

The Religious  
Philosophy of Rabbi Zvi  
Hirsch Kalischer.  
Jack H. Adler

The Religious Philosophy of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer  
by  
Jack H. Adler

Submitted in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the  
degree of Master of Hebrew Letters – June 1954

Sponsors: Dr. Gershon Churgin  
Dr. Mark Wischnitzer

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF RABBI ZVI HIRSCH KALISCHER

by

JACK H. ADLER

Submitted in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the  
degree of Master of Hebrew Letters - June 1954

SPONSORS: DR. GERSHON CHURGIN  
DR. MARK WISCHNITZER

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. RABBI ZVI HIRSCH KALISCHER .....	1
A. His Life and Personality	
B. His Writings	
II. HIS RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY .....	10
A. Introduction	
1. Purpose of the book - Sefer Emunah Yesharah	
2. General content and organization	
B. Sefer Emunah Yesharah - Vol. I	
1. The passageway to knowledge	
2. The ladder of knowledge	
3. The Unity of God	
4. On creation	
5. On providence	
6. On the soul	
C. Sefer Emunah Yesharah - Vol. II	
1. The purpose of creation	
2. Free will and God's omniscience	
3. Torah Min Hashamayim	
4. Reasons for the commandments	
III. CRITICAL APPRAISAL .....	45
A. Kalischer's Relation to Previous Jewish Thought	
B. Kalischer's Relation to the Thought of His Time	
C. An Evaluation of Kalischer's Contribution	
APPENDIX .....	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	54

## CHAPTER I

### RABBI ZVI HIRSCH KALISCHER

#### A. His Life and Personality

Zvi Hirsch Kalischer was born in Lissa in Prussian Poland on the 5th of Nisan 5555 (March 24th, 1795). His family connections linked him to some of the most learned names in Germany.<sup>1</sup>

Lissa was at that time a center of Torah learning and Kalischer quickly distinguished himself as a brilliant student of the two gaonim Rabbi Akivan Eger of Posen and Rabbi Yaakov of Lissa.<sup>2</sup>

Kalischer married when he was twenty-three and settled in Thorn. Throughout most of their lives his wife supported him by operating a small scale business establishment, thus enabling Kalischer to devote himself exclusively to his studies. When his reputation as an outstanding scholar began to spread every community in Germany desired to have him for their rabbi. Kalischer, however, rejected all such overtures, in his determination not to utilize his learning as a means to his personal enrichment refusing to become a paid public servant.

The community of Thorn also recognized the greatness of

---

<sup>1</sup>His family line traced itself back to the "Maharal" of Prague and Rabbi Mordecai Jaffa, author of the "Lebushim." Yitzhak Gur Aryeh, Rav Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (Jerusalem: HaTur, 1927), p. 22.

<sup>2</sup>Dr. Israel Klausner, The Zionist Writings of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (Jerusalem, Mosad Harav Kook, 1947), p. 12. This book and the one mentioned above are the most complete sources of information on Kalischer's life available in this country. Unless otherwise stated they are the primary sources for the information contained in this historical sketch.

this scholar in their midst and insisted upon appointing him their rabbi. Kalischer accepted the responsibility of the position out of a sense of obligation to the community in which he lived and officiated in this capacity for fifty years. Despite the fact that for considerable periods of time he and his wife lived in scarcity, he never took a penny in remuneration for his services. When ever his congregational leaders begged him to accept a salary he would refer them to his wife for a decision. She, in turn, inevitably responded that her husband must do as he deemed fit. It was only toward the end of his life that his living accrued to him in plentitude and honor. Kalischer died in 1874.

Kalischer's entire life was devoted to study, teaching, and public service. Especially after the publication of his earlier halachic works,<sup>1</sup> which testified to his scholarship and aroused great excitement in rabbinic circles, Kalischer found himself submerged under a veritable flood of halachic questions and correspondence. Nevertheless he patiently responded to each correspondent in his characteristically clear and persuasive style.

Kalischer was one of the few Rabbis of his place and period who were well versed in philosophy and secular learning as well as traditional knowledge. In the role he felt called upon to fill as defender of his traditional faith against the heresies and doubts prevalent in 19th century Germany,<sup>2</sup> he understood the necessity

---

<sup>1</sup>Eben Bohan and M'oznayim Lamishpat. See p. 7.

<sup>2</sup>For a description of the conditions in Germany see Dr. Y. Z. Zehavy, The Assimilation Movement in Israel (Tel Aviv: 1942), pp. 23-24. Also cf. Graetz, The History of the Jews, V, Ch. 18.

for training in philosophy and metaphysics if he was to successfully answer the attack of the cynic. He accordingly familiarized himself with both medieval and modern philosophical thought and did not hesitate to grapple with the philosophical and metaphysical problems that stand at the forefront of mankind's quest for truth. Thus his writings indicate an acquaintance with the works of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Spinoza, and even Descartes, as well as the works of Jewish authors, both medieval and modern.<sup>1</sup>

Kalischer was an outstanding personality of his generation in still another way. Despite his studious nature he never submerged himself exclusively behind the four walls of scholarship. He never sought the sheltered seclusion so dear to many of his colleagues, and particularly his German colleagues, who could not find the means to muster even defensive efforts on behalf of their embattled faith, much less wage a counterattack as Kalischer dared to do. Unlike them Kalischer never surrounded himself with a shell. He recognized and reacted to everything that occurred that was of interest to Jews and Judaism. His voice was constantly heard in all of the Hebrew journals expressing his opinion on both large and small issues that affected the life of the community. These contributions included philosophical articles, religious exhortation and comment as well as exegetical and halachic articles, and political and Zionist articles, thus embracing all the fields of his interests.

Typical of his philosophical articles are the many

---

<sup>1</sup>Klausner, op. cit., p. 30.

published in HaMagid, HaLebanon, and other journals as well, following the publication of the first volume of his philosophic work, Emunah Yesharah. In these he responds to those who attacked various aspects of his thought. Other articles range over the entire realm of philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

Kalischer bitterly opposed those who, like Geiger and Philippon and their followers, maintained that Jewish salvation was to be sought in religious reforms. Thus in HaMagid Kalischer castigates the City of Berlin in an allegory on the famous biblical elegy concerning Jerusalem.<sup>2</sup> How, Kalischer demanded, can you give the title "Rabbi" to men who do not believe even in the Pentateuch and Prophets, to say nothing of the Talmud? He also severely attacked Holdheim in the Orient for his suggestions that the Sabbath and circumcision be abolished.

The best known and certainly the most important aspect of Kalischer's participation in the life as well as the thought of 19th century Jewry is his fervent propagation of and agitation for the zionist idea. The theoretical aspects of these efforts

---

<sup>1</sup>The following partial compilation is typical:

- "Maimonides and His Opponents," Israelite Annual, 1840.  
 "The Situation of Philosophy in Our Times," HaMagid, 1861, Nos. 18, 19, 27, 38-39, 42-43; HaMagid, 1862, Nos. 30-31.  
 In this series of articles, Kalischer carries on a debate with M. Reiss and Israel Rall. No. 27, 1861, contains a criticism of Kant's arguments attempting to undermine the philosophical proofs of the existence of God.  
 "Returning a Gentle Answer," HaMagid, 1863, Nos. 2-3.  
 Kalischer's debates with A. B. Gotlober, HaMagid, 1865, Nos. 21-25, 33.

וגמה כו" הו" קרית האש"ן אומר משה"ס אלפי עמ' הו" ה' 2  
 כן וליק נפכה"ם שד"ס א"ל האומות ואלו ה' יודין ?  
 "A Time to Build," HaMagid, No. 8 (Feb. 23, 1870). The reference is to Dr. Ob and Dr. Geiger, the man of "madah."



were crystallized in his work, Derishat Zion, which was published in 1862. The book created a great impression, especially in the East. It was translated into German by Poper (Thron, 1865) and a second Hebrew edition was issued by N. Friedland in 1866. Kalischer himself traveled with indefatigable zeal throughout Germany for the purpose of enlisting practical support for his plans and establishing colonization societies. It was his influence that caused Hayyim Lurie to form the first society of this kind in Frankfort-on-the-Main in 1861, which was soon followed by others. Kalischer enlisted the aid of men like Moses Montefiore,<sup>1</sup> Rothschild, and Adolphe Cremieux. It was owing to his agitation that the Alliance Israelite Universelle founded the agricultural colony of Mikveh Yisrael, the rabbinate of which was offered to Kalischer even though he was too old to accept it. Although his endeavors were not attended with immediate success, Kalischer never lost hope. By exerting a strong influence upon his contemporaries, including such prominent men as Henreich Graetz, Moses Hess,<sup>2</sup> and others, he is considered to have been one of the most important of those who prepared the way for the foundation of modern zionism.

An interesting glimpse into Kalischer's personality is afforded us by his passion for the question of the restoration of the sacrifices. This inordinate passion gave rise to an

---

<sup>1</sup>Klausner, op. cit., p. 168, presents a letter written by Kalischer to Montefiore in 1860.

