# The Clarion—Winter 2006

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The Clarion
FROM THE EDITOR

It is my honor to present to you this issue of the Clarion. After an extended hiatus, Yeshiva University's undergraduate journal of political science returns to present a strong compilation of articles from students and faculty.

The Clarion's format has fluctuated over its two decades of publication. Our previous issue, published in 2003, had a magazine format, combining articles with interviews with leading political figures, and making significant use of photos. This year's Clarion returns to a more traditional academic journal format. We made our format more dynamic by retaining our focus on academic political science while including interviews with two of America's leading academics: Yale's Robert Dahl, the dean of American politics, and Daniel Pipes, a historian who left the university to found the influential Middle East Forum thinktank. Many thanks to those scholars for their time and contributions.

In the past, the Clarion has had a welcome but unpredictable presence on the undergraduate academic scene at Yeshiva University. This edition is a first step towards, with hope and hard work, this journal's steady semiannual publication. It must be followed up by dedicated effort on the part of its staff and submissions on the part of political science students on campus. As the university's department of Political Science has begun to expand and flourish in recent years, so may the Clarion be strengthened and improved in the years to come.

The publication of a journal of political science at a college with only one thousand liberal arts students is no small feat, and was made possible only through the assistance of many individuals who possess a commitment to liberal arts and the pursuit of truth. Many thanks to Drs. Ruth Bevan, Stephen Pimpare, Evan Resnick, Joseph Luders, Bryan Daves and Ryuji Mukae; to Dean Frederic Sugarman and Yeshiva College for their crucial financial support; to Ariel Rosenzveig, president of Yeshiva's Joseph Dunner Political Science Society; to Tova Press, our publisher; to our entire staff, our contributors, and our readers.
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Interview: Daniel Pipes on the Middle East and Campus Watch

Alan Goldsmith and Tzvi Kahn interviewed Dr. Daniel Pipes, founder and director of the Middle East Forum, in his Philadelphia office on August 26, 2005. The ensuing discussion covered Israel's disengagement from Gaza, the Iraq conflict, the war on radical Islam, and Middle East studies on campus. Several further questions were posed to him on January 18, 2006, in the aftermath of the Israeli political realignment and the incapacitation of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

Dr. Pipes, an award-winning columnist for the New York Sun and Jerusalem Post, has authored fourteen books and hundreds of articles on the Middle East. A graduate of Harvard (A.B., 1971; Ph.D., 1978), Dr. Pipes has taught at the University of Chicago, the U.S. Naval War College, and his alma mater. A former official in the Departments of State and Defense, he also served as vice chairman of the Fulbright Board of Foreign Scholarships, as a member of the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Dr. Pipes was one of the few commentators to warn about the threat posed by radical Islam before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, leading the Boston Globe to state, "If Pipes's admonitions had been heeded, there might never have been a 9/11." As the head of the Middle East Forum, a Philadelphia-based think-tank, Dr. Pipes is the founder of Campus Watch, which seeks to critique and improve Middle East studies at American universities.
What, in your view, motivated Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to implement the disengagement plan in light of his previous vows that such a move would be a terrible mistake?

Sharon never really explained what caused him to change his mind in the course of 2003. He won an electoral victory in January arguing against unilateral withdrawal, and in December he called for just that policy. Indeed, it is actually a shorter timeframe, because in February he was arguing against it, and by November we know he had changed his mind. So, in a mere nine months a total shift took place.

One can only speculate on his reasons. One can give him the benefit of the doubt and say that it was shifting circumstances, but it's not clear what those were. Or, one can be skeptical and say that he was trying to win his legacy, to win praise from those who criticized him. My particular theory is that he was trying to make himself a great figure in Israeli and Jewish history. Or he was hoping to avoid indictment and other problems of corruption. We don't know. And that's part of the problem—not only did he renege on his campaign platform, but he never explained why.

How will the Palestinians respond over to the long term to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza?

Sharon sent them a very clear signal that terrorism works. Israelis were happily in Gaza for decades, and when it got too painful they left. Similarly in Lebanon, and presumably the same in the West Bank. Why not Jerusalem? Why not Haifa? Why not Tel Aviv?

For whatever reason that Sharon proposed the disengagement, why do you think he waited until the second term to do it?

I can't explain that either. Why did he not say this when running for office in January 2003? Why did he not announce to his rival candidate, Amram Mitzna, in January 2003, "We agree on withdrawing from Gaza, so let's focus on our differences about taxation and edu-
But I can point out that Sharon is the fourth Israeli elected prime minister in a row who has reneged on his promises on dealing with the Arabs. In like manner, Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak did the same. They said one thing at election time: Rabin: "I will not deal with the PLO." Netanyahu: "I will not return the Golan Heights." And Barak, "I will not divide Jerusalem." And in all these cases they did - or were willing to do - the opposite. I see this as the hubris of a politician elected prime minister of Israel and thinking how is he going to be a great and acclaimed leader. And the only way to do it is not by fixing the taxes or schools; not by occupying Cairo; but by making concessions to the Arabs, and so they all do that.

NEXT STEPS

Now that Gaza is under Palestinian control, what should be the next step of Ariel Sharon's successor?

Well, this withdrawal has made things considerably difficult, in two senses. One is that the Palestinians have a sense of exhilaration. They are on a roll; terrorism works, Israelis are on the retreat. The second is in terms of means. In terms of getting weaponry, training soldiers, sending off Qassam rockets, they are in a stronger position than they were before.

Israel's goal has to be to convince the Palestinians that Israel is strong and they are weak. When you have just inflicted upon yourself a defeat, that is rather difficult to do.

Will Ariel Sharon's sudden stroke, which ended his political career, cause him, his actions as Prime Minister, and his legacy to be forever lionized and immune from criticism?

That does appear to be the case. The change in the media treatment of him has been as extreme as it was predictable. Sharon never explained the reasons for his sudden and drastic reversal in outlook over the past two years of his political career but one prominent explanation was his seeking to improve his personal standing.
and legacy. If that was the case, he certainly succeeded.

Will that permanently legitimize strategic withdrawal in the face of terrorism?

No, affection or even reverence for a politician does not guarantee that his methods are followed – and especially not with someone with a record so contradictory as Sharon’s. Current policy debates and realities will drive decisions more than Sharon’s final actions.

Sharon’s stroke led to a sharp increase in popular support for him and his party, Kadima. Will Kadima’s popularity hold steady long enough for that party to effectively win the upcoming elections and implement more territorial withdrawals?

Ehud Olmert and the other leaders of Kadima have done an impressive job of keeping the party intact but it is too early [written on January 18, 2006] to predict whether they will hang together for the next two months and more.

When Sharon first left the Likud and formed Kadima, you considered its prospects for survival dim in light of the history in Israel of breakaway, centrist parties formed around one personality. Will Sharon’s stroke, Olmert’s swift and decisive takeover, and Kadima’s control of the government give it a strong chance for survival and long-term electoral success? Or does it have too narrow a foundation and too wide a disparity of characters and political views to win without Sharon?

I remain intensely skeptical that Kadima can remap Israel politics. The Labor-Likud division has always dominated the country’s life (and even before it, the Yishuv’s) and I do not see Kadima overcoming this debate through some ingenious third way. I expect Kadima, like its predecessors, to fade quite quickly.

What do you think is Mahmoud Abbas’s game plan? Do you think he is employing the same strategy as Yasir Arafat—namely, promoting violence among the Palestinians in an attempt to extort further territorial concessions while he simultaneously talks peace to Israel and the West?
No, I don't think that Abbas has the same game plan. Abbas came out in 2002 against the violence, not on moral or strategic grounds, but on tactical grounds, saying that violence had failed. That in itself is a good and useful thing but it's neither a change of heart nor a moral awakening.

Abbas is weak, however, and cannot implement this. He is not a global star like Arafat was, fêted from one capital to the next. He does not control the finances or the street toughs. Further, developments in the last year of Arafat's life have made it more difficult—namely, the growth of anarchy, warlordism, gangs, Islamist groups, and rival security forces.

After the disengagement, Abbas declared it the result of the "martyrs." If he perceives that suicide bombings fulfill a tactical need, would he go ahead with them?

Yes, and he might, due to Sharon's mistakes. Back in 2002, Abbas said, in effect, "Terrorism isn't working—cut it out." And that's what he's been saying and what others were saying. And then Sharon turns around and effectively says, "No, terrorism is working. Let me prove it to you by running from Gaza." So this whole argument is much harder to make. Terrorism does work. The "martyrs" did push the Israelis out — that can't be disputed.

What Sharon had achieved in 2001-03 was thrown out the window. We're back to 2000, with the Israelis on the retreat from Lebanon and terrorism working. Abbas's arguments have dissipated. And while I do think he is skeptical of terrorism, it's hard for him to argue with success.

Let's say Abbas was able to control the terrorist groups. Would that necessarily be a good thing for Israel? Is it a matter of similar goals? Is it a matter of power? If he did that, would that signal that he's really in favor of peace with Israel?

Yes, controlling the groups would be a good thing.

If he did that, would that signal that he's really in favor of peace
with Israel?

No, Abbas calling for an end to terrorism because it is not working is hardly the same as wanting to live in harmony with Israel.

Well, let's say that peace means negotiating a two-state solution.

That is a minoritarian position; some 20% of Palestinians are ready to accept an Israel, to live next to it without resort to violence. That number fluctuates and has now gone down as a result of the retreat in Gaza.

Ironically, democracies are better off with enemies who are explicit. It is easier for the public to deal with a Stalin than a Khrushchev, a Saddam Hussein than a Hafez al-Assad. The fully overt enemy makes convincing people a lot easier.

Hamas has no intention of tricking Israel, whereas the PLO does. From that point of view Israel is not better served by having the PLO rather than Hamas. Their goal is the same, namely, the destruction of Israel. The PLO engages in diplomatic negotiations, smiles towards the West, makes nice words when necessary. Hamas does not. The PLO's PR capabilities are significant. Hamas does not have those, though even it is making diplomatic gains. There are important voices in the West now talking about opening relations with Hamas.

PROSPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT

You mentioned in a recent article that Sharon and Bush had lauded Abbas and thus had much invested in his success; but you believe him to be possibly a more dangerous adversary than Yasir Arafat. Why did those leaders invest so much in Abbas? What do you think is running through their minds?

There is a widespread consensus that in September 1993, Palestinian rejection of Israel as a state came to an end. From that time until now, while there have been all sorts of violence, disagree-
ment and incitement, they have basically been within the context of Palestinian acceptance of Israel. That notion and framework is absolutely key.

I disagree with the framework. I think that the words spoken and signed onto in September 1993 were fraudulent and nothing changed. The Palestinian intent to destroy Israel, in particular, remained in place.

The consensus says Abbas had a change of heart, I say he made a tactical shift-useful, good, but not terribly meaningful. Once you decide he's had a change of heart, then you find yourself invested in proving that to be the case, whether you are the Israeli left or the US government.

Considering the demographic problem in Israel, with a rapidly rising Palestinian Arab population, is Israel moving unwillingly towards a minority-majority state, and thus to inevitable comparisons to the apartheid system of South Africa? If Israel makes no further territorial concessions, will the country have to choose between being a democracy and a Jewish state?

I find that argument perplexing, since neither Israelis nor Palestinians are calling for the populations of Gaza or the West Bank-maybe we should now just talk about the West Bank-to be included in Israel. Nobody wants that. And the Arabs that have been included in Israel-mainly through Jerusalem residence-have not, by and large, taken out Israeli citizenship. What's the issue, then?

Well, the issue is that in several years down the road, the Palestinian birthrate in the West Bank and Gaza expands ...

But West Bank and Gaza Arabs are as little likely to become citizens of Israel as Egyptians or Jordanians.

You don't see it as an issue to have 40% of the population ruling over 60% of the population, even if the 60% are not citizens?

Well, first, Gaza is now, at least for the moment, out of that calcula-
Second, the proportion of Israelis to Palestinians, demographically, does not seem to be the issue. Would things be better if there were ten times more Israelis than Palestinians? That ratio seems nearly immaterial to me.

On the other hand, there is a real demographic issue for Israel with its Arab citizens. They are experiencing a very high fertility rate and are likely to become a larger proportion of the body politic. That is a genuine problem, for this population is widely aligned with its enemies. Look at, say, the Arab members of parliament in Israel who show themselves basically sympathetic to the other side.

Do you think it's realistic, then, to assume that if at some point there were to be a Palestinian state, Jews would be able to live peacefully there?

That is, in my view, a requirement of any settlement. Israelis living on the West Bank must be able to live there without fear of hostilities. When the Palestinians do come to accept Israel, lay down arms, and live in harmony, then having Jews in their midst by definition cannot pose a problem. To put this in its most extreme form, a resolution of the problem implies that the Jews of Hebron have no more need of security than do the Arabs of Nazareth. Just as there are Arabs in Israel, there can be Jews in the Palestinian areas. They don't necessarily have to have Israeli citizenship. That is obviously a remote prospect. But if it does not occur, the conflict is not over, and the war continues.

Israel is currently at peace with Jordan and Egypt, but the Jewish populations of those countries are very small. Few Jews would feel safe living in those countries, even though they are at peace with the state of Israel.

Yes, those states have nominal agreements with Israel. I say "nominal" because the hostility of their populations remains in place. In the case of the Jordanians and Egyptians there's not a whole lot that the people can do, but the Palestinians, being cheek by jowl with Israelis, can do a lot. They can go stab someone, run a car into someone, or blow themselves up. There has to be a true resolution of the problem-not just signatures on pieces of paper, but a change
of heart.

In fact, the lesson we learn from all these signatures—Egypt-Israel in 1979, Lebanon-Israel in 1982, Palestinians-Israel in 1993, Jordan-Israel in 1994, and the shimmering possibility of Syria—is that these are basically meaningless agreements because they did not reflect a change of heart, but were an end in and of themselves. We now know that agreements, to mean something, have to memorialize a shift that has taken place, rather than be daring, novel-and unpopular.

I'd go further and note that there was a better attitude in Egypt and Jordan, where there now are peace treaties in place, before those treaties were signed. In the pre-treaty days, Egyptians and Jordanians said to themselves, "Our government is carrying the anti-Zionist banner for us. We don't have to worry about that." After the agreements were signed, they said, "Our governments are working with Israel. Anti-Zionism is now our burden." As a result, hatred of Israel grew after the treaties were signed.

I lived in Egypt before the treaty and saw first-hand how Egyptians were not emotionally connected to the fight against Israel. Since 1979, they are connected—and increasingly so with time. In retrospect, those cold government-to-government agreements were a mistake. They should have followed a change in popular sentiment, rather than lead it.

Couldn't one argue that even if there was no change of heart, essentially since the agreements were signed there really have not been any conflicts, any battles at all between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Jordan. Would that not be considered in itself worthy of making a treaty?

Three points in response: One, I don't see any reason to think that there would have been attacks anyway. Neither of those governments were inclined to make war on Israel. Two, Israel has no treaty with Syria and also has not fought a war with it for over two decades. Three, in the case of Egypt, not only has the treaty aroused popular sentiment, but it has opened the floodgates for the American arsenal to go to Egypt. As a result, Cairo has built up, in the past quar-
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Century, a serious conventional military force, far greater than what it had before. Accordingly, the chances of a conventional war between Egypt and Israel are substantially greater precisely because of the treaty between them.

Iraq and Beyond

Do you believe that Iraq constitutes a central front in the war on terror, as President Bush has frequently claimed?

No. Iraq was originally a separate problem, as Saddam Hussein had almost nothing to do with radical Islam. Nor was he relying heavily on terror. He was listed, famously, with North Korea in President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech and had only slightly more to do with radical Islamic jihad than did North Korea. Iraq then became part of the war on terror in the sense that jihad has come to the country. I do not agree that if we weren't fighting them there we'd be fighting them here. We are fighting them there and here. There's plenty of evidence that the war in Iraq has led to more alienation among Muslims living in the West.

If America were to succeed in crushing the insurgency and creating a real democracy, would you consider that an inherent victory in the war on terror, or the war on Islamic fundamentalism?

Not particularly. What we're seeing in Iraq, as in most countries in the Middle East, is that Islamists are the ones surging due to democratic means going into effect. Ibrahim al-Jaafari is obviously a great improvement over Saddam Hussein, but he is a pro-Tehran Islamist. I fail to how it's a victory over radical Islam when Islamists come to power.

How must the Bush administration navigate between its support for the majority-Shi'ite, Iran-friendly government in Iraq, and its tough stance with the Shi'ite government of Iran?

This points to a larger problem throughout the Muslim world: We call for democracy and it's the Islamists who succeed. My answer is yes,
Many pundits have argued that the war in Iraq has encouraged, and will continue to encourage, pushes for democracy in other Arab countries. Is this a realistic assessment? Would it be fair for President Bush to take credit for democratic movements emerging in countries like Lebanon and Egypt?

Islamists are now in a position of strength in Iraq, and their strength in Iraq has encouraged Islamists in other countries of the region. That is not going to help us. I'm no fan of Hosni Mubarak, but I sure wouldn't like to see him replaced with a radical Islamic government.

Do you think we can expect to see similar democratic movements emerge throughout the Arab world?

That depends too much on future developments. I can't predict.

Going back to democracy in Iraq, Recent demands by Iraqi Shi'ites that Islam constitute the "primary" or the "main" source of law have been a central bone of contention in the drafting of Iraq's constitution. How do these developments bode for the prospects of establishing a democracy in Iraq? Do you believe that democracy is compatible with the Islamic republic envisioned by Iraq's Shiites?

In principle, there's no contradiction between Islam and democracy, but in practice, given historical context and actual developments, there's going to be a long and painful process to reconcile them. Can you imagine the Soviet Union going in two years, from 1953 to 1955, from Stalinism to democracy? Impossible. Likewise, it was impossible in Iraq from 2003 to 2005. It shouldn't have been twenty-two months between Saddam's overthrow and elections for prime minister-it should have been twenty-two years.
Why would it have been better slower?

Because democracy, as the record everywhere shows, takes time to develop. It is a spirit and an understanding based on counterintuitive premises. Loyal opposition, freedom of speech, the marketplace, minority rights, independent judiciary-these are learned habits. We as Americans take them for granted, but they're very sophisticated notions. Whether it be in East Africa, Eastern Europe, or Latin America, democracy takes decades. The Soviet Union has had fifteen years and look what remains to be done. Turkey took decades and decades. Look at Chile, Taiwan, Mexico, Poland-these are works in process.

What Arab country or countries should be the prime focus of American lawmakers if and when the violence in Iraq recedes? Specifically, how should Washington respond to the prospects of a nuclear Iran? Do you believe that America may someday need to implement "regime change" in countries like Iran, Syria, or Saudi Arabia?

I have a more modest attitude towards these ideas. Ever since World War II and the rehabilitation of Germany and Japan, there's been an assumption that if we win, we rehabilitate our enemy. Yes, rehabilitation is an option, but one to be resorted to with caution. Another option is simply defeating the enemy and leaving him to fix things. In the case of Iran, should Tehran be determined to build nuclear weapons, one possibility is going in to destroy their nuclear installations, but without any kind of regime change or rehabilitation. I don't see that it's our responsibility to repair the country. Iraq has received billion of dollars from the Western world. Why? We don't owe anything to Iraq. Just because it was a threat to us doesn't mean we have an obligation to it. I endorse the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but I am very unhappy about the intense engagement in Iraq, and making the success or failure of our effort depend on how the Iraqis are doing. It's not our main concern.

At a time of tremendous, simmering Islamic fundamentalism, is it really worthwhile to go in and topple a country and not choose what takes its place, or at least try to?
One can try, of course, but it's very hard.

Would it be better to leave it in chaos?

In some instances, yes.

Why?

Because we can't choose what takes its place. American forces went to Afghanistan and removed the Taliban, to Iraq and removed Saddam Hussein. We had a glorious victory for a few weeks. We should have taken our victory and left. Why build sewers and arbitrate between tribes and oversee elections? I'm not against rehabilitation in principle. If I thought it would work, I'd be for it. But I never thought it would work in Iraq. I'm on record about this as early as April 1991 and then April 2003.

In that case, do you think America should withdraw from Iraq now?

Now, things are more difficult. The war had a great start, but it was botched. We have made Iraq's welfare the determinant of American success. If the country is not doing well and we leave, we lose. But we lose if we stay, for Iraqis care much more about Iraq's destiny than do Americans, so they will prevail. In short, we can't win.

