

# Love and Hate at Qumran: The Social Construction of Sectarian Emotion

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## Abstract

Employing a “social constructionist” approach, according to which emotions are culturally conditioned expressions of values, this study considers how the sect behind 1QS used the emotions of love and hate to teach its members the proper ways of evaluating the world. Sectarian love and hate were vehicles through which the sect communicated core beliefs about election and revelation. Because his entrance into the sect was made possible by divine love, the initiate was expected to recognize his utter dependence on the divine will by loving those whom God loves and hating those whom he hates, thereby affirming his place in the covenantal community. Since *divine* love and hate manifested itself in the selective revelation of knowledge, *sectarian* love and hate required the unselfish disclosure of knowledge to other group members and the concealment of the same knowledge from outsiders. This link between the emotions of love and hate and an ethic of disclosure and concealment left its mark on routine sectarian conduct in the practice of reproof. Reproof of insiders and the conscious withholding of reproof from outsiders was a “socially dictated performance” of either love or hate that demonstrated the sectarian’s commitment to communal beliefs about covenant, knowledge, divine will, and relations with outsiders.

## Keywords

Community Rule, Hodayot, emotion, reproof, Maskil

## 1. Introduction: Sectarian Emotional Life

The sectarian texts among the Dead Sea Scrolls are replete with the language of emotions. The groups represented by the various manuscripts of the Damascus Document, Hodayot, War Scroll, and Community Rule frequently reflected upon their social relations—with fellow sectarians,

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outsiders, and God—through the idiom of emotions such as love, hate, mercy, shame, disgust, fear, and revenge. Yet with few exceptions, Scrolls scholars have paid scant attention to the prominent place of emotion language in sectarian expression.<sup>1</sup>

Emotions certainly played an important role in sectarian experience, as Angela Kim Harkins has recently shown.<sup>2</sup> My analysis in this article, however, will not provide insight into how sectarians *actually* experienced emotion, but, instead, consider how the sect<sup>3</sup> used the language of emotion as a

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<sup>1</sup> For important treatments, see Angela Kim Harkins, “The Performative Reading of the Hodayot: The Arousal of Emotions and the Exegetical Generation of Texts,” *JSP* 21 (2011): 55–71; eadem, *Reading with an “I” to the Heavens: Looking at the Qumran Hodayot Through the Lens of Visionary Traditions* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012); Steven Weitzman, “Warring against Terror: The *War Scroll* and the Mobilization of Emotion,” *JSJ* 40 (2009): 213–41; Johanna Stiebert, “Shame and the Body in Psalms and Lamentations of the Hebrew Bible and in Thanksgiving Hymns from Qumran,” *OTE* 20 (2007): 798–829; and Alex P. Jassen, “The Dead Sea Scrolls and Violence: Sectarian Formation and Eschatological Imagination,” *BibInt* 17 (2009): 12–44. For treatments of emotion in other Second Temple texts, see Thomas Kazen, “Impurity, Ritual, and Emotion: A Psycho-Biological Approach,” in *Issues of Impurity in Early Judaism* (ConBNT 45; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2010), 13–40, and Francoise Mirguet, “Emotions in Translation: Hebrew Background and Hellenistic Influence in 1 Maccabees” (unpublished paper; I thank Professor Mirguet for sharing her paper with me). For treatments of emotion in the New Testament, see Thomas Kazen, *Jesus and Purity Halakhah: Was Jesus Indifferent to Impurity?* (ConBNT 38; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2002); Matthew A. Elliott, *Faithful Feelings: Rethinking Emotion in the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Kregel, 2006); and Stephen C. Barton, “Eschatology and the Emotions in Early Christianity,” *JBL* 130 (2011): 571–91. For a recent collection of essays that encompasses Second Temple literature and the New Testament, see *Emotions from Ben Sira to Paul* (ed. Renate Egger-Wenzel and Jeremy Corley; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> See Harkins, “Performative Reading of the Hodayot.”

<sup>3</sup> My references throughout the paper to “the sect” and “sectarian” should be understood as referring to the community associated with 1QS, whose relationship with earlier and contemporaneous groups represented in the Scrolls has been the subject of much recent scholarship; for representative views, see, e.g., Charlotte Hempel, “The Literary Development of the S-Tradition: A New Paradigm,” *RevQ* 22 (2006): 389–401; eadem, “1QS 6:2c–4a—Satellites or Precursors of the Yahad?” in *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Contemporary Culture: Proceedings of the International Conference Held at the Israel Museum, Jerusalem (July 6–8, 2008)* (ed. Adolfo D. Roitman, Lawrence H. Schiffman, and Shani Tzoref; STDJ 93; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 31–40; Alison Schofield, *From Qumran to the Yahad: A New Paradigm of Textual Development for the Community Rule* (STDJ 77; Leiden: Brill, 2009); and John J. Collins, *Beyond the Qumran Community: The Sectarian Movement of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010). I draw attention to the Cave 4 manuscripts of S to the extent that they are relevant to the passages I am investigating. The passage that I analyze from 1QH<sup>a</sup> below is one that

vehicle for communicating its system of norms and values. Initiates seeking to acquire a new identity first had to internalize the appropriate ways in which to view their world — which objects, people, or behavior were so dangerous as to be worthy of fear; so offensive as to arouse shame or anger; so indispensable as to merit love; so reprehensible as to inspire hate; so helpless as to deserve pity; or so worthless as to merit disgust.<sup>4</sup>

In order to expose the ways in which the sect used the language of emotion to effect these transformations in outlook, I will employ a “social-constructionist” approach to emotions.<sup>5</sup> This perspective, to be elaborated below, views emotions as expressions of belief about objects, people, or behavior, views of the sort delineated in the previous paragraph. These beliefs, moreover, are culturally conditioned, serving to align the beliefs of individuals with those of their group and functioning “to restrain undesirable attitudes and behavior, and to sustain and endorse cultural values.”<sup>6</sup> Members of a community develop an awareness of which social situations warrant an

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shows clear linguistic and thematic contacts with texts from 1QS; see Carol A. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space: Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 277–86. While it is likely that some sections of 1QH<sup>a</sup> were either non-sectarian or inherited from a parent community (see Angela Kim Harkins, “The Community Hymns Classification: A Proposal for Further Differentiation,” *DSD* 15 [2008]: 121–54 [132–38]), the connections between the Hodayot passage that I include in my discussion and 1QS are so extensive that it seems reasonable to assign its provenance to the community responsible for 1QS or to a very closely related group. As noted by Harkins, “Community Hymns Classification,” 145, “[t]he sections of Community Hymns that show the strongest alignment with the terminology known from the sectarian text 1QS are the second *LeMaskil* grouping (5:12–7:20),” the portion of 1QH<sup>a</sup> that I will be focusing on.

