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## ***F*rom Crusades to Blood Libels to Expulsions: Some New Approaches to Medieval Antisemitism**

*by David Berger*

### I

Despite ubiquitous, ritualized gestures of obeisance toward Salo Baron's rejection of the "lachrymose conception" of Jewish history, most historians of medieval Jewry continue to employ a periodization structured by patterns of toleration and persecution. On the whole, the Jewish condition in the early Middle Ages emerges as relatively stable and secure, while the later period is marked by a growing hostility which finally erupts into libels, pogroms and expulsions.

Sweeping generalizations are, of course, always vulnerable to attack, and this one more than most. Even if limited, as it is, to Christian Europe, it characterizes the treatment of a dispersed group across a thousand years and a multitude of political and cultural boundaries. Thus, all observers make an exception for the persecution of Jews in seventh-century Visigothic Spain. Beyond this instance, some historians have raised more general questions about what they see as a rose-colored perception of the early period. Kenneth Stow, for example, challenges the view that Jews were treated so well in the early Middle Ages that one can justly speak of an alliance with Christian rulers or even of Jewish political power.<sup>1</sup> Although his rejection of this position unquestionably has concrete ramifications for our perception of early medieval Jewry, what he substitutes for a political alliance which ultimately breaks down is a legal status which ultimately becomes anomalous. The fundamental periodization remains intact.

Within this general framework, the effort to locate more precise transitions immediately raises the specter of the crusade of 1096, an event which looms large in the Jewish popular imagination as well as in the works of historians. In his important studies of the catastrophe which

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befell the Jews of the Rhineland, Robert Chazan has argued against the position that it was a watershed, primarily on the grounds that Northern European Jewry in the following century achieved economic growth and extraordinary cultural creativity in an environment of relative toleration.<sup>2</sup> The transforming significance of the first crusade can also be challenged from the other direction--by underscoring evidence of significant persecution in Northern Europe beginning with the early years of the eleventh century.

One item of such evidence is the series of attacks around the year 1010 to which we shall presently return. No less significant are the indications of routine violence against eleventh-century Jews, but here we face a methodological question of great interest and wide application. In a brief passage marked by his typical erudition and care, Avraham Grossman has noted a number of sources in which Jews report looting of Jewish homes, roads so dangerous that "no Jew comes or goes," and fear that a city-wide tragedy would generate attacks on the Jewish community.<sup>3</sup>

The problem here is to distinguish the generic unrest of an extremely violent society from "bias crimes" directed specifically against Jews. Grossman is not insensitive to this point. On one occasion, for example, he argues that a reference to the looting of "the houses of all the Jews" makes it clear that the violence was targeted. While he may well be correct in this case, the argument is not decisive, and the reference to dangerous roads is even less compelling. Members of a minority group with a powerful self-consciousness of their subordinate position tend to perceive attacks in personal terms even if the identity of the victim was irrelevant or marginal in the eyes of the perpetrator; sometimes, they may make specific reference to Jews simply because that is the universe of discourse of both the writer and his audience.

In his very recent *Communities of Violence*, an excellent work concentrating on the later Middle Ages in the South of Europe, David Nirenberg has noted the problem of classifying violent crimes on the basis of unproven religious motivations. He presents the issue extremely well

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but puts it aside on the grounds that the medievals' legal perception of violence across religious boundaries, at least in the Crown of Aragon, saw it through the prism of those boundaries.<sup>4</sup> This does not resolve the question if we are interested, as we are here, in the motivation of attackers who were neither lawyers nor theologians. As contemporary authorities have discovered while struggling to determine whether a particular mugging should be classified as a bias crime, it is no easy task to decide whether even the racist who shouted, "Nigger!" as he relieved his victim of his wallet was motivated primarily by greed, primarily by bigotry, or by an equal measure of each. It is a foregone conclusion that the victim in that case would see himself as the object of a racially inspired attack, and such feelings may exist--at times justly, at times not--even when no epithet was heard. Standing alone, sporadic Jewish testimony to anti-Jewish violence must be utilized with care.

Nirenberg also raises a much larger question which stands as a challenge to the fundamental enterprise addressed in this lecture. The overarching patterns limned by "teleological, *longue durée*" history tend to disappear, he says, when one looks closely at individual events. The point is of central importance provided that we apply it with due moderation. *Longue durée* history should indeed not allow us to forget that Jews could live in relative security well beyond a "turning point," and that a horrific event can be followed by a return to normalcy. Eleazar Gutwirth, for example, has recently argued that the Jewish community of Spain remained creative and even optimistic well after the "watershed" pogroms of 1391.<sup>5</sup> Local conditions, which depend on a multitude of factors, will often be decisive for a particular community, and even in the midst of a massive wave of persecutions such as those spawned in Franconia from 1298 to 1300 by the host desecration charge, "the universal narrative was always told and unfolded within the immediate context of power and politics of a town and its region."<sup>6</sup>

The same caveat applies on the wider canvas of national rather than local politics. In 1992, I organized a session at the conference of the

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Association for Jewish Studies on medieval expulsions of Jews in comparative perspective. Robert C. Stacey and William C. Jordan discussed the expulsions from England and France respectively. Despite the fact that these events took place in neighboring countries less than two decades apart and both analyses focused on relations between the king and the local aristocracy, the explanations proposed were so disparate that one could easily have come away with the sense that the proximity of both geography and chronology was entirely coincidental.<sup>7</sup>

This was of course not the case, as both participants took pains to note, and their feeling of unease at such a perception illustrates the dangers of too dismissive an approach to *longue durée* history. We cannot allow the trees, or even the groves, to persuade us that there is no forest. In the final paragraph of his book, Nirenberg concedes that cataclysmic events like those of 1391 can "indelibly alter the world in which they occurred, refiguring the field of meaning in their ritual lexicon."<sup>8</sup> Changes of perception, whether they result from cataclysm or more gradual developments, fundamentally transform the psychology of a society, so that courses of action that would never have been entertained as anything but a fantasy or an intellectual exercise become real, even seductive options. To take a narrow example, an unhappy marriage in a society in which divorce, though legal, is almost unthinkable is far more likely to last than the same marriage in an environment where relationships are routinely dissolved. The same local or national conditions can engender very different results; an environment in which massacres or expulsions are seen as realistic possibilities is far more likely to produce them.

The second half of the Middle Ages, then, generated physical attacks, conversionary efforts, economic restrictions, the badge, campaigns against the Talmud, the three major accusations of ritual murder, host desecration, and well poisoning, and widespread expulsions. This is a real shift, and it legitimately calls for large scale explanatory efforts, always disciplined by the considerations of which Nirenberg so effectively reminds us.

