or exports in the South China Sea to develop robust trading networks, and the Kowloon Peninsula soon emerged as a hub of commerce for the rising economic power. This success resulted in a territory with one of the

⁴⁷ Eckart, “8 Things You Need to Know About China’s Economy.”

⁴⁸ Much of China still remains impoverished. Among the greatest obstacles China faces towards overall prosperity is leveling the economic imbalance between the affluent urban centers in Eastern China and the less developed, agrarian regions of the West.

⁴⁹ Mangesh Sawant, “Why China cannot challenge the US military primacy,” Air University, December 13, 2021, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2870650/why-china-cannot-challenge-the-us-military-primacy/>

⁵⁰ Milton Friedman, “Free to Choose: The Original 1980 TV Series,” Free To Choose Network, January 1, 1980, https://www.freetochoosenetwork.org/programs/free_to_choose/index_80.php

highest standards of living in all of Asia: Hong Kong's GDP per capita rose nearly eight-fold, from 5,700 USD in 1980 to 49,661 USD in 2021.⁵¹ According to Friedman, the force underlying the productivity of the region was free-market economics. Unlike the command economy of Mao's China, Hong Kong businesses were necessarily able to anticipate supply and demand in the market, promulgating a steady culture of productivity. Beyond basic trade and production, the emergence of Hong Kong as an economic powerhouse spurred a series of modern innovations as Hong Kongese entrepreneurs sought to combat the West in technology and science, thereby affecting Hong Kong's emerging reputation as an innovative center.⁵²

Rather than merely exhibiting economic growth in Hong Kong, Friedman's documentary imparts a more general message: Hong Kong can be viewed as a microcosm of sorts, a downsized model of China's paralleled growth in the same decades, for the success of free-market policies Friedman documented in Hong Kong was closely replicated in much of China. As exhibited by Friedman's work, Deng's pragmatic policymaking is by no means only actionable in China; rather—as evidenced by its southern neighbor—a predictor of success beyond the borders of the People's Republic.

It must be noted that this essay's objective in documenting economic growth in China and Hong Kong is not to evince the superiority of the free-market system over the command economy, *per se*. The free-market system is merely a mechanism by which the success of pragmatist policy is best exhibited in the case studies of China and Hong Kong. Ultimately, this essay attempts to provide a comprehensive account of political pragmatism: the recognition that the merit of political ideologies is reliant solely on their functionality, a correspondent repudiation of dogmatism, and

⁵¹ "Hong Kong GDP Per Capita 1960-2023," MacroTrends, accessed May 4, 2023, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/HKG/hong-kong/gdp-per-capita>.

⁵² Common Sense Capitalism, "Milton Friedman Describes Hong Kong as an Example of the Free Market System." YouTube, November 2, 2010, educational video, www.youtube.com/watch?v=xqh0zXSd4vc.

the will to occasion historical change for the betterment of society. Deng Xiaoping's implementation of pragmatist policies offers not only a replicable template for economic prosperity, but immortalizes those who partook in the philosophical tradition responsible for pragmatist theory, preserving their memories in the impact of their thoughts. This is as unsurprising as it is poetic—a pragmatist would have it no other way.



chinese posters . net

⁵³ “Comrade Deng Xiaoping Inspecting the Army Parade.” Picture This. <https://www.picturethiscollection.com/exhibitions/detail/gw0312lcomradedengxi/en/>.

Jewish Participation in Narodnaya Volya

Bluma Gross

Imperial Russia's strict definition of nationality and respective policies marginalized minority communities that did not conform to Russian orthodoxy and the general notion of Official Nationality. The Jews in Russia were disenfranchised by Russian royalty, officials, peasantry, and notably by Catherine the Great's reign and her development of the Pale of Settlement in 1794. This social, economic, and political disenfranchisement, along with generally suboptimal living and rights restrictions on the entire Russian population, but especially the Jews, led to the mobilization of Populist movements that advocated for the removal of the tsar and his autocratic reign to a politically free Western-style constitutional republic in its stead. In this paper, I will analyze motivations for Jewish participation in the revolutionary terrorist movement Narodnaya Volya and how it impacted the perception and treatment of Jews in Russia before and after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (1818–1881).

The political and socioeconomic condition of Russian society under the absolute authority of Tsardom was dismal, lacking a constitutional framework and notions of civil and individual rights. Notwithstanding the disillusionment of the Russian masses with the Tsar's tyrannical reign and their lack of civil society, the Jews in Imperial Russia were not only deprived of civil rights but were perpetually perceived as alien to Russian society.¹

This perception by Russian society was only exacerbated with time as Jews were only permitted certain vocations within the confines of the Pale. Some common occupations Jews held in the Pale were tavern keepers, tax farmers, and *kulaks*.² These occupations were viewed as

¹ John Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855–1881* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

² Land-owning peasantry; Benjamin Nathans, *Beyond the Pale: The Jewish Encounter with Late Imperial Russia*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

immoral and generally unpreferable, which further played into the notion that Jews were parasitical and preyed on the weaknesses of Russian peasantry.³

One of the results of Catherine the Great's partitions of Poland was the development of the Pale of Settlement (Fig 1). Prior to the annexation of Poland, the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth hosted most of Europe's Jewish population.⁴ With the partitions, this large minority fell under Russian jurisdiction. Catherine's edict effectively decreed all Jews to the confines of the Pale in what is modern day Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Moldova, Lithuania, and Poland.⁵ Jewish restriction to the Pale was not the only legal way in which they were disenfranchised; Jews were also restricted from traveling, and in an attempt by Tsar Nicholas I to integrate Jews into wider society, Jewish boys were conscripted at much younger ages than the general Russian population, causing internal divides and collective trauma in these communities.⁶

Tsar Nicholas I's death and the transition to the reign of Alexander II heralded in an era of reforms for the general and Jewish population. Alexander II, dubbed the Tsar Liberator, abolished serfdom, eased restrictions on the Jewish population in the Pale by reducing legal discrepancies for Jewish professionals and those Jews who proved "useful" to Russian society, removed the inhumane underage conscripts or cantonist unit, and relaxed censorship.⁷ These policies and the comparatively freer atmosphere was known as the era of Great Reforms.⁸

³ Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*; Isaac Max Rubinow, *Economic condition of the Jews in Russia* (Arno Press, 1975).

⁴ Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 2.

⁵ Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 30.

⁶ Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 27–28.

⁷ Erich Haberer, *Jews and Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 20; Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 46–48, 51.

⁸ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 12.



Figure 1. The Pale of Settlement (1791–1917) was a territory in the Russian Empire in which Jews were confined.⁹

⁹ John Klier, "Pale of Settlement," YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern Europe, September 14, 2010, https://yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/Pale_of_Settlement.

One of Alexander II's reforms granted Jews who lived in the condensed Pale for generations the right to move to the Russian interior. Though conditionally, this process was part of the larger attempt to Russify all Jews in the Empire called Selective Integration according to Benjamin Nathans in *Beyond the Pale*.¹⁰ The Russian state bureaucracy worked together with the new class of Jewish intelligentsia to try to merge Jews into the Russian social hierarchy primarily through academia.¹¹ This condition, for Jews to ascertain a place in Russian society outside of the confines of the Pale, proved troublesome to the Jewish masses, who were largely pious and uninterested in a non-Jewish education for their children outside of the traditional *cheder* and *yeshiva*.¹² Only a handful were interested in a secular education, but for those few Jews who wanted to attend an institution of higher education, doing so meant abandoning their place in traditional Jewish society, as secular education was seen inside the community as heretical and nonconformist.¹³

The rise in popularity of Jewish enlightenment, or *Haskalah*, gave Western educated Jewish intelligentsia a platform to try to facilitate broader Jewish communal changes in imperial Russia during the liberating era of Alexander II's reforms.¹⁴ The *maskilic* Jews were a small, but vocal part of the Jewish community. One of the *maskilic* Jews' aims was to assimilate the Jewish masses to their modern, liberal, and secular ways, and they wanted to integrate them into Russian society. However, they were faced with fierce opposition by the primarily devout population.¹⁵

As renegades inside and outside the Jewish community in the Pale—i.e., their secular and integrative approach within and their Jewish identity to the Russian state bureaucracy externally—

¹⁰ Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 201.

¹¹ Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 202; Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question*, 366.

¹² Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 206.

¹³ Nathans, *Beyond the Pale*, 20.

¹⁴ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 6.

¹⁵ Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question*, 250.

Jewish intelligentsia were prone to joining revolutionary causes, such as the socialist organization Narodnaya Volya, or the People’s Will. Narodnaya Volya was a populist group that stood for the end of the tsar’s autocratic reign and the immediate granting of civil liberties and political freedom through systematic terror.¹⁶ Though only one Jew was implicated in the assassination Tsar Alexander II while the case was in trial, numerous Jews facilitated the assassination plot and were very active in Narodnaya Volya’s Executive Committee, which was the primary planning organ of the group.¹⁷ Moreover, to be part of the Executive Committee (among many other qualifications) one had to “oblige himself to remain in the society until its ends have been achieved, i.e., ‘the existing government has been destroyed.’”¹⁸ There was significant Jewish participation and loyalty in the Executive Committee.

Before joining Narodnaya Volya’s Executive Committee and becoming a radical constitutionalist, Aron Isaakovich Zundelevich was one of the early members of the first revolutionary (and exclusively Jewish) group known as the Vilna circle.¹⁹ Zundelevich grew up in Vilna to well-respected parents in the Jewish community.²⁰ He belonged to a middle-class family. His father was a talmudist and a devoted, although unsuccessful, commercial businessman, but his mother made ends meet for the family of nine as an inn manager in Vilna.²¹ As a religious child, Zundelevich had ambitions to become a rabbi.²² After his bar mitzvah, Zundelevich went to study in a yeshiva in Smorgon, in the Grodno region of Belarus, where, instead of deepening his faith, he encountered “heretical” *maskilic* literature and became skeptical of traditional Judaism.²³

¹⁶ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 17; Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia* (New York City: Alfred A Knopf, 1960), 639.

¹⁷ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 163.

¹⁸ Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 652.

¹⁹ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 75, 81.

²⁰ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 81.

²¹ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 81.

²² Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 81.

²³ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 82.

Further, Zundelevich joined the Vilna Rabbinical Seminary and maintained his *maskilic* views, only the former with his parents' approval, and taught himself Russian.²⁴

Zundelevich was an active participant in—and a key member of—the Executive committee in Narodnaya Volya; he secured the resources and underground provisions of Narodnaya Volya's revolutionary precursor, the defunct Zemlia i Volia.²⁵ It was Zundelevich who thought of using the then-modern dynamite for the assassination of the tsar.²⁶ Further, Zundelevich received the title of “chief contrabandist” for smuggling dynamite and illegal socialist literature. He was also called “minister of foreign affairs,” as he recruited and trained men from outside Imperial Russia.²⁷ Zundelevich also bought equipment for the movement's printing shop, which increased and improved printing operations, a crucial strategy to amass more members for the cause.²⁸ Zundelevich was arrested in the St. Petersburg Public Library in October of 1879 and sentenced to hard labor for life in Eastern Siberia, yet in 1906 he left and emigrated to England.²⁹ Though Zundelevich would no longer be able to participate in revolutionary activities, one of his apprentices and colleagues from the Vilna circle, Veniamin Iokhelson, would continue to transport revolutionary goods and was an important agent to the Executive Committee.³⁰

Vladimir or Veniamin Illich Iokhelson was born to a wealthy traditional Jewish family in Vilna.³¹ He had a strict religious upbringing and studied the Talmud at his parents' behest. As a result of his strict upbringing, he looked to “European education” as an escape and, with permission from his father, he studied Russian with a tutor.³² After persistent fights with his father

²⁴ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 81.

²⁵ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 188.

²⁶ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 189.

²⁷ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 189.

²⁸ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 189.

²⁹ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 188–91; Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 685.

³⁰ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 191.

³¹ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 80.

³² Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 80.

about going to a gymnasium to receive a secular education after his bar mitzvah, he and his father settled on the Vilna Rabbinical School.³³ It was in the Rabbinical seminary that Iokhelson met Zundelevich, who gave him guidance and encouragement as his senior, and they related over moving away from traditional Jewish norms.³⁴

Iokhelson was also instrumental in Narodnaya Volya's technical sphere. The Vilna native transported propaganda to disseminate to Russian intelligentsia and radicalized Jewish youth with socialist literature.³⁵ Iokhelson also issued *Narodovoltsy*, members of Narodnaya Volya, with forged identity papers and stamped them, which helped the revolutionaries with concealing their identities, assisting them in avoiding legal difficulties.³⁶ Furthermore, together with Hesia Helfman, the two scouted and created a "heavenly refuge" for the Narodovoltsy to gather in St. Petersburg, posing as a couple.³⁷ The location functioned as an assembly place and administrative center where most underground operations took place.³⁸ Moreover, Hesia Helfman was also an essential figure in Narodnaya Volya.

Hesia Helfman was a dedicated Narodovoltsy and critical member of the Executive Committee. Hesia Helfman, together with Iokhelson, established the apartment in St. Petersburg for Narodnaya Volya's clandestine operations and meetings in St. Petersburg.³⁹ Helfman made the apartment on Gorokhovaya Street an essential unit for the revolutionaries, at first as an underground printing establishment, then later to store the dynamite used for the assassination

³³ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 81.

³⁴ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 81.

³⁵ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 192.

³⁶ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 193.

³⁷ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 193.

³⁸ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 193.

³⁹ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 192.

plan.⁴⁰ Helfman also raised funds for the revolutionary cause and disseminated revolutionary socialist literature.⁴¹ As noted by Iokhelson:

Her talent was the creation of several important conspiratorial quarters where she proved herself an extremely adroit “proprietary.” Nobody matched her ability to get along with landlords and janitors as well as she did—to put off, as it were, uninvited visitors with smooth talk and to divert their attention from compromising objects which, it seemed, should inevitably have caught their eyes. Underneath a most unassuming, simple exterior, even talkativeness, there was hidden a remarkable presence of mind and ingenuity.⁴²

Helfman’s fate was grim and represented the dissolution of Narodnaya Volya. Helfman was one of the six destined to be hanged for her crime in the “tsaricide” if not for her pregnancy.⁴³ Though less lethal a sentence, she was given life in prison, but died shortly after the birth of her child in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St. Petersburg.⁴⁴

After the trial, Helfman’s role as a Jewish revolutionary was emphasized and a wave of pogroms erupted in Russia, largely inspired by the belief that Jews were responsible for the tsar’s assassination.⁴⁵ Though instrumental in facilitating revolutionary and terrorist activity leading to the assassination, the revolutionary Jews in Narodnaya Volya were not representative of the largely poor and devout Jewish population in Imperial Russia, who ultimately were not spared from being the target of the violent peasant’s “general socio-economic frustrations,” as noted by Haberer.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 194.

⁴¹ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 199.

⁴² Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 194.; V.I. Iokhel’son, “Gesia Mironovna Gel’fman,” in *Gesia Gel’fman. Materialy dlia biografi i kharakterstiki*, ed. V. Iokhel’son and R.M. Kantor (Petrograd-Moskva: Byloe, 1922), 11.

⁴³ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 198.

⁴⁴ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 19.; Venturi, Franco. *Roots of Revolution*, 720.

⁴⁵ Haberer, Erich. *Jews and Revolution*, 204–205.

⁴⁶ Haberer, *Jews and Revolution*, 205

At the end of the nineteenth century, the bleak Jewish condition in Imperial Russia led a minor, but vocal population of Jews to channel their social, political, and economic discontent through revolutionary means in the form of populist terrorism. This small subsection of Imperial Russian Jewry played a small, but critical, role in Narodnaya Volya's scheme to assassinate the tsar in hopes of sparking revolution and upending the tsar's autocratic reign.

Caffeine's Convivial Coup: The Influence of Coffee on Early Modern Society

Nadav Heller

Coffee is the second-most widely consumed non-alcoholic beverage in the world, and for good reason. It provides a convenient source of energy and numerous health benefits; it facilitates social interaction and creates venues for casual meetings. Coffee's universality in this regard is telling. Businessmen in New York might cut a deal over a Starbucks table, Ethiopian and Eritrean families may host day-long coffee rituals to gather family and friends, and Swedish colleagues might *fika* (break routine) with a signature *bryggkaffe*. The emergence of coffee and the coffeehouse as an epicenter for social development was most pronounced in the early modern period. The popular beverage migrated from Turkey to England to Germany to America. By analyzing coffee's influence on society, we can better understand both this beloved beverage and the formation of civilization as we know it today.

Coffee was also a precursor to modern multiculturalism. At first, the Turkish beverage was treated with great suspicion. Europeans have historically viewed Eastern cultures as inferior and in need of remediation, and all too often that remediation came in the form of colonial conquest. The idea of absorbing elements (even drinks) of their "backwards" cultures was regarded as dubious and unwise. After opening trade routes with Arab countries, Europeans began to recognize the complexity of their societies. This is perhaps best exemplified by the eccentric sartorial choices of Jean de Thévenot, a Frenchman who wore a turban and bisht in identification with Ottoman culture. Although this realization came to earnest fruition only many centuries later, its seedlings were ensconced between the fleshy lobes of the coffee cherry. Ironically, coffee catalyzed colonial activity in the early modern era by kickstarting tobacco-esque plantations. Max Havelaar famously bemoaned European exploitation of the Javanese and the lopsided cultivation system implemented there. Marx similarly remarked that one might mistakenly think that coffee was the natural destiny

of the West Indies because of its prevalence there. Between 1800 and 1850, 1.5-million slaves were put to work on coffee plantations, clearly demonstrating coffee's major role in colonial activity.

In addition to its international impact, coffee created local hangouts in the form of public spheres. German sociologist Jürgen Habermas loosely defined the “public sphere” as a forum to shape popular opinion. To Habermas, “the bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public” to discuss matters of common concern.¹ This radically shifted the conversation surrounding court and state, asserting that common men should have opinions and that those opinions should matter. Coffee, and its home, the coffeehouse, helped provide a setting conducive to creating a public sphere. The English coffeehouse in particular was open to all, even allowing women to attend their daily gatherings.² By the late seventeenth century, there were more than three-thousand coffeehouses in England, rivaling the well-established taverns that dotted the urban cityscape. They became popular as arenas for debate, and many popular intellectuals began their careers at coffeehouse tables. These coffeehouses were some of the first—and the most exemplary—public spheres.

Coffeehouses provided low-cost luxury for the poor. In Ottoman lands, the poor came to coffeehouses because they lacked shelter or a place to socialize. Patrons would treat their friends to a communal pot, and frequent customers could get rounds “on the house,” entrenching the coffeehouse as a cost-efficient outing.³ Charles White, a nineteenth-century British traveler, went

¹ Jürgen Habermas, Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox, “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964),” *New German Critique*, no. 3 (1974): 49–55, <https://doi.org/10.2307/487737>.

² Steve Pincus, “‘Coffee Politicians Does Create’: Coffeehouses and Restoration Political Culture,” *The Journal of Modern History* 67, no. 4 (1995): 807–34, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2124756>.

³ Ralph S. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985), 99.

so far as to call coffee “the principal sustenance of the poor.”⁴ The low-cost comfort and genial acceptance of the coffeehouse helped found and epitomize modern standards of living for the poor.

The coffeehouse was not just for the poor, however, and eventually usurped the tavern as the preferred haunt of the masses. This overtake was so extensive that in eighteenth-century Germany, Frederick the Great felt compelled to release a proclamation against it: “Everybody is using coffee. If possible, this must be prevented. My people must drink beer. His Majesty was brought up on beer, and so were his ancestors, and his officers.”⁵ Many German upperclassmen joined him in lamenting the impingement of coffee on beer commerce, decrying the substance as emasculating and unhealthful. As coffee, a stimulant, supplanted beer, an intoxicant, focus prevailed over drunkenness. In lieu of an afternoon pint, the common man might get an espresso, causing productivity to skyrocket. The prominence of coffee over beer also reflected a more meta-historic shift: the regnant beverage-of-choice for millennia had been unseated by a foreign newcomer. Consequently, coffeehouses were more sophisticated and less rowdy than taverns, and helped create a more refined and erudite social space.

Coffeehouses helped to generate an educated citizenry. Europeans seeking knowledge of current events flocked to coffeehouses for pamphlets, letters, and newspapers. To many, this was the primary draw of the coffeehouse, which earned the sobriquet “penny university” for the inexpensive edification it provided. In Ottoman culture as well, “early rising worshipers and pious men”⁶ frequented coffeehouses to make conversation, and coffeeshops became a place for witty men to discuss poetry and literature.⁷ In most pre-modern societies, the government was an

⁴ Charles White, *Three Years in Constantinople: Or, Domestic Manners of the Turks in 1844* (London: Henry Colburn, 1846).

⁵ William Harrison Ukers, *All About Coffee* (New York City: Tea and Coffee Trade Journal Company, 1922).

⁶ Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses*, 113.

⁷ Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses*, 101.

institution that people obeyed without understanding, and most lay people lacked the knowledge necessary to contribute to politics. In this way, coffeehouses helped sow the seeds of democracy by making politics accessible. Democracy etymologically originates in the Greek root “*demos*,” meaning “of the people,” as Stefan Zweig noted: Vienna coffeehouses were a “sort of democratic club to which admission costs the small price of a cup of coffee.”⁸

Coffeehouses became hubs for political unrest and were often targeted by monarchic authorities: Queen Mary and Charles II both tried to legally suppress coffeehouses, painting them as lairs of disaffected sedition.⁹ In France, cafes occasionally exploded into revolutions where “sentiment of more than common hardness or violence against the government” was enthusiastically applauded, and in 1789 the overthrow of Louis XVI began in a coffeehouse.¹⁰ As a sheltered place where political discussions were openly held, the coffeehouse served as a think tank for counter-cultural political ideologies. Adam Smith wrote *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) in a British coffeehouse, and Benjamin Franklin’s Club of Honest Whigs met at a London coffeehouse, to cite two examples.

Coffee further contributed to industrialization by helping establish contemporary sleep cycles. Early modern society viewed sleep as an unfortunate necessity to be banished if possible to avoid wasting time.¹¹ Alexander Pope used “drowsiness as a metaphor for cultural collapse and celebrate[d] coffee for keeping the senses alert.”¹² In keeping with Pope’s sentiment, coffee was frequently marketed as a solution to combat drowsiness. In 1652, an advertisement for coffee read: “it will prevent Drowsiness... and therefore you are not to drink of it after Supper, unless you

⁸ Stefan Zweig, *The World of Yesterday* (Lexington: Plunkett Lake Press, 2013).

⁹ Ukers, *All About Coffee*, 73.

¹⁰ Ukers, *All About Coffee*, 73.

¹¹ Benjamin Reiss, *Wild Nights: How Taming Sleep Created Our Restless World* (New York City: Basic Books, 2017).

¹² Reiss, *Wild Nights*.

intend to be watchful, for it will hinder sleep for 3 or 4 hours.” (Fig. 1) Coffee helped late-nighters stay up and work, and helped early-risers get their days started, solidifying the eight-hour night so common in the modern West.




Figure 1. The very first ad for coffee (1652).¹³

¹³ Jim Edwards, “This Is the First Ever Ad for Coffee, from 1652,” *Business Insider*, July 23, 2012, <https://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-the-first-ever-ad-for-coffee-from-1652-2012-7>.

Coffee additionally established nighttime as an opportunity for work and productivity. Previously the domain of vagrant devilry, the night became the province of workers, writers, politicians, and intellectuals. Coffee enabled late working nights (and offered regenerative morning espressos as a fallback), further cementing contemporary sleep schedules. Coffee thus became associated with productivity, long working hours, and intense concentration—all trademarks of early-modern work ethic and calling cards of Enlightenment industrialism.

As a final reflection, the avant-garde specialization of commodities so popular today is perhaps typified by coffee. Historically, coffee was not enjoyed for its taste, and its “quality” was a relative nonfactor. Early accounts describe haphazard brewing processes, and advised drinking coffee at a temperature too hot to taste. As coffee became more of a luxury, it began to address different markets. Mass-produced instant coffee provided an inexpensive, effective, and convenient caffeine kick. The “Double R” Brazilian-style coffeehouse, on the other hand, worked at a much more leisurely pace, grinding their beans on-site and encouraging patrons to linger. To this day, coffee prices vary widely from industrial instant at \$3/lb to specialty Hacienda el Roble for over \$100/lb. A discerning consumer with a delicate palate looking to enjoy the experience of tasting coffee might opt for more expensive and more specific coffees, whereas working-class caffeine junkies are happy to purchase whatever is cheapest.