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Newsom, *Self as Symbolic Space*, 3, who has noted that the Yaḥad’s reliance on new initiates generated the “need to create the sentiments of affinity and estrangement required for social boundaries.” See also eadem, “Constructing ‘We, You and the Others,’ Through Non-Polemical Discourse,” in *Defining Identities: We, You, and the Other in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting of the IOQS in Groningen* (ed. Florentino García Martínez and Mladen Popović; STDJ 70; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 13–21.

<sup>5</sup> I hope to pursue this line of inquiry in a manuscript now in preparation, tentatively entitled *Feeling Like a Sectarian: Emotions and Identity at Qumran*.

<sup>6</sup> Claire Armon-Jones, “The Thesis of Constructionism,” in *The Social Construction of Emotions* (ed. Rom Harré; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 32–56 (34).

emotion where “its presence would demonstrate the agent’s commitment to the cultural values exemplified in that situation.”<sup>7</sup> In our case, emotions would have played a vital role in imparting to sectarians the group’s network of norms and values. This line of inquiry will contribute to the burgeoning interest among Scrolls scholars in the sectarian consciousness and sense of self.<sup>8</sup>

In order to probe the role of emotions in communicating sectarian values, this article focuses on the emotions of love and hate.<sup>9</sup> These emotions are ripe for analysis from a social-constructionist perspective because they symbolized some of the sect’s foundational beliefs, particularly the group’s views on covenant and election, cornerstones in the construction of sectarian identity. Love of insiders and hate of outsiders were not simply the products of a tight-knit community estranged from the outside world. Rather, love and hate served as vehicles for *constructing* and *embracing* the group’s distinctive worldview, according to which only the sect enjoyed a covenantal relationship with God. Divine love and hate, as we will see, were presented as the basis for the relative positions of sectarians and non-sectarians in the divine pecking order, and sectarian love of insiders and hatred of outsiders served as emotional endorsements of this value system.

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Steven D. Fraade, “Interpretative Authority in the Studying Community at Qumran,” *JJS* 44 (1993): 46–69; Maxine L. Grossman, *Reading for History in the Damascus Document: A Methodological Study* (STDJ 45; Leiden: Brill, 2004); and Newsom, *Self as Symbolic Space*.

<sup>9</sup> On love in the Scrolls, see Lawrence H. Schiffman, “Dead Sea Scrolls,” in *Encyclopedia of Love in World Religions* (ed. Yudit Kornberg Greenberg; Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2008), 1:143–44. Love is generally regarded as an emotion by students of emotion; see, e.g., Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 276–80. By contrast, O. H. Green, “Is Love an Emotion?” in *Love Analyzed* (ed. Roger E. Lamb; Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1997), 209–24, argues that often love is not an emotion. Green argues that, due to the “common contention of the several theories of emotions that the intentionality and rationality of emotions are based on belief” (210), love can only be an emotion when it is, in fact, based on belief. Even if Green is correct, love in the worldview of the Yahad is certainly based on beliefs about divine grace and redemption, as we will see below.

However, the use of love and hate to endow the sectarian outlook with meaning was not so simple. The internal structure of the sect was also hierarchical; not all sectarians occupied the same rank in the divine scheme.<sup>10</sup> A member's hatred of outsiders thus affirmed his commitment to the sect's elevated status, while his love of insiders affirmed his commitment to overlook the different status of other sectarians. As we will see, the sect had to navigate a fine line between hating outsiders because they were lower on the divinely ordained hierarchy, and loving insiders regardless of their rank.

This article will proceed as follows. Before turning our attention to 1QS and 1QH<sup>a</sup>, we will elaborate upon the social constructionist approach to emotions, a discussion that will help to frame our analysis of the sectarian texts. We will then move on in section 3 to uncover the discursive role that love and hate played in several passages in 1QS and 1QH<sup>a</sup>. In section 4, we will focus on the practice of reproof. As we will see, reproof was connected with the emotions of love and hate and served as the vehicle through which group members deployed those emotions as an affirmation of sectarian values. Finally, section 5 will consider the problem of intra-sectarian hate, and the tension between the group's hierarchical structure and the values associated with the emotions of love and hate.

## **2. The Social Construction of Emotion**

Emotions, according to the approach adopted in this article, are the products of beliefs and evaluative judgments about other people, objects, or behavior. For example, “[i]n order to have fear

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<sup>10</sup> For discussion and presentation of sources, see Nathan Jastram, “Hierarchy at Qumran,” in *Legal Texts and Legal Issues: Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Cambridge 1995, Published in Honour of Joseph M. Baumgarten* (ed. Moshe Bernstein, Florentino García Martínez, and John Kampen; STDJ 23; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 349–77.

... I must believe that bad events are impending; that they are not trivially, but seriously bad; and that I am not entirely in control of warding them off.”<sup>11</sup> In the words of the anthropologist Michelle Rosaldo, emotions are “embodied thoughts.”<sup>12</sup> Emotions, moreover, are not disinterested beliefs, but judgments that the person, object, or behavior in question “is seen as *important* for some role it plays in the person’s own life.”<sup>13</sup> Something inspires fear precisely because of the belief that it poses a danger *to me*. Emotions are in this way “concerned with the person’s flourishing.”<sup>14</sup>

According to the “social-constructionist” school, these beliefs and value-based judgments “are not natural, but are determined by the systems of cultural belief, value and moral value of particular communities.”<sup>15</sup> Emotions are “socially dictated performances, social scripts, as it were,

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<sup>11</sup> Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 28. This view of emotions should be distinguished from the behaviorist view of emotions, popularized in the nineteenth century by the psychologist William James and the physicist Carl Georg Lange, according to which emotions were simply the experience of physical sensations; see William James and Carl Georg Lange, *The Emotions* (New York: Hafner, 1967), and William James, “What is an Emotion?” *Mind* 9 (1884): 188–205.

<sup>12</sup> Michelle Rosaldo, “Towards an Anthropology of Self and Feeling,” in *Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion* (ed. Richard A. Shweder and Robert A. LeVine; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 137–57 (143).

<sup>13</sup> Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 31 (emphasis in original). This view of emotion, which has emerged as an important line of inquiry in the last thirty years, actually has ancient roots in the Classical world, where its proponents included Aristotle and the Stoics; see Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, who labels her own approach to emotion as “Neo-Stoic”; William W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion: A Contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and Ethics* (2d ed.; London: Duckworth, 2002); and David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), esp. 3–40.

<sup>14</sup> Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 31.