You are a frequent critic of various forms of Arab, Islamic, and Palestinian nationalism. What would replace it in order to detribalize, democratize and liberalize the Middle East?

Well, the prospect of alternatives seems pretty dim at this point. In decades past there were attempts at secularism, at separating state and religion. There has developed over the years more of a state nationalism. The countries that work best are the most secular. Those movements are weak today but those alternatives are not impossible.

Is it a fallacy to equate financial and political liberalization with a more friendly approach in the Middle East to the West and to
Israel?

Yes. Bahrain typically marks number two on the Heritage-Wall Street Journal ranking of economic freedom. It's not particularly friendly towards Americans, much less Israelis.

CAMPUS WATCH

Has Campus Watch worked? Has it achieved its objectives?

Well, you should probably ask our opponents. They seem to think it has. If you go to the homepage of Campus Watch, we currently have a quote from Miriam Cooke, professor of Asian and African languages and literature at Duke University, saying that we are not only changing the rules in Middle East studies but undermining the very foundations of American education! That's a bit more purple prose-ish than most, but yes, they blame many of their problems on us.

Have academic standards and academic discourse improved since the start of Campus Watch?

Well, we're only three years old next month, so no, we can't claim that there's been a huge change. But I would say there has been a lowering of the rhetorical levels, in that the prospect of being critiqued, of having your statement put on the Campus Watch website as the "quote of the month," of having students report what pressure you are putting on them in the classroom, and other developments, have led to more caution. The spotlight that we've created has improved matters. It hasn't lead to fundamental change; it has lead to rhetorical change. Fundamental change will take time.

Columbia University's ad hoc grievance committee report responding to allegations of intimidations in its Department of Middle East and Asian Languages and Culture was dismissed by many critics as a "whitewash" because it effectively exonerated most of the professors that lay at the heart of the controversy. If you were a member of the investigative committee, how would you have composed the report? What recommen-
I can't say. It's too detailed a topic, and I didn't see the raw materials. Also, it's really not our issue at Campus Watch. That report was about the maltreatment of students, which is significant, but we focus on the content of Middle East studies. Further, we are less interested in specific professors than in the corporate culture. At Columbia there are some twenty specialists on the region and nearly every one of them is on one side politically. Ten and ten, or so, would offer balance. But right now it's nineteen to one or so. They could be wonderful to students and model instructors, but that would not touch the deeper issue, which is the content of the professors' work.

On a related issue, when Ward Churchill at the University of Colorado-Boulder, a professor of ethnic studies, compared victims of 9/11 to Nazis, there were demands from the public for his termination. Do you think it's appropriate for a university to fire a professor for making such a statement, and what should university administrators do when they encounter such a professor?

We're less interested in firing people than in how they are hired and who is hired. We seek a balance, ensuring that voices not now heard are heard in the future.

Middle East studies has deeply changed. I've been in the field long enough to have seen it before this happened. When I entered it in the 1960s, a diversity of voices existed, though even then there was certainly a left-ward bias. Now, it's gotten to the point that students come to me, a couple of times a year, to tell me that they have cited me in a footnote and a professor berated them for this "unacceptable" citation. This is groupthink, hegemonic discourse - pick your term. Professors cannot tell students what to read, whom to cite, but they are attempting that now.

So practically speaking, is Campus Watch seeking to fire anyone? Practically speaking, the only way you're going to change the discourse is to get rid of professors.
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No, the long term solution lies less in firing the incompetents now warming seats and more in hiring intellectually diverse and competent scholars. ♦
"What do we call forgiveness? What calls for forgiveness? Who calls for, who calls upon forgiveness?"¹

In his essay "On Forgiveness," Jacques Derrida argues that true forgiveness is to forgive the unforgivable; fines forgiveness as the willingness to allow the injustice that has already been done to oneself by another to stand. Once a wrong has been made up for it does not make any sense to speak of forgiveness. If someone owed a debt and paid it back then neither of the parties owes the other anything; it would be foolish of the lender to say that after receiving his money back that he forgives the borrower. It only makes sense to talk about forgiveness when that debt cannot be paid back, such as in situations of persecution and particularly mass murder.

Derrida sees the act of asking for and of granting forgiveness as one of the key underlying foundations of modern international politics; the Abrahamic notion of forgiveness has been internationalized and secularized in order to serve the needs of the modern state and society. The main actors in this new politic of forgiveness are not individuals but states. There are two reasons for this.

Firstly by focusing upon the state we can avoid the question of: is the apology or forgiveness really meant or is it just feigned? By keeping forgiveness within the dominion of the state we are able to avoid prying into this "secret" and as such we do not interfere with the process of national memory.

The second reason is that "all Nation-States are born and found themselves in violence."² The state itself, in order to justify its own legitimacy, needs to be able to get everyone else to agree to take its own sins off of the table. Since all states have some guilt everyone is agreeing to allow everyone else's guilt to be covered up in exchange for their guilt also covered over and kept a secret.
Derrida's theory of forgiveness offers an interesting angle to address two fundamental questions: What does the Middle East peace process mean, and why has it, so far, failed so miserably? The peace-process, in the schematic of forgiveness, can be seen as an Israeli-Palestinian agreement to ask and, in return, grant forgiveness for past 'misdeeds.' With Oslo, the Israelis agreed to renounce their claims over the West Bank and Gaza, and to forgive the Palestinian Authority for its acts of terrorism. The Palestinian Authority agreed to renounce terrorism, along with any claim over the pre-1967 Israel, and to forgive Israel for having occupied 'their' land. The reasoning behind the acts of both sides is not moral contrition but simple political expediency. Israel wants an end to Palestinian violence and the Palestinian Authority wants a state. Furthermore each side feels that it needs the support of the European Community and the United States and cannot afford to be seen as being obstructive to the goal of peace.

The peace-process has failed because the entire mechanics of forgiveness have broken down. Neither side is capable of asking for forgiveness or granting it because doing so would undermine the legitimacy of both sides and run counter to the politics of memory from which both sides have built an edifice in order to justify their own existence. Discussions on the failure of Oslo place great emphasis on the religious problems. I think that issue is a distraction. Remember, secular Jews (the Israelis) and secular Muslims and Christians (the Palestinians) are the ones who have failed at the negotiation tables. I would suggest that the reason for the emphasis on the role played by religious extremists in bringing about the current crisis is that the religious want the credit for it and the secular want to give them the blame for it. Most of the religious factions, both Jewish and Muslim, oppose the peace process, so the narrative that their actions have stopped that process appeals to them. As for the Western secular media, the narrative that they want to tell is of a Middle East caught in an endless cycle of medieval religious wars, with the only hope for peace lying in a spirit of "Enlightenment," "tolerance" and "understanding," i.e. secularism.

The problem with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that which distinguishes it from almost any other conflict in history, is the fact that the legitimacy of each side's claims is almost totally mutually exclusive.
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If it was legitimate for the state of Israel to have been created in 1947 and for Israel to have fought its various wars with the neighboring Arab states, then the Palestinian Authority becomes a terrorist organization and can therefore claim no legitimacy. If the Arab states were the aggressors in 1948, the blame and responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem lies with those states, and not with Israel. If, however, the Palestinian cause is legitimate and the PLO can be considered freedom fighters, then by necessity the state of Israel is an imperialist state, imposed upon the Arab peoples by the West, with no right to exist and no right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel.

In most conflicts between states, what is at stake is not a state's inherent legitimacy. More importantly, most conflicts do not involve the legitimacy of the claims of private citizens to their property. It is possible for the French and the Germans to be at peace with one another despite their conflicts over Alsace-Lorraine because the ownership of Alsace-Lorraine does not affect the intrinsic integrity of either the French state or the German state. It is possible for Germany to declare that it forgives France for its "wars of aggression," (the Thirty Years War and World War I) and is willing to start afresh. Germany can even say that its decisions to fight the war of 1870 and World War II in order to regain control over Alsace and Lorraine were wrong, and admit that these were "criminal wars of imperialist aggression." The German people could ask the French to forgive them without affecting the legitimacy of the governments in Berlin and Paris, nor destroying the concept of being a Frenchman or a German. More importantly, neither of these claims would affect the German or French citizen's claim to their home, whether they are in Alsace or Lorraine, Berlin or Paris.

Much of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations can be seen in terms of finding a compromise on what and who is to be forgiven. In signing the Oslo Accords, Israel essentially agreed to forgive Yasir Arafat and the PLO. By accepting him as a partner in peace and by agreeing to transfer specific tracts of land to the Palestinian Authority, Israel agreed to wash away Arafat's actions, as if they never happened. In exchange, Arafat and his Palestinian Authority agreed to forgive the state of Israel for the occupation of Arab land and to ask forgiveness for their own acts of terrorism. The genius of
Oslo was that it could give both sides a diplomatic victory and it did not require either side to make any hard sacrifices; all issues such as a Palestinian state, refugees and Jerusalem were pushed off for later "final status negotiations."

Meanwhile, both sides were able to make the case to their own people that Oslo did not mark a surrender on their part. Rabin and Peres were able to make the case to the Israelis that with Oslo they were buying off Arafat; they were getting him to turn on his fellow Palestinian terrorists in exchange for nominal control over Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Even Peres, in those years, was adamant that there would be no Palestinian state, no partitioning of Jerusalem and no return of refugees. Arafat, on the other hand, was able to interpret Oslo as a ceasefire in the struggle against Israel, with fighting to resume if Israel did not deliver on his demands for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, along with the return of the refugees.

The failed Camp David accords, with its offer of a state comprising the Gaza Strip along with almost all of the West Bank, was, in the schemata of forgiveness, an agreement to state that Zionism and the founding of the state of Israel, along with the Six-Day War in 1967, was legitimate. As such, the Arabs must ask forgiveness for their attempts to destroy Israel.

However, since it was wrong for Israel to hold on to the West Bank and Gaza, Israel must ask forgiveness from the Palestinians for that. Barak and the Labor party was willing to accept this line and the Likud probably could have been forced to go along with it as a matter of practicality. In truth, the Camp David accords did not even require the Labor party to ask for forgiveness for any of their actions. The settler movement was largely a creation of the right, so Barak essentially offered to ask for forgiveness for the sins of his political opponents-imagine a President Kerry, after having won the 2004 election, pulling American troops out of Iraq and apologizing for America's, i.e. Bush's, war of aggression.

Arafat could not accept Barak's offer of post-1967 borders in exchange for pre-1967 ones because to do so would still undermine the Palestinian Authority's legitimacy, as represented by him. The
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which is the source of Arafat's legitimacy, was founded in 1964, before Israel had the West Bank and Gaza, and its purpose was the destruction of a state of Israel which then did not occupy the West Bank and Gaza. To accept Camp David would mean that Arafat himself would have to admit that he was a terrorist and that his whole enterprise was illegitimate.

Arafat needed to be able to get Israel to accept that there is a right of return for all the Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian Authority claims to represent all the Palestinian people, not just those in Gaza and the West Bank but also the Palestinians in Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia, etc. If the Palestinian Authority were to make a peace agreement that left all the refugees stranded, the P.A. would be admitting that there really is no such thing as a Palestinian people, that the concept was just a scam to obtain sympathy from the West. But Israel cannot allow the refugees to come back. If all or most of the refugees were to return, then Israel could of course be destroyed by democratic means. But even if not a single refugee were to accept the offer to return, the Palestinian Authority would still gain a de facto victory over Israel. By agreeing in principle to allow the refugees to return, Israel would be accepting at least partial blame for causing the refugee problem back in 1948. This in turn would undermine the founding of the state of Israel; it would show that a Jewish state's creation was an inherently detrimental act to the Arab natives, and so therefore legitimate reasons existed for the Arab states to have rejected the formation of a state of Israel.

For Israelis, the notion of forgiving Palestinian terrorism is a difficult pill to swallow, especially for the right wing. Such an action requires turning one's back on all the blood spilt and putting it out of the political mind and memory. That goes against the ideology of the Holocaust. The slogans associated with the Holocaust are "zachor" (remember) and "never again." Crucial to the Israeli self-image is the Zionist notion of the "New Jew," who, unlike the Jew of Eastern Europe, does not "meekly" allow himself to be led to the camps and slaughtered. Instead, our new Jew remembers what happened, refuses to follow in that path and will not allow Jewish blood to be spilt unanswered.
The Palestinians have, in regards to forgiveness, even less room to work with then the Israelis. The Palestinians have an even greater need for a collective memory because they still lack a country which they could claim as their own, and because they have a very ambiguous status as a people. Palestine never existed as an Arab country; it was part of greater Syria, itself a part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries. The Palestinians are trying to create a country that has never existed before.

To further complicate matters, Palestinians have to carry around two national memories: They claim to be their own separate group and a part of the greater Arab front. They claim that "Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and [that] the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation." Are the Palestinians their own separate group or are they a part of Pan-Arabism? They need to be both. If the Palestinians are their own separate group then why should the various Arab states help or even tolerate them? If the Palestinians are just an element of the greater Arab peoples the why should the West help them, instead of shifting the burden of assistance to other Arab countries? If the P.A. were to cut a deal with Israel, give up their struggle and recognize Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state, the P.A. would cut itself off from the Pan-Arab cause. If that occurs, what reason do the other Arab states have for giving the P.A. further support? Ultimately, the Palestinian Authority needs Arab support much more then it needs Western support. If the French feel betrayed by the Palestinian Authority they still will not massacre Palestinians by the thousands, as the Jordanians did thirty years ago.

The end result of this inability to proclaim forgiveness has been over four years of the Intifada, at a cost of thousands of Israeli and Palestinian lives. At a tactical level very little has changed in these past few years. Israel still has the military advantage; it is capable of striking any Palestinian target at any time and place. It is only limited by its moral commitment to keep the actions of its military within the bounds of the Western ethical framework, and by the limit of America's toleration of its actions. The Palestinians are still capable of carrying out act of terrorism. While not all, or even most, of these attacks will succeed, the Palestinians can still take out dozens of
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Israeli citizens from time to time. What has changed since Camp David are the major players, with Barak replaced by Ariel Sharon and Arafat by Abu Mazen, in turn changing some of the dynamics of the schemata of forgiveness.

Sharon's disengagement plan brought to the forefront a deep fracture within Israeli society. Within the schemata of forgiveness, Sharon and the majority of the country agreed not just to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, but also to disassociate the state of Israel unilaterally from the settler movement. Sharon has effectively announced to the world that Israel views the settlements not just as a failure but as a mistake that needs correction.

Sharon is in the process of forcing Israel to actually swallow the pill that Barak had been willing to accept. Sharon, because he is on the right, is in a better position to do this. He has, in effect, managed to isolate the settler movement and the far right from the rest of the country. As a result, the settlers essentially have been left to themselves to fight this issue. It has ceased to be an issue of whether or not Israel should take the blame or if even the Israeli right should take the blame. Rather, it has become an issue of whether the settlers should bear the blame, and for the vast majority of Israelis the answer is yes.

At a fundamental level the settlers have been betrayed, left as scapegoats, the stains on Zionism that need to be expunged. They came to the territories as an extension of the Zionist dream. Now they are being written off from the Zionist movement—not even as failures, for failures are still allowed their martyrs, but as sins for which one has to ask forgiveness.

On the other side is the more recent rise of Abu Mazen in the wake of Arafat's death. Abu Mazen is different from Arafat because while Arafat's claim to authority was tied to his leadership of the P.L.O., Abu Mazen's claim is built upon his democratic election as head of the Palestinian Authority. As such, Abu Mazen does not owe anything to the refugees and, more importantly, to other Arab countries. He can choose to rely on the West, instead of the likes of Syria and Saudi Arabia. The West has deeper and more generous pockets. All
Abu Mazzen must do is to convince the West that he is a responsible leader who will have the money to rebuild the Palestinian infrastructure, which will in turn give him the political advantage over his opponents. As a result, it is conceivable that Abu Mazzen would accept a Palestinian state even if it does not include a right of return for the refugees or Jerusalem as the capital. Will this happen? I am by nature a cynical person and this is the Middle East, a realm seemingly designed by God for the express purpose of manufacturing cynics. Yet hope springs eternal.

From the perspective of the schemata of forgiveness, what is necessary for the peace process to work is for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza to come to view themselves as a separate entity from the Palestinians in refugee camps and from the Pan-Arab cause. This would make it possible for them to accept some version of the Camp David accords. The reconstructed Palestinian people, through their new leadership, could give up on the cause of the refugees and ask Israel for forgiveness for having tried to destroy it. Israel, in turn, could ask this new Palestinian people to forgive them for the occupation and the settlements. This would create a situation where both sides would be capable of allowing themselves to back down from the politics of hate and vengeance and to enter into the politics of peace and forgiveness.

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2 Ibid, p. 57.
The overwhelming dichotomy between increased authoritarianism in oil-rich states and increased democratization in states lacking oil is becoming progressively manifest. While many analysts use the materialist "oil impedes democracy" argument to invalidate the relevance of political culture in the absence of democracy, I argue that the effects of oil are widely encompassing, repressing even the most fundamental social substrata, including both civil society and autonomous political orientations. Attendant to this point, I find that an important causal mechanism known as the modernization effect, as described by Michael L. Ross, has been forestalled, perpetuating this element of the so-called "resource curse" by helping to sustain existing cultural norms. My argument demonstrates that the suppression of democratic aspirations and civil society in the Middle East through externally derived oil revenues has sustained both the existing neopatriarchal and tribal regimes that are prevalent in the contemporary Arab World.

Lisa Anderson, in her "Critiques of the Political Culture," presents a very complete criticism of the tendency to assess the Middle East democracy deficit through a "political culture" lens. She argues that "There is virtually no effort to examine the actual causal connection between apparently correlated phenomena, such as attitudes, behavior, and institutions, nor is there any capacity for dynamic analysis in which change in one realm of human life could be predicted to precipitate change in another." ¹

While I do not entirely disagree with Anderson's assessment, I will try to demonstrate that the effects of oil constitute a causal connection, correlating the presence of oil and the persistence of political norms that thereby preserve authoritarianism. I am by no means suggesting that the political culture of the Mideast was forged upon the pretense of oil wealth, nor am I suggesting that the oil had preempted a liberalization process already underway at the time of its nationalization. On the contrary, I suggest that the seemingly anti-
quoted existing political and social norms of the region are fortified and continued as a result of the governmental action taken as a result of oil wealth. Implicit in this hypothesis is the notion that ideational and materialist approaches are not only equally important, but also interdependent.

In his article, "Democracy without Democrats," John Waterbury asks whether liberalization is possible if a political culture does not embrace democratic ideals. He finds by and large that a lack of democracy frequently accompanies a lack of democrats. Ronald Inglehart similarly echos Waterbury: "The peoples of given societies tend to be characterized by reasonably durable cultural attributes that sometimes have major political and economic consequences." That being said, how does a political culture aggregate itself from the microcosmic level (the family) to the macrosmic level (the regime type)?

In the case of the Middle East, the cultural element that has exerted a high degree of influence upon the prevailing political climate is the existence of neopatriarchy. Hashim Sharabi explains:

...The dominance of the father (patriarch), [is] the center around which the national as well as the natural family are organized. Thus between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will is the absolute will, mediated in both the society and the family by a forced consensus based on ritual and coercion.

The leader thus becomes both the provider and the sole authority in a neopatriarchal regime. Since patriarchy is based on a "distinctive mode of economic organization," the same method of providing so called "dependant capitalism" has been employed by governments through the use of oil rents to maintain citizen dependency. Thus, in order for both the heads of state and leaders of clans alike to preserve absolute rule over their constituents, they each must maintain follower dependency and therefore discourage the formation of any formal institutions that may threaten their position. The means with which leaders of polities achieve these self-serving ends is through the use of unlimited oil rents to strategically suppress a viable work-
ing class, thereby preserving its weakness. Consequently, "neopatriarchal society as a dependant, nonmodern socioeconomic structure represents the quintessentially underdeveloped society."^5

Hence, the psychological features of neopatriarchy have aggregated themselves from the family level, ultimately penetrating governmental organization, saturating it with notions of the absolute dominance of both the father figure and the informal group. The resulting effect has become the sole existence of a vertical rule, emanating from the top down, compounded by shifting clusters of parasitical, informal groups.6

Yet the above arguments do not account for the fact that Arab-Muslim countries rank significantly lower than non-Arab Muslim countries in fostering electoral competitiveness, even though they are similarly patriarchal and tribally oriented.7 The deep cleavage between these faith-liked, but geographically dissimilar groupings indicate that there is something specific in the structural makeup of the Arabian Peninsula that helps to account for their underachievement in their degree of equitable elections. Unlike their Muslim counterparts in Western Asia, a vast majority of the countries in the Middle Eastern region (10 of 15) derive a large portion of their revenues from oil wealth. Ergo, these countries distinguish themselves in their inability to achieve democracy, not by virtue of the particulars of religious doctrine or cultural ideals, but as a result of the region's specific structural properties.