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It is far from clear that the primary explanation for such shifts lies in the specifics of the relationship between the dominant society and the particular minority group. Most contemporary Jews recoil at the suggestion that objectionable Jewish behavior produces, let alone justifies, anti-semitism, though the instinct which generated movements for moral self-improvement as a weapon against hostility has not faded into total oblivion. But if it is not offensive Jewish behavior which engenders hatred, we need not assume that any concrete Jewish action or characteristic, or even a historical event involving Jews, is the key to understanding the transformation that we confront.

We might profitably pursue this point through a passing glance at a recent, benign development in the relationship between Christians and Jews. The received wisdom informs us that the Second Vatican Council's declaration in *Nostra Aetate no. 4* that contemporary Jews bear no responsibility for the crucifixion and that Judaism retains spiritual value resulted from introspection which was occasioned by the Holocaust and encouraged by Jewish ecumenicists. While these factors were surely real, I believe that they were decidedly secondary.

Vatican II was convened in a post-colonial age marked by a new regard for self-determination and a new respect for cultural diversity--including religious diversity--as well as minority rights. Exclusivist claims did not sit well in this environment, and harsh punishment, even divine punishment, for religious dissent surely did not. A telling expression of the inner struggle triggered by the clash of this liberal, humanistic sensibility with a narrower, more forbidding tradition was formulated by a playwright hostile to Catholicism whose bitter work, *Sister Mary Ignatius Explains It All To You*, nonetheless has its very funny moments. Sister Mary, an old-fashioned nun teaching in the aftermath of Vatican II, defines "limbo" for her classroom/audience. If I remember correctly, she displays a picture of a baby trapped behind the bars of a crib and declares, "Limbo is the place where unbaptized infants went before the Ecumenical Council."

The historical and theological precision of this statement may leave something to be desired, but it brilliantly captures a central feature of the ideological atmosphere of the Council, which had nothing to do with Jews and next to nothing to do with the Holocaust. It was this spirit that animated the adoption of a more positive attitude toward Islam and the religions of the East, the assertion that salvation is possible outside the Church--and *Nostra Aetate*, no. 4. One who locates the fundamental impetus of the historic declaration on the Jews in the specifics of the Jewish-Catholic relationship loses sight of the larger process and misses the key point.

II

For medieval Europe, the most important recent effort to subsume the transformation of attitudes toward Jews under the rubric of a much broader change is R. I. Moore's *The Formation of a Persecuting Society*.<sup>9</sup> Moore's essential argument proposes that economic, political, and cultural developments in the eleventh and twelfth centuries produced a new class or group of classes which needed to consolidate power in the face of elements which posed a threat to the evolving order. Thus, heretics, Jews, even lepers, began to face exclusion and persecution at approximately the same time; somewhat later, male homosexuals and witches faced a new level of hostility for similar reasons. As we shall see, even Moore cannot refrain altogether from an analysis of certain characteristics of medieval Jewry, if only to establish the plausibility of a Jewish threat, but the thrust of his argument points away from the particularities of Christian attitudes toward Judaism and Jews.

Though Nirenberg dislikes Moore's approach as an example of the suspect *longue durée* mode of historiography, his own analysis, for all its specificity, also marginalizes the particularities of the Jewish-Christian relationship. Through a comparative examination of the treatment of Jews and Muslims in Aragon, he reminds us, to take a single example, that not only the former were accused of poisoning wells. Thus, we can see Jews as a vulnerable group whose specific Jewishness is almost irrelevant.

In very recent years, we have witnessed the revival of a long-rejected interpretation of eleventh-century Europe which also sees Jews as one of several groups victimized by a larger transformation. Richard Landes' *Relics, Apocalypse, and the Deceits of History*,<sup>10</sup> which has been described as probably "the best of a number of recent studies forcing reassessment of the central Middle Ages,"<sup>11</sup> maintains that eschatological expectations surrounding the millennium gripped the imagination of the European populace, generating a wide variety of religious and social movements. In an article specifically addressing the persecution of Jews, Landes has now argued for harmonizing Jewish and Christian accounts of persecutions which he dates in 1010 to produce a picture of sustained violence whose aetiology he locates in apocalyptic frenzy.<sup>12</sup>

Landes' stimulating presentation merits careful attention, though I remain more skeptical than he about the dating and reliability of the major Jewish source describing these events.<sup>13</sup> It is a virtual certainty that noteworthy attacks against the Jews of Northern Europe took place in approximately 1010; that these resulted from millennial eschatology is a possibility that has been restored to the historiographic map but continues to strike me as highly speculative. Should we embrace this possibility, we would then face a second, larger challenge which applies to Moore's position as well. Do these interpretations purport to explain only the *genesis* of anti-Jewish violence by identifying the spark which kindled a conflagration but which, like the God of the Deists, did its deed and--in the words of a caustic observer--then went to Florida? Or is it possible that apocalyptic tension and a Jewish threat to the position of Christian elites persisted beyond the period of their initial appearance and provided an ongoing impetus to medieval Judeophobia?

Landes himself describes a "millennial generation" lasting in acute form until 1033, which is the thousandth anniversary of the Passion, and sees close links between this atmosphere and that of the late-eleventh-century crusade. This is self-evidently an important historiographic contention, but we cannot plausibly extend such a factor indefinitely, though it

can surely make further appearances.<sup>14</sup> Later medieval antisemitism will have to seek other sources of nourishment.

In Moore's case, the process by which a new, literate elite established itself extends over a longer period of time than a millennial generation, but here too the explanation must lose its force after a decent interval. And once again, the initial contention itself bears scrutiny. Moore sees the Jewish threat to this elite as both economic/professional and intellectual/religious. Jews, he says, had a tradition of literacy and economic experience which stood in the way of aspiring Christian merchants and bureaucrats, and they had a developed understanding of Scripture which raised questions about the theological and exegetical enterprise which Christians were beginning to pursue with renewed sophistication.

With respect to the first point, it is difficult to agree that the tiny Jewish population of Northern Europe, however overrepresented it might have been in commerce, constituted the sort of obstacle to Christian entrepreneurs or government functionaries that would produce widespread persecution. The second assertion is particularly difficult to test. I have argued elsewhere that European Jews, especially in the North, did challenge Christian beliefs with surprising aggressiveness,<sup>15</sup> but references to the challenge posed by Judaism do not appear with sufficient frequency in Christian literature to persuade me that it was a factor so compelling that it played a major role in the formation of a persecuting society. Ironically, Moore's deemphasis of Jewish particularity in the development of medieval antisemitism requires him to attribute enormous importance to their role in European society so that they may fit into his larger explanatory scheme.