<sup>15</sup> Armon-Jones, “Thesis of Constructionism,” 33. In contrast, the view of evolutionary biology and psychology, championed most famously by Charles Darwin (*The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* [3d ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998]), assumes that emotions develop among mammals for their adaptive value, and hence are both universal and innate. For a more recent statement of this view, see Paul Ekman, *The Face of Man: Expressions of Universal Emotions in a New Guinea Village* (New York: Garland STPM Press, 1980).

grounded in shared understandings about the meanings of social events and actions.”<sup>16</sup> Emotions, in other words, are culturally conditioned. Our responses to external stimuli are not pre-programmed but instead “provide a social rather than an individual idiom, a way of commenting not so much on oneself as on oneself in relation to others.”<sup>17</sup>

By way of example, anger could serve to endorse a community’s beliefs about the limits of acceptable behavior. Members of that community would be expected to understand the local belief system, the sorts of actions that threaten that belief system, and the circumstances in which anger is justified as an affirmation of those values. On the other hand, unjustified anger would demonstrate a lack of awareness about cultural norms and the types of actions that violate them. Since anger can function to affirm communal values, the line separating justifiable and unjustifiable anger will be drawn differently by different cultures.<sup>18</sup> It is even possible that emotions considered natural in one culture would be deemed inappropriate in another; such is the case among the Utku Eskimos, who, according to one anthropologist, regard anger as always inappropriate.<sup>19</sup>

Because emotions are statements about cultural norms, they often emerge in social interactions among members of a culture—that is, in speech.<sup>20</sup> Emotions are not simply played out in the form of rituals or bodily gestures, but are captured in spoken words that communicate cultural

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<sup>16</sup> John Corrigan, “Introduction: Emotions Research and the Academic Study of Religion,” in *Religion and Emotion: Approaches and Interpretations* (ed. John Corrigan; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3–31 (11).

<sup>17</sup> Donald Brenneis, “Shared and Solitary Sentiments: The Discourse of Friendship, Play, and Anger in Bhatgaon,” in *Language and the Politics of Emotion* (ed. Catherine A. Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 113–25 (113).

<sup>18</sup> See Catherine A. Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll & Their Challenges to Western Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 177–81, and Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 162–63.

<sup>19</sup> See Jean Briggs, *Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo Family* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

<sup>20</sup> Lila Abu-Lughod and Catherine A. Lutz, “Introduction: Emotion, Discourse, and the Politics of Everyday Life,” in *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, 1–23 (10–11).

values through the idiom of emotion. Thus, members of the Micronesian Ifaluk speak of being *song*, or justifiably angry, as a way of characterizing those actions that violate local mores and taboos.<sup>21</sup> By embedding emotion in speech, members of a culture can confirm their acceptance of local values or, alternatively, challenge them. The more powerful members of Ifaluk society are often the ones who speak of being *song* in order to appropriate for themselves the right to establish societal norms.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, the less powerful among the Ifaluk can likewise claim to be *song* as a way of challenging those norms.<sup>23</sup>

The fact that emotions reflect beliefs and values suggests that, as social constructionists, we should not focus on emotions per se but rather on emotions as a *discourse*, a term which, as used here, refers to the ways in which “texts and talk and all sorts of other social practices ... [are] productive of experience and constitutive of the realities in which we live and the truths with which we work.”<sup>24</sup> In other words, we should focus on the role of emotions in communicating the beliefs, values, social roles, and expectations that animate social life.

The social-constructionist school does not necessarily assert that “each culture’s emotional life is unique”<sup>25</sup> or deny that emotions can have an “autonomy, force, and structure”<sup>26</sup> of their own. In general, emotions very well could be “specific colorations and intensities” of primal, universal

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<sup>21</sup> Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions*, 160–62.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 168–74.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Abu-Lughod and Lutz, “Introduction: Emotion, Discourse, and the Politics of Everyday Life,” 9–10.

<sup>25</sup> Richard Shweder, *Thinking Through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 252.

<sup>26</sup> Charles Lindholm, “An Anthropology of Emotion,” in *A Companion to Psychological Anthropology: Modernity and Psychocultural Change* (ed. Conerly Casey and Robert B. Edgerton; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2007), 30–47 (41).

emotions that are culturally determined.<sup>27</sup> In our particular case, however, I spotlight the role of culture precisely because, as we will see below, the language of emotions was used as an important discourse for the communication of the sect's distinctive worldview.

### 3. Election and Sectarian Love and Hate

The imperative for the sectarian to love his fellow sectarian and hate all outsiders emerges from the opening lines of 1QS:<sup>28</sup>

1. In order to seek
2. God with [all the heart and soul] doing what is good and right before him, as
3. he commanded through Moses and through all his servants the prophets, and in order to love all
4. that he has chosen and to hate all that he has rejected (לאהוב כול אשר בחר ( ולשנוא את כול אשר חאט
5. and adhering (ולדבוק) to all good works
- ...
9. ... and in order to love all the Sons of Light (לאהוב כול בני אור) each
10. according to his lot in the Council of God, and to hate all the Sons of Darkness (ולשנוא כול בני חושך) each according to his guilt
11. at the vengeance of God (בנקמת אל).

In this passage, the audience is instructed to “love all that he [i.e., God] has chosen and to hate all that he has rejected,” and, later in the passage, “to love all the Sons of Light ... and to hate all the

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 42. See also Armon-Jones, “Thesis of Constructionism,” 37–39, and Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 159.

<sup>28</sup> Translations of 1QS are based on Elisha Qimron and James H. Charlesworth, “Rule of the Community (1QS),” in *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek Texts with English Translations, Volume One: Rule of the Community and Related Documents* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), with modifications.



21. with righteousness all who choose what pleases you, [that he might walk<sup>33</sup> in all whi]ch you love (אהבתה), and abhor (ולתעב) all that  
 22. [you hate]. And you have caused your servant to have insight [ לו]ts of humankind. For according to (their) spirits you cast (the lot) for them between  
 23. good and evil, [and] you have determined [ ] *tm* their recompense. And as for me, I know from the understanding that comes from you  
 24. that through your goodwill toward a p[er]son you mul[ti]ply his portion] in your holy spirit. Thus you draw him (תגישנו) closer to your understanding. And according to  
 25. his closeness, so is his zeal (קורבו קנאתו) against all evildoers and people of deceit. For all who are near to you (קרוביך) do not rebel against your command,  
 26. and all who know you do not pervert your words. For you are righteous and all your chosen ones are trustworthy. All injustice  
 27. and wickedness you will destroy forever, and your righteousness will be revealed in the sight of all your creatures. *vacat*  
 28. And as for me, I have knowledge by means of your abundant goodness and by the oath I pledged upon my life not to sin against you  
 29. [and] not to do anything evil in your sight. And thus I was brought (הוגשתני) into association (or in the Yahad) with all the men of my counsel. According to  
 30. his insight I will draw him close (אגישנו), and according to the amount of his inheritance I will love him (אהבנו). But I will not regard evil, and a wi[ck]ed b[ribe] I will not acknowledge.  
 31. I will no[t] exchange your truth for wealth, nor any of your judgements for a bribe. But according as [ a per]son,  
 32. [I will]love him (אהבנו) ש[א]י [לפי], and according as you place him far off, thus I will abhor him (וכרחקך אנתו כן אתעבנו). (1QH<sup>a</sup> 6:19–32)

Sectarian love and hate, as they emerge from this passage, reflect the group’s belief about their relations with God: their utter dependence upon him, the circumstances behind their election, and the special knowledge that he has bestowed upon them.