<sup>2</sup>Moses Hess, Rome and Jerusalem, pp. 117 et seq. Hess includes in his own book the conclusions of Derishat Zion and Kalischer's proposed plan of action.

extensive exchange of correspondence between Kalischer and his teacher, Rabbi Akiba Eger, who endeavored to discourage him from his one-man crusade.<sup>1</sup> When Rabbi Eger found himself unable to cope with Kalischer's arguments he sent all the halachic correspondence to his father-in-law, Rabbi Moses Sofer, author of the Hatham-Sofer. After prolonged discussion Kalischer succeeded in bringing him also into agreement with the halachic accuracy of his views. Rabbi Moses Sofer, however, pushed aside the idea because of its impracticality inasmuch as the Turks would never permit non-Moslems to perform sacrifices in the Mosque of Omar. Interest in the idea subsided and it was forgotten by all except Kalischer, who seemed unable to forget. Even his most intimate friends regarded his concern with the immediate restoration of the sacrifices as a form of mania. In their shame they tried to overlook what they considered a childish obsession.<sup>2</sup> Nachum Sokolow, however, regarded this trait in a very different light and criticized their attitude.<sup>3</sup> What others regarded as an unimportant deficiency Sokolow regarded as the essence of Kalischer's aspirations and visions. This mania, according to Sokolow, was nothing less than an expression of "his soul's longing for its fountainhead ... a spark that has smouldered beneath the dust and then burst into flame ... it was a disguised internal revolution

---

<sup>1</sup>The exchange of letters extended from Hol HaMoed Pesach, 1832, to the 12th of Iyar, 1833. Kalischer later published the correspondence in Derishat Zion, pp. 69-93.

<sup>2</sup>Gur Aryeh, op. cit., p. 47.

<sup>3</sup>HaOlam, No. 51 (22nd of Kislev, 1925).

that desired to completely do away with the policy of waiting, of contentment in exile, of longing for redemption divorced from constructive action."<sup>1</sup>

### B. His Writings

Kalischer's first published work was *Eben Bohan* (1842), a commentary on Section 89 of the *Shulhan Aruk*, *Hoshen Mishpat*. This was important primarily as a sample of the major halachic work he was to produce later.

Sefer M'oznayim LaMishpat (1855): This work was a commentary on the entire volume of *Hoshen Mishpat*. It contains an extensive commentary on each law, elucidating the remarks of both the earlier and later commentators who preceded him, and often presents halachic decisions on confused issues. It was divided into three parts, only two of which, covering up to Section 42, have been published. The third part remained in manuscript form.

In 1843 Kalischer published the first volume of his philosophic treatise, Emunah Yesharah. This marked the real beginning of his literary activity, at a time when he was already forty-eight years of age. Kalischer was a man who labored long and tediously before he saw fit to give expression to the result of his thought. When he did finally present the first of his researches it made a strong impression on his readers. Among these were many Jews in Russia and Poland, where his books had a profound influence. The second volume of this work, though completed at

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

the same time,<sup>1</sup> was not published until 1869. Both the content and style of *Emunah Yesharah* greatly impressed the new Jewish intellectual leaders. Dr. Julius Furst, editor of the *Orient*, wrote an article in his publication dealing with Kalischer's religious philosophy, in which he praised both Kalischer and his book. *HaMagid* also carried enthusiastic comment.<sup>2</sup>

Derishat Zion (1862) was originally conceived to be the third volume of *Emunah Yesharah*. Kalischer published it seven years before the publication of the second volume because he was conscious of the urgent importance of the topic and the vital necessity for such a book. Derishat Zion presented three central and truly revolutionary themes: 1) It stressed that the redemption promised by the prophets would only come about in a natural way and through the practical efforts of the Jewish people. 2) It urged the colonization by Jews and with Jewish support of Eretz Israel. 3) It argued the permissibility of performing the traditional sacrifices even in the present day.

Kalischer's commentary on the Pentateuch was published in Warsaw in 1873. In its entirety it comprised a German translation and two Hebrew commentaries. The first of these, Sefer HaBrit, is an explanation of the thought and intellectual and moral content of the text while the second was a verbal explanation of the text. The commentary reveals the exalted soul of its author, a

<sup>1</sup>Klausner, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>2</sup>"...and all this I saw and heard and my heart expanded with joy, for this man is one of us. And I said, I will tell my brothers, the inhabitants of Russia and Poland who regard Prussia as a desert waste, that here too are found fountains of living water..." HaMagid, No. 7 (January 16, 1857).

soul completely absorbed in his hope and faith in the future redemption of his people.

Other works are: Yeziat Mizrayim- a commentary on the Hagadah. Zvi LaZadik- a commentary on Yoreh Deah which is now included in all editions of the Shulhan Aruk.

He recognized the importance of a book like this in the situation in which the German Jewish community found itself. Power and of faith had become scarce, when the number of souls that sought God in truth to fulfill his commandments had seriously diminished.<sup>1</sup>

Kalischer was aware that many Jewish sages frowned upon and warned against the study of philosophy. He was ready to concede their justifications, granting that if a man without training and wisdom could take philosophical thoughts the results could only be detrimental. For the confusion and doubts sown by philosophy are readily grasped, while the subtle solutions are not so readily understood. In too many instances only the confusion and doubts remain in the heart as a result of such unguided investigations and not new wisdom, and the individual strays from the path of righteousness and is lost.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Kalischer was aware that heretical and destructive ideas were prevalent and that only the weapons of reason and logic could stay their progress. He felt that his book would supply the answer. He felt that he had sufficiently

---

<sup>1</sup>Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, Emunah LeYehudim, Vol. I (Brooklyn: S. I. Hirsch, 1883), p. 7.

## CHAPTER II

### HIS RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY - SEFER EMUNAH YESHARAH

#### A. Introduction

Purpose of the book. -- Kalischer wrote *Emunah Yesharah* to meet a definite need. He recognized the importance of a book like this in the situation in which the German Jewish community found itself, "when men of faith had become scarce, when the number of souls that sought God in truth to fulfill his commandments had seriously diminished."<sup>1</sup>

Kalischer was aware that many Jewish sages frowned upon and warned against the study of philosophy. He was ready to concede their justification, granting that if a man without training and wisdom delved into philosophic thought the results could only be detrimental. For the confusions and problems posed by philosophy are easily grasped, while the subtle solutions are not so readily understood. In too many instances only the confusions and doubts remain in the heart as a result of such unguided investigations and not new wisdom, and the individual strays from the path of righteousness and is lost.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, Kalischer was aware that heretical and destructive ideas were prevalent and that only the weapons of reason and logic could stay their progress. Kalischer hoped his book would supply the answer. He felt that he had sufficiently

---

<sup>1</sup>Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, *Emunah Yesharah*, Vol. I (Krotoschin: B. L. Monasch, 1843), p. 8.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

clarified the issues so that the average intelligent reader would be able to follow him over the hazardous pathways of logic and not stumble. This, he regarded as the primary purpose of the book.<sup>1</sup>

Other values Kalischer saw in his book were 1) that it contained many original proofs besides those given by his predecessors and thus would clarify many difficulties, 2) that as a result of his investigations he had come to understand many scriptural passages and rabbinical remarks that posed difficulties, and these interpretations had been incorporated into his work.

Organization and content. -- Kalischer's thought is systematically divided between the two volumes of *Emunah Yesharah*, though the division is by no means a rigid one. Volume I deals primarily with questions common to all theology and metaphysics; Volume II deals primarily with the special aspects of the faith that was divinely revealed to Moses. Thus the first volume discusses the relation of knowledge to faith, the nature of God, Providence, the soul, and reward and punishment, while the second volume discusses the purpose of creation, free will, the divine character of the Torah, and the reasons for some of the commandments.

A valuable feature of the book is, as mentioned above, the wealth of exegetical material it contains. This material is spread throughout both volumes and is introduced whenever the topic under discussion supplies Kalischer with a key to the understanding of the difficult scriptural or rabbinic passage.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid.

These passages are thus inevitably given a philosophic interpretation. In the appendix I have prepared a systematic index to this material.

### B. Sefer Emunah Yesharah - Vol. I

The passageway to knowledge. -- In this section Kalischer presents his views on the only safe and productive approach to the relations between reason and logical investigation on the one hand and traditional faith and acceptance on the other. He posits as prerequisite the recognition that the laws of religion are ultimately beyond the decisions of the human intellect. They necessarily must be so for no two human minds are identical, and therefore if the human mind was to be the only criterion there would necessarily be an infinite multiplicity of religions, each individual following the dictates of his own whims.

Human intellect cannot be made the ultimate criterion, for since man is composed of matter his intellect is necessarily limited. The mind of man can reach only so far, and just as distant as is the intellect of man from that of the beast, so too is the divine intellect distant from the human.

Therefore, Kalischer warns, before you set foot in the garden of God to eat the fruits of understanding, resolve that you will continue to cherish the faith your fathers received on Mt. Sinai even if you cannot fathom all mysteries.<sup>1</sup>

What then is the value of investigation if it is not to

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 15.



determine belief? Kalischer insists that if a man believes solely out of habit and without the support of reason and understanding, his faith rests on very insecure foundations. It is the possessor of such a faith who feels that he has suddenly been shown the light when confronted with a well-reasoned pseudo-scientific attack on his beliefs, whereas he had been in darkness previously. Therefore it is an obligation to be able to rebut the arguments of the heretic.