### III

Other approaches to our problem appeal to factors which began in the eleventh or twelfth century but persisted through the end of the Middle Ages. There is nothing new about the view that increased piety at all levels of society played a critical role in the rise of hostility toward Jews. In an essay in which I shamelessly attempted to interpret the entire history of antisemitism in twelve pages, I noted this point by observing that before

the eleventh century "Christianity had not yet struck deep enough roots in mass psychology to generate the emotional force necessary for the wreaking of vengeance on the agents of the crucifixion. Early medieval Europeans worshipped Jesus, but it is not clear that they loved him enough."<sup>16</sup>

Jeremy Cohen, in a major study which has deservedly become central to the discussion of medieval antisemitism, emphasized the role of Christian belief but shifted the focus from the piety of the masses to the theology of the elite. *The Friars and the Jews*<sup>17</sup> argues that the very foundations of toleration were undermined by growing Christian familiarity with the Talmud. Through the efforts of Nicholas Donin, a thirteenth-century French Jewish convert to Christianity, Christians came to realize that (to borrow the sharp formulation of an acquaintance of mine) the Jews are the people of the book--but the book is not the Bible. Though Donin and others attacked the Talmud for blasphemy and hostility to Christians, Cohen sees the primary thrust as the argument that the Talmud was "another law." Since one of the cornerstones of the theology granting Jews toleration was the assumption that they preserve the law of the Hebrew Bible not only in their libraries but in their behavior, this argument was fraught with the most dire consequences.

Key aspects of Cohen's argument convince me, while others do not. I believe that Donin really was intent upon reversing the Church's fundamental policy of toleration and that the "other law" argument was his most important weapon. I also believe that this effort, in the long run, was not wholly ineffective; later medieval friars were greatly tempted by the blandishments of the argument, and by the end of the Middle Ages, some Christian scholars were saying things about forcible conversion that would have been inadmissible in earlier centuries.<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, the analysis does not place sufficient emphasis on the impact of Donin's other arguments, and, far more important, it does not accord appropriate consideration to the profound conservatism that marks all law, and particularly religious law. Later attacks on the Talmud, includ-

ing arguments for rescinding toleration of Jews because of it, drew primarily upon allegations of hostility toward Gentiles (which, to the extent that it is embedded in Talmudic Law, could not easily be removed by censorship), secondarily upon assertions of blasphemy against Jesus (which could be more readily deleted), and only marginally if at all upon the contention that Jews are adherents of "another law."<sup>19</sup>

The deeper problem is that toleration of Jews was a matter of settled doctrine in medieval canon law. It was hard to avoid the impression that Donin was arguing that Church authorities from Augustine through a long line of Popes were simply mistaken about a key issue. In the thirteenth century, at least, the inadmissibility of such a conclusion was so clear that it was in the Jewish interest to argue that banning the Talmud was tantamount to banning Judaism, and this point appears to have carried considerable weight in the ultimate decision to permit the pursuit of Talmudic study. In a very recent article which addresses the question of why Jews, who were widely associated with witchcraft, were hardly ever prosecuted for their sorcery, Anna Foa alludes to this point. It may be, she suggests, that the Church avoided prosecuting Jews for the "heresy of witchcraft" for the same reason that the "new law" argument was abandoned: either step would have resulted in the classification of "all the Jews, qua Jews," as heretics, thus breaking down the fundamental conceptual barriers that made the traditional toleration of Jews possible.<sup>20</sup>

As time passed, however, the force of the doctrine of toleration eroded even as it was ritualistically affirmed. The tepid reaction of the Church to anti-Jewish massacres and the evolving sense that expulsions do not violate accepted doctrine are cases in point. A striking illustration of the gaping inconsistencies that arose out of the tension between a tolerant doctrine and an intolerant society--not excluding the clergy themselves--leaps out at the reader of R. Po-Chia Hsia's account of the report of a papal commission on the trial of Jews for the ritual murder of Simon of Trent. Here the protective doctrine is not the overarching Augustinian argument for tolerating Jews but the Church's determination that the blood accusation

is a libel.

On June 20, 1478, a papal bull was published pursuant to the commission's report.

[Pope] Sixtus IV cleared Hinderbach [the prince-bishop involved in the case who was urging approval for the cult of Simon] of all suspicions; the commission of cardinals, who had diligently examined all pertinent records, concluded that the [torture-ridden] trial had been conducted in conformity with legal procedure. Sixtus praised the bishop's zeal but admonished Hinderbach, on his conscience, not to permit anything contrary to the 1247 Decretum of Innocent IV (which prohibited ritual murder trials) in promoting devotion to Simon nor to disobey the Holy See or canonical prescriptions. Moreover, Sixtus forbade any Christian, on this or any other occasion, without papal judgment, to kill or mutilate Jews, or extort money from them, or to prevent them from practicing their rites as permitted by law.<sup>21</sup>

In other words, Jews do not commit ritual murder, ritual murder trials are illegal, this ritual murder trial was conducted in accordance with legal procedures, and one may promote devotion to Simon of Trent, whose only claim to devotion is that he was martyred in a ritual murder, provided that one does not affirm the reality of ritual murder.

Thus far, I have presented Cohen's thesis in terms that are narrowly focused on Christian familiarity with a Jewish text, but there is a broader dimension as well. Decades ago, Salo Baron proposed a relationship between national unification and medieval antisemitism, arguing that "single nationality states," driven both by incipient feelings of nationalism and the intolerance of a monolithic society toward outsiders, were far more likely to be hostile to their Jews. Since such states tended to develop in the central and late Middle Ages, it was in that period that antisemitism peaked.<sup>22</sup> Though Baron's thesis may help us understand national differences in the treatment of Jews, its arguably anachronistic appeal to nationalism and its failure to address the degree to which the transformation cut across national boundaries has marginalized it as a major explanatory strategy.

Cohen invokes a different sort of unity--the unity of Christendom as a whole. Thus, his emphasis on the Talmud is complemented by the argument that the friars' inclination to exclude the Jews was nourished by the growing sense that all of society is an organic Christian body. When the primacy of the Church as a unifying force began to decline, this inclination was not undermined; on the contrary, "the defensiveness characteristic of declining empires" reinforced the predisposition "to scrutinize the substance of contemporary Judaism and develop the theory of Jewish heresy."<sup>23</sup> I am somewhat uneasy about adopting a speculative argument which draws the same conclusion from an ascendant Church as from a declining one, particularly since at least some of the friars were severe critics rather than defenders of Rome. In any case, there is no intrinsic connection between the larger picture drawn by Cohen and the more specific argument which is the core of his extremely valuable study. Though both factors could of course be significant, the bulk of the work creates the impression that familiarity with the Talmud was the driving force behind the reevaluation of Jewish status. The concluding chapter appears to suggest that it was primarily Christian unity which inspired the impulse to exclude Jews, and the Talmud was the available means to do so.