As Paula Mathieu powerfully notes, the striated commodification of goods occurs in every corner of the market, from produce to computers to transit, and coffee serves as a microcosm for this division. Starbucks, for example, markets a coffee experience that transcends a tasty beverage: “When we consume Starbucks, we consume justifying narratives along with the products” that aim to “persuade consumers that drinking its coffee is a transcendent gourmet experience.”¹⁴ In this

¹⁴ Paula Mathieu, “Economic Citizenship and the Rhetoric of Gourmet Coffee,” *Rhetoric Review* 18, no. 1 (1999): 112–27. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/466093>.

way, coffee's developing market influenced economic specialization on a historic scale—not only are there wide discrepancies in coffee quality, but there is a coffee *experience* as well. A coffeehouse may have mellow lighting, soft indie rock, and fuzzy charcoal art on the walls. It aims to be a place for a casual date, a work meeting, a homework assignment, or just an escape from the house. In a way, however, we have all been *living* the coffee experience for decades. Our sleep schedules, social interactions, economic decisions, class alignments, and political systems were guided by coffee long before marketing consultants took notice. The coffeehouse may no longer be the public sphere Habermas dreamed of, but it's an undeniable staple of modern culture, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

The Passing of the Great Racist: Examining Madison Grant's Pseudoscientific Work

Yonatan U. Kurz

I. Introduction

In 1916, American lawyer and eugenicist Madison Grant released a book titled *The Passing of the Great Race* (or, *The Racial Basis of European History*)¹ in which he posited that white people from Northern and Western Europe, whom he referred to as the “Nordic race,” were inherently superior to other human “races,” and proceeded to discuss the history and nature of these races and how they manifested themselves throughout American history (Fig. 1). Despite Grant’s extensive usage of scientific language and seemingly thorough expositions of his theories, he lacked sufficient evidence to provide a thorough basis for these ideas. Instead, he utilized pseudoscience as a springboard to assert the dominance of the Nordics and urge for rules and regulations that would control the population of “inferior people,” including Italians, Syrians, Hindus, Negroes, and Jews. Despite Grant’s deeply flawed understanding of both the science of race and its integration into European and American history alike, his work nonetheless received critical acclaim and served as a justification for not only discrimination against and oppression of minorities, but even for the heinous crimes committed by the Nazis during World War II. Thus, Grant served as the eugenic progenitor of modern-scientific racism and produced a destructive ripple effect for decades to come.

¹ Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race: Or, The Racial Basis of European History*, Fourth ed., (New York City: Scribner, 1936).





Figure 1. The cover of Madison Grant's book from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (left) and his portrait from the 1920s (right).²

II. (Pseudo)Scientific Context

Many of Grant's theories and suppositions in *The Passing of the Great Race* were firmly predicated on an assortment of racist and pseudoscientific eugenics which, when combined with his zoological expertise, were perceived by many as substantial backing for his bigoted arguments and attestations of Nordic superiority, and gave him the means to express further racist rhetoric.³ After beginning his work with a discussion of race and democracy, in which he stressed the importance of striking a "clear distinction between race and nationality,"⁴ Grant proceeded to

² United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "An Obsession with Preservation," *Medium*, November 2, 2022, <https://medium.com/memory-action/an-obsession-with-preservation-c52d4038462a>.

³ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 152.

⁴ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 3.

describe the physical basis of race, invoking the Mendelian Laws of Inheritance that “certain bodily characters, such as skull shape, stature, eye color, hair color and nose form...are transmitted in accordance with fixed laws,” and “various characters which are normally correlated or linked together in pure races may, after a prolonged admixture of races, pass down separately and form what is known as disharmonic combinations.”⁵ These positions revealed Grant’s belief that unappealing attributes were actually transferred not only between family members, but even within ethnic and religious groups. This provided a basis for him to revile any sort of fusion between the Nordics and other races, as “the result of the mixture of two races, in the long run, gives us a race reverting to the more ancient, generalized and lower type.”⁶

Grant then delved into the nature of interbreeding as well as the physical characteristics that can determine race, stating that the best method of doing so is the “comparison of proportions of the skull, the so-called cephalic index” before explaining the physical features of three distinct subspecies of man: the Nordic or Baltic subspecies, the dark Mediterranean or Iberian subspecies, and the Alpine subspecies.⁷ These descriptions allowed Grant to integrate his bigoted arguments into his work, as he denigrated the “power of environment” as “derived in its turn from the loose thinkers of the French Revolution and their American mimics.” Grant claimed that “such beliefs have done much damage in the past and if allowed to go uncontradicted, may do even more serious damage in the future.”⁸ These profoundly bigoted statements peaked with the comment that “it has taken us fifty years to learn that speaking English, wearing good clothes and going to school and to church do not transform a Negro into a white man...Americans will have a similar experience with the Polish Jew, whose dwarf stature, peculiar mentality and ruthless concentration on self-

⁵ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 13–14.

⁶ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 18.

⁷ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 19–21.

⁸ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 16.

interest are being engrafted upon the stock of the nation.”⁹ Such statements made it evident that the “scientific backings” that were present in Grant’s work merely served as justifications for ruthlessly racist rhetoric.

III. Sociological Context

The Passing of the Great Race is also predicated upon a strong sociological frame of reference with respect to the nature of races and populations, in addition to his accompanying problems and solutions. This stance provided Grant with a segue to discuss the elimination, or at the very least, the detachment of the lesser races. When discussing the nature of “Race, Language, And Nationality,” Grant described how races compete, explaining that “where two races occupy a country side by side, it is not correct to speak of one type as changing into the other... one of the two contrasted types will have some small advantage or capacity which the other lacks...those possessing these favorable variations will flourish at the expense of their rival...[and] one type gradually breeds the other out. In this sense, and in this sense only, do races change.”¹⁰ However, it is with this idea that Grant decried the “mistaken regard for what are believed to be divine laws and a sentimental belief in the sanctity of human life,” declaring “the laws of nature require the obliteration of the unfit and human life is valuable only when it is of use to the community or race.”¹¹ This statement, combined with his voiced concerns that either an “inferior type or race may profit greatly by good environment,” or that “on the other hand, a member of a superior race in bad surroundings may, and very often does, sink to an extremely low level,”¹² allowed Grant to transition to the idea of racial Darwinism and Nordic supremacy.

⁹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 16.

¹⁰ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 46.

¹¹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 47.

¹² Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 98.

The aforementioned “obliteration” was justified in Grant’s eyes by the “supply [of] brains for the unthinking mass of the community,” in addition to the “ever increasing number of moral perverts, mental defectives and hereditary cripples,”¹³ for “great injury is done to the community by the perpetuation of worthless types,”¹⁴ and “it is race, always race, that produces genius.”¹⁵ It is likely with this belief that Grant stated that “Negroes have demonstrated throughout recorded time that they are a stationary species and that they do not possess the potentiality of progress or initiative from within. Progress from self-impulse must not be confounded with mimicry or with progress imposed from without by social pressure or by the slaver’s lash.”¹⁶ Thus does Grant exhibit his attribution of a lack of value to the Negro race. Grant also posited a model of precedent for such measures to be taken and mentioned contemporary American society among them. Grant discusses the absorption of blond Nordic invaders in Hindustan and the “carefully regulated system of castes” in India “to preserve the purity of their blood” before writing that “in our Southern States Jim Crow cars and social discriminations have exactly the same purpose and justification.”¹⁷ Grant’s observations concerning the development, structure, and functioning of human society served to justify his discriminatory proposal; all that was missing was a framework to further warrant his suggestions.

IV. Historical Context

Grant’s scientific racism relied heavily on utilizing an apparent historical context to work with, coalescing itself into his understanding of the history of America from a bigoted perspective. He then proceeded to explain how the integration of other races has led to “the American look[ing]

¹³ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 49.

¹⁴ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 50.

¹⁵ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 98.

¹⁶ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 77.

¹⁷ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 70.

calmly abroad and urg[ing] on others the suicidal ethics which are exterminating his own race.”¹⁸ In his very introduction, Grant brazenly denied the phrase, “we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal” in the Declaration of Independence, by explaining that the authors “were themselves the owners of slaves and despised Indians as something less than human...equality in their minds meant merely that they were just as good Englishmen as their brothers across the sea.”¹⁹ He added that the addition of the word “free” to the phrase is false, and such an alteration would surely “startle and amaze” the Founding Fathers. Grant then proceeded to rebuke earlier Americans for welcoming immigrants to help with the industry and remarked that “the New England manufacturer imported the Irish and French Canadians and the resultant fall in the New England birthrate at once became ominous.”²⁰ In Grant’s eyes, the economic boons given by the migrants were not worth their integration into society, as “the American sold his birthright in a continent to solve a labor problem. Instead of retaining political control and making citizenship an honorable and valued privilege, he entrusted the government of his country and the maintenance of his ideals to races who have never yet succeeded in governing themselves, much less any one else.” This led to the “spread of socialism and the recrudescence of obsolete religious forms.”²¹ Evidently, the purported relegation of manual labor to minorities was, from Grant’s perspective, a sign of national deterioration.

Such scientific racism continues with Grant’s discussion of the pre-Civil War South, where he remarked that the white man’s entrusting of labor in the fields and factor to the Negro slaves to spare them of “exposure to an unfavorable environment” meant that “when slavery was abolished and the white man had to plough his own fields or work in the factory deterioration began,” it led

¹⁸ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 91.

¹⁹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, xx–xxi.

²⁰ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 11.

²¹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 12.

to a “change in type of the men who are now sent by the Southern States to represent them in the Federal Government...attributed to the fact that a large portion of the best racial strains in the South were killed off during the Civil War,” and “the new democratic ideals...result in the choice of representatives who lack the distinction and ability of the leaders of the Old South.”²² To Grant, fundamentally incorrect decisions were made by Southern whites on both a physical and political level over the last century that enabled such a weakening, as he strongly questioned “the subsequent granting of citizenship to Negroes and to ever-increasing numbers of immigrants of plebeian, servile or Oriental races, who throughout history have shown little capacity to create, organize or even to comprehend Republican institutions.”²³ Undeniably, he held the belief that emancipating African-Americans harmed the American public. Grant stated that “the Negroes of the United States while stationary, were not a serious drag on civilization until in the last century they were given the rights of citizenship and were incorporated in the body politic.”²⁴ This claim not only laments a perceived decline in America, but also unabashedly presents overtly racist assumptions with no evidence to support them.

Grant expressed his racist and xenophobic views as he discussed the decline in the Native American population. He attributed this decrease to the growing presence of immigrants and minorities in America. He predicted that “in large sections of the country the native American will entirely disappear,” in light of their disposition to not “intermarry with inferior races” and inability to “compete in the sweat shop and in the street trench with the newcomers.”²⁵ However, he immediately integrated a racist element into this prediction as well, and boldly stated that

²² Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 42–43.

²³ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 218.

²⁴ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 82.

²⁵ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 92.

the result of unlimited immigration is showing plainly in the rapid decline in the birth rate of native Americans because the poorer classes of Colonial stock...will not bring children into the world to compete in the labor market with the Slovak, the Italian, the Syrian and the Jew...these immigrants adopt the language of the native American, wear his clothes, steal his name and...take his women, but they seldom adopt his religion or understand his ideals.²⁶

Grant sought to ascribe the woes of the Native Americans to the new minorities and migrants of America. He remarked that “the Melting Pot was acting instantly under the influence of a changed environment,”²⁷ and saw such assimilation as ruining the virtue of the white population that was purely Nordic prior to the Civil War.²⁸ While Grant clearly viewed the Melting Pot as an American debacle, he lacked meaningful substance to vindicate and validate his claims, leading to the next major component of this work.