Thus faith alone is not to be sought as the highest good. On the other hand, those who rely solely on their reason and intellect will surely go astray, dealing as they are with issues beyond the ken of human reason and intellect. The paradox can be avoided by utilising reason and following two rules: 1) a distinction must always be made between those things that are beyond reason and those that are opposed to reason. The former would include events that are only impossible from the viewpoint of natural law; the latter those that are impossible to conceive of at all because of intrinsic contradiction. Thus the former are possible to God, while only the latter cannot be imagined.<sup>1</sup> 2) Shun heretical thoughts and inclinations since they lead to practical consequences that should be avoided.<sup>2</sup>

These two rules can safely guide our attempts at understanding. The first distinction, made by Ma imonides and also Albo in his *Ikkarim*,<sup>3</sup> clearly establishes that there is nothing

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>3</sup>Joseph Albo, Sefer Ikkarim, Section I, Ch. 22.

in the Torah belonging to the latter category, the category of those things that are intrinsically impossible, and therefore impossible to accept. Kalischer proves that the second rule is also a requirement by quoting Reggio,<sup>1</sup> Mendelsohn,<sup>2</sup> and Maimonides.<sup>3</sup>

The ladder of knowledge. -- Kalischer distinguishes between the following three types of proof: 1) logical proof, 2) direct proof - the testimony of sensory perception, 3) inferred proof.<sup>4</sup>

Direct proof is not subject to error. Logical proof, on the other hand, is never beyond doubt because the proof itself requires verification of its premises. Inferred proof is in between the other two; it is not subject to sensory perception and yet it falls in the same category. The soul provides an example - it is not perceived by the sense of sight and yet its existence is as unquestioned as if it were directly perceived because our senses perceive its activities and therefore must infer its presence.

When it comes to verification of religious truth, logical proof is invalid since religion is beyond the limit of the intellect. The only valid proofs are either directly perceived ones or those inferred from directly perceived ones with the aid of the

<sup>1</sup>How, Reggio asks, can faith be commanded? He decides that it is necessary to "affirm and observe the obligation to believe since the obligation falls not on the intellect but on the will, requiring it to use all means that can give rise to belief." Isaac Samuel Reggio, The Torah and Philosophy, Section 3, Ch. 1.

<sup>2</sup>"Whenever I see my investigations are tending to lead me from the right path I immediately rise and stand silently seeking the way back." Moses Mendelsohn, Moadei Shahar, p. 163.

<sup>3</sup>Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilhoth Avodah Zarah, Ch. 2.

<sup>4</sup>אין אדם יודע אלוהים Kalischer, op. cit., p. 41.

intellect. The category of direct proof would include the perception by the entire people of Israel of the Living God when He addressed them from the flaming cloud on Mt. Sinai. The lessons contained in all the other miracles and wonders would fall in the category of inferred proof. Thus from the earth opening and engulfing Korach it was possible to perceive through inference that the Divine Will desired only the children of Aaron to be priests and that the command of Moses be obeyed.<sup>1</sup>

The Unity of God. -- Kalischer maintains there are three ways to acquire faith and religious knowledge. These are through tradition, through reason, and through a comprehensive study of the soul.<sup>2</sup>

Tradition will never lead one astray. Reason is invaluable when used in conjunction with tradition to weigh and plumb it judiciously. It is true that if a person endeavors to arrive at subtle truths by means of reason alone he will inevitably fall into error. But if he avoids this trap and limits himself to simple logic he can arrive at a proper knowledge of his Creator through reason. Thus Kalischer quotes Bachya's proof of the existence of God from the necessity for a first cause.<sup>3</sup>

Kalischer, however, prefers the third way to knowledge of God - through a study of the soul and a comparison of its relation to the body with God's relation to the world, maintaining that it is possible by this method to arrive at the basic principles of the existence of God, His Unity, His Providence, as well

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 45.

<sup>3</sup>Bahya Ibn Pakudah, Duties of the Heart, On Unity.

as the immortality of the soul and its reward and punishment. Employing this method Kalischer points out that just as the physical organs cannot function by themselves without the presence and action of the soul so the various parts of the world have no will and no power of function without the presence and action of God.<sup>1</sup>

Kalischer attempts to establish the Unity of God in all three ways. Through reason: by definition the first cause cannot have a reason. If there are two causes each one is dependent on the other and we must find another to be first.<sup>2</sup> Through comparison to the soul: since all the bodily functions work in harmony it proves the moving forces come from one source. The soul is one and yet is capable of conducting manifold activities at will. Thus God is One and yet is the cause of all the world's motion.<sup>3</sup>

On creation. -- Kalischer criticizes Aristotle for his theory of the world's eternity and maintains it is impossible to believe other than that the world was created in time. He brings four proofs in support of this statement.

1) The world is composed of various elements and the elements in turn are composed of matter and form. The world is thus seen to be a composite and anything that is a composite, anything that is the result of combination, requires that there was a time when its composition and combination took place.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

2) The world is finite; it has a beginning and an end. It is a logical axiom that anything having a beginning and end in space also has a beginning and end in time, for everything finite in space is finite in time and is subject to definition in time through the correlates of when and where.

Kalischer cannot understand how Aristotle could have advanced his theory of the world's eternity in view of his acceptance of the following two premises: 1) there is a chain of cause and effect and a first cause which is the ultimate cause of all else, 2) the first cause is infinite. If, as Aristotle maintained, the world is uncreated in time then it has co-existed with its cause from the first. This would require that everywhere the cause is found its effects should also be found. Why then should the world be finite if its cause is infinite?<sup>1</sup>

3) Kalischer takes this proof from Albo's *Ikkarim*.<sup>2</sup> Albo maintained that the creation of the world in time out of nothing is a dogma common to divine law in general and belonging especially to the Law of Moses though it is neither a fundamental nor a derivative principle, for we can conceive of both without the idea of creation *ex nihilo*. The dogma, however, may be likened to a branch issuing from the first principle which is the existence of God. God is free from defects. But if He cannot create out of nothing there would be that defect in His nature.

4) Kalischer believes that the main reason for advocacy of the theory of the world's eternity is the inability to

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>Albo, *op. cit.*, Section I, Ch. 23.

conceive of why the world should have been created at just the particular time it was and not some other.<sup>1</sup> This is like asking someone why he manufactured a certain tool in a particular form and not another. In order to ask this question it is necessary to have previous knowledge of another form that would have better served the same purpose. Thus just as you can ask why the world was not created a thousand years earlier so you can ask why it was not created ten thousand years earlier. The question is subject to infinite regression until the ultimate conclusion reached would be that the existence of the first cause immediately required the existence of the world. This we know to be false.<sup>2</sup> The correct view is that before creation time did not exist. Creation at a specific moment was necessary to demonstrate that God's act of creation stemmed from His will and not necessity. This is the view of both Albo<sup>3</sup> and Maimonides.<sup>4</sup>

Kalischer attacks on two counts Plato's theory that there existed an eternal, hylic, matter out of which God created the world and that He therefore cannot overcome the essential nature of that matter. First of all, everyone agrees that God is omnipotent. Secondly, the first cause, by definition, must be infinite.<sup>5</sup> This excludes the possibility of the co-existence of

---

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>3</sup>Albo, op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, II, Ch. 18.

<sup>5</sup>Earlier Kalischer discusses the necessity for the creation of a vacuum, a finity from which God had removed Himself, before the world could be created, Kalischer, op. cit., p. 63.

the eternal matter alongside of it.<sup>1</sup>

Kalischer next deals with Spinoza who maintained that God and the world are one and that the nature of the world's creation was predestined, for if another manner of creation was possible why then was it not the manner translated into reality? He replies that God as the first cause acted out of His will and not necessity. The only necessity that existed was from the point of view of man, the object of God's desire to benefit and elevate. From this viewpoint God could not have created the world differently.<sup>2</sup>

On Providence. -- Kalischer brings a variety of arguments in evidence of God's Providence.

1) God is omnipresent because He is infinite. From this it is apparent that nothing can occur that He is unaware of for there is no place that exists outside of Him.<sup>3</sup>

2) Every effect necessarily has a cause and if the cause does not operate even momentarily the effect is inoperative. Therefore, if God, the first cause, would remove His sight even momentarily from the world He has created it would cease to exist.<sup>4</sup>

3) By comparison to the soul's knowledge of all the body's activities. Just as the soul is aware of and controls all the individual's functions so God is conscious of and controls all the activities of the world.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 80.

4) From the waves of the sea which tower over the level of the land and yet are limited by the boundaries that have been set for them. Now if God desired that the waves be thus limited why did He not make their greatest height lower than that of land and thus not give them even the possibility of encroaching on land? The answer to this is that He wished to make evident the continual dependence of the natural order on His providence.<sup>1</sup>

5) Kalischer quotes a variety of proofs cited originally by Albo.<sup>2</sup> Thus he argues from the presence of dry land, since the nature of the elements require that the earth be covered with water. Also the existence of rain provides evidence of God's providence since it is impossible to attribute solely to nature, inasmuch as it does not occur with the regularity of time and manner which is characteristic of all purely natural phenomenon. The experience of man gives testimony as well. Thus Albo maintains that such common occurrences as the prosperity and continued good fortune of the righteous man despite the malicious efforts of shrewd enemies, the infliction of suitable punishment in amazing displays of truly ironic justice, the sudden revelations of dreams, are all indications of God's providence. Kalischer adds a similar proof from the abrupt and radical change of fortunes, the poor and humble being elevated and the high and mighty brought low.