#### IV

If only because of the prominence of the Jewish moneylender in popular images of the Jew, economic explanations of medieval antisemitism have always enjoyed considerable prominence. The central Middle Ages witnessed the development of a profit economy. To the extent that Jews had owned significant lands--and it is very difficult to assess the dimensions of such ownership--they tended to become urbanized and eventually engaged in moneylending to a degree considerably disproportionate to their numbers. Despite the unquestionable value of Joseph Shatzmiller's revisionist *Shylock Reconsidered*, which documents friendly relations between a beleaguered Jewish moneylender and his Christian customers, there is no doubt that this profession was not conducive to feelings of

warmth and amity.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, the transformation of the economic landscape was accompanied by the growth of a literate class. We have already encountered Moore's emphasis on the competition that this development engendered with the established literate class of the Jews. Even if we hesitate to speak of fierce competition, we can certainly recognize the impact of this change on the society's economic or administrative need for an increasingly marginalized minority. To the extent that even the undeveloped economy of the early Middle Ages had some need for an educated class--and it did--that need was partially met by Jews; the profit economy required a greater number of educated people, but it generated a sufficient supply from within the Christian community itself. This consideration may well loom large in explaining the welcome granted late medieval Jews in the economically and culturally undeveloped lands of central and eastern Europe in the late Middle Ages, well after they had worn out their welcome in the developed countries of the West.

In his *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe*,<sup>25</sup> Lester K. Little has attempted to weave a psychological explanation of antisemitism into the fabric of economic change. Christians, he says, experienced wrenching moral conflicts in confronting the profit economy. Guilt over usury, pawnbroking, even the sale of religious objects and outright theft was projected on to the Jews, who became "scapegoat[s] for Christian failure to adapt successfully to the profit economy." Jews were limited "to occupations thought by Christian moralists to be sinful and then harass[ed]...for doing their jobs."<sup>26</sup> It is unfair to ask for hard evidence for this sort of psychological assertion, and historiography would be a far less interesting, fecund, and instructive enterprise if we systematically refrained from such speculations. Still, in the absence of evidence one can react to this suggestion only by putting the question to one's informed intuitions. Since the Christian masses did not engage in the economic "sins" of which the Jews were accused, my own instincts do not permit me more than a whispered "perhaps."<sup>27</sup>

The most widely discussed theory of medieval antisemitism in the last few years is undoubtedly the one presented by Gavin Langmuir in his very impressive twin volumes, *History, Religion, and Antisemitism*, and *Toward A Definition of Antisemitism*.<sup>28</sup> Here too we find a psychological explanation, but it is rooted in much different considerations involving a redefinition of antisemitism itself and careful but creative speculation about the reaction of Christians to new developments in their own religion.

To Langmuir, hostility toward Jews before the twelfth century was an unremarkable version of ordinary xenophobia. Like all forms of bigotry, it exaggerated, distorted, and generalized real characteristics of the hated group. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, something frighteningly special occurred: Jews came to be subjected to accusations of a wholly chimerical sort. The entire group was stigmatized as ritual murderers, consumers of human flesh and blood, desecrators of hosts, and poisoners of wells despite the fact that not one Jew had ever been observed in the act of committing a single one of these crimes. Such accusations--and only such accusations--deserve the unique appellation "antisemitism."

What could have caused this new departure? Langmuir believes that Christians in the High Middle Ages, faced with profoundly difficult doctrines like transubstantiation, began to entertain grave doubts about the irrational demands made upon them by their evolving faith. One solution was to deflect these doubts by attributing irrational beliefs and behavior to Jews, whose very presence was a disturbing challenge to the dogmas with which Christians were struggling. It was not Christians, then, but Jews who came to embody irrationality *par excellence*.

There can be little question that some Christians were deeply troubled by the doctrine that the object which looked, felt, and tasted like bread was in fact the body of Jesus, and there is much plausibility in the suggestion that the host desecration charge, which in some cases implied that Jews themselves recognize the numinous character of this bread, could help to allay such doubts. As Miri Rubin put it in a study of this accusa-

tion, "The tale's force derived from the rich world of eucharistic knowledge and myth which was being imparted at the very heart of the religious culture, and it was bolstered by an ongoing tension between the eucharistic claims and the realities or appearances which most people apprehended in and around it."<sup>29</sup>

Langmuir, however, goes much further by placing the "chimerical" accusations in a separate category and connecting all of them to the inner doubts of Christians. Several scholars have noted that the sharp distinction between normal xenophobia and accusations without a shred of empirical basis is highly problematic. In lengthy reviews of Langmuir's book, Robert Stacey argued persuasively that by medieval criteria, the evidence that Jews commit ritual murder was not without rational foundation, and Marc Saperstein made the even stronger point that we cannot be certain even today that no Jew ever desecrated a host.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, although obtaining a consecrated host was no simple matter and there is no reason to believe that any medieval Jew bothered to take the risk, I have little doubt that if such a Jew had found himself in possession of this idolatrous object symbolizing the faith of his oppressors, it would not have fared very well in his hands.<sup>31</sup> Any definition whose validity is entirely dependent on the assumption that a particular act never happened even once is likely to find itself in a precarious position.

Moreover, as I noted in a much briefer review, even if we attribute antisemitic accusations to psychic insecurity--and the evidence for this is quite thin--that insecurity need not take the form of religious uncertainty. The turbulent world of late medieval Europe was not incapable of producing other forms of emotional dislocation. "Indeed, [Langmuir's] parallel discussion of modern times inevitably refers to inner tensions involving self-esteem and the role of the individual in society rather than traditional religious doubts."<sup>32</sup> Most recently, Anna Sapir Abulafia, without rejecting Langmuir's thesis for some Christians, argues that others were genuinely persuaded that the proper use of reason demonstrates the truth of Christianity so clearly that the Jews' failure to see this calls their very



humanity into question. She sees no real evidence to regard this position as a result of "irrationality caused by suppressed doubts," and I think that she is right.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, let me emphasize that whatever my reservations about Langmuir's analysis, I do not reject on principle the position that the doctrine of transubstantiation may have had a significant effect on Jewish insecurity beyond the host desecration charge itself. Indeed, I am inclined to think that the belief that the body of Jesus was regularly sacrificed in Christian ritual greatly increased Christian receptivity to the assertion that Jews sacrificed his surrogates in their own perverted fashion. Where the belief in the "real presence" waned, the blood libel found considerably less fertile soil.