Grant then transitioned to tracing the history of European races, perusing the eras of Eolithic Man, Paleolithic Man, and the Neolithic and Bronze Ages before discussing his trifurcation of races (Alpine, Mediterranean, and Nordic) and how they manifested within European and Asian history. From the very start, he made his beliefs in Social Darwinism quite visible, and remarked that the European “low cranial average...can be best explained by the presence of large numbers of individuals of inferior mentality,” defects that were “carefully preserved by modern charity, whereas in the savage state of society the backward members were allowed to perish and the race was carried on by the vigorous and not by the weaklings.”²⁹ Moreover, he made it clear that the fact that the British Isles is the only nation lacking “true Alpine round skulls... composed solely of Nordic and Mediterranean races,” and “to this fact are

²⁶ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 91.

²⁷ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 17.

²⁸ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 81.

²⁹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 109.

undoubtedly due many of the individualities and much of the greatness of the English people,”³⁰ showing that he believed a total erasure of the so-called “Alpine race” was crucial for the greatness of a nation, given the fact that “in classic, medieval and modern times, [they] have played an unimportant part in European culture.”³¹

This degradation of the Alpine race, was in contact to the greatness of the Nordic race, which he called “the race that gave the world the great civilizations of Egypt, of Crete, of Phoenicia including Carthage, of Etruria, of Mycenaean Greece, of Assyria and much of Babylonia...the most splendid of all civilizations, that of ancient Hellas, and the most enduring of political organizations, the Roman state.”³² This group, described as being “a purely European type, in the sense that it has developed its physical characters and its civilization within the confines of that continent...[and] therefore, the Homo europaeus, the white man par excellence.”³³ Having described and defined the races, origins, and distinctive features of each group, and “having shown the existence in Europe of three distinct subspecies of man,”³⁴ Grant made sure to draw an unmistakable distinction between the virtues that each race brought to society. He gave to the Mediterranean race “chief credit of the classic civilization of Europe, in the sciences, art, poetry, literature, and philosophy, as well as the major part of the civilization of Greece, and a very large share in the Empire of Rome,”³⁵ and called the Nordics “domineering, individualistic, self-reliant” and “a race of soldiers, sailors, adventurers and explorers, but above all, of rulers, organizers and aristocrats in sharp contrast to the essentially peasant and democratic character of the Alpines.”³⁶ Such a historical frame of reference made it abundantly obvious that Grant believed the Alpine

³⁰ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 137.

³¹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 147.

³² Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 153.

³³ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 167.

³⁴ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 233.

³⁵ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 165.

³⁶ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 228.

race and the weak minorities had been and continued to be an encumbrance of society, and a proper solution was necessary to restore order to humanity.

V. Proposed Solution for the Great Race

While establishing his rationale from historical, sociological, and pseudoscientific vantage points that humanity was facing a major issue of race-mixing, Grant provided several “remedies” to “those who read these pages [and] feel that there is little hope for humanity.”³⁷ Regarding the concept of race improvement, he saw two possible methods of solution: either man could “breed from the best,” as the Spartans had done with great success, or “eliminate the worst by segregation or sterilization.” After recalling the Middle Age’s persecutions that resulted in the elimination of free thinking and profession found in Spain, northern Italy, France, and the Low Countries, Grant declared that the best method of race improvement was to deprive the least “desirable elements of the nation” of the power to contribute to future generations, and used the obliteration of black sheep and certain colored cattle as “scientific” examples.³⁸ Moreover, he proclaimed a belief that “A rigid system of selection through the elimination of those who are weak or unfit—in other words, Social failures—would solve the whole question in a century, [and] enable us to get rid of the undesirables who crowd our jails, hospitals and insane asylums.”³⁹

While Grant did not call for mass extermination of the individual, having said that “the individual himself can be nourished, educated and protected by the community during his lifetime,” he nonetheless asserted that “the state through sterilization must see to it that his line stops with him or else future generations will be cursed with an ever increasing load of victims of misguided sentimentalism,”⁴⁰ and displayed a clear belief in social Darwinism that would create a

³⁷ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 50.

³⁸ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 51–53.

³⁹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 50–51.

⁴⁰ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 51.

certain level of supremacy. He also showed a desire for racial distinctions, as he claimed that they were “absolutely essential to race purity in any community when two or more races live side by side... [It] may be called prejudice by those whose careers are cramped by it but it is a natural antipathy which serves to maintain the purity of type. The unfortunate fact that nearly all species of men interbreed freely leaves us no choice in the matter,”⁴¹ and dwelled on his earlier comments that “races must be kept apart by artificial devices of this sort or they ultimately amalgamate and in the offspring the more generalized or lower type prevails.”⁴² To Grant, all of his exposition in the various spheres merely served as a background for him to strongly advocate and justify discrimination, segregation, and racial selection to end the racial woes that had plagued humanity.

VI. Grant’s Anti-Semitism

Although Grant derided the African-American population as the most significant racial burden on society, he also expressed a sense of hauteur toward Jews in *The Passing of the Great Race*. In addition to his earlier comments that the Polish Jew’s “ruthless concentration on self-interest are being engrafted upon the stock of the nation,”⁴³ he concluded in his discussions of the lower type winning out in race mixtures that “the cross between any of the three European races and a Jew is a Jew,”⁴⁴ revealing an utter scorn and derision towards the people. Moreover, he compared them to the Negro race in assuming American names,⁴⁵ adding that “the man of the old stock is being crowded out of many country districts by these foreigners just as he is to-day being literally driven off the streets of New York City by the swarms of Polish Jews.”⁴⁶

⁴¹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 18.

⁴² Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 221–222.

⁴³ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 16.

⁴⁴ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 18.

⁴⁵ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 81.

⁴⁶ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 91.

However, such comments were merely a hint of Grant's raging anti-Semitism. In a different one of his works, *The Conquest of a Continent Or, The Expansion of Races in America* (1933), Grant wrote extensively about how Jews were "essentially a non-European people...distinctly Alpine...a mixture of Slavs and of Asiatic invaders of Russia,"⁴⁷ and spoke worriedly about the mass immigration of Jews to America, crying out that "Americans were so obsessed with the idea of a "Refuge for the Oppressed" that they even welcomed the draining into our country of that morass of human misery found in the Polish Ghettos."⁴⁸ Such hateful rhetoric had been previously stated in a letter sent by Grant to President Taft where he exhorted that Polish Jews were "ruining" America's big cities,⁴⁹ claiming that the President had fallen to the "Jewish influence" by vetoing the Literacy Test Act of 1912 and clearly attempting to use his stature to influence Taft to discriminate against Jews. While the anti-Semitism in *The Passing of the Great Race* was certainly less garish in comparison to other sections of Grant's oeuvre, sentiments of Jewish inferiority are nonetheless quite perceptible in his vehemently racist rhetoric and remain a fundamentally foundational part of this work.

VII. A View of America's Future

Throughout *The Passing of the Great Race*, Grant made his views on the necessity for racial boundaries quite clear, and occasionally gave very specific examples to necessitate such divisions, and declared that "as long as the dominant imposes its will on the servient race and they remain in the same relation to the whites as in the past, the Negroes will be a valuable element in the community but once raised to social equality their influence will be destructive to themselves

⁴⁷ Madison Grant, *The Conquest of a Continent; Or, The Expansion of Races in America* (New York City: Scribner, 1933), 225.

⁴⁸ Grant, *The Conquest of a Continent*, 225–227.

⁴⁹ "Madison Grant, Restrictionist and Eugenicist, Dead," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency* 2, no. 250 (June 1937), http://pdfs.jta.org/1937/1937-06-02_250.pdf?_ga=2.257017615.586597273.1672555100-2117813218.1671374420.

and to the whites.”⁵⁰ However, he also provided his own prognostications for the American future, and predicted that “far more value will be attached to racial in contrast to national or linguistic affinities...when it becomes thoroughly understood that the children of mixed marriages between contrasted races belong to the lower type, the importance of transmitting in unimpaired purity the blood inheritance of ages will be appreciated at its full value.”⁵¹ He also insisted that the role of the educational system would change with such an understanding reaching the public, and expressed that that “as soon as the true bearing and import of the facts are appreciated by lawmakers a complete change in our political structure will inevitably occur and our present reliance on the influence of education will be superseded by a readjustment based on racial values.”⁵² Maintaining the position that the “extreme antiquity of physical and spiritual characters” would withstand the elements of language and nationality, Grant contended that such facts had to be considered in relation to American race development. He then concluded the work with an utter rejection of the union of races found in the Melting Pot, and perorated that “we Americans must realize that the altruistic ideals which have controlled our social development during the past century and the maudlin sentimentalism that has made America ‘an asylum for the oppressed,’ are sweeping the nation toward a racial abyss.”⁵³ Such an admonition of caution served as the apogee to Grant’s work, a castigation of American decency in favor of Nordic supremacy that left little to the imagination about the true nature and motivation for his cause.

VIII. Reception and Impact

Despite *The Passing of the Great Race*’s unmistakable racism and extensive usage of pseudoscience without substantial backing, Grant’s educational background (a degree from Yale

⁵⁰ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 87–88.

⁵¹ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 60.

⁵² Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 262.

⁵³ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 263.

with honors as well as a law degree from Columbia Law School), stature⁵⁴ and illustriousness as cofounder of the American environmental movement provided his work with critical acclaim from intellectuals and leading thinkers alike. One such example was Charles Benedict Davenport, a fervid eugenicist and professor of zoology at Harvard, who wrote a letter to Grant urging him to push forward on immigration restriction, and asked, “Can we build a wall high enough around this country so as to keep out these cheaper races; or will it be a feeble dam, leaving it to our descendants to abandon the country to blacks, browns, and yellows?”⁵⁵ Moreover, it has been documented that Grant enjoyed friendships with multiple presidents; in fact, President Teddy Roosevelt raved about the book in the February 1917 issue of *Scribner’s*, and called it

a capital book, in purpose, in vision, in grasp of the facts our people most need to realize. It shows a habit of single serious thought on the subject’s most commanding importance. It shows a fine fearlessness in assailing the popular and mischievous sentimentalities and attractive and corroding falsehoods which few men dare assail. It is the work of an American scholar and gentleman, and all Americans should be sincerely grateful to you for writing it.⁵⁶

The Passing of the Great Race received favorable reviews, and was reprinted in 1922, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1930, 1932, and 1936, as it sold over one million copies. It also made its way into the 1920s culture of America and was referenced and alluded to by both F. Scott Fitzgerald and Ernest

⁵⁴ He was, among other things, president of the New York Zoological Society, a trustee of the American Museum of Natural History, director of the American Eugenics Society, vice president of the Immigration Restriction League, a founding member of the Galton Society, Secretary of the New York Zoological Society, an early member of the Boone and Crockett Club, and one of the eight members of the International Committee of Eugenics.

⁵⁵ Paul A. Offit, *Pandora’s Lab: Seven Stories of Science Gone Wrong* (Washington D.C.: National Geographic, 2017), 120.

⁵⁶ Theodore Roosevelt, “New Scribner Publications,” *Scribner’s Magazine* 61, no. 2 (February 1917): 18.

Hemingway, who subtitled one of his satirical treatments “A Romantic Novel in Honor of *The Passing of a Great Race*.”^{57,58}

Such plaudits and commendations revealed the likelihood that *The Passing of the Great Race* had a direct influence on American policy, especially given its comprehensive treatment of the nature of eugenics.⁵⁹ Just one year after its publishing, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1917 banning “all idiots, imbeciles, feebleminded persons, epileptics, insane persons, [and] persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority” from entering the United States, and during deliberations, one congressman reportedly read directly from *The Passing of the Great Race*.⁶⁰ The book also influenced the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and the Immigration Act of 1924, which restricted immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and Africa while banning migrants from the Middle East and Asia, a law that anthropologist Franz Boas said centered around the Nordic theory of superiority.⁶¹ It also led to the National Origins Act of 1929, which led to more immigrants entering the United States in 1907 alone than during the entire next quarter-century.⁶² This, of course, excited Grant, who called it “one of the greatest steps forward in the history of this country...we have closed the doors just in time to prevent our Nordic population from being overrun by the lower races.”⁶³

⁵⁷ In *The Great Gatsby*, the character Tom Buchanan reads a book called *The Rise of the Colored Empires* by “this man Goddard,” presumably a combination of Grant and his colleague Lothrop Stoddard. “Everybody ought to read it,” Buchanan explained. “The idea is if we don’t look out, the white race will be—will be utterly submerged. It’s all scientific stuff; it’s been proved.” [F. Scott. Fitzgerald, *The Great Gatsby* (New York City: Scribner, 1925), 10.] (It is worth noting that Buchanan’s character is the primary antagonist of the novel that can be viewed as a caricature.)