The soul. -- Kalischer begins his discussion of the soul by stating the traditional view. According to this view the soul

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>2</sup>Albo, op. cit., IV, Ch. 8, 9.



is independent of the body and not a correlate or a product of physical existence. Thus in reference to the beast and animal kingdom Scripture refers to the earth bringing forth the soul of life, for their living souls are products pure and simple of nature, but the reference to man's soul explicitly defines its origin as divine. This attitude toward the human soul necessarily has as its corollary belief in the soul's immortality.<sup>1</sup>

What exactly is the soul? In Kalischer's view there are two basic approaches. One is that which Maimonides attributes to Alexander Aphrodisiensis.<sup>2</sup> This view maintains that the soul is only a readiness and potentiality to acquire ideas. It regards the acquired intellect, which achieves combination to the Active Intellect, as the only portion of man that survives after death. Opposed to this view is the one held by Jewish thought and many wise men of the gentile world as well who regard the soul as a divine spark that achieves immortality by its efforts to carry out the divine will.<sup>3</sup>

Kalischer endorses the latter view, maintaining it is forbidden to accept the theory that only the acquired intellect can enable man to become attached to the Active Intellect and thus gain immortality. Those who believe that Maimonides accepted

---

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 95.

<sup>2</sup>Maimonides, Guide, II, trans. Friedlander (London: 1925) p. 173.

<sup>3</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 96.

this theory are wrong.<sup>1</sup> The explanation to his statements lie in the fact that the soul is such a purely spiritual substance that it would have been impossible for the Creator to combine it in its perfected form with physical matter. He therefore reduced its spirituality and perfection to a potentiality. In this condition the soul was able to combine with the body, and as the body develops the soul develops with it, proceeding from potential to realized perfection.<sup>2</sup>

Kalischer presents a number of proofs in support of the proposition that the soul is indeed an entity independent of the body and is divine in nature:

1) Animals have their full allotment of wisdom and understanding from the time they are born; it is not subject to development. This indicates that the human soul is not of the same quality as the soul of the beast; it is not a purely natural phenomenon.<sup>3</sup>

2) The human intellect sharpens as it grows older and does not obey the natural law of growth and decay. While these proofs indicate that the human intellect is a unique and divine gift the question still remains as to the nature of the human soul, exclusive of the intellect.<sup>4</sup> Is it subject to extinction along with

---

<sup>1</sup>On the basis of the Guide, I, Ch. 70. "...for the soul that remains after death is not the soul that lives in man when he is born, the latter is a mere faculty, while that which has a separate existence after death is a reality."

<sup>2</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 97.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>4</sup>הנפש הבהמית. Kalischer is obviously thinking of Avicenna's conception of the soul as tripartite, composed of the vegetative, the animal, and the rational soul. The part in question is the animal soul.

the vegetative soul, or is it immortal? Even though Crescas explained that Maimonides' opinion is not similar to Aristotle's and maintained there is no difference between the reward of one righteous person and another,<sup>1</sup> Kalischer felt there was still confusion on this point. This, he believed, could be removed by the realization that the gradual development of even the physical functions in the human indicates that these functions are products of the intellect and conscious soul. The human soul is indivisible into differentiations, one part being mortal and the other immortal. The human soul, per se, is immortal, and the only differentiation that can be made is between the destiny of a righteous soul and that of an evil soul. While both are immortal, the evil soul cannot enter into the Divine Presence until it has been purified.<sup>2</sup>

3) A third proof is offered by the nature of God. Thus it is impossible to conceive of the ultimate Judge of the universe performing injustice. In view of this the famous question posed by the prosperity of the evildoer and the misfortune of the righteous necessarily leads to the realization that God's ultimate reward and punishment applies not to the transient but to the eternal life. Kalischer believes that is why the prophets so vividly expressed the apparent problem.<sup>3</sup> It is also one of the two purposes behind the dramatic tirade against God's seeming

---

<sup>1</sup>Hasdai Ben Abraham Crescas, Or Adonai, Ch. 70.

<sup>2</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 105.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 112.

injustice that is to be found in the Book of Job.<sup>1</sup> At this point Kalischer devotes a chapter to the interpretation of the content of Ecclesiastes and Job in the light of these ideas.<sup>2</sup>

The nature of reward and punishment. -- Kalischer first reconciles an apparent contradiction in Maimonides' statements on this subject. Thus at one point Maimonides says that in the eternal life the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads and take pleasure in the glory of the Divine Presence.<sup>3</sup> Then he says that the benefits accruing to the soul in the future world cannot be conceived and described by anyone in this world.<sup>4</sup> The explanation lies in that in order for an individual to comprehend anything at all external to himself, there must exist some similarity in quality between the object and the perceiver. As the similarity grows so too does the individual's comprehension of the object. Therefore when the individual's conception of God has reached a high level of truth and completeness it implies that he himself has become more divine in quality. It follows therefore that he would now be able to receive the pleasure of the Divine Presence to a degree previously inconceivable.<sup>5</sup>

There are two distinct types of benefit which derive from the acceptance of and the observance of God's commandments. One

---

<sup>1</sup>The other being the passionate expression of a plea for God to reveal his justice in this world as well so that mankind might see and understand and scorn the path of evil.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., Ch. 9, p. 117.

<sup>3</sup>Mishneh Torah, Hilhoth Teshubah, Ch. 8, Halacha 2.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., Halacha 6.

<sup>5</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 129.

follows as a natural result of adhering to the best and truest guidance available, just as benefit accrues to a patient who follows his doctor's instructions. The second benefit is not a natural consequence but a specially bestowed reward for having observed God's commandments not because they are good for us in themselves but just because they are the will of God.<sup>1</sup>

This explains why there are three distinct phases to the future reward of the righteous soul: 1) the phase after death, 2) the phase of resurrection, 3) the phase of the coming world. Immediately after death the soul enjoys the reward of nearness to the Living God and sharing in the Divine Presence that accrues to it as a natural consequence of its lifelong acquisition of wisdom and righteous deeds. The greater the proximity to God that it has earned the greater the bliss. But the second category of benefit as enumerated above must be bestowed upon both the body and soul, since it is bestowed as reward for the control and subjugation of the individual's physical nature. This second benefit is therefore granted to the resurrected individual, so that both the body and soul, both having had a part in its achievement, may participate in the reward. This second phase will not last forever but will pass into the third and last - Olam Habah. While those individuals resurrected will not again undergo death, their physical aspects will be purified and shed until only their spiritual beings remain, as occurred in the case of Elijah. This last metamorphosis is necessary to enable

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 134.

the soul to cling completely to its Creator.<sup>1</sup>

While only the righteous will be resurrected, no one will be excluded from the coming world with the exception of the complete sinner, the doer of evil in deliberate defiance, the man who does not believe at all in the Torah.<sup>2</sup> Kalischer claims to have derived all these views from shorter statements and allusions of Maimonides.

The punishment accruing to the soul of the evildoer can likewise be divided into three aspects. The first aspect is the punishment accruing as a natural consequence of having led a sinful life. These sins are a burden to the soul which prevent it from coming near unto the Divine Presence, and this enforced separation causes it pain. In its constant efforts to approach its source of origin it is rebuffed and sent back to its place of darkness and desolation where it can find no peace.<sup>3</sup> This punishment is not an expression of God's vengeance but a natural consequence of sin. Those who sinned out of weakness and inability to govern their desires are purified by means of this suffering and made worthy of the coming world.<sup>4</sup>

If the soul sinned in deliberate defiance of God, however, then it deserves God's vengeance. Thus the deliberately sinful soul is deprived of resurrection, and condemned to eternal death.

Kalischer discusses the question of why the Torah did not present a clear definition of the soul's destiny. He maintains that to the learned person the allusions found in the Torah are

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 135

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 138.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 139

sufficiently clear and precise, while to have presented these concepts to the masses could only have had a deleterious effect. The reason for this is that the religious beliefs of ancient man were founded on two erroneous concepts. They believed that God was too exalted to have any contact with the world and they believed that imperfect man was incapable of reaching God without the aid of intermediaries. Therefore they worshipped kings as God's representative, and even worshipped animals, regarding them as perfect in contradistinction to man's imperfection.<sup>1</sup>

When God gave the Torah to Israel He therefore stressed both that His providence does exist in this world and that man can achieve perfection and merge his soul with that of the Living God even in his present worldly existence. But if the Torah had explicitly stated that the closest communion with God takes place after death many would have been misled and believed that there was actually some substance to the theories of the idol-worshippers, that man achieved perfection and the ability to commune with God only after death. The Torah, therefore, revealed the truth only to the learned.<sup>2</sup> Kalischer presents an outline of the references in the Torah which indicates to men of wisdom the doctrines of immortality of the soul.<sup>3</sup>

#### C. Sefer Emunah Yesharah - Vol. II

The purpose of creation. -- It is axiomatic that the creation of the world was an act of kindness on God's part. Yet

---

<sup>1</sup> Since they are born with all their faculties and do not require or give evidence of gradual development.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 144.

the difficulty in understanding this kindness becomes apparent when we consider that the moral path of man through life is beset with many pitfalls and the majority of mankind seemingly stumble and sin. Thus the Rabbis conclude that it would have been better for man not to have been created.<sup>1</sup> Rambam dealt this question but Kalischer felt the Maimonidean solution was not complete. As Maimonides phrased the problem, if we say that the world was created for the sake of man and man was created for the sake of worship, of what purpose is the worship? God does not require it as He could not suffer a lack even if nothing existed. The conclusion Maimonides reached was that there was no purpose in the creation other than that was the will of God.<sup>2</sup> This conclusion has puzzled many people as they could not conceive of the Master Craftsman creating without a purpose. What Rambam meant, in Kalischer's opinion, is that man cannot grasp the purpose.