From the above paragraph we can conclude that the Arab component (oil) combined with the Muslim component (neopatriarchy) provides a recipe for the continuance of authoritarianism. Thus, the structural element provides an outlet for the cultural element to exist. In other words, the strategic way in which oil revenues are allocated by Arab governments contributes to the upkeep of authoritarian regimes and the prevailing political culture; it is not that the culture is perpetuated because the "Arab world [is] congenitally defective."8

Although there are many structural elements of a region that might
help to explain its proclivity towards authoritarianism, in his essay "Does Oil Hinder Democracy," Michael L. Ross attempts to supplement the current, widely accepted discourses on the topic by presenting a series of causal mechanisms accounting for the fact that indigenous oil resources have extremely negative effects on a country's ability to become democratic. In his examination of the correlation between oil and authoritarianism, he finds that several elements of the resource curse have foiled the evolution of a robust civil society, and consequently, democracy. My addendum to Ross's ostensibly structural thesis is that political culture has stagnated as a result of the sovereign's suppression of civil society, leading to the intransigency of enduring cultural ideals, specifically neopatriarchy.

Ross initially presents an analysis that asserts that minerals tend to generate a high level of rents paid directly to the government by external actors.9 Hazem Beblawi further explains that this so-called "rentier state" is achieved when "only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being only involved in the distribution and utilization of it."10 In addition to unconstrained government spending on patronage, the military ultimately becomes so large that it systemically prevents an essential precondition to democracy known as the 'group formation effect.' "When oil revenues provide a government with enough money, the government will use its largesse to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent of the state and hence the might be inclined to demand political rights."11

In the latter part of his essay, Ross employs a wholly culture-based argument, called the 'modernization effect,' to describe one of the ways in which democracy is hindered by resource wealth. Implied in the modernization effect is the need for two essential social mechanisms, education and occupational specialization, that initially serve as social impetuses for democratization by stimulating a self-sufficient middle class "accustomed to thinking for themselves on the job and having specialized skills that enhance their bargaining power against elites."12 Waterbury similarly explains that "high levels of literacy and urbanization, and substantial middle-income stra-
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ta yield an informed middle class with a stake in how politics are conducted, a heightened sense of citizenship, and an insistence that public officials be held accountable."13 The Middle East has proved unsuccessful at modernizing because of "the failure of the population to move into industrial and service sector jobs [which] renders them less likely to push for democracy."14

Considering that most of the owners of capital in oil-abundant states are "concentrated in the public sector, rather than constituting the nuclei of an emerging civil society," it allows for the government to assert considerable control over the working class.15 While the "patriarchal condition" is usually a precursor to the "full development of the foundation of industrial society,"16 in the case of the Middle East this precept has proven to be invalid since the continued interdependence of the bourgeois and the government, combined with the state's repression of any semblance of a civil society has left the bourgeoisie both "underdeveloped" and "overwhelmed by an overdeveloped state," resulting in the persistence of predominating cultural norms that are conducive to authoritarianism.17

Accordingly, without a self-sufficient or autonomous bourgeois, democracy cannot be sustained. Incidental to the Middle East, Waterbury describes a sort of tacit pact entered into by the state and the private sector bourgeois guaranteeing the allotment of governmental monies and public goods to members of the bourgeois who, in return, would relinquish any explicit democratic aspirations.18 Since countries with high levels of oil and mineral wealth have "budgets that are exceptionally large and unconstrained," they are able to engage in this form of "fiscal pacification."19 The practice of strategically coöpting both social and economic groups in exchange for political suppression has resulted in "labor and the ownership of capital...link[ing] together to maintain authoritarian controls."20 Thus, the bourgeois's utter dependence on the state's patronage network for monetary backing has ultimately rendered the citizens of the Middle East incapacitated, perpetuating their dependence on the patriarch.21
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Without the unwavering vote of the bourgeois in favor of democracy, the conventional patriarchy, which has been adopted by the state, will continue to be exercised, depriving the people of an outlet for cultural, and eventually political, change. Similar ideas constantly reverberate through much political culture literature. "Without active participation on the part of citizens in egalitarian institutions and civil associations, as well as in politically relevant organizations, there will be no way to maintain the democratic character of the political culture or of social and political institutions."22

A legitimate quid pro quo for the "maintenance of the democratic character" in the above citation is the sustenance of the authoritarian character.

Thus, the pattern of subordination and the relinquishing of power to the omnipresent patriarch in Middle Eastern countries can only be combated by the emergence of the civil society. Further compounding the difficulty in overcoming the democracy deficit, in order for civil society to emerge, the working class must relinquish its dependency on the patriarch, voiding the unstated interdependence between them, thereby repossessing ruler accountability. The cyclical nature of this relationship is rooted in externally derived oil rents paid to Middle Eastern governments directly by foreign actors, to be appropriated on patriarchal whims.

Collectively, Ross's findings not only confirm the corollary between economic development and cultural changes that ultimately produce democracy, but also serve to vindicate my aforementioned hypothesis that the political culture resulting from tribalism and neopatriarchy is sustained by externally derived oil revenues. As Bill and Springborg explain, "The formation of a viable formal group structure requires a certain level of organizational skill, a degree of trust and cooperation, a reservoir of funds for equipment and staffing, and a willingness on the part of political elites to tolerate the existence of such groups."23 For a democracy to support itself, all of the above factors must be simultaneously present. Although some of the factors are present in the case of the Middle East, others are evidently lacking.

The "reservoir of funds," although clearly abundant in the Middle
East, is used to suppress "willingness [for democratization] on the part of political elites" rather than to foster trust and cooperation. Formation of the formal group has been further hindered by "the patrimonial leader's need to keep his followers dependent lead[ing] him to discourage creation of formal organizations in which they might gather to oppose him."24 Said dependency has been achieved through both the allocation of oil rents to mollify select social groups, and the production of an overdeveloped military designed to repress organizations that may be perceived as adversarial. Furthermore, the absence of a self-sustaining middle class has hindered any semblance of a citizen push to revolutionize the existing, intertwined political and cultural ideals.

In this essay I did not intend to present the absolute importance ideational approaches, nor to fully discount materialist approaches from the discussion of the Middle East. I did, however, demonstrate that they are equally worthy of consideration in political analysis discourses, as they lack the mutual exclusivity constantly ascribed to both the interpretations of Middle Eastern culture as well as its structural properties. The view that the two are interdependent helps to explain why the Middle East has been particularly exceptional in its resistance to democratization, seeing as the region's abundance of oil revenues yields the prolonging of the neopatriarchal regimes. Although the resource curse is not insurmountable, mineral wealth does prove to be a rather large impediment for a country's development of democratic expectations and dissolution of antiquated political norms. True, the Middle East is "analytically nuanced," since upon gaining independence most of the oil rich governments in the area were intensely authoritarian, and remained highly authoritarian after the nationalization of this great mineral resource (meaning the oil did not obstruct a democratization process already in effect).25 But the claim can still be made that the prevailing political culture persists as a result of unconstrained government spending due to its large influx of externally derived rents.

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NOTES


Anderson, 78.


Ross, 334.

Ross, 336.


Ross, 357.

Waterbury, 27.

Sharabi, 16-17.

Waterbury, 28.

Waterbury, 27.

Ross, 334.

Waterbury, 27.


Arato, Andrew and Cohn, Jean L. *Civil Society and Political*
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24 Anderson, 85.

25 Ross, 335.
On June 23, 2003, Howard Dean, former governor of Vermont, formally announced his candidacy for President of the United States. Dean's announcement was not a surprise to anyone in particular, not to the public and certainly not to his thousands of volunteer supporters, who had been campaigning for him for over a year. In a relatively short amount of time, Dean, the obscure governor of one of the smallest and least populous states in the United States, would manage to become the front-runner for the Democratic Party's nomination for president, and to hold his lead for a considerable amount of time.

Propelling his surge into national prominence was a unique social movement, arising from dissatisfaction with the status quo in American politics. Dean's campaign fizzled in the end after he failed to win any early Democratic primaries, but the movement lives on, with its parent organization, Democracy For America, remaining active, concerning itself with various 'Progressive' causes.

While the day-to-day history of the movement has been thoroughly documented by standard media sources, an objective analysis of its composition and qualities has yet to emerge. While not nearly long enough to comprehensively cover all aspects of the movement, this essay seeks to begin a probe into the nature of the movement, specifically the nature of its membership, its ideology, how its members identified with it, its conduct, and its reflection on American society as a whole. Hopefully, this will serve as a starting point for further research on the nature of this unique social movement, shedding light on the reasons for its rapid rise and subsequently even more rapid demise. It is also hoped that the lessons learned from this research can to be applied to the understanding of social movements generally, giving historians greater insight into the factors that characterize and define them.

When studying the Howard Dean social movement, it is necessary to consider and examine four critical areas:
1. The social profile of the movement's members.
2. How the members identify with and see themselves within the movement.
3. The structure, mobilization, activities, and policies used by the movement.
4. The lesser apparent goals of the movement, and what they show us about American society in general.

In studying these aspects of the movement, we can gain a better understanding of what drove the movement's inception, how and why it functioned the way it did, and perhaps gain insight into the novelties of this particular movement, and what they contributed (and continue to contribute) to American society.

If we wish to understand how the Howard Dean movement got off the ground, it is crucial to explore the social backgrounds and profiles of its members. This is the most basic starting point. No social movement is anything more than the sum of its individual members, and it is thus important to understand the nature of this particular one from the standpoint of its members, beginning with who was moved to join it. Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of the movement is its social composition.

Its members did not come from established groups involved with politics. Rather, they were largely people like Jennifer Powers, "a Gen X'er who in past elections was like millions of others who vote but don't pay much attention to politics-and certainly don't lift a finger to help any particular candidate." Powers, a 32-year-old school grant-writer from Philadelphia, claimed to have volunteered 30-40 hours a week after her day job, with only internet direction from the Dean campaign. Thousands of supporters joined her in becoming active in politics for Howard Dean's campaign, many claiming that they had never been involved in politics before. In the midst of the his campaign, Dean campaign manager Joe Trippi claimed that "anecdotal evidence" suggested that Dean's supporters came from "a mixed bag of the (Democratic) party's liberal base, reinvigorated Democrats who had either dropped out of the process or were never engaged and political who supported Ross Perot in
Many of Dean's supporters came from younger, more counter-cultural and idealistic backgrounds. They may not have had as much time to be become disaffected with American politics as their older and more experienced counterparts, but it is obvious that they felt alienated from them. Kimmy Cash went so far as to have "Dean ... Hope ... Truth ... 2004" tattooed on her arm on Nov. 17, 2004, Dean's 55th birthday. Cash was a 28-year old mother of two from Monrovia, and she had spent most of her life as a punk-rock junkie, a member of an American counterculture with a large following. She started punxfordean.org, a website that claimed to have 16,000 people signed up as Dean supporters, half of whom were not previously registered to vote. Cash, with red streaks in her dark hair and various nose piercings-punk-rock counterculture identifiers-said that she was raised in a Democratic family in Ontario, CA, where voting was held in high regard. She went off on her own at the age of 13, dropping out of college several times, one year even making a living by selling vintage collectors' items on internet auctions, while living in a converted garage with her husband and two children. She was especially outraged by the approaching Iraq war, and decided that Dean was for her after reading about him on the internet, later sneaking into the V.I.P. section of a Dean rally and meeting him in person.

Other relatively politically inexperienced members were willing to go even farther than joining Dean's campaign. Chris Zychowski, a software expert from San Francisco, decided to go to law school to fight for the issues he believed in during his activism in the Dean move-
Tracey Denton joined Democracy For America, an organization started by Howard Dean after the end of his campaign, along with many of her colleagues. While Denton is in her mid-twenties, her companions in the movement are mostly middle-aged, those gathered with her in a Manhattan bar described by an interviewer as "mostly disaffected suburbanites who have migrated to the city."

Perhaps the most striking observation about members' social profiles is their ordinary appearance. Their ranks, estimated at one time by The Economist to have reached more than 500,000 registered supporters, were composed of ordinary Americans from lower-middle class backgrounds, many of whom had never experienced politics before, but who were clearly hungry for action. The social profile is very much in harmony with the typical profile of a bottom-up movement—a movement guided by masses of people at the grassroots, rather than by power-wielding individuals at the top. While the social profile might be ripe for a bottom-up movement, we must consider if the members themselves would agree. Namely, we must consider how the members of the movement identified themselves within their movement. This includes both the reasons why they joined and the roles that they felt they played while active in the movement.

No matter how much grassroots activism may have played a role in the (short-lived) success of Howard Dean's campaign, we must consider that it was, after all, a political campaign, and there was bound to be a great deal of direction given from the top-down. However, one of the most ambitious courses of action taken by Dean's campaign was to forge and promote a distinct and unique identity among Dean's volunteer supporters, and to make them the psychological and ideological center of the movement, even when decisions would have to be made from the top-down. The key to this approach has fit in the lock on many previous occasions, spawning successful social movements throughout history.

Lacking the funds for a traditional campaign, Dean and his campaign manager, Joe Trippi, channeled most of their resources to the arena where they believed they could get the most out of their money. At the beginning of the critical "primary week", when early
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victory would likely produce the Democratic nominee, Karen Hicks, the state director of Dean for New Hampshire wrote a letter to Dean supporters. But using the special Dean tools, she did not print her letter, but rather communicated it to Dean's supporters in the most effective manner possible—she posted it on his "blog," an electronic bulletin board that could be accessed from Dean's website.7 Her letter reflected the proactive identity that the Dean supporters had developed over the course of the campaign. Calling on them to participate in bringing out the vote for Dean in the Granite State, she wrote that the week would "demonstrate that the people power reigns decisively in New Hampshire. You built this campaign and now you will carry it through...."8

A few hours earlier, Nico Pitney posted his own message, reporting from Iowa that all was going well, with Dean people out canvassing, phone banking, and preparing tens of thousands of door hangers and flyers. He declared: "Our power was demonstrated yesterday. An unprecedented 48,000 doors were knocked on, with 12,000 in the Des Moines area alone. One experienced campaign official told me that the previous record he had seen was 10,000 in an entire weekend. What we did - with your help - is simply awesome."9

It is true that many presidential campaigns have tried to create a sense that the supporters are the vital elements in the endeavor, but references to the complete power of the common supporters were commonplace in the Dean campaign, certainly much more so than in other contemporary campaigns. Postings similar to the above two were not only common in the Dean campaign, they comprised the bulk of activity on the campaign website. Earlier in the day, lan Hines had declared to the volunteers that "You are the heart of Democracy. You are the storm that will shake America. Prove it to the world." Hines described the feelings of Dean supporters best when he remarked that he and his colleagues were "feeling the excitement" during their activities. He then excitedly and rhetorically asked: "Are you feelin' it yet?"10

Perusing this "blog", one finds many other examples of volunteers with very proactive, confident attitudes, seeing themselves as vital
components in the effort, not only to get Dean elected, but to promote a positive progressive agenda in America, a country that they truly love. Zach Levin, a High School Outreach Coordinator for Dean in Southern California, expressed this point best: "Whether it is passing out flyers, attending a rally, calling voters, no job is too big or too small. Taking our country back is like putting together a one-thousand piece puzzle; it cannot be accomplished without every piece. I hope all of you find the "piece" inside of you!" This point is very important, as it illustrates an essential aspect of the Dean movement. The movement received a spark from Howard Dean and his campaign managers, but in the end Dean was almost totally dependent on his grassroots supporters. His supporters were very progressively inclined, and seemed willing to work for other progressive causes, but Dean's campaign was the catalyst that activated their energies, and channeled them into his campaign.

Howard Dean openly promoted the identity of proactive promoters of progressive change among his supporters. He did so openly on his website, telling his supporters on the eve of the Iowa Caucus:

"This Monday, the people of Iowa have the power to tell the political establishment and the special interests that we have come to reclaim our government. Over the last few weeks, the Washington insiders have come at us with everything they have."

"But this campaign no longer is mine; it belongs to the people who are building it. It's not simply about the war or stopping the President's reckless tax cuts. It's not even about health care, jobs and education as I hoped it would be. It's about power. It's about who owns our government. It's about who runs our government."

"Our campaign does not just talk about change. It is energizing the American people so that together we can take action. For the first time in a generation, we have the power to break the stranglehold of special interests on our government and on our politics. We, a campaign of the people, have the power to take our country back, to make sure the people run the government. You have the power to revitalize our democracy and restore the United States to a place of respect in the world. I ask you to stand up and stand together with
me. To stand up to the special interests and the political establishment. To stand up for our democracy. No one is going to do it for you—you have to do it, you have to stand up for change. Lincoln said that "a government of, by and for the people shall not perish from this earth"—that responsibility is now in your hands.”

Dean later made an appeal, not to his supporters, but to the American public, urging Americans to "Get Involved!" In his appeal, he declared that his campaign was "about bringing Americans back into the the [sic] political process." He urged individuals to be take action and feel like they are part of a larger movement: "In the coming weeks, you can attend or host events that will build our community and spread the message that we are taking back our country. These gatherings and parties take place all across the nation—if you don't find one in your neighborhood, you can plan your own." It should be noted that this appeal came as late as February 11, when Dean's defeat seemed assured. This was of little consequence for Dean and his supporters, who continued to actively promote their agenda as a community of proactive individuals bound by the common cause of Dean's candidacy, no matter how dismal the prospects of it became.13 It was not merely the Dean campaign in which the movement's members were interested, but the promotion of the broader agenda. They felt that Dean was a good icon for their causes.

Of course, Dean also placed the usual feel-good politician-talk on his website, a good example being his welcome letter, "A Welcome from Governor Howard Dean." But when one browses through his website, he is immediately struck not by the type of material that is present on other campaign websites, but by what is conspicuously not--active involvement by and a plethora of material geared towards grassroots supporters.

The Labor section of his website stresses the grassroots identity of the movement, distinguishing Dean's campaign from all of his rivals. It read: "Bush will try to buy this election for $300 million, selling our country to big corporate special interests. The Dean campaign is building the largest grass roots coalition in history. Two million volunteers. We will win through people power."14 While there is no evi-
dence pointing to such a large number of Dean volunteers, (perhaps this number was merely a goal) the grassroots attitude was put across very well. "This campaign is about community, about all of us," Dean told a New Hampshire crowd that sent him on to his next stop with a standing ovation.\textsuperscript{15}

The movement's sense of community and drive for a progressive cause led one Democrat to hypothesize that "Many of Dean's people are more in love with the campaign than they are with the candidate." Joe Trippi, Dean's campaign manager, spoke eloquently about Dean's capacity to create a fundraising base that could challenge the Republican Party's vast treasury, and of the energy Dean inspired at the grass roots. He talked of the campaign's appeal to younger voters who have the potential to lead a political realignment. Dean's signature exclamation to his supporters was "You have the power!" Trippi pointed out that while the other candidates built themselves up, Dean built up his supporters instead, saying, "Look at you. Aren't you cool? Aren't you amazing?"\textsuperscript{16} His building of this identity would prove critical for the day to day functioning of the movement, with individuals taking initiative to "make things happen" for Howard Dean and his causes.\textsuperscript{17} As Tricia Enright, the communications director for Dean put it, "This is a people-powered Howard."\textsuperscript{18}

Indeed, Dean's people believed no only in the importance of their cause, but that they were working outside of the standard political system, one that includes the major news media. Responding to a patronizing New York Times letter, entitled "Come Back, Little Deaniacs," asking for Dean supporters' help in other progressive causes, one Dean supporter wrote:

"It is insulting and patronizing to assume that Howard Dean's supporters are all little kids who've lost their way and don't know how to vote and act like adults. I'll tell you what turns people off to politics, and it's not fine, strong, intelligent men like Howard Dean. It's the people in the news media who insult, belittle and discourage at every opportunity. "We in the Dean movement are not babies, and we're not going
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away. No matter what happens, we will keep fighting to take the country back from special interests and replace the veneer of what is passed off as "news" with the substance that Americans crave.”19

As distinguished from the other contemporary campaigns with regard to its tactics, the Dean movement's innovative improvisation in the face of a dearth of resources helped spark a revolution in the way politics are conducted, with more emphasis placed on the internet, groups of individual supporters, and large numbers of donors contributing relatively small amounts of money. When the tactics and tools of the Dean movement are examined, three basic categories can be seen: building an organizational support group of volunteers, campaigning both electronically and physically, and raising money to support the former endeavors, again both electronically and physically, but with a heavy emphasis on electronic fundraising.