## VI

If Langmuir's thesis has generated the broadest discussion of our issue in the last few years, a more narrowly focused article about the ritual murder charge has produced the most explosive one. About five years ago, Yisrael Yuval published a lengthy Hebrew essay with the intriguing title, "The Vengeance and the Curse, the Blood and the Libel."<sup>34</sup> What he had to say generated fascination, controversy, even anger, to the point where the journal in which the study appeared devoted a double issue to multifaceted responses followed by the author's rejoinder.<sup>35</sup>

In ruthlessly compressed form, Yuval's thesis makes the following argument:

1. The vengeance: A great divide separated Ashkenazic and Sephardic perceptions of the fate of Gentiles at the end of days. The former anticipated a vengeful redemption, the latter a proselytizing one. While Sephardim envisioned a world in which all nations will recognize the God of Israel, Ashkenazim elaborated a tradition attested in midrashic and liturgical texts which described how the blood of Jewish martyrs splatters and stains the royal cloak of the Lord until the time when He will avenge that blood in a campaign of devastation and annihilation against the Gentile world which had shed it. Despite the dearth of typical Messianic

movements among Ashkenazim, they looked forward to this event with acute eschatological anticipation.

2. The curse: On the Day of Atonement and during the Passover seder, the Ashkenazic liturgy was marked by curses against the Gentiles. This too is a manifestation of the specifically Ashkenazic vision of redemption and should probably be seen as a quasi-magical effort to hasten the much-awaited moment of divine vengeance. Northern European Jewry was not without its unique form of Messianic activism.

3. The blood: During the first crusade, some Rhineland Jews killed their own children. While the motive of preventing forced apostasy is self-evident, one chronicle approvingly recounts the story of a Jew who killed both himself and his children after the crusading army had already left as an act of atonement for his conversion during the earlier attack. To the chronicler, personal atonement is only part of the story. A key element in the narratives of such killings is the capacity of the victims' blood to arouse divine vengeance and hence hasten the redemption. In the later discourse, if not in the events themselves, the martyrs' death "was intended (*no'ad*) not merely to sanctify God's name but to arouse Him to revenge."<sup>36</sup>

4. The libel: No satisfactory explanation exists for the genesis of the ritual murder accusation. The widely held perception that it was born in England with the death of William of Norwich in 1144 is erroneous. A careful examination reveals that it originated in Würzburg in 1147 or even in Worms in 1096, that is, in Germany during the first or second crusade, while the earliest suggestion that William was killed by Jews did not emerge until 1149. There is good reason to speculate that a major impetus for this false accusation was the real behavior of Jews in killing their own children. Christians were probably aware of some aspects of points 1, 2, and 3, and they transformed the Jewish belief in divine eschatological vengeance and the "blood sacrifice" designed to arouse the Lord to carry out that vengeance into a libel in which the hostility of known child killers is directed toward more logical victims, namely, the children of the hated Christians themselves. The accusation of ritual murder, utterly false as it

is, was extrapolated from genuine Jewish behavior.

This is a provocative thesis provocatively formulated. "The [Christian] narrative," writes Yuval, "sets forth Jewish murderousness and desire for revenge. These two motifs are not fabrications *ex nihilo*; rather, they follow from a distorted interpretation of Jewish behavior during the persecutions in 1096 and of the ritual of vengeance which was part of the Jews' eschatological conception. This lie," he concludes, playing on Rabbinic aphorism, "had legs."<sup>37</sup> It is hardly surprising that the article evoked a sharp response.

Let me react, once again with ruthless brevity, to the four elements of Yuval's thesis.

1. The vengeance: As Yuval's critics pointed out, and as he himself conceded in a clarification, even Ashkenazic Jews did not envision the complete liquidation of non-Jews at the end of days. In my view, the subject is more complex and more interesting than either Yuval or his critics have indicated, and I have elaborated in some detail in a forthcoming Hebrew article.<sup>38</sup> At the end of the day, however, the motif of eschatological vengeance is more than strong enough to sustain the initial step of the first element in Yuval's argument.

Nonetheless, significant obstacles stand in the way of his use even of this first element. To begin with, there is no concrete evidence that twelfth-century Christians, who never mention a Jewish belief about the eschatological destruction of Gentiles, knew anything about it.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, the real Ashkenazic doctrine, as Yuval concedes and even insists, was entirely passive; vengeance is the Lord's. Yuval's point is that this shift from the passive expectation of divine vengeance to active, eschatologically motivated revenge is precisely the Christian distortion. This is surely not impossible, but a speculative connection in the absence of any evidence that Christians even knew of the belief in question would be considerably more plausible if the hypothesized link were straightforward. The more distant the real conception is from its use by Christians, the less convincing the speculation becomes.

Yuval does point to one early Christian text which indeed connects Jewish murderousness with redemption, and it is none other than Thomas of Monmouth's account of the alleged ritual murder in Norwich. Here we are told that it is recorded in ancient Jewish writings that "without the shedding of blood the Jews can neither obtain their liberty nor ever return to their ancestral land." Standing alone, this sentence must surely capture the attention of a reader who has been introduced to the "vengeful redemption," though even at this point there is a sense of profound dissonance since God's eschatological destruction of Gentiles is not a condition of redemption but a part of the final scenario.

Whatever connection may nonetheless be entertained is profoundly shaken by the continuation of Thomas's account:

Hence it was decided by them in antiquity that every year they will sacrifice a Christian in some part of the world to the most high God to the scorn and disgrace of Christ, so that in this fashion they will avenge their suffering on him whose death is the reason why they are excluded from their homeland and are exiled as slaves in foreign lands.<sup>40</sup>

By this point, we realize that the text knows nothing of a Jewish belief that Gentiles will be killed *en masse* at the end of days. Though Yuval cites Thomas's report as a reflection of the vengeful redemption, he might have been better advised to see it primarily as a distortion of the belief that the death of Jewish martyrs arouses divine wrath against Gentiles, though here too only the first sentence is even of potential value. By the end of the passage, it becomes evident that we have no indication that Christians knew anything of this belief.

To utilize this text, then, Yuval must assume multiple distortions: With respect to the vengeful redemption, killing by God becomes killing by Jews, eschatological killing becomes contemporary killing, mass killing becomes the annual killing of one person; with respect to "the blood ritual," Jewish children become Christian children, and killing to arouse divine wrath becomes killing to counteract the effect of Jesus' death. Again--all this is possible, but the larger the magnitude and quantity of the distortions,

the weaker the argument. It requires a monumental stretch to maintain that even this text is evidence of Christian familiarity with either of the Jewish beliefs in question.

2. The curse: As Yuval indicates, the earliest evidence that Christians knew of the liturgical curses dates from 1248, a full century after the beginning of the ritual murder accusation. It is not even clear, especially in light of Yuval's response to one of his critics, that in the final analysis he even argues that this component of the "ritual of vengeance" played a role in creating the accusation;<sup>41</sup> in any event, it is the least important element in his argument.

3. The blood: Christians certainly knew that some crusade-era Jews had killed their own children. The force of Yuval's argument, however, depends on considerably more than this, namely, that the Jewish chroniclers understood these killings as part of an effort to arouse divine wrath against Christians and thus hasten their eschatological annihilation and that at least some vague awareness of this interpretation penetrated Christian society.