The essence of the problem is this: Cannot God bestow His benefit on man without the necessity for the world's creation? Cannot God grant the highest good to the human souls while they are in heaven? God knows the nature of each soul. If the soul is good, if God knows that it will overcome temptation in its earthly existence, why then does He not reward it immediately? And if the soul is inclined to evil why does He create it at all, since He surely does not desire the destruction of the evildoer?

Kalischer feels it is possible to arrive at a reasonable answer to these questions in two ways:

- 1) It is impossible to conceive of the existence of any

<sup>1</sup>Erubin, 13.

<sup>2</sup>Guide, I. Ch. 4.



creation or created beings at all without the existence of man. Kalischer demonstrated previously that it is impossible to imagine that there existed an area devoid of God's presence, and that in order for God to create the world it was first necessary for Him to withdraw His Presence and create an empty area in which to found the universe. In this area he wished to place the spiritual objects of his creativity in order to bestow upon them benefit. But if He did not extend His influence and Presence to them they would be totally incapable of life and existence, since if the cause is not present the effect is necessarily non-existent. On the other hand, if He did extend His Presence to them they would immediately be reabsorbed into the flame of His glory and cease to exist independently, just as a small flame is absorbed into a larger one. If, however, the small flame is bound to a wick, it does not lose its own identity. Man, being composed of matter as well as spirit, acts as the wick in this case and makes possible the existence of all the worlds.<sup>1</sup> This reasoning explains the Midrash Tanchuma which says that the Lord created and destroyed many worlds before the creation of this one, as well as the remark of the sages that when God created man He first took counsel with the assembly of angels who advised Him against it, whereupon He stretched out His finger and destroyed them.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, Emunah Yesharah, Vol. II, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>This is a sample of the exegetical material contained in Emunah Yesharah. Difficult passages are interpreted in the light of philosophic concepts.

2) The creation of the world and man was essential if God was to grant His eternal kindness to His creations in the highest degree possible. The spiritual, heavenly beings did not meet the requirements because they are static in their natures and as such are limited by definite boundaries. Anything so defined and finite cannot be the recipient of infinite kindness. For this it was necessary for God to create man in His image and give him freedom of choice and thus the possibility for infinite development and infinite reward.<sup>1</sup>

Free will and God's omniscience. -- The next problem Kalischer grapples with is the difficulty of reconciling the theory of free will with God's knowledge. In his opinion Maimonides answered the question when he pointed out that God's knowledge and God's essence are one and the same, and therefore just as man cannot grasp the essence of God so he cannot understand His knowledge.<sup>2</sup> Thus God has a knowledge of all events that will occur and yet the individual's choice of action remains in his own hands.

God's perfection, which is axiomatic, requires that His knowledge be complete, for ignorance of anything at all would surely be a deficiency. So too do all of the arguments for God's providence<sup>3</sup> apply equally to His omniscience.

A difficulty is presented by the fact that God cannot be subject to change. How then can He have knowledge of transient

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>3</sup>See above, p. 17.

particulars? On this point as well, Kalischer quotes Maimonides - the change is present only in the object or person changed and not in God's knowledge of the item changed. This factor also permits the possibility of free will and is an argument against the view held by Spinoza and others that the actions of man are predetermined. For free will is only possible when the initiative for change comes from the person who undergoes the change and not from the first cause.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the comprehensive answer offered by Maimonides that the nature of God's knowledge is different than ours and inconceivable to the human mind, Kalischer is aware that there are aspects to the problem which both require and are subject to further clarification. Thus it is necessary to believe that God has knowledge of even what is now non-existent, knowledge of all events before they come to pass. One reason is supplied by Rambam's original argument in support of God's omniscience, namely that any deficiency at all in God's knowledge would imply a deficiency in His Perfection, which is inadmissible. Another is that if we say that God does not know of all future events and how every individual will act and choose, then we refute the perfection of His creation and the principle of Chesed on which the world was based. Kalischer therefore refers to Rambam's statement that God saw everything from the first; that His knowledge embraces all that is destined to occur throughout eternity.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, the belief in man's free will and

---

<sup>1</sup>Eemunah Yesharah, Vol. II, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup>Guide, III, Ch. 20.

possibility of choice is a necessary dogma. For if man's will is not free there is no point to reward and punishment or to the giving of commandments. Furthermore if man does not make the choice of good or evil then the responsibility for the evil he does belongs to his Creator. Kalischer attempts to reasonably reconcile the conflict between these two necessary beliefs.<sup>1</sup>

First a distinction has to be made between two types of necessity, intrinsic<sup>2</sup> and extrinsic.<sup>3</sup> The former defines an event which has to occur because of factors contained within itself. An example of intrinsic necessity is the necessity for it to rain if rain-filled clouds are present and there is no wind to dispel them and the other conditions are all favorable. An example of extrinsic necessity is the necessity for it to rain when the prophet predicts rain in the immediate absence of all the physical phenomena which presage rain - the necessity for the prophecy's fulfillment is dependent on God's knowledge that it will rain at a specific time.

When we apply this distinction to the problem at hand we see that God's knowledge belongs to the second category. Its veracity is an extrinsic necessity; it is dependent on extrinsic factors. God's knowledge is dependent on the freedom of choice of man, for it is through an individual's choice of good or evil that God knows what he will choose, and not the other way around. Kalischer finds an expression of this thought in Rambam's

<sup>1</sup> Kalischer, op. cit., p. 39.

<sup>2</sup> הכרח נמשך העצמות

<sup>3</sup> הכרח נמשך הזולת

statement that God has no knowledge of anything that is totally non-existent.<sup>1</sup> In this statement Maimonides wished to make known that if the choice of good or evil was not to be found at all in the human will, then even God would not be able to know what he would choose.<sup>2</sup>

Kalischer posits the following principles in his attempt to reconcile free will with God's omniscience.

- 1) Everything in the world has a cause and an effect.
- 2) The cause cannot be determined by the effect.
- 3) Knowledge of anything totally non-existent is impossible even to God.
- 4) Both God's omniscience and the free will of man are necessary beliefs.
- 5) There is intrinsic necessity and extrinsic necessity, and everything in the category of extrinsic necessity is caused by something else.

It is true that the soul of man can choose to do good or evil and it is also true that God knows previous to the individual's decision what decision he will make. If you ask which is the cause and which the effect, the answer is that the choice is the cause and God's knowledge the effect. For according to the third principle if the choice did not exist there would be no possibility of God's knowledge of it.

It cannot be objected that perhaps God does not have the previous knowledge of the choice since no choice actually exists but everything is predestined. By doing so you would refute the

<sup>1</sup> Guide, III, Ch. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Kalischer, op. cit., p. 40.

principle of free will that has already been established by various proofs.

Thus the choice is the cause of God's knowledge of the choice. Therefore in accordance with the second principle God's knowledge of the choice in no way determines it. A possible objection to this analysis is that the knowledge exists before the choice is made. How then can it be the cause of that knowledge or how can the possibility of choice ever really exist? The answer lies in the fifth principle which distinguishes that necessity which derives from other than intrinsic causes. Thus just as the prophet's knowledge of a coming event is not the cause of that event but rather the event is the cause of his knowledge and his prophecy is merely an assurance that the event will take place, so God's knowledge is only an assurance that there will exist at a particular time a particular cause for a certain event. This particular cause is the free choice that the individual makes and is the direct cause of the event.<sup>1</sup>

In the light of this analysis, Kalischer defends Saadiah's statement on the subject against Albo's criticism. Thus Saadiah states that God's knowledge of potentialities is not the cause of their ultimate realization just as His knowledge of past events is not the cause of their existence. For if His knowledge was the cause of their realization they would necessarily occur with the regularity of natural phenomenon. As this is not the case, as we are witness to their constant uniqueness, we must

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

conclude they are not dependent on his knowledge.<sup>1</sup> Albo criticizes this statement as approaching the view of those who maintain God cannot know potentialities for if He did have knowledge of them, and they were not dependent on that knowledge, then His knowledge could not be considered immutable.<sup>2</sup> Kalischer points out that all Saadiah wished to imply was that the choice of one of two or more possibilities is the cause of God's knowledge and not the other way around, and therefore the possibility of free choice exists.

Torah Min Hashamayim. -- With acute insight Kalischer realized that a key problem in maintaining and strengthening traditional belief was the verification of the divine character of the Torah. In his introduction to this section he terms his arguments weapons in the battle against heretics, two-headed swords to be used against those who would ambush souls on the pathways of faith. He cites five classes of proof:<sup>3</sup>

1) Teleological proof. -- Logic rules that there was a necessity for God to have given a Torah to humanity, that the design of creation demanded it. For it is impossible to conceive of God so lacking interest in and pity toward man, who is the purpose of all creation, that He would not give him guidance and instruction on how to achieve perfection. And let no man arrogantly proclaim that his human wisdom is a sufficient guide on the path of life. For not only are the majority of people unable

---

<sup>1</sup>Saadiah ben Joseph, Emunot ve-Deot.