As discussed earlier, Dean's "blog" allowed him to connect with a wide range of supporters across the country quickly, efficiently, and economically. It also allowed for a broader range of participation from activists within the movement, contributing to the grassroots and bottom-up character of the movement. The blog was especially critical because of the unique nature of Dean's movement. Other campaigns could operate electronically with a standard website that publicized their messages, signed up volunteers, and told volunteers what to do. Not so with Dean, who was far too limited resource-wise.

The blog allowed a reverse flow of information- back to the top, and then out again to fellow grassroots activists. The blog was the activists' primary tool for providing their input and actually running the show. A tremendous burden was thus taken off the shoulders of Dean's campaign headquarters, and spread over the collective shoulders of up to 500,000 volunteers. Joe Trippi put it best: "I was just lucky enough to have skipped out of politics for awhile and understood that you don't order the Internet around," he said. "You just have to let go. That's what makes this campaign different. It's owned by the 500,000 people who have signed up saying they want to join Howard Dean in taking our country back."20
The flow of action and power can be illustrated by contrasting the Dean campaign with the reelection campaign of George W. Bush. The Bush campaign used the internet to guide activists to events that they could take advantage of, and to provide them with ideas for activism. Activists were encouraged to sign up as "Team Leaders" for Bush, and were encouraged to host events and campaign for Bush. In addition, a campaign news service sent out updates to "bloggers." What was conspicuously lacking, however, was interaction. There was clearly no organized, thorough grass-roots campaign for Bush, in the same mold as the Dean movement. Bush's campaign simply took the elements of old campaigning, spreading basic messages and raising money, and spiced them up with new technology. On the contrary, Dean's movement relied on the new technology, and relied on its grassroots activists. One Dean activist, upset by a newspaper's portrayal of Bush's movement as "grassroots," wrote: "According to Webster, grass-roots means 'originating among or carried out by the common people; as a grass-roots political movement.' Bush's political strategist Karl Rove and his $2,000-a-plate contributors are hardly what one would call "common people." Dean's half-million supporters and their average $77 contribution do match the Webster definition. Joe Trippi, Dean's campaign manager, tells crowds, "A great myth in American politics is that I am running the campaign. The truth is that it is you the people." When Dean addresses an audience, he points out to them, repeating, "You have the power," and they cheer. Because they know it is the truth.

After pointing out the socio-economic differences between the activists in the two groups, the writer did something very telling, writing, "The driving grass-roots force behind the Dean campaign is the MeetUp organization. The Dean MeetUp, with some 750 members in Sonoma County, meets at 7 p.m. the first Wednesday of every month. To join a real grass-roots movement, visit dean2004.meetup.com." The writer emphasized the local character of his group, something that no Bush activist was likely to do, because of the more central organization of the Bush campaign.

With an organizational apparatus of interconnected (through blog communication and meetings arranged on the blogs) volunteers,
the next important step for the Dean movement was conducting grassroots activities on the local level across the country, but especially in Iowa and New Hampshire, the first states where voters would go to the polls to vote for the Democratic presidential nominee. The conventional wisdom, accepted by the Dean campaign, was that momentum from early victories in these two states could carry Dean through the remaining primaries. The theory was that this would likely happen for any candidate, but especially for Dean, since the only thing he did not yet demonstrate was the ability to win. Local grassroots campaigns, with local volunteers producing results with their own initiative, would come to characterize the Dean campaign. The main goal, of course, was to get out the vote, with the secondary goal being fundraising to support the effort and to pay for advertising.

The grassroots activities varied widely. At a "meetup" arranged through Dean's blog, a group got together in August 2003 to write handwritten letters to voters in New Hampshire, asking them to vote for Howard Dean. 40 to 50 people got together at Barley's in the Old City in Knoxville, on a Tuesday evening. The group's leader, Ben Ware, was a 20-year-old University of Tennessee student from Vermont, but retirees and employed people turned out as well. Ramsey Cohen, a 15-year-old high school sophomore, was the youngest.24

Erica Derr, mentioned above, began volunteering by working about eight hours a week for Dean's campaign, taking initiative on her own to get out the word on the campaign. Judy Weinstein, the 44-year-old executive at a California entertainment company referred to above, appointed herself as the director of Dean's voter outreach in the San Fernando Valley. Without any direction or guidance from Dean's campaign, she organized fourteen volunteers over two days to staff a table at the Van Nuys Aviation Expo. According to the Washington Post, it was the only table of its kind that ever drew 100,000 visitors a day.25

Browsers of Dean's website were encouraged to "join the Dean community," which included meetings on the first Wednesday of every month, held at more than 1,000 events nationwide. These
meetings were critical from the very start of the campaign. Various "house parties" were encouraged, similar to the Bush campaign, but the Dean campaign went much further with its handwritten letter writing campaigns, getting very local and very personal with voters. These were no mass mailings of the kind that the other campaigns sent out. It was hoped that they could make much more of an impact.26

On January 18, there were over 30 scheduled events listed for the New York City area alone. The events ranged from parties, to fundraisers, to volunteer community service, to campaign volunteering. Ideas were provided by the campaign, and volunteers were encouraged to create their own events and manage them on their own. Unlike the Bush campaign, which offered very few options and no national forum, the Dean campaign offered the best of both. Organizers were free to customize events to their liking, and were able to post detailed information about them on a centralized forum for all Dean activists, sorted by zip code for convenience sake. A "Dean Social" was advertised for January 24th at a church:

*Improve your Constitution....Dance For Dean! Mark your calendars for Saturday, January 24th, 2004 - just three short days before the all-important New Hampshire primary. We want to see you and your (undecided!) friends at Dance for Dean, a kick-off bash for a series of Brooklyn parties and events leading up to our NY primary. The plan is simple - we throw a party and you show up prepared to do the following: meet, mix, dance, drink, move, groove, fraternize, lionize (Dean), cavort, carouse, debate, and demonstrate. Start partying through the primaries at one of Brooklyn's oldest community venues. We'll have DJs, performance pieces, refreshments, a raffle, and plenty of info about our next President, Dr. Howard Dean.

Suggested donation is $15 ($8 for students and the unemployed). Please note: this is not a fundraiser. We appreciate your donations to cover the costs of the event and so that we may bring you other Brooklyn for Dean events.27

A posting for a "Working Meeting" at a local Starbucks read:

*Come join us at the Wyckoff Starbucks! This is a brand new Dean
As noted earlier, Dean volunteers knocked on 48,000 doors in Iowa. In Cedar Rapids, Iowa, more than 200 'Perfect Stormers' from around the country (most college students) knocked on doors and phoned voters as the Iowa caucuses approached. Thousands of Dean volunteers flooded into Iowa from other states just before the caucus. A description of one of these volunteers, Ryan Davis, in a story in "The Baltimore Sun" on Dean's blog, speaks volumes for the local grassroots dedication the Dean campaign benefited from.

"He was part of a barnstorming effort across 32 states that was interrupted when the campaign's Airstream exploded and died in Arizona. He has toiled in the campaign's Burlington, Vt., office, even after a promised salary never materialized and he ended up having to work in a deli to support himself and his growing addiction to getting Dean elected. About a week and a half ago, Davis was sent here, and the campaign found him free lodging in the spare bedroom of a local supporter, where he sleeps in a child-sized bed outfitted in SpongeBob SquarePants sheets. But most of the time, he is on the job, working out of a messy sty of an office with borrowed tables and chairs and volunteers who have been thrown together from across the country for the race to what is the finish line in Iowa but the starting point for the rest of the campaign."30

"Text messaging" technology was utilized to keep many Dean supporters in as close contact to each other as possible. This technology allows people to communicate through typing with computers and cellular phones. The campaign's network utilizing this technology was named "Dean Wireless", and volunteers were encouraged to form and register large groups for members to communicate with each other, and for the purpose of receiving "text messages" from the Dean campaign. While technology provided a framework to get out the vote, and grassroots organization provided the direct means, raising money was a significant issue. Money was needed to support the frame-
work, as efficient as it was, to support centralized direction from the campaign, and to purchase advertising. Incidentally, technology and grassroots activity would provide the movement with innovations in fundraising. The internet drew in a younger crowd of donors, paying electronically, a group that is not inclined to read political junk mail that arrives at their doorsteps. One quarter of Dean's contributors were under 30 years old. It also enabled easier and less costly fundraising, with the ability to instantly donate and to process donations with less overhead costs. The grassroots activism helped raise a tremendous amount of money, at one point raising $6 million over three months, from more than 21,000 people, mostly through online donations. The activism of thousands of volunteers made it possible. Dean emailed his supporters: "We have shown the power of our numbers, and what we can achieve when each of us takes an individual action that is matched by the actions of thousands of others."

Beyond the goals of getting Howard Dean elected and advancing a progressive agenda, the Dean movement seems to have had a much more ambitious, though less readily apparent, goal. The Dean activists were fighting for their vision of what American democracy should be, with a leader at the top making tough decisions with input from his constituents, but with the general direction and activism coming from the grassroots. They could not possibly have had nearly as much influence working for any other campaign. The others were far too top-down, and would never allow such interference with their power. That is why the Dean movement placed such a heavy emphasis on 'democracy' and 'taking back America.' The activists conducted themselves according to the system that they wished to see implemented across America- one of decision-making that arises from the local level and influences the decisions at the top. The Dean campaign would certainly not have been possible without these grassroots decisions. The Dean grassroots just wanted to make sure that the American government would be guided by these same types of decisions, rather than by what they saw as the unrepresentative and unresponsive status quo.

The Howard Dean movement belongs in the category of grassroots social movements, though it has unique characteristics that lean it
towards top-down movements in some ways, particularly in the area of the sources of leadership and inspiration. The members of the movement tend to be younger on average, with many students involved in politics for the first time, but many middle-aged people formed the backbone of the movement as well. Many were typical, average, working and middle class Americans who felt motivated to become active or active to a greater degree in politics. The movement members identified as independent political agitators focused on a particular cause, inspired to work for Dean in particular but concerned with a broader progressive political agenda. They saw themselves as inspired by and connected to the top leadership, but understood the onus of responsibility placed on them as independent actors. The structure and tactics of the movement were set up to conform to this identity and relationship, with the leadership spurring on the grassroots, but the grassroots largely running the campaign on their own. Beyond the election of Howard Dean and the promotion of a broader progressive political agenda, the movement sought to promote the broader democratic values with which it believed America should be run, including participatory democracy and responsiveness of leadership. It was the perception of the lack of these values that drove the movement to promote "Democracy For America," keeping it going even after Howard Dean's defeat.

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NOTES

2 Ibid.
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5 Interview with Tracey Denton and Associates by Joshua Harrison.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
25 Romano, Lois. "Dean, Driven by the Grass Roots: Bottom-Up


28 Ibid.


30 Ibid.


American legislative government is built around the principle of representative democracy--particularly in the case of the House of Representatives, the branch of the legislature explicitly conceived of as representing the people. But in an age of Internet voting and state voter initiatives, our legislative model is coming under increased scrutiny. Many argue that the entire system of political representation is an inadequate substitute for pure democracy. In this paper I will examine different conceptions of the role of a popular representative, and try to determine whether the House of Representatives as it stands today can fairly carry out its role as a popular body. I will then suggest a framework for a hybrid system of direct democracy, should one be deemed necessary.

It should be noted that I am confining this examination to the House, to avoid the complexities regarding the precise nature of the Senate. The Senate was never intended to be a popular body, as was the House; rather, it was meant to represent the states as distinct and equal political entities, and Senators were therefore bound by their state legislatures in ways that Congressmen were not. "From the beginning the Massachusetts legislature followed the practice of 'instructing' senators and 'requesting' representatives; Virginia did the same. Representatives, deriving their authority from direct elections, could not be commanded by the legislature, it was felt." ¹ I believe that the Senate's function is still valid and worthwhile, even now that Senators are popularly elected, but that is a subject for another time.

What is the role of a popular representative? And what should be his relationship with the people who elected him? Even when the Constitution was written there was no clear theoretical consensus, and there is no consensus today. There are two main competing models of political representation: representative as trustee, and representative as delegate.
A trustee is elected by a constituency because they have confidence in his judgment and ability to make the correct legislative decisions; he therefore has significant freedom of action in deciding on policy. As John Stuart Mill stated, the people retain control of the overall political process, but leave the details to their representatives:

"[T]he whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate controlling power, which... they must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they please, of all the operations of government... [But] there is a radical distinction between controlling the business of government and actually doing it. The same person or body may be able to control everything, but cannot possibly do everything; and in many cases its control over everything will be more perfect the less it personally attempts to do." 2

The purpose of trusteeship is twofold. First, it allows policy to be set in accordance with the superior knowledge and skill of the trustee, as opposed to the relative ignorance of the people. As John F. Kennedy wrote in Profiles of Courage, "The voters selected us... because they had confidence in our judgment and our ability to exercise that judgment from a position where we could determine what were their own best interests, as a part of the nation's interests." 3 Or, as Congressman Robert Luce said, "Public opinion is not infallible. For this reason it is persuasive, but not compelling. Men in the mass are at times prejudiced, angry, impulsive, unjust. So at times the legislator must stand up against prejudice and passion, impulse and injustice." 4

Second, a trustee may set policy for the sake of the general welfare, without regard to the narrow interests of his constituents. Edmund Burke, in his Speech to the Electors of Bristol, said,

"Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole-where not local purposes, nor local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of
A delegate, on the other hand, is elected by his constituency in order to serve as their voice in the legislature. He is to pursue their interests and advocate their views, with little if any capacity for independent action. As President John Tyler said before the House, "How can [a representative] be regarded as representing the people when he speaks, not their language, but his own? He ceases to be their representative when he does so, and represents himself alone."  

Or, as Parke Godwin said more bluntly, "A representative is but the mouthpiece and organ of his constituents."  

The purpose of delegation is to approximate direct democracy as nearly as possible. Democracy, the rule of the people, is seen as the best way to achieve the general welfare, by definition. The Virginia legislature made the point emphatically in 1812, writing to their representatives in Washington who were refusing to follow the people's instructions: "...the people are acknowledged to be the only legitimate source of all legislation....the general good is but the aggregate of individual happiness....the general will is only the result of individual wills fairly collected and compared..."  

It is important to note that in both models of representation, ultimate political authority remains with the people, even if it is expressed in different ways. But is this indeed what happens in practice? Rousseau was adamantly against the very idea of representative government: "[Rousseau] held that 'the moment a people allows itself to be represented, it is no longer free....'" Rousseau argued that sovereignty resides in the people, who, acting under the General Will, are always right. No representative can make law on their behalf."  

And his objections are borne out in the opinions of Madison and Hamilton, both supporters of centralized representative government. Madison spoke of legislatures as having "...the power of instructing to the people, without the difficulty of determining the momentary attitude of the majority."  

Hamilton's views were far more explicit. In his writings one often finds "...the identification of sovereignty with legislative power."
For [Hamilton], the delegation or surrender of the legislative power...meant the delegation or surrender of sovereignty. The people remained "sovereign" only through the carefully guarded and complex machinery of election. Even in The Federalist, Hamilton baldly spoke of "the authority of the sovereign or legislature," and defined laws as "rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject." 11

Theory aside, we find that in practice many representatives are less interested in representing the people than in remaining in office. One might assume that such representatives would tend to follow the wishes of the majority of their constituents, thus acting as delegates and representing the people for all practical purposes anyway. This often happens, but frequently such representatives follow Rule Four of James M. Burns's archetypical Congressman: "[A]s far as possible do not commit yourself on the important national issues that divide your constituents." 12 Thus, important national issues are pushed off the agenda to avoid controversy, or alternatively representatives try to straddle both sides of the issue (for example, Senator John Kerry's notorious statement that "I actually voted for the $87 billion before I voted against it"). Thus, they fail in their obligations both to the general welfare and to the particular welfare of their constituents.

Another factor that causes representatives to disregard their constituents is the two-party system. The first allegiance of a representative is often to his party. In the words of William Howard Taft, 13

*Party members retain their party loyalty, perhaps because they have inherited the attachment, often because of what may be called sporting interest in it, but usually because their minds have been trained to acquiesce in the party judgment and the party platform, and to associate party success with the best interests of the people and the country.*

That may be so, but is not the representative then simply acting as a trustee, judging the wisest course of action to be that of the party that he has, after all, elected to join? Not necessarily. The present structure of the legislature gives each political party tremendous
power to coerce its members into following the party line. As former Vice President Henry A. Wallace wrote,

The party organization in Congress could deprive a dissident congressman of his most valuable privileges. The first result of disloyalty to party principles could be the loss of membership in Congressional committees....The constituents of a congressman without committee privileges would not long return him to Congress.

In many ways, party politics almost entirely deprives most representatives of their freedom of action. "Party pressure seems to be more effective than any other pressure on congressional voting, and is discernible on nearly nine-tenths of the roll calls examined..." Additionally, they are made equally unresponsive to the interests of their constituents. "[F]eatures of the legislature such as party organization may lead individual legislators to behave contrary to the majority preference in their district."

Moreover, can the people truly be represented under the present system, under any circumstance? With "first-past-the-post" election systems, it is all but guaranteed that a large portion of the voters in each district will oppose the elected representative. This is true both in the sense that they do not approve of him as a trustee, and that he does not advocate their views in Congress as a delegate. More importantly, the districting structure distorts the political landscape in a number of crucial ways.

First, in a single-vote, two-party system, one has very little incentive to vote for a third-party candidate. Very often, the third-party candidate is seen as stealing votes away from one of the two larger candidates, leading to the victory of the other, less-preferred candidate. In reaction to this dynamic, most people would rather settle for second-best than vote in a manner that truly expresses their views, leading to a constricted public debate. This is in sharp contrast to the opinion of John Stuart Mill: "The influence of every mode of thinking which is shared by numbers ought to be felt in the legislature...to secure the proper representation for their own mode may be the most important matter which the electors on the particular
occasion have to attend to.” 17

Second, in a relatively balanced two-party system, small shifts in public opinion are magnified in the House of Representatives. "A net shift of one percent of the electorate from one party to the other will result in a net gain of about 2.5 percent of the House seats for the benefitted party.” 18

Third, congressional districts are uniquely prone to gerrymandering, where the dominant party redraws districts so as to solidify its own hold on power. The ways in which a gerrymandering party can manufacture safe districts for itself, or unsafe districts for the opposition, are many and varied. Worse, often both parties collude in drawing districts, although this usually occurs on the state level. In one egregious example, as noted by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger during his 2005 State of the State address, "153 of California's congressional and legislative seats were up in the last election and not one- I repeat-not one changed parties. What kind of democracy is that?" 19

Voting-rights organizations frequently submit plans for redistricting reform, but they are usually ignored, because neither of the two parties is interested in truly fair districts. "Gerrymandering will doubtless persist, for little can be done to implant the seeds of 'fair play' in soil that is not hospitable; and it is clear that plans-no matter how ingenious-for measuring the contours of districts will not be given much legislative attention.” 20

The rampant abuse of congressional districting creates an imperative for change, in order to have truly just government. "[T]he very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed that political power will be abused to promote the particular purposes of the holder, not because it always is so, but because such is the natural tendency of things, to guard against which is the especial use of free institutions.” 21

But what is the best way to reform the system? The answer depends heavily on whether Congressmen should be treated as trustees or
delegates. If the nation decides that legislative authority should be placed in the hands of a small body of skilled lawmakers selected by popular vote, then relatively small reforms would suffice to restore fairness to the system. These would include some form of redistricting reform, and the adoption of an instant-runoff voting system that would eliminate the "wasted-vote effect" of third parties.