Line twenty one recalls the typical Deuteronomic imperative to love God and walk in all his ways.<sup>34</sup> William Moran has described this love as “covenantal,” a conception that is modeled upon

<sup>33</sup> Restoring להתהלך with many commentators, for reasons stated in the next footnote; for other possibilities, see Stegemann with Schuller, *1QHodayot*, 92, note to line 21.

<sup>34</sup> See, e.g., Deut 10:12. The partial reconstructions שר אהבתה [כול בכול] and ולתעב [שנאתה] [שה] receive strong support from the identical formulation found in 1QH<sup>a</sup> 4:36: [לה]תהלך בכול אשר אהבתה ולמאוס בכול אשר שנאתה.

the loyalty owed by a vassal to his suzerain.<sup>35</sup> The model of covenantal love assumes that the Israelite is an autonomous individual with the choice between loving and hating God: “And now, O Israel, what does the Lord your God demand of you? Only to fear the Lord your God, to walk in his paths, to love him, and to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and soul” (Deut 10:12). In the Hodayot passage, by contrast, the speaker’s emotions are dependent upon and follow inexorably from those of God. In lines nineteen through twenty two, the speaker appears to state that it is through divinely endowed knowledge that he has learned what God loves and hates: “[Blessed are you,] O Lord, who places understanding (בִּינָה) in the heart of [your] servant ... [that he might walk in all whi]ch you love (אֲהַבְתָּהּ), and abhor (וַיִּתְעַב) all that [you hate].”<sup>36</sup> Immediately thereafter in lines twenty two through twenty four, the speaker adds that he also knows that God has divided humankind into those who apparently follow his will, described in the preceding words as that which he loves, and those who apparently adhere to that which he hates: “For according to (their) spirits you cast (the lot) for them between good and evil.” Knowledge remains an important theme through the remainder of the passage, with references to the speaker’s divinely-granted knowledge in lines twenty three, twenty six, and twenty eight.<sup>37</sup>

The conclusion of the passage sharpens the relationship between divine and human emotions. In line thirty, the speaker uses the verb שָׁנָה (שִׁנָּה), a verbal root already attested in line twenty four (שִׁנָּה) to describe the occasions on which God admits group members “to your understanding” and in line twenty nine (שָׁנָה) to recall the speaker’s own initiation. It is through the “understanding” granted to him by God that the speaker, like his fellow sectarians,

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<sup>35</sup> See William L. Moran, “The Ancient Near Eastern Background of the Love of God in Deuteronomy,” *CBQ* 25 (1963): 77–87.

<sup>36</sup> On the reconstructions לִהְיוֹתֶנּוּ and הָיָה, see n. 34, above.

<sup>37</sup> On the theme of knowledge in Hodayot, see Newsom, *Self as Symbolic Space*, 209–32.

learned what God loves and hates. By contrast, in line thirty, the speaker himself is admitting (וַיִּשְׂרַח) new members, at which point he loves each of them (וַיִּחַבֵּם). These two sets of word pairs, וַיִּשְׂרַח and וַיִּחַבֵּם, are connected: the speaker's own initiation (וַיִּשְׂרַח), which, as stated in line twenty four, is a fate determined by God, enabled him to recognize that another person deserves admission to the sect (וַיִּשְׂרַח). Moreover, once the new initiate has been admitted, the speaker must love him (וַיִּחַבֵּם), because, according to line twenty one, he must love that which God loves (וַיִּחַבֵּם).

Emotions, we discover, are made possible by the special knowledge that the speaker receives, and the speaker is only capable of feeling, whether love or hate, once he is granted insight into how God himself feels. The speaker's emotional experience thus mirrors his religious experience, both of which are wholly determined by and dependent upon God. This point also emerges in lines twenty four and twenty five, according to which sectarians become zealous once God has admitted them into the sect.

In this scheme, love and hate are not simply emotions, beliefs that insiders are indispensable and outsiders detrimental to their wellbeing, but signs that an individual has been divinely elected. If he is truly a sectarian, that is, if he has in fact received the esoteric wisdom that was the province of the sect alone, then he will feel the emotions of love and hate and will count them among the divine gifts associated with membership in the sect. By connecting those emotions with a self-consciousness that is wholly shaped by God's mysterious grace, love and hate become constitutive of sectarian identity. Through his love and hate, the sectarian demonstrates his endorsement of his community's worldview.

Love and hate in the sectarian texts are more than simply terms denoting unity and alienation. They are a discourse, in the sense defined earlier, that shapes the sectarian's reality. Intertwined with sectarian beliefs about election, covenant, and knowledge, this discourse constructs

a world in which the sectarian's interactions and social role are made coherent and meaningful.

These texts do not simply train the sectarian how to feel, but, rather, how to evaluate his place in the divine order. He is embedded in a covenantal community, and his emotions toward God, fellow sectarians, and outsiders must reflect his acknowledgement of that fact.

#### **4. Reproof as Emotional Performance of Love and Hate**

##### **A. The Connection between 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6 and the Practice of Reproof**

As described in the passage from 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6 above, it is through the revelation of knowledge that the sectarian learns not only *what* God loves and hates but also *whom* he loves and hates. In that first-person passage, the speaker affirms that, thanks to divine revelation, he knows the path that God loves as well as the identity of those people whom God loves. The speaker concludes by pledging that only God's beloved will gain entry into the sect and thereby enjoy access to knowledge of God's beloved ways. Implicit in this pledge is an ethic of disclosure and concealment: the model sectarian of 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6 will shield his knowledge of God's beloved ways from the hated outsiders and will reveal that knowledge to the beloved insiders.

The link between the emotions of love and hate and the ethic of disclosure and concealment, implied in 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6, left its mark on routine sectarian practice. The group's practice of reproof, which, as we will see, is characterized as an act of love and hate, served as the vehicle for concealment and disclosure of knowledge. By reproofing insiders only, the sectarian affirmed the group values represented by love and hate in 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6. Reproof, in other words, was a "socially dictated performance"<sup>38</sup> of emotion that demonstrated the sectarian's commitment to sectarian

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<sup>38</sup> Corrigan, "Introduction: Emotions Research and the Academic Study of Religion," 11.

norms. The importance of reproof in the sectarian texts reminds us that “emotions are phenomena that can be seen in social interactions, much of which is verbal.”<sup>39</sup>

The relationship between reproof and love and hate emerges clearly from the following passage in 1QS:

