G-O-O-D MORNING KABUL
TAMIL QUAGMIRE
PORTRAIT OF A SAVAGE EMPEROR
PRETORIA AND US
SHOWDOWN IN MOSCOW
KNOW YOUR CANDIDATE!

Special Report
THE NATO CONFLICT
Pages 29-33
LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHERS

Starting up a political science magazine is much like forming a special combat team. You have to find the proper mix of people—both seasoned upcoming political scientists and eager newcomers—who can work together under trying conditions to reach a common goal. Then you have to get your hands on some graphics paraphernalia and find a suitable place to put it all together. Finally, after a gargantuan effort, you’re ready to produce a high-quality product for the discerning political science fan.

Having done all of the above, we feel that we’re well on our way to becoming the best darn political quarterly magazine on campus.

But we still have a long way to go, and that’s why we’d like to encourage you, our reader, to drop us a line and let us know what you think of this publication and to offer suggestions to make it even better.

Of course, we couldn’t have gotten this far without the help of countless people on and off campus—friends, students and faculty. Some have provided extensive background materials, maps and photographs. But above all, special thanks must go to the Alumni Association of Yeshiva University, Dr. Ruth Bevan and Dr. Efrem Nulman.

But, most important, we couldn’t have produced a magazine on political science without the cooperation of the members of the J.P. Dunner Political Science Society themselves, our Contributing Editors, who have gone out of their way to help us capture in words the fast and furious world of both national and international politics.

We at the YU Clarion look forward to your comments, and, in closing, would like to extend a heartfelt thanks, in advance, to all of your future readers everywhere. We couldn’t do it without you!

Ilan Aldoubey and Jennifer Notis

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many deserve our deepest gratitude for their unselfish assistance and support in the publication of The YU Clarion. We take this opportunity to thank one and all, but as we cannot mention everyone involved, we’d like to name but a few. Robert Mark of Royal Oxford deserves special thanks for his generous donation. We would also like to commend the Alumni Association of Yeshiva University, Yeshiva College Student Council (YCSC), Stern College for Women Student Council (SCWSC) and especially Dr. Efrem Nulman for their active support. Our sincerest gratitude goes to Dr. Ruth A. Bevan, whose assistance to the magazine and other student activities is invaluable and seemingly endless. We greatly appreciate receiving reprint rights of photographs, cartoons, maps, graphs and logos from a variety of sources credited appropriately with each item.
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ON THE COVER
Afghan mujahidin getting ready to take over from departing Red Army.
The West Bank and Gaza Strip
CONQUEST OF WAR
BY ILAN ALDOUBY

The legitimacy of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been disputed by all for the past twenty years. The West Bank, an ear-shaped hill and desert territory, is inhabited by about 800,000 Palestinians; another half a million Palestinian Arabs live in the slender finger of desert known as the Gaza Strip. Israel conquered both areas in six days of fighting in 1967, and for more than two decades the Israelis stayed on as occupiers.

Shortly after this year's start, daily turmoil gripped the occupied territories. Mobs of Palestinian youths threw stones and hurled Molotov cocktails at police, and patrols of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reacted violently. Casualties were reported on both sides. By the end of March, more than 100 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier lay dead. As a result, Israel was condemned by the United Nations. The resolutions passed denounced Israel for using live ammunition instead of the customary rubber bullets and water hoses to break up the riots. Most unusually, Washington abstained from voting, thus showing its dissatisfaction with Israel's handling of the Palestinian uprising. However, no one wanted to acknowledge that if hostile mobs toss Molotov cocktails at you, spraying back water is not too effective.

The reason for the recent outburst, sparked by a relatively insignificant incident in Gaza, was mainly the result of Palestinians again being played as pawns against Israel in the great Middle Eastern chess game. Almost all of Israel's Arab neighbors have taken turns attempting to poke holes in any soft spot they could find, such as Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and her determination to hold the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Ignoring the fact that the two territories had been conquered fair and square during the 1967 Six-Day War, the Arab countries continued applying political pressure for their return.

International law clearly states that "the conquering country has the right to impose its own political and civil restrictions on the conquered"; and "absolute allegiance is the right of the conqueror." Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines the term "conquer" as "to subdue; to gain by force; to take possession or control of land by winning a war." Clearly, Israel was the conqueror of the two areas and by sheer conquest has a legitimate military claim for annexation.

Throughout history all nations—without exception—have legitimized their conquest by performing the political act of seizing new lands after the cease of hostilities. It is not unreasonable for Israel to do the same. Ancient Rome started as a small city some fourteen miles from the Mediterranean coast, and by imperialistic methods, soon claimed Macedonia, Africa, Syria, Germany, and Southern Italy; the Romans annexed these territories after the war.

Continued on page 36
These are three of a series of articles that will appear in the first and second issue of the YU Clarion, profiling Republican candidates for the 1988 nominations.

fundamentalist born-again supporters.

Scion of an aristocratic Southern family from Lexington, Va., Pat Robertson traces his roots to two Presidents, William Henry and Benjamin Harrison. His bible-quoting father, Willis R. Robertson, a Virginia gentleman of the old school, had served in the House and then the Senate for 34 years, battling liberalism, the growing power of the Federal judicial system, and the "unelect" perpetual tyranny of the Supreme Court." His mother, a deeply religious Southerner, had flooded him since childhood with gospel literature, and ultimately overwhelmed him with Baptist rhetoric.

At the outbreak of the 1956 hostilities in the Far East, young Robertson joined the Marines, was commissioned a Lieutenant and shipped overseas. He was detoured, however, at the last moment to a training program in Japan, but eventually served in Korea. Robertson was later accused by a fellow Marine, former Republican Congressman Pete McCloskey, that he had used his father's clout to avoid combat. Outraged, Robertson insisted that he had neither sought nor received preferential treatment from his father, the Senator. He then sued McCloskey for libel, demanding $35 million in compensation.

At Virginia Tidewater College, Robertson is remembered as an enthusiastic wrestler; he was also a gregarious fraternity man and an excelling Pi Beta Kappa at Washington and Lee College. He finally enrolled at Yale Law School and spent his summers working for the Senate Appropriations Committee staff.

In the last year at Yale, Robertson secretly married Adelia "Dede", a Roman Catholic nursing student he had met at a party. Their first son, Timothy, was born only 10 weeks thereafter. Dede would later teach nursing at Tidewater, turn interior decorator, raise four

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serving lessons to neighbors. But even so, the Doles could not make ends meet; they had to move into the basement of their home and rent the upstairs to avoid losing it to foreclosure.

As World War's start, Bob joined the Army. He served as an infantryman in Italy, where he was severely wounded. He finally returned home almost totally paralyzed and barely surviving after having spent 39 months in military hospitals during which he endured 8 operations. The town raised $1,800 to pay his medical bills, and Bob Dole had to learn how to use his limbs.

Once cured, the ambitious and impatient young Dole enrolled at Washburn University Law School, and upon graduation, became county attorney. Always proud of his humble beginnings, he would later tell his Kappa Sigma fraternity that as such, he had approved his grandparents' welfare checks.

Dole entered the Kansas political arena as a

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fiercely loyal Republican. A partisan Representative in the House of the mid-'60s, he gained renown as a conservative freshman Senator in 1968. Yet, as GOP leader in the Senate, Dole worked closely with liberal Democrat George McGovern to write food stamps legislation in 1976. A decade later, he would lead the fight in the Senate to establish Martin Luther King Day, and persuaded a reluctant Reagan Administration to accept the 1982 Voting Rights Act.

Dole had been thrust into the public eye in the early '70s while chairing the Republican National Party and defending Richard Nixon in the midst of the Watergate scandal; his stance nearly lost him the 1974 Senate reelection race. He was the Republicans' vice-presidential nominee in 1976, and as President Gerald Ford's running mate was branded a hatchet man, an image he is still trying to live

Continued on page 37

man of the Hudson Institute think tank known for its conservative and libertarian ideas.

Pete Du Pont relentlessly tries to drown out the murmurs about his patrimony by boldly questioning sacrosanct social programs his rivals fear to address. While serving congress for three terms, Du Pont had a conventionally moderate, rather liberal voting record. His campaign now strives to emphasize a shift from this record to his success as a free-market advocate while serving two times as Governor of Delaware from 1977 to 1985.

Du Pont's simple, radical ideas slowly developed into a provocative "empowerment philosophy." In a recent interview he stated emphatically: "The challenge in a post-Ronald Reagan era is to promote this idea of empowering people to make decisions in their own lives, to extend into areas that aren't directly economic - to what I call opportunity issues."

Accordingly, Du Pont supports abolishing farm subsidies within five years; creating pri

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Winter/Spring 1988
These are three of a series of articles that will appear in the first and second issue of the YU Clarion, profiling Democratic candidates for the 1988 nominations.

MICHAEL STANLEY "Mike" DUKAKIS
Governor of Massachusetts

The Duke’s Passion

The slogan that accentuates most the platform of Michael Stanley Dukakis in his bid for the presidency is: “What he did for Massachusetts, he can do for America.” His innovative use of gubernatorial powers had enabled Massachusetts to become economically the strongest state in the union. Dukakis believes that all states should play an active, albeit specific role in “creating economic opportunity”—ideally a role of mediator and not star contributor or recipient of financial aid.

Michael Dukakis, nicknamed “the Duke,” a mark of respect rather than affection, is an enigma to all. Kevin Harrington, former state Senate president and now a high-powered lobbyist, calls him “the single most puzzling political figure I’ve ever known.”

The son of Greek immigrant parents, Dukakis was born in 1933, three years after his brother Stellan. His father, Fanos, came to America at 15, speaking no English, and eight years later talked his way past a skeptical admissions official and into Harvard Medical School.

His mother, Euterpe, was 9 when she landed in the Haverhill public school and did so well that she was later excelled in Maine and became a teacher. Dr. Dukakis, a family physician who reputedly managed more than 3,000 deliveries before he died in 1979, had been a staunch conservative. His wife, a charming patrician woman, was more liberal.

The Dukakis were, by all accounts, demanding parents. The boys had specific responsibilities and led a very structured life—a stern upbringing guided by a combined New England Puritanism with Greek Orthodox ethnicity. Dukakis thrived under this demanding regimen. He was an honor student at Brookline High School, student council president, a 5-foot-8 guard on the basketball team, tennis player and cross-country runner. As a senior, in 1951, he entered the Boston Marathon and finished 57th in a field of 191. Just when all looked too well, his brother Stellan had a nervous breakdown while a student at Bates College; he would never completely recover. In 1973 Stellan was killed by a hit-and-run driver. The two had been very close and Michael would experience great difficulties dealing with the tragedy.

Continued on page 37

ALBERT "Al" GORE JR.
Senator from Tennessee

A Washington-Bred from Dixie

At 39, Albert Gore Jr., the freshman Senator from Tennessee, is the youngest aspirant on the 1988 presidential campaign trail—just a bit younger than John Kennedy was in 1959. Although he has repeatedly represented himself as a national candidate rather than a Southern one, Gore holds the enviable position of being the only Democratic hopeful from the South, and a self-proclaimed “raging moderate,” who dares challenge the dovish stands on defense and foreign policy of his six opponents.

Albert Gore was born in privileged surroundings in Washington, D.C., and spent much of his childhood in an apartment of the Fairfax Hotel on Embassy Row. He went south only some summers at the insistence of his mother Pauline, to stay with a tenant manager at his family’s 250-acre cattle farm in Carthage, Tenn. His father, Albert Sr., now 79, had served for more than 20 years in the House and then the Senate. A liberal populist, the Senator from Tennessee had been a staunch civil rights advocate and opponent of the Vietnam War. Al Jr. was an honor student at St. Albans’ School, later admitted to Harvard, where he captained the football team. It was there that he first met Mary Elizabeth at his graduation party. He married the outspoken "Tipper," who would raise two daughters, author Raising PG Kids in an X-Rated Society, and co-founded the Parents Music Resource Center, an organization that opposes rock lyrics featuring sex, alcohol, drugs and violence.

In the late ’60s, Albert Jr. was considering Harvard Law. Meanwhile, he demonstrated nationwide against the Vietnam War, rooted for Eugene McCarthy, and even thought of resisting the draft. But fearing that he would hurt his father’s reelection chances, Al enlisted as an Army reporter and saw a short stint in Vietnam. Albert Sr. lost his Senate seat and Al Jr. returned home in 1971. He took a job as a reporter and editorial worker for the Nashville Tennessean and at the same time enrolled at Vanderbilt University as a theology student but soon changed his mind. The year after, for Congress, won a seat for Tennessee and served prominently in both the House and the Senate for almost a dozen years.

In both his domestic and foreign policies, Continued on page 38
With the start of the primary season for the election of Republican and Democratic presidential hopefuls, the YU Clarion surveyed a crosscut of our campus voters to ascertain their opinions about the 13 major candidates and non-candidate Governor Mario Cuomo. A total of 150 students participated in the poll. Their favorite Republican candidate was Vice President George Bush with 30 votes (20%) followed by Democrat Gary Hart with 14 votes (9.3%) who had meanwhile bowed out.

Which of the following parties are you registered with?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Affiliation</th>
<th>Number of Students Surveyed</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For whom would you vote at this time of the primaries?

| Republicans         | Bush       | 30         | 20.0 |
|                     | Dole       | 7          | 4.6  |
|                     | Robertson  | 11         | 7.5  |
|                     | Kemp       | 12         | 8.2  |
|                     | Haig       | 3          | 2.0  |
|                     | DuPont     | 2          | 1.3  |
|                     | Total      | 150        | 100.0|

| Democrats            | Dukakis    | 10         | 6.6  |
|                     | Jackson    | 1          | 0.6  |
|                     | Simon      | 12         | 8.2  |
|                     | Gore       | 3          | 2.0  |
|                     | Gephardt   | 5          | 3.3  |
|                     | Balbitt    | 2          | 1.3  |
|                     | Hart       | 14         | 9.3  |
|                     | Cuomo      | 5          | 3.3  |
|                     | Undecided  | 35         | 23.3 |
|                     | Total      | 150        | 100.0|

How do you rate the following traits of a presidential candidates?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>Strongly Opposed</th>
<th>Slightly Opposed</th>
<th>Indifferent</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smoked Marijuana</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Career</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extramarital Affairs</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involved in Intelligence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Religious Convictions</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Good Morning Kabul!

Angry and frustrated Afghans, Russian veterans of the war in Afghanistan, encounter great domestic difficulties, public indifference and official neglect similar to the homecoming experiences of American Vietnam veterans.

BY BATYA ROZWASKI

Last November, a few hundred Moscovites packed the auditorium of the Russian capital’s House of Films for an “Evening on Afghanistan”, sponsored by the popular weekly magazine Ogoniok. As customary at similar social gatherings, the program included an informative lecture, poetry readings, songs and a panel discussion of the magazine’s journalists and their guests; then, in a lengthy question-and-answer session, the panel commented on select written inquiries from the audience, circulated on scraps of paper through the moderator.

That memorable night, Artyom Borovik, Ogoniok’s veteran war correspondent, whose gripping accounts and brutally frank war stories had bewildered the uninformed Russians, emotionally explained his reasons for portraying the horrors of war so graphically; he was determined to help overcome public indifference toward the sacrifice of the Soviet soldier, and embarrass government officials into treating homecoming veterans with greater respect.

Valery Burko, an airman who had lost both legs at the knees when he stepped on a land mine three years earlier, sang ballads about death in Afghanistan and the deep feelings of fear, pain and anger experienced by the Soviet soldier in combat.

In the avalanche of angry comments that swamped the podium, one anonymous note scribbled on a ticket stub whose seat number had been conveniently blacked out, read: “Remember Vietnam!”

The analogy often drawn both in the United States and the USSR between America in Vietnam and Russia in Afghanistan is generally wrong in many particulars, but in critical respects the similarity is striking. Both prolonged foreign wars of questionable purpose did not confine their damage to the battlefield, but cast equal doubt on official policies and left similar physical and emotional scars that still tear at each country’s social fabric.

Rosy Propaganda

After the invasion of Afghanistan, in December 1979, and during the first few years, the Soviet population was told very little about the nature of the war. The impression was deliberately created that a limited contingent of Soviet troops was providing temporary assistance to a neighbor...
THE STINGER

Soviet military efforts to subdue the Afghan resistance were dramatically intensified in the winter of 1988. The Soviet offensive, coupled with a significant improvement in counterinsurgency tactics, had already made the last three years the bloodiest and most difficult period for the resistance since the beginning of the war. Still, the Soviets did not come close to inflicting crushing blows on the mujahidin. In the fall of 1986, the tide began to turn with the arrival of Stinger missiles from the United States, the first truly effective anti-aircraft weapon in the resistance arsenal. The delivery of US-made Stingers and British Blowpipe missiles changed the nature of the war in a number of significant ways. First, the remarkable effectiveness of this weapon system, reported to have achieved kill ratios of close to 50 percent, had denied the Soviets uncontested domination of the air and had severely limited the scope and effectiveness of their air operations. This has dramatically enhanced the operational effectiveness of mujahidin units. Apart from providing a major boost to their morale, the Afghan Freedom Fighters started extracting a steep price from the Soviet Army both in terms of lost aircraft and casualties. According to a conservative estimate, the introduction of the missiles had resulted in the loss of 270 Soviet aircraft in the past year, estimated to have cost about $2.5 billion. The losses of air crews were also significant.

A Stinger missile in the field.

Source: Jane's Weapon Systems

BY JOELLEN MURPHY—THE WASHINGTON POST

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Factfile

Area: 260,000 square miles (647,500 square km.)
Population: 18 million (including nearly 3 million refugees who have fled to Iran and Pakistan)
Capital: Kabul (Pop. soared to est. 2 million)
Bordering Countries: Pakistan (south and east), Iran (west), Soviet Union (north), and People's Republic of China (northeast)

Time Zone: GMT +4.5

Climate: Extremely hot, dry summer days; cold nights; cold winters with moderate rain and snow in the mountains, scanty rain in the plains, strong winds and dust storms throughout year

Official Languages: Pushto and Dari (a Persian dialect)
Other Tongues: Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluchi, and Pashai

Ethnic Background: Tribes identify themselves on the basis of languages—Pushtuns (Afghans), Hayars and Tajiks (Dari speaking), Uzbeks, Turkmen and Chahar Aimaqs.

Religions: Sunni Islam (87%), Shiite Islam (12%)

Commercial Products: Dried fruit, nuts, natural gas, lambkins, raw cotton, wool, carpets, grain, textiles, and coal

Trading Partners: U.S.S.R., Japan, Pakistan, India, United Kingdom and West Germany

Currency: Afghani (56 = U.S. $1.00)

Former Political Status: British Protectorate (1837-1919)
Chief of State: Dr. Mohamed Najibulla, President of the Revolutionary Council

Head of Government: Prime Minister and President of the Council of Ministers, Sultan Ali Kishimand

National Flag: Plain red field with golden emblem in the upper corner next to the hoist.

Winter/Spring 1988
Testimony of a Russian Soldier

Recently a tape containing an interview with an unnamed Soviet soldier who had just returned from Afghanistan was smuggled to the West from the Soviet Baltic Republic of Estonia. The interview was published in Izekiri, an Estonian-language samizdat (underground) publication. Following are translated excerpts of the interview.

Q. How do you estimate the size of our army in Afghanistan?
A. I've heard from the officers that the figure is about 150,000, but a part of the army is not Russian. When we were sent to guard the main road between Kabul and Jalalabad, those who escorted our trucks were Bulgarians.

Q. What about the regular Afghan Army?
A. Those I saw were old men, illiterate semi-idots. We were together in so-called "friendly joint-actions". That meant that some inefficient, inactive remnants of their army joined us in order to learn (how to fight). They hung around us and were completely useless during operations. They only annoyed us, but they were very enthusiastic. When we escorted their trucks to some actions, we were also joined by their People's Militia unit. All of them were old men, even grandfathers; all wearing their turbans and long wild beards. We couldn't understand what kind of an army that was.

Q. How close were you to normal Afghan life?
A. Once we escorted a Russian geological expedition; their engineers were looking for minerals there. We also protected Afghan vans transporting gas and food. And we frequently accompanied civil servants; they are easily distinguished from other people by their dress. The peasants in the villages hate them. Ordinary Afghans are dressed awfully, they wear a kind of very thick blanket made out of dark-colored cotton, and they wear it day and night. They also use these blankets as tablecloths or rugs on which they display their goods for sale in the street. They sleep in them and pray on them. The civil servants' style of dress thus puts these people off. They are considered strangers and outsiders among their own people.

Q. How did these civil servants treat the Soviet soldiers?
A. We had very limited contact with them. I personally had the impression that they saw us as some kind of protective force. They were never hostile towards us because they realized that they could not last long without us.

Q. How often were you in action against the Afghan guerrillas?
A. The situation of our army there was often really terribly unclear. It was difficult to say who was a partisan fighting against his country's aggressors and who was a bandit torturing our prisoners of war. There were places we did not dare to go, because the Afghan rebels occupied strong positions and were well equipped. It is not possible for me to assess the general situation there, but I can say that our military operations were very often limited because of the Afghan partisans' fierce fight for freedom against us.

Q. You call them "freedom fighters"?
A. When I was there, we never called them that. It would have been dan-
dangerous, because we didn’t trust each other. We wouldn’t dare admit that they were freedom fighters because then, who were we? But now, back home, I know they are freedom fighters.

**Q. What kind of arms did they have?**

**A.** The Mujahidin were equipped with old rifles and Russian Kalashnikov machine-guns and submachine-guns. Some of their units had American and Egyptian automatic weapons.

**Q. How did they get Russian Kalashnikovs?**

**A.** They attacked our military bases and took them from my dead comrades. Some weapons they simply bought from the peasants. Ironically, these were our weapons. Often, regular Afghan soldiers exchanged their Russian arms for American and Egyptian automatic weapons.

**Q. Did you have a problem spending your free time?**

**A.** We tried to rest every minute of our free time. That suited our commanding officers too, because when we were resting they felt more relaxed. They could stop thinking about us and drink vodka. Drinking was their relaxation. There were no movies and no books to read. Once, in Kabul, a concert was organized for us. I attended, but without much enthusiasm.

**Q. Who were the performers?**

**A.** The Russian rock band “Blue Guitars”. I was expecting to be discharged within a few months and this made me feel desperate. I was terribly envious of the musicians and angry with them. The problem was not their music, but the thought that they would return to Moscow to a peaceful, quiet and wonderful life.

**Q. Did you try drugs?**

**A.** No, I’m not interested. I was lucky, because I don’t smoke or drink, so I didn’t depend on such things. Some soldiers got hashish and other drugs from the peasants. Our Asian soldiers were very often drug addicts because hash and other such things grow on their land.

