Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12202/4018| Title: | Voting and optimal provision of a public good. |
| Authors: | Shao, Ran Zhou, Lin |
| Keywords: | Public good Mechanisms Dominant-incentive compatibility Quotas Committees |
| Issue Date: | Feb-2016 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier |
| Citation: | Shao, Ron & Zhou, Lin. February 2016. Voting and optimal provision of a public good. Journal of Public Economics. 134, 35-41. |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the optimal provision of a costly public good using an average efficiency crite- rion. For every fixed cost, we identify a quota mechanism as the optimal mechanism among those that are dominant-incentive-compatible, deficit-free and kind. Moreover, we also consider the asymmetric case and demonstrate that a committee mechanism is optimal for a large class of mechanisms. In particular, this mechanism dominates all VCG (pivotal) mechanisms. |
| URI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.006 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12202/4018 |
| ISSN: | 0047-2727 |
| Appears in Collections: | Sy Syms School of Business (SSSB) -- Faculty Publications |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Publicgood jan15.pdf | 300.84 kB | Adobe PDF |  View/Open |
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