15. He should carry out the judgment of each one in accordance with his spirit, and advance each one (לקרבו) according to the cleanness of a man's hands, and according to his insight
16. bring him close (להגישו), and thus (establish) his love along with his hatred (וכן שנתו). But he must not reprove (אשר לוא להוכיח) or argue with the Men of the Pit,
17. but instead conceal the counsel of the Torah (ולסתר את עצת התורה) in the midst of the Men of Deceit. He must reprove (ולהוכיח) with true knowledge and righteous judgment (only) the chosen of
18. the Way, each according to his spirit and according to the norm of the time. He shall guide them with knowledge, and instruct them in the mysteries of wonder and truth in the midst of
19. the Men of the Community, so that they may walk perfectly each one with his fellow in everything which has been revealed to them. This is the time to prepare the way
20. to the wilderness. He shall instruct them (in) all that is found to be performed in this time. He shall separate himself from each man who has not turned his way
21. from all deceit. These are the norms of the way for the Maskil in these times with respect to his love and his hate (לאתו שנתו). Eternal hatred
22. against the Men of the Pit in the spirit of concealment (שנתת עולם ברוח הסתר). He shall leave to them property and labor of hands, as a slave does to the one who rules over him, and one oppressed before
23. the one who dominates over him. He will be a man zealous (חקנא) for the statute and prepared for the day of vengeance (י ו נ ק ם). (1QS 9:15–23)

This text, which is addressed to the Maskil, articulates clearly the injunction against sharing divine knowledge with non-sectarians.<sup>40</sup> The passage refers to the sectarian law of reproof, which enjoined members of the sect to reprove their fellow sectarians in front of witnesses on the day on which an

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<sup>39</sup> Abu-Lughod and Lutz, “Introduction: Emotion, Discourse, and the Politics of Everyday Life,” 10–11.

<sup>40</sup> On the function of the Maskil, see Carol A. Newsom, “The Sage in the Literature of Qumran: The Functions of the *Maškil*,” in *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (ed. John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 373–82.

offense was committed.<sup>41</sup> The role of reproof in this particular text has been labeled by Billah Nitzan as its “educational function.”<sup>42</sup> Sectarians were to reprove fellow members exclusively, according to lines seventeen and eighteen: “He must reprove with true knowledge and righteous judgment (only) the chosen of the Way.” Lines twenty one and twenty two account for the distinction between sectarians and non-sectarians in this regard using the language of emotion: the Maskil reproves fellow sectarians out of love, but refrains from reproving others out of hate. According to this text, the hate that manifests itself in silent opposition to the outside world plays an important role in the divine plan. The Maskil must confine reproof to other sectarians in order to conceal the group’s esoteric law and guarantee that outsiders will not be privy to salvific knowledge. The discursive role played by covenantal hate endows their secrecy with meaning: by retaining exclusive control over their knowledge, the sect replicates the divine hatred that originally concealed that knowledge from the outsiders.

The contours of sectarian love and hate, as in 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6, surround the divine gifts bestowed upon the sect: only the beloved sectarians, and not the hated non-sectarians, received divine knowledge. The Maskil is enjoined to hate, but the divine plan has arranged for this hate to take the form of disengagement; the Maskil’s apparent passivity is actually an expression of hatred. In order to “conceal (וּלְסַתֵּר) the counsel of the Torah” (l. 17) he must respond to his adversaries in a “spirit of concealment (בְּרוּחַ הַסִּתְרוֹ) ... as a slave does to the one who rules over him, and one

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<sup>41</sup> On this law, see Lawrence H. Schiffman, *Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Courts, Testimony, and the Penal Code* (Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1983), 89–98, and Aharon Shemesh, “Rebuke, Warning, and the Obligation to Testify in Judean Desert Writings and Rabbinic Halakha,” *Tarbiz* 66 (1997): 149–68 (Hebrew).

<sup>42</sup> Billah Nitzan, “The Laws of Reproof in 4QBerakhot (4Q286–290) in Light of their Parallels in the Damascus Covenant and Other Texts from Qumran,” in *Legal Texts and Legal Issues: Proceedings of the Second Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Cambridge 1995, Published in Honour of Joseph M. Baumgarten* (ed. Moshe Bernstein, Florentino García Martínez, and John Kampen; STDJ 23; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 149–65 (157). See also Newsom, *Self as Symbolic Space*, 141.

oppressed before the one who dominates over him” (ll. 22–23). The nature of his hatred, according to line twenty three, is guided by his zeal for the day of vengeance: in order to seal the fate of his opponents, he must conceal from them the sect’s salvific knowledge.

In this scheme, disengagement is a demonstration of power, not of weakness, as it facilitates vindication and redemption. Love and hate are not simply emotions, beliefs that insiders are indispensable and outsiders detrimental to their wellbeing, but rather are vehicles through which the sectarian can demonstrate that he has been divinely elected. The Maskil’s passive demeanor belies his actual position of power, since it ensures the eventual punishment of non-sectarians.<sup>43</sup> As discourse, this portrait of hatred constructs a social reality in which sectarian powerlessness is actually a display of power.<sup>44</sup> Sectarian hate is not simply an emotion, but an assertion of moral rectitude. To borrow the terminology of one philosopher of the emotions, this is “malicious hatred,”

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<sup>43</sup> See Newsom, *Self as Symbolic Space*, 171. Contrast the views of E. F. Sutcliffe, “Hatred at Qumran,” *RevQ* 2 (1960): 345–56 (350); Krister Stendahl, “Hate, Non-Retaliatio, and Love: I QS x, 17–20 and Rom. 12:19–21,” *HTR* 55 (1962): 343–55 (344); and Magen Broshi, “Hatred: An Essene Religious Principle and Its Christian Consequences,” in *Antikes Judentum und frühes Christentum: Festschrift für Hartmut Stegemann zum 65. Geburtstag* (ed. Bernd Kollmann, Wolfgang Reinbold, and Annette Steudel; BZNW 97; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 245–52 (249), who interpret this passage as mandating an ethic of passive non-retaliation in light of the impending Day of Judgment. While the upshot of this passage is sectarian passivity, I prefer viewing this passage as endowing that passive resistance with an important element of power: the sectarian’s task is to partner with God in vengeance by ensuring that the outsiders remain ignorant of the divine will.

<sup>44</sup> See Alex P. Jassen, “The Dead Sea Scrolls and Violence: Sectarian Formation and Eschatological Imagination,” *BibInt* 17 (2009): 12–44 (16): “The violent eschatological vision serves in the present primarily as a rhetorical tool to empower the disempowered community.” See also David Flusser, “The Social Message from Qumran,” in *Judaism and the Origins of Christianity* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), 193–201 (198), and idem, “The Dead Sea Sect and Its Worldview,” in *Judaism of the Second Temple Period: Volume One: Qumran and Apocalypticism* (trans. Azzan Yadin; Jerusalem: Magnes, 2007), 1–24 (15–16).



knowledge. On the other hand, by not reproving outsiders, the sect retains its monopoly over that knowledge, dooming non-sectarians to destruction. As an expression of the group's emphasis on love and hate, the law of reproof becomes an important vehicle through which the sectarian comes to apprehend his place in social life: his social interactions have cosmic consequences, preserving, on the one hand, the integrity of the sect and, on the other hand, ensuring the ultimate demise of all outsiders.<sup>48</sup>