**Q. Were there frequent attacks on Soviet bases?**

**A.** Yes, not only on our bases, but on our civil administration offices. They blew us up and attacked us with our own weapons. Sometimes they kidnapped our administrative people and took them hostage.

**Q. How did you operate against suspect villages?**

**A.** We were ordered to shoot every suspect. But all men were suspect because they were all fit and able to fight. Especially suspect were those who wore the yazshah (veil). Normally only women wear them, but men are also allowed to do so. A covered face was therefore considered a ploy to hide one’s identity, and they were shot. If a suspect village was very small and had resisted us, we were given orders to kill everyone we could find. Afghan villages are very densely populated. The houses are all attached to each other and the whole village is like a labyrinth built of clay. Houses are single-story homes with yards inside. You never knew what was around the next corner and you had to shoot first. Before entering a yard or street, you had to deliver a volley of machine-gun fire. I doubt whether (any such) village ever recovered. The villages that survived (the attack) were those which had groups of Mujahidin resisting fiercely until we were pushed back. After such operations we became completely wild and started looting. Some of us turned sadists: we lost our minds. We screamed to rouse our morale to justify ourselves. It was some kind of ecstasy when we could not think and were just shooting and shooting.

**Q. What do you think about the occupation of Afghanistan? When you were there as a Russian soldier, how did you see our position?**

**A.** In Afghanistan we were in a desperate situation and we didn’t think about such things. I may be wrong, but now I think we are the occupying force. I think about this more and more.

**Q. Do you think the Mujahidin can win?**

**A.** They are steel-willed. It is very difficult to break their will. I think they will resist until they are all wiped out. That is why the war in Afghanistan is so murderous.
Continued from page 9
now told about the scale of the fighting and the tension, danger and difficulties involved in pursuing a war against guerrillas in a land of dubious loyalties. However, no criticism of the Soviet role in Afghanistan was tolerated and all mention of casualties was avoided. Soviet forces, the press explained, were in for a long haul because of the unrelenting interference in Afghanistan’s affairs by the United States and Pakistan, which were arming and sheltering the Afghan resistance.

Increasingly, attempts were made to popularize the war by portraying it not only as an intervention on behalf of a Socialist ally, but as an extension of the defense of the motherland. Internationalist duty continued to be fostered, and analogies with the Second World War became more frequent. But the emphasis subtly shifted to patriotic virtues and military traditions. The army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda wrote in 1985: “The sons are following in their fathers’ footsteps. Their hearts are filled with readiness to accomplish exploits with loyalty to the heroic traditions.”

The Soviet media thus continued to present only the news the Kremlin saw fit to print. The military aspect of the war still remained off limits to critics and inquisitive journalists. There have as yet been no questions asked in the press about the origins of the war and why it has taken Soviet military might so long to subdue the “Afghan counterrevolutionaries.” Nor was there any mention of demoralization among Soviet troops, drug abuse, desertion to the enemy, and the impact of Soviet casualties. The Kremlin still refused to divulge the number of dead and wounded. The United States State Department’s most conservative estimates, however, disclosed that the one million Soviet soldiers who had served in Afghanistan since the invasion in 1979, suffered some 35,000 casualties, more than 12,000 of them deaths. These figures did not include the many soldiers killed by disease or stung by scorpions.

There also was no admission of the large-scale atrocities committed by Soviet troops against the Afghan population. Soviet citizens who listened to Western radio stations heard that the Red Army’s brutal methods had been exposed abroad and condemned by individuals and organizations, ranging from Soviet deserters to the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Soviet sensitivity on this score was shown when Komsomolskaya Pravda published a vitriolic attack on foreign “falsifiers and forgers who are fabricating stories and photographs about alleged Soviet crimes in Afghanistan.”

Afghan Glasnost

As selective glasnost on the Afghan theme slightly lowered the wall of propaganda and secrecy, certain issues that until then had been taboo for the Soviet media were brought to the surface. After pretending for years that the intervention in Afghanistan had the full understanding and wholehearted support of the Soviet population, the media now began acknowledging that the war had not been all that popular at home, and that not everyone had accepted the official line; it revealed the existence of widespread dissatisfaction and division among the population. Slowly, such openness was broadened to include some discussions of popular attitudes towards the war as well as criticism of the slanted way in which it had been depicted in the past.

Outspoken criticism then focused on draft dodging by the offspring of high officials. In a letter to the Ukrainian Komsomol daily Molod Ukrainy, S. Berezovska, the mother of two draftees, charged that a disproportionate burden of the fighting had been placed on the offspring of the workers. “There are no children of officials (in Afghanistan),” she complained. Other mothers publicly wondered why the sons of top party leaders had escaped service in Afghanistan, suggesting that the war would have been over long before, if the officials’ children were dying there too.

The Afghanis Plea

The bitterness of a great many of the half a million Afghan veterans, most of them young draftees from the European regions of the USSR, started seeping out in letters to the newspapers. Not until the beginning of 1986 did the Soviet media reluctantly admit, however, that some wounded and disabled Afghans, as the Afghan veterans had come to be known, were encountering bureaucratic indifference. It became increasingly evident that most veterans who had served in Afghani-
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stan." Humiliated by such treatment and by their disabilities in a society that tends to hide its invalids, some of them sought refuge in special sanitariums rather than return to their families.

**Drunkenness and Drug Addiction**

In another parallel with American soldiers who had served in Vietnam, some Soviet veterans have become victims of drunkenness and drug addiction while fighting in Afghanistan. Alienated by the indifference of their compatriots at home, and given to despair brought on by service in an unpopular, seemingly endless war, the soldiers had turned to alcohol and drugs. Opium and hashish were not forbidden in Afghanistan and heroin was therefore easily obtainable in Kabul bazaars. Soviet servicemen, especially natives of Asian republics, who had dabbled in drugs at home, found it easy to exchange Soviet military gear or trade arms for drugs. Quite a few veterans thus returned from Afghanistan addicted to heroin.

him to seek the company of comrades in arms. The Afghantsi first organized small veterans' groups to discuss the wounds of war and swap war stories. They sponsored sharpshooting matches and jeep-driving contests, taught karate and boxing to students approaching draft age, provided moral and financial support for war widows, and raised money to build monuments to fallen soldiers.

Yet some battle-hardened Afghantsi had come home imbued with revolutionary zeal and full of aggressive energy. Contempestuous of the life they had returned to, they wanted to make matters into their own hands and purge society of undesirable elements, even if this meant breaking the law. Many felt that the police were not doing enough to maintain order. Some joined vigilante gangs that harassed and beat up suspected criminals and non-conformists. These superpatriots, who had become accustomed to solving problems with fists and Kalashnikovs, now wanted to remake civilian life to operate military style. They were soon blamed for beatings and drunken rampages, and for vigilante-style attacks on hippies and youngsters who did not conform to their standards of patriotic behavior.

On January 8, 1986, Komsomolskaya Pravda published an account of one such group of Afghantsi in Togliatti. The veterans there had become disgusted with the "anti-social behavior" they saw around them and formed a vigilante squad, waging their own private war against "money-grubbers and scroungers," whom they dubbed contras. Komsomolskaya Pravda warned the young zealots about the consequences of taking the law into their own hands, yet treated them sympathetically. "The Afghantsi," the newspaper explained apologetically, "undergo a revolutionary purification in Afghanistan, and therefore see the world through a powerful filter that brings out moral distinctions."

The press tended to focus on Afghantsi who believed their battle experience had made them morally superior to the people around them. But the media's constant boosting of the veterans as role models won the former soldiers no friends. Calls for the establishment of separate veterans' organizations for the Afghantsi thus fell on deaf ears. Even the local Komsomol organizations were reluctant to help set up Afghanistan veterans' clubs.

**The Komsomol Offensive**

The privately-organized Afghantsi groups that had sprung up spontaneously around the country were quickly becoming an embarrassment and a potential rival to the Komsomol, the Communist Youth League, which had virtually ignored the veterans for more than seven years.

Realizing the threatening domestic impact of the war and the dangerous precedent of veterans groups organizing outside the party framework, the Komsomol decided to assert its control over the discontented Afghantsi, or as they put it, "channel and guide them back into constructive directions," by attempting to reincorporate them into the fold. Last November, the Komsomol called a national meeting of all such known Afghan veterans' groups in Ashkhabad, capital of the Central Asian Republic of Turkmenia.

Dressed in battle fatigue, 2000 be-medalled reservists, most of them de-leges of independent Afghantsi groups, debated the merits of joining the Komsomol. The gathering somewhat resembled a convention of Vietnam veterans and hardened Soldiers of Fortune gathered in Nevada. They argued that traditional party bureaucracy would dilute their purpose, but when the Komsomol

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Sri Lanka today is a witches cauldron," recently commented a Western observer. "Blood and venom are added daily into the original poison of religious-racial loathing emanating from both the minority Tamils and the majority Sinhalese."

The government of 81-year-old ailing President Junius Richard Jayewardene finds itself in the unenviable position of having to restrain and appease rival Hindu ethnic groups wishing to secede, while hosting the armed forces of a neighboring sovereign state fighting its battle, and worst of all, containing radical Buddhist factions that terrorize Colombo, killing moderate government leaders who advocate negotiations and limited local autonomy.

Sri Lanka's most difficult domestic problem, inherited by President Jayewardene's United National Party (UNP), from its predecessor governments, was posed by the grievances and aspirations of the minority Tamil community. Since the early 1970s, militant Tamil youths, disgruntled with the inability of the traditional political leaders of their community to secure what they regarded as legitimate political and economic rights within a united Sri Lanka, have sought through violent means to create a separate Tamil state in the Northern and Eastern Provinces where Tamils predominate. The militants, consisting of six major Marxist groups and 37 smaller ones commonly referred to as "Tamil Tigers," have grown steadily in strength.

Severe communal violence, which for years had remained dormant just beneath a surface of fiery rhetoric, finally erupted in Colombo and Sinhalese-majority areas in late July 1983. After 13 soldiers were ambushed and killed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) activists near Jaffna, Sinhalese rioted in Colombo and Kandy, torturing and killing some 400 people, mostly Tamils, while arson gutted 50,000 Tamil homes. The LTTE Tigers later continued to use terrorist tactics, such as assassinations of government officials, politicians associated with the administration, and alleged informants, in pursuit of their objectives, but have also demonstrated a growing capacity to mount military operations against targets such as government facilities, police stations and military installations.

Throughout 1984, attacks by Tamil terrorists have grown in frequency and severity. By Spring 1985, violence had become endemic throughout the northern one-third of the country and had affected large areas of the east as well. The situation was further complicated in April, when a Tamil-Muslim conflict broke out in the Eastern Province. Riots there resulted in numerous deaths, 40,000 homeless, and widespread property damage. Sri Lanka's Armed
Forces, which had never before faced prolonged combat, were unprepared for the task of putting down an incipient, communal insurgency. Acts of indiscipline and revenge by the security forces against the civilian population in Tamil areas thus seriously exacerbated the problem.

The communal conflict in the Eastern Province was topped on May 15 by a Tamil attack on the sacred Sinhalese city of Anuradhapura which killed 120 persons. Fearing civil war, the government and the Tamils agreed on direct negotiations. A cease-fire took effect June 18, and representatives of the Colombo Administration and all Tamil factions met for the first time in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan, on July 8. The dialogue, aimed at finding a compromise formula which would provide some autonomy for the Tamil minority within a unified Sri Lanka, ended in disarray when the intransigent Tamils walked out.

Pax Sri Lanka: the Hindu view of the July peace agreement.

In the early months of 1986 it had become obvious that Sri Lanka was in a virtual state of civil war. Each of the two parties was determined to attain their contradictory goals: the Sinhalese leadership to reassert their domination of the entire country, the Tamils to express their separate cultural identity in political terms. The lack of communication was as critical as the Sinhalese custom of nodding the head up and down for “no,” while moving it from side to side for “yes.”

In the summer of 1987, after four years of civil conflict pitting Buddhist against Hindu, the Indian prime minister of neighboring India, flew to Colombo to sign a peace accord with the Buddhist Sri Lankan President Junius R. Jayewardene. The pact aimed to stop the slaughter and end the strife that had claimed 7,000 Sri Lankan lives. Responding to Tamil demands for a homeland, Jayewardene agreed that Sri Lanka’s largely Tamil Northern and Eastern provinces would be united under one semiautonomous elected regional council. And in return for a rebel cease-fire, the Sri Lankan Army would pull back from territo-

1987 - January 24: Tamil militants declare unofficial self-imposed administration in Northern Province; abort autonomy attempt following government embargo.
- February: SLAF sweeps West Coast Mannar area; seizes principal guerrilla base camp; controls central districts; Jaffna Peninsula remains last major insurgent stronghold.
- April 17 (Holy Friday): Tamil Tigers ambush bus of Sinhalese holiday travelers on jungle road in Trincomalee district; massacre Buddhist monks, gun down 127, injure scores.
- April 21: Car bomb explodes at bus station on Gassawork Street in Colombo during rush hour; leaves 110 killed and more injured; both EROS and LTTE Tigers claim responsibility.
- Sinhalese youth riot; Police establish curfew in Colombo; shoot 15 civilians in Wavel; killing spree leaves 285 dead in six days on both sides.
- April 22: SLAF barricades itself in Fort of Jaffna and a dozen camps in peninsula; four Air Force fighter planes pound guerrilla strongholds, killing 80 rebels and civilians.
- May: Sinhalese demonstrators demand Prime Minister Jayewardene resign.
- SLAF launches Liberation I Spring Offensive in Tamil areas with two brigades; LTTE Tigers concentrate forces in Jaffna.
- June: India and Sri Lanka initiate secret talks on Tamil issue through diplomatic intermediaries. Colombo reluctantly agrees to consider Tamil self-rule and grant autonomy to de facto Tamil state created by linking Northern and Eastern Provinces; India promises to impose settlement on rebels.
- SLAF Liberation II offensive to secure remainder of Jaffna Peninsula canceled.
- July 15: Negotiations continue in Colombo with Indian High Commissioner, Ambassador J.N. Dixit; Indian observers allowed into rebel Tamil territory to assess situation.
- July 28: Sinhalese JVP riot to sabotage peace initiative; security forces shoot rioters; 35 killed; curfew imposed again.
- LTTE Tigers launch attack on Sinhalese villages, burning and pillaging; 60 people killed.
- July 29: Jayewardene and Gandhi sign Tamil peace treaty in Colombo.
- July 30: Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) contingent of 1,700 men arrive in Sri Lanka to police treaty.
  - After 75-minute meeting with Rajiv Gandhi, LTTE Tigers leader Prabakaran, agrees to accept terms of treaty.
- August 1: Cease-fire goes into effect on all fronts; SLAF withdraws to barracks.
- IPKF takes over SLAF positions; begins dismantling minefields in Jaffna Peninsula.
- August 2: Tamil guerrillas of all organizations reluctantly start surrendering arms to Indian Army.
- August 4: LTTE Tiger leader Prabakaran formally ratifies pact.

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Indian soldiers of the Peacekeeping Force (PAK) in the Jaffna Peninsula carrying their dead.

Tamil Struggle for Autonomy
A Chronology

This chronology of events illustrates the struggle for Tamil autonomy and outlines the efforts of the Sri Lankan Government to quell the communal insurgency, prevent a division of the island and oppose the establishment of a separate Hindu Tamil Eelam (homeland) within the Sinhalese Buddhist nation.
Tamil Tigers: The Terror Network in Sri Lanka

By March 1988, as many as 45 Tamil and Sinhalese insurgent organizations have been identified in Sri Lanka. Five major Marxist guerrilla groups dominate the Tamil separatist movement while two terrorist groups are leading the Sinhalese extremists. Both entities have forced most of the splinter groups to give in to their authority.

Tamil Organizations

Guerrilla Groups:

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) - BACKGROUND: Originally founded in 1972 as the Tamil New Tigers (TNT). Took the defeat of 1976, the organization is commonly known as the Tamil Tigers. LEADERSHIP: Created by Velupillai Prabhakaran, and presently led by Commander "Kittu". Outlawed in 1978. STRENGTH: Estimated by Western observers to number 2500 to 3000 men; claims 2500 to 5000 armed guerrillas. POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Marxist with Leninist infrastructure (Central Committee and Politbureau); organized into a political and military wing. POLITICAL GOALS: Calls for People's War to establish a Socialist Tamil Eelam (homeland) in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. ALLIANCES: In April 1985 joined Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) created exactly a year earlier by EROS, EPRLF and TELO, commonly called the Three Star Group (see below), but withdrew one year later in the aftermath of bloody confrontations with TELO. MILITARY GOALS AND TACTICS: Engages in widespread terror and assassination. Carried out a number of massacres, the most prominent being in May 14, 1985 attack on the Buddhist holy city of Anuradhapura where nearly 150 civilians were slaughtered. Inactive in Tamil areas throughout the island, especially in the northern Jaffna Peninsula. Formed Black Tigers as specialized commandos in 1988. ARMS: Soviet and Chinese automatic rifles, light machine guns, mortars and RPG-7 grenade launchers; homemade ammunition and explosives.

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) - BACKGROUND: Commonly known as the Revolutionary Students. LEADERSHIP: Run by a Revolutionary Council under General Secretary V. Balakumar. STRENGTH: Claims 1000 to 1500 followers organized in both urban terrorist cells and rural guerrilla units. POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Marxist-Leninist. POLITICAL GOALS: Same as Tamil Tigers. ALLIANCES: Close but wary partnership with LTTE. MILITARY GOALS AND TACTICS: Active in both North and East. Heavy rural guerrilla movement in Batticaloa sector. Recently stepped up efforts to infiltrate Tamil population of hill country in central Sri Lanka. ARMS: Possesses smaller quantities of Soviet and Chinese arms; shares underground munitions facilities with LTTE; has some home-made factories of its own. Concentrates weapons arsenals in Batticaloa.

Eelam Liberation Organization (TELOR) - BACKGROUND: Offshoot of the militant Tamil Youth Front (TYF), created in 1974. LEADERSHIP: Sri Sabaratnam, its longtime leader, was killed together with several hundred of his men in heavy fighting with the Tamil Tigers in Jaffna during May 1986. STRENGTH: Decimated by heavy inflicting losses and crippled by mass arrests, it now has 2500 to 3000 men left. Presently attempting to mobilize the population, setting up district and village committees to flush out new recruits. POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Marxist. POLITICAL GOALS: Prior to the July 1983 anti-Tamil riots, had political links with Sinhalese Marxist insurgents. Close ties with India's civilian intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) which financed, armed and trained TELO. Until New Delhi imposed peace on all sides in the conflict, TELO willingly accepted directions from the RAW. ALLIANCES: Member of ENLF guerrilla Three Star Group. MILITARY GOALS AND TACTICS: Regrouped under one banner, it has fresh forces in the field. Operates mainly in Jaffna and Trincomalee area. ARMS: Imported Soviet, East European and Chinese small arms, ammunition, explosives and mines.

Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) - BACKGROUND: Emerged out of the London-based General Union of Eelam Students (GUES) in mid-1981. LEADERSHIP: Founded and led by K. Pathmanaban. STRENGTH: Estimated at 15000. POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Marxist. Noted for its dogmatism. POLITICAL GOALS: Creation of independent Tamil People's Eelam. ALLIANCES: Member of ENLF guerrilla alliance, the Three Star Group. MILITARY GOALS AND TACTICS: The organization's military wing, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had strong ties with Said Hameed, the London representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). PLA made arrangement to train cadres in PLO camps in Lebanon and Syria; students would participate in combat missions against Israeli Defense Forces. First achieved prominence in July 1984, when it kidnapped an American couple working for USAID. ARMS: Possesses large quantities of Soviet and Chinese small arms, machine guns, mortars, RPGs and demolition equipment supplied by PLO, Syria, Libya and India.

People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) - BACKGROUND: Created in 1980 as a breakaway group from Tamil Tigers, apparently due to personal differences between its two leaders over a woman. LEADERSHIP: Still commanded by its original creator Uma Maheswaran. STRENGTH: 8000 to 10000 members. POLITICAL ORIENTATION: Marxist-Leninist. Developed Communist infrastructures and united political-military chain of command under a Central Committee headed by a Comrade PoliticaL GOALS: Creation of independent Tamil Socialist People's Republic. Main...
The Armed Forces in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka Security Forces:

Sri Lanka Army (SLA) - BACKGROUND: The Sri Lankan armed forces were not always an efficient fighting unit. In July 1983, when the Tamil insurgency movement was still limited, government troops numbered only 11,500 poorly armed, undisciplined soldiers, grouped in one infantry regiment (4 battalions). Most of the military being Sinhalese (less than 5 percent of the soldiers and 3 percent of the officers were Tamil), they saw themselves as cast adrift in a hostile sea of Tamils, whose language they could not speak, whose customs they did not share, and who knew where mines were being buried and when ambushes were being planned. The government denied that retaliatory action and inactivity, but there was a definite hostile attitude toward the Tamil population whose hearts and minds the military sought to win. Anger and inexperience thus resulted in excesses. In early 1984, the government was forced to disband almost an entire battalion when discipline broke down in the aftermath of punishments meted out to 400 soldiers who had massacr ed civilians. Only a few remaining unit members were combined with another regular battalion. LEADERSHIP: To make the military into an effective fighting force, Colombo brought Lieutenant General Cyril Ranatunga out of retirement in September 1985. He would conduct the war through a Joint Operations Command (JOC). A Sandhurst graduate, General Ranatunga had served during the 1971 Sinhalese insurrection as Coordinating Officer and later commanded government forces in Jaffna. He had retired from the army in 1983. STRENGTH: The small pre-war force was reorganized substantially from 23,000 men in 1985 to more than 50,000 at the beginning of 1988. At present it is comprised of 16 battalions representing four infantry regiments, and supporting units, a commando regiment, two artillery regiments, and one armored reconnaissance regiment. Among the first priorities of the new SLAF was the restoration of discipline and esprit de corps which was as dispirited by continued savagings in the press as it was by circle movements in the field. A fresh leadership was also brought to the fore, when 1000 junior officers were sent to Pakistan for training. Senior officers took strategy courses and completed command schools in Israel. ARMIS: Pakistan and Israel supplied new weapons. China also provided arms and equipment, as did private dealers in Belgium, Germany and Singapore. Eastern European countries offered to sell the same but were refused. South African armored personnel carriers and heavy artillery were purchased due to the similarity between the geographic conditions of the two areas of conflict. DEFENSE BUDGET: The military budget in 1983 came to $66 million. In 1985 it had risen to $325 million. Estimates for 1987-88 put anticipated defense expenditure at $1.5 billion, approximately half the total projected budget of Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) - STRENGTH: A force of 3500 men and 37 aircraft, which include 14 trainers, 11 transports, and 12 helicopters. Aircraft operate primarily from Katunayaka, Trincomalee, Ratmalana, and Sigiriya. For support of ground forces, SLAF employs Cessna 357s and Italian Siai Marchettis.

Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) - BACKGROUND: A force of some 3000 men. ARMIS: Thirty-eight rapid patrol boats defending the island's coastline, one yard and service craft and six auxiliary tactical support ships. The primary naval bases are in Colombo, Trincomalee, Tangalla, and Kalpitiya.

Foreign Advisors:

Israeli Intelligence Experts - BACKGROUND: In March 1984, in an attempt to upgrade its civil and military intelligence apparatus, Colombo decided to employ foreign intelligence experts. Israel was depended on the basis of its vast technical, and diplomatic relations with Jerusalem had been suspended under Prime Minister Shira Bandaranaike's leftist government. The PLO and its related movements, which ironically were backing the Tamil revolt.

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Tamil Autonomy

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- August 6: Colombo declares amnesty for all political prisoners.
- August 18: Jayewardene attacked by Sinhalese JVP extremists with automatic fire and hand grenades inside Parliament building; President escapes assassination attempt unscathed; National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali gravely injured; both JVP and PPM claim responsibility.
- September: Sri Lanka Navy intercepts boat stacked with arms and ammunition on way from India to Jaffna; apprehends occupants, LTTE Tigers' Jaffna Commander Kumaran and 16 guerrillas; Army arranges their transfer to Colombo to stand trial for violating circumvent agreement; 17 Tigers swallow cyanide capsules.
- Suicides prompt orgy of bloodshed; LTTE Tigers massacre more than 200 Sinhalese villagers in Eastern Province.
- October 2: LTTE Tigers stop handing over arms to Indian Army; decide to continue fighting for "sacred soil"; concentrate forces in Jaffna peninsula.
- October 9: IPKF launches offensive against Tamil guerrillas; loses 100 men first day; destroys villages around Baticaloa.
- October 13: 250 Tamil rebels killed, 1000 injured.
- October 28: IPKF contingent rapidly increases to 30,000; elite units thrown into battle.
- November: IPKF severs entire Jaffna Peninsula; 200 Indian troops killed and 700 wounded.
- Parliament passes bill granting Tamil local autonomy in Northern and Eastern Provinces.
- December: Former Indian movie star Manmohan Gopalan, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, who backed Rajiv Gandhi's intervention in Sri Lanka, dies in Madras; India's 52 million Tamils protest massacre of Sri Lankan brothers by Indian soldiers.

1988

January: LTTE forms Black Tigers suicide commandos.
- January 24-30: Jayewardene holds series of conferences with Gandhi on civil war in Tamil areas, beef-up of Pak contingent, upcoming local elections in Northern Province, and Referendum in Eastern territories.
- February: Pak forces reach 42,000 men; Their casualties reach 750 dead and over 1500 wounded.
- March: Tamil Tigers intensify opposition to Pak; fight jungle guerrilla war in Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Torn Jaffna Peninsula only hours after the agreement was signed. They were the vanguard of a force that would eventually number 50,000 men.

The pact ran into prompt resistance as thousands of Sinhalese went on a rampage, burning and looting Tamil properties. At least 60 people were killed by security forces called in to put down the rioting. Gandhi himself came under attack as he inspected a Sri Lankan honor guard, when a hostile Sinhalese sailor bruised him with a rifle-butt blow.

Domestic political problems had weighed heavily in Jayewardene's decision to compromise. He was increasingly worried that fighting was undermining the economy, devouring the national budget and scaring off tourists and investors. Public animosity toward the accord brought fresh problems. But Jayewardene's Sinhalese critics saw Gandhi's role, and that of his Indian troops, as a dangerous interference in Sri Lankan affairs.

Tamil rebel leader Velupillai Prabhakaran did not sign the settlement either. It fell too short of Tamil independence, he indicated, and one of its provisions would permit the Eastern Province eventually to opt out of the Tamil region. Prabhakaran's LTTE Tigers decided to carry on fighting, even with Indian troops stationed in Jaffna. That Indian presence on Sri Lankan soil would ultimately also provoke the Sinhalese into violence on a scale unmatched during the last four years.

Towards the end of 1987, the LTTE Tigers' attempt to precipitate an exodus of Sinhalese from the East brought them into conflict with the Indian Peacekeeping Force (PKF). After bloody fighting, the Indian forces took the northern key city of Jaffna. The Tamil Tigers retreated into jungle hideouts for more hit-and-run attacks. Their logic now claimed that it was better to perish in a great Gotterdammerung than to compromise. Tragically, the mostly moderate Tamil people had little say in the framing of such nihilistic strategy. They were taken along strictly for the ride.

The heavy casualties inflicted on the Indian army, some 700 troops killed and almost 1200 maimed and wounded, led to increased Indian demands for a troop pullout. But India was committed to guaranteeing peace and the PKF stayed on.

By the Spring of 1988, the Tigers' demand for a separate Hindu homeland was rivalled by the chauvinist call for a Sinhala Buddhist nation. Both communities rejected a pluralist approach to solving the ethnic problem. The Sinhalese in the South, represented by the militant Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which had violently opposed the accord and had caused the deaths of many a politician in recent months, was gaining support among the have-nots. Disgruntled students, Buddhist monks, and poorly paid army privates were recruited by the JVP, the latter providing access to weapons. The Sinhalese were now getting ready to wage an all-out guerilla war in the south, and possibly isolate Colombo.

The future seemed bleak. Yet United States and Western aid kept the cash lines open. The aid consortia, previously under pressure to halt funds until peace with the Tamils was negotiated, contin-
used to provide political and economic support—short of military aid—to ensure that external, anti-western forces do not move in.

With the intensification of the Tamil separatist insurgency, heightened by urban terrorism and rural guerrilla war, the United States had no problem recognizing India’s claim that Sri Lanka was within its regional sphere of influence, and saw no threat in New Delhi’s direct military involvement. The State Department considered Rajiv Gandhi’s present-day involvement in Third World countries espouse than was Indira Gandhi’s government when India had been a valuable Soviet ally in the late 1970s. For this reason, Washington felt confident that Gandhi’s peace accord proposals were sincere and that the presence of the Indian Army in Sri Lanka was indeed temporary.

Washington now limited itself to repeated calls on Tamil militants to lay down their weapons and come to a negotiated settlement “under a united Sri Lanka”, while pledging its support to the Jayewardene Administration and promising to help rebuild the country after the violence subsided. Robert Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, periodically reiterated the warning that a military solution to the struggle of Tamil separatism was unlikely. Yet the Reagan Administration saw the establishment of a Marxist Tamil state as a step backward that would constitute a destabilizing force in the region. It therefore viewed Sri Lanka as “proof to other developing countries of the efficacy of the political and economic system which we advocate.”

What role did the United States play in the island’s political quagmire? Washington’s stake in the strife was clear. Jayewardene had proved a staunch friend of the United States, supporting an American naval presence in the Indian Ocean, accepting the return of 70 Peace Corps volunteers after an absence of 13 years, and renewing the 1951 Voice of America agreement, permitting the VOA to upgrade and modernize its radio transmitting facilities on the island. Economic aid would thus be forthcoming.

For years American diplomats could do no more than monitor the strife in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Then, in 1977, US interests received an unexpected boost when Jayewardene’s United National Front won a decisive electoral victory over the leftist opposition leader, Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Western diplomats had feared all along that Mrs. Bandaranaike’s rabid socialism and anti-American stance, coupled with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s pro-Soviet foreign policy, would create a bleak picture for American influence in South Asia. But Washington was delighted as Jayewardene, a staunch anti-communist, promised to promote foreign investment, support accelerated economic development and establish a free-trade zone in Sri Lanka.

Jayewardene’s Administration had inherited a faltering economy. In the first three decades of independence, successive socialist governments had pursued generous social welfare policies, diverting a large share of resources into free or subsidized education, medical care, food, energy, and transportation services. As a result, Sri Lanka’s adult literacy rate (87%), life expectancy at birth (68.9 years), and other social indicators were indeed high compared to those of other developing countries, resulting in a high standard of living and strong human resource base, despite a low per capita income. However, the diversion of resources away from productive investment, and the steady intrusion of government into all aspects of economic activity, eventually led to supply shortages, unemployment, and economic stagnation.

Colombo technocrats thus received a mandate to get the economy moving. The new government launched a broad program of economic reforms aimed at loosening and later removing the structure of government controls, allowing freer play to market forces, reducing consumer subsidies, stimulating more rapid economic growth of the private sector, and providing employment and production incentives. In contrast to previous governments, the new leadership emphasized foreign trade and encouraged foreign investment.

Jayewardene sought to meet his ambitious economic and development goals through market-oriented policies. He created an Investment Promotion Zone, a free-trade area aimed at attracting foreign investment and expanding nontraditional exports. His free-market philosophy brought about several years of rapid economic growth. Annual real growth averaged 6-7% during the first seven years, compared with 3% during the same period in the 1970s. (Recorded growth dipped to 5% during the 1983 ethnoterrorist period that scared away tourists, whose hard currency provided a major income for the Sri Lankan economy.) Unemployment fell from well over 20% to an estimated 12% in 1984, though it soared again when civil war erupted.

To finance development, Sri Lanka had incurred repeated budget and balance-of-payments deficits, which in turn had generated inflationary pressures and a growing external debt burden. The Government then focused its monetary and fiscal policies on improved management to reduce these imbalances. However, this task was complicated, first by the July 1983 communal disturbances, and subsequently by the growing Tamil insurgency in the North and East. Particularly sensitive to these problems were foreign investors and the tourist industry, an increasingly important source of foreign exchange earnings.

Sri Lanka’s trade structure reflected its continued reliance on traditional plantation exports. Through centuries of colonial rule, the island had achieved fame for its spices and plantation crops. Later, tea, rubber, and coconuts were introduced on a large scale and soon became pillars of the economy, accounting

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The Savage Emperor

The Rise and Fall of Jean-Bedel Bokassa

BY BEHNAM DAYANIM

Jean-Bedel Bokassa, former President of the Central African Republic and later self-crowned Emperor, was ousted by a French-led coup in 1979, and forced into Paris exile. He voluntarily returned to the CAR last year to stand trial for mass murder, the embezzlement of his country's treasury and cannibalism. His catalog of atrocities was exceeded only by Idi Amin Dada, former President of Uganda, and Mobutu Sese Seke, former dictator of Zaire. Having assassinated dozens of his advisors, tortured and massacred his political opponents, eaten the heart, liver and flesh of his personal enemies, clubbed to death demonstrating schoolchildren, and poisoned his various-year-old grandson, Bokassa made the Most Infamous Rulers List by sponsoring Central African "Killing Fields" and becoming one of the three grandes monstres of post-colonial French Africa.

Perhaps no statesman captures the essence and excesses of modern African politics more than Jean Bedel Bokassa, the deposed emperor of the former Central African Empire, now Republic (CAR). Accused of tyranny, megalomania and decadence, the self-proclaimed monarch had nonetheless commanded the intense loyalty of hundreds of thousands of his subjects during a 14-year reign of terror, and according to many, continues to do so today. Considered by some Western observers to have been little more than a French puppet of whose excesses the Quai d'Orsay eventually grew weary, Bokassa indulged in a variety of lavish displays of opulence, including a largely French-financed coronation ceremony reminiscent of the one held by Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte nearly a century and a half earlier.

The circumstances surrounding Bokassa's rule and ultimate overthrow provided limitless opportunities for speculation and analysis in the attempt to derive some logical reason for his acts. French West Africa had long been considered within the French Commonwealth sphere of influence. The CAR has received vast amounts of economic and military aid from Paris and had enjoyed the benefits of extensive private and public investment. French subsidies in the 1980s had made up two-thirds of CAR's yearly budget. The memory of President Charles de Gaulle was revered by villagers in the most remote jungles of the CAR, same as it was in the neon-lit streets of Paris.

Not surprisingly, due to this long record of French involvement, did Bokassa accuse the French government of

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Central African Republic

Historical Background

The Central African Republic (CAR), is an anarchic collection of some eighty-odd tribes that speak the same language, Sangho, and share a long history of oppression. Most of these tribes were driven into the area by Arab slavers, who continued to raid their villages as late as 1910.

At the turn of the century, the French, Belgians and British, who had been fighting over central Africa, came to an agreement: the British received the Nile valley to the East, the Belgians took most of the Congo valley in the West and the French settled for what became known as French Equatorial Africa, comprised of territories of Gabon, the Congo, Chad, and Ubangi-Shari, a well-watered plateau slightly smaller than Texas, bounded by the Ubangi River on the south and drained by the Shar River in the north.

The capital of Bangui was founded in 1889, and grew quickly into a thriving center, rich in diamonds, timber, gold, ivory, rubber and docile natives. But brutal French colonial exploitation quickly took its toll, and by 1925, the country was in ruins. Villages and fields had been abandoned; malnutrition and starvation were widespread. The vicious subjugation of the natives and the plunder of their country's resources continued into the late 1930s.

During World War II, with promises of greater economic opportunities, the Free French recruited a large number of warriors from among its Central African tribes and organized them into the French Colonial Infantry Forces. The Africans fought with the Allies against the German invader under the legendary General Charles de Gaulle and later, at war's end, saw action in Indochina.

The French rewarded the Central Africans for their assistance by continuing colonial rule. The Africans reacted with anger. In 1955, when Frenchmen went unpunished for abusing their servants, riots broke out in Bangui, and for a time there was widespread unrest and a war of terror against Europeans. Three years later, General De Gaulle decided to dismantle the French empire and the territories of French Equatorial Africa became independent.

Ubangi-Shari was renamed the Central African Republic. Its first president, Barthélémy Boganda, was a M'Baka
Emperor Bokassa I

By Ilan Aldouby

Jean-Bedel Bokassa was one of the many victims of French colonialism. His father, Mgboundoulou, who had been caned to death by a French administrator in 1927, Mgboundoulou, a member of the M'Baka, a small tribe in the south of Bangui, who account for only 7% of the CAR’s 5 million people, but who would later constitute an inordinate number of the country’s civil servants. A week after his father’s murder, Jean-Bedel’s grieving mother committed suicide, leaving 12 orphans to be brought up by 32 uncles. One of these orphans was six-year-old Jean-Bedel, called Bokassa literally, “forest,” in M’Baka because he had been born in a little forest near the Berengo swamp.

The Soldier

Jean-Bedel was educated by Catholic missionaries, but instead of becoming a priest, he decided to be a soldier. He fought against the Nazis in the Free French Forces under General Charles De Gaulle, who became his hero. At De Gaulle’s funeral in 1970, Bokassa was so bereaved that he sobbed uncontrollably, shouting “Papa, Papa.” He later served in the French Colonial Infantry in Indochina, where he was decorated and commissioned. He survived the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and eventually rose to the rank of First Lieutenant, a significant achievement for an African in the French army. He returned home in the late 1950s.

tribesman who had been orphaned by brutal colonialism. Boganda was a priest turned political activist; he was revered by his people, but was not destined to lead them for long. He scarcely had composed the national anthem and designed the flag when he was killed in a plane crash.

Boganda was succeeded by his inept nephew, David Dacko, who presided over increasing turmoil. During a run on the diamond fields in the early 1960s, the people left their villages en masse and the economy went to pot. Dacko, still attempting to legitimize his presidency, called for general elections; he polled 99.4% of the vote through a procedure that would have made Albania look democratic.

By 1965, the republic was ready for revolt. After foiling a takeover attempt by the chief of police, Lieutenant Colonel Jean Bédel Bokassa, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and a cousin of President Dacko, took advantage of the New Year’s Eve revelry to mount a coup d’etat. On January 1, 1966, Dacko was ousted and exiled; Bokassa promoted himself Field Marshal and took power with French blessings. It was the beginning of a 14-year reign of terror, first as President of the Central African Republic, and later in December, 1977, as self-crowned monarch of the Central African Empire (CAE). Bokassa was deposed on September 21, 1979 by Operation Baracuda, a bloodless French-led coup, and replaced with the cousin he had originally ousted, David Dacko.

Dacko soon found that the CAR had been bankrupted by Bokassa’s greed. Bilateral aid from the United States, suspended under the emperor, was not being resumed. French aid was less than sufficient to subsidize the Administration. Drought further pushed the economy into insolvency into meltdown. Ruling by decree, and using classic Third World tactics, Dacko bribed the opposition, created numerous new government jobs, and built new roads and public works to provide employment for the masses. Still, the economy deteriorated. To attract Western capital, Dacko suspended diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and in 1980, at a show trial in absentia, sentenced Bokassa to death. State finances still deteriorated and opposition mounted. In 1981, less than a year later, President Dacko was overthrown by Chief-of-Staff General André Kolingba in a bloodless coup. The General rules the CAR to the present day.

The Coup

The country gained independence on August 11, 1960, taking the name Central African Republic. Bokassa was promoted Colonel and helped organize the new nation’s armed forces. CAR’s constitution initially provided for a 50-member, unicameral National Assembly elected for a 5-year term by universal suffrage. Bokassa’s cousin, David Dacko, and his African Social Evolution Party won a majority in the assembly, and banned all other political parties. Dacko became CAR’s first President and was reelected in 1964. He appointed Bokassa Chief-of-Staff. But when Dacko established close relations with the People’s Republic of China and allowed an influx of Chinese technical and diplomatic personnel, he aroused the resentment of the military, which finally ousted him in 1966.

Bokassa, a General by now, assumed power; he immediately abolished the constitution, dissolved the legislature and transferred administrative duties to his appointed cabinet.

Bokassa proclaimed himself President for Life in 1972 through the country’s sole political party, the Movement for Social Evolution of Black Africa. Two years later he promoted himself Field Marshal. By then he was already minister of the interior, defense, agriculture, trade, industry, mines, transportation, civil aviation and aeronautics, and the recipient of 32 self-awarded national orders, including first engineer, first farmer, and best soccer player. He could truly boast, “L’état c’est moi” (I am the state).

Never satisfied with his ministers, there were constant Cabinet changes. Elizabeth Domitien, who enjoyed Bokassa’s confidence for many years, was appointed Premier in early 1975, but was quietly dismissed in mid-1976 for unknown reasons. Then at the end of the year, a new constitution brought into being the Central African Empire (CAE), and on December 4, 1977, the 173rd anniversary of Napoleon’s coronation, in sweltering Bangui, Jean-Bedel Bokassa crowned himself Emperor Bokassa I.

The Coronation Extravaganza

Bokassa was an avowed Francophile. His fascination with Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte was notorious. For months he had sat in the Cine Club in downtown Bangui, screening old movies about Napoleon and studying them carefully. He then hired the 200-year-old firm of Guiselin, which had embroidered Napoleon’s uniforms, to make 15 outfits for his coronation, including an ermine-and-velvet robe with a 50-foot-long train, whose 785,000 pearls and 1,220,000 crystal beads took 16,000 seamstress-hours to sew on. But if the bill was to be footed by French taxpayers, most of the money returned to private French hands. Lanvin made Empress Catherine’s coronation gown. Arthus Bertrand of Paris topped the imperial crown with a 138-carat diamond worth $2 million; the scepter and the diadem upped the total cost of the jewelry to $5 million. French President Giscard d’Estaing contributed 20 diesel Citroens and 60 air-conditioned limousines for the celebration.

The coronation ceremony was held in the Catholic Cathedral in Bangui before a crowd of 5,000 guests with extravagant pomp. Yet no Western head of state or African leader was
present. Bokassa sat on an enormous, two-ton, gold-plated eagle throne adorned with 800-gilded feathers and towered by wings with a 13-foot span. Huge banners looming over him, he finally placed the 2000-diamond encrusted crown on his head and swore to defend the constitution of 1959, which was, in fact, still pending.

The extravaganza ultimately cost well over $25 million—one third of that land-locked nation’s annual budget and all of France’s aid for that year. As one of the 25 poorest countries in the world with an average annual per capita income of $120, the CAR could ill afford it. Most Africans were acutely embarrassed. Sadly commented one African diplomat present: “It will set our image back 20 years.”

**Savage Brutality**

Bokassa’s coronation spectacle demonstrated an unbounded megalomania which was matched only by his random, senseless brutality. For the next decade he executed his most dangerous rivals, suspended the constitution of 1959, dissolved the National Assembly, and assumed all legislative and executive powers. As president, he embarked on a program of modernization, including diamond and uranium production, building roads, hospitals and a slaughterhouse. But within a few years, his personal savagery had filtered to the West. In 1969 he executed a high-ranking Cabinet member for plotting his overthrow, and four years later his minister of public works was taken to the infamous Ngaraga Central Prison for treason and was never seen again. Relatives of suspected traitors were also eliminated.

Bokassa then called for a war on crime. Beggars with shriveled limbs and other birth defects, who he felt were a shame to the race, were taken off the streets of Bangui, flown in military planes and dropped into the river. In 1979 he decreed that petty first offenders and thieves would have their left ears cut off; second offenders would lose their right ears; third offenders a hand; and the fourth time they would be hanged. That year Bokassa celebrated Mother’s Day by ordering the release of all women from prison and by having everyone in jail for a crime against a woman hanged at dawn. Two prisoners went to the gallows. By 1972, furious that his war on crime seemed to have had little effect, he invited foreign photographers to watch his soldiers club and kid 46 petty thieves. Bokassa personally took part in the public flogging. Three of the convicts died instantly. The rest were left on display in a ditch under the hot African sun for six hours.

Bokassa’s cruelties were not reserved for his countrymen alone but foreigners as well. On July 15, 1977, Associated Press correspondent Michael Goldsmith, reporting from Bangui, filed a routine story that included unkind remarks about Bokassa. He had been unable to raise the Paris bureau and so the story was sent to South Africa over commercial telex lines for retransmission to France. In the process, the report was garbled. Several lines of gibberish printed with the story were shown to the Chief of Police, who decided that they must be some kind of code and that Goldsmith was a spy for South Africa. The correspondent was arrested and taken before Bokassa, who greeted him warmly, and then, without warning, laid open his forehead with a heavy ivory-inlaid ebony cane. Goldsmith was vaguely aware of being stomped by Bokassa, one of his sons, Sylvestre,

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his misfortune and ouster. Citing former President Valery Girard d’Estaing as the culprit, Bokassa claimed that the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (DECE), the French CIA, engineered the coup that first placed his cousin, David Dacko, into office and later replaced Dacko with General Andre Katingba, the emperor’s former Army Chief of Staff.

The unwelcome ex-emperor awaits under guard the opening of his trial in Bangui.