⁵⁸ Ernest Hemingway, *The Torrents of Spring: A Romantic Novel in Honor of the Passing of a Great Race* (New York City: Scribner, 1926).

⁵⁹ Charles C. Alexander, “Prophet of American Racism: Madison Grant and the Nordic Myth.” *Phylon* (1960–) 23, no. 1 (first Qtr, 1962): 77, <https://doi.org/10.2307/274146>.

⁶⁰ Alexander, “Prophet of American Racism,” 77, footnote 12.

⁶¹ Noel Hartman, “‘The Passing of the Great Race’ @100,” *Public Books*, July 17, 2016, www.publicbooks.org/the-passing-of-the-great-race-at-100/.

⁶² Paul A. Offit, “The Loathsome American Book That Inspired Hitler,” *The Daily Beast*, August 26, 2017, www.thedailybeast.com/the-loathsome-american-book-that-inspired-hitler.

⁶³ Jonathan Spiro, *Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant* (Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2009), 233.

However, the most devastating impact of *The Passing of the Great Race* can be found overseas, where Grant's work received great praise upon its translation to German a decade after its original publishing. The book received a warm embrace from supporters of the German National Socialist movement and was read in prison by a sullen officer named Adolf Hitler, who wrote Grant an admiring letter after becoming Führer,⁶⁴ calling the book "his Bible"⁶⁵ and thanking him for his work. In fact, sections of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* actually plagiarized Grant:⁶⁶ Grant said that "it has taken us 50 years to learn that speaking English, wearing good clothes, and going to school and to church does not transform a Negro into a white man,"⁶⁷ and Hitler wrote that "it is a scarcely conceivable fallacy of thought to believe that a Negro or a Chinese, let us say, will turn into a German because he learns German and is willing to speak the German language,"⁶⁸ leading a reviewer in the *New York Times Book Review* section to say, "substitute Aryan for Nordic and a good deal of Mr. Grant's argument would lend itself without much difficulty to the support of some recent pronouncements and proceedings in Germany."⁶⁹

Grant's work was the first non-German book ordered to be reprinted by the Nazis upon taking power, with the party listing it as essential reading in 1936,⁷⁰ and during their prosecution for committed during World War II war crimes, Nazi leaders presented the book as proof that eugenics did not arise in Germany but rather had deep American origins. Only a quarter-

⁶⁴ Stefan Kühl, *Nazi Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 85.

⁶⁵ Edwin Black, *War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race* (New York City: Avalon Publishing Group, 2003), 259.

⁶⁶ Aliya R. Hoff, "The Passing of the Great Race; or The Racial Basis of European History (1916), by Madison Grant," *Embryo Project Encyclopedia*, July 12, 2021, <http://embryo.asu.edu/handle/10776/13282>.

⁶⁷ Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 16.

⁶⁸ Adolf Hitler, "Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler (3)," Wellesley College Academics, accessed May 5, 2023, <http://academics.wellesley.edu/Polisci/wj/100/mk3.html>.

⁶⁹ William MacDonal, "Mr. Grant's Plea for a Nordic, Protestant America," *New York Times*, November 5, 1933, <https://www.nytimes.com/1933/11/05/archives/mr-grants-plea-for-a-nordic-protestant-america-the-conquest-of-a.html>

⁷⁰ Offit, "The Loathsome American Book That Inspired Hitler."

century after its publishing, and *The Passing of the Great Race* had not merely been a recipe for Nordic supremacy and “race purity”—it was a blueprint for ethnic genocide, and Grant was the architect, his pseudo-science hailed as an inspiration for several atrocities.

Even in today’s day and age, long after Madison Grant’s ideas have fallen from grace and lost credit thanks to their association with Nazism,⁷¹ vestiges of his thought can nevertheless be found in bigoted and deeply racist rhetoric. His comments that “one class or type in a population expands more rapidly than another and ultimately replaces it...a replacement pure and simple and not a transformation”⁷² contain strong similarities to the white nationalist replacement theory often quoted by the far-right in modern America, and his notions of Nordic supremacy bear a striking resemblance to the contemporary white supremacists found in the United States. Despite Grant’s fallacious and vitriolic statements of pseudoscience in *The Passing of the Great Race* having little to no backing, they nonetheless continued to carry credence in the eyes of eugenicists and nationalists alike and gave him the horrific honorific of being one of the founding fathers of modern racism.

⁷¹ Ella Wagner and Perri Meldon, “Madison Grant,” National Park Service, April 6, 2022, <https://www.nps.gov/people/madison-grant.htm>.

⁷² Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 47.

The Birth and Life of the Finnish National Movement

Avi Polotsky

I. Introduction

In the far reaches of nineteenth-century Northeastern Europe, Finnish subjects of Czarist Russia began to push for control of their national destiny. Since the twelfth century, the Finns had no sovereignty, and Finland was either occupied by Swedish or Russian forces. However, a Finnish identity began to transcend Swedish or Russian citizenship between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. This Finnish identity fueled a mass national movement that succeeded in forming an independent Finland for the first time in history. This research paper will explain the history of the Finnish national movement according to Miroslav Hroch's typology of national development,¹ highlight ancestral myths that formed the Finnish identity, and outline the ideological models of Finnish patriotism.

II. History of Finland and the National Movement

Miroslav Hroch's typology will guide this account of the history of Finland and the Finnish national movement. Hroch laid out three phases of progression in national movements. The first is Phase A, scholarly interest in that nation's culture. Next is Phase B, patriotic agitation by an educated elite. Phase C is the final stage, the rise of a popular national movement.² As the Finnish national movement is interwoven with Finnish history, the transitions to each phase will be addressed.

¹ Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

² Hroch. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*.

Early Finnish History and Swedish Rule

The Finnish nation descends from Finno-Ugric tribes that lived in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. These tribal ancestors occupied the area as early as the Stone Age.³ The Finnic tribes never formed a unified polity; their only relation to each other was through ethnicity and language. Finnish is a Finno-Ugric language with Germanic and Slavic influences. Due to tribal decentralization, the term “Finland” was only used by outsiders to refer to the geographical area. Toward the end of the first millennium, the politically fragmented Finnic tribes coalesced into a single ethnic group due to the presence of Scandinavian Swedes to the west and Slavic Russians to the east. The Kingdom of Sweden and the Principality of Novgorod-Seversk competed to control the region. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the area of Finland was gradually conquered by Swedish forces. In 1323, Sweden and Novgorod signed a peace treaty, solidifying Swedish control of Finland.

Over the next 486 years, the Finnish people became acculturated into Sweden. There was no concept of an independent Finland; it was only seen as a region of greater Sweden. During this period, the Finns were loyal to the Swedish leadership, and their only noticeable distinction from ethnic Swedes was language. The population of geographic Finland was split between a predominantly peasant Finnish majority and a multi-class Swedish minority. Though the Swedes were the elite in Finland, Finnish peasants were never subjected to a feudal system and many owned land.

Swedish was the official language, and literature in Finland was only produced in Swedish. Finnish was the dominant colloquial language, but it was not the medium of art and intellectual activity. The first example of Finnish literature is credited to Bishop Mikael Agricola, an ethnic

³ Erland Nordenskiöld, “Finland: The Land and the People,” *Geographical Review* 7, no. 6 (June 1919): 362, <https://doi.org/10.2307/207669>.

Finnish religious leader who lived in the sixteenth century.⁴ The roots of a Finnish national identity sprung from there, and two centuries later, Finno-Swedish noblemen began to take an interest in Finnish culture. With the work of ethnographers, the multiple Finnish dialects were unified into a central literary language. The advent of a Finnish literary tradition marks the beginning of Phase A.⁵ Interestingly, the early leaders of studying the Finnish language and culture were primarily ethnic Swedish nobles and elite. This changed in the late eighteenth century, as Finns began to take an interest in their cultural background, and the concept of a “fatherland”⁶ was born. This interest in Finland was still intellectual, not political. The Finnish national movement was yet to ascend to Phase B.⁷

Czarist Russian Rule and the Rise of the National Movement

After a series of wars between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Russian Empire, the territory of Finland was transferred to the Czar in 1809. Finland went from being an integrated region of Sweden to being the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland within the expansive Russian Empire. At this time in history, the Finnish people were far removed from their tribal polytheist ancestors; they were primarily Westernized Lutherans that had evolved societally alongside their former Swedish compatriots. Under Swedish rule, the Finns were seen as native citizens of Sweden.⁸ Once the deep historical ties with Sweden were cut, the Finnish national identity could develop independently. In Russia, the Finns had autonomy over their region; they had their own constitution and even their own military organization. The young Finnish national consciousness

⁴ Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, 62.

⁵ Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, 62.

⁶ John Saari, “Finnish Nationalism Justifying Independence,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 232 (March 1944): 33–38.

⁷ Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, 62.

⁸ Saari, “Finnish Nationalism Justifying Independence,” 34.

was still relegated to Phase A, but as Finland evolved as an autonomous subregion, Finnish intellectuals transitioned from scholars to patriotic leaders.

The Finnish national movement was fueled directly by the development of linguistic and cultural studies. The primary leader of this development was Johan Wilhelm Snellman (Fig. 1), a philosophy professor in Helsinki, who went beyond studying Finnish culture and pioneered the concept of Finnish patriotism. In the 1840s, he developed a nationalist program to strengthen the autonomous Finnish government infrastructure to prepare for independence. Snellman also urged the Finnish upper classes to abandon Swedish as their native tongue and speak the same language as the rest of the Finnish population. He opened a newspaper called *Saima* in 1844. This paper was a Swedish language publication that Snellman used to communicate his message to the educated Swedish speakers of Finland.⁹




Figure 1. Johan Snellman (1806–1881), one of the most influential figures in the development of Finnish nationalism.¹⁰

⁹ David G. Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 99.

¹⁰ Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons:

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:JV_Snellman.jpg#/media/File:JV_Snellman.jpg

Another leader was Johan Ludvig Runeberg, a Finnish priest who inspired patriotism through poetry. Poetry was a massive inspiration for Finnish national pride, especially Elias Lönnrot's *Kalevala*,¹¹ an epic poem based on Finnish folk stories. The *Kalevala* became the national myth of the Finnish people, who needed to reinvent their mythology after nearly a millennium of foreign domination. This period, the 1830s–1840s, is the clear start of the transformation to Hroch's Phase B.¹² Educated journalists, intellectuals, and artists were aiming to bring Finnish nationalism to the mainstream.

At this point, the patriotic aspirations of a culturally independent Finland were mainly held by the societal elite. Still, Fennomania, as the Finnish national movement was called, began to spread throughout the classes of Finland. Fennomans founded newspapers intended to spread patriotism to the rural and peasant populations. The divides between the peasantry and the educated, wealthy, and urbanized Finns began to lessen due to the Fennomans' educational outreach. As David Kirby points out:

By the end of the 1840s, the gulf between the elite and the people had been narrowed somewhat by the growth of a Finnish-language press and the publication and dissemination of popular reading material. The more vigorous approach to the promotion of popular education was largely the work of a new generation of students, many of humble background from the purely Finnish-speaking hinterland.¹³

¹¹ Elias Lönnrot, *The Kalevala: An Epic Poem after Oral Tradition*, trans. Keith Bosley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

¹² Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, 62.

¹³ Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland*, 99.

In the 1860s, Fennomania formed an official party called the Finnish Party. Finnish nationalism was expanding into a larger movement, though it was still not widespread enough to be designated as Phase C.

The Fennomans realized that for a cohesive Finnish national body to be achieved, Finland had to fully shed its Swedish influence. The upper classes of Finland were Swedes in all senses but ethnicity. A truly unified Finland could only be realized by removing the gap between Swedish speakers and Finnish speakers. The push for Finnish lingual dominance was not without resistance, as Swedish speakers began to oppose the Fennoman movement in the 1860s. The Swedish Finns felt their historic lingual control over Finnish institutions was being threatened, and a Swedish counter-nationalist movement arose. The Svecomans believed that Finnish and Swedish speakers were two different nations and wanted to resist Fennomania. Another party with nationalist ideals was the Liberal Party, which advocated for civil rights for the Finns and more autonomy from the Czar. However, this party was soon devoured by the lingual conflict, and its members joined either the Fennomans or the Svecomans.