By describing the act of reproof in terms of the emotions of love and hate, the sect perpetuated the biblical link between behavior and emotion.<sup>49</sup> More important, however, is the particular behavior in question: emotion is connected with speech. As a verbal performance, reproof would affirm the love that bound members of the sect to each other and would have shown the sectarian that his speech was not simply a mode of communication, but was also invested with emotional significance. At the same time, when the sectarian encounters an outsider, emotion is associated with silence. All of the sectarian's social interactions are guided by the divine will, and since God seeks to destroy the outsider, the sectarian must ensure that his own hate seals the fate of the non-sectarian: "Eternal hatred against the Men of the Pit in the spirit of concealment ... He will be a man zealous for the statute and prepared for the day of vengeance" (1QS 9:21–23). In his

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<sup>48</sup> Of course, the law of reproof is exegetically linked with Lev 19:17–18; see James L. Kugel, "On Hidden Hatred and Open Reproach: Early Exegesis of Leviticus 19:17," *HTR* 80 (1987): 43–61 (52–55), and idem, *The Bible as It Was* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 457. It would be a mistake, however, to reduce 1QS 9:15–23 to biblical interpretation, since that interpretation is shaped by the broader portrait of love and hate in the texts under discussion.

<sup>49</sup> On the relationship between emotion and behavior in the Hebrew Bible, see Yochanan Muffs, "Love and Joy as Metaphors of Willingness and Spontaneity in Cuneiform, Ancient Hebrew, and Related Literatures: Part I: Divine Investitures in the Midrash in the Light of Neo-Babylonian Royal Grants," in *Love & Joy: Law, Language and Religion in Ancient Israel* (New York: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1992), 121–63; idem, "Love and Joy as Metaphors of Willingness and Spontaneity in Cuneiform, Ancient Hebrew, and Related Literatures: Part II: The Joy of Giving," in *Love & Joy*, 165–93; and Gary A. Anderson, *A Time to Mourn, A Time to Dance: The Expression of Grief and Joy in Israelite Religion* (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991).

interactions with both insiders and outsiders, the sectarian’s love and hate illustrate James Averill’s observation that “emotions are a socially prescribed set of responses to be followed by a person in a given situation. The response is a function of shared expectations regarding appropriate behavior.”<sup>50</sup>

## B. Reproof in the Hymn of the Maskil

The connection between reproof and emotion resurfaces in the Hymn of the Maskil in 1QS 10, where we again find the themes of hate, revenge, and suppression of knowledge from non-sectarians. The speaker in this text appears to embrace the mandate given to the Maskil in the previous column of 1QS:

17. When affliction starts I will laud him, and at his salvation I will cry out for joy thoroughly. To no man will I return  
 18. evil for evil, with good I will pursue humankind. For with God (resides) the judgment of every living being, and he shall pay man his reward. I will not envy in a spirit of  
 19. wickedness, and my soul will not desire wealth of violence. And (in) the strife of the Men of the Pit (תַּחַשׁ יִשְׁבֵּי אֲנִי בְּיַד יְהוָה) I will not engage (שׁוֹפֵט אֲנִי) <sup>until the Day</sup> of Vengeance (יְדִי יִשְׁפֹּט אֲנִי); but my anger I will not  
 20. turn away from the Men of Deceit, and I will not feel satisfied until he has accomplished judgment. I will not hold anger (אֲנִי אֲחַז אֲרִיב) towards those who turn away from transgression; but I will not have compassion (אֲנִי אֲחַמֵּד אֲרִיב)  
 21. for all those who deviate from the Way. (1QS 10:17–21)

In this first-person hymn, the speaker, who seems to represent himself as a leader in the sect, models the same pacifistic approach toward outsiders that was mandated in the previous column in the Community Rule.<sup>51</sup> As in 1QS 9:15–23, the speaker embeds the description of his emotions within the context of God’s eschatological plans: God is the judge of evil and the speaker’s savior. These facts give the speaker the confidence to remain silent in the face of his adversaries and anticipate the

<sup>50</sup> James Averill, “A Constructivist View of Emotion,” in *Emotion: Theory, Research, and Experience, Vol. 1: Theories of Emotion* (ed. Robert Plutchik and Henry Kellerman; New York: Academic Press, 1980), 305–39 (308).

<sup>51</sup> See Jassen, “Dead Sea Scrolls and Violence,” 43, who notes the “absence of real-time vengeance against sectarian enemies,” in this passage and elsewhere in the Scrolls.

day when God will inflict upon them punishment for their deeds. The speaker enunciates basic doctrines of sectarian belief and connects them with his passive disposition toward his enemies, resolving the tension between all-consuming hate and extreme submissiveness.

As in 1QS 9:15–23, the hymn appears to allude to Lev 19:17–18: the speaker affirms that לֹא יִלְאֵן בְּאֵפֶר, recalling the prohibition of Lev 19:18a that one should not “bear a grudge” (לֹא יִלְאֵן וְתִטֵּר).<sup>52</sup> On the other hand, the speaker alludes to the רִיב אִנְשֵׁי שַׁחַת, recalling the prohibition in 1QS 9, וְלֹא יִשְׂרָף אֶת אֲנָשֵׁי הַשַּׁחַת, וְאִשְׁרָ לֹא לְהוֹכִיחַ. Though he will maintain his anger toward the Men of the Pit, he will not engage them “until the Day of Vengeance,” or עַד יוֹם נִקְמָה, recalling the same reference to יוֹם נִקְמָה in 1QS 9:23 and its echo of לֹא תִקְחֶנּוּ in Lev 19:18a.

The instructions to the Maskil in 1QS 9:15–23 thus share linguistic and thematic links with 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6:19–32, as described above, as well as with 1QS 10:17–21. However, while 1QS 9:15–23 is presented as a set of instructions in the third-person, the two related passages are both first-person accounts. This difference provides insight into the role played by emotions in constructing sectarian reality. Observing the distinctive speech practices that members of the 1QS group were expected to learn, Carol Newsom remarks that

Very little is more closely identified with one’s own self than speech. As a physical process, speech engages the body, but it is also an activity of the mind. In speaking, one actively takes up a subject position within a discourse. Thus ownership of the discourse, and the identity that comes from it is strongly enhanced through the activity of speaking in its terms and accents. Thus it is important to look not only at texts that model new ways of speaking, like the beginning of the Serek ha-Yahad, but also to look at those speech practices by which individual sectarians themselves learned to make such speech their own.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> On the connection between reproof and Lev 19:17–18, see above, n. 48.

<sup>53</sup> Newsom, “Constructing ‘We, You, and the Others,’” 17.