The key issue is that of intent, and there is something of a slippery nature to Yuval's presentation of this issue. If all he means is that the chroniclers believed that the *effect* of the killings would or might be that divine wrath would be aroused, he is on firm ground--but his larger argument is dramatically weakened. We would again have to assume a major distortion--in this case a quantum leap--in the Christian perception of a Jewish belief: Although in fact no Jew ever suggested that martyrs killed children *so that* God would take revenge against those who indirectly precipitated, but did not carry out, the killings, Christians mistakenly assumed that this peculiar logic is what drove the Jews' behavior and then took the next crucial step by making Christians the direct victims.

In fact, Yuval almost surely aims to make the stronger argument by maintaining that the chroniclers did see the killings as *designed* to arouse divine vengeance, that is, that Jews killed their own children--in at least one instance when there was no real need to do so--so that God should get

angry at Christians. He writes that the belief in a connection between the blood of Jewish martyrs and such vengeance "makes it possible to hasten [the redemption]."<sup>42</sup> We have already encountered his assertion that the death of martyrs "was intended...to arouse [God] to revenge."<sup>43</sup> And he speaks about "such intentions" attributed to the martyrs by the chroniclers.<sup>44</sup>

Both Ezra Fleisher and, even more clearly, Mordechai Breuer pointed out the absence of any evidence that the chroniclers assigned this motivation to the martyrs. In his responses, Yuval appears to miss the crucial distinction between the motivation of martyrdom and its eschatological effect, so that he believes that he has refuted the criticism by pointing to the motif of the stained robe which arouses God to action.<sup>45</sup> Although the chroniclers call upon God to avenge the blood of his people, there is not the slightest indication that they believed that Jews killed their children for the purpose of eliciting this vengeance, nor does any Christian source ever hint at such a motive.

4. The libel: Though Yuval does point to some Christian sources that draw a connection between the Jewish belief in eschatological vengeance and the blood libel, these are extremely late. Once the accusation existed, Christians attempted to buttress it using whatever means were available to them; as early as the thirteenth century we find citations of biblical "prooftexts" which no one would seriously identify as factors in generating the libel.<sup>46</sup> Yuval's argument for shifting the locus of the earliest ritual murder accusation to Germany is suggestive but far from compelling. As for the early Christian reactions to the killing of Jewish children, some were unrelievedly hostile, but some were remarkably understanding.<sup>47</sup>

In sum, early Christian sources make no reference to the Jewish belief in eschatological vengeance, a belief which in any event did not involve Jewish activism. There is no evidence that twelfth-century Christians knew of the curse, which is in any case the least significant element in Yuval's thesis. There is no evidence that they knew that Jews kill their children to hasten the vengeful redemption (or that Jewish chroniclers

believe this), and there is good reason for them not to know this since it is not true. They do know that Jews killed their children in order to prevent their conversion to Christianity. And that is all. Is this enough to allow a historian to speculate that such knowledge could have contributed to producing the accusation of ritual murder? Yes. But it is a speculation that could have been--and was--offered before Yuval's argument,<sup>48</sup> and it is a far weaker speculation than the article attempts to present.

While I remain unpersuaded by the central thesis of this essay and recoil from some of its rhetoric, I would be ungrateful if I did not acknowledge how much I learned from it. Rarely has an article generated as much stimulating discussion--some of it sterile, but some of it fructifying--of a crucial subject in the history of medieval Jewry.

## VII

Finally, we need to look at a large question which cuts across the boundaries of the varying interpretations that we have examined. Did the upsurge in antisemitism in the latter half of the Middle Ages move from the top down or from the bottom up? Part of the problem arises from the difficulty of defining "top" and "bottom." Relevant components of medieval society include popes and kings, canon lawyers and upper clergy, mendicant friars and parish priests, knights and bureaucrats, merchants, serfs, and the urban poor. Cohen's emphasis on theology clearly points to the upper, educated end of the spectrum, while Landes makes a point of stressing the popular nature of the eleventh-century hostility.<sup>49</sup> Moore has been particularly sharp in his denunciation of the view that antisemitism was "popular" in origin, but because he sees knights and lower clergy as distinct from the "populus," his denial that the masses played a key role in the development of Judeophobia does not necessarily become an emphasis on society's elite. The distinction between the highest echelons of the Church and the lower clergy is well illustrated by their respective attitudes to the charge of ritual murder; the official Church resisted it, but the accusation in Norwich as well as the first genuine blood libel, which occurred in Fulda in 1235, resulted in large measure from the initiatives of clerics.<sup>50</sup> As to the "popu-

lus," the association between the Devil and the Jews, complete with physical deformities and Jewish stench, gives off the odor of mass superstition.<sup>51</sup>

It is especially important to recognize that once a belief has entered society, it takes on a life of its own. It spawns new beliefs. It may be an effect, but it becomes a cause. Self-evident as this may be, failure to respect this point has led to historiographic anomalies of the most serious sort, not least of which was the refusal of classical Marxism to recognize non-economic causes in history. Even if certain ideologies were spawned by class interests, it violates common sense to argue that children brought up with a set of beliefs cannot be motivated by them. In our own area of concern, it seems to me that Langmuir's theoretical discussion in *History, Religion, and Antisemitism* is marred by a refusal to recognize this possibility. Thus, he argues on principle that it is inherently problematic to appeal to religious belief--rather than "normal empirical explanation"--to account for historical developments such as antisemitism, as if such beliefs, even if initially generated by "normal, empirical" causes, cannot produce further effects.<sup>52</sup>

Moore correctly observes that "once a pattern of persecution has been established and its victims identified," it is easy to understand why popular sentiment would demand appropriate action.<sup>53</sup> Similarly, Stacey pointed out in his lecture on the expulsion from England that people who believed that Jews regularly kidnapped and murdered Christian children clearly had every reason to want those Jews as far removed from their families as possible. We readily recognize that by modern times, Jew-hatred had become so deeply ingrained that for many people, the evaporation of old "causes" required the substitution of new ones. In the Middle Ages as well, new resentments would naturally be directed at familiar enemies, and these resentments would reinforce the enmity. Precisely because causes produce effects which produce further effects, we *may* be able to speak of a primary cause for an eleventh or twelfth or thirteenth century transformation, but we cannot speak of *the* cause, perhaps not even the primary cause, of the increased hostility to Jews in a period as extensive as the late

Middle Ages.