In the 1870s and 1880s, the Fennomans overtook the Svecomans in numbers and influence, and the Finnish language became the dominant language in societal institutions. The efforts by Finnish patriots to shape national character through language and the arts finally bore fruit. Although the divisions between Swedes and Finns remained well into Finnish independence, a paradigm shift occurred in which Finland's leadership class finally spoke their own nation's language. Miroslav Hroch designated the end of the 1870s as the transformation from Phase B to Phase C, as Finnish patriotism, through the efforts of Snellman's followers, was by then a popular political ideology in Finland.¹⁴

¹⁴ Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, 63.

Russian authorities did little to stifle burgeoning Finnish patriotism for most of the nineteenth century. In fact, the Czar inadvertently aided the development of a culturally independent Finland by moving the Finnish capital from Turku, a city on the southern coast with heavy Swedish roots, to Helsinki, a city much closer to the Russian capital St. Petersburg. The Russians made this change in 1812 to distance Finnish autonomous leadership from their Swedish roots and to bring Finland into the Russian cultural sphere. Though the Russians pushed limited Russification on Finland in the first few decades of occupation, Finland was largely given control over its internal affairs, especially under the reign of Czar Alexander II from 1855–1881. Under his leadership, Finland underwent a development period with increased industrialization and education. The modernization process aided in the rise of the Finnish language, and support for the Fennomans heightened.

By the end of the century, however, Russian oversight would become tyranny. Internal unrest in Russia and conflicts with other powers pushed the Empire to consolidate control domestically. Finland was one of Russia's westernmost duchies, and fears of an invasion by a surging German empire through Scandinavia impelled the Russians to strengthen their grip over their Finnish subjects. In the 1880s and 1890s, Imperial authorities began to strip Finland of the autonomy Finns had been privileged to since 1809. Czar Nicholas II took the throne in 1894 and immediately took steps to ensure Finnish subservience to Russia. He disbanded the Finnish army and enacted laws contradictory to the Duchy of Finland's constitution. The Czar did this to preemptively stifle Finnish resistance and assert Russian dominance over Finland's governance. If Finnish officials refused to enforce the new laws, they were sent to exile in Siberia.¹⁵ In 1900, the Czar announced the Language Manifesto, which made Russian the official language of Finland's

¹⁵ Saari, "Finnish Nationalism Justifying Independence," 36.

government and schools. Fennomania was powered by the use and reverence of the Finnish language, so this decree was an existential threat to the Finnish national consciousness.

The final decades of the Russian Empire were crucial for the Finnish national movement. Although Hroch dated the completion of Phase B at the beginning of the 1880s, it was the tyrannical actions of the Russians during the three decades of the Empire that truly solidified popular support for an independent Finland.¹⁶ Fennomania was initially focused on the internal divide between Swedification and Finnification, but the Russian assault on Finnish autonomy would push the movement in a new direction. In 1902, the Czar drafted Finnish males into the Russian army, but only half of the men that were summoned showed up to join. In Helsinki, a large mob formed to protest and admonish the Finns who answered the draft call. Governor-General Nikolay Bobrikov, the Czar-appointed ruler of Finland, sent Cossack soldiers in to control the crowds. A year later, Bobrikov exiled Finnish leaders and banned organizations from convening. 1904 saw the first truly violent acts of Finnish rebellion, as Bobrikov was assassinated along with a pro-Russian Finnish Senator.¹⁷

At this point, the Finnish national movement was undisputedly in Phase C.¹⁸ Finnish laborers called a strike in 1905, a time of revolution and instability throughout Russia. This strike was a nationwide patriotic effort and completely wiped away the Duchy's social order that had existed since 1809. The aristocracy that had steered Finland and even lit the first sparks of Finnish patriotism was now overshadowed by populist Finnish nationalists and the labor movement. The Finnish Social Democrats dissolved the old Senate and founded the Finnish Parliament. Finnish citizens were granted universal suffrage, regardless of land-owning status or gender. Still, the

¹⁶ Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, 63.

¹⁷ Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland*, 140.

¹⁸ Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*.

Russians continued to attempt Russification, and complete independence was not in the imaginations of most nationalists.

That reality changed during the First World War. In 1917, the Empire of the Czar had crumbled and multiple factions fought for control of Russia. The Finnish nationalist factions took advantage of the disarray, and on December 6, Parliament declared independence from Russia. The Finnish national movement had evolved from scholars having interest in Finnish culture to patriots pushing their nation to independence for the first time in history. The new state was not without struggles, as conflict between conservatives and socialists erupted in the 1918 Finnish Civil War. The conservative Whites won the civil war, preventing the losing Reds from dragging Finland into the Bolshevik sphere. Now, the Finnish people had a new challenge ahead: maintaining a prosperous independent state.

III. Mythology of the Finnish National Movement

The revitalization of Finnish culture and language were the backbone of the Finnish national consciousness. Every nation is built from ancestral mythology that gives members a sense of glory and uniqueness. The nation of Finland is no different. In 1835, Elias Lönnrot published an epic called *Kalevala*;¹⁹ it was a compilation of Finnish pagan folklore that described Earth's creation. These myths had been passed down orally for over a thousand years, but had been viewed as mere stories from Finland's pre-Christian past. Lönnrot used these stories to convey to contemporary Finns a sentiment of chosenness and primordialism. The story also forged an intimate connection between the Finnish people and the land. The Finnish people were not simply human beings, but were part of their homeland. *Kalevala* portrayed three national myths: Finnish origins in time, space, and ancestry. According to the myth, the Finns originated at the beginning

¹⁹ Lönnrot, *The Kalevala*.

of time. They had always lived in Finland and descended from the myth's supernatural characters. The Finns did not simply evolve over history, but Finland and its Finns had existed from the beginning of time. While not historically factual or scientifically realistic, Lönnrot's poem inspired Finns to view their existence as special and unique among the world's nations. Finnish folklore brought the modernizing Finns back to the folk soul that had laid chiefly dormant since the Swedish conquest. Early Fennomans tapped into this feeling and shaped folklore into unifying national mythologies.

IV. Model of Finnish Nationalism

Historians and scholars of nationalism have reached a consensus that there are two main forms of nationalism: "Western and inclusive" national movements and "Eastern and exclusive" movements.²⁰ Hans Kohn pioneered this binary distinction in his book *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*.²¹ "Inclusive" nationalists viewed the nation as a political community that focused on furthering individual liberties, democratic practice, and classical liberal philosophy.²² "Exclusive" nationalists viewed the nation as an organic ethnic and lingual community that focused on furthering the prestige and power of the nation above the individual.²³

The Finnish national movement does not fit perfectly into just one side of this dichotomy. Under Swedish rule, Finland developed a democratic government and was governed by a constitution.²⁴ As the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, it retained these practices. The Finnish political culture was inherently democratic, which would suggest that the Finnish national

²⁰ Geneviève Zubrzycki, "The Classical Opposition Between Civic and Ethnic Models of Nationhood: Ideology, Empirical Reality and Social Scientific Analysis," *Polish Sociological Review*, no. 139 (2002): 275, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41274824>.

²¹ Hans Kohn and Craig J. Calhoun, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005).

²² Kohn and Calhoun, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

²³ Kohn and Calhoun, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

²⁴ Saari, "Finnish Nationalism Justifying Independence," 34.

movement would be of a civic and ethnically inclusive nature. However, the Finnish national movement did not arise from a need for civil liberties, as Finns were not lacking in that area. The Fennomans were inspired by pride in Finnish culture and literature and sought to create an exclusively Finnish identity. The motto of the Fennoman movement was explicit about this goal: “We are not Swedes, we do not want to be Russians, so let us be Finns.”²⁵

Although the Finnish national movement had “inclusive” elements, it took on more of an “exclusive” model. In 1906, Finnish nationalists reshaped the governance of the Grand Duchy to include full representation and suffrage for all Finns, man or woman.²⁶ However, the Finnish government’s primary motivation for declaring independence was not individual liberty, but national sovereignty. The 1917 Declaration of Independence is clear about this:

Thus, the people of Finland has taken its fate into its own hands, and the present state of things gives both justification and obligation to do this. The people of Finland is deeply aware that it cannot fulfill its national and human mission without being completely free. Our centuries old longing for freedom should now be made true; the people of Finland should take its place as an independent nation at the side of other peoples of the world...As the Government wanted to bring these words to the attention of all citizens of Finland, each and every citizen—private or in a position of authority—is earnestly appealed to uphold and maintain public order and, to do everyone’s patriotic duty in exerting one’s all strength to promote the achievement of nation’s common goal at this very moment, now more important and crucial to the people of Finland than in any time ever before experienced.²⁷

²⁵ Matti Klinge, ed., *Suomen Kansallisbiografia [The National Biography of Finland]*, Studia Biographica (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2003), 406.

²⁶ Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland*, 146.

²⁷ Elin Hofverberg, “Finland: 100 Years of Independence – Global Legal Collection Highlights,” Library of Congress Blogs, January 11, 2018, <https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2018/01/finland-100-years-of-independence-global-legal-collection-highlights/>; A. E. Rautavaara, “To the people of Finland,” histdoc, accessed May 5, 2023, <https://www.histdoc.net/history/itsjul.html>

It is noticeable in this excerpt that the people of Finland are described as a collective. The people of Finland did not take *their* fates into *their* own hands; it “has taken its own fate into its own hands...”²⁸ The Finnish people viewed themselves as making up part of a single unit, as a part of the Finnish “volksgeist.”²⁹ This is typical of “Eastern” national movements, which were focused on the “soul” of the nation and viewed the people as part of a larger organism.³⁰ Still, the nation of Finland was not aggressively exclusive, and Fennomans did not pursue their patriotic goals at the expense of civil liberties or democracy. The Finnish national movement combined elements of both the “Western” and “Eastern” models of nationalism.³¹

V. Conclusion

The Finnish national movement was an extraordinary collective achievement for the Finnish people. There had been people called Finns since at least the first century CE,³² but it was only after the efforts of Finnish patriots that those individuals formed the nation of Finland. The push for nation-forming was powered by an appreciation of the Finnish language and mythology, which gave rise to a newfound national consciousness, followed by complete independence and self-determination. Ancient mythology and legends of the past awoke a sense of deep-rooted national pride in the Finnish people. After centuries of foreign occupation, the “volksgeist” of Finland could finally control its own destiny.³³

²⁸ Hofverberg, “Finland”; Rautavaara, “To the people of Finland.”

²⁹ Kohn and Calhoun, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

³⁰ Kohn and Calhoun, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

³¹ Kohn and Calhoun, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

³² Kirby, *A Concise History of Finland*, 2.

³³ Kohn and Calhoun, *The Idea of Nationalism*.

Boats on the Coast of France: Monet vs. Derain

Rachel Sarraf

When one first looks at the *Regatta at Sainte-Adresse* by Claude Monet in Gallery #818 and subsequently at *Fishing Boats, Collioure* by André Derain in Gallery #830 of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, one may think that they do not have much in common. Monet's *Regatta at Sainte-Adresse*, completed in 1867, is an oil-on-canvas painting depicting a natural seascape of the northern coast of France. The painting presents a sense of realism by portraying the shore, boats, people watching, and homes in the background. Derain's *Fishing Boats, Collioure*, finished in 1905, is an oil-on-canvas painting illustrating boats on the southern coast of France with two men in the foreground. There are vibrant oranges, reds, blues, and greens that pop out to the audience. By simply looking at the colors and styles that were used in both paintings, one can easily recognize the differences between both works. Simultaneously, even though there is a direct contrast between the colors, composition, location, and, most importantly, the time periods of the two artists, there is a clear similarity of the iconography between the two: boats on the coast of France. Despite their different styles, the same iconography is portrayed in both paintings.