But if the nation decides that legislation should indeed reflect the views of the people directly, then it is doubtful that the House of Representatives can carry out that function at all. As delegates are intended to be an imperfect substitute for direct democracy, if the House of Representatives (or a state legislature, for that matter) is not expressing the will of the people, the natural solution would be to dissolve it entirely and move to legislation by direct democracy. Such a shift may have already started, on the state level. Many states have seen a tremendous growth in the use of voter initiatives, in which legislation is voted on directly by the people, as the people grow increasingly impatient with gridlock in their state legislatures. This would represent a rudimentary form of direct democracy, which is to say, legislation by the people in its purest form—but the present system of voter initiatives has problems as well. It is very expensive to get a proposal on the ballot, often costing in excess of a million dollars, and "participation biases can lead to direct legislation policies that are not preferred by a majority of citizens, but that gain the approval of a majority of active voters." 22

I have not decided which model of government is to be preferred, trusteeship or direct democracy. Though the trend in America seems to favor the adoption of direct democracy, I believe that we should first be certain that it would be an overall improvement over trusteeship. There are many advantages to a small body of legislators; it is obvious that the majority of people can at times have catastrophically bad judgment, and in such times an elected legislature can serve as a check on public passions, as stated above. Furthermore, voting by the public is always vulnerable to fraud, even if necessary improvements are made to our present, absurdly lax and fraud-prone voting system. (Perhaps these points would be reason enough to retain the Senate as it now stands, even if the House were dissolved.)
That said, direct democracy has much to recommend it. By definition, it would produce results in accordance with the national sentiment, assuming a reasonable system of voting. The influence of special interests would be nullified, letting legislation pass or fail on its own merits. Presumably, potential legislation would be shorter as well, and in any event would be open to the scrutiny of millions of citizens who would pick out the tiniest flaws. (This is in sharp contrast to the present situation, in which most Congressmen do not even read the bills they vote on.) Finally, it can be expected that the sheer volume of pork-barrel spending would decrease tremendously, as few individual citizens would derive enough benefit from such spending to warrant the nationwide mockery that would come with it, even if it were to pass.

Many view democracy with skepticism, believing that people are fundamentally selfish and shortsighted. The following statement is typical: "A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until a majority of voters discover that they can vote themselves largesse out of the public treasury." But while examples of such behavior can be seen in American politics, one can more often find the reverse. When Michael New examined Tax and Expenditure Limitations (laws that impose spending caps on state budgets) in 26 states, he found that "[Tax and Expenditure Limitations] passed by citizen initiative procedures are more effective in limiting state spending and revenues than are TELs passed by state legislatures." 23

Another objection to direct democracy is that it would promote 'the tyranny of the majority.' But the Founding Fathers themselves believed that this was mostly a concern among small communities, and that as the size of the political unit increased, minorities would be proportionally better protected. "In Federalist 51, [Madison] argues explicitly that minority rights are protected by extending the size of an area governed so that 'society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority.'" 24 Researchers Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler tested this theory, analyzing the voting patterns for
several ballot measures deemed to be anti-homosexual, and concluded that larger political jurisdictions were significantly less likely to vote in favor of the measures, even when controlling for income, race, and education.\(^25\) While it is difficult to draw broad conclusions from data on a single issue, it does provide some support for Madison's assertion. But significant problems remain with direct democracy. First, there is the aforementioned concern about a small group of active voters dictating policy to the larger, inactive mass. Second, voters are influenced by outside factors: "[T]he electoral cycle, campaign spending, media coverage, issue characteristics, voter fatigue, and the number of days before the election shape voter awareness of ballot propositions...Changes in the information environment, not just individual differences, drive citizens' basic political awareness."\(^26\) And the "tyranny of the majority" would be a constant worry, Madison notwithstanding. How, then, can one construct a system with all of the inherent advantages of democracy, while mitigating its weaknesses?

I propose a hybrid framework for direct democracy that could address many of these concerns and reflect the will of the people far better than representation or voter initiatives. I do not necessarily believe that this framework should be instituted, but I would like to submit it regardless to the marketplace of ideas, so that its merits can be compared to those of alternative views, and so that others wiser than I could perhaps employ my ideas within systems of their own.

The framework is based on two principles. First, each voting citizen has a vote in all legislation. Second, each citizen may at any time designate another to vote on his behalf, and at any time revoke that designation.

Legislation would be proposed and voted on over a secure internet network. To those who worry about internet security or voting fraud, I answer that in a world of internet bank transactions, there is absolutely no reason why voting cannot ideally take place over the internet as well. Each voting citizen will have a secured account on this network that is accessible solely to him, through password-pro-
A citizen may decide to do one of three things. First, he may decide to act completely independently, voting on legislation as he sees fit, but remaining an individual in a sea of individuals. Second, he may assign his vote to another. This second citizen would become a representative for the first, or for several others, who would presumably only vest their authority in him because they trust his judgment or agree with his views. They would all receive their representative's voting records, and if they are ever dissatisfied with him they can revoke their support or transfer it to someone else. Assigning of votes would be used by people who believe themselves too busy or unqualified to vote on legislation themselves. Meanwhile, representatives could only represent people in their state, and could represent no more than 1/435 of the total population of the country, so as not to make them any more powerful than present-day representatives, and lessen the chances for demagoguery.

The third option for voting on legislation is the one I find most interesting. A citizen could choose to vote for himself, but at the same time join a caucus, or more than one. A caucus could have an unlimited membership from any state, and could be organized around any issue, personality, or mode of political thought. A caucus would be officially lead by one person, and would serve two purposes. First, it would serve as an indicator of the political strength of its cause, and provide exposure for the caucus’s ideas. If a citizen who headed a caucus of one million voters would surely attract attention from news media and other political figures, thus elevating the standing of the cause he represented.

Second, the leader of a caucus would write periodical bulletins to his members, in which he could endorse or oppose specific pieces of legislation. This sort of endorsement would be valuable to citizens who cannot research legislation on their own, particularly if they are members of several caucuses. In his research, Arthur Lupia found that endorsements can efficiently convey complex information to otherwise uninformed voters:

> [R]espondents who possessed information about endorsers but could not answer questions about issue specifics cast votes very
similar to those respondents who had both similar, relevant, personal characteristics and possessed enough information to answer issue-specific questions. This finding supports my model's claim that voters can use endorsements to make more accurate inferences (i.e., the types of inferences that 'informed' voters make) and increase the likelihood that they cast the same vote they would have cast if they had possessed better, or complete, information.27

This system would neatly solve the present difficulties with inactive or uninformed voters, allowing the popular vote to reflect more closely the will of the people.

Now, how is legislation submitted for a vote in the first place? Obviously, if each person could submit legislation directly, the system would be flooded with tens of thousands of bills a day. However, fundamentally each person should be able to submit legislation. Following the present example of voter initiatives, each proposed bill would be archived in a separate listing (which would likely be very, very long), where it would remain until it has been endorsed by 5% of voters. The author or authors of the bill would be responsible for gathering the necessary support and directing voters to the specific bill. It is hoped that this step would weed out any "legislative spam," leaving only those bills that deserve an up-or-down vote in the public forum. Of course, any bill that has already passed the Senate would automatically be up for the vote.

Once a bill has received the necessary support, it would then move to the central legislative network, where public debate would commence. Debate should be held open for some lengthy period, perhaps one year. As William Howard Taft said, "It needs attention and deliberation to decide first that wrong exists, and second what is the right remedy. A popular constituency may be mislead by a vigorous misrepresentation and denunciation. The shorter the time the people have to think, the better for the demagogue."28

However, there are many circumstances which necessitate quick action. Therefore, large majorities could move to shorten debate. Perhaps a supermajority of 67% could shorten debate to six months, 75% could shorten debate to one month, and 90% could
shorten debate to one week. The exact proportions would be refined as necessary.

Once debate is closed, the vote would be held on the next Sunday. Very probably, voters would consider a number of bills each week. Once the vote for each bill is tallied, it will either be approved, or it will be rejected and consigned to the archives.

As an aside, I do not care for the idea that a fifty percent-plus-one majority is sufficient for approval, and fifty-percent-minus-one is sufficient for defeat. Especially when dealing with large bodies, that margin is statistically insignificant and leaves open the very real possibility of carelessness, fraud, or mechanical artifacts, or the influence of outside factors such as information asymmetries. Moreover, it imposes far too low a standard for approval in any case. If just under half of the nation opposes a measure, should it really become law of the land so quickly? I would prefer instead that a 55% majority be necessary for passage, and that should the tally be between 50% and 55%, the bill will be voted on again every week until it either breaks above 55%, in which case it passes, or below 50%, in which case it is defeated.

Several practical issues still need resolution before such a system could be implemented. The procedure for amending bills needs to be fleshed out; likewise, a procedure must be created for reconciling bills with the Senate. Another serious issue is defining conflicts of interest. Under the present system, representatives receive a generous salary, and they are forbidden from receiving money from any other party for fear of vote-buying. But in the proposed system, everyone involved would be private citizens. They would have jobs, or businesses, and could very well receive in the normal course of commerce large sums of money from companies or groups whose interests are at stake in pending legislation. This would be particularly troubling if the voter in question were a representative for many people, or a leader for a major caucus. I do not yet have a solution for this issue.

Once a workable system is devised, how could it be instituted? Certainly the members of the House, and all the interests that depend on it, would fight hard against such a change. I think the
answer can be seen in the growth of voluntary online polling. Of particular interest is a website, www.vote.com, run by Dick Morris, former strategist of Bill Clinton. Registered members may vote on major issues, including legislation; as each member votes, the site generates an email from that member to the President and the member’s legislators, advocating the position that he voted for. Morris speculates that this sort of instant feedback could powerfully influence legislators in the future, as more and more people participate in such polls.29

To move from this sort of informal polling to a system of direct democracy, the first step for an interested organization would be to select a state whose population broadly favors direct democracy. Then, they could set up the above system as an informal poll for residents of that state, divided by legislative district, with the understanding that it is an intermediate step towards replacing the state legislature. Once participation is high enough, and legislators find themselves increasingly constrained by the published views of their constituents, then a constitutional amendment would be submitted instituting the online system as a legislative instrument. From there, the system would be exported to other states, assuming it works well. When national support and participation becomes high enough, then a push would be made on the national level. If direct democracy is indeed a better form of government than representative government, my method would work fairly well in achieving its institution.

All of this does not address the underlying issue: should representatives be trustees or delegates? However, this essay may serve to clarify the debate somewhat, and to suggest methods of improving otherwise worthwhile institutions. Clearly, however, the House of Representatives in its present form cannot be said to fulfill either conception of representation, distorted as it is by party pressure, gerrymandering, and an artificially narrow range of political viewpoints. Until some sort of substantive reform is implemented, the House can only be representative in name, and not in reality.◆

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NOTES

3 Riemer, 23.
4 Riemer, 77.
5 Riemer, 11.
6 Riemer, 22.
7 Riemer, 38.
8 Riemer, 40.
9 Riemer, 6.
10 Riemer, 38.
12 Riemer, 54.
14 Riemer, 54.
15 Julius Turner in Riemer, 66.
17 Mill, 178.

21 Mill, 175.

22 Gerber, 265.


25 Ibid, 1023.


28 Taft, 7.


http://llr.lals.edu/volumes/v34-issue3/morris.pdf
It is a cliché to suggest one can understand a foreign country by watching the films that country has produced. But a viewing of the Japanese animated film "Spirited Away" would convince you that this, like most clichés, contains an element of truth.

First, let me tell you the story of the film without delving too deeply into details, lest you haven't seen it. The film concerns a ten-year old girl named Chihiro and her fantasy adventure.

On a car trip to the new town where they are relocating, Chihiro and her parents get lost and discover another world inhabited by spirits and divinities. In that fanciful world, her parents undergo a mysterious transformation due to their thoughtless behavior. Now, it falls on Chihiro to rescue her parents and return them safely to the human world.

It turns out that the only way she can do this is to get job in a bath house for spirits and divinities and work like a slave therein. The owner of the bath house is a sorceress named Yubaba who changes Chihiro's name to "Sen," because one of Yubaba's methods for controlling people is to make them forget their past, including their original names.

Personally, I am not too keen on anime films, so I would have ignored this film when shown in New York two and a half years ago. But because I was intrigued by the story, I ventured to see it in Times Square and found it very cute and entertaining. After the show, however, I overheard an audience member say the film was confusing because the characters change their personalities as the story develops.

I think this person's comment captured the essence of this film, which is that people change their personalities. The film is pregnant with moral relativism. And, in that sense, it is very Japanese.
The characters in the film do change their personalities -- mostly from bad guys to good guys or at least to decent ones. Take for example, a monster named "No Face." Being voracious, demanding, and violent, he is one of the unwelcome guests at the bath house. "No Face" is not only faceless but voiceless as well, so he swallows employees of the bath house, one after another, to "borrow" their voices with which he can make his own demands. But Chihiro (or Sen), having experienced hardship and grown up rapidly, is able to recognize good qualities in "No Face" and, realizing the monster is actually a good guy, successfully converts him into a good friend.

Another example is Yubaba, the sorceress. Even this fierce-looking, exploitative and avaricious owner of the bath house gradually becomes impressed by Sen's tenacity, selflessness, kindness, and yes, love for others. Eventually, Yubaba would allow Sen and her parents to return to the human world.

The lesson here, if any, is that in this world there is no such thing as a wholly good or wholly bad person. People change. And I believe this is a quintessentially Japanese mindset. In other words, the Japanese don't believe there is an absolute line separating good people and bad people. You might want to call it "moral relativism" or "relativistic morals." And I submit that this derives from the predominant religious conception among the Japanese, which is related to Shinto, an indigenous religion in Japan.

The word Shinto means "the way of god." In simple terms, Shinto is polytheistic in that it has a multiplicity of deities or divinities, called kami. And the Shinto pantheon consists of the "yaoyorozu no kami" (literally, 800 myriads of divinities, though the number "800" in ancient Japanese simply signifies "countless"). In fact, the Japanese traditionally see divinity everywhere. There is kami in a river, there is kami in a mountain, there is kami in an ocean, there is kami in fire, and there is kami in the wind. All natural phenomena are caused and governed by kami.

But kami are not limited to natural phenomena. Your ancestors and great figures of the past are also divinized. Until 1945 when Japan surrendered, the emperor was regarded as divine. Therefore, during
the occupation, General MacArthur told Emperor Hirohito to declare to his people that he was merely a human being!

Furthermore, there are kami for a variety of human relations. A single person who is desperately looking for a future spouse goes to certain shrines to pray for it. This kami is called "en-musubi-no-kami," meaning a god for match-making.

Returning to the very concept of kami, each kami is endowed with an active force called tama. This tama can be seen as violent at times or as peaceful at others. Tama supposedly resides in a sacred stone, sword, mirror, or other object that is kept out of sight in a Shinto shrine. So, religious rituals at a Shinto shrine center on dealing with the tama in question. While making wishes on behalf of the community in the shrine, people offer food and sake, dance and music, to please tama when they believe it is peaceful or to pacify and cajole tama when they think it is violent. The point is that the same god can be violent or peaceful. Everything is fluid, even gods.

Historically speaking, Shinto has demonstrated a high degree of flexibility or relativism as it has sought to accommodate itself with other religions that were imported from abroad, such as Buddhism and Confucianism. Especially during Japan's medieval period (from the 8th to 12th century), there was constant interaction between Shinto and Buddhism, thus generating a variety of syncretic sects and rituals. However, during the Edo period (from the 17th to mid-19th century), there was an attempt to purify or re-nationalize Shinto by eliminating foreign influences. This was part of the so-called "Sakoku" (isolation) strategy during the Edo period. It was during the subsequent Meiji period (1868-1912) that this re-nationalized Shinto became the state religion of Japan. Also during the Meiji era, the emperor - formerly a constitutional monarch - saw his ancient role as the highest priest of Shinto emphasized for political purposes. So, Japan in this period, namely from 1868 through 1945, was a theocracy of sorts. It couldn't have been an extreme type of theocracy, however, because the main purpose of this theocracy was the modernization of the country along the Western model. In 1945 this Shinto-as-state religion was disestablished and again became simply one of the forms of worship in Japan.
THE CLARION

To summarize, Shinto is significantly characterized by its flexibility, relativism, or lack of absolutism. Today, the majority of Japanese people are not very religious and they only go to shrines on special occasions such as New Year's Day, before and after the birth of a child, or seasonal festivals. At the base of Japanese religiosity, however, lies Shinto with its flexible, relativistic, and non-absolutist nature.

Now, this brings us back to the overheard comment made by one of the viewers of "Spirited Away," namely that the film was rather confusing because the personalities of the main characters changed as the story proceeded. I will assure you that person was not Shintoist!

Here I submit that it would be somewhat difficult for those who believe in monotheistic religions such as Judeo-Christianity to really understand things that are significantly influenced by a polytheistic religion like Shinto. At the obvious risk of over-simplification, I would say that those who believe in a single god tend to view the world in a dichotomous way, that is, good and bad, according to the criteria set by the single god in which they believe. And they tend to seek to confront the bad while making an alliance with the good.

For example, modern American foreign policy has more or less demonstrated that characteristic, namely, a dichotomy between good and evil. The famous (or infamous) "Axis of Evil" slogan, hammered out recently by the Bush administration, which designates Iran, Iraq, and North Korea together as evil, is a good example. In fact, President Bush has sought to maximize moral clarity in executing his foreign policies. Put otherwise, he abhors moral relativism or ambiguity. That is an extreme example of this characteristic but I would say that past U.S. administrations have had their own versions of this good-and-evil foreign policy model.

In contrast, Japan's post-war foreign policy has exhibited a significant degree of moral relativism. Japanese officials simply do not see the world as black and white, good and evil. They see things in relative terms. And they seek to avoid confrontation with other countries that are generally deemed evil. For example, Japan has maintained some form of relations with countries that the U.S. has designated as enemies.
China immediately comes to mind. Since its establishment in 1949 to this day, the P.R.C. has been viewed by the U.S. as a real or potential enemy and been dealt with as such. But Japan, even at the height of the Cold War, viewed China as a country with which it could and should talk and do business. Therefore, Japan maintained relations with China except diplomatic ones, even though Japan was under tremendous, constant pressure from the U.S. to join the containment of China.

Let me give you an episode in this connection: In January 1965, when the U.S. was rapidly escalating its military involvement in Vietnam, Japanese Prime Minister Sato met with President Johnson in Washington. During their meeting, Johnson told Sato that China's militant policies and expansionist pressures against its neighbors were endangering the peace of Asia. In response, Sato said that in dealing with China, Japan intended to continue to promote private contact with China. But it was the remark he later made at a press conference that I want to bring to your attention. He said that Asian problems could often be solved not by the West's "rational approach" but required the patience and understanding of the Asian mind. It was obvious that Sato was using an "Asian card" against the U.S. but more to the point, by the West's "rational approach" Sato most likely meant a black-and-white worldview. It would be useful to remember that those words were uttered by Sato -- arguably the most pro-American of all post-war Japanese prime ministers.

Admittedly, it would be fairly easy to criticize Japan's foreign policy as wishy-washy, unprincipled, or unanchored in solid philosophy. Nevertheless, given that we currently are living in a world with a single hegemonic superpower led by a president who especially abhors moral ambiguity in international relations, with attendant serious consequences for its own society as well as for the rest of the world, I submit and hope that there might be more opportunities for Japan to use its fuzzy and relativistic foreign policy in order to help make this increasingly black and white world less so and more tolerant to things that are neither black nor white.

Let us hope that Japanese leaders will have as much courage as
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An oft-cited support for the Jewish State of Israel is that the land on which it stands was promised to the Jewish people by God in the Bible. Secular Israeli politicians commonly draw connections between modern Jews and their Biblical ancestors with regards to land rights. "If one possesses the Bible, if one considers oneself to be the people of the Bible, one should also possess the biblical lands, those of the Judges and the Patriarchs, of Jerusalem and of Hebron, of Jericho and others besides."¹ Later-prime minister Menahem Begin declared that "Eretz Israel will be given back to the people of Israel. In its entirety and for ever."² Critics of Israel's legitimacy as a sovereign state have criticized this affirmation of Divine right and claimed that Israel's entire raison d'être rests upon it. Author Nathan Weinstock stated that "Zionist mysticism only has coherence by reference to the religion of Moses. Take away the concepts of a 'chosen people' and a 'promised land' and the foundation of Zionism crumbles."³ In the book Who Is an Israeli? Yosef Agasy went so far as to equate modern Jewish nationhood with that of Aryan nationhood in Nazi Germany. Both are examples, in Agasy's eyes, of "phantom nations" created to enable anti-democratic oppression of others.⁴ Biblical beliefs are hardly matters of empirical verification, but the value of such beliefs, regardless of their truth, cannot be disputed. As the philosopher and keen observer of ideological evolution Friedrich Nietzsche realized, in the end, the value (meaning the utility) of things was far more important than their truth. Nietzsche focused on how morals and religion evolved and what uses they served throughout man's development.