She suggests that first-person speech in the Hodayot would have been an especially important way by which the individual sectarian could learn to talk differently:

A person who listened to such first-person speech recited by others, who learned how to compose such a piece for himself, or who even took up and read such a piece as his own prayer would be drawn into a self-understanding shaped according to the patterns embedded in the Hodayot. A pre-formed prayer that one appropriated for one's own would function in relation to the speaker in ways similar to the work of a creed ... or a pledge of allegiance ... These speech acts strategically obscure who the speaking subject is. The ambiguity about exactly *whose* words these are (the author's? mine?) make them a powerful instrument in the formation of identity.<sup>54</sup>

If speech serves to bridge the gap between the body and mind, then speech about emotions—“embodied thoughts”<sup>55</sup>—would be doubly effective. It was imperative that the individual sectarian internalize the precise manner in which he was to hate outsiders and love insiders. 1QS 9:15–23 represents the set of norms that were to guide the Maskil and, as indicated in other sources, the sect at large.<sup>56</sup> By reiterating the third-person instructions of 1QS 9 in a first-person hymn in 1QS 10, the Maskil would have internalized the distinctive forms of sectarian love and hate, just as the individual sectarian would have through the recitation of the hodayah in 1QH<sup>a</sup> 6:19–32. As we have already seen on several occasions, the sect's emotions are truly “evaluations [that are] evident in ... speech behavior.”<sup>57</sup> Because “language implements social reality,”<sup>58</sup> these speech acts seem designed to affirm the norms that underlie sectarian love and hate.

## 5. When Insiders become Outsiders: Intra-Sectarian Hate

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>55</sup> Rosaldo, “Towards an Anthropology of Self and Feeling,” 143.

<sup>56</sup> See sources cited above in n. 47.

<sup>57</sup> Abu-Lughod and Lutz, “Introduction: Emotion, Discourse, and the Politics of Everyday Life,” 11.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

Love and hate, as described in the texts above, reinforced a hierarchical worldview, in which the sectarians stood at the peak of the divine order by virtue of divine love. Accordingly, they were required to duplicate God's love and hate by themselves hating outsiders, all of whom were lower on the scale of the divine order, and loving other sectarians. However, the hierarchical structure of the sect posed a potential challenge to this love ideal. Although sectarian hate of outsiders was borne of a belief in their own predestined supremacy, they also asserted that the divine spirit rested in certain sectarians more than in others. If hatred of outsiders trained the sectarian to view the world as a pre-ordained, hierarchical order, then urging him to overlook that pre-ordained order and love all sectarians equally, regardless of rank, could prove challenging. The question, then, is how the emotions of love and hate were used as a discourse for affirming a worldview in which sectarian superiority requires hatred of outsiders but in which the sectarians must love one another, the internal hierarchy notwithstanding.

It is clear from the following passage in 1QS that the sect acknowledged the possibility of intra-sectarian divisiveness, if not hate:

They shall admonish (להוכי) one another in t[ru]th (א[ת] [ת]), humility (ענוה), and merciful love (אהבת חסד) to another. He must not speak to his fellow with anger or with a snarl, or with a [stiff] neck [or in a jealous] spirit of wickedness. And he must not hate him (ישנאהו) [in the fores]k[in] of his heart (לבבו [ת] ל [בעור]),<sup>59</sup> for he shall admonish him (יוכיח) on (the very same) day lest he bear iniquity because of him (אלא יאשם). (1QS 5:24–6:1)

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<sup>59</sup> The reconstruction of [ת] ל [בעור] follows that of Jacob Licht, *The Rule Scrolls* (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1965), 136 (Hebrew), accepted by Schiffman, *Sectarian Law*, 107 n. 64. See, however, Kugel, “On Hidden Hatred,” 52 n. 25: “[T]he whole point is that this clause is an elaboration of Lev 19:17, ‘You shall not hate your brother in your heart,’ and a tying together of that stricture with the Law of Reproach. An ‘adversative reference’ would not only obscure that relation but would as well eliminate the true sense of ‘hatred in the heart’ that is plainly being invoked here.”

This passage, which is the only one in sectarian literature whose language echoes all five components of Lev 19:17–18, adds an important, additional wrinkle to the law of reproof. In general, a timely reproof is taken as evidence of the sectarian’s regard for his fellow. The juxtaposition of hatred and a timely reproach at the end of this passage confirms this fact: a hater would let his knowledge of the sin linger, only to disclose the details on some future, more convenient occasion.

In order to appreciate fully this passage, it needs to be set in its immediate context. 1QS 5:24–6:1 recognizes the dangers of the hierarchical structure of the sect. The law of reproof there is embedded in a description of the yearly assessments of each sectarian, undertaken “in order to examine their spirit and their works year after year, so as to elevate each according to his insight and the perfection of his way, or to keep him back according to his perversion” (1QS 5:24). The text then immediately demands that reproof be delivered in a spirit of love and not hate.<sup>60</sup> The link between reproof and these emotions is apparently an acknowledgement that, because of the hierarchical structure of the sect referred to in the previous lines, reproof could be used as an expression of hate rather than love. The tenor in which one member reproves his wayward fellow is thus taken as a litmus test of the former’s commitment to group solidarity. It is not a coincidence that the same description of the sectarian ethos—“truth, humility, and merciful love”—found in 5:24 to describe the proper mode of reproof also appears earlier in 1QS 2:23–24 following the description of the annual covenant ceremony, which concludes by warning the group that “no one shall either fall from his standing place, or rise from the place of his lot.” In both cases, the sectarian hierarchy threatens the spirit of love that should animate group life.

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<sup>60</sup> At least in CD 9:18, reproof was recorded by the Mevaqquer, serving as a medium through which sectarian rankings would be determined; see Esther Eshel, “4Q477: The Rebukes by the Overseer,” *JJS* 45 (1994): 111–22 (114), and Nitzan, “Laws of Reproof,” 157.

The sect recognized that rigid hierarchy and love stand in tension with each other in the life of the group. If the hate directed at the non-sectarian is based upon the sect's superiority in the divine order, there is a danger that that emotion could also manifest itself within the sect. A sectarian might direct his hate toward another of a lower rank, that is, someone assigned by the divine will to an inferior rank.<sup>61</sup> Conversely, a sectarian of lower rank might resent one of higher rank. Significantly, the passage in 1QS 5:24–6:1 constitutes a substantial expansion of the presumed original now attested in 4QS<sup>d</sup>, which simply read: “Each shall admonish (להוכיח) his companion (with) merciful love (ואהבת חסד). He must not speak to his companion in anger or with a snarl or in jealousy (באף או בתלונה או בקנאת רשע). Also let no man accuse his companion to the Many without a confrontation (בהוכח) before wit[nesses].”<sup>62</sup> The expansions — reproof issued אל and not [קשה] רב, the injunction against delayed reproof because לא לבבו [ת] ל [בעור] — all focus upon the importance of group unity, demonstrating a clear sensitivity to the dangers of the group's hierarchical structure.<sup>63</sup> The increasing concern about the ramifications of the sect's hierarchical structure would be well explained if, as suggested by Eyal Regev, 1QS 5 belongs to a stage in which earlier egalitarianism gave way to an increasingly hierarchical mode of organization.<sup>64</sup>

The description of intra-sectarian reproof in 5:24–6:1 shows contacts with earlier passages in 1QS. 1QS 5, the beginning of 4QS<sup>d</sup> and possibly the original introduction to the Community Rule,

<sup>61</sup> See Newsom, *Self as Symbolic Space*, 142.