An intensification of popular piety, a changing economic reality, political, social and economic struggle among nobility, kings, and popular movements, Christian familiarity with post-biblical Jewish texts, the growing prominence of the Devil and his minions, naked fear, millenarian expectations and a triumphalist Christian mission, perhaps the exclusiveness produced by national or Church-centered unity and the anxiety engendered by the doctrine of transubstantiation--all these contributed to the erosion of the security of the Jews. Of course we need to evaluate the relative significance of one or another factor in specific environments, whether chronological, geographic or personal, and sometimes we may conclude that a particular proposal is simply wrong. But embracing all those that we deem relevant is not a counsel of despair or a failure of nerve. Not only does history resist controlled experiments in which we can isolate one factor to see if it works; large historical developments are rarely moved by isolated factors to begin with. We would do well to remember Burke's analogy--proposed for quite different purposes--between the complexity of society and that of the human organism. A candid look at the tangled web of our own psyches is a salutary reminder of the humility with which we need to approach the explanation of so durable, so protean, and so daunting a phenomenon as antisemitism in medieval Christian Europe.

**From Crusades to Blood Libels to Expulsions:  
Some New Approaches to Medieval Antisemitism**

1. Kenneth R. Stow, *Alienated Minority: The Jews of Medieval Latin Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 3-4.
2. Robert Chazan, *European Jewry and the First Crusade* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1987), pp. 197-210; Chazan, *In the Year 1096: The First Crusade and the Jews* (Philadelphia and Jerusalem, 1996), pp. 127-32. In a forthcoming article on the fast of 20 Sivan, David Wachtel has made some valuable observations on the deep impact that must nonetheless be attributed to these events.
3. Avraham Grossman, *Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz ha-Rishonim* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp. 12-13.
4. *Communities of Violence* (Princeton, 1996), pp. 30-32.
5. E. Gutwirth, "Towards Expulsion: 1391-1492," in Elie Kedourie, ed., *Spain and the Jews: The Sephardi Experience, 1492 and After* (London, 1992), pp. 51-73.
6. Miri Rubin, "Desecration of the Host: The Birth of an Accusation," in Diana Wood, ed., *Christianity and Judaism* (Oxford, 1992), p. 184.
7. Stacey's analysis has now appeared in a Hebrew version. See his "Yahadut Angliah ba-Me'ah ha-Yod-Gimmel u-Be'ayat ha-Gerush" ("The Jews of England in the Thirteenth Century and the Problem of the Expulsion"), in David Katz and Yosef Kaplan, eds., *Gerush ve-Shivah: Yehudei Angliah be-Hillufei ha-Zemanim* (Jerusalem, c. 1993), pp. 9-25.
8. *Communities of Violence*, p. 249.
9. Oxford, 1987.
10. Cambridge, Mass., 1995.
11. *The American Historical Review* 102 (1997): 433.
12. Richard Landes, "The Massacres of 1010: On the Origins of Popular Violence in Western Europe," in Jeremy Cohen, ed., *From Witness to Witchcraft: Jews and Judaism in Medieval Christian Thought* (Wiesbaden, 1996), pp. 79-112. Landes credits two earlier studies, which have in his view been unjustly ignored, with looking at these developments from the proper perspective. See Hans Liebeschütz, *Synagoga und Ecclesia* (Heidelberg 1938, 2nd ed., 1983), and L. Dasberg, *Untersuchungen über die Entwertung des Judenstatus in 11. Jahrhundert* (Paris, 1965).
13. The most hostile treatment of the reliability of that source is Kenneth Stow, *The "1007 Anonymous" and Papal Sovereignty: Jewish Perceptions of the Papacy and Papal Policy in the High Middle Ages* (Cincinnati, 1984). I have reservations about important aspects of Stow's argument, which he strengthens in one instance by unjustifiably conflating two disparate quotations in his source; see Robert Chazan's review in *Speculum* 62 (1987): 728-31. At the same time, I am largely persuaded by his uneasiness at finding a strong and sophisticated Jewish presentation of the doctrine of papal sovereignty in an allegedly eleventh-century text.

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14. See, for example, Jeremy Cohen, *The Friars and the Jews: The Evolution of Medieval Anti-Judaism* (Ithaca and London, 1982), pp. 246-47, for references to Joachite eschatology as a possible secondary factor in the development of anti-Jewish attitudes in the thirteenth century. For the sixteenth century, see Heiko A. Oberman, *The Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Age of Renaissance and Reformation* (Philadelphia, 1984; German original, 1981), pp. 118-22; Kenneth Stow, *Catholic Thought and Papal Jewry Policy 1555-1593* (New York, 1977).

15. David Berger, "Mission to the Jews and Jewish-Christian Contacts in the Polemical Literature of the High Middle Ages," *The American Historical Review* 91 (1986): 576-91.

16. See my "Anti-Semitism: An Overview," in David Berger, ed., *History and Hate: The Dimensions of Anti-Semitism* (Philadelphia, 1986), pp. 3-14 (quotation on p. 5).

17. See note 14.

18. See, for example, R. Po-Chia Hsia, *The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany* (New Haven, 1988), pp. 111-31.

19. See my "Christians, Gentiles, and the Talmud: a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Response to the Attack on Rabbinic Judaism," in Bernard Lewis and Friedrich Niewöhner, eds., *Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter* (Wiesbaden, 1992), pp. 115-30.

20. Anna Foa, "The Witch and the Jew: Two Alikes that Were Not the Same," in Cohen, ed., *From Witness to Witchcraft*, pp. 373-74. On "the persistence of traditional behavior," see also Stow, *Alienated Minority*, pp. 242-47. Alexander Patschowsky has reacted to Cohen's thesis by pointing to the fourteenth-century suggestion at high levels of the Church that killers of Jews be prosecuted as heretics; see his "Der 'Talmudjude': mittelalterlichen Ursprung eines neuzeitlichen Themas," in Alfred Haverkamp and Franz-Josef Ziwes, eds., *Juden in der christlichen Umwelt während des späten Mittelalters* (Berlin, 1992), p. 22.

21. R. Po-Chia Hsia, *Trent, 1475: Stories of a Ritual Murder Trial* (New Haven, 1992), p. 127.

22. Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, 2nd ed., vol 11 (New York, London and Philadelphia, 1967), pp. 192-201. This section of Baron's *magnum opus* summarizes a thesis that he had first proposed much earlier.

23. *The Friars and the Jews*, pp. 248-64 (quotation on p. 255).

24. J. Shatzmiller, *Shylock Reconsidered: Jews, Moneylending, and Medieval Society* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1990). Cf. William C. Jordan's beautifully formulated reservations in an essentially appreciative review: see *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 82 (1991): 221-23.

25. Ithaca, New York, 1978.

26. *Religious Poverty*, pp. 54-56.

27. It is true that Little (p. 54) also speaks of the projection of guilt feelings for violence, which the masses did perpetrate, but violence predates the central Middle Ages, and an appeal to specifically anti-Jewish violence raises the specter of circularity.

28. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1990.

29. "Desecration of the Host," p. 184.

30. Robert C. Stacey, "History, Religion, and Medieval Antisemitism: A Response to Gavin Langmuir," *Religious Studies Review* 20 (1994): 95-101; Marc Saperstein, "Medieval Christians and Jews: A Review Essay," *Shofar* 8:4 (Summer, 1990): 1-10. See also Robert Chazan, *In the Year 1096*, pp. 143-46.