Zionist founder Theodor Herzl, though not a pious Jew, realized early the power of the ethereal, such as religion, to draw popular support for his cause. Modern authors have written books entitled The Case for Israel⁵ and The Case of Israel⁶ (the latter opposing
Though a thoroughly assimilated Jew, Herzl understood the vast importance of religion to the Jewish people and the utility of religion in promoting the Zionist cause. For millennia the Jews had suffered unimaginable persecution, exile, and death because of their persistence in the faith of their fathers—indeed, their text par excellence, the Bible, describes the wanderings of their ancestors for forty years, faithfully following their religious leader Moses and the G-d in whose name he spoke. Although religion was often seen as outside accepted reason in 19th century Enlightenment Europe, Herzl was not so quick to dispense with Judaism as a tool for Zionism. He recognized its enormous capability to gain adherents for movements which cloaked themselves in religious garb, and also noted its remarkable endurance, outlasting emperor and civilization. Note Herzl's written planned comments to philanthropist Maurice de Hirsch, a critic of his Zionist efforts. "You don't have any use for the
imponderables? What, then, is religion? Just think what the Jews have suffered over the past two thousand years for the sake of this fantasy of theirs. Yes, it is a fantasy that holds people in its grip. He who has no use for it... will never be a leader of men, and no trace of him will remain."7 By harnessing religion to Zionism and not restricting his movement simply to humanitarian or socialist aims, Herzl could hope to create a popular groundswell for Zionism that gripped human beings and would keep adherents faithful long after other rationales for Jewish independence faded. Moreover, as someone who maintained little contact with Judaism and Jewish organizations after his bar mitzvah, Herzl needed a way to reconnect with his people if he hoped to organize them and gain their support for a tremendous national endeavor. Nietzsche, though an atheist, was well-aware of the great ability of religion as a tool for rulers and leaders to bond with their subjects and control them. "For the strong and independent who are prepared and predestined to command... religion is one more means for overcoming resistances, for the ability to rule-as a bond that unites rulers and subjects and betrays and delivers the consciences of the latter, that which is most concealed and intimate and would like to elude obedience, to the former."8

Herzl once told his editor at the Neue Freie Presse that "religion is indispensable for the weak."9 Despite his derisive tone, Herzl's point was accurate and should not be considered renounced by his future Zionist activities; Herzl simply realized later that religion was indispensable for the strong as well. After perceiving the threat of growing anti-Semitism in Europe, Herzl realized that he and his co-religionists would always be considered outsiders in Diaspora countries, and decided to rediscover the value of his own religion, previously discarded as useless for a man of his character. After going into a synagogue for the first time in years, he wrote that he found the experience "solemn and moving. Much of it reminded me of my youth."10 Judaism was not merely a crutch for the spineless but, Herzl realized, a system of thought and practice and ritual that could provide meaning for the meaningless and connect people from London to Odessa who would have no other basis for identification. "We recognize our historic identity only by the faith of our fathers..."
the old faith is the only thing that has kept us together." Not only did Judaism unite Jews everywhere, but it also provided a constant reminder of Israel's national ambitions, a useful seed for a Jewish nationalist revival. "All through the night of their history the Jews have not ceased to dream this royal dream: 'Next year in Jerusalem.'"11

In his construction of the Zionist movement, Herzl took this lesson to heart. On his journeys to gain support, he met not only with wealthy Jews but with the chief rabbis of Vienna and England and invited the chief rabbi of France to attend the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland.12 Hoping to gain acceptance amongst very religious Jews, Herzl attended Orthodox synagogue services on Shabbat prior to the Congress's opening session, going to the lengths of memorizing the Hebrew words of the blessings for the Torah reading.13 "With this, the assimilated Viennese journalist was transformed into a true Jewish leader," wrote Hazony.14 He also maintained excellent relations with that Basel synagogue, announcing prayer times from the Congress's rostrum.15 And at the Second Congress, he cultivated relationships with more observant Eastern European Jewry by seating "a group of black-coated Eastern rabbis" on the dais.16 Needing to obtain funds for the Zionist Organization's operating resources, he imposed a poll tax which he called the sheqel,17 reminiscent of the Biblical measure of fines and the value of consecrated objects.18 Repeatedly, Herzl took pains to place Orthodox Judaism and its devotees squarely within the camp of Zionism, despite its orientation, which was antithetical to his contemporary, secular, Enlightenment-oriented values. And his political progeny followed in his example, with social democratic Prime Minister David Ben Gurion mandating religious instruction for all Israeli children to ensure youth would grow up with more than a tenuous connection to their state.19 Herzl knew well the Nietzschean lesson, born out by Vatican-advocated Crusades and even the simple Jewish story of Hanukkah, that faith was one of few weapons powerful enough to rally people to great and noble and life-threatening tasks.
Yet Herzl's Zionism was not defined by religion; nor, as stated above, did he profess fidelity to it. He understood its value and utilized it, without letting it overtake his political ambitions. "He assumed religion would have a formal role to play in the Jewish state, just as it did in Austria, Germany or Britain," writes Hazony.20 All those states were, at Herzl's time, thoroughly modern but preserved institutions of traditional authority, such as church and monarchy, which possessed relatively little practical power but enormous significance as figureheads. Institutional Judaism could play the same role in Herzl's ideal state, with Jerusalem drawing thousands thrice yearly for the pilgrimage festivals, with even Diaspora Jews making the hajj-like trek in an overwhelming show of Jewish unity that would remind the state's citizens of their individual and national purpose.21

Had Zionism turned into a solely religious movement under religious leadership, the scope of its appeal would have been limited in both the Jewish and general spheres, and it would have risked degenerating into a movement powered solely by prayers and religious acts of 'aliyyah, but not by active, vigorous politicking. Nietzsche realized the danger of religion in politics when it ceased to be merely the instrumentality of a greater effort. "One always pays dearly and terribly when religions do not want to be a means of education and cultivation in the philosopher's hand but insist on having their own sovereign way, when they themselves want to be ultimate ends and not means among other means."22 But though Herzl cultivated the support of prominent rabbis, he had no intention of allowing them to dictate national policy in what was to be a modern, democratic state based primarily on legal authority. "We shall know how to restrict them to the temples. Just as we shall restrict our professional soldiers to their barracks. The army and the clergy shall be honored to the extent that their noble functions require and deserve it. But they will have no privileged voice in the state."23 Comparing the religious leaders to the military, Herzl made it clear that neither would play the roles of political decision-makers, roles for which they were singularly unsuited.
Jews prayed for almost two millennia for a return to Zion.\(^{24}\)

Students of the revered rabbis the Vilna Gaon and the Ba'\(\text{a}\)al Shem Tov immigrated to Israel en masse. But clearly, neither effort had accomplished anything tangible beyond increasing Jewish religio-desperation and slightly increasing the number of Jews in the Holy Land. Neither effort would yield a Jewish political state, but Herzl's did. Indeed, according to Nietzsche such efforts would have captured the Jewish imagination and bound it, through prayer, to the lands of the Diaspora until their rescue by the "One who restores His presence to Zion." Their prayer and faith would alleviate their pains and oppression and allow them to sustain themselves. "The sovereign religions we have had so far are among the chief causes that have kept the type "man" on a lower rung-they have preserved too much of what ought to perish..." wrote Nietzsche.

"When they gave comfort to sufferers, courage to the oppressed and despairing, a staff and support to the dependent, and lured away from society into monasteries and penitentiaries for the soul... [they broke] the strong, sickly o'er great hopes... bend everything haughty, manly, conquering, domineering... invert[ed] all love of the earthly and of dominion over the earth into hatred of the earth and the earthly."\(^{25}\)

When supreme, religion kept the Jewish people complacent with their fate and removed them from the realm of political action into a state of acceptance and passivity, unable to take the bold actions that could have yielded an angry, powerful revolt capable of restoring a Jewish state. As Israeli political theorist Yoram Hazony wrote of the early religiously-guided movements for a return to Zion, "all these efforts were perhaps doomed to fail in attracting large-scale Jewish activism if only because their efforts were not backed by tangible political and financial abilities."\(^{26}\) Herzl's secular movement, which made necessary use of Judaism to further its ends, was Jewish activism, the refusal to wait for Divine assistance. A fervent Zionist in Chaim Potok's classic novel The Chosen reflects the political spirit that Herzl breathed into the Jewish people, a reawakened hunger for the state even amongst once-complacent and patient religious Jews. "Some Jews say we should wait for God to send the
Messiah," said the character of Rabbi David Malter. "We cannot wait for God! We must make our own Messiah... Palestine must become a Jewish homeland!" The Jews were no longer a people restrained by their religion to perpetual desperation, supplication and meekness. Their religion was not a sedative but an apparatus used by men of means to attract hearts and minds to a cause that would not be realized by prayer alone.

Secularists criticized the role of religion in Zionism from the beginnings of Herzl's efforts, demanding that Jewish nationalism be framed in terms of socialism, rationalism, modernity. Religion, a relic of a past age, had no place in a political movement or state. One need only glance at the world of 2004 to see the utter shallowness of Herzl's critics, and their ignorance of the importance of great ideas, be they true or false. Dictatorship of the proletariat collapsed with a bang in Russia and with a whimper in China. Contemporary philosophers question how we can possibly know anything. Modernity has come under attack from traditionalists and liberals alike. The Jewish state exists, an observant Jew is mayor of a unified Jerusalem, and chic urbanites go to lectures at Kabbalah Centers.

Theodor Herzl is often remembered for his quote "If you will it, it is no dream." Friedrich Nietzsche made an analogous judgment when he criticized those who sought to know and embrace ultimate, abysmal reality, instead of building castles in the sky and luxuriously dwelling therein. "What in us really wants truth?" he asked.

"The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment... the question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating... the falsest judgments... are the most indispensable for us... without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and the self-identical...man could not live---that renouncing false judgments would mean renouncing life and a denial of life."

The judgment of the existence of God, the judgment of Israel's chosenness and special mission despite the long exile, the judgment of
the potential for national rebirth after two miserable millennia—it takes great dreamers, great builders to make such judgments and make life far more palatable and full of potential for all. Herzl knew that he faced a mammoth, unprecedented task—transforming an oppressed, scattered group who muttered "So may it be His Will" into activists who proclaimed "So may it be Our Will." Agricultural colonies and military victories would not achieve this transformation alone. Religion could move minds and hearts, wallets and weapons. Nietzsche's point, and Herzl's implied judgment, was that "if you cannot dream it, there shall be no will."

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NOTES

1 Jerusalem Post, August 10, 1967.
11 Herzl, Theodor. The Jewish State (translated by Harry Zohn).
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13 Herzl diary, Sept. 3 and 6, 1897. Diaries, 581, 584, 588-589.

14 Hazony, 122.


16 Hazony, 138.

17 Hazony, 129.


20 Hazony, 138.

21 Hazony, 112.

22 Nietzsche, Beyond, section 62.

23 Herzl, The Jewish State, 100.

24 Taken from the seventeenth section of the 'Amidah, the Jewish prayer par excellence said thrice daily by observant Jews. The seventeenth section speaks of the restoration of the Temple service, complete with fire-offerings and prayer.

25 Nietzsche, Beyond, section 62.

26 Hazony, 98.


29 Nietzsche, Genealogy, section 4.

30 Ken Yehi Ratzon, a phrase that is part of numerous prayers in Jewish ritual.
At a time when the United States is occupied battling a violent insurgency in Iraq and searching for terrorists in Afghanistan, it appears that new events are forcing the United States into yet another confrontation, this time with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its desire to achieve nuclear capabilities. Currently, Iran has the potential to deliver a 700kg payload as far as 1,300km using its Shehab-3 missile, a distance that encompasses both American military installations in the Persian Gulf, as well as Israeli and moderate-Arab civilian centers. The Iranian capability to strike at targets located within this distance coupled with Iran's tenuous history, its anti-Western rhetoric, its alleged terrorist connections, and its calls for the destruction of Israel means that Iranian wishes to achieve nuclear means must be dealt with and thwarted immediately.

However, given the military and political realities that currently exist in Iran, it is highly unlikely that any preemptive air strike would completely dismantle the Iranian nuclear project, and instead would most likely compel the Iranians to work faster while giving the theocratic regime a rejuvenated wave of support in the face of Western aggression. Therefore, given the sad reality that a preemptive strike will most likely not take out all of Iran's nuclear facilities due to the strategic locations of the facilities and because Iran already has the potential to retaliate against any strike with tremendous force, and since a preemptive strike will also strengthen the very leadership the West wishes to see leave, the preemptive strike option should be avoided at all costs.

The policy option known as preemption has gained notoriety among policy makers from the Israeli preemptive air strike against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor on June 7, 1981. At the time of the attack, it was hailed as a great success. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was attempting to build a nuclear weapon, and Israel, aware that it was likely going to be the state most threatened by a nuclear Iraq, decided to destroy the reactor before it was too late. Advocates of preemption against Iran tend to refer to the Osirak strike as the model
that could be followed in an attempt to destroy Iran's rapidly developing nuclear program.

In support of using a preemptive strike if necessary, Israeli OC Air Force Maj-Gen. Elyezer Shkedy stated in a Jerusalem Post article that he was "confident that Israel's air power can accomplish any mission required of it."¹ Shkedy added that "the first squadron of the new US-made, long-distance F-16 jet bombers [capability] of reaching Iran was 'ripe.'"² However, Shkedy must realize that the situation in Iran is vastly different from that of Iraq in 1981. Not only is the weaponry different, but the political ramifications from a preemptive strike at this time could be catastrophic.

Before examining the downfalls associated with preemption it must be noted that "counterproliferation actually has a surprising amount to recommend it."³ If it was feasible to destroy all, or even a vast amount of the key elements to Iran's nuclear program, then while the strike would not terminate the nuclear program, nuclear proliferation in Iran would be handed an enormous setback. Brookings Institute fellow, Kenneth Pollack explains:

> *Since the key is to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the current regime, such a delay could be all that is necessary. In effect, that is exactly what the Osirak raid did. It merely set back Saddam's nuclear program, but in doing so, it ensured that Saddam did not have a nuclear weapon in time for either the Iran-Iraq War or the Gulf War, and that was just enough of a delay to prevent him from ever acquiring one.*⁴

However, unlike dealing with Saddam Hussein in 1981, the Mullahs of Iran have made it clear that any aggression towards them will be met with retaliation. One can only assume that this would mean either a strike at American forces in the region or perhaps even at Israeli civilian centers, a threat that Iran has not kept secret. Furthermore, the consequences of a unilateral preemptive strike are not only military in nature. Politically and diplomatically, any nation that strikes another nation unilaterally risks tremendous repercussions in the form of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation as
While the Osirak strike is held in high esteem as a great success of the IAF, and is the prime example for the preemption model, it must be noted that the Osirak strike had downfalls as well as its generally viewed successes. In contrast to popular belief, it seems that Israel's strike on Osirak "did nothing to hinder Iraq's nuclear aspirations. Although it temporarily set back its capabilities, it served rather to reinforce and increase Saddam's desire for a nuclear arsenal." Imad Khadduri, an Iraqi nuclear scientist under the Hussein regime, recalled that Israel's preemptive strike had the exact opposite effect that Israel hoped for, and instead the attack "sent Hussein's A-bomb program into overdrive and convinced the Iraqi leadership to initiate a full fledged nuclear weapons program immediately afterwards." Therefore, while the Israelis did succeed in removing the immediate threat, the Iraqi reaction actually escalated the situation and led the Iraqis to significantly improve their nuclear weapons program. There is little doubt that Iran would react differently. Furthermore, Iran has acted much more diligently than Hussein did, strategically placing their reactors, opposed to Hussein, who had his facilities concentrated together, making a successful preemptive strike against Iran an even more daunting task.

Unlike Osirak, where the reactor's location was well known to the Israelis, and its defense was minimal, the Iranian nuclear program is not concentrated in one location, making any hopes of eliminating the program improbable. Iran has spread their reactors out over their enormous country with the "Natanz facility, about 160 miles south of Tehran...big enough to hold 50,000 centrifuges" and able to produce enough uranium for 25 10-kiloton nuclear bombs a year, according to David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and Technology.
and International Security, a Washington think tank specializing in nuclear issues. In addition, the Bushehr reactor, actually located closer to the town of Halileh, is about 12km to the south of Bushehr proper, along the Persian Gulf coast, in the same site as the location of Iran's Nuclear Energy College. It sits approximately 400km south of Tehran and a significant distance from Natanz and Arak, Iran's heavy water production site, located "at the Qatran Workshop near the Qara-Chai river in the Khondaub region, in Central Iran, 150 miles south of Tehran." Furthermore, it is believed that the most essential parts of the reactors are also well underground, making an attack even more difficult. The Iranians have also put the reactors in strategic locations, placing them near civilian centers in order to further deter any first strike. Therefore, just the placement of the Iranian reactors already makes a strike against them much more difficult and less promising when compared to the military success at Osirak.

Furthermore, unlike the Osirak attack, which was not matched with an Iraqi retaliation, Iran has made it clear that they will strike back at Israeli civilian centers and key American bases and facilities in the Middle East. Given Iran's connections to the Islamic terror network, it is also conceivable that Iran would even attempt a terrorist attack against the American homeland if possible, in retaliation for a preemptive attack.

A preemptive strike against Iran, by either the United States or Israel, would also most likely be the death knell for any Iranian reform movement. History shows that the pattern for Iranians has been to "rabidly reject any foreign interference in their affairs." In contrast to experiences in Iraq, Pollack writes that "just as Saddam was assured that all of Iran would rise up against the mullahs if he invaded in 1980, only to find that the Iranian people rallied to the government, so too might the United States find the same..." Because the mullahs would gain strength on the heels of a preemptive strike, any hopes for regime change or liberalization in Iran would be obliterated.

Furthermore, a preemptive strike against Iran, a strike which would
either be done unilaterally by Israel with America's approval or by American jets, would be a diplomatic disaster. Currently, America's popularity at the United Nations is extremely low. A preemptive strike against Iran, especially one that leads to civilian deaths, would surely exacerbate this already precarious situation. Perhaps the State Department has already recognized that America is not exactly the world's most popular country, allowing the Europeans to conduct preliminary talks with Iran about their nuclear program. Surely, if American standing in the Arab and diplomatic communities was higher, America would be leading these crucial negotiations. The Osirak strike did hurt Israel's diplomatic standing for a brief time, but Israel, unlike the United States, was faced with hostile neighbors anyway, a situation that did not look like it would change anytime soon. However, the United States has invested a lot of capital and has spilled a lot of blood to see that both Afghanistan and Iraq emerge as democratic states, and thus, America has a lot more to lose politically from a preemptive strike today, compared to Israel's strike on Osirak.

While Iran has not openly declared that it would seek to destabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, Pollack notes that "another potential menace to American interests is the possibility that at some point, Iran might choose to actively fight the American reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Because of the extent of Iranian influence and presence in Iraq, this could have devastating consequences." With the American military already extended in Iraq, the emergence of another front would require Washington to either bring in troops from other vital locations, something that has been resisted, or an even more drastic step, and one which would surely receive tremendous domestic criticism, a military draft. Therefore, because of the consequences of a preemptive strike, it seems unlikely that America would engage in such a maneuver at this time.

Finally, a strike against Iran will cause Iran to react just as Saddam Hussein did after the Osirak attack, thereby increasing its nuclear program to act as a deterrent. However, the situation with Iran is even more vexing than with Iraq because Iran is currently a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Accordingly, Iran must disclose information and allow for inspections, something
which Iran argues it has done. However, a strike against Iran will undoubtedly result in Iran's abandonment of the NPT, which would mean that Iran would no longer be obligated to allow inspectors into the country. Furthermore, given the fact that Iran is the victim in a preemptive strike, it is likely that the United Nations would not even take action against Iran if it did build more weapons after the strike, because they would argue that Iran needs these weapons to deter any further aggression.