Dacko’s well-received investiture was indicative of a new democracy in the CAR. Yet he proved too weak and ineffectual and was ordered removed by the French; he was ousted by General Kolingba in an ostensibly indigenous coup d’état. Kolingba proceeded to create an effective one-party state with an elected Parliament; and in a recent move to demilitarize the present government, called a referendum on a new national Constitution. A 90 percent vote of confidence implemented a popular Constitution on November 21, 1987, designed to democratize the Republic.

Insiders partly corroborate Bokassa’s story. Alexandre de Marenches, former director of the SDECE, last year revealed the secret details of a political pact and military and financial program concluded between Bokassa and Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qadafi; fears of a possible alliance between the two countries and an intensification of the Libyan campaign in neighboring Chad, compelled Paris to remove Bokassa from power. To add further strength to the charge of SDECE interference, an anonymous French government official commented that Bokassa had been the victim of a disinformation campaign, part of a French intelligence technique known as “gilding the pill.”

Bokassa’s trial presented the most enigmatic piece in the already bewildering puzzle. The mere fact that a trial was to take place at all belied all normal expectations. Bokassa, safely ensconced, if a bit muffled, in France, voluntarily chose to return to Bangui for reasons known only to him. If he had hoped to encourage a popular uprising by supporters rallying to his cause, he was to be sorely disappointed. The trial had aroused remarkable levels of interest and sympathy for the deposed leader among the people, yet no widespread discontent with the Kolingba regime was in the offing, particularly since the passage of the new Constitution.

Moreover, the question of how Bokassa escaped 24-hours surveillance of his French chateau proved additionally troublesome. His opening greetings to French President Francois Mitterand, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, and “all Gauls” upon entering his “not guilty” plea fueled speculations that it was the French who had engineered the trial to cause maximum embarrassment to former President Valery Girard d’Estaing before the upcoming presidential elections.

At the trial, past associates of Bokassa testified to an assortment of crimes he had allegedly committed while in power. His former cook accused Bokassa of maintaining a refrigerated supply of human bodies from which he would occasionally extract a portion for a tasty snack. Others charged the ex-emperor with feeding political prisoners to his private menagerie of lions and crocodiles and massacring a group of schoolchildren. On the more mundane side, the government released data pointing to the embezzlement of $15 million in public funds, including the theft of the crown jewels. The rumors swirling about this remarkably serene and paternal Bokassa obscured any search for the truth. If one were to believe everything of which Bokassa was accused, the Emperor would have had to spend his entire time of every single day of his reign in nefarious acts of malice and vice.

On June 12, 1986, Bokassa was con...
Pretoria and US
Our Embattled South African Policy

BY JENNIFER NOTIS

"The policy of separate development (apartheid) is designed for happiness, security and stability...for the Bantu as well as the white."

Hendrik Verwoerd
Former President of South Africa

"South Africa is the scapegoat of America's bad conscience (but) the South African government is not prepared to surrender."

Pieter W. Botha
State President of South Africa

The drama of the crisis in South Africa today has been matched, in a quieter but no less significant way, by a rise of interest and activism in the United States. The issue of apartheid, after being conspicuously ignored by the Administration during President Reagan's first term in office, has gained momentum both with the general public and Congress.

Based upon the theory that white men are born superior to blacks, apartheid insists that whites must be the dominant members in an operative society. While most American politicians and interest groups are in agreement that such approach is wrong, opinions continue to differ as to what role the United States must play with regard to its foreign policy in South Africa.

Anti-Apartheidists Mobilize

Africa has traditionally been of secondary importance in U.S. foreign policy, and South Africa, though linked by history, strategy and trade with the West, shared the same low rating as the rest of the continent. But as a result of the sustained crisis in South Africa this attitude changed. By late 1984, only a few months after the wave of black protest had begun, anti-apartheid sentiment in the United States started to grow dramatically. Television brought the African turmoil—and its accompanying violence and police brutality into millions of American homes for the first time.

The U.S. domestic political climate however, was receptive. After the re-election of President Reagan in November 1984, the Democrats united around anti-apartheid forces. The Free South Africa Movement was launched in Washington with demonstrations and "sit-ins" at South African diplomatic missions around the country. The increasing mobilization of American blacks around the apartheid issue, prompted Republican officeholders at all levels to join the protest against racism in South Africa. In December 1984, 55 conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives informed the South African ambassador in Washington that they would be compelled to support sanctions against Pretoria unless there was an early end to apartheid. "The reality of apartheid," they wrote, "and the violence used to keep it in place, make it likely that our relations will deteriorate."

"Constructive Engagement" Protected

The Reagan Administration's position had manifested itself in a policy of "constructive engagement". Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, the architect and protector of "constructive engagement", had promised stability and a greater role for American diplomacy in Southern Africa, the independence of Namibia, the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from Angola, movement toward fundamental reform and the dismantling of apartheid. But after four years in office, Crocker had achieved little towards these ends. The South African government had devised a new constitution that specifically excluded the black majority from political participation in the central government. The policy of "constructive engagement" was widely perceived as moving Washington closer to Pretoria and giving the impression that the United States was unconcerned about the fate of the oppressed black majority.

Apartheid, the brutal form of government presently enforced in South Africa, is an institutionalized policy of racial segregation and discrimination employed by the white minority to forcefully subjugate and repress the black majority.

Washington had also instituted a policy of "friendly persuasion" through dialogue with the white leadership of South Africa, in order to encourage reform of apartheid policies. Certain officials later claimed that the Administration's friendly approach
had brought about some progress. Their allegations were partially based upon an incident that had occurred in December 1984, when eleven blacks were released from prison in Pretoria where they had been detained without trial. The prisoners were acquitted after an intense campaign of protest. “I don’t think that we are being too bold in taking credit for this,” President Reagan proclaimed. In fact, in an attempt to placate the United States, the Pretoria government had informed Washington of the prisoners’ release even before they had advised their own people.

Throughout 1985, the crisis continued in South Africa and domestic pressure mounted against the Administration. Harsh bi-partisan statements were beginning to be made against Pretoria and Washington’s “constructive engagement” policy. The divestment campaign and campus protests took on new life across the country and sanctions bills began to take shape in Congress. A stigma of failure was increasingly attached to “constructive engagement,” and politicians soon realized that there was no political mileage to be gained by supporting apartheid, whereas there was indeed condemning Pretoria. A concerted effort by Congress to legislate sanctions against South Africa was preempted when President Reagan promised to issue an Executive Order imposing a milder set of measures.

The President had consistently opposed the enactment of any sanctions, economic or otherwise, against South Africa. A senior spokesman for the Administration explained: in the past, whenever Reagan had commented on acts of violence in South Africa, he only succeeded in antagonizing the Pretoria government.

**Limited Sanctions**

In September 1985, as a result of a dramatic surge in anti-apartheid protest and congressional activism, President Reagan grudgingly imposed limited economic sanctions against South Africa. It was not unreasonable to construe this change of heart as a tacit admission that the policy of “constructive engagement” had all but failed. If anything, the tactics invoked by the United States had prompted only more violence in the region by angered and frustrated South African blacks. The Reagan sanctions, however limited, were an important symbol: “a demonstration to the ruling South African white nationalists that even an American President whom they had come to regard as their savior could turn against them.”

As violence escalated in South Africa the number of groups in the United States identifying themselves with the struggle against apartheid had increased sharply. Almost all American anti-apartheid activists were in full agreement that Pretoria’s racist policies were intrinsically wrong.

The major point of dissonance was whether or not the United States should adopt a stance of disinvestment—the forced sale of stock and other assets held in South Africa.

**The Sullivan Guidelines**

The question whether American companies should be pressured to sell or close operations in South Africa was soon debated vehemently by industrial lobbyists, student organizations and the blacks in the United States and South Africa. Rev. Leon Sullivan, a black Baptist clergyman and civil rights leader, who preaches regularly from the pulpit of a Philadelphia church, formulated a code of conduct for American firms doing business in South Africa. His set of anti-apartheid principles came to be adopted by a majority of companies operating there. Sullivan believed that United States firms were justified in remaining, if they stressed desegregation in the workplace, strengthened the training and promotion of black employees, and pressed for improvement in black health care, housing and education. 127 of the nearly 200 American companies still doing business in South Africa subscribed to the Sullivan Principles.

Industrial lobbyists echoed Sullivan’s views, by asserting that should a total divestment policy be instituted, American business would not be the main loser, rather the blacks of South Africa would suffer the most. Many American corporations in South Africa had followed the Sullivan guidelines and made it their policy to institute relief programs that helped remedy the repressive measures instituted against blacks there. Ford Motor Company, for instance, had trained blacks for skilled jobs normally reserved for whites in South Africa; IBM earmarked $10 million of its annual profits for computer laboratories in black primary schools; while

General Motors set aside $2 million for new housing, home improvements, and scholarships for black students. These lobbyists were quick to point out that blacks working for American companies were being treated far better and received greater benefits than their black counterparts working for South African owned corporations.

**Solvent Relations**

In 1986, while American business implemented its own set of reforms in South Africa, Congress followed its contradictory impulses, attacking communism and punishing apartheid. In March Congress approved the Administration’s request for up to $15 million in military aid for Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA movement in Angola, whose principal military backer was South Africa. For many black states in Africa and blacks inside South Africa, this move provided concrete evidence that the United States was on Pretoria’s side, and against them.

Many congressmen went on to support punitive sanctions against Pretoria later in the year, unconcerned about the perceived contradiction in their position. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) volunteered his own program to help spur on reform in South Africa. But, although the attitude of both the House and Senate had changed markedly, the Administration continued to assert that it was determined to maintain “solvent relations with South Africa” while attempting to quietly influence a reform program.

**The Anti-Apartheid Act**

In view of such stubborn perseverance, Congress sought not only to pressure South Africa to put an end to apartheid, but also to dissociate the United States from that system. The Senate’s first firm action against the policies of racial segregation of the South Afri-
can government went on record July 11, 1985, when Bill S995 was introduced by a Republican senator from Indiana. The Anti-Apartheid Act called for significant economic sanctions against the South African regime, if no suitable reforms were instituted before the end of an 18 month period. The sanctions included bans on new investments and the importation of Krugerrand gold coins. The Act further attempted to restrain United States banks from making loans to the South African government or to any corporations controlled by that government, and to bar the sale of computer technology to agencies involved in administrating the apartheid system. Another facet of the Congressional proposal, and one still under discussion, was to prohibit the export of nuclear materials to South Africa, unless Pretoria was ready to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The House of Representatives was in full concurrence with the Senate over the issues concerning apartheid, and took forceful strides in the direction of a firmer foreign policy. Rep. William H. Grey III (D-Pa.) proposed Bill HR1460, that complemented the sanctions cited in Senate Bill S995, by preventing the United States from expanding business operations in South Africa.

Congress thus succeeded in organizing a coherent program that was perceived in many quarters as liable to cause a significant foreign policy setback for the Reagan Administration. But there was overwhelming support in both the House and the Senate for the enactment of exclusive anti-apartheid punitive measures. In the summer of 1986, the Senate bill passed in an 80 to 12 vote, while the House bill went through with a sweeping vote of 295 to 127.

The final Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act banned the importation of South African coal, uranium, iron and steel, agricultural produce, textiles and Krugerrands. It prohibited new U.S. loans, investments, credits and the sale of computer technology to the South African government and its agencies; landing rights for South African Airways were also terminated. The measure, while urging closer U.S. official contacts with the African National Congress (ANC) and other anti-government political groups, ordered a study of the South African Communist Party and "the extent to which Communists have infiltrated the many black and non-white South African organizations engaged in the fight against the apartheid system."

Proponents of both bills now hoped that the widespread bipartisan support shown for a change of U.S. policy would convince President Reagan that it was time to take a firmer stand and make a stronger statement against apartheid. But the President vetoed the bill, and in the fall, both houses overrode his veto by substantial majorities. It was the worst defeat for the Administration's South African policy yet.

**The Reaction**

The congressional override on sanctions strengthened the White House's conviction that South Africa was a no-win issue. It grudgingly agreed that the presidency had an image problem; there was a broad perception in the United States and South Africa that, no matter how strongly and how often President Reagan condemned apartheid, his true sympathies lay with South Africa's whites.

International pressures followed in September in the form of mild sanctions imposed by the European Economic Community; they were much less punitive than the ones imposed by the United States Congress. Strong rhetorical support from the black Frontline States, would not have much of an impact on the region either. Nevertheless, a "sanctions war" between South Africa and the world was closer to reality than ever before, as public and private sectors in the Republic were planning "sanctions-busting" operations on a large scale.

This intransigence of the South African government, coupled with action such as attacking its neighbors, rejecting mediation, refusing to release Nelson Mandela, and declaring a new state of emergency, convinced many American congressmen that the United States had to make a firm stand on principle and that punitive sanctions, though an imperfect foreign policy instrument, were the only way to express America's moral outrage. They hoped that the Administration would change its policy and address domestic pressures more effectively, but to no avail.

The Administration reacted to growing public and congressional opposition with policy "reviews"; official anti-apartheid rhetoric, the recall of the U.S. ambassador; the search for a black ambassador to replace the incumbent; the creation of an interagency working group in the State Department; and a special advisory committee of 12 prominent Americans responsible for coaching the Secretary of State as to what policy "would be most likely to bring about the peaceful elimination of apartheid and create a political system not based exclusively on race."

Thus, after six years, "constructive engagement" had failed miserably. The Afrikaners' dogged pursuit of their own interests, their decision to reject negotiations with the ANC, the Anti-Apartheid Act making punitive sanctions an integral part of U.S. policy, effectively killed "constructive engagement." In the end, the policy seemed to have alienated practically everyone: black South Africans, white South Africans, the Frontline States, most Americans and even loyal allies.

**Quiet Diplomacy**

In 1987, the Administration... Continued on page 41

Protesting black woman faces South African riot police.
Showdown in Moscow

BY DAVID ADELSON

"I believe deeply in what we have begun; I believe deeply. And if I were told that we must stop the process of restructuring, I would never agree . . . for me, there is no other way."

-Mikhail Gorbachev

"We are the elite, and you will not pull us down. You don't have the strength. We will rip the flimsy sails of your restructuring. So dampen your enthusiasm."

-A Communist Party official's wife quoted in Moskovskaya Pravda

E ver since Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power as General Secretary of the Communist Party in March 1985, he was said to have "combined the fervor of an evangelical preacher with the instincts of a riverboat gambler in order to cajole the Soviet Union toward a new day."

For the past 34 months, the most obvious changes have occurred in the U.S.S.R. in the realm of art and literature. The Soviet press, whose heavy-handed censorship by the central government had been eased and in some cases lifted, the wisdom of political party control and reverent toward top officials, has become a testing ground for Gorbachev's glasnost, or openness initiative on both foreign and domestic issues. Newspapers and periodicals suddenly began dealing with such long-ignored subjects as prostitution, drug addiction, the alienation of youth, and the disorientation of soldiers returning from service in Afghanistan.

This new openness has had less impact in such areas as economic reform and governmental streamlining. Because of a longstanding stagnation present in these fields, any attempt at a general system overhaul had been met with resistance at all levels of power. However, this ominous cloud has been building over the Soviet landscape received scant attention in the western press. As Alexander Bovin, a Soviet commentator said, "I cannot escape from the feeling that we underestimate the scale and power of resistance that is opposed to his (Gorbachev's) strategy."

In fact, most recently the momentum of glasnost seems to have weakened, and resistance to it moved into the open. Opponents of glasnost have questioned with increased boldness and government officials publishing long-suppressed literary works such as Boris Pasternak's novel Dr. Zhivago. It seems as if these opponents are becoming better organized, a Russian editor revealed. His opinion was echoed in recent CIA documents in which the agency's intelligence analysts have expressed the opinion that a threat to Gorbachev and his policies does exist.

Yet, one must delve further into the intricacies of the Soviet political system in order to ascertain how serious this threat is, and subsequently, how far can Gorbachev go. The reforms he introduced have altered, at least superficially, dozens of areas of Soviet life and sparked tremendous opposition from a system that despite its revolutionary rhetoric is not accustomed to change. The Secretary General thus could only hope that the cold-water approach of glasnost combined with its twin perestroika (restructuring) of the economy will inspire Soviet apparatchiks to mend some of their less redeeming ways.

Most critical for Gorbachev is the growing resistance to glasnost ethos which exists within the vast Soviet bureaucracy. "Between the people who have the authority and the leadership," he told a group of Soviet writers, "there is an administrative layer--the apparatus of the ministries, the party apparatus which does not want alterations and does not want to be deprived of certain rights connected with privileges." It was this group of status quo promoters he alluded to who had defeated reforms in the past during the administrations of Nikita Khrushchev and Alexei Kosygin. Today many top bureaucratic posts are still held by party "conservatives" appointed during the Leonid Brezhnev era. To break the static formations of such entrenched and corrupt interest groups is extremely difficult. Gorbachev must therefore develop support among mid-level officials of the huge party and government machinery and gain control over the party provinces "feudal barons" before he can become an unchallenged master of the national Communist Party.

The key to the General Secretary's success revolves around the political acceptability of his economic and social changes. It thus remains to be seen whether his introduction of reform will be so disruptive that the latent opposition within the party will spring to the fore. Gorbachev must allay costs to the pockets of opposition he faces in the Politburo and Central Committee from uniting over a showdown issue.

Such tactic is a political necessity. Although Gorbachev has moved remarkably fast to neutralize members of the Old Guard from the Brezhnev era (1964-1982) and place his own people in key posts, there are definite indications that he has yet to consolidate his power. The most recent plenum of the Party's Central Committee was postponed twice because of a lack of consensus regarding personnel changes, and when the committee finally met, it failed to approve any of Gorbachev's reforms--especially his mandatory retirement plan for committee members. There no doubt was opposition in the bureaucracy.

There seems to be much speculation whether there are power brokers disgruntled with Gorbachev who could replace him with Yegor Ligachev, the number two man in both the Politburo and the Party Secretariat. Although Ligachev has not openly broken with Gorbachev's policies, he has presented them with a more conservative spin. Whenever Gorbachev called for a reexamination of the Stalinist era and other "blank pages" of Soviet history, Ligachev cautioned against dwelling on past problems; when Gorbachev urged greater openness, Ligachev followed with a call for more discipline. Thus Ligachev must be considered, despite his vehement denials, the primary contender for Gorbachev's post. Indeed, his present position as head of Soviet personnel and party ideology have allowed him to develop a separate base separate from Gorbachev by assuming the role of protector of ideological orthodoxy. This has led CIA Sovietologist Marc Zlotniv to assert that Ligachev serves the purpose of a fall back, a more moderate reformer than Gorbachev, who could be used whenever the party finds itself in need for a lesser radical.

In view of such internal opposition, it becomes obvious, that by no means is Gorbachev's control over the Politburo complete. Actually, in a political crisis, Gorbachev can rely upon only three sup-

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Glasnost and Soviet Jewry

BY DR. RUTH A. BEVAN

Glasnost has virtually become an American household word. Routinely translated as "openness," the glasnost policy has raised hopes in various quarters for a Soviet domestic liberalization, and thus, deductively, for a more cooperative, peaceful Soviet position internationally. Mikhail Gorbachev, the originator of glasnost, has consequently been propelled into the limelight of immense popularity in this country.

Glasnost hype portrays Soviet Jews in an increasingly improved situation. All Jewish prisoners-of-conscience are said to have been released from Siberian and other Gulag internment, the most renowned of these being Natan Sharansky, now living in Israel. Long-standing refuseniks like Josef Begun (an erstwhile prisoner-of-conscience), Ida Nudel, and Vladimir Slepak have been recently granted exit visas; and in the year 1987, about 900 refuseniks have left the Soviet Union each month. Furthermore, a kosher eating establishment has recently opened in the larger Moscow synagogue, Hebrew instruction is now being allowed, and seforim made available. Americans visiting refuseniks of late have been relatively free of interference and molestation. So all seems to bode well for Soviet Jewry under glasnost. Or does it?

"Openness" is a misleading translation of the Russian term glasnost. To the American mind, openness is synonymous with "open society"-democratization with all its implications of civil rights. Glasnost, however, should more properly be understood as "publicity," implying that defective, dysfunctional aspects of Soviet organizational structure are now to be publicly discussed for corrective purposes. In the light of the Yeltsin dismissal, this intent is, however, circumscribed.

Criticism or discussion is never an end in itself. Hence glasnost is not an end but a means to perestroika (restructuring) which is the ultimate Gorbachev objective. Glasnost-perestroika is therefore the attempt to make the economic engine of the Soviet Union more efficient. Anyone who has visited Russia can see that it has economic troubles. There is not only overemployment and the resulting problem of idle, surplus labor, but also misdistribution of goods, a scarcity of staples, bureaucratic duplication and waste. Glasnost, in its function as foreign policy verbiage, seeks to disguise these economic problems by allowing Americans to think that the Soviet Union is indeed undertaking a restructuring in the name of democratization.

Glasnost has a Russian historical precedent. Basically, it is a policy of expediency, not of philosophical principle. Those familiar with Russian history know it has displayed a pendulum effect between reformers and reactionaries. Conversely, it is the case that the western observer has no small misgivings over the veracity of the American media's claims of "unprecedented" liberalization in the Soviet Union.

A refusenik with a job, however, is still a refusenik that wants to leave the Soviet Union. Refuseniks must thus be differentiated from non-Jewish Soviet dissidents like Andrei Sakharov, who openly expresses the desire to reform Soviet society in the direction of greater democratization. Refuseniks have no such interest. They are neither reformers nor revolutionaries. They want only to leave the Soviet Union.

Yet, in this age of glasnost, emigration has become more, not less, difficult. On January 1, 1987 a new emigration law went into effect in Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union. It restricts possible emigration for those with immediate family abroad (spouses and parents). Of the some two million Soviet Jews, this law pertains only to about 30,000. A sabra married to an economic officer at the American Embassy in Moscow told me that glasnost would mean the sudden release of an appreciable number of refuseniks, but then the doors would be slammed shut.

We are presently witnessing the release of refuseniks, including prominent ones, leaving the Jewish community bereft of identified leadership and teachers. Moreover, these departures have pitted the Jewish community cruelly against itself:

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Can NATO Survive the Arms Treaty?

BY MAX POLACK

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed in Washington by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and American President Ronald Reagan, eliminating missiles that have a range of 300 to 3400 miles, and agreeing to subsequent negotiations on strategic weapons, are no doubt, important steps towards the normalization of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. And as the Administration’s departing Director of the Arms and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth L. Adelman, stated: "It gets rid of 1,600 Soviet warheads, while we only give up 400." Furthermore, according to the INF treaty, the Soviets are allowed to keep only 80 to 100 shorter range nuclear missiles for two and a half years, and the United States is permitted to retain a similar number of Pershing I A’s for the same period. The disarmament deal entails bilaterally controlled, step by step dismantling of an entire category of nuclear weapons (Russian SS-20s and American Pershing 2s) which will ultimately lead to an unprecedented system of nuclear control. The agreement is also accompanied by an understanding for on-site verifications of arms control.