Around the middle of the nineteenth century, Europe experienced extensive political, social, and economic changes. The Bourgeoisie was the new class that controlled society just as the new organization of the economy, called capitalism, was introduced to France. Moreover, the development of the steam engine, coupled with other groundbreaking innovations, was successfully achieved. Urbanization was facilitated by the railroad, the new mode of transportation. People were able to travel to many different cities for as short as just a day. Along with these changes propelled by the Industrial Revolution, which are collectively understood as modernity, the movement of Impressionism arose in the world of art. Since people were able to travel and explore new places, artists took inspiration from the landscapes they saw. There was an

increase in leisure time for both the middle and upper classes of Paris, of which people took advantage. People engaged in different activities such as bathing, boating, and fishing; the Impressionists wanted to capture these moments of modern life in their paintings as well. Impressionism is further associated with beautiful sunny days, the contrast of clouds, or simply lots of light. Impressionists created art that went against the rules of the Academy in Paris. Their work generally looked sketchy and did not have any contour lines. Regardless, there's enough evidence to make out the figures and the social class of the subjects.

One of the works of art created during this movement was Monet's *Regatta at Sainte-Adresse* (Fig 1.). Monet's painting is a modest illustration of leisure activity; in this case, people are sitting on the beach and are interested in watching the *regatta*, or boat race. This scene portrays the epitome of Impressionism. Much like other Impressionist artists, Monet displayed short brush strokes on the canvas, which one can discern on the water and the sand. Brilliant colors typify his artwork—in this instance, the shimmering blue-green water and the strikingly blue boat, the latter emplaced on the white, sandy shore, creating a captivating contrast. The day is sunny with some clouds, both of which are associated with Impressionist art. Monet's painting gives off a feeling of relaxation and positivity. Impressionism emphasizes the effects of light, which is evident in this painting where the light is depicted shining on the ocean and the sand of the shore. Furthermore, the attire of the individuals on the shore suggests that they are members of the Bourgeoisie, whom Impressionists often depicted in their paintings since they were dominating society during that time. The women on the shore hold parasols under the blazing afternoon sun. The men are wearing jackets and hats; based on the length and color of their clothes, it is understood that they are from the upper or middle class. This is all relevant to the high-class lifestyle and standard of living experienced by the Bourgeoisie.



Figure 1. Claude Monet, *Regatta at Sainte-Adresse*, 1867¹

Impressionist art is characterized by various stylistic qualities, such as a sketch-like appearance and a lack of the polished finish that was common in the academic paintings showcased at the Salon of the academy in Paris. Monet went against the conventions of the Academy, which deemed certain artistic styles as the epitome of “great painting.” In his painting, he displays visible brushstrokes and incorporates iconography of modern life. This style was viewed as opposition to the Academy, which favored hiding brush marks in paintings and eschewing depictions of modern life in favor of more traditional subject matter. Furthermore, while landscapes were not valued by

¹ Claude Monet, “Regatta at Sainte-Adresse,” The Metropolitan Museum of Art, accessed May 5, 2023, <https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/437136>

the Academy, they were highly valued by Impressionist artists. Monet is clearly portraying a landscape, and more specifically, a seascape, in the suburb of Sainte-Adresse.

As time passed, Neo-Impressionists placed increasing emphasis on the scientific effects and significance of color. Then, Post-Impressionists created more expressive and symbolic art. Following the two movements was a movement known as Fauvism. It was an *avant-garde* response that transformed qualities from the two prior movements to be more radical and outrageous than Impressionism ever was. *Fishing Boats, Collioure* by Derain was painted during this era. Fauvism emerged in France around 1905. The term Fauvism was created when audiences viewed the Fauve artworks and described them as a “wild beast”—which translates to *fauve* in French. Fauvism is a style composed of vibrant and intense colors and the application of broken brush strokes. While retaining the values of the Neo-Impressionist and Post-Impressionist styles of art, Fauve artists took certain qualities to another level of innovation.

Derain painted *Fishing Boats, Collioure* (Fig. 2) almost forty years after the Impressionist movement in which Monet created his painting. Over time, there were numerous scientific advancements in creating brighter and more heavily pigmented colors. Derain was able to use these new colors in *Fishing Boats, Collioure*. His paintings feature striking, vivid hues like orange, red, yellow, blue, and green that are not present in Monet’s 1867 art. The artist can control the intensity of color on the painting. The Fauves believed that color alone had an effect on the viewer. There are blue and green mountains in the background along with orange buildings. The sailboats are made of numerous yellow tints and shades, and the people are made from an array of colors. Interestingly, in Fauvism, the subject matter has no connection with the absurdity of the colors used. The colors of the paintings are supposed to pull apart from the painting by evoking extreme expressions that these artists sought to obtain. Additionally, Fauvism radicalizes the invention of

showing brush strokes on the canvas, a stylistic quality maintained from the Impressionist era of painting. The brush strokes of Derain's work are more visible than those of Monet's, showcasing the heightened extremity of Fauvism.




Figure 2. André Derain, *Fishing Boats, Collioure*, 1905²

Both the time periods in which the artists lived and their respective outlooks and subjects' locations contributed significantly to the differences between the two pieces. The perspectives of the paintings contrast completely, and each sets a specific tone and style to the painting. Monet's painting features a side view of the figures, creating a more open appearance to the scene. The

² André Derain, "Fishing Boats, Collioure," The Metropolitan Museum of Art, accessed May 5, 2023, <https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/482510>.

ability of people to travel by train to new places they have never seen before contributed to new landscapes that provided inspiration for artists. Monet traveled to the north of France on the coast of Normandy at Sainte-Adresse. This town was primarily home to the upper-middle class at the time and therefore the people depicted in his painting are from the Bourgeoisie. On the other hand, in Derain's piece, one is viewing the painting in the same perspective as the figures that are pictured in the foreground. It provides a diagonal angle of the overlapping sailboats, with blue and green mountains pictured in the background of the painting. The painting seems more crowded compared to Monet's work. The audience is viewing the back of the figure's bodies in Derain's while their sides in Monet's. Derain, like his counterpart Monet, took advantage of faster transportation by traveling to Collioure in the south of France with Henri Matisse—another influential Fauve artist. Collioure was a small fishing town close to the Spanish border and was inhabited by a majority of working-class people. One can discern the particular social class by noticing the clothes that Derain painted. Clearly, the difference in perspective of the paintings, as well as the location of the artist, had an impact on its composition and subject.

Monet's style of art seems to be more appropriate to the shared subject matter of the leisure activity of laying on the shore and watching the boats. The more relaxed style of the brushstrokes, along with the colors involved in the painting, emanate an eased, positive tone. In contrast, Derain's painting seems to have a greater visual interest due to his application of intense and vibrant colors; it seems to grab the attention of the viewers more aggressively than Monet's. *Regatta at Sainte-Adresse* appears more typically beautiful by showcasing realism, while *Fishing Boats, Collioure*, is more moving and unsettling.

Despite coming from different movements and containing different stylistic qualities, both Monet and Derain created art with the same subject matter of boats on the coast of France. Monet

created his piece during the Impressionist movement, which concentrated on the effects of light and application of brushstrokes. Meanwhile, Derain created his painting during the movement of Fauvism and was prompted to use bright, vibrant colors. The same iconography used by two artists is represented differently, as each painting reflects its own period of time, location, and the people in the area, which then prompt each artist to create a work of art in his own way.

When History Mattered¹

Doctor William Stenhouse

Once upon a time, many years ago, when leaders wanted policy advice, they turned not to economists or astrologers or other modern experts who predict the future, but to historians. Some kings paid historians for their work; some even had one or two on retainer. Today, the White House has a Council of Economic Advisors. Would it get better advice from a Council of Historians? It's certainly possible, though one person who would probably have said no was Charles de la Ruelle, a minor aristocrat who lived in Poitiers, France, in the sixteenth century. He was a lawyer. Then, as now, no one wanted a council of those, but that didn't stop him from attacking historians. In 1573, he published a short book entitled *Succinctz adversaires contre l'histoire et professeurs d'icelle* (Short Comments against History and its Professors).² De la Ruelle disliked history for a variety of reasons. It didn't offer valuable practical or moral examples, because its subject-matter was usually pretty grim. It couldn't tell you exactly what happened in the past: you only had to look at the fact that different historians come up with different accounts. And it couldn't be impartial, because most historians wrote for rich patrons and spent their time flattering them or attacking their enemies. De la Ruelle's book was sufficiently popular to go through three editions in the next four years, and he confidently dedicated the third edition to the king of France at the time, Henri III. In his address to the monarch, de la Ruelle revealed why he was so worried.³ The problem was that the nobles of France were turning from feats of arms to the liberal arts. Law and medicine had practical value, but history, which the nobility valued above all, did not. He did not

¹ This is an abridged and revised version of an essay forthcoming in *A Cultural History of Ideas in the Renaissance*, ed. Jill Kraye (London: Bloomsbury, 2023).

² Charles De la Ruelle, *Succinctz adversaires...contre l'histoire & professeurs d'icelle* (Poitiers: Bouchet, 1573).

³ Charles De la Ruelle, *Les Succinctz adversaires...contre l'histoire et professeurs d'icelle*, third ed (Paris: n.p., 1577), sig. AIIIr-[AV]v.

speak as a concerned parent of a twenty-first-century undergrad, but as a concerned citizen. The nobles' addiction to reading about the past was enervating the state.

De la Ruelle's book could be an elaborate joke (that has not aged terribly well). It could be a serious attack.⁴ Modern scholars are divided, but either way, it points to the fact that in the late sixteenth century, history mattered. Historians could tell you how to live, they could tell you what policies to follow, and they could celebrate your achievements in print for posterity. Historians had the sort of power and influence that most of us typing away today can only dream of. Here are some examples and some possible explanations.

I. Some people in the past did things better than we do

At roughly the same time as he wrote his most celebrated work, *The Prince*, Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) also began the *Discorsi*, a long series of reflections inspired by his reading of the Roman historian Livy. In his preface, he bemoaned the fact that Renaissance statesmen failed to copy the achievements of their ancient forebears:

I cannot help simultaneously marveling and grieving when, on the one hand, I consider how much honor people accord to antiquity and how often—to pass over countless other examples—a fragment of an ancient statue has been purchased for a high price so that someone may have it on hand to adorn his house and to have it copied by those who take delight in that art and they then strive with their utmost skill to show it in all their works; and when, on the other hand, I see the deeds of the greatest *virtù* that histories show us,

⁴ For the former position, see Trevor Peach, "Contre l'histoire et les historiens: Les *Succinctz adversaires* de Charles de la Ruelle (1572–1574)," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 65 (2003): 69–82; for the latter, e.g., George Huppert, *The Idea of Perfect History: Historical Erudition and Historical Philosophy in Renaissance France* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 165.

undertaken by ancient kingdoms and republics, by kings, generals, citizens, proposers of laws, and others who have toiled for their countries being admired rather than imitated.⁵

Sixteenth-century people looked at the Romans with awe when they should have been learning from them. Some of Machiavelli's ideas have a distinctly modern tinge. For example, he argued that religion should function as social glue. Machiavelli discussed how King Numa established religion in Rome to maintain a civil society and concluded that "we can see how useful religion was in controlling the armies, inspiring the plebs, keeping men good, and shaming the wicked."⁶ This was where modern Catholic leaders had failed. Thanks to them, Machiavelli wrote, Italy lacked religion and was in shambles. Leaders should "foster and strengthen all things that happen in religion's favor, even if they judge it to be false."⁷

In Machiavelli's wake, historical scholars and experts in ancient Roman law or politics presented information to help their patrons' policy-making, just as architects devised buildings in imitation of ancient structures. Military practice, in particular, brought together historians of a variety of stripes: the ancient Roman army was famously effective, which encouraged Renaissance scholars to try to distill and explicate the secrets of its success. One example was Andrea Palladio (1508–1580). Palladio is best known for his architectural theory and practice, strongly influenced by the Roman buildings he saw in Italy. In the US, the most famous exponent of Palladian ideals is Thomas Jefferson, who followed Palladio's precepts at Monticello and for the campus of the University of Virginia. Less well-known is Palladio's more general fascination with Roman civilization, including the underlying reasons for the Romans' military success. He produced

⁵ Niccolò Machiavelli and Francesco Guiccardini, *The Sweetness of Power: Machiavelli's Discourses and Guiccardini's Considerations*, ed. and trans. James Atkinson and David Sices (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press 2002), 19.