<sup>2</sup>Ikkarim, IV, Ch. 1.

<sup>3</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 55.

to grasp the essentials of life and righteous living by means of their intellect alone, but even those who are qualified are inevitably subject to manifold doubts and uncertainties.<sup>1</sup> These uncertainties inevitably exist both about questions of detail<sup>2</sup> and the ultimate questions of life as well.<sup>3</sup> Albo mentions this argument.<sup>4</sup>

2) Inherent Proof. -- The content of the Torah itself is a proof of its divine truth. Every other code or religious constitution ever promulgated on earth all contain deficiencies, inaccuracies, superstitions, hypocrisies, in short, all the defects their human authors were subject to. No man has ever reached the perfection necessary to avoid these serious shortcomings in the heritage he left his fellow men. Thus Socrates before he died as a martyr for truth commanded his disciples to sacrifice to the gods; Aristotle erred in his views on the eternity of the world; Plato erred in his concept of virtue. Yet the mortal Moses at one time and in one unified vision presented to the world a Torah whose perfection and completeness and infinite wisdom cannot be denied. The only explanation is that the spirit of God expressed itself through Moses and gave the

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

<sup>2</sup>How, for example, do we know that we may eat flesh? Who gave us permission to eat living creatures?

<sup>3</sup>Who has ever told man with unquestionable authority how he may please his Creator and thus achieve eternal life? The performance of justice and charity are truly praiseworthy and yet they are basically something a man does for his own benefit, to maintain civilization so that he may enjoy its blessings. This, therefore, cannot be the full measure of spiritual perfection man was put on the earth for the purpose of acquiring.

<sup>4</sup>Ikkarim, III, Ch. 7.



Torah to Israel. And whereas the thinkers and philosophers must spend all their days in travail to discover even a fraction of the truth, and that often liberally diluted with falsehood, we were granted the truth in its ultimate perfection on Mt. Sinai.<sup>1</sup>

A second approach to the proof inherent in the Torah itself is presented by Kalischer in a quote from Wessely's book, Gan Naul. This cites the scientific knowledge and understanding displayed in the reconciliation of the lunar and solar calendars.

"The wise men of other nations after much labour eventually arrived at the approximate measures but not the exact ones, for it is beyond man's understanding and impossible for him to equalize the lunar months with the solar year with exactitude, to arrange the festivals in accordance with God's commands, but Israel possessed these secrets... From the day of our exile the fund of our wisdom was lost and we remained with only the remnants of knowledge necessary for the arrangement of the festivals... even Ptolmey wondered on this exact calculation and said it was truly a divine matter and a testimony that existed in Israel as quoted by Don Abarbanel."<sup>2</sup>

A third example of the inherent proof is again a scientific one and again taken from Wessely.<sup>3</sup> This cites the scientific knowledge evident in the laws distinguishing between clean and unclean animals. Weisel points out that the Rabbis also emphasized this aspect.<sup>4</sup> Kalischer adds that this evidence also testifies as a proof that the Unwritten Law was necessarily handed down from generation to generation from Moses who received it

---

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>2</sup>Naftali Hertz Wessely, Gan Naul (Warsaw: O. L. Sklower, 1838), Section 8, Ch. 8.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., Section 7, Ch. 7.

<sup>4</sup>Rabbi Akiba in Sifri asks: Was Moses a hunter to possess such knowledge?

by divine means because it contains many facts of classification which could not have been known even to natural scientists through their rational investigations.<sup>1</sup> Kalischer mentions the source of the rabbinical statements upon which he bases this argument.<sup>2</sup>

3) As proved by miracles and wonders. -- When it comes to weighing the true and false as far as proof offered by miracles goes, Kalischer posits the following criterion: With the exception of the miracles mentioned in the Torah, all signs and wonders performed in the history of the world have without fail been examples of individual changes affecting only the individual,<sup>3</sup> and not changes in the basic phenomenon and natural order of the world. For it is impossible for the latter to be under the control of man, while the former may be the result of invention or wizardry.

In this category of proof Kalischer brings three further evidences of the divine character of the Torah:

1) When other prophets made predictions, the wondrous events have never taken place before the public scrutiny and were never testified to by entire peoples and nations. Thus only a few could testify that a particular person could heal the sick and demented etc., and these few inevitably were the person's followers and disciples, whose testimony is therefore open to suspicion of distortion and exaggeration. Moses, on the other

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 70.

<sup>2</sup>Mishneh Torah, Hilhoth Maahalot Asurot, Ch. 1 and Hulin, 59.

<sup>3</sup> 1M38 28N "60 '15E

hand, performed his wonders before the entire people of Israel and other nations as well, and his miracles were not momentary and limited in nature but rather were exemplified by the gift of Manna over a forty-year period or by the wonders performed in Egypt which affected the entire land.

2) The effectiveness of the agent is an indication of the strength and power of the one who has sent him on his mission. Thus if he who dispatches the agent is the Almighty Lord the agent should be capable of achieving his aims and overcoming all obstacles; if he prophesies his prophecy must be fulfilled. Neither is the case with those pretenders who have misled their listeners with falsehoods.<sup>1</sup>

3) The Torah has presented us with a criterion for judging the truth of a prophet and his message.<sup>2</sup> Kalischer stresses the importance of the negative formulation of the criterion as it is stated in the Torah. For there are magicians and fortune tellers who profess to predict the future. But the criterion remains an important one because the knowledge of the crystal gazer always falls into one of two categories. Either it is knowledge that is prevalent in another locality and somehow the crystal gazer gains knowledge of it, or else it is a shadow of the future that he grasps, a mere psychic premonition, vague and inaccurate. Only the true prophet is marked by two characteristics: 1) His predictions are truly prophecies and his

---

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>2</sup>"When a prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken..." Deuteronomy, Ch. 18, V. 2.

knowledge is of future events and not something that has already come to pass elsewhere, 2) His prophecies are clear and definite containing information as to when, where, and how the predicted event will take place and who will be involved. This is Rambam's approach.<sup>1</sup>

4) As proved by continued substantiation. -- Every miracle and wondrous event is never completely free of doubt as to whether its explanation lies in the wisdom and art of some mortal or if it is truly an act of the Creator. The doubt can only be eliminated by the following criterion: If the wondrous events originated in the power of a mortal they must necessarily cease with his death, but if they came from God and He is their cause they should continue to appear in every generation. Thus miracles did not cease with the death of Moses but continued under Joshua's leadership and from one generation to the next.<sup>2</sup>

5) As proved by universal acceptance. -- All the religions of the world which profess monotheism agree that the Torah of Moses is true and was divinely revealed. But the Christians claim they received a new testament and the Mohammedans assert that Gabriel spoke to Mohammed. Kalischer leaves it to the judgement of his readers whether the new uncertainties can be substituted for the certainty of Judaism. The validity of each of the other two religions is questioned by the remaining two, and only the truth of Judaism is affirmed by all three.

Reasons for the commandments. -- Before delving into this

<sup>1</sup>Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishneh.

<sup>2</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., p. 92.

question Kalischer disclaims any intention of seeking the ultimate reasons for the commandments, since no man can ever hope to claim that his wisdom has grasped the divine will. All the laws of the Torah were issued as commands and the reason for their promulgation left unclarified in order that man might observe them on a higher level than that of human understanding, that he might not say that the reason for a particular commandment was valid in the past under particular conditions that existed but now times have changed, the reason is no longer valid, and the commandment therefore no longer requires observance.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless the attempt at understanding should be made for two reasons: 1) understanding leads to the more eager and joyous performance of the command, 2) the investigative effort itself has been commanded and will receive its own reward.

If God had desired He could have promulgated only decrees completely understandable to the human intellect. Why then did He give some commands whose purpose cannot be grasped by the human mind? One answer was previously presented by Kalischer when he pointed out that such commandments are on a higher ethical plane than the rational ones since they are observed solely in order to fulfill the divine will. The other answer is that only through the observance of such commandments can man achieve eternal life and infinite bliss. For the rational commandments are linked to the human intellect which is limited and finite and therefore are by themselves unable to earn for man the infinite rewards which was the purpose of creation. On the other

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 104.

hand, the commandments which are above human intelligence are linked to the infinite divine intellect and therefore to infinite reward.<sup>1</sup>

Confusion exists concerning the essential function of the commandments. Thus it is not clearly defined whether their performance is essential to the perfection of the heavenly worlds and the emanated beings as well as the soul of man, or whether they are merely a means of man's purification and elevation. There are rabbinic statements in support of both views; on the one hand, concluding that God requires man's worship and on the other, denying that man's obedience or disobedience can in any way affect God's perfection. Kalischer reminds us that he has already pointed out that all the worlds and spiritual emanations owe their possibility of existence to man who is linked to both the upper and lower worlds,<sup>2</sup> and therefore in this sense God requires the worship of the righteous who thus make it possible for Him to bestow His light on His spiritual creations. Nevertheless it is forbidden to imagine that this act of God's is required for His perfection.