The INF came at a most appropriate time for both leaders. Ronald Reagan, who had begun his mandate with a high level of support from both Congress and the American people, has recently suffered several political setbacks which gravely damaged his credibility. But this historical treaty could allow the President to remodel the course of history. The Republicans would thus be in a better position at the upcoming elections to represent themselves as the party whose leader had “brought peace to the world.”

At the same time, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is seeing this agreement as an accord that could reinforce his position as head of the new Kremlin team. Since he came to power, Gorbachev has tried to institute reforms in many of the country’s economic and bureaucratic institutions, and, above all, its spirit of immovability. As his bold endeavors have not been particularly popular among many of his colleagues, the treaty will undoubtedly strengthen his position at home.

The elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, however, could be detrimental to the Western Alliance. The INF agreement which Washington has named “The Zero Option,” is considered by many European allies as a perfect example of presumably equal reductions having unequal effects. The relationship of these weapons to the security requirements of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are totally different, as NATO has always considered nuclear weapons a way to compensate for its inequality in manpower and conventional armaments with the Warsaw Pact.

By strategic calculations, at most levels of confrontation, the two alliances are unequal. Warsaw Pact advantages are numerous: superiority of 2 to 1 in divisions; over 2 to 1 in tanks; nearly 3 to 1 in artillery and over 2 to 1 in combat aircraft. The Soviets and their allies thus could easily win a land battle with their non-nuclear forces, a victory NATO could only reverse with battlefield nuclear weapons—artillery and short-range missiles—of which the Soviets again have a superior arsenal.

So more than just a response to the mobile Soviet intermediate range SS-20 missiles aimed at the European Alliance’s heartland, the American Pershing 2s were part of a modernization effort undertaken to keep Warsaw Pact forces at bay. These late-model Pershings, also mobile missiles capable of launching a single, nuclear warhead more than 1000 miles, are highly concealable, almost impossible to target weapon of pinpoint accuracy. They are, explained General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, “the one weapon of which the Russians have been truly afraid.”

DISARMAMENT TREATIES

Chronology

1945 - Creation of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO)
1966 - France withdraws from NATO
1972 - Signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT)
1983 - Deployment of the Pershing 2 and intermediate cruise missiles in Western Europe
1985 - Research started on Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly known as the “Star Wars” program
1987 - Summit meeting in Washington between General Secretary Michael Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan
- Signing of Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty

The European allies also regard the intermediate missile umbrella under United States control as an essential link between NATO's conventional forces and its strategic nuclear capability. When removed, Europeans fear that the Soviet Union will be able to blackmail NATO member nations into doing its will, leaving the United States isolated and helpless. "The Zero Option," warned Rogers in a passionate farewell to the alliance last summer, "will take NATO back where it was before 1979," when the Pershing deployment was approved—a regression toward the precarious situation that confronted the alliance in its infancy. Denuclearization, he added, will make Western Europe safe again for conventional war or more likely nuclearization. Since WWII, Europe’s defense has been dominated by both the United States and Russia. As Cold War tensions intensified, Western countries aligned with the United States to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while their eastern neighbors joined the Warsaw Pact. America was determined to protect Europe from the "Communist Menace," and Western Europe wanted to be protected against the "Red Giant". So over the years, NATO amassed an amazing range and quantity of arms. To pro-
tect against the Soviet SS-20 missiles, Washington imposed the shipment of Pershing 2s in 1983, while at the same time, continued nuclear experiments and Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research. Reagan's aggressive NATO policy was later designed to force Gorbachev to the negotiating table. While ultimately successful, most recent diplomatic maneuvers among uneasy European allies show that the President did not consider European defense needs quite carefully.

In a front page article of Le Monde (September 15, 1987) French editorialist Michel Tatu transposed the summit and consequent treaty events to the Middle Ages. Imagine, he wrote, rival kings who ruled two kingdoms. Hoping to arrive at a certain state of non-war, they decided to eliminate their small-range armaments. They made sure, nonetheless, to keep their main arms of destruction—just in case. The military situation thus changed but only minutely. The major problems remained. Indeed, the two kings were still not enjoying a true and lasting peace. Each had preserved the power to send troops to the other side, maintained the ability to launch long-range projectiles from their castles, and continued to rule over their allies, who could later be used in a war against each other.

The location of the each king's individual camp, however, was extremely important. One king ruled over a big island, while the other held on firm to the continent. The Island King withdrew the armaments he had stationed on the continent, trying to show his enemy of how little importance he thought they were. As stable relations were being sought by both, the two kings finally initiated a dialogue: "I threaten you with my powerful arms," said the Island King, "but I care about you and therefore withdraw my small pieces of artillery from the battlefield." "Understood," answered the Continental King. "I will also withdraw my small artillery." But in reality, the Island King's armaments were not a threat to the Continental King.

Similarly, according to the INF T, the territories in-between the two camps—Western Europe—will lose their only real defense, while the two superpowers maintain their capabilities of invasion. Western European defenses had been bolstered and secured by American forces and armaments. By itself, NATO has no real military might. Without nuclear weapons, Western Europe is losing its strategic importance for the United States, and the alliance and parity between the allies is weakened.

"The elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe could be detrimental to the Western Alliance."

Until the 1970s, U.S.-Soviet relations were virtually non-existent. Each camp armed to the teeth and wooed potential allies; America concentrated on helping protect Western Europe. Now the thaw between Reagan and Gorbachev leads to a sort of demilitarization of the territory in between the two superpowers.

As Western Europe is not one political entity, European nations are subject to the whim of the superpower, although United States decisions are subject to their respective approval. France, a main military power, is not a member of NATO, yet it supports other Western European nations against Russia. But each Western country and its government have their own theory regarding the Soviet Union. Consensus is therefore not automatic. At present, for instance, French President Francois Mitterand is trying to establish a real cooperation with West Germany in a first step towards a more unified Europe. Mitterand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl intend to include the other European partners only at a later date. A united Europe thus still remains a myth. The withdrawal of long range missiles would therefore endanger Europe's position because it would become virtually defenseless. And, without weight, the Old Continent is compelled to a limited sovereignty.

For all the above reasons and in view of the INF T, Europe will sooner or later refuse to be dictated to by a superpower. Washington expects that and therefore has no choice but to agree that there is a necessity for Western European nations to work together and achieve political and military unity. A significant step towards such unity would be a formal, not oral, recognition of the Soviet-American pact, without giving the right to other nations to determine and control their strategy. It would make it clear that the agreement between Reagan and Gorbachev would only apply to the superpowers, and would not be a threat to the freedom of the government of their allies.

It seems logical that at some later point the European community would come up with an independent treaty of military cooperation, that would free its member nations to use any type of armaments considered necessary for their defense, including nuclear missiles. Europe would thus have elaborate means of deterrence for its existence, while for the United States and the Soviet Union intermediate missiles would not be crucial at all. Such a European covenant would encounter not only a very cold attitude from the two superpowers but possibly stiff opposition. Yet many Europeans want a strong united Europe. And in order to fulfill their aims, the Old Continent has to secure its defense in the long run; the only way to achieve that is to

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The old Greek-Turkish quarrel over the island-state of Cyprus, the dispute over the establishment of a clear frontier in the Aegean Sea and oil exploration under the Aegean seabed, has flared again in April 1987, only to subside temporarily towards the end of the year, to the relief of the rest of NATO member nations. After rattling their sabres, the two traditional enemies sheathed them and started talking warily about talking again. Each made sure to give way without surrendering pride or principle.

An Uneasy Alliance

Such occasional political and military confrontations between Greece and Turkey, have taken place periodically for more than four decades. Shortly after World War II, the United States, Canada and most Western European countries created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to guarantee protection of the European continent from communist block aggression. Turkey, in the interest of its own security as a neighbor of the Soviet Union, and its goal of modernization in association with the West and according to Western concepts, formally applied for admission to NATO on August 1, 1950. Greece followed suit. In October that same year, the two were included as participants in the alliance defense planning for the Mediterranean region. A year later, a protocol was signed in London admitting both countries as members effective February 18, 1952.

Under the original terms of the NATO alliance, Turkey's 1st Army was to have cooperated with Greek forces along its western flank in defensive operations against potential attacks from the north; but since 1975, when Greece withdrew its troops from NATO's integrated military command over Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, the Turkish 1st Army assumed full responsibility for defense of its sector.

Last year, the NATO command was again taken aback by the Greek-Turkish squabble that threatened its southern flank. Turkey's importance to the defense of Europe had been well established. Stretching below the Soviet Union and bordering Iran, Iraq and Syria, its strategic value was obvious. On the other hand, Greece, which had meanwhile returned to the alliance after a six-year absence, was in a constant up-and-down over its joint membership with Turkey. Greek maverick Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou cautiously asserted that NATO membership gave Greece no protection against a Turkish attack in Cyprus or on its own soil, if Greece became estranged from its NATO allies. Yet last year, Papandreou surprised everyone, Ankara included, when he declared that he would keep Greece in NATO. In a painfully convoluted statement, Papandreou quipped: "We are not pulling out of NATO now because war with Turkey would become inevitable."

Three Points of Contention

In spite of a lull in hostilities, the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two traditional historic enemies have not been settled. The three points of contention, the Aegean Sea borderline, oil drilling and Cyprus remain unsolved and continue to threaten to tear apart the alliance. The major source of contention to date remains the status of Cyprus. Although the island is situated only 80 miles off the Turkish coast (compared to 800 miles off the Greek coast) almost 80 percent of its population is of Greek origin, while the remaining 20 percent are Moslem of Turkish origin. In 1959, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement with Britain, the colonial power on Cyprus, to grant the islanders independence, with guarantees of protection for the Turkish minority. The agreement, however, was short-lived. Tensions between the two Cypriot communities escalated into violence. In 1964, the United Nations sent a multinational peacekeeping force to separate the contenders. (See “UNFICYP—The Peacekeepers of Cyprus” on page 32.)

Ten years later, a military coup in Greece led to a straining of Turkish-Greek relations. Five days after the coup, fearing for the safety of their people, Turkey invaded Cyprus, demanding that the northern third of the island be placed under Turkish Cypriot rule. When Greece rejected the demand, Turkey conquered more territory in the north, allotting almost 40 percent of the land to the Turkish Cypriot minority. Most Greek Cypriots living in that area were driven out to the south, and the Turkish Cypriots living in the south were flown by the Turks into the occupied territory. On at least two occasions since then, the Turkish Cypriots declared independence. In 1983, when the community pronounced itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the United States, Greece, and most other countries denounced the action; Turkey alone recognized the new government. (See “The Twin Republics” on page 31.)
The Aegean Conflict

Although northern Turkey and Greece share a common land border, their southern portions are separated by the Aegean Sea, littered with many small off-shore islands. Most of these islands have been recognized internationally as Greek patrimony. But their proximity to Turkey has been the focus of Turkish nationalist annexation demands.

The task of fixing a clear frontier in the Aegean Sea was further complicated by the uniqueness of their geography. A chain of islands belonging to one state lie just off the coast of another—leading to the obstruction of the coastal state’s access to the open sea.

Existing international law does not cover such a case. The Greeks, believing that the general thrust of this law favors them, have argued for years that the International Court of Justice in The Hague should decide the dispute. Turkey has insisted that it should be settled through bilateral negotiations. As for the third option—mediation—the disputants have refused to ask the United Nations Secretary-General for help, nor would they agree to an American suggestion that they should use the good offices of NATO Secretary-General, Lord Carrington.

A decade earlier, in 1976, after an incident similar to this last one, both recourse to The Hague and negotiations were tried. Greece took its case to the court, which found in 1978 that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter. The Turks, who had held that view all along, took no part in the proceedings.

At the urging of the UN Security Council, and under a Greek-Turkish agreement signed in Berne, Switzerland direct talks began. These went on unproductively until 1981. None have been held since, especially after Greek elections brought Andreas Papandreou to power.

In one respect, Greece and Turkey have shown noteworthy restraint. Although a coastal state’s right to 12 nautical miles of territorial waters is generally accepted, Greeks and Turks have both finally recognized that making 12-mile claims would set off a conflict in the congested Aegean. The Greeks have kept to their six-mile limit, and, although Turkey matches Russia’s 12-mile claims in the Black Sea, it has settled for six miles in the Aegean.

Sink the Sismik

The Aegean Sea, however, is the source of another Greek-Turkish dispute. At the conclusion of World War I, the two countries signed a treaty which Turkey now claims establishes the sea as international waters. Greece, though, claims exclusive rights to the Aegean’s soil and mineral deposits.

On March 27 last year, when the Aegean crisis came to a head, it was by no means obvious that any step backward was possible. Turkey’s National Security Council, headed by President Kenan Evren, ordered the oil exploration vessel *Sismik I* to sail through the Dardanelles under naval escort to start prospecting for oil in the Aegean. This action was in response to what the Turks saw as Greek plans to violate a 1976 agreement by drilling in international waters off the island of Thasos. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou vowed to stop *Sismik I* by force.

When prudence finally averted a fight.

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**SOUTH CYPRUS**

**Factfile**

- **Name:** Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot)
- **Area:** Third largest island in Mediterranean, after Sicily and Sardinia. 9,248 square kilometers, 225 kilometers in length; 96.5 kilometers in width.
- **Population:** Some 850,000 of which 665,200 are Greek Cypriots, Armenians and Maronites.
- **Capital:** Nicosia (Greek Cypriot)
- **Climate:** Mediterranean. Cycle of hot, dry summers; rainy winters; brief spring and fall seasons.
- **Neighboring Countries:** Situated in eastern Mediterranean, north of Egypt, west of Syria and south of Turkey.
- **Political Status:** Former British colony. Independence: August 1960.
- **Government:** Elected President, appointed Council of Ministers, and elected House of Representatives.
- **Political Parties:** Leading government party, chaired by George Vassiliou calls itself the Democratic Party (Dimokratikto Komma, DK); supports settlement of Cyprus problem based on United Nations resolutions. The communist party is named Progressive Party of the Working People (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou, AKEP) and is led by Ezekias Papaioannou. The socialist party in the south is the United Democratic Union of the Center (Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosis Kendrou, EDEK) founded by Vassos Lyssarides; supports government. The Pro-Western Opposition Party (Dimokratikos Synagermos Democratic Rally, DSDR) was founded by Glafkos Clerides.

**International Memberships:** United Nations organizations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and British Commonwealth.

- **Armed Forces:** National Guard: some 10,000 active, 20,000 reserves. Twenty-three battalions maintained at various strengths and lightly armed; mostly conscripts. Greek Cypriot Police: Cyprus Police Force—5,500.
- **Foreign Armed Forces:** United Nations Forces (UNFICYP): Approximately 2,500—including five infantry battalions; lightly armed. British Forces: Troops within Sovereign Base Areas—4,700; various ground, air, land and naval forces; heavily armed.

**Annual growth:** 0.5 per cent
**GDP:** $2,561-billion; per capita: $3,850
**Unemployment:** 3.5 per cent
**Budget:** expenditure $695.5-million; deficit $534.8-million
**External debt:** public $594-million; private $367-million
**Foreign trade:** imports $1.36-billion; exports $574-million.

**Current account deficit:** $204-million
**Inflation rate:** 4.3 per cent
**Currency:** Cyprus pound
**Exchange rate:** US$1 = £ 0.50

Papandreou invited the Turks to talk about drafting a joint submission to the International Court of Justice in The Hague, asking that it set the boundaries in the Aegean. The question has been raising hackles in Athens and Ankara since oil, in modest volume, was first found in the Aegean 14 years ago. The present argument over the right to exploit oil found under the continental shelf that extends beneath the entire Aegean had started three decades ago. Turkey did not accept a 1958 UN convention on the shelf, which recognized that islands were to be taken into account in determining coastal states' shelf-rights.

A 1982 revised text spelled out that doctrine in more detail. Turkey voted against adoption of this new UN sea law treaty, which has not yet been ratified anyway by enough countries to take effect. In both treaties, however, the effect of "special circumstances" was recognized. The parties were thus urged to agree to jointly explore and share the revenues from off shore oil fields instead of disputing them. But Greece and Turkey were not even thinking about such a conciliatory solution.

A Military Stand-down

Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's first response to Papandreou's proposal was intriguing. He had been absent from the National Security Council meeting because he was still on his way home from a heart operation in Texas. He observed that Turkey might have to reconsider the question of arbitration by the international court. (The Turks have steadfastly opposed this in the past, insisting on straight negotiations with the Greeks.)

The relief that greeted the military stand-down in Turkey turned into deep disquiet. An avalanche of criticism was showered on Ozal, not merely from opposition groups but from hard liners in his own ruling Motherland Party. Ozal was accused of preparing a sell-out to placate the Americans and the EEC, which Turkey was about to join.

Papandreou could hardly have wished for a better diversion from his mounting domestic problems. He faced an economic strike and a trial of strength with Greece's defiant Orthodox Church over his plans to seize church land. The latest flare-up rallied the nation behind his stand against the Turks.

Yet, the Greek prime minister further stung his NATO partners. When the danger was Turkey's height, he turned for moral support to the Soviet block. He sent an envoy to neighboring Bulgaria and assembled the ambassadors of Warsaw Pact countries for a briefing in Athens. At the same time, he ordered the Americans to close their communications base near Athens, an order he later continued on page 33.
Following the outbreak of hostilities between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus in December 1963, the U.N. Security Council met to consider a complaint by the government of Cyprus charging intervention in its internal affairs and aggression by Turkey. Ankara maintained that Greek Cypriots had tried for ten years to annul the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey, however, denied all charges of aggression on the island-nation.

On March 4, 1964, the Security Council of the United Nations unanimously recommended the creation of a United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with a mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting and help maintain law and order. Since then, the Security Council has periodically extended the peacekeeping force's mandate for periods of six months at a time.

A coup d'etat in Cyprus on July 15, 1974 by the Greek Cypriot National Guard led by Greek Army officers opposed to President Makarios, was followed by Turkish military intervention. The Turkish Army subsequently established control over most of the northern part of Cyprus.

Following the invasion, the Security Council called for a cease fire between the Greeks and the Turks, which finally came into effect on August 16. Negotiations followed, but with no results.

Initially, UNFICYP had a strength of approximately 7000, provided by 8 countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Great Britain. For 10 years the force was deployed island-wide to coincide with civilian district boundaries. As a result of the Turkish invasion of 1974, the newly-created United Nations force was redeployed along a Buffer Zone and carried out its task by manning a number of static observation posts and maintaining regular armed mobile patrols.

The peacekeeping activities of UNFICYP today are mainly, but by no means exclusively, concentrated along the same Buffer Zone, which runs on an East-West axis across Cyprus. The zone is defended to the north and south, with some exceptions, by cease fire lines of the opposing forces at the time of cessation of hostilities in 1974. The present focus on the Buffer Zone, therefore, essentially represents a second, quite distinct phase in the UNFICYP history in Cyprus.

The Buffer Zone is 217 kilometers long and comprises three percent of the ancient island. The zone winds through the northwestern suburbs into the historic walled capital of Nicosia, where it closely follows the path of the famous "Green Line," a maze of streets and alleys so named when, in 1963, a green marker was applied by a UN officer to the map of the city.

Two other UNFICYP territories are the Kokkina enclave, an area of 1.5 square kilometers and Varosha, where the force maintains a presence in the now abandoned resort suburb of Famagusta.

Within the Buffer Zone, by Security Council mandate, the UNFICYP has exclusive control of all military, political, economic and police matters. The peacekeeping force is supported by a 39-man international U.N. civilian staff comprised of 15 nationalities, and over 400 local employees. Most of the soldiers are stationed in Cyprus for some six to seven months, but a small nucleus of staff officers must serve for several years. They are under the command of a general, who is responsible directly to the Secretary-General and the Security Council--the ultimate political authority for the force. The Secretary-General has on the island a civilian Special Representative.

UNFICYP soldiers, like their counterparts in other UN peacekeeping forces, are provided with arms for self-defense and are authorized to use them for that purpose only. As on similar peacekeeping missions, the soldiers are not equipped to oppose a conventional military attack. They are there with the concurrence of the contending parties. And if this political consensus breaks down, peacekeeping becomes virtually impossible--a point often overlooked by critics of such operations.

Though lightly armed, UNFICYP soldiers have placed their lives at risk on many occasions by confronting heavily armed troops. Nine soldiers from different countries and one Australian policeman have been killed in combat-related incidents since 1964.

Of the 2,300 soldiers in the U.N. Force in Cyprus today, only about half are assigned to patrol the Buffer Zone; the remainder carry out staff, support, economic and humanitarian tasks. For the ordinary soldier, the most familiar aspect of UNFICYP is the OP (Observation Post). There are 104 of them along the zone, around Kokkina and in Varosha--70 of them permanently manned and 34 occupied on an occasional basis.

U.N. soldiers are observing breaches by either side of the military status quo that has been established almost 15 years ago. They look and listen for any unusual activity, known in UNFICYP as "moves forward." Officers, therefore, maintain close contact with their equivalent on both the Greek and Turkish sides, striving to prevent tension or misunderstanding from escalating into a potentially dangerous confrontation. On rare occasions, the problem is referred to U.N. Headquarters in New York, where it is dealt with at the highest political level.

UNFICYP has two types of police contingents: the Military Police responsible for the discipline of the force, and civilian police, currently from the regular police forces of Australia and Sweden. The UNFICYP civilian policemen carry out in the Buffer Zone exactly the kind of police duties they would do at home--investigating robberies and unauthorized economic activities, and dealing with humanitarian problems. They are unarmed and have no powers of detention. They therefore hand over offenders to the authorities on the Greek or Turkish side. In addition, they are also involved in liaison with the police forces of both sides on matters which extend well beyond the Buffer Zone.

UNFICYP is the only U.N. peacekeeping force financed solely by voluntary contributions. Funding comes from two sources: one third of the costs are met by a Special UNFICYP Account, to which 69 countries have contributed for the past 25 years. Approximately two-thirds of the cost are absorbed voluntarily by troop-contributing countries.
Aegean Squabbles

Continued from page 31

rescinded when the crisis abated.

Nothing cheered the Turks more than Papandreou's curious conduct. It gave them the opportunity to present themselves as NATO's staunchest members— an appearance they diligently try to maintain in their squabbles with Greece— and to portray the Greeks as unstable and unreliable allies. Turkey thus quickly accepted an offer of mediation from NATO's Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, while Greece turned it down.