Thus, while a preemptive attack may appear to be ideal, especially given the fact that the Osirak preemptive strike was for the most part deemed a success, in reality, a preemptive military air strike against Iranian nuclear reactors is the least favorable of the few possible ways of dealing with Iran at the present time. Due to Iran's retaliatory capabilities, the all but guaranteed lose of civilian life an attack will bring forth, the legitimacy that the mullahs will in turn receive from an attack, and the diplomatic crisis that would ensue afterwards, policymakers must avoid a preemptive strike at all costs.

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NOTES

2 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
10 Pollack, 383.
11 Ibid.
12 Pollack, 380.
In his seventh decade as a political scientist, Dr. Robert Dahl continues to vigorously critique American politics. Dahl, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Yale University, is the author of over a hundred articles and fifteen books, including the acclaimed work Who Governs (1961), which analyzed the history of politics and political decision-making in New Haven, Connecticut.

In 2002, Dahl wrote How Democratic is the American Constitution?, which found the U.S. constitution democratically deficient, particularly in comparison with other Western democracies. In his Clarion interview, which was conducted at his New Haven home by Alan Goldsmith and Hart Schwartz, Dahl proved himself the embodiment of a scientist, full of enthusiasm for the potential of experimentation to enhance democracy in America.

Regarding your most recent book, why should the American constitution be more democratic?

Actually, the question I ask is "how democratic is it?" But going to "should," I think the reason "should" is based upon a fundamental commitment—mine, yours, and others—to the ideals of democracy, and the democratic values of which a relatively high degree of political equality among the citizens of a country is a basic value. It is reasonable to ask, then, about a constitution in any democratic country: how democratic is it? And what can we do about it if it falls short of the goal?
As I think I said in that lecture, there is a threshold at which you can call a country democratic. You have a substantial number of countries you can call democratic because they meet that threshold of institutions, but what we don't have is any measure of differences between countries. How much above that threshold are they? Or are they just at the threshold, or minimally at the threshold? And if, like Aristotle, we think of democracy, as I do and think it's important to do, as both a goal or ideal and also an actuality, then if there's a large gap between the ideal and the actuality, it's quite reasonable to ask, first, what are the sources of that gap? And also, is there anything we can do about it, as with other kinds of ideals where we recognize the gap. Is it inevitable? Is it going to get worse?

I was curious myself, listening to the talk, about the basic assumption about democracy as an ideal. It seems that there need to be some limits in order for government to function, or function effectively. So, listening to the talk, my question was: Why should political equality be an ideal as opposed to, say, something else? As one of the other professors on your panel mentioned, why not the public good?

What is the public good, and whose public good? I think the importance of political equality, that is, each citizen ideally having an equal set of rights and opportunities, and even resources, is to enable that person to act on behalf of his or her own conception of the public good or his own interest. And to deny the ideal of political equality is to say that in effect, some people should be more equal—should have more power than others to act. And while we would say that of the elected representatives, who incorporate the delegated authority, that's very different from saying that there are people whose interests or lives are worth more than those of other people. And I think it violates a very fundamental, ultimately ethical norm when you say that the interests of this group of people are more valuable than the interests of that group of people, and therefore they should be given more power.

There's civic equality, where you have equal rights and opportunities—you can sit where you want on the bus, and you can work at any profession that you're qualified for, and so on. But
political equality is different, because that refers to the administrative structure of the government. Is that a fair difference? Also, do you mean there is not enough civic equality or not enough political equality?

No, I'm talking here about political equality, the capacity of citizens to influence their government. And now, like democracy itself, there are barriers to the real world achievement of political equality. It's a demanding ideal...the reality is always very far from it. We can think of individual resources that are not even social, but are inherited capacities to interact with other people effectively, and then there are these barriers to achievement, but within the limits of those irreducible barriers, are there actions we can take that would make it possible for people to achieve a greater degree of political equality?

Now, I think political equality has limits, intrinsic limits, in the following sense: One cannot simultaneously-rationally, reasonably-defend democracy, the role of democracy and the role of political equality, and, at the same time, defend infringing on those rights that are absolutely necessary in order for democracy and political equality to be achieved-- freedom of speech, for example. You cannot simultaneously defend those goals and say it's alright to infringe on freedom of speech. Now, all of these are clearly complex goals. But, you can't simultaneously insist upon the importance of political equality in a democracy, and be willing to infringe on freedom of organization to bring these things about. And it is quite reasonable to have a high court--in the U.S. the Supreme Court--where challenges can be made. Does this overstep those intrinsic or inherent boundaries?

Now, the area beyond those absolutely fundamental rights, in order to be self-governing, becomes much hazier. Then, it becomes riskier and riskier for a court to intervene on those questions. But within that limit, if the legislative body oversteps those boundaries, then I think it's quite legitimate for a high court to say "No." So, by and large, if those rights are present, then much of public policy is theoretically 'up for grabs.' And then it depends on what people's choices are. It comes down to the question of majority rule, and the limits on majority rule. These are not easy questions to answer.

The fear of the "tyranny of the majority."
Yes, which I think is a gravely overstated fear, as compared with the infringement on human will of minorities, who have much more power, and exercise their power, to keep great numbers of people from achieving their possible goals. That, historically, is the rule.

You mean an oligarchy.

Yes. And the constant threat of the accumulation of political resources in the hands of a small group, which typically will call upon some body of philosophy or religion, from Plato onward, to justify its right to rule--the divine right of kings, for example.

In certain circumstances, you might have a situation where too much democracy leads to chaos, political chaos. I'm not arguing for totalitarian government, but a limited autocracy, it seems, at some points, might be a starting point to move towards democracy. For if there's chaos, then there's injustice for everyone.

Well, I think that Samuel Huntington--and I disagree with Sam on lots of things, but he pointed out and I think he's right--that stability and security are very high priorities in all societies at all times. And if you have to make a choice between, let's say, chaos or extensive violence, and order brought about in a non-democratic fashion, I think that most people would probably say at some point that we need to exert some type of authoritarian regime. Then what you hope for is some kind of soft authoritarian regime.

Right. Like in Russia these days.

Yes...Russia is certainly a preferable alternative to chaos--if that is the real alternative. That is often--I think all too often--used as a threat on the part of some elites to justify their power, even within a democratic system.

In the American political system, part of one branch of government reflects the viewpoint of the majority to some extent-the House of Representatives. You have the Senate which essentially reflects regional representation. You have, with regards to matters of foreign policy and the implementation of laws, a
slightly more restricted, more elite, implementation by the president, and also legal interpretation by the Supreme Court, where you might need clearer and speedier decision-making. But you still have a great deal of influence by popularly elected representatives in the policy-making venture. And to some extent, isn't that a preferable system, where you incorporate different values like regional importance, and importance of state sovereignty, with political equality, with political representation in the House? Wouldn't that indeed seem to have been proven a more stable form of government, compared to a system for such as France, for instance, which has gone through five Republics in the same time America has gone through one?

Well, you might as well compare it with Britain and the House of Commons. What you have in Britain is a pretty stable system, with the majority being pretty powerful... There's an example of a country that is stable, democratic, without these limits, other than cultural limits, and belief in this burgeoning British constitution. If we were to put them on a scale of instability of cabinets, we should contrast Britain, let's say, with France, and then an in-between case of Italy, where the average life of a Cabinet is under twelve months...

The United States is an extreme example among the Western democracies of checks and balances that do limit the power of the majority. Let's go back to the House of Representatives. In the last election in the House of Representatives, some forty or less of the contests were really competitive, and part of the reason is that after each census, it becomes a battle in the legislature to arrange the districts so that they favor the incumbents. And then you get deals between the Republicans and the Democrats, and so you get safe districts which now have been made enormously non-competitive districts. So there, who is being protected? What interests are these that are being served by this kind of arrangement? It's arbitrary.

And as to the Senate, as I write in the book, I don't see why a person from Wyoming who is elected to the Senate should have essentially 12 votes compared to the person in California. I don't see a justification for it. You have to make a rational case that there are interests there that would be damaged, and that should not be damaged,
even though the interests of other people would be advanced if they damaged these interests, like subsidies...

The obvious counter-argument is that it serves to keep the country unified. There are very few countries, like the United States, which need to limit their majority rule, because there are very few countries which are as diverse, which have such a diverse population over such a large area. Britain is a relatively homogenous country.

Getting less so—and Italy, too.

You mentioned how in the House of Representatives, which alone is based on proportional representation, there are only 40 seats which are more or less open. And indeed that is a problem of redistricting and gerrymandering. That is fundamentally not a problem of state legislatures, because they're the ones who have done it in not really a constitutional form. For example, Arnold Schwarzenegger in California is taking steps to try and make redistricting more independent, based on judicial panels, which is indeed an action being taken by a level closer to the people. So, is that necessarily a fault of the House of Representatives, or even of the Constitution?

No, it isn't necessarily of the written Constitution, but of the unwritten Constitution: Those elements of the Constitution which were not written and have become so deep a part of the political culture that they are very hard to change. I think that under the Constitution, it certainly would be possible to have districts that are more representative of the population, and indeed it would be possible to have, let's say, more representative districts with our winner-take-all system. Even in districts, the Constitution does not prevent PR, or a runoff, which they have in some states, or an instant runoff. It's very hard to change [the traditional Constitution], but we could have a better electoral system. That, it seems to me, is a byproduct or a consequence of asking these questions: Are there ways we can make our Constitutional system-written, or unwritten or traditional—reasonably more democratic? And I think we can try out, at the local state level, some other electoral systems, like instant runoff, seeing what we can learn from them and then acting. To do that, we've got
to start changing the way Americans think about the Constitution—as a sacred document so perfect that it ought not to be changed.

Anything can be changed in Canada, for example, in their Constitution...

**Because it's not venerated as much?**

Yes, because it's not venerated as much. Here, it's taken as a doctrine.

**Religious, almost.**

Yes, almost religious. Iconic. And I think that's unhealthy. Between the extremes of that, and then the opposite extreme of saying constitutions don't matter, that they are frivolous and someone will change it every two years or whatever--I think we can get stability if we begin to examine these things in a more practical and less iconic fashion.

**Practically, the American Constitution balances a lot of American values, such as political equality and separation of powers, and is actually a document remarkably shaped by compromise. It's lasted over two centuries, during which America has prospered, it's the leading superpower, it's gone through less republics than France, and less instability and no dictatorship compared to Italy, and so forth. So why should we fix something that doesn't appear incredibly broken?**

Well, you can ask that of the railroad system; you can ask that of an automobile. If it's not broken, why fix it? Well, it may be not working very well, and somewhere between the break-down and working well, there are intermediate stages, in which it's not working well by what I would regard as reasonable standards, and also by comparative standards. France and Italy are not the only countries to compare it with. You can compare it with Britain; Canada; Australia; New Zealand; the Scandinavian countries. They're smaller countries, to be sure... but still it seems to me that it shouldn't be regarded as historically fixed that we can't examine the Constitution, formal and informal, and think of ways that it might be improved. By what stan-
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dard? Well, among others, the standard of whether it will achieve more political equality and democracy. We've achieved one huge revolution, of which the Constitution served as a barrier for over a century, and that was the status of African-Americans.

The Senate provided a veto from 1836 onwards over even discussing slavery. The "gag rule" was adopted, until the Civil War, so that you couldn't even debate slavery. And then the Supreme Court struck down the effort to veto civil rights discussion. It took an extremely astute politician, Lyndon Johnson, to effect change. One has to admire what he did, both in the Senate and as president, to manipulate and compromise with the Southern senators, in order to get a majority to pass the Civil Rights Acts of the 1950s and 1960s. An amazing task: to overcome those limits resulting from minority vetoes! Whether the minority veto imposed heavy costs on another minority, because they didn't have the right to veto, was a result of political circumstances.

Eventually the US was able to end slavery through a combination of war and Constitutional change, but only after it reached a point where the country was in an extraordinarily fragile state, close to where it was in the articles of Confederation. Although it's not a popular contemporary viewpoint, couldn't it be argued that for the benefit of the country, it made more sense to compromise on slavery in 1787, and fight that battle, both politically and militarily, later on, even though it doesn't fit within our modern democratic framework?

Well, it's a good question, and to me the answer is unclear, because you'd have to engage in some historical scenarios of "what if?" It's clear that if they hadn't made that compromise, the South would have become a separate country. Now, assuming the South had become a separate country, and the United States would have retained possession of most of what became the United States, the South would have remained pretty much bound, militarily and economically, and I think economic development of the North would have continued, and possibly increased.

But the question--it's almost a moral question in my mind--is would blacks, African-Americans, be better off or worse off? I don't know
the answer. I don't know any way of playing that out. After all, it took not only the Civil War, in which there were something like 600,000 deaths, I believe, huge by historical standard as a percentage of the nation's population. And, even in absolute numbers, up until World War I, very high. And then blacks were kept in a state of subjection in the South until the 1960s and 1970s. Would it have been worse? I don't know. But, anyway, we did it that way, and that, I think, helped to create a fear of disorder, a fear of civil war, that further increased the strength of beliefs in the sanctity of the Constitution. 'If we touch the Constitution, look what might happen, we might have civil war.'

BY WHAT MEASURE?

You're talking about standards of political equality and democracy. With railroads or airlines it's pretty easy to measure them, because they're financial--either they are in the red or in the black. But how could you measure them statistically? Is it possible?

I think that's one of the most important questions, one that political science should be facing. How do you compare it in countries which have these standard democratic institutions intact? I'll go back to something I remarked upon earlier: Can we now say that in some democratic countries there is a greater degree of political equality, a greater degree of democracy, by some standards, and in what respects? For example, I think--though maybe this just reflects a bias that my grandfather came from there--that if one were to measure these things, the Scandinavian countries would turn out to be higher on a scale of democracy above the standard threshold. Now, why is that? As I said, to a very good Norwegian friend and Swedish friend of mine, "You know, you Norwegians and you Swedes, you've been sitting on the same piece of ground there for two thousand years. You're highly homogenous...You've never in all that time had any foreigners in significant numbers present, except some Wehrmacht soldiers...You're a tribe", I said to them [laughter]...in the same sense that you've got these deep understandings.

But when it comes to social policy, we Americans view it as a situation of 'us and them, we and they.' If it were us, we'd do it for our-
selves, but they, they're another story. For whom are we spending these funds? For us! We can have 50% of our GNP going into government, because it's us! We're spending it on ourselves, and we're choosing to do that.

So then I went on to say that "You countries, all you European countries and certainly in Scandinavia, have a problem of immigration... You know, in the United States, a Pakistani can become an American. It will take two generations, and he can become an American. Can a Pakistani ever be a Norwegian?"

I think that the Canadians have handled this in a different way, the best I can tell, handling immigration particularly well. But anyway, the Scandinavian countries were able to, in part because of their homogeneity. The Netherlands is a different story, but even there, there was a homogeneity which has led to severe tensions for some time. But again, they were a people, a single people, and by and large a single language. And our diversity, I think, the American policy of immigration and assimilation, is by world standards an enormous success. And I think it continues to be even with the large Hispanic population. That's a new challenge. I think it's harder for Europeans, and for Scandinavian countries. Because... how do you assimilate them into your culture? We take it for granted... We are a nation of immigrants.

And the idea of France is a nation of Frenchmen.

Absolutely.

My question was also related to the idea of statistics, to measure freedom or equality. Again, it's easier in other fields, like economics or psychology, even. We were just learning recently, in one of our courses, that there was a large debate in the 1960s in the field of political science, when people started to become more oriented towards a behavioralist model or a scientific model, as opposed to a more classical model. It would seem that if you're measuring these kinds of things, and then using the statistics to make judgments on what should be done, then depending on the orientation of the political scien-
I think that's a very good question. I think I played at least a small part in what we called the 'behavioral revolution.' Pendleton Herring, the then-head of the Social Science Research Council and a political scientist, who wrote a book on political parties, invited me and a number of other people to serve on a committee, and we set up grants to political scientists to do investigations in what we were beginning to call political behavior, using statistical methods, and that played a role in what came to be called the behavioral revolution. Political science was significantly changed with the more systematic use of statistics, the study of behavior, the use of public opinion polls—all of which was quite new, and resisted by most political scientists.

It was about 1958 or 1959, at an International Political Science Association meeting in Rome, where I gave a paper, later-published, called "Epitaph for a Successful Revolution." And my point was, yes, the revolution is successful. Now, let's fit this in. Let's keep in mind that political philosophy is still important. And I think, at least in my department, we achieved a degree of diversification in our appointments and our scholarship. Not everybody has to adhere to one approach, but we can choose.

Now, most recently—and it's already 15 or 20 years old—the theory of rational choice has greater limitations, because of the complexities in behavior. It's excessively deductive, and all too often, I believe, it's not tested. That's one of the things we were doing in the 'behavioral revolution,' so-called, using these statistical models. You've got to find a way to test your conjectures! And that may mean going out and interviewing people, or you get statistical data that you can put in, or whatever. But you test it. Even changing levels of happiness, and relation to the political system [chuckles]-people began to do tests of this and that kind, and so on. But all too often, I think the rational choice model has remained untested. To me, that's been a less productive innovation than the 'behavioral revolution.' You still have to keep the notions of political philosophy, political values, historical aspects, comparative aspects. Comparative studies also began to develop statistical and other techniques that made them more rigorous, more testable. And I think that basically
political science is a better field by a good measure today than it was when I was starting out.

Do you think that the political field in the future will keep some emphasis on the more normative and historical aspects, or do you think it runs the risk of losing the qualitative, normative aspect?

I'm worried about that. I'm worried that the people in political theory will become more isolated, professionally, from these other aspects of political science, so the conversation, the dialogue, which I think would profit both sides, will become less common. I felt that some of the graduate students were talking about psychology without any knowledge of it, as if you could get your psychology from classical Greek sources. There are a lot of things we don't know, but we know more than Aristotle, to be sure. So, to answer your question, it worries me.

DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES

With regards to proportional representation, In your latest book, you stated, "in a majoritarian system, the only winners in an election are the citizens who happen to be in the majority, while all the other citizens, being in the defeated minority, are losers. By contrast, in proportional representation, everyone, or basically everyone can win, enough to leave them basically satisfied with their government." Now, in a proportional representation system, there are two questions I have. First of all, doesn't the attempt to govern through the electoral consensus run the same risk you would have of trying to operate a government based upon consensus of the public good? In the talk at Cardozo, it was brought up that any type of consensus you came up with would simply be too vague, and more concerned with preserving the status quo, than with achieving actual, beneficial change.

Well, a pragmatic answer to your question is to look at the countries that have P.R., often with broad consensus, for instance, the Netherlands and Sweden, and ask about reform taking place there.
They are, in many, many respects, far ahead of the United States, in the extent to which [reform] legislation has been passed. Now, a Swedish political scientist has pointed out that from the period of 1942, through the late 1980s there were largely consensus governments, in the sense that coalitions could be put together that would represent a majority in the house, but even more than that, they would seek to get a broader consensus, in, let's say, the Parliament. This was a harder achievement, but they were able to work away at that, and for reasons I think we talked about earlier, there P.R. works extremely well.

Does a P.R. system suit every country? If you're speaking comparatively, because a P.R. system tends to lead to multi-party systems, and if the country isn't homogeneous enough, or the citizens aren't sophisticated enough to understand the politics and to live with it, then the problem of the multi-party system is that it could be a big blow to the unity of the polity. So, in the United States, it seems the two-party system is good, because there's such a widely-ranging amount of interests that the two-party system that is created by not having P.R. means that large and broad coalitions can be unified by the political parties. So, the question then becomes, is P.R. still appropriate for the United States? How would that unity [of the American two-party system] be sustained?

That's a good question. To go back to the question itself, I think actually P.R. in many of these countries-and I don't want to say they are comparable to the United States-has been a unifying force. Look at Switzerland, with its linguistic and religious diversity, and geographical diversity. Without P.R., it would have fallen apart. And one of the things about P.R. is that, arguably, it takes this diversity into account, and requires a degree of compromise, which sometimes takes extensive negotiations. For example, it sometimes takes a new Dutch government six weeks or more to form a new cabinet and coalition. But by the time they've got a cabinet and coalition, they've got the program in place, too. They know what they're going to do, and they've got the majority behind them. It's a different kind of political model.