<sup>62</sup> 4Q258 1a ii 4–6. The precise relationship between the 4QS MSS and 1QS remains a subject of dispute. I follow Metso's assumption that 1QS represents a later, expanded version of 4QS<sup>b,d</sup>; see her *Textual Development*, 89–90. Contrast this view with that of Philip S. Alexander, “The Redaction-History of *Serek ha-Yahad*: A Proposal,” *RevQ* 17 (1996): 437–53, who assumes that 1QS, the oldest of the Community Rule MSS, is the more original.

<sup>63</sup> For the discrepancies, see Metso, *Textual Development*, 83–84.

<sup>64</sup> See Eyal Regev, *Sectarianism in Qumran: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (*RelSoc* 45; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), 177–80. Contrast the view of Collins, *Beyond the Qumran Community*, 63.

details some of the sect’s guiding principles and briefly outlines the manner in which new initiates were incorporated into the sect.<sup>65</sup> The sect is said to represent “truth (in) unity, humility (אמת יחד וענוה), righteousness, justice, merciful love (ואהבת חסד), (indeed) circumspectly walking in all their ways ... He shall ... circumcise in the Community the foreskin of the inclination (and) a stiff neck (למול ביחד עורלת יצר ועורפ קשה)” (1QS 5:3–5). According to the Treatise on the Two Spirits (TTS) at the conclusion of the previous column, these attributes are characteristic of the “spirit of truth”:<sup>66</sup>

1QS 5:3–4	1QS 4:2–6
To achieve together truth (אמת) and humility (ענוה), justice and uprightness, merciful love and seemly behavior on all their paths (צדקה ומשפט ואהבת חסד והצנע לכת בכול דרכיהם).	To enlighten the heart of man, straighten out in front of him all the paths of true justice (צדק) ... it is a spirit of meekness (רוח ענוה), of patience, generous mercy ... of generous compassion with all the sons of truth (ורוב חסדים על כול בני אמת) ... of careful behavior in wisdom concerning everything (והצנע לכת בערמת כול).

Many of the formulations in 1QS 4:2–6 and 5:3–5 recur in the description of the ideal reproof, which, according to 1QS 5:25–26, must be delivered in “t[ru]th, humility, and merciful love” (א[מ]ת ענוה ואהבת חסד) rather than with a “[stiff] neck” or out of hatred “[in the fores]k[in] of his heart” (בעור[ל] ל[ת] לבבו).<sup>67</sup> If the sectarian cannot deliver his reproof in “truth, humility, and merciful love,” as 1QS 5:24 requires, then he violates the mandate of 5:3–5 and, as

<sup>65</sup> See Metso, *Textual Development*, 145.

<sup>66</sup> Outside of these instances and parallels in 4QS MSS, this list of attributes is only found elsewhere in the Scrolls corpus in 1QS 8:2; 4Q298 (4QWords of the Maskil to All Sons of Dawn) 3–4 ii 2–8; and 4Q438 (4QBarki Napshi<sup>c</sup>) 4 ii 4.

<sup>67</sup> All three passages contain echoes of Mic 6:6–8. On the use of that passage in 1QS 5:3–4, see Charlotte Hempel, “Emerging Communal Life and Ideology in the S Tradition,” in *Defining Identities: We, You, and the Other in the Dead Sea Scrolls*, 43–61 (52–54).

outlined in the passage from TTS, demonstrates that he does not possess the spirit of truth—he is not an authentic sectarian. A sectarian who issued a reproof in a spirit of love endorsed those values that constitute sectarian identity and, conversely, a group member who delivered reproof in a spirit of hate demonstrated his rejection of those values.

These observations can be described in terms of intra-sectarian power relations. In limiting reproof to their fellow sectarians, group members transformed this practice into a source of sectarian power, as described earlier. This same practice, however, could also serve as the foundation for unauthorized displays of power within the group. This assertion of power could take the form of a sectarian of higher rank reproofing one of lower rank, thus reinforcing the internal hierarchy, or one of lower rank reproofing his superior, thereby challenging the hierarchy. In order to combat these possibilities, 1QS 5:24–6:1 used the emotion of love to arrange a society in which, despite the establishment of hierarchical difference outlined in 5:23, the internal display of power is incompatible with one’s election.

The relationship between emotions and the reproof of a sinning sectarian can be described with reference to the following quote from the philosopher of emotions, Claire Armon-Jones:

Emotions are a socially prescribed set of responses to be followed by a person in a given situation. The response is a function of shared expectations regarding appropriate behavior ... According to constructionism, there is a prescriptive implication embedded in the cultural situations in which emotions feature in that an emotion is not merely warranted by the situation as culturally construed but is deemed by members of a community to be a response which ought to feature in that situation because its presence would demonstrate the agent’s commitment to the cultural values exemplified in that situation. This prescriptive relation between the emotion and the values it reflects is alleged by constructionists to have a crucial role in contributing to the acquisition of culturally appropriate emotions and to the subsequent regulation of the agent’s responses to emotion-warranting situations.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Armon-Jones, “Thesis of Constructionism,” 33.

1QS emphasizes that, when a sectarian witnesses another group member sinning, he must demonstrate the emotion of love as a measure of his “commitment to the cultural values exemplified in that situation.” In the hierarchical life of the sect, a reproof issued through love would play a “crucial role in contributing to the acquisition of culturally appropriate emotions.” A reproof issued in a spirit of hate or jealousy, on the other hand, would imply a misunderstanding of the group’s norms and how they are implicated in the situation in question.

## **6. Conclusion**

The texts discussed above should be viewed as part of the project of re-orienting not only sectarian allegiances but also the group’s thought-patterns and belief-system. The portrait of love and hate in the texts surveyed in this article helped to affirm a reality in which the individual’s place in the divine order was now inseparable from his standing in the community. Covenantal love and hate now encompassed all of his interpersonal relationships.

Although the group’s construction of love and hate emphasized the degree to which they were passive recipients of divine grace, the emotions were also sources of sectarian power, markers of their ultimate supremacy over the outside world. Love and hate both reflect and reinforce the tension that stands at the core of the sectarian consciousness: the sectarian is, on the one hand, empowered by divine gifts and insight, and, on the other hand, is deprived of his autonomous self by virtue of the divine will that assigned him to the sect in the first place.

This study has also highlighted the ways in which greater attention to emotion can illuminate aspects of sectarian social dynamics. If the sectarian emotion of hate expressed the power of the sect toward outsiders, it could also be used as an expression of power between sectarians of different

ranks. The sectarian effort to use hate as a vehicle for boundary drawing between them and the outside world could actually be a divisive force within the life of the sect. The viability of the sectarian project thus depended upon the success of the sect in fostering an emotional disposition that would not be self-destructive. The emotions of love and hate were therefore required as affirmations of the sectarian values of group unity and the belief that all were members of one covenant.