The way the hardliners on the Turkish National Security Council took charge in the absence of Ozal, had occasioned much debate in Turkey, while it allowed the Greeks to gleefully present what happened as proof that the generals are still trying to call the shots on the other side of the Aegean. An exchange of diplomatic letters followed, but no solution was reached.

With the warships of both allied nations back at base after the last confrontation, the outcome of the conflict was far from clear. Greece's Andreas Papandreou had the satisfaction of standing firm against Turkey's threat to start prospecting for oil in the Aegean's disputed bed. Turkey's Turgut Ozal secured an assurance from the Greeks that they too would refrain from drilling in disputed areas. The word later heard in Ankara to describe 'Turkey's position was gerilemek; it meant taking a judicious step backward, without climbing down...

NATO to the Rescue

At the year's start NATO was still deeply concerned over the Greek-Turkish tensions and the potential for war in southern Europe. The importance of both Greece and Turkey to the alliance was unquestioned. Turkey, the closest NATO country to the Soviet Union, provides the alliance with one of the most important strategic buffers in southern Europe, the Turkish Straits, the only bridge between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Turkey also has an army of 700,000 men, which is the second largest land force in NATO, Greece, also of vital strategic importance to NATO, has borders with three communist countries—Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Greece serves as a link in communications between Turkey and Italy, another NATO member.

Predictably, NATO has avoided taking sides in the dispute. Unfortunately, such a position of neutrality had backfired in the past. In 1974, the year Turkey invaded Cyprus, Greece had refused to commit participation in the military programs of NATO. In fact, it did not actively rejoin the alliance for six years. Greece, one of its officials said recently, now resents NATO for not taking a clear stance on the latest conflict. This ambiguity, he feels, is tantamount to legally equating Turkey's position, including the illegal occupation of Cyprus and the partition of that country.

A high ranking Turkish official at the United Nations explained Turkey's position in the conflict to me. Greece's hostility towards Turkey is an outgrowth of the Turkish occupation of Greece during the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, he explained, has repeatedly offered to negotiate with Greece on a variety of issues, such as the status of the islands and minerals in the Aegean Sea. Greece, however, has thwarted all such attempts by insisting that the Cyprus issue head the agenda. Turkey's position on Cyprus remains that its troops would have to remain stationed there until the safety of Turkish Cypriots can be guaranteed.

Turkey lauds NATO for not taking sides in the conflict. In fact, Ankara feels that the conflict is indeed a minor one in which all issues are soluble, provided both parties negotiate in good faith. Since the Cyprus issue is the most controversial one, the two countries should first find a common ground on all other issues. In such negotiations, NATO could, at the most, play a mediating role. NATO is thus once again in a precarious position. Due to the strategic value of both member nations, it cannot afford to take one side at the expense of the other. This problem is magnified by the existence of strong anti-American feelings in Greece and of a rising Muslim fundamentalist majority in Turkey. It seems, however, that it would be in the alliance's best interest to coordinate its efforts to negotiate their problems, with NATO taking an active role as mediator.

At the seat of the problem remains the Greek-Turkish disagreement over sovereignty in the Aegean and the rights to any natural wealth beneath that sea. This had recently prevented the establishment of a joint air defence organization because Greece fears an arbitrary boundary drawn by NATO may be used by Turkey for political ends. Athens has further unsuccessfully sought a commitment from the United States to guarantee its frontiers in the Aegean from "violations coming from any direction," thus trying to lure the United States to participate in a thinly-disguised anti-Turkish alliance.

Greece Boycotts NATO

Today, two key nations in the Western alliance are at daggers drawn, and one of them, Greece, even regards Warsaw Pact countries as socialist blood brothers. Greece and Turkey's long-established animosity continues unabated. Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus and the resultant imposition of a Mediterranean

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Twin Republics

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carried on the political and economic development of the new republic under the continued leadership of President Archbishop Makarios III. An uneasy truce was maintained for three years as the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) stood by.

After a 1967 coup in Athens brought to power a military junta that strongly opposed Cypriot President Makarios because of his attempts to solidify relations with the Soviet Union and Third World countries, an attack by members of the Greek Cypriot National Guard commanded by Colonel George Grivas, former leader of the anti-British guerrilla, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), on a Turkish village in November, renewed the cycle of conflict. Once again Turkey threatened military intervention. United States mediation efforts brought about an uneasy truth: Turkey called off its invasion threat, and Greece withdrew more than 10,000 soldiers who had been infiltrated onto the island. Later in December, Turkish Cypriots set up a separate provisional administration in the north.

Within the context of a cease-fire, on July 15, 1974, the Makarios government was overthrown by the Cypriot National Guard, led by mainland Greek officers, and five days later troops from Turkey invaded the island. The Turks launched a combined parachute and h流水 suddenly assault in concert with an amphibious beach attack. When the fighting subsided, the UN Security Council called for an immediate cease-fire. But the negotiations between Greece, Turkey, and England, held in Geneva until mid-August broke down, and further military operations extended the area under Turkish Cypriot control in the north. Hostilities finally ceased at midnight on August 16. More negotiations followed, but with no results. After peace talks, the Turkish Cypriots expanded their foothold even more, occupying the northern 37 percent of the island.

In early 1975, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, administered by Greek Cypriots, continued nevertheless to lay claim to legal jurisdiction over the entire island, except for the British Sovereign Base Areas, and was internationally recognized other than by Turkey as the sole legitimate governing authority.

Cyprus, however, was for all practical purposes divided into two mutually exclusive political entities, and its economy was effectively segregated between the two with only negligible contact. Spyros Kyprianou, former foreign minister, had succeeded to the presidency of the republic after Archbishop Makarios died of a heart attack in August 1977, while Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas became President of the self-proclaimed entity in the north.

Throughout, 1974 was a turning point in the history of Cyprus and radically changed the balance of power on the island. Its immediate, pervasive effect was a
**CAMPUS**

**Israel’s 40th Birthday:**
**A Perspective in US-Israel Relations**

BY CINDY T. SCHLANGER

How does United States policy in the Middle East affect Israel’s domestic and foreign affairs? Israeli Consul General Moshe Yeager, elaborated on this topic last November 3, 1987, when he addressed a joint Yeshiva and Stern College audience on campus.

The ambassador explained at length the drastic general changes in policy making that occurred after the Second World War—changes that affected both superpower and small nation alike. Post-war foreign policy decision-making was brought about by advances in modern technology and weaponry. An expansion of international trade caused intertwining economies, and the growth of international communications and media exposure made it easier for the public to become aware of current events and for its representatives to relay policy decisions.

Every time a country put forth new initiatives and tried to implement policies, it was no longer the only one affected. The political makeup of the world had changed and polarized into spheres of influence: the U.S.S.R. and its East European satellites; China and Asia; the United States and its Western allies, also known as the Free World. It is into this last category that Israel falls.

Israel, Ambassador Yeager pointed out, is one of the most independent countries in the world, belonging to no other organization or alliance than the United Nations. Listing the national agenda of the State of Israel, he noted that first and foremost comes defense. Israel’s mere existence depends on its defense—a constant top priority for the government.

The defense of Israel’s territory entails many economic hardships. It is extremely difficult for such a small country to manufacture its own weapons. A large portion of Israel’s budget must therefore be allocated towards the purchase of arms. Same as other nations in the area, Israel relies on foreign sources for much of its weaponry. It does, nonetheless, manage to supplement such acquisitions with local technology, though at great cost.

Since its independence in 1948, the State of Israel has accepted continual assistance from the United States. As of last year, it had received $5 billion in United States aid. The entire budget of Israel amounts to $24 billion. So if the United States supplies only that small a portion of the budget, couldn’t Israel do without it? Despite the fact that United States aid may be marginal in comparison to its entire budget, Ambassador Yeager explained, such funds are imperative for defense purposes, as Jerusalem cannot shoulder all of its military expenses.

The financial factor in the relationship between the two countries thus creates an Israeli dependency on the United States. While the Israeli government

**Books**

**Bibliopolitics**

**Soviet Union**


Motyl’s answer to the question posed in the title is No! The Ukrainians, Balts, Central Asian Muslims and others will not rebel, partly because they have found rewards within the system, even though their states are Russian-dominated, but above all because of the fear of the KGB. Motyl demonstrates that even the Ukraine, the only real possibility for revolt has neither the necessary basis for organized internal opposition nor the outside influence imperative for it. His case is well argued and convincing. Yet other observers take a different view and the answer to the question will not be solved in the short term.

**Middle East**


To understand the events of the past decade in Lebanon, Norton probes into the complexity of sectarian policies and particularly the role of the Shia community. The story of the largest and strongest Shia movement, Amal, its struggles with rival sects and with the PLO, its competition with both traditional and radical Shia factions, and its relations with Israel and Syria, is told in great detail. Colonel Norton, who teaches at West Point, served with the U.N. peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon.

**Israel**


The Israeli Connection exposes, according to its writer, “Israel’s unending war with the Third World as arms supplier to the forces of colonialism and reaction and ally of other ‘pariah states,’ especially South Africa.” The story is pieced together from scattered items and news reports, the reliability of which is suspect, and the interpretations overdrawn. But the author seems convinced that the classified material, if available, would prove he has erred only in being overcautious. Sensationalist, to say the least.

**Intelligence and Espionage**


Winks, a Yale historian, tells the story of a small sample of Yale men in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), forerunner of the CIA, both frustrated and fulfilled. The book’s most useful contribution for students of intelligence is the story of the controversial James Angleton. The rest of the book is a case study of both the OSS and the wartime relations between “cloak” and “gown”, rather than a comprehensive assessment of either.

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The Restructuring Prospect


Perestroika (literally restructuring), authored by Mikhail Sergeievich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, describes his new far-flung program that restructures Soviet society, details how its far-reaching intended reforms came about, and elaborates on their application to agriculture, industry, trade, and foreign affairs. Perestroika is the result of an American initiative. Shortly after Gorbachev took power, publishers Cornelia and Michael Bessie invited him to write "a real book—not a collection of propaganda speeches." Surprisingly, the General Secretary agreed, delivering a manuscript early last September. Intended as a personal statement of his program, Gorbachev's Perestroika was published not only in the USSR but almost everywhere else around the world.

Although somewhat repetitious, Perestroika is informal, candid and almost conversational in tone. The work falls into two parts: the first deals with perestroika as an internal program of economic, social and attitudinal change; it represents a digest, in popular form, of that concept detailed in Gorbachev's two reports to the January and June 1987 plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The second part, presented in a more vigorous style, deals with the Soviet Union's global relations, most specifically with Western Europe and the United States. In this part, too, some ideas have been expressed by Gorbachev previously in speeches, interviews, and articles, in Russia or abroad. Thus, little of the material used is new to followers of Soviet affairs.

The first chapter contains one of the most withering public criticisms of the Soviet system ever made by a high-ranking Kremlin official. "We only thought that we were in the saddle" (in the 1970s), Gorbachev writes, "while the actual situation was one that Lenin warned against: the automobile was not going where the one at the steering wheel thought it was going." Gorbachev invokes the Marxist-Leninist spirit with an almost religious fervor. He sees his perestroika program not only as a return to true Leninist principles, but an extension of them. Referring frequently to the founder's writings, and using traditional Marxist logic, he pointedly notes that even Lenin acknowledged that a single revolution would be insufficient to transform society; perestroika is, he promises, the Second Russian Revolution aimed this time at invigorating socialism by linking it to democracy.

From the outset, Gorbachev stresses, perestroika is not an attempt to restructure the social economy of the Soviet Union into a capitalist economy modeled after the United States; it is, rather, the restructuring of the existing economy within the framework of socialist precepts, utilizing Marxist-Leninist guidelines to the fullest extent—a process partly attempted but never accomplished in the past. Perestroika, he further emphasizes, is not an idea that surfaced suddenly; the concept was discussed exhaustively at meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party way back in 1985.

Perestroika extends to the realm of world affairs as well: nuclear weapons have placed inescapable constraints on the feasibility of class struggle; peaceful coexistence must be separated from the ultimate determination of one class to prevail over the other; security has to become multilateral as no single nation can obtain it any longer by making others insecure; capitalism and socialism will have to exist "within a framework of peaceful competition which necessarily envisages cooperation;" and history, not class struggle, will decide who wins.

Outlining this new Soviet thinking towards the West, Gorbachev treats Eastern bloc policy initiatives versus Western Europe at length. The Communist world prefers to deal with a united Europe as an entity unto itself instead of just a United States ally. He analyzes U.S.-Soviet relations, especially with regard to nuclear disarmament, and reviews the breakthroughs and setbacks of the past, including Geneva and Reykjavik. (The book was published before the most recent Washington Summit).

Perestroika, however, contains not an insignificant number of ambiguities, evasions, and contradictions: the distinction Gorbachev makes between history and class struggle is unclear, as Lenin's enthusiasm for democracy was, at best, inconsistent; glasnost has yet to extend to diplomatic history; and reconciling democratic principles with a continuing absence of an official opposition is an almost insurmountable problem.

Whether perestroika is a subtle ploy to encourage Western complacency, or

Mr. President!

BY CINDY T. SCHLANGER

HOLD ON MR. PRESIDENT! By Sam Donaldson. New York, Random House, 260 pages. $17.95.

Sam Donaldson is one of Washington's most controversial political correspondents. The man President Ronald Reagan once called "the ayatollah of the press corps," has been ABC's chief White House correspondent since 1977. He is also the anchorman of ABC's "World News Saturday" and a moderator on "This Week With David Brinkley." Donaldson has often been called one of the meanest, toughest and most obnoxious reporters ever to cover a president.

In "Hold On Mr. President," Sam Donaldson colorfully describes his childhood, the events that led him to a career in the media and his slow rise through the ranks of TV news shows. He discusses in depth what it has been like covering both Presidents Carter and Reagan, and how they and their administrations dealt with the press.

Donaldson sees the role of the press as being one of challenging the President, forcing him to admit his mistakes, revealing his future plans and making the public aware of it all. This is his job, Donaldson states emphatically, and contrary to popular belief, he is not out to get President Reagan; he is just there to report on what and why is or is not happening.

While it may appear that Donaldson is more hostile towards President Reagan than he had been with President Carter, the answer can be found in the author's comparison of the two administrations and their relationship with the press; President Reagan held twenty-six news conferences during his first four years in office, while President Carter held fifty-nine press conferences during the same four years, more than double that amount. Donaldson attributes this behavior of the White House to the fact that "Reagan and his advisers simply don't like the press." Therefore, he explains, the corps of correspondents has resorted to screaming matches across the White House lawn while the President is boarding his helicopter. Such tactics make it extremely difficult for Reagan to hear the questions or answer them, much to the relief of his advisers. This story also explains why a Doonesbury comic strip referred to Sam Donaldson as "the human bullhorn."

Sam Donaldson skillfully conveys the life of a White House reporter, who covers the single most important politician in the United States, if not the world. His firsthand experience and insights help explain some of the inner workings of the Reagan administration; he, no doubt, effectively conveys the politics behind the press and the press behind the politics.
CONQUEST OF WAR

Continued from page 3

“The object of war is victory, the object of victory is conquest, and the object of conquest is occupation,” proclaimed Napoleon.

In the course of his reign at the helm of France, he conquered most of Western and Central Europe and introduced aggressive measures which turned France into an empire. The Arabs throughout history proved to be one of the most brutal and victorious conquerors, destroying powerful Byzantine Empire, and placing Spain under their boot.

And let us not forget the Americas, whose explorers viciously massacred hundreds of thousands of native Indians, not just to seize land but to gain riches. The Spanish conquistador Hernan Cortes entered Mexico, where Cortes conquered the West Bank and control its mountain ridges overlooking Tel Aviv within hours before Israel could mobilize its citizen army. Thus Israel must maintain a buffer force in the West Bank.

Israel and the Arab world will probably remain hostile forever if the IDF stays in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. If, on the other hand, Israel could achieve real peace in return for the Occupied Territories, the strategic threat would matter less.

Jerusalem, nonetheless, remains the clincher. The Arab states might have quenched some of the occupied settlement without Jerusalem, and the Israelis would never relinquish their capital. After entering the Old City, the eastern half of Jerusalem which was governed by Jordan, the Israelis declared that they will “never part from their holiest city again.” Israel annexed the Jordanian part of Jerusalem two weeks later.

The present occupation looks more like an undeclared annexation. Some 55,000 Jews now live in the West Bank in more than 100 settlements. The ridges around Arab Jerusalem have been planted with Jewish suburbs. The settlers are there to stay. But even 55,000 settlers could not obstruct a peace agreement, if the rest of Israel’s 4 million citizens wanted one. After all, Israel dismantled the town of Yamit, in Sinai, to achieve peace with Egypt.

The real difficulty is the reluctance of Israelis to decide what they want to do with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Today hardly any Israeli wants to go back to the pre-1967 borders. Almost all believe that Israel should keep Jerusalem. Opinions about the rest of the territories are divided: half the population favors staying put; the other half vaguely believes that Israel ought to make some sort of territorial compromise in return for peace. Such compromise, however, would have to allow Israel to keep some of the West Bank in order to secure safer borders.

One must not forget that the Arab states and the displaced Palestinians never accepted the defeat. By their refusal to recognize Israel, and their stated determination to destroy it, they helped bring about Israel’s intransigent conqueror’s stance. After the 1967 war, when Israel might have quenched some of the occupied territories for peace, the Arab states met in Khartoum and issued their famous “three Noses”: no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. They thus closed the door on any immediate solution.

Israel’s former position that it would keep the territories until the Arab states will be willing to trade them for peace, must be maintained. Until the Palestinians renounce their claim to Israeli proper, Israel should not budge from the territories it conquered in 1967. And even then, it might be impossible to uproot enough of the West Bank to make a deal possible. Nobody likes to admit it, but the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—the kernel of Arab-Israeli enmity—will drag on for many years to come.

L.A.

On the West Bank, demilitarization, however, is not enough. An Arab army based East of the Jordan river could cross to the West Bank and control its mountain ridges overlooking Tel Aviv within hours before Israel could mobilize its citizen army. Thus Israel must maintain a buffer force in the West Bank.

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L.A.
Bob Dole
Continued from page 4

down. For one year in 1986, Dole served as the Senate Majority Leader. As such, he soon became known for his LBJ-type dealmaking and compromising. He had mellowed his tones to climb further the political ladder.

Bob Dole is known for being a staunch supporter of the Reagan Administration, having almost all White House-initiated legislation, including abortion and school prayer. He strongly advocates civil rights, supports the food stamps program, and opposes Medicare cuts. He retains a keen sympathy for the disadvantaged and in particular the disabled. Further legislation that gives aid to the handicapped—an interest stemming from the shattering of his right arm during the war.

In his approach to international politics, Dole is even more ambiguous. Although he voted in favor of 
Continued on page 4

Mike Dukakis
Continued from page 5

Dukakis chose Swarthmore College, an intellectually rigorous, politically liberal Quaker school outside Philadelphia, switched out of pre-med courses after his first year of physics, but indulged his growing interest in politics—both on and off campus. Having grown up with two languages at home, Dukakis added French, Spanish and Italian in college, spent a summer in Central America and, after graduation, volunteered for the Army and went to Korea as a private; in order to break the tandem of back-rack. HeReporting that language as well.

Back home, Dukakis entered Harvard Law School and graduated in 1960, just in time to watch the Democrats nominate Brookline native John F. Kennedy for president. Today Dukakis says: “There were two figures in my early political life who had the greatest impact on me: Joe McCarthy and Jack Kennedy. McCarthy...”

While at law school, Dukakis plunged into local politics in Brookline, a comfortable, old-line Boston suburb. He organized a reform slate that took over the town meeting. Then, inspired by John Kennedy, he started building an organization of reform Democrats, expanding the fight statewide. So in 1962, Dukakis won a seat in the state legislature. He had a whole agenda ready from the start. Radiating disdain for favor-trading, he introduced bills to put utilities underground, bar outdoor advertising, and support widespread liability for fault auto insurance. After a failed race for Lieutenant Governor in early 1970, Dukakis changed course temporarily and took a stint as moderator of the PBS television show The Advocates. Mastering the medium would serve him well later in his political campaigns.

Governor Dukakis was swept into office with the aid of an adeptly mobilized army of volunteers in the Watergate election of 1974, a year when “clean government” was very much in fashion. He was unseeded four years later in the 1978 Democratic primary by Edward J. King, a businessman-polician who had managed to gather voters the Governor had alienated. Dukakis would later describe that setback as “the most painful thing that ever happened to me in my life.” But that was the end for Dukakis. After the fiasco, he retreated to Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government where he taught political management and studied economic development.

Then in 1982, he won a hard-fought re-match victory in office, he displayed a supple new political negotiating style that captured former antagonists in the state legislature and business. He won passage of innovative social welfare and economic development programs and, riding a boom to which he was but one of many contributors, he cut taxes before running for a third term. Then, last year, the state gave him a landslide victory with 69 percent of the vote. Once reelected and notably relaxed for perhaps the first time in his 53 years, the man who had never wanted to be anything but “the best governor Massachusetts ever had” set his sights on the presidency, leaving many to wonder what really makes Michael run.

When Michael first met Katherine “Kitty” Dickson, she was, at that time, Jewish, divorced, and had a son by her first marriage. They married immediately. Dukakis’ parents were initially resistant to the match, but Michael married Kitty in 1963, marking the true break with his Greek immigrant roots. The Governor’s temperamentally opposite, Kitty proved to be warm, intensely emotional and a bit extravagant, while Michael was reserved, analytical and parsimonious. They raised three children: two daughters and John, 29, Kitty’s son from her first marriage, who now runs the Dukakis campaign in the South.

Showcasing the Massachusetts Miracle of economic and social programs, expanded jobs and soaring budget surpluses, Governor Dukakis can proudly point to laudable accomplishments. He had no doubt brought the state economy back from the dead. Twelve years before it had been bouncing off the bottom of the barrel. Now the unemployment rate has dropped 4 percent; tax rates have gone down as revenues for state programs increased; an education and training program provided jobs for more than 30,000 welfare mothers; a tax enforcement and amnesty program raised $900 million in three years; and innovative partnerships had spurred balanced economic development around the state.

Dukakis truly believes that he has found an answer to the Democratic Party’s desperate search for a new economic ideology. His program would encompass the basic elements of “economic opportunity” and “full employment” to be achieved by rechanneling existing federal sources into a regional development fund. Commented an influential Washington observer: “Dukakis at times sounds like a man whose fondest ambition is to be Governor of the United States.”