31. In "Mission to the Jews," p. 589, I alluded to the story in Joseph Official's *Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne*, ed. by Judah Rosenthal (Jerusalem, 1970), p. 14, which describes a Jew who was seen urinating on a cross and proceeded to produce a clever justification. See also Joseph Shatzmiller, "Mi-Gilluyeha shel ha-Antishemiyut bi-[ye]mei ha-Beinayim: Ha'ashamat ha-Yehudim be-Hillul ha-Zelav" ("Among the Manifestations of Antisemitism in the Middle Ages: The Accusation of Jewish Desecration of the Cross"), in *Mehqarim be-Toledot Am Yisrael ve-Erez Yisrael*, vol. 5 (Haifa, 1980), pp. 159-73, and the observations on the relationship between host desecration charges and other accusations of Jewish acts of desecration in Friedrich Lotter, "Hostienfrevorwurf und Blutwunderfälschung bei den Judenverfolgungen von 1298 ('Rindfleisch') und 1336-1338 ('Armleder')," in *Fälschungen im Mittelalter*, vol. 5 (Hannover, 1988), pp. 543-48. Yisrael Yuval, "Ha-Naqam ve-ha-Qelalah, ha-Dam ve-ha-'Alilah," *Zion* 58 (1992/93): 52, n. 77, properly endorses Lotter's position that not every accusation that Jews desecrated Christian sancta should automatically be rejected as unfounded.

32. *The American Historical Review* 96 (1991): 1498-99.

33. Anna Sapir Abulafia, "Twelfth-Century Renaissance Theology and the Jews," in *From Witness to Witchcraft*, pp. 128-32. In general, see her *Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance* (London and New York, 1995).

34. "Ha-Naqam ve-ha-Qelalah, Ha-Dam ve-ha-'Alilah," *Zion* 58 (1992/93): 33-90.

35. *Zion* 59: 2-3 (1994).

36. "Ha-Naqam," p. 70.

37. "Ha-Naqam," p. 86.

38. "'Al Tadmitam ve-Goralam shel ha-Goyim be-Sifrut ha-Pulmus ha-Ashkenazit" ("On the Image and Destiny of Gentiles in Ashkenazic Polemical Literature"), in Yom Tov Assis et al., eds., *Yehudim mul ha-Zelav: Gezerot Tam"u Ba-Halakhah, Ba-Historiah, u-ba-Historiographiah* (*Facing the Cross: The Persecution of Ashkenazic Jews in 1096*).

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39. Let me make it clear that a request for evidence to support this and related hypotheses is not predicated on the antiquated assumption that the culture of Ashkenazic Jews and that of their Christian neighbors were sealed off from one another. I have discussed this interaction with references to recent scholarship in Gerald J. Blidstein, David Berger, Shnayer Z. Leiman, and Aharon Lichtenstein, *Judaism's Encounter with Other Cultures: Rejection or Integration?*, ed. by Jacob J. Schacter (Northvale, New Jersey and Jerusalem, 1997), pp. 117-25.
40. A. Jessop and M.R. James, eds., *The Life and Miracles of St. William of Norwich* (Cambridge, 1896), Book 2, pp. 93-94. (I have made some modifications in Jessop and James's translation.) Yuval discusses the passage in "Ha-Naqam," p. 82.
41. See his remarks in *Zion* 59 (1994): 399-400.
42. "Ha-Naqam," pp. 65-66.
43. "Ha-Naqam," p.70. *No'ad* can just possibly have the softer meaning of "was destined," but this does not appear to be the sense of the passage.
44. "Ha-Naqam," p. 68.
45. *Zion* 59 (1994): 383-84, 398.
46. See the *Nizzahon Vetus* in my edition, *The Jewish-Christian Debate in the High Middle Ages* (Philadelphia, 1979; softcover ed., Northvale, New Jersey, 1996), #16, Hebrew section, pp. 14-15, English section, p. 54, and *Sefer Yosef ha-Meqanne*, pp. 53-54.
47. A survey of the Christian material was presented by Mary Minty, "Qiddush Ha-Shem be-'einei Nozrim be-Germaniah bi-[ye]mei ha-Beinayim" ("Jewish Martyrdom in the Eyes of German Christians in the Middle Ages"), *Zion* 59 (1994): 209-66.  
The most insightful Christian remark appears in a fourteenth-century text, but its force was somewhat obscured by a mistranslation in the article. *The Cronica Rheinhardbrunnensis* (MGHS 30/31, Hannover, 1896, p. 642) reads as follows: "Dicitur eciam, quod dum Iudei viderent non posse evadere manus occisorum, quod pro quadam sanctitate secundum legem ipsorum, ne traderentur in manibus incircumsorum, se mutuo interfecerunt." Minty (p. 216) translates: "It is also said that once the Jews saw that they could not save themselves from their killers, they voluntarily killed one another for a certain sanctity rather than fall into the hands of the uncircumcised." The word "voluntarily" is not in the Latin. What the text says is that "they killed one another for a certain sanctity in accordance with their own law," an absolutely accurate presentation of the martyrs' view that they were dying to fulfill the halakhic requirement of sanctifying the name of God.
48. See his gracious comment (*Zion* 59 [1994]: 392) acknowledging a tentative suggestion by Ivan Marcus in *Jewish History* 1 (1986).
49. "The Massacres of 1010," pp. 93-96.

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50. On Fulda, Yuval (*Zion* 59 [1994]: 397, 399) points to the study by B. Diestelkampf, "Der Vorwurf des Ritualmordes gegen Juden vor dem Hofgericht Kaiser Friedrichs II. in Jahre 1236," in D. Simon, ed., *Religiöse Devianz* (Frankfurt/M, 1990).
51. In the absence of new interpretations of the Jewish association with Satan, I have not addressed the subject here. This does not mean that I do not consider it highly significant; see my brief remarks in *History and Hate*, pp. 7-8, 11-12. For my reaction to B. Netanyahu's recent work on antisemitism in late medieval Spain (*The Origins of the Inquisition* [New York, 1995]), see my review in *Commentary* 100:4 (October, 1995): 55-57.  
Two important, recent books which address Christian antisemitism in the Middle Ages did not fit into the parameters of this lecture, but I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge them. Mark Cohen's *Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1994) draws upon its author's great expertise in the Islamic world to place our subject in a comparative context, and the first volume of Steven T. Katz's *The Holocaust in Historical Context* (New York, 1994) contains a book-length treatment of medieval antisemitism which is balanced, comprehensive, and remarkably erudite.
52. See *History, Religion, and Antisemitism*, p. 9, and esp. pp. 42-46.
53. *Formation of a Persecuting Society*, p. 108.

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