⁶ Machiavelli and Guiccardini, *The Sweetness of Power*, 57.

⁷ Machiavelli and Guiccardini, *The Sweetness of Power*, 60.

illustrations for translations of the works of Julius Caesar (published in 1575) and of Polybius (which were never published).⁸ Most of the illustrations show scenes in the battles that Caesar described. The letter key and the schematic way that the soldiers are shown make clear that the illustrations aim less at verisimilitude than explication (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. Caesar, *I commentarii* (Venice: de' Franceschi, 1575), fig. H. By Internet Archive Book Images.

Who did Palladio think would read his book? He targeted contemporary military men. He dedicated the Caesar edition to an active soldier, Giacomo Boncampagni, illegitimate son of the sitting pope, Gregory XIII, general of the papal armies and leader of the Spanish king's troops in Milan. In the preface, he bewailed "the miserable condition of our era," and attacked those

⁸ John Hale, "Andrea Palladio, Polybius and Julius Caesar," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 40 (1977): 240–55, <https://doi.org/10.2307/750998>.

contemporary captains who denied that they could lead armies “with the order and skill of the ancients.”⁹ He defended his recourse to antiquity with a personal example of its applicability:

They also say that the ancient orders are difficult and impossible to adapt to the customs of our times, but in this (as in other matters) they are again mistaken, because the ancient soldiers were peasants and craftsmen, for the most part uncouth and uneducated, and their captains were not demigods, but men like us, and the maneuvers are easy and clear to those who understand their principles. This having been clarified to me, since I found myself in the company of some gentlemen well versed in the affairs of war, I ordered (for their pleasure) some galley oarsmen and pioneers, who were there, to do all those maneuvers and military drills that can be carried out, without creating any disorder or confusion whatsoever.¹⁰

As with his architectural work, he aimed at—and achieved—concrete ends.

II. History can explain why “it is how it is.”

Palladio presented his historical knowledge of the Romans as a means to contemporary military success. This direct and pragmatic distillation of information was not, however, the only route that professional historians could take. They could also promote patrons in various ways. Some of the results are predictably fawning and vacuous, though others show how historians could adapt to new requirements of early modern rule.

In Spain, for instance, the royal historian Juan Páez de Castro not only celebrated the achievements of King Philip II and his family, but also collected geographical information about the regions of his territory. Páez wrote to towns in the kingdom with a questionnaire about local

⁹ Julius Caesar, *I commentari*, ill. Andrea Palladio (Venice: de Franceschi, 1575), sig.*v.

¹⁰ Caesar 1575, sig.*1v; tr. in Guido Beltrami, “Palladio and Polybius’ Histories,” in *Andrea Palladio and the Architecture of Battle with the unpublished edition of Polybius’ Histories*, ed. Guido Beltrami (Venice: Marsilio, 2009), 70.

history and customs, the responses to which he gathered for the Escorial, the new royal library near Madrid. Another royal historian, Ambrosio de Morales, actually traveled around Spain collecting historical manuscripts for Philip's library. He wrote a *Crónica general de España* (General Chronicle of Spain), beginning in the Roman period, and an account of the Roman remains that he saw or was informed about in the kingdom, the *Antigüedades de las ciudades de España* (Antiquities of the Cities of Spain). Explicitly, and valuably, this collection presented the earliest secure historical evidence for the Iberian Peninsula, left by the Roman conquerors of the area; implicitly, though, it suggested that Philip's Spanish kingdom, only established in the late fifteenth century in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, when the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon were joined, had long-standing roots in antiquity. The work of Páez, Morales, and their colleagues brought a new spirit of investigation and critical discernment to historical research in Spain. But we should not confuse those qualities with a lack of passion or patriotic fervor. They wanted to bolster their homeland by illustrating the wealth of its historical testimony. In addition, we can see the move to gather sources from across the kingdom at the behest of the king as part of a wider interest in defining the state as a geographical entity and in developing a bureaucracy to enhance its efficiency and the authority of its ruler.¹¹

Other historians moved in more ingenious directions. Renaissance humanists' commitment to the prestige of the ancient past, and their eagerness to find the origins of things, played a hugely important role in the way in which rulers presented themselves, their families, and their states in the early modern period. Traditionally, medieval rulers had derived their right to rule through their blood lines: property, wealth, and authority usually passed from father to son. Hence, they had

¹¹ See Richard Kagan, *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Kira Von Ostenfeld-Suske, "Writing Official History in Spain: History and Politics, c.1474–1600," in *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, eds. José Rabasa et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 428–48.

long been concerned with documenting their connections to their predecessors. Renaissance historians could now offer princes and aristocrats plausible arguments and evidence for ancestors in deep antiquity, whether Roman, Greek, Trojan, or earlier.¹²

A related product of this concern with forebears that emerged in the Renaissance was the printed family tree. Visual depictions of royal lines were not new, but they had tended to show the direct path of descent from father to heir, with the founder at the top, making the succession very clear. Early modern scholars adapted and exploited the form to present their genealogical arguments, playing with metaphors of trees and branches to show the reach of families and placing founders, mythical or otherwise, at the bottom.¹³ Historians then worked with artists and print-makers to circulate these assertions more widely. The prints they produced were not necessarily fantastical, and they could make precise historical arguments. Scipione Ammirato (1531–1601) was called to Florence in 1569 to work for Cosimo de' Medici on a new history of Florence. In that position, he researched families and genealogies, and published a series of elaborately designed family trees, connecting families with their territories (Fig. 2).

¹² Roberto Bizzocchi, *Genealogie incredibili: Scritti di storia nell'Europa moderna*, second ed., (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009).

¹³ Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, "The Genesis of the Family Tree," *I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance* 4 (1991): 105–29, <https://doi.org/10.2307/4603672>.




Figure 2. Family tree by Scipione Ammirato.¹⁴

Ammirato had the support of the Florentines, but we can also identify historians who used this technique to make more challenging arguments. In the mid-1580s, the French succession was politically sensitive and aggressively disputed: Henri III was childless, his brother had died in 1584, and the next male in line to the throne was a distant cousin, the Protestant Henri of Navarre. Versions of a broadsheet that circulated in German Protestant circles present Henri III and Henri of Navarre prominently at the head of two branches of the same tree emerging from Louis IX (the great Saint Louis, r. 1226–70), and celebrate their reconciliation as brothers. Henri, Duke of Guise, leader of the Catholic League and unwaveringly hostile to Navarre, is portrayed as the ancient wrestler Milo of Croton, who was killed by a pack of dogs after he got trapped in a tree-trunk that

¹⁴ Scipione Ammirato, "Family tree," New York Public Library Digital Collections, accessed May 5, 2023, <https://digitalcollections.nypl.org/items/a16fb142-2303-4877-e040-e00a180678a8>.

he was trying to split apart. In an early variant, Guise's 1588 assassination at the hands of Henri III's bodyguards is shown in the background; another, presumably made a little later, highlights the truce signed by Henri III and Navarre in April 1589, but also King Henri's own death at the hands of a Dominican friar in August that led to Navarre's accession (Figs. 3 and 4).¹⁵ Family trees, researched and carefully presented by historians, served the valuable purpose of legitimizing potentially shaky claims to power, or of illustrating rival branches.



Figure 3. Frans Hogenberg, Family tree of the Guise and Bourbon families, ca. 1588. © The Trustees of the British Museum, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ursula Mielke and Ger Luijten, *Remigius and Frans Hogenberg* (Ouderkerk aan den IJssel: Sound & Vision Publishers, 2009), B55.

¹⁶ Frans Hogenberg, "Geburt lini der Königen von Frankreich und Navarren," The British Museum, accessed May 5, 2023, https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1893-0411-25.



Figure 4. Frans Hogenberg, Family tree of the Guise and Bourbon families, ca. 1589. Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum RP-P-OB-78.785-239.¹⁷

III. History can tell you what to do (if you’re a Christian, at least).

Rulers wanted to derive authority from the appearance of historical continuity, and they relied on historians to prove it. In a period of rapid political change, these scholars provided a sense of tradition and stability. A related and even more fundamental arena in which the skills of early modern historians came to the fore was religion. At a basic level, the Reformation engaged with history and approaches to the ecclesiastical past. The Protestant Reformers asked about the nature of the early church and justified their critiques of contemporary practice by drawing on evidence of contrasting customs in antiquity; Catholics pointed to the apostolic succession and the historical legitimacy of papal authority. Catholic historians did not simply defend their version of

¹⁷ Frans Hogenberg, “Stamboom met takken van Valois en Bourbon, 1589, Frans Hogenberg, 1589 – c. 1593,” Rijksmuseum, accessed May 5, 2023, <https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/collection/RP-P-OB-78.785-239>.

Christianity against the Protestants; they also worked to regularize Catholic ritual and belief. Their most influential historian was Cesare Baronio (1538–1607), who worked in Rome. He began his publication career with a revised edition of the *Martyrologium romanum* (Roman Martyrology) of 1586. This fixed the calendar of saints and martyrs for the Catholic world, giving the dates on which they were celebrated and brief details of their lives and deaths. Believers could use the book to chart their yearly celebrations. It required careful research on Baronio’s part, and it irked Protestants less than it did those people whose local saints he questioned and rejected. Using some of his findings, Baronio then compiled the twelve-volume *Annales ecclesiastici* (Ecclesiastical Annals), outlining the history of the church from Jesus’s birth until 1198, and making clear the primacy of the pope.

The Protestants rejected Baronio’s account, but Catholics, too, particularly outside the Italian Peninsula, questioned his details.¹⁸ In Spain, for example, we can identify profound attacks on Baronio’s authority. In response to his rejection of various local traditions, the Jesuit Jerónimo Román de la Higuera invented a series of chronicles that he attributed to a fourth-century author, Flavius Lucius Dexter. These chronicles filled in the gaps for the early history of Christianity in Spain, they gave the Iberian Peninsula an important role in the religion’s history, and they supplied brief but explicit testimony for some of the saints Baronio had removed in his martyrology and history.¹⁹ As a result, they were a valuable source for Spanish local historians of the seventeenth century—who raided them for evidence of their regions’ sanctity and religious significance—and allowed locals to question the importance of the pope. On a higher political level, Baronio’s

¹⁸ Jan Machielsen, “An Aspiring Saint and his Work: Cesare Baronio and the Success and Failure of the *Annales ecclesiastici* (1588–1607),” *Erudition and the Republic of Letters* 2 (2017): 233–87.

¹⁹ Katrina Olds, *Forging the Past: Invented Histories in Counter-Reformation Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 172–76; Cesc Esteve, “The Chronicler’s Background: Historical Discourse and National Identity in Early Modern Spain,” in *The Roots of Nationalism: National Identity Formation in Early Modern Europe, 1600–1815*, ed. Lotte Jensen (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2016), 87–108.

research for the *Annales* had cast doubt on the Spanish Habsburgs' claim to Sicily. King Philip III responded in 1605 by banning the volume in which the argument appeared from the territories of the Spanish Empire.²⁰ Histories of religion could reinforce or challenge local practices and beliefs; they could also be of national political concern.

IV. Conclusion

When we consider some of the contributions that historians claimed to make to the modern state, it is not hard to see why de la Ruelle's attack on the historical profession might be read as satirical. For King Henri III needed sagacious counselors. Perilously positioned in the aftermath of the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre, Henri is likely to have found learned advisors, who promised to be able to shape and understand the present with reference to the past, much more valuable than bluff, belligerent aristocrats. The Renaissance was an era defined by a self-consciousness about the past. It was also an age of profound technological change and both religious and political insecurity. Historians flourished amid the uncertainties of this historical age, often in paradoxical ways: as military tactics evolved and larger armies used cannon and gunpowder to revolutionize warfare, they advocated learning from the Romans. As rulers such as Philip II created bureaucratic institutions that redefined the way the state worked, historians offered proof of dynastic right to rule. And in the face of religious revolution, they provided historical justifications for the forms in which Christian factions presented themselves. In a period of swirling change, historians, like today's economists, promised an empirically safe haven and the foundation on which solid structures could be built. Whatever de la Ruelle's criticisms, the power of historians and their subject had never been greater.

²⁰ Olds, *Forging the Past*, 168.