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dc.contributor.authorShao, Ran
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Lin
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-22T18:52:35Z
dc.date.available2018-10-22T18:52:35Z
dc.date.issued2016-02
dc.identifier.citationShao, Ron & Zhou, Lin. February 2016. Voting and optimal provision of a public good. Journal of Public Economics. 134, 35-41.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0047-2727
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12202/4018
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we study the optimal provision of a costly public good using an average efficiency crite- rion. For every fixed cost, we identify a quota mechanism as the optimal mechanism among those that are dominant-incentive-compatible, deficit-free and kind. Moreover, we also consider the asymmetric case and demonstrate that a committee mechanism is optimal for a large class of mechanisms. In particular, this mechanism dominates all VCG (pivotal) mechanisms.
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/*
dc.subjectPublic gooden_US
dc.subjectMechanismsen_US
dc.subjectDominant-incentive compatibilityen_US
dc.subjectQuotasen_US
dc.subjectCommitteesen_US
dc.titleVoting and optimal provision of a public good.en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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