Kalischer attempts to explain Maimonides' attitude toward the sacrifices, which appears to be at odds with the main stream of traditional thought. Thus Rambam regards the sacrifices as a concession on God's part to the habits of the masses and an attempt to wean them away from idolatry. But if this was the case there would have existed no reason for Adam and Noah to

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., pp. 106, 107.

<sup>2</sup>See above, p. 26.

perform sacrifices when they did not have the problem of idolatrous habit to contend with. Evidently there must be some intrinsic benefit in the act of sacrifice. Kalischer maintains that Maimonides in his great wisdom understood that every commandment that was given to Israel has two levels of purpose and significance, one level being apparent to all men as rational and reasonable and the other being apparent only to the wise who seek the transcendental and divine purpose of the commandment. Thus in the case of sacrifices Rambam expressed the secondary, rational, purpose which all could grasp, but there is also the intrinsic value in the act of sacrifice of bringing man closer to God. This primary purpose was known to Adam and Noah and others in similar conditions and was their reason for the performance of sacrifices.

Kalischer defends Maimonides' assertion of the immutability of the Torah against Albo's attack.<sup>1</sup> He expresses wonder that Albo, whose reasoning is usually so sound, should have entered into such a futile dispute. For it is agreed by all that no change may be enacted in any of the commandments unless the changes are revealed in a revelation as striking and unquestionable as the revelation on Mt. Sinai itself. Therefore, what purpose to Albo's academic hair-splittings, since if God Himself appears in another Sinaitic revelation who will have to have recourse to Albo's affirmations of the Torah's possible mutability? Nevertheless Kalischer feels that Albo's arguments might be utilised by sinners for their own purposes, and therefore refutes

---

<sup>1</sup>Albo, Ikkarim, III, Chs. 14-19.

them one by one in order to confirm Rambam's view.<sup>1</sup>

In the last section of the book Kalischer presents possible reasons for various commandments. The laws he discusses and their location follow:

1.	Laws of prohibited foods .....	p. 134
2.	The signs of cleanliness in foods .....	p. 135
3.	Extirpation for the eating of blood .....	p. 136
4.	Prohibition of the vein in the hip-sinew .....	p. 138
5.	Prohibition of meat and milk .....	p. 139
6.	Laws of sex and marriage .....	p. 141
7.	Laws of <u>Yibum</u> .....	p. 143
8.	Laws of <u>Halitzah</u> .....	p. 144
9.	Laws with the purpose of inculcating pity .....	p. 145
10.	Laws of <u>Shehitah</u> and <u>Trefah</u> .....	p. 148
11.	The Pascal offering .....	p. 160
12.	Laws pertaining to the first-born .....	p. 156
13.	The uncleanness of dead bodies .....	p. 157
14.	Laws pertaining to menstruation .....	p. 158
15.	Laws of the scapegoat .....	p. 159

---

<sup>1</sup>Kalischer, op. cit., pp. 115-128.



CHAPTER III  
CRITICAL APPRAISAL

A. Kalischer's Relation to Previous Jewish Thought

Kalischer is directly related to the main stream of medieval Jewish philosophy from the viewpoint of both his content and approach. As it can be seen from the summary of his thought herein presented, he deals primarily with the classic problems of theology in general and Jewish philosophy in particular. In his approach he is a rationalist. Yet both the general tenor of his work and specific details of his thought reveal that he is not as strict and rigid a rationalist as were Maimonides and Gersonides. The reason for this is probably that while Maimonides and the other more rigid rationalists attempted to reconcile their religious beliefs with complete and well defined systems of philosophical thought (even if those systems were often combinations of various aspects of Aristotelian, Platonic, Neo-Platonic, and Kalamistic thought), Kalischer endeavored to reconcile his faith with the less rigidly systematized demands of his simple reason.

That the two philosophers Kalischer feels himself most akin to are Maimonides and Albo is testified to by the great preponderancy of his references to their works over the works of all others. In respect to Maimonides the reason is obvious; in Maimonides the rationalist school of Jewish philosophy reached its greatest development and all similar efforts are necessarily

based upon and subject to comparison with his works. The reason for Kalischer's admiration for Albo and his extensive use of Albo's approach is probably due to the similarity of their function. Thus both are not original thinkers of major importance; they are both summarizers who attempt to clarify and simplify the main aspects of Jewish thought and present it to their respective generations in an attractive and compelling manner. Kalischer states in the introduction to *Emunah Yesharah* that this is his primary purpose and he follows his aim consistently.

It is in line with this ambition to clarify Judaism's philosophical heritage that he offers explanations of Maimonides' conception of the soul, of why there are three phases to the soul's reward and punishment, of why the Torah does not explicitly deal with the topic of future life after death, of how God's knowledge may be reconciled with man's free will, of statements made by Saadiah and Maimonides on the subject of God's knowledge, and of Maimonides' attitude toward the sacrifices. It is here that Kalischer's originality lies.

#### B. Kalischer's Relation to the Thought of his Times

Kalischer's period differed from the period of the medieval philosophers whose approach and thought he so much admired in one very important respect. The larger part of the medieval philosophical works were written by and for men who were imbued with their undiluted traditional beliefs and yet were puzzled as to how to reconcile these beliefs with the science and

philosophy of their day. Kalischer's problem, on the other hand, was not so much the reconciling of two sources of truth as the verification of the truth of the traditional beliefs and the demonstration of their rationality and reasonableness.

The Judaism of Kalischer's period was confronted with the following problem. The floodgate of secular knowledge had been opened to the Jewish community only recently and yet that knowledge had been eagerly embraced. Jewish knowledge, on the other hand, still suffered under the burden of centuries devoted solely to halacha and mysticism. The disproportion between the rapid absorption of secular knowledge and approach on the one hand and the stumbling efforts of religious thought to keep up with the changing climate and combat the secular spirit with its own terminology and on its own grounds, on the other, gave impetus to the decrease of adherence to the traditional beliefs. Kalischer's task was to reintroduce the medieval rationalizations of faith into religious thought. He had to reclaim for Judaism the supports of reason and logic and rational proof that were its heritage from the medieval period.

This theme is also evident in the works of Isaac Samuel Reggio and Naphtali Hertz Wessely, who preceded Kalischer. In Kalischer it explains his emphasis upon those questions most crucial to religious faith. Thus Kalischer does not stress proofs of the existence of God and His incorporeality, beliefs that would commonly be held even by those infected with the secular spirit, but he does stress God's providence and the special relationship that exists between God and the human soul.

And it is because of the times in which he wrote and the objectives he had in mind that Kalischer gives so much emphasis to the divine origin of the Torah and the significance of the commandments.

### C. An Evaluation of Kalischer's Contribution

Kalischer was neither the formulator of a philosophic system nor was he the promulgator of a unique philosophical approach. He had no such aspirations in mind. There were three objectives in his philosophic writings. He wished to simplify and persuasively present the thoughts of his predecessors, to clarify by his own contributions issues over which there existed confusion, and to find explanations for difficult passages in his philosophic thought. He attained a high degree of success on all three counts.

Kalischer presented the essence of Jewish philosophical thought in a simple and persuasive manner. This was an important contribution towards strengthening the religious consciousness of his period. His work had a profound influence both in Germany and especially in Poland and Russia, where the Haskalah movement was just beginning.<sup>1</sup> This influence was felt for years after the original publication of Emunah Yesharah. Thus in 1913 a portion of his work was reprinted in Warsaw, under the title Sefer Petah HaDaat, for the purpose of strengthening religious belief among the younger generation.

Many of Kalischer's original contributions on difficult

---

<sup>1</sup>Klausner, op. cit., Introduction

problems are explanations of great value and subtlety. These include his analyses of the purpose of creation, of the Torah's apparent disinterest with other worldly existence, and his attempt to reconcile God's knowledge with human free will by means of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic necessity. His summary of the proofs for the divine origin of the Torah is also of great interest and is the most complete ever presented up to his day. Kalischer's acquaintance with recent developments in secular philosophy and his criticism of these developments from his religious viewpoint was a factor in the regeneration of the intellectual and cultural status of orthodox Judaism, as well as a guide to the catholic program it would have to adapt if it was to hold its own in the future.

Certainly not the least effective part of Kalischer's attempt to demonstrate the intellectual validity of the traditional heritage for modern generations was his interpretation of abstruse Scriptural and aggadic material. Kalischer saw behind much of this material the imaginative and symbolical expression of deep and sublime truths about man, the world, and God. The mass of exegetical material included in Emunah Yesharah might very well be made the subject of a separate paper.

Kalischer's work was thus important to his generation both as a scholarly contribution and as a reintroduction to Jewish philosophy. In both these respects Kalischer's thought retains not only a historical interest but a surprising degree of intrinsic value for our own generation.