Dukakis does not rule out tax hikes; in fact, he openly favors raising taxes. His fervent belief in such methods had made him intensely unpopular in Massachusetts. It was not until the rewards of his program began to be experienced that Dukakis came to regain his popularity.

On civil liberties issues, Dukakis has not budged an inch since the start of his career. He still opposes the death penalty, despite polls showing most voters favor it. He supports public financing of abortions and opposes foster-home placements with homosexual couples.

Dukakis has taken strong stances on environmental issues like toxic waste dumps and acid rain. He also wants to revive the National Guard’s Corps to universal health care for Massachusetts and the rest of the nation. Child care for working parents would also become a priority.

The Governor opposes aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, citing it as illegal. Instead, he urges Washington to support Central American
Bruce Babbitt
Continued from page 5

life," Hattie, now 40, is a successful Phoenix trial attorney, an ardent naturalist and the mother of two teenage sons.

Babbitt worked a few years in a private Arizona law firm representing Indian interests, before crossing the bridge to public office. First elected attorney general in 1974, he won high marks for prosecuting rampant land fraud and setting up the state's first grand jury system. He succeeded to the governorship four years later through a duke: the elected governor stepped down, and upon the sudden death of the incumbent, Attorney General Babbitt was left next in line to complete his predecessor's interrupted term. Although he won the following gubernatorial election by only a small margin, Babbitt took the next one, in 1982, by storm. He stayed in office until the completion of his term a year ago.

Asa presidential candidate, the most important issue for Bruce Babbitt remains cutting the federal budget deficit. "That's the key," he says, "to saving Social Security." He intends to tackle the deficit with a combination of budget cuts and revenue increases. He therefore advocates a 5 percent national consumption tax, a sort of sales or value-added tax that would raise some $60 billion annually, while at the same time calling for a tax structure that encourages saving.

One of Babbitt's more provocative positions in his austere economic prescriptions, is his support for means testing, or a "universal needs test" as he calls it. He believes that government should gauge each program's true needs thus sparing low-income recipients while increasing the burden on the well-to-do. Federal backing, including social security, Medicare benefits, tax deductions and farm subsidies, should be allotted on the basis of need, even though the most successful programs have provided comprehensive general coverage.

Babbitt's foreign policy platform is based on an unequivocal opposition to Contra aid. He has urged the Administration to negotiate with the Sandinistas and honor the Arias Peace Plan or any agreement acceptable to the Contadora nations. He feels that "Nicaragua is not the first domino of a Marxist expansion, but the last domino in the progress of democracy." Babbitt also rejects a policy of isolationism, noting that existing treaties permit the United States to defend Central American countries in case of a Soviet invasion.

Having visited Israel on two occasions while Governor of Arizona, Babbitt adopted a pro-Israel position. While there, he conferred with Israeli leaders on economic development, bilateral relations, and joint agricultural projects. He is firm in his stance not to negotiate with the PLO as long as it continues refusing to recognize Israel's right to exist, and calls for a forceful response to terrorism.

Babbitt stresses the need for a strong United States commitment to Israel. America's staunchest ally in the Middle East. "Our ties to Israel," he concludes, "are based upon common values and strategic interests."

Bruce Babbitt is now running a low-budget, long-shot campaign, propounding bold but realistic policies, viable by fellow Democrats. His chances of running all the way to the convention are therefore quite slim.

On February 19, 1988, Bruce Babbitt announced in Washington that he was dropping out of the Democratic contest. He had finished 5th at the Iowa caucuses and 6th in New Hampshire.

Afghansi Revolt
Continued from page 12

promised financial assistance, greater involvement with policies governing veterans' benefits and a say in the military training of new recruits, it won over the majority of delegates.

The national council of Afghans and reservists was to be governed by a 50-member Leading Committee elected exclusively from among Komsomol and Communist Party members. Most independent groups were thus absorbed by the Komsomol, and those who refused to join were outlawed.

The Communist Party resistance to efforts of starting new clubs for Afghan veterans intensified, as chances for an end to the war in Afghanistan increased and the return of an additional 120,000 soldiers was expected.

The Memorial War

The Komsomol press continued downplaying the war, and focused on the cultivation of patriotic thinking and physical fitness. It made only scant reference to the acute problems of the Afghans and avoided any mention of their demands to erect national memorials honoring the sacrifice of their comrades.

These Afghans demands echoed by a public outcry for a national memorial forcing the reluctant Komsomol to allocate funds to erect two such monuments in Moscow and Tashkent. Still, the party would not allow the explicit memorialization of the war in Afghanistan and instead decided to honor all Soviet soldiers who had fulfilled their internationalist duty in foreign campaigns, including those who had fought in the Spanish Civil War, aided the Cuban Revolution, and helped quell the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia.

It's Not Easy to be Young

The problems of the Afghans finally began to receive frank treatment in the media last year. A powerful new documentary, Is It Easy To Be Young? opened in Moscow, playing to packed houses. The film presented moving interviews with disabled and embittered veterans, as well as the parents of soldiers killed in Afghanistan. In one segment, Afghans described the horrors of war and their difficulties in adapting to civilian life. They complained that old friends seem interested only in figuring out how to obtain better consumer goods insignificant concerns compared with their own war experiences.
The film did not directly criticize the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, but included unmistakable antiwar sentiment. "I know we are defending our interests," explained one veteran, "but it is a dirty business." "War doesn't make you grow up," added another, "it makes you grow old." Such a bold look at the conflict and its consequences proved a sensation, and all showings were reported to have been sold out.

Soviet television also showed a two-part program in which a moderator interviewed several disgruntled young militants. One Afghantsi named Foteev said openly that at home "it is considerably more difficult than it was in Afghanistan." Relations with people are much more complicated...Afghan veterans are considered dangerous people...Some do not understand us at all," he explained, "others call us fanatics; still others understand us but cannot support us because they do not feel up to it." But the distrust and fear of the activist Afghantsi goes way beyond not believing their accounts of the war. Foteev claimed, at work, he was being "constantly watched and checked from above."

Many letters from veterans printed in Sobesednik, a supplement to Komsomolskaya Pravda, grumbled about inadequate medical care for men crippled in battle, criticizing a society gone soft and complained about the inability to pick up the old threads of civilian life. "I've been home awhile and gotten used to the tranquility," wrote one frustrated former soldier in a Moscow newspaper, "yet I don't feel as if I belong here."

Increasing awareness about veterans' problems and continuous pressure from the Afghantsi and their families, resulted in more adequate medical help for expatriate soldiers who needed it. In response to letters from citizens asking how they can assist veterans, Komsomolskaya Pravda suggested sending food and gifts to hospitals where the wounded were being treated.

The government finally facilitated proper housing, created anti-drug programs and organized support-group meetings for veterans. Plans to erect memorials to the war dead were now publicized and thus somewhat eased the anguish of the Afghantsi, who resented the Kremlin's unwillingness to acknowledge the sacrifice of Soviet youth in the Afghan conflict.

When the Kabul regime declared a six-month unilateral cease-fire and Moscow later expressed its readiness to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by the end of this year, 20 members of a Russian unoffical peace group issued a statement warning that the problem of the Afghantsi, still somewhat understated in the Soviet press, was becoming more acute every day. "We are worried about the fate of the people who went through this school of blood," they noted. "We are approaching that dangerous condition when, having returned to our society, this generation which was under fire will disseminate the terrible experiences they acquired among their contemporaries....It is common knowledge," they concluded, "what psychological and moral difficulties American veterans of the (Vietnam) war suffered."

Recently, Mikhail Gorbachev described Afghanistan as "a bleeding wound." If and when the wound is finally closed, a scar will no doubt remain forever.

**Colombo's War**

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for as much as 50% of the Gross National Product (GNP).

The island being predominantly an agricultural and trading nation, plantation agriculture was still important. But efforts were now made to expand the agricultural base and diversify into light industry, tourism ($100 million) and other non-traditional industries of growing importance, such as textiles and garments, with emphasis on the export sector. In addition, remittances from Sri Lankans working abroad ($300 million) have also become important foreign exchange earners.

By 1987, Sri Lanka was still in the midst of this ambitious development program which, in conjunction with the high-growth, market-oriented policies started eight years before, now began to revitalize the economy. Yet the most essential element of Sri Lanka's economic success was the generous support provided mainly by the United States and allied Western donors. The country received concessional long-term loans, grants, and food aid.

U.S. bilateral economic assistance to Sri Lanka had started as early as 1950 and had reached by the end of 1985 over $1 billion. The current program of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) focused on agricultural productivity and farm incomes, off-farm employment, and the development of the Mahaveli basin, a $2 billion regional hydroelectric irrigation and resettlement project. USAID's other ongoing programs included reforestation, water management, agricultural research, malaria control, private enterprise promotion, and co-financing of United States and Sri Lankan voluntary organizations. These projects represented a portfolio for which approximately $150 million had been provided by 1987. In addition, a low-income housing and urban development guarantee program, totaling some $50 million to date, had assisted the government in financial primarily rural housing.

The Food for Peace program to Sri Lanka also included multi-million dollar loans and grants administered by CARE, for wheat and nutritional food supplements for needy children.

The United States also financed family planning and small development projects, implemented by private organizations.

Economic relations with Washington expanded steadily. In addition to being one of Sri Lanka's major aid donors, the United States also became the island's largest export market, purchasing goods valued at more than $300 million in 1987—mostly tea, rubber and garments. The free trade zone had developed a dynamic textile industry, which now ranked 10th as a supplier of garments for the American market. The United States in turn exported wheat and aircraft to Sri Lanka. Although private American investment in Sri Lanka had grown since liberalized economic policies were introduced, it still remains a relatively modest $20 million.

Through USAID programs, the United States thus has contributed to Sri Lanka's goal of maintaining a high rate of economic growth, reducing unemployment, providing housing, and affording citizens increased economic opportunity. Jayewardene's policies also have attracted a wave of other Western capital. Hotels sprang up to serve a boom in tourism. Then came terror and war. Now the tourists are gone and so is much of the business revival. At night, Colombo's streets are empty except for panhandlers, the homeless, and armed sentries. Unemployment stands at 17 percent of the work force, inflation is at double-digit levels and soaring military outlays have pushed the government budget $1 billion in the red.

For Sri Lanka, therefore, the year ahead will be traumatic. The peace accord, however imperfect, may be the only prospect for building a lasting peace with the Tamils. Failure by both sides to accept this reality will lead only to the continuation and inevitable escalation of factional violence and further economic trouble. Yet for the moment, bitterness is the order of the day in the Tamil region of Sri Lanka. The security forces are preparing to move out again into the bush, for it is obvious that the war is far from over. It is most likely to continue for years to come.

**Security Forces**

*Continued from page 16*

had been allowed to maintain a resident diplomatic mission. By May, Colombo authorized the establishment of an Israeli Special Interests Section, with the United States as protecting power. The new Colombo Station Chief of the Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence organization, negotiated the aid program. By the end of that year, a combined group of Mossad advisors, Sherut Bitachon Kibi (Shin Bet) counter-intelligence agents, and Chief Me-
Small teams of the three services trained Sri Lankan personnel in intelligence gathering and internal security techniques, equipment collection and exploitation of information, infiltration of Tamil revolutionary movements, recruiting terrorists and running agents nets, planning clandestine counter-insurgency missions, and carrying out covert operations to disrupt and contain guerrilla activities. Analysis and dissemination of data was organized and operated by the Sri Lankans themselves.

Four years later, Israeli personnel involved in the program have been rotated several times. The result of their efforts were three highly efficient civilian, military and police intelligence agencies whose efforts proved most efficient in both urban and rural areas.

United States Military Observers—BACK
GROUND: A very small group of American military observers attached to the Sri Lankan armed forces has been reported on the island. No confirmation is available.

Mercenaries:

Police and Counter-Insurgency Trainers—BACKGROUND: KMS Ltd., a Channel Island independent security organization and quasi-official London surrogate, which had表面 in the world from Africa to Afghanistan, was retained shortly after the 1983 outbreak of hostilities to train the new police Special Task Force (STF). Commonly known as "The Keeny Menny Services" (the movement of a snake in Swahili), the KMS, led by former British Special Air Service (SAS) Colonel Jim Johnson, is reported to have some 40 English trainers at the STF facility south of Colombo, instructing new recruits. The mercenary training team does not perform operational duties. KMS personnel nevertheless has attracted stiff opposition from India and reportedly caused a rift with London which is trying to have them removed from Sri Lanka. KMS-trained Sri Lankan instructors are slowly replacing the British.

Air Force Instructors—BACKGROUND: The KMS is also being utilized to supply pilots for the rapidly expanding Sri Lankan Air Force. The number of foreign helicopter and fighter pilot trainers used by the SLAF is said to be 20. They fly actual missions but are prohibited from engaging in combat. Sri Lankan fliers are said to be somewhat resentful of the excellent contractual terms under which their instructors serve, but foreigners are being hired in increasing numbers.

Foreign Armies:

Indian Peacekeeping Force (PKF)—BACKGROUND: One day after the July 29, 1983, signing of the unexpected peace agreement between Colombo and New Delhi, the first units of the PKF arrived in Sri Lanka. An Indian contingent of some 3000 troops from the 52nd Infantry Division (Armoured) of the Indian Southern Command spearheaded a force of 3 brigades in combat array complete with Soviet-made BMP-1 armed cars which streamed into the Northern Province.

CEASE-FIRE: Agreeing to guarantee the accord with armed might, the Indians positioned their troops to separate the Tamil guerrillas from the Sri Lankan Security Forces. They policed the cease-fire and supervised the turning in of insurgent weapons. By the end of August, the LTTE Tigers and some of the other guerrilla groups had returned only a fraction of their arsenals and sought to circumvent the peace treaty. In September, the LTTE Tigers were fighting delaying actions in the jungle while falling into the countryside. Tamil guerrillas of most other groups declared war on the Pak, they now called "the representatives of the Indian bourgeoisie." STRENGTH: India had increased its on-island Pak forces to 75,000, and in the last three winter months of 1987, threw into battle elite troops and special forces such as one Chukra Battalion and a Parachute Regiment. CASUALTIES: By March 1988, Indian casualties had mounted to over 750 dead and 1500 maimed and wounded. MILITARY BUDGET: New Delhi is spending at present 3 million rupees ($230,000) a day to maintain its PKF forces in Sri Lanka. The fighting continues unabated.

Savage Emperor

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victed after a six-month trial for conspiracy to commit murder, the unlawful detentions and execution of political opponents, the mass murder of schoolchildren, and the embezzlement of public funds. He was acquitted for lack of evidence on charges of theft of the crown jewels and cannibalism. The accusation of conspiring with Libya was dropped by the court due to the lack of jurisdiction. The other charges proved sufficient to land Bokassa the death penalty. Judge Edouard Frank ordered that he be executed by gassing or by firing squad at the Bangba Prison. Bokassa was given 3 days to appeal the CAR Supreme Court.

"Bokassa had been the victim of a French disinformation campaign — an intelligence technique known as 'gelling the pill.'"

At the beginning of 1988, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal; sentence was to be carried out at once. But on February 29, President Kolingba, following his previous practice of invariably commuting all capital punishment sentences to life imprisonment, granted clemency to Bokassa. He was ordered to spend the rest of his life in solitary confinement. Nevertheless, one thing seems certain. Bokassa's days as a central figure in CAR affairs had ended. Even his once awe-inspiring ability to influence the masses has faded into mere curiosity. The death sentence had caused no outbursts of emotion either in the courtroom or around the country.

When hearing about his commutation, Bokassa remained as calm and good-natured as ever, confident that "one day the truth will finally be told" and his son, 36-year-old Prince Otou, a French businessman and pretendee to the CAR throne, will assume his rightful position as Emperor of Central Africa.

Bokassa I

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and soldiers of the Presidential Guard: then he passed out. When he came to 18 hours later, Goldsmith was on Death Row in Ngaragaba Prison, handcuffed and bleeding.

Goldsmith remained in solitary confinement for a month. Then, suddenly, conditions improved. His meals were brought from the Safari Hotel and he was given medical care. Finally, one day he was taken to Berengo Palace, where Bokassa told him in a three-hour monologue that he was now considered a member of the family. The Emperor offered to make Goldsmith his personal journalist at any salary he chose. Goldsmith refused. Bokassa shrugged, kissed him on the cheek, and put him on a plane to Paris.

On another occasion, upon returning from an official visit to the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, Bokassa summoned the local press to report about his trip. On the radio that night, newscaster DDL described the meeting as a "statement" rather than a "press conference." For some reason Bokassa was offended by this comment and had the man brought to the palace, where his soldiers beat him to a pulp. The journalist was then taken to Ngaragaba Prison and left there for a year without even the possibility of a trial. The torture and killings at the Central Prison, were carried out under the supervision of Commander Joseph Mokwa and his aide, Otto Sacher, a former Polish officer. The two were notorious for their brutal excesses.

On February 3, 1976, Bokassa's son-in-law, Fidel Obrou, who had joined a cabal to assassinate the Emperor, tried to blow him up with hand grenades, but missed. The Imperial Political Police discovered that one of his 10 co-conspirators had been General Jean-Claude Mandaba, CAR's Ambassador to Rumania. Bokassa ordered his expanding Lee's traditional political king, and arrested him as soon as he stepped off the plane. Mandaba belonged to Obrou's tribe and was suspected of having participated in the cabal, but his guilt was never proven. The Mokwa-Sacher team had the General confess in no time, then cut off his parts and delivered them, as requested, to Bokassa. The other eight conspirators were summarily shot. A few hours later Obrou scratched a message on one of the walls, still visible today: "They are coming to shoot me this morning. I pray God will not give me any pain in my soul and that people will look after my family." His executions would make sure that his wish was never fulfilled. Mokwa was himself executed for his crimes in 1980. Sacher disappeared without a trace.

In January 1979, Bokassa decreed that all schoolchildren must wear uniforms, both because he was obsessed with uniforms and because his family owned the only uniform factory in the country. A few days later, several hundred children of middle-class civil servants, whom Bokassa had not paid in months and who could not afford the uniforms, organized a peaceful demonstration against the edict. Bokassa arrived on the scene in his-
torched, personally distributed ammunition to the soldiers (the military had not been allowed to carry loaded rifles since Obrou’s assassination attempt on his life), and gave the order to fire into the crowd. More than a dozen children were killed.

On April 19, a group of elementary school children from the Lakanou Quarter threw stones at his car. Such leç-majesté could not be countenanced. Bokassa’s Political Police rounded up 180 kids and threw them into three cells at N’Djamena Prison. Several six-year-olds suffocated. That night Bokassa stalked in around eight o’clock. Ignoring the sobbing treatises of parents outside the prison, he ordered the children brought out. Yelling “I’ll teach you to shout ‘Death to the Emperor,’ ” he split open the heads of a half-dozen of them with his ebony cane. Then, turning to Mokwa, he snapped: “You finish them off,” and walked out. Only 27 of the children survived.

A Private Zoo

Bokassa used to hold kangaroo court at his Kolinga residence near Banin outside Bangui, sitting under a canopy with his ministers on the right, and the prisoner tied up in the middle of flagstones. Whenever the Emperor thought that his prisoner was not telling the truth, he would march up to his soldier, who fed the man to the lions or the crocodiles, depending on Bokassa’s mood. The lion’s cage was in a nearby bunk with huge boababs sprouting from it, a passage in back leading to where the condemned man was handcuffed; the crocodile pool was a few feet away. The lion-keeper, who had been caught once stealing meat from the animals to feed his family, was himself thrown to the beasts, but they would not eat him; Bokassa ordered the man thrown into the crocodile pool. Later claimed at his trial that the crocodiles were “simply for decoration,” but French soldiers who broke into Kolinga on the day the Emperor was ousted dredged the pool and found the gnawed remains of several human skeletons.

Bokassa firmly believed that he had supernatural powers that made people tremble and obey him because of an infusion of strength transferred to him from his animals—the 20 lions, 18 crocodiles, and dozens of venomous snakes. In fact, Bokassa raised cobras and vipers at the same villa where gazelles and antelopes grazed in the shade of kolongo (fan palm trees). He would keep an eye on them through a closed-circuit surveillance system from his bedroom.

The Cannibal

Bokassa often privately boasted that he also derived his power from eating people. Central Africans were regularly surprised to see that their Emperor was a carnivor. The African term for gestural cannibals who actually enjoy the taste of human flesh. Eating humans was not as strange and repellent in Africa as it is in the rest of the world.

They thus invariably believed that he had been a cannibal “pour renforcer son pouvoir” (to strengthen his power). Such state-level cannibalism, wherein a chief of state ate the hearts, livers, and parts of his enemies so that their power would pass over to him was said to have been common among the M’Baka. Bokassa’s tribe.

The M’Baka had a reputation for eating people. They even had a special chant they performed when partaking of human flesh. “Violent battles frequently broke out between the M’Baka and their neighbors for petty reasons,” wrote the French ethnographer, Dr. Michel Poutin, in his 1910 Notes Ethnographiques sur les Populations M’Baka “and victims of these battles were eaten by theM’Baka.” Human flesh, he noted, was considered a true feast. After a battle, wounded or dead enemies were brought into the village and tied to a pole. Then, the chief, who always had first choice, circled with red paint the parts he wanted. Despite their barbaric eating habits, Poutin concludes, the M’Baka were considered more courageous, cunning, intelligent, and also physically stronger and better-looking than other, non-cannibalistic tribes.

Bokassa, a true M’Baka cannibal, had assigned a room in his Kolinga mathematics teacher, Massangue, who was positively identified by his relatives. Bokassa’s cook, Philippe Linguisia, later testified that he and the Emperor together took flesh out of the cold-storage rooms at Kolinga and that Bokassa would ask him to cook a meal, which “he ate in my presence and seemed to appreciate it.”

David Dacko, Bokassa’s cousin and President of the Central African Republic before and after Bokassa’s tenure, said he was shown pictures of cut-up bodies found in the freezer at Kolinga the day after the coup. The pieces had been tossed up with string like rib roasts and were positively identified as human flesh by the coroner. An African newspaper who had entered the cold storage rooms after the coup described them as reeking of the unmistakable smell of human flesh.

“Anyone who has been in a war would recognize it immediately,” he later wrote. “There is nothing quite like it.”

The second and last installment of this PORTRAIT will be continued in the next issue.

Pretoria and US

Continued from page 24

needed to switch the new policy of sanctions with its original non-punitive strategy of “quiet diplomacy. The White House had come to terms with the provisions of the Anti-Apartheid Act which it so strenuously opposed. The phrase “constructive engagement” was dropped from official statements, and State Department officials were privately calling it “the policy that dare not speak its name”.

