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dc.contributor.authorAllswang, Gila
dc.descriptionThe file is restricted for YU community access only.
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we view the profitability of implementing consumer frequency programs through a game theory lens. Our model takes into account consumers with differing values, both for the good being sold and for their time. These customers have the option of seeking out and utilizing coupons, frequency programs, or both in order to save money on the good. However, both of these programs require time, so not all consumers will be willing to take advantage of them. The models conclude that a rational firm will make the decision to implement these programs based on the composition of their target population. Frequency programs and coupons can both be effective profit maximizing strategies for the firm. They are most effective when catered to their specific consumer population, as is depicted in the three models.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipS. Daniel Abraham Honors Programen_US
dc.publisherStern College for Womenen_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States*
dc.subjectConsumer behavior --United States --Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subjectConsumers --United States --Attitudes --Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subjectMarket surveys --United States --Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subjectCustomer loyalty programs --United States --Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subjectCoupons (Retail trade) --United States --Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subjectRetail trade --United States --Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subjectGame theory.en_US
dc.titleThe Cost of Consumer Loyalty: A Game Theory Approach to Frequency Programs and Couponsen_US

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States