APPENDIX

AN INDEX TO THE EXEGETICAL MATERIAL IN EMUNAH YESHARAH

A. Scriptural Passages

<u>Book</u>	<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Verse</u>	<u>Location</u>
Genesis	V	24	Vol. I, p. 101
	XXVII	27-28	73
Exodus	III	13-16	Vol. I, p. 68
	XXV	25,26	II, 65
Numbers	XXVI	5	Vol. I, p. 33
Deuteronomy	IV	19	Vol. II, p. 100
	VII	10	I, p. 127
	XVIII	23	II, p. 78
	XXIX	11	I, p. 22
	XXXII	43	103
Joshua	XXIV	14-22	Vol. I, p. 146
Judges	XXIII	22	Vol. I, p. 145
Samuel I	XXVI	29	Vol. I, p. 100
	XXVIII	entire chapter	148
Isaiah	VI	3	Vol. I, p. 52
	XXI	16	II, p. 83
	XXVIII	9-12	63
	XXIX	13	$\frac{1}{2}$ I, p. 17
	XXVIII	20	81
	<del>XL</del>	22-24	79
	XL	25,29	80
	XL	27,28	75
	XL	29	65
	XLII	18	17
	XVI	9	58
	<del>LIV</del>	<del>16</del>	<del>105</del>
	LIV	2	Vol. II, p. 25
	LVII	16	Vol. I, p. 103
LXIII	9	II, p. 63	
Jeremiah	II	13	Vol. II, p. 99
	V	22	I, p. 83
	IX	22	14
	X	6	II, p. 95,99
	XI	15	I, p. 14
	XII	6	110
	XII	7-10	II, p. 83

<u>Book</u>	<u>Chapter</u>	<u>Verse</u>	<u>Location</u>	
Malachi	III	10	Vol. I, p. 73	
Micah	VI	3-9	Vol. II, p. 67	
Psalms	VIII	2,3	Vol. II, p. 105	
	XVIII	12	31	
	XIX	2	I, p. 55	
	XXXIII	15	80	
	L	22	24	
	LXXXV	4,5	II, p. 69	
	LXXXIX	2	94	
	XC	entire chapter	28	
	XCIV	9	I, pp. 61,94	
	CIV	2	66	
	CXIII	5-9	90	
	CXIV	entire chapter	II, p. 74	
	CXXXI	1,2	I, p. 28	
	CXXXV	17	81	
	CXXXVI	2	81	
	CXXXIX	1-9	91	
	CXXXIX	13-16	II, p. 46	
	CXXXIX	16-18	I, p. 55	
	CXXXIX	1-8	II, p. 45	
	CXLVII	4	I, p. 59	
Proverbs	III	6	Vol. I, p. 14	
	IV	1-3	34	
	X	7	18	
	XII	19	II, p. 94	
	XIX	8	I, p. 27	
	XXX	2,3	40	
	Job	X	6,7	Vol. II, p. 49
XII		7,8	58	
XII		10	28	
XX		26	I, p. 139	
XXVIII		12	63	
XXVIII		entire chapter	152	
XXXI		26	22	
XXXVI		18	24	
XXXVI		26	86	
XXXVIII		4	65	
XXXVIII		14	II, p. 20	
Ecclesiastes		II	12	Vol. I, p. 17
		II	12	35
	II	14	38	
	VI	11,12	II, p. 44	
	XII	6	I, p. 106	
	XII	11	27	

An extensive analysis of the philosophical implications of the entire Book of Job is attached at the end of Vol. I.

B. Rabbinic Passages

Shabbat 31 - Vol. I, p. 24

מעשה העכו"ם אולד שהוא לפני שחאי ואף גיירני על אמת שלא צנו  
כל היתור כשאיני צומד על רגלי אחרת פאפו באמת הבנין שכי 13. הא  
לפני העלם אייריב אל בלעק סני לחברק סא תעביז צו היא כס התורה  
בוטה ואידיק פירושא היא צו אמור.

Shabbat 88 - Vol. II, p. 30

תנאי התנה במעשה בראשית אם יקבלו ישראל הגוה מתקיימת ואם  
לא יחזירם אמרו וברו.

Sanhedrin 38 - Vol. II, p. 31

כשעלה בדעתו לכתוב את האדם נתייעל בכתב משלובים ואמר מה  
אנוט כי תצטרנו מושיט הקד"ה אצבעו בינית וזרפן

Hagigah 11 - Vol. I, p. 68

כי שאלנו עימא פראטונין אשר היו לפני יי (דברניקצן) יבול ישאל אלפי קובץ  
שנהרא העולם? תאמר אמר מן היום אשר ברא אלוקים אדם על הארץ  
החמלת הארבעה דברים דמיו לו והיטע מה ראוי לו שלפני באו עולם מה שחשבה  
מה אמרה מה לפניי מה אמורה.

Hagigah 14 - Vol. II, p. 33

בתחילתו ערב וצדק במעשה מרובה ורצה את מן השמים ופקדה את  
כל האילנות שהשדה בתו כל האילנות ואמרו שירה כלו ה' מן הארץ וכו'  
ואם אלוק נצטב מתק באש ואמר בן מן מעשה מרובה.

Taharot (near the end) - Vol. II, p. 34

אז מצא הקד"ה כלי החזיק ברכה לישבאל ואם השלום שנאמר ה' עוז לעמו  
ויה' יעק את עמו השלום

Yomah 82 - Vol. II, p. 48

הבואו עובדאן בארחתא אשג מעברת הריחה מעם ביה"כ אתא לקמיה דרב  
אל תחושיה מה צימא צבבורי הוא לחסו מה ואילמס אן קרו עקב הטרם אצדק בהטן  
ידעתיק וכו' נפק מיניה ר' יוחנן הווא עברה להריחה לחושיה מה וטא אימחשטאן  
קרי עליה טורא רשעים מרחק וכו' נפק מינה שבתאי אצדק פרו

Baba Batra 15 - Vol. I, p. 110

היא אמר ביקס איוה לעכסוק קערהאל פיה ירי יהואד אמר אזו ציבר  
איוה אלמו כלמד הטטן וכן אמר אביז.

Baba Batra 63 - Vol. II, p. 85

כמימי טאא קלא לחברוב חכירתי שביקת מיכי העלמא צלמא שטת  
בטייתי אנוא ואשטיפיה? אל בוקחתי צבוראן צבורא קוסאן חלמא  
וטא עברי טנאמר האומי טו תראו אשר שמה חוה הדין חייק ק  
נודעו למוצק טלא נברא יותר משנהרא וצטשו שנהרא יבשנים המוש  
ואמרו לה יתשמש מתעשין

Hulin - Vol. II, p. 112

טור שיקריה אדם הכאוסן קרן אלה היה במתחן

Berachot 4 - Vol. II, p. 83

ראוי היו ישתחו לעשות להם גם היוו עצמאן כדרך שששה להם  
היו יבושעו ג' ו' אלמו שיער הטטן



Berachot 7 - Vol. II, p. 84

במה זמנו באת, וכמה רגעי של תקנה אחת משנות רבות ושמות  
אלפים ושמות מאה ושמונים ושמונה בשנה כן רגעי לבונה בלילות

Berachot, Perek HaRoeh - Vol. II, p. 25

עבדיקום אין ערקת מנוחה לא בעת צולטן בעתה שלמאור יובן אחים לא  
אין יראה לא אלל עיקום בפיו

Pirkei Abot, Ch. III - Vol. II, 42

הכל צבוי והרשות נמונה

Pirkei Rabbi Eliezer - Vol. II, p. 31

שחיי מקובל נברא? מאור לבונו, והוא עתה זכה נבראת? חללי  
מחלת כסא הכבוד

Midrash - Vol. II, p. 27

כשעה שאור לון תקנה למעשה של עסקי המשכן אין רגעי יכולין ישראל  
לעשות? אם אפילו אחד מישראל שלמאור מאת כל איש אשר יבין לבו וחד  
של אין תקנה למעשה עשה עי משכן אל וכו' יכול אני לעשות פנה, של זרוע  
ודעה זרע שאתה הוא למעשה בק עשה למעשה.

Blessing of the New Moon - Vol. I, p. 55

אשר בראונו הרי שחיקים וברוח פיו כל צבאם חוק וצמאמן  
אמן שלא ישל את עבדיקום.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

- Albo, Joseph. Sefer HaIkkarim
- Braverman, H. Anshe Shem. Warsaw: 1892
- Graetz, H. History of the Jews
- Gur Aryeh, Yitzhak. HaRav Zvi Hirsch Kalischer. Jerusalem: 1927
- Hess, Moses. Rome and Jerusalem
- Husik, Issac. A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy.  
Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1916
- Kalischer, Zvi Hirsch. Sefer Emunah Yesharah. 2 vols.  
Krotoschin: 1843, 1871
- Karsol, G. Rabbi Yehudah Alkali- Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Kalischer,  
Selected Writings. Jerusalem: 1940
- Klatzkin, Jacob. Dictionary of Hebrew Philosophical Terms.
- Klausner, Israel. The Zionist Writings of Rabbi Zvi Hirsch  
Kalischer. Jerusalem: Mosad HaRav Kook, 1947
- Maimonides, Moses. Moreh Nebuchim.
- Sokolow, Nahum. The History of Zionism. 2 vols.
- Wassely, Naphtali Herz. Gan Naul. Warsaw: D.L. Sklower, 1838
- Zehavy, Y. Zvi. The Assimilation Movement in Israel. Tel  
Aviv: 1942

### Articles

- Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums, 1874, p. 757
- Judischer Volkskalender. Leipsic: 1899 p. 143
- Klausner, Israel. Sinai. vol. II,  
part 2 (1939) pp. 371 - 385, 613- 621. vol. III, part 1  
pp 264- 269.
- Jewish Encyclopedia. Vol. VII, p. 421
- Universal Jewish Encyclopedia. Vol. VI, p. 295