Throughout the year promises of more aid to the Frontline States were made and expanding contacts with South Africa’s various black leaders, including African leaders, the African National Congress were intimated: Secretary of State George Schultz met with ANC leader, Oliver Tambo, in January. South Africa had thus become a domestic civil rights issue. Promised Republican Senator and presidential hopeful, Robert Dole: “It will be on Congress’ agenda every year for the next decade.”

A Divestment Offensive

Students continued pressing for divestment, and demonstrated from Cornell to Berkeley. The sit-ins were reminiscent of the tumultuous anti-Vietnam scenes enacted around the country when President Richard Nixon was in office. Many colleges and universities even instituted an annual National Anti-Apartheid Protest Day.

The Students were not only clamoring for attention but for total divestment from South Africa. Columbia University administrators finally guaranteed that their demands for the divestment of school funds from South African businesses will be met. Harvard University, on the other hand, insisted that divestment might pacify America’s conscience, but would do little to help South African blacks; in fact, they assured, it would have a contrary effect as money and the power that goes with it, were in the hands of corporations opposed to apartheid. Harvard continued using its dollars to invest that South African recipients observed the Sullivan Principles.

“Countries that have failed to apply adequate anti-apartheid pressure will be held accountable and suffer future punitive trade measures when power is transferred to the black majorities.”

American blacks were particularly sensitive to the plight of South African blacks; they realized that their brothers’ struggle was not merely a matter of white people denying rights and opportunity to blacks, but of a theory man had formulated which justified universal white dominance. The black community and certain religious groups thus viewed divestment as a purely moral issue void of economic concerns. They perceived those who have businesses in South Africa or own stock in South African corporations as accomplices of a regime that represses blacks.

The Nobel peace laureate, Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, went as far as to suggest that the United States and Western countries that have failed to apply adequate anti-apartheid pressure be held accountable and suffer future punitive trade measures, when power is transferred to the black majority. Tutu further contended that if the international community fails to press for an end to apartheid, the day might come when he would have to endorse the use of violence against the South African government. He later clarified his remarks by
explaining that he was not being so presumptuous as to say the he would give the signal for open revolt; he would only acknowledge the moment when its time would come.

Sullivan: Get Out!

Though the mien of all anti-apartheid bills was the requirement of all American firms in South Africa to comply with the Sullivan Principles, results had failed all expectations. Rev. Sullivan, discouraged by the results of recent white-only elections that produced a sharp turn to the right, concluded that his “Principles” had failed to bring an end to apartheid, urged all American firms to leave South Africa and the Reagan Administration to break remaining trade and diplomatic ties with Pretoria. Sullivan insisted that American companies stop supplying South Africa with components and end licensing agreements in that country. The only exceptions, he added, should be the news media, philanthropic and education programs, and black-owned businesses.

In Pretoria, Foreign Minister Roelof (“Pik”) Botha fumed that South Africa could not “allow itself to be threatened in this way.” The Reagan Administration took exception to Sullivan’s brash announcement, stating that “it is now more important than ever for U.S. firms to stay in South Africa and work for an end to apartheid.” Asked whether his guidelines could endure without him, Sullivan quipped, “Well, they kept the Ten Commandments without Moses, didn’t they.”

Toward the end of 1987 major corporations (Exxon, General Motors, IBM, Coca-Cola, and Britain’s Barclays) announced that they were pulling out of South Africa, citing the failure of the government to address the fundamental issue of political change.

* * *

As a new wave of violence swept South Africa, and rumors of civil war intensified, it became increasingly difficult to envision a peaceful, or even compromising end to apartheid. It was evident that during the 38-year-old rule of this racist policy the South African government had suffered few material losses; it was now rapidly becoming inured to critical rhetoric. So, even a devious policy appeared to be the only route open towards ending apartheid. Yet, such options must be carefully analyzed as continued divestment would, at this point, mean the loss of thousands of jobs by the oppressed blacks. Thus, presently, there appears to be a no-win situation in South Africa as no solution seems to be acceptable to either the whites in power or the persecuted black majority. Seemingly, the issues surrounding divestment and apartheid will remain on the Congressional agenda at least in the near future. “Apartheid,” summed up, Sen. Newton R. Grinwich of Georgia, “has replaced civil rights as the key vote on racial issues.”

Given the rigidity of the South African government and the damaged foreign policy in Washington, there is not much the Administration can do in the near future. This is not to say that the United States will do nothing at all. Washington will not doubt reposition itself more neutrally, so it can later offers its services as a credible mediator between opposing sides in South Africa.” The United States has only a limited ability to influence developments in South Africa,” summed up a recent study of the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies, “particularly in the short run. We do not possess any levers that can be used to force the white ruling group to move faster or further than its own assessment of risks and gains dictates, or to leverage blacks to adjust their priorities and tactics to our perception of reality. We can educate and persuade a bureaucratic boll- ster; we cannot coerce, compel, or force changes in what drives the components of this most complex society to their uncertain destiny.”

Moscow Showdown

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porters—Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, who has no independent political base except Gorbachev’s; Lev N. Zaikov, former chief of the Leningrad party; and Alexander N. Yakovlev, perhaps Gorbachev’s closest advisor on domestic affairs. The other members elevated to the Politburo in June—Nikolai N. Slyunkov, the party’s top economic advisor, and Victor P. Nikonov, its agricultural czar—are considered Gorbachev allies on economic issues, but their allegiance in other questions is less certain. Opposition to the Secretary General in the Politburo centers around remnants of the Brezhnev era—G. Aliyev, Vladimir Scherbitsky, and Soviet President and former Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Again, the key man here is Ligachev who possesses much of the same charisma that helped Gorbachev vault to power.

The Party Secretariat is Gorbachev’s stronghold, for here he has anchored his political machine, appointing his allies to key positions. However, the greatest potential vulnerability for Gorbachev lies in the Central Committee. It is here that Western Kremlinologists identify at least five overlapping groups which oppose or could challenge Gorbachev’s policies: entrenched party officials tainted by corruption, older officials afraid of Gorbachev’s mandatory retirement, regional party leaders attempting to retain patronage power, ideological conservatives scared of avant-garde changes, and those who feel Gorbachev’s opponents argue, question with increased boldness the wisdom of glasnost."

Aside from governmental dissent, Gorbachev must be wary of other more powerful pillars of the regime such as the armed forces and the KGB, who seem to be fairly uncompromised at the present. Admittedly, the quick military reorganization that culminated with the appointment of General Dimitri T. Yazov, a Gorbachev protege, as Defense Minister following the Mathias Rust “peace flight” to Moscow in May 1987, was a helpful move for Gorbachev. Moreover, the army and the KGB have for sometime advocated the type of renewal presently underway, mostly because they have always had access to real Soviet economic statistics.

It is thus apparent that despite certain not so insignificant internal opposition, Gorbachev is currently prevailing in his pinnacle of power. He sets the agenda, dominates the news, and occupies a position of enormous power that enables him to reward friends and punish enemies. His opposition, although large in scope, is quite splintered. Shifting alliances in the Politburo and Central Committee usually focus on specific issues, but presently there is no alternative program available and no other leader, not even Ligachev, daring enough to step forward; the General Secretary remains unchallenged. So the longer he stays in office, the more opportunities Gorbachev will have to appoint supporters and confidants to the Politburo and the Central Committee.

With his pride, charisma, and popular support, Michael Gorbachev has perhaps the best chance to overhaul the Soviet system from within. Yet, to complete this reformation and restructurization process, he faces critical showdown issues; one of these being the need to retrain approximately 20 million Soviet workers within the next ten years. As Gorbachev stressed, there is no other way. Russia has passed the point of no return.

Continued from page 26 those released feel guilty, and those left behind suffer remorse. A friend in Leningrad writes that around him refuseknis leave but his reappraisal for an exit visa has been denied and will not be reviewed again until 1990. In the meantime, his 25-year-old son is liable for the military draft and his 18-year-old daughter undergoes daily harassment as a Fid, and fears dismissal from the university in spite of outstanding grades.
Gorbachev argues that emigration of refuseniks, which has been urged by Americans, is a "brain drain" to the Soviet Union. This is nonsense and smacks of the elitist arguments used by many anti-Semites. Firstly, Jews constitute less than one percent of the Soviet population, and, moreover, refuseniks have been denied brain labor from the inception of their refusal. In this respect, the Soviets' treatment of refuseniks constitutes their own brain drain policy. Implicit, however, in Gorbachev's statement is the fear that more Jews than official refuseniks would want to leave the Soviet Union, if able. Nevertheless, this still does not constitute a brain drain.

What emigration rights for Jews would constitute is a depletion of political pawns. Every expert game of chess requires the studied use of pawns in accomplishing the broader, vital objective. Soviet Jewry is the corpus of pawns in the Soviet political chess game. Refuseniks recognize such fact and thus plead that America remember this in its bargaining with the Soviet Union.

Why don't the Soviets just let the Jews out? The answer should be in this light be self-evident. Why abandon one's bargaining chips? The past year's release of refuseniks must thus be evaluated against both the Washington summit and Soviet needs. Should these needs be satisfied momentarily, the Soviet Union will keep other Jewish pawns in reserve for future objectives.

Finally, glasnost-perestroika does not even touch upon anti-Semitism—a daily fact of life in the Soviet Union. Lenin, in his day, had predicted that Jews would be subjected to anti-Semitism by Communists and Russian nationalists. He also predicted that the movement would be fueled by religious hatred and nationalistic cravings. The ideological and political forces that support anti-Semitism in the past and continue to do so today are strong. The movement has not been eliminated by the glasnost policies of perestroika, as some observers have hoped.

For Soviet Jewry, glasnost is a cynical policy of manipulation. For Soviet Jewry, glasnost is a cynical policy of manipulation. The attitude on the part of some Americans that Jews should simply be given the wherewithal to live as Jews in the Soviet Union, in the form of kosher food, seforim and Hebrew instruction, is dangerously misguided. Russian history teaches us that what has been dispensed by an autocratic, monolithic political power can also be withdrawn at will. So, after the immediate objectives of the chess game have been accomplished, there may again be no kosher food, no seforim, no Hebrew instruction.

A vital, productive Jewish community is inherently contradictory to either the Marxist-Leninist or nationalistic objectives of the USSR. Before we therefore lie the threat of Jewish cultural genocide in the Soviet Union. The vital question, however, remains: with or without glasnost and without Jewish culture, who will be a Soviet Jew?

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INF and NATO

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build a unified military force.

The creation of a strong and united Europe requires a certain degree of autonomy. It is what Washington expects from its allies, it should support and encourage an independent European system.

In the meantime, European skeptics and opponents of the INF treaty, grudgingly agreed in public to support the Reagan-Gorbachev pact. They understood the temptations of Gorbachev's peace slogans on Europeans fearful of war; they accepted the divisions among themselves and the ease with which continental superpowers have always exploited them in the past; but they could not refrain from accusing the Reagan administration of having lost sight of the original purpose of NATO and its principles, of playing with the allies' fears of the possible consequences of a gradual diminution of Europe, and of following an appeasement policy of sacrificing the long-term deterrent for short-term political gains. Conditioned by geography, these European strategists could not overlook the closeness of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact forward-based forces. For them the treaty's prohibition of the possession and use of certain atomic weapons and the elimination of intermediate nuclear missiles could be an open invitation to non-nuclear military action. They no longer fear a sudden massive nuclear attack but the much more realistic possibility of a conventional war that would threaten Western Europe's mere existence.

Nasty Squabbles

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apartheid recently brought the two allied enemies to the brink of war for the third time this century.

Greece's open contempt for the United States makes a mockery of the collective defense concept. The Hellenic Armed Forces are deployed on the premise that Turkey will be the adversary in any war—a philosophy formally announced by Premier and Defense Minister Andreas Papandreou in December 1984. "There is no military threat from the north," he asserted, "only the east."

The 10-year defense plan both antagonists must adhere to was launched in 1982. In the following 4 years Greece's defense budget was hoisted by 12.7% and a massive 25% thereafter. Some of the funding for this build-up seemingly against Turkey was being provided by the United States. Such a thankless task was made even more complex by the fact that military aid must adhere to a previously-agreed formula of 7:10 shares for Greece and Turkey respectively. Such a division was reaffirmed in a September 1983 treaty allowing the United States to use four Greek bases (Souda Bay, Hellenikon, Iraklion and Neamaki) and 16 secondary sites until December 91, 1988. The accord was reached only after long and acrimonious accusations. But if the Greek Socialist government remains in power, the United States will be required to abandon all bases by the end of 1989.

Greece's relationship with the remainder of NATO has been no less strained. Having left the Alliance in protest over the use of NATO-funded equipment by Turkey in Cyprus, Greece rejoined in October 1980—just a year before the Socialist government came to power. Increasingly, Athens boycotted NATO exercises, and if the alliance thought that the agreement with the United States on bases in 1983 was the precursor of better relations, such hopes were dashed a mere three weeks after the signing when a series of United States-Greek army maneuvers were discontinued because the operational scenario revolved around an attack from the north, not Turkey in the east.

Turkey Perseveres

Whatever Turkey's real or imagined designs against Greece and southern Cyprus, it would appear that Ankara had enough problems of its own without going out of its way to provoke Athens into a renewed clash. Militarily, Turkey is rapidly obsolescing—a state of affairs worsened by a four-year estrangement
The division of the island's population into two physically separate ethnic communities reflects deeply ingrained feelings of cultural identity. Within the divided society, the spirit of purely Cypriot nationality does not exist. Language, instead, is the crucial element of social and political identification. Thus the Greek-speaking Cypriot thinks of himself first of all as a member of the Hellenic nation with a history and civilization reaching back over millennia. His affiliation with other Greek speakers and with Greece takes precedence in most situations over his identity as a Cypriot. Similarly the Turkish-speaking Cypriot identifies in most settings with other Turkish Cypriots, and language forms for him a bond with mainland Turks.

Religion, the foremost basis for social cleavage, divided Cypriot society into a large Orthodox Christian majority and an Islamic minority. However, the lines of religious and ethnic division today coincide. The Greek-speaking community adheres to the Orthodox Christian Church of Cyprus, and the Turkish-speaking community is Sunni Moslem. In both ethnic communities, institutionalized religion is closely associated with nationalist sentiment.

As the country entered the decade of the 1980s, the impact of the coup and the armed Turkish intervention that followed remained starkly evident. The ensuing political, social and economic issues constituted a continuing source of tension throughout the island and the eastern Mediterranean. Turkish troops from the mainland remained in the northern part of Cyprus despite UN resolutions calling for their withdrawal.

Then, on November 15, 1983, the Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally created the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Widespread condemnation of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots followed. Talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots resumed early in 1985. A reunification of the island, however, was never achieved.

Intercommunal talks in search of a political settlement to the Cyprus question continued unabated for years. But despite some appearance of progress, including consideration by both sides of a United States settlement proposal, by the end of 1987, the two communities remained as far apart as before in their attempts at reaching a solution.

Restructuring
Continued from page 35

whether the roots of its policies are shallow, have only few short-term benefits, would take a long time to implement and therefore would never last, is to be seen. The Secretary General does admit that there have been problems implementing his concepts. Changes have come about slowly, and perestroika is still being met with opposition. He does, however, remain confident that restructuring is precisely what the Soviet Union needs to rejuvenate its economy. He therefore incessantly reassures his readers of the Soviet people's "passionate support" for perestroika and promises that his Kremlin team will make it work; he urges them to trust Soviet economic architects whose policies will pose no threat to the West. He believes that it will be a great terror for the world to ignore perestroika for its effects will be far reaching.

On the whole, these statements are no more than an untestable set of assurances. Perestroika no doubt provides us with an important opportunity to analyze how far the Soviet Union has evolved since the days of Generalissimo Stalin's reign of terror and what those changes might imply for the future. Therefore the book could be a first flicker of evidence that the USSR might evolve in time from a state seeking to challenge the existing international system to one capable of living peacefully within it. It could, in fact, turn out to be a long-awaited mellowing of Soviet society.

Thus Perestroika cannot be dismissed merely as repackaged propaganda; yet it should be accepted with raised eyebrows and a healthy dose of wait-and-see suspicion.

Twin Republics
Continued from page 33
de facto political division of the island and a new perception among Greek Cypriots that mainland Turkey rather than the Turkish Cypriot community is the real power center in future settlement decisions. Furthermore, the intervention gave rise to massive refugee movements involving more than 200,000 persons that drastically altered the population distribution in the country. Initially, a large-scale exodus of Greek Cypriot refugees from the north was followed by an airlift of Turkish refugees from the south, via Turkey, to the north. These shifts resulted in the almost complete segregation of the two ethnic communities.

US-Israel
Continued from page 34
does not necessarily take into account European nations when making policy decisions, the same does not hold true for the United States.

Such dependence is "unhealthy and needs to be reduced as much as possible," Ambassador Yaeger stressed, in order to increase the freedom of policy making in Israel. Whenever there is a slump in the Israeli economy, its dependency on the United States increases. Even the Secretary of State George Schultz recently became involved in Israeli economic reforms.

However, there is a much brighter side to this relation—the growing friendship between the two countries. This friendship deepened in recent years, and there is greater respect for Israel in the United States today than ever before. Ambassador Yaeger said that he had been pleasantly surprised on more than one occasion to find a great deal of support for Israel among non-Jews. While Americans may know little about Israeli leaders, he added, they have a positive opinion of Israel.

As Israel celebrates its 40th birthday, Ambassador Yaeger stressed, it must continue to lessen its dependency on Washington, while at the same time maintaining its genuine friendship with the United States. It is on this birthday, he concluded, that Israel must win over the support of non-Jewish Americans.
E ven everyone knows that choosing a President is a delicate and trying task. Conceivably, the President of the United States holds in his hands the lives of hundreds of millions of people, while his sphere of influence extends not only from coast to coast but to all countries around the globe. He must therefore be a man of great intellect, charisma and purity—a shining example to whom the world can turn for justice, guidance and aid. In short, the man to whom we refer as the President must be a veritable prince among men—a man, by no means, to be taken lightly. For these reasons, and others, it becomes obvious that Ronald Reagan is the man for the job.

There are those of dubious character who would dare to wag an accusing finger at President Reagan, simply because the national economy has gone to hell with a trillion-dollar deficit, the stock market has nearly collapsed, and the national defense budget toward thousand-dollar toilet seats, and we have lost face with other nations around the world because of nefarious Iran-Contra hearings. Because of these and other trifles which have occurred during his presidency, people call Reagan incompetent.

Imagine that! And, because of such few, minor incidents, people say he isn’t on top of things, and that his wife and staff handle most of his national duties. What do they want from the poor man? Is he supposed to be omniscient? A man of his stature needs time to ponder the course of his weighty actions. Must he run a country to boot?

Just let Ronald Reagan’s illustrious presidential career speak for itself; it’s littered with incidents attesting to the President’s competence and wisdom.

Ronald Reagan has been no run-of-the-mill leader. He deserves to be placed in a class by himself. Past presidents have been conceited, arrogant and haughty. Being insecure, they felt compelled to profess a working knowledge of presidentially-related duties and tasks. But not Reagan!

By dint of his strong character and predisposition, he is not ashamed to admit: “I don’t know….. I don’t remember,” as he commented so readily during the Iran-Contra hearings.

Working a back-breaking fifteen minutes a day (as per the New York Times), the man is a living dynamo. Can anyone truly compete with Reagan’s far-reaching experience? Certainly after almost eight years, he must have gotten the knack for being President.

Indeed, our revered and beloved leader must possess an intimate knowledge (gained by trial and error) of the economy’s every quirk and idiosyncrasy. With the unbiased and impartial wit of his charming wife to draw on, Ronald and Nancy are an imposing twosome. After all, aren’t two heads better than one?

President Reagan has been the butt of media-originated jokes so often that the reader must labor to keep an unclouded view of the man and what he stands for. We are dealing with an understanding, peaceful man.

Remember when Ariel Sharon had all those terrorists bottled up and at Israel’s mercy? Who else but Reagan would insist on furnishing a multitude of psychotic Middle-Eastern terrorists with an unconditional pardon and free transportation by boat, away from their captors? Being the kind of soul he is, Reagan didn’t want to deprive the terrorists of their livelihood, and allowed them to keep their machine guns, explosives and other knick-knacks.

What a guy!

Throughout the annals of time, history has shown that all great leaders are, to some extent, surrounded by an air of mystery. President Reagan is no exception. To this day, people wonder why he would send troops to Lebanon, and yet specifically forbid the soldiers to load their weapons....

Considering Ronald Reagan’s many positive and progressive qualities, we come to the crux of the matter: do we want this man at the helm of our country for another four years?
AFRICA: FRONTLINE AGAINST AIDS. The spread of AIDS in Africa is a matter of grave concern, with millions dying from the disease. The continent must find ways to combat it.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT: SPETNAZ. Soviet Special Forces are known to operate clandestinely in our midst. Trained to wreak havoc in the West, they are now being employed in other parts of the world. This unit is said to be involved in operations in Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA: LURCH TO THE RIGHT. Even in Pretoria, they call him Mr. Hitler. Eugene Terre Blanche (literally White Land) has formed an extreme right-wing Afrikaner Resistance Movement, whose brownshifted storm troopers disrupt and terrorize meetings of blacks and whites alike, while flaunting Nazi colors and symbols. The YU Clarion reports on the white backlash that is gaining wide support.

AFRICA: FRONTLINE AGAINST AIDS. Although no proof exists that AIDS originated in Africa, the dread disease is now more widespread on the Black Continent than anywhere else in the world. Several hundred thousand Africans are dead and perhaps five million more carry the virus. Our editors report on racist myths and the latest hard facts which show the alarming growth of AIDS on the continent.

FOCUS: SECRET WAR IN THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE. Kuhn Sa, the Busimese opium warlord and spiritual father of narco-terrorism, reigns high over the vast territory of the 75,000-square-mile Golden Triangle, where the borders of Thailand, Burma and Laos meet. Forty competitive warlords, who also command vast, heavily-armed troops, oversee the world's largest opium and heroin trade. They each represent ethnic minorities fighting for freedom and independence: the Kachin, Shan, Hmong, Mon, Akha and Karen.

PORTRAIT: THE SAVAGE EMPEROR (Part II). The conclusion of the Bokassa Saga tells the story of the ex-emperor's harem and family exploits. It reconstructs the details of the French coup that ousted him, recounts his life in exile and his great escape home. The show trial in Bangui concludes the story of one of Africa's most vicious rulers.

CAMPAIGN 88: KNOW YOUR CANDIDATES. Watch the continuation of the series as the YU Clarion presents the next three Republican and Democratic presidential candidates to allow you the full choice before voting.

MORE on National Affairs. And MUCH MORE on Ireland, Morocco, India and Panama.

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