If you should begin to get several parties, then maybe you're better
off with a P.R. system than with a "winner-take-all" system, because with a "winner-take-all" system, you may then begin to get governments which represent less than a majority. You may then get elections in which maybe a third of the voters are represented, and two-thirds aren't. So what I would like to see, I repeat, is more experimentation. And I mean careful, careful experimentation. I don't know whether we have the capacity for it. But it wouldn't inflict huge damage to try some systems—which have been tried out elsewhere—out at the state level, and see how they work.

Justice Brandeis, in 1912 or 1913, I think, said that we should use the states as laboratories. They are so, but in a very chaotic way. And we want to look at the experiment that is going on in experimental terms, so that we come back and examine it. We might also want to put a limit of time on it, so that after ten years, we take another look at it, and revert back to the old way if we don't like this new system.

Is the main idea of your book, then, that the experiments are adjustments, grease in the machine to make it run more smoothly, instead of a more radical realignment?

I'm not arguing for a constitutional convention. Maybe that's somewhere in the future. I do think that what is desirable is what I've just been saying, that we try out some things, that we develop a different kind of attitude, and that we look more clearly at the defects. Take the House of Representatives. Now, I have thought, and this may undermine the legitimacy of the system more than I would like, but there are times and places when they'll publish Congressional votes, and they do it by party. And I would like to see a measure in which each of those state delegations is also coded to allow statement of what proportion of the population, or some measure of the population, voted for that candidate in the last election. So then you might get, for example, something passed by sixty percent of the members of the House, who represent thirty percent of the voting population in the last election. That's theoretically possible.

Well, since people obviously don't get one hundred percent of the votes in their district, in a close vote it would be very difficult to have a majority which would represent a majority of the
I think in the existing House it would, but I don't think that would necessarily be the case, if there were P.R., or even if the voting districts were more fairly designed than they are.

**America and Democracy in the Middle East**

I want to tie together the possibility of proportional representation to the elections that are happening in Iraq, the first free elections ever in that country. In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to conduct elections on the basis of proportional representation. A lot of the political parties emerging are based upon ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq. The country indeed was artificially created, so you then have a great [lack] of firm national ties in the absence of dictatorship.

There have been criticisms of proportional representation, based on the theory that it would exacerbate ethnic and religious tensions, and that it would not help to bring about the unification of the country that we see as beneficial. So, my question is, do you think that P.R. was the right choice for the Iraqi elections?

Yes, I do. At least if we think "winner-take-all" is the alternative—that would be a disaster, because with the "winner-take-all," you could get the Shiite majority taking all. That would mean that the Sunnis would be probably almost totally excluded.

I think P.R. was probably a good move. Any system requires the capacity for compromise, cooperation, and negotiation. Unfortunately, these are not a part of the political culture in Iraq. Its history doesn't suggest that they're very good at compromise, cooperation, and negotiation. Whether P. R. will facilitate their learning to cooperate, negotiate, within the different groups, and work together, I don't know, but I think the "winner-take-all" would have been a great mistake.
Even if you had electoral districts drawn which tried to allow majority-minority districts for Sunnis and Kurds?

Maybe. Maybe you could have designed such electoral districts. But that would have taken a degree of imposing by the occupying authority. You might have designed electoral districts to achieve substantially the same result, but since you can achieve that result by P.R., I would say, why not?

It's an opportunity to build from the ground up, without the gerrymandering.

Yes, it is, and given their political culture and the role of bosses, chiefs, and so on, building from the ground up may be necessary.

Do you think democracy has a future in Iraq?

On that I'm doubtful. I also think there's an enormous degree of uncertainty, so great that trying to predict outcomes in that situation is just a big gamble.

If democracy doesn't work well, and if indeed the people don't seem to have an especially strong attachment to democracy in Iraq, should principles of equality require America to simply withdraw? Actor Ed Asner said that "if the people of El Salvador want communism, let them have it." Should America allow Middle Eastern countries, and Iraq specifically, to have more autocratic or totalitarian systems, or should it step in, not for the purposes of national security, but for purposes of protecting individual rights, minority group rights, and so on?

Well, if we were consistent in that policy, and stepped in everywhere, or where you had repressive regimes, you would have to start in North Korea. And starting in North Korea would set off something that I don't think you would want to set off. It would require stepping in to a great many countries around the world--for example, Saudi Arabia and African countries. Yet, if we take on, as our national obligation, stepping in, and if necessary with military force, in every country that denies its citizens full democratic and human rights, then we're going to be committed to engaging in warfare and
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occupation all over the globe, forever.

The country that would be destroyed in the process would be the United States. We simply can't do that. It's bad enough as it is, the inroads that have taken place in civil liberties, and civil rights, and so on. Guantanamo is a disgrace. It's a national disgrace. And we're going to have problems enough, because I think terror is like crime. Terror is easy, there's a huge reservoir of young people who are prepared to do it. And if we respond to it in a warlike manner, and mobilize while we're scared, well, I can see American democracy declining. Many of the rights that we value most are going to be infringed upon more and more. So, to save the world means to lose what is best, I think, from the system of the United States.

We happen to be, for better or for worse, in Iraq now. In regards to Iraq, do we have a responsibility to strongly resist a popular reversion to a more autocratic form of government?

Well, I think that if there is a strong movement in that direction, I think we have to leave, because I think we cannot remain there as a permanent occupier. We haven't even done that successfully in our three ventures in Haiti, where we've left a huge mess.

The days of empire are over with. People are too fired up with national self-determination.

Exactly.

Also, the difficulty becomes, if the elections in Iraq veer off towards failure, hostility, chaos, etc., and the United States says "we tried, and we're leaving now," then everyone will cry out then, too. You can't win either way, because there's a humanitarian outrage if there are massacres [upon American withdrawal]. It's bad enough that there's insurgency, counter-insurgency, but if and when they're left to fend for themselves, it could be ten times worse if it's Iraqis against Iraqis.

Yes. I think it's a terrible dilemma that we've gotten ourselves into. And I think that staying on, as an occupying power, what, forever? For twenty years, thirty years? It's impossible. We don't have the
resources. And it leaves us vulnerable in other areas, where there can be huge crises.

For example, we have to deal with Iran. I hope that the Administration is not going to go into Iran the way it moved into Iraq. I think the Europeans are right, that you've got to negotiate with them. I think that with North Korea, we've got to negotiate. We have to bribe them—l'm not against a little national bribery... [laughter] We have to bribe them, if necessary. Because the alternatives are so much worse. You're dealing with situations in which all alternatives are bad, but some are worse than others.

THE FUTURE OF GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

We have contrasting movements in the United States. We've always had a strong tradition of responsible, together with a strong belief in self-reliance, local representation, and smaller government. We also have witnessed the destruction of empire in the last century. Nations are moving toward self-determination and nationalism. At the same time, we have large alliances, the United Nations and NATO, and movement towards resolving issues and wars.

Resolving transnational conflicts through very large bodies, we have seen consolidation on very important issues. In the past, these issues would often have been resolved by national or local governments, while now they are resolved by undemocratic bureaucrats in Brussels. So we have a movement towards very large government, and we have a movement also to very small government. How do we preserve responsiveness? Is there any alternative to moving towards a more multinational/world government?

Let me address what I think is the thrust of the question. I think that internationalization, globalization, development of international organizations, could play an important role, or a desirable role, and that even the EU will decrease the extent to which people within countries can control their own destiny. I think that means a decline
in democracy-I don't think even the EU is going to be very democratic. A democratic deficit is there, but if you think of many other international organizations, many of these organizations are not democratic at all. What some people are beginning to talk about now is accountability, and I think that's a difficult task. It's a desirable path, but a difficult one to go down: How can national parliaments hold these international bodies accountable in some way? It requires a degree of attention and organization that I think national legislatures don't have, and will not have.

Will that be for a statesman to accomplish? If the national legislature cannot, should the president or foreign minister do so?

Well, to some extent, but then, again it's a shift of control, of democratic controls, to a smaller and smaller number of people, where the controls are very weak. This, I think, is one of the more pessimistic futures, and one very difficult for me, at least, to see a satisfactory way out of. One way is to improve accountability through beefing up national legislatures' capacities for holding international organizations accountable to their treaties, and so on.

If to a large extent, we are moving sovereignty upwards, with lesser-known people governing huge numbers of people, how do we discover who governs?

That's a lovely question. I think there the same techniques that I used [regarding the city of New Haven, Connecticut] in Who Governs? would be required... What you have to do is go in and study decisions. You go in and you interview and you re-create how those decisions got made, who made them, who was left out. You re-create the whole process of decisions, and then you can ask the question "who governs?"

Speculating from outside, you can impute all sorts of conspiracies, or whatever. You have to get inside-go to Brussels and start interviewing, reviewing, analyzing...how was this particular decision [made], who was in the room, who was left out, who said this, who said that, and so on. Reconstruct that, and then you can begin to say who governs. ◆
Kenneth Waltz, a past president of the American Political Science Association, is most well known for his theory of neorealism, in which he argues that bilateralism leads to peace and multilateralism leads to war. This theory won him great respect and accord amongst the political science community. Waltz has recently espoused a new theory, this time tackling the issue of nuclear proliferation. The first half of his theory is that nuclear deterrence worked and has in large part been responsible for the peace between great powers since World War II. We will focus on the second half of the theory, which indicates that this deterrence is desirable. He is quoted as saying "more may be better," contending that new nuclear states will use their acquired nuclear capabilities to deter threats and preserve peace. Waltz concludes that America should not be overly alarmed by a glacial spread of nuclear weapons because those weapons will only be used for defensive purposes. He goes so far as to say that nuclear weapons cannot even be used to blackmail other countries. We take issue with three specific facets of his argument: its moral equivalence, the existence of nuclear blackmail, and inherent contradictions with his original neorealist theory.

MORAL EQUIVALENCE

Waltz demonstrates a total lack of moral clarity by arguing that America should not worry about glacial proliferation. In a speech at Yeshiva University on December 15, 2004, Waltz mentioned that he would not find it distasteful if Iranian nuclear weapons put a crimp in America's style. By making peace and stability goals in and of themselves he ignores the reality of just wars. When making this argument Waltz places all types of war on the same level. He does not make the moral distinction between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the American liberation of that same country. He equates the American invasion of Afghanistan with the Nazi invasion of Poland. We do not deny that deterrence will work; we merely ask whether it is a good thing. Giving states that do not respect human rights the
power of deterrence is a recipe for disaster. If Slobodan Milosevic had nuclear weapons a NATO intervention in Yugoslavia would have been impossible. If Hitler had nuclear weapons no state would have dared to intervene on the Jews' behalf.

Three of the world's major human rights violators, Iran, Iraq and North Korea, are also, unsurprisingly, three of the countries most commonly associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The specific topic of Waltz's speech at Yeshiva was nuclear proliferation in Iran. He again claimed that fear over their proliferation is unnecessary because the weapons will only be used for peaceful means. Try explaining that to the Iranian people. On June 7, 2004, Human Rights Watch published a document titled Like the Dead in Their Coffins: Torture, Detention, and the Crushing of Dissents in Iran which documented, among other human rights violations, how "The Iranian authorities have managed, in the span of four years, to virtually silence the political opposition within the country through the systematic use of indefinite solitary confinement of political prisoners, physical torture of student activists, and denial of basic due process rights to all those detained for the expression of dissenting views." Allowing Iran to gain a credible deterrent threat against the United States hammers the final nail into Iranian dissent.

In the late 1980s Saddam Hussein initiated the Anfal campaign, under which he committed acts of genocide against Kurds living in northern and southern Iraq, and was responsible for the murder of at least 50,000 Kurds. During this campaign Saddam committed war crimes including the widespread use of chemical weapons such as sarin gas, mustard gas and nerve agents. In April 1991 following the Gulf War Saddam once again perpetrated genocidal attacks against the Kurds and Shiites. In this campaign he murdered between 40,000 and 100,000 Kurds, and between 60,000 and 130,000 Shiites. Saddam finally relented partially because American took steps to protect the Kurds, including setting up 'no fly zones' over northern Iraq. If Saddam were to have obtained a nuclear arsenal, as many signs indicate he was attempting, he would have been able to return to slaughtering the Kurds.

North Korea, a county that currently operates death and concentration camps, has been able to utilize Waltz's strategy and deter
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American intervention. North Korean concentration camps are thought to contain 200,000 and to include "gas chambers where horrific chemical experiments are conducted on human beings." A high level North Korean defector recently gave testimony about the horrors that he had witnessed. "I witnessed a whole family being tested on suffocating gas and dying in the gas chamber, The parents, son and a daughter. The parents were vomiting and dying, but till the very last moment they tried to save kids by doing mouth-to-mouth breathing." This is the future advocated by Waltz. He sees no problem in the fact that a country exists in which "imprisoned women are often forced to abort fetuses and prisoners are routinely executed in public, often in the presence of children. Pluralism and civil society are nonexistent. There is no religious or press freedom." Glacial proliferation is a situation which provides regimes such as North Korea the means to preserve situations such as this one.

No single group benefits more from a world in which peace is preserved solely through nuclear deterrence than terrorists. No one, not even Waltz, claims that nuclear deterrence can prevent events such as the attack on the USS Cole or the Marine barracks in Lebanon, or even the events of September 11, 2001. The only thing that nuclear deterrence can prevent is American retaliation for such attacks. If Afghanistan had been a country that benefited from the protection of nuclear weapons, Operation Enduring Freedom would have been impossible. In a world that permitted glacial proliferation, Osama Bin Laden would still be free to finance and orchestrate terrorist attacks and there would be nothing that America could do to stop him.

Despite current claims to the contrary, if Saddam Hussein had ever participated in glacial proliferation he would have instantly transformed Iraq into a safe haven for terrorists. Iraq provided the terrorist Abu Nidal and his organization safe haven from 1970 to 1983. He even returned there at some point before his death in 2002. The only reason that Nidal was expelled in 1983 was because Saddam believed that by doing so he could gain American support in his war against Iran. Perhaps more disturbingly, Saddam did not seem overly anxious to take action against Ansar al-Islam, "an al-Qaeda affiliate active in Iraqi Kurdistan since September 2001." 650 mem-

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members of this group operated out of northern Iraq. It is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that if Iraq had the ability to deter American intervention, Al Zarqawi would not have been the last terrorist to consider Iraq a safe haven.

Iran, whom Waltz specifically mentions as a possible candidate for proliferation, is another country with a long history of supporting terrorism. The 9/11 Commission found that "Tehran operatives maintained contacts with al-Qaeda for years and may have provided transit for at least eight of the 19 men who wreaked havoc in the United States with hijacked airliners on September 11. Al-Qaeda and Iranian operatives struck an accord in late 1991 or 1992 to provide training for assaults on Israel and the United States, and terrorist leaders and trainers went to Iran for instruction in explosives." Iranian support for terrorism and anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon. In 1979 Iranian students took 52 Americans hostage. If glacial proliferation had already reached Iran those people would have been as good as dead. If Iran knew that it could have used a nuclear threat to deter America, negotiation would have been nearly impossible. The Iranians could have murdered all of the hostages and known that they would not have to fear retaliation. When considering the implications of Waltz's theory, it is important to ask whether allowing Iranian proliferation is an acceptable sacrifice for stability.

While Professor Waltz may be correct in assuming that nuclear proliferation would prevent war, he is incorrect in assuming that it would cause peace. If countries such as pre-liberated Iraq, Iran and North Korea were to proliferate, or continue proliferating, nuclear weapons would make peace an impossible dream for countless millions of people. While Waltz is unconcerned that nuclear proliferation will "put a crimp in America's style," tens of millions of oppressed people worldwide consider that prospect a cause for grave concern. By equating one war with another and one country with another Waltz commits the unconscionable sin of moral equivalence.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

Waltz claimed in his speech at Yeshiva that it is impossible for one
country to blackmail another. This is simply ahistorical. In 1994 America discovered that "North Korea was preparing to remove some fuel rods from a research reactor which they'd been operating at Yongbyon. [The] fuel rods contained five or six bombs' worth of weapons-grade plutonium." As soon as America heard this they immediately changed their policy toward North Korea. Prior to 1994 America severely restricted its economic and political ties to North Korea. Restrictions existed on "US imports of most North Korean products. Sales of most US consumer goods and financial services to North Korea. US investment in most North Korean industries. Direct financial help from US citizens to North Koreans. US ship and plane transport of cargo to and from North Korea. Commercial flights to and from North Korea." Kim Jong Il was able to use the threat of nuclear proliferation to improve American policy towards his country. The Clinton Administration guaranteed that if North Korea would halt its nuclear weapons program they would be richly rewarded. Under the Agreed Framework the Clinton administration promised the North Koreans two light water nuclear reactors, 500,000 tons of oil per year, and movement toward the normalization of trade and diplomatic relations between the two countries. North Korea was able to get all of these concessions without doing anything to moderate the very policies which caused the economic and political restrictions in the first place. Kim Jong Il was able to use nuclear blackmail to force America to accept the Agreed Framework, a deal extremely favorable to North Korean interests.

NEOREALISM

Waltz's original theory of neorealism casts serious doubts on his explanations of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the wars between India and Pakistan. This presents a serious problem for Waltz's argument that states act rationally and do not go to war with states that have nuclear weapons. He attempts to answer this problem by saying that states which attack nuclear powers only attack their non-vital interests and nuclear powers will only use nuclear weapons to protect their vital interests. The only problem is that this inherently contradicts the very theory that made Waltz famous. In order for one state to truly know that another will only attack peripheral targets, and not threaten their vital interests, there needs to be a high level
of communication and trust between the two states. This concept of accurate understanding and trust between two states is contradictory to Waltz's description of neorealism and the security dilemma. Waltz describes a situation titled the security dilemma, "Rational countries living in the state of anarchy and the security dilemma would be suspicious of and hostile to each other because of their tense relations, although that was not their original idea." No state ever wants war, whether or not nuclear weapons are in the picture. Each state is merely forced to build up its defensive arsenal so that it does not fall into a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis its neighbor and then a misunderstanding leads to war. According to Waltz, "With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire, then conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur. To achieve a favorable outcome from such a conflict, a state has to rely on its own devices, the relative efficiency of which must be its constant concern." Unless Waltz wants to claim that nuclear weapons do far more than deter aggression, such as change basic human nature, his explanation for the wars between Israel and its neighbors in 1973 and between India and Pakistan force him into contradicting his original theory.

PAN-ISLAMISM

Waltz's claim that using a nuclear weapon is suicide is only accurate assuming that no person or entity affiliates or will affiliate themselves with a movement that supersedes the state. Waltz's argument that states, being rational actors, would never threaten their own survival by attacking using a nuclear weapon only works so long as leaders give their ultimate commitment to their states. If a leader ever acknowledges commitment to a higher calling, such as Islamic fundamentalism, it would not be suicide for him to use nuclear weapons in an offensive manner. The mullahs could theoretically launch a nuclear assault on America, confident that our retaliation would only be against Iran. In this case they could consider their sacrifice as leading to a net gain for their cause. Iran would be destroyed but Islamic fundamentalism would live on in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and numerous other countries. If any nuclear-empowered government were to truly associate with a supranation-
al movement, such as Islamic fundamentalism, it may actually become rational for them to use nuclear weapons.

Samuel Huntington, in his famous essay "The Clash of Civilizations," claims that this situation of supranational affiliations is actually taking place right now. He postulates that a condition is developing in which countries are grouped "in terms of their culture and civilization. Instead of the highest actors being countries he writes that "Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations." If the mullahs see themselves as a part of the "Islamic civilization of Islam," as opposed to just Iranians, it would be no more irrational for them to commit suicide than it is for any suicide bomber to do so today. An Iranian nuclear assault would be no different from a Palestinian committing suicide to further his cause in Israel or a kamikaze pilot killing himself to further his cause in World War II. Huntington explains that "Groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from other members of their own civilization." If there ever came a point in time when the Western civilization seemed poised to overtake the Islamic one, how could one state not respond with a nuclear attack? To sit idly by and watch as your civilization is taken over would become the new suicide. Waltz is correct in assuming that states are rational actors, but there are situations in which rational actors might decide to commit suicide to